1. WHETHER ANY OFFENCE WAS MADE OUT U/S 30 OF THE ARMS ACT?

It is submitted that the no offence can be made out against Mr. Targaryen as he was in
compliance with all the provisions of the Arms Act, 1959. The remedy he seeks from the
High Court of Delhi is that the Court shall quash the Summons, the Charge Sheet and all the
proceedings thereof and the High Court can do the same using its inherent powers u/s 482 of
the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.

1.1. That the High Court has the power to quash the Summons, the Charge sheet and all
proceedings.

1.1.1. It is humbly submitted that it is the duty of every Court to award proper sentence
having regard to the nature of the offence and the manner in which it was executed or
committed, etc. The criminal law adheres in general to the principle of proportionality
in prescribing liability according to the culpability of each kind of criminal conduct.1
1.1.2. It is deferentially submitted that Section 482 of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973
gives the Court an inherent power to quash any criminal proceedings. Court shall
exercise its inherent power to quash proceedings in order to meet ends of justice. 2
Where continuing with the proceeding would be a futility, quashing FIR should not be
refused.3
1.1.3. When the F.I.R. discloses a cognizable offence then the investigation cannot be
stopped and proceedings quashed.4 In this regard, it is submitted that no offence was
found and still the investigation was carried on without any basis as Mr Tagaryen was
in compliance of all the necessary requirements. Quashing of FIR or a complaint in
exercise of inherent powers of the High Court should be limited to very extreme
exceptions.5
1.1.4. This statutory power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. has to be exercised sparingly with
circumspection, in the rarest of rare cases, to do real and substantive justice for the
administration of which alone it exists or to prevent the abuse of process of the court. 6
1
State of Karnataka v. Puttaraja, AIR 2004 SC 433.
2
Gian Singh v. State of Punjab and Anr.(2012) 10 SCC 303.
3
Manoj Sharma v. State & Ors. 2008 (4) CRIMES 359 (SC).
4
Subhas Aggarwal v. State of Bihar, 1989 Cri.. L.J. 1752.
5
Trisuns Chemical Industries v. Rajesh Aggarwa & Ors., AIR 1999 SC 3499.
6
S.D. Ashoka Kumar v. State, 1991 (2) Crimes 276 Mad.
 Complaint or charge-sheet can only be squashed in the rarest of rare exceptional case,
but where the allegations on the face of the complaint do not constitute an offence,
criminal proceedings may be unhesitatingly quashed.7
1.1.5. It is humbly submitted that proceedings against an accused in the initial stages can be
quashed only if on the face of the complaint, no offence is constituted. But an FIR
cannot be quashed under Section 482 Cr.P.C. when allegation in it constitutes an
offence.8
1.1.6. In appropriate case, to prevent judicial process from being an instrument of
oppression or harassment in the hands of frustrated or vindictive litigants, exercise of
inherent power is not only desirable but necessary also, so that the judicial forum of
court may not be allowed to be utilized for any oblique motive. When a person
approaches the High Court on the facts and circumstances of a case has to exercise the
power with circumspection as stated above to really serve the purpose and object for
which they are conferred.9
1.1.7. In Didigam Bikshapathi v. State of Andhra Pradesh 10, the Supreme Court held that
section 482 of Cr PC does not confer any new power on the High Court. It only saves
the inherent power which the Court possessed before the enactment of the Code. It
envisages three circumstances under which the inherent jurisdiction may be exercised,
namely, (i) to give effect to an order under the Code; (ii) to prevent abuse of the
process of Court; (iii) to otherwise secure the ends of justice.
1.1.8. In the landmark case State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal11 a two-judge bench of the
Supreme Court of India considered in detail the provisions of section 482 and the
power of the high court to quash criminal proceedings or FIR. The Supreme Court
summarized the legal position by laying the following guidelines to be followed by
high courts in exercise of their inherent powers to quash a criminal complaint:
1. Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint,
even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not
prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused.

7
Ajeet Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2007 (1) RCR 655 (Allahabad).
8
R.R. Gopal v. Inspector of Police, Madras, 1992 Cri. L.J. N.O.C. 129 (Orissa).
9
S.W. Palanitkar & Ors. v. State of Bihar and Ors., 2002 (1) ALD (Criminal) 108 SC.
10
Didigam Bikshapathi v. State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 2008 SC 527
11
State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal 1992 Supp. (1) SCC 335.
 2. Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence
collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any
offence and make out a case against the accused.
3. Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and
inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach
a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the
accused.
4. Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or
where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for
wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to
private and personal grudge.

1.2. That no offence can be made out Under Section 30 of Arms Act, 1959.
1.2.1. It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble High Court Section 3 of the Arms Act 1959
provides that “No person shall acquire, have in his possession, or carry any firearm
or ammunition unless he holds in this behalf a license issued in accordance with the
provisions of this Act…”.
1.2.2. It is further provided that a person may, without himself holding a licence, carry any
firearm or ammunition in the presence, or under the written authority of the holder of
the licence for repair or for renewal of the licence or for use by such holder. It is a
settled law that it is mandatory to obtain sanction from the District Magistrate even
before the charge-sheet is filed against the accused and that sanction obtained at a
subsequent stage will not cure the defect and the entire proceedings will stand
vitiated.12 The sanction is not intended to be an automatic formality. The sanctioning
authority should apply his minds on the facts alleged before sanction to prosecute in
cases under the Arms Act, 1959 is given. The sanctioning authority is to see whether
on the face of it, there exists a prima facie case for the grant of the sanction.13
1.2.3. In the present case, there is no sanction taken from the District Magistrate before
filing of the charge-sheet againt the Appellant. As the sanction is not present in the
present case, the proceeding against the Appellant is void and impermissive in law.
1.2.4. It is further submitted that the proviso to Article 10 of the act which deals with the
license for import and export of arms holds that “a person who is entitled by virtue of
this Act or any other law for the time being in force to have, or is not prohibited by
12
State v. Koli Nagi, AIR 1952 Sau 82.
13
Gaya Din v. State, AIR 1958 All 39.
 this Act or such other law from having, in his possession any arms or ammunition,
may without a license in this behalf bring into, or take out of, India such arms or
ammunition in reasonable quantities for his own private use”.
1.2.5. It is submitted in the instant matter that the Appellant was having a license for
possession of 500 live cartridges 14 in accordance with the provisions of Section 3 as
stated above and further he also held a special permission from Master of Whisperers
to posses up to 15000 live cartridges. Further since he had the license to possess such
arms, he was also entitled to import and carry them as held by Section 10 of the act.
1.2.6. Further the BCAS (Bureau of Civil Aviation Security of India) Circular provides that
a person has a free allowance of carrying cartridges not exceeding 5015. In the present
case, the Appellant carried only 50 Firearms as are permitted under the law. It is
additionally submitted that the Appellant had declared the possession of the cartridges
at the airline check-in counter. When the goods are voluntarily declared ands are
under the permissible limit of law, the same are not liable for confiscation or levy of
penalty.16
1.2.7. It is submitted that mens rea is an essential ingredient of a criminal offence. The
concept of mens rea by its very name implies a mental element for the commission of
crime and in the simplest way it means an intention to do the forbidden act. 17 It
includes within itself intention, recklessless and sometimes negligence. 18 In many
cases mens rea includes knowledge as well. Knowledge is cognition and intention is
volition; thus both are states of mind of the actor.
1.2.8. A statute may exclude the element of mens rea, but it is a sound rule of construction
adopted in England and also accepted in India to construe a statutory provision
creating an offence in conformity with the common law rather than against it unless
the statute expressly or by necessary implication excluded mens rea. Mens rea by
necessary implication may be excluded from a statute only where it is absolutely
clean, that the implementation of the object of the statute would otherwise be
defeated. The nature of mens rea that would be implied in a statute creating an
offence depends on the object of the Act and the provision thereof.19

14
Factsheet para 1, page 1.
15
Factsheet para 3, page 1.
16
K. R. Ahmed Shaw v. Addl. Collector of Customs, Madras, 1981(8) E.L.T. 153 (Mad.).
17
Glanville Williams, The Mental Element in Crime, Magnes Press, Jurusalem, The Hebrew University, 1945 at
p 10.
18
Jerome Hall, General Principles of Criminal Law, Charles C Thomas, USA, 1960 at pp. 105-145.
19
Nathu Lal v. State of MP, 1965 SCR 870.
1.2.9. In the present case, the Appellant did not have any intention to violate the provisions
of the law. The same can be gathered from the fact that he complied with the
provisions of declaring the number of cartridges carried by him. Further the Appellant
purchased the cartridges to practise as the Appelant is a renowned Sports person.
Thus, it is concluded that the act of the Appellant of carrying and possessing the
cartridges does not fulfill the mnadate of mens rea and hence the Appellant cannot be
held liable for any violation of the provisions of Arms Act, 1959.
1.2.10. Therefore it is submitted that the act of the Appellant of carrying cartridges was
neither in violation of any provision of the Arms Act nor in violation of any provision
of his license and hence he is not liable under Section 30 of the said act.