Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 175380 March 22, 2010

GREGORIO ESPINOZA, in his own personal capacity and as surviving spouse, and JO ANNE G.
ESPINOZA, herein represented by their attorney-in-fact, BEN SANGIL, Petitioners,
vs.
UNITED OVERSEAS BANK Phils. (formerly Westmont Bank), Respondent.

DECISION

CORONA, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari1 of the November 9, 2006 decision2 of the Court of Appeals (CA)
in CA-G.R. SP No. 62250.

On March 24, 1996, Firematic Philippines was granted a credit line by respondent United Overseas Bank
(then known as Westmont Bank). As security, petitioners Gregorio Espinoza and the late Joji Gador
Espinoza (spouses Espinoza) executed a third-party mortgage in favor of respondent over four parcels of
land, one of which was covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 197553 of the Registry of Deeds
of Caloocan City. Through its credit line, Firematic obtained several loans from respondent, as evidenced
by promissory notes and trust receipts.

Due to Firematic’s failure to pay its loans, respondent filed a petition for extrajudicial foreclosure in July
1996 with notary public Eduardo S. Rodriguez in Caloocan City. After complying with the legal
requirements, the property covered by TCT No. 197553 was sold at public auction. Respondent was
awarded the property, being the only bidder in the amount of ₱200,000.3

The certificate of sale was registered with the Register of Deeds of Caloocan City on September 25, 1996.
In July 1998, an affidavit of consolidation of ownership over the property was also registered with the same
office. On July 24, 1998, ownership was consolidated in the name of respondent as evidenced by the
issuance of TCT No. C-328807.

On March 10, 2000, respondent filed an ex parte petition for the issuance of a writ of possession which was
docketed as LRC Case No. C-4233 in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Caloocan City, Branch 124. This
action was opposed by petitioners who moved for the consolidation of the proceedings with Civil Case No.
C-17913 pending before RTC Branch 120 of the same city. Civil Case No. C-17913 was an action for the
nullification of the extra-judicial foreclosure proceedings and certificate of sale of the property subject of
this case.

In an order dated April 18, 2000, RTC Branch 124 granted petitioners’ motion for consolidation and
ordered that LRC Case No. C-4233 be consolidated with Civil Case No. C-17913, provided that the
presiding judge of RTC Branch 120 did not object. Respondent’s motion for reconsideration was denied in
an order dated September 7, 2000.

Respondent then filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus4 in the CA, which was granted. The orders of
RTC Branch 124 dated April 18, 2000 and September 7, 2000, respectively, were reversed and set aside.
The CA adhered to the long-established doctrine that purchasers in a foreclosure sale are entitled, as a
matter of right, to a writ of possession and that any question regarding the regularity and validity of the sale
is to be determined in a separate proceeding. The CA also held that such questions are not to be raised as a
justification for opposing the issuance of the writ of possession, since such proceedings are ex parte.
Hence, the CA directed the issuance of a writ of possession in favor of respondent.

Aggrieved, petitioners filed this petition.

The core issue for resolution is whether a case for the issuance of a writ of possession may be consolidated
with the proceedings for the nullification of extra-judicial foreclosure.

Petitioners contend that peculiar circumstances in the instant case make it an exception from the general
rule on the ministerial duty of courts to issue writs of possession. Given that the issuance of a writ of
possession in this case must be litigated, consolidation with the pending case on the nullification of extra-
judicial foreclosure is mandatory because both proceedings involve the same parties and subject matter.

Respondent, on the other hand, insists that the consolidation of the ex parte petition for the issuance of a
writ of possession with the complaint for nullification of extra-judicial foreclosure of mortgage is highly
improper and irregular because there are no common questions of fact and law between the two cases.
Respondent also argues that any question regarding the validity of the mortgage or foreclosure cannot be a
ground for refusing the issuance of the writ of possession and should, instead, be taken up in the
proceedings for the nullification of the foreclosure.

We rule for respondent.

The order for a writ of possession issues as a matter of course upon the filing of the proper motion and the
approval of the corresponding bond if the redemption period has not yet lapsed.5 If the redemption period
has expired, then the filing of the bond is no longer necessary. Any and all questions regarding the
regularity and validity of the sale is left to be determined in a subsequent proceeding and such questions
may not be raised as a justification for opposing the issuance of a writ of possession.6

In Santiago v. Merchants Rural Bank of Talavera, Inc.,7 we defined the nature of a petition for a writ of
possession:

The proceeding in a petition for a writ of possession is ex parte and summary in nature. It is a judicial
proceeding brought for the benefit of one party only and without notice by the court to any person adverse
of interest. It is a proceeding wherein relief is granted without giving the person against whom the relief is
sought an opportunity to be heard.

By its very nature, an ex parte petition for issuance of a writ of possession is a non-litigious proceeding.8 It
is a judicial proceeding for the enforcement of one's right of possession as purchaser in a foreclosure sale. It
is not an ordinary suit filed in court, by which one party sues another for the enforcement of a wrong or
protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong.9

On the other hand, by its nature, a petition for nullification or annulment of foreclosure proceedings
contests the presumed right of ownership of the buyer in a foreclosure sale and puts in issue such presumed
right of ownership. Thus, a party scheming to defeat the right to a writ of possession of a buyer in a
foreclosure sale who had already consolidated his ownership over the property subject of the foreclosure
sale can simply resort to the subterfuge of filing a petition for nullification of foreclosure proceedings with
motion for consolidation of the petition for issuance of a writ of possession. This we cannot allow as it will
render nugatory the presumed right of ownership, as well as the right of possession, of a buyer in a
foreclosure sale, rights which are supposed to be implemented in an ex parte petition for issuance of a writ
of possession.
Besides, the mere fact that the "presumed right of ownership is contested and made the basis of another
action" does not by itself mean that the proceedings for issuance of a writ of possession will become
groundless. The presumed right of ownership and the right of possession should be respected until and
unless another party successfully rebuts that presumption in an action for nullification of the foreclosure
proceedings. As such, and in connection with the issuance of a writ of possession, the grant of a complaint
for nullification of foreclosure proceedings is a resolutory condition, not a suspensive condition.

Given the foregoing discussion, it is clear that the proceedings for the issuance of a writ of possession
should not be consolidated with the case for the declaration of nullity of a foreclosure sale. The glaring
difference in the nature of the two militates against their consolidation.

The long-standing rule is that proceedings for the issuance of a writ of possession are ex parte and non-
litigious in nature.10 The only exemption from this rule is Active Wood Products Co., Inc. v. Court of
Appeals11 where the consolidation of the proceedings for the issuance of a writ of possession and
nullification of foreclosure proceedings was allowed following the provisions on consolidation in the Rules
of Court. However, the circumstances in this case are substantially distinct from that in Active Wood.
Therefore, the exception granted in that case cannot be applied here.1avvphi1

In Active Wood, the petition for writ of possession was filed before the expiration of the one-year
redemption period12 while, in this case, the petition for writ of possession was filed after the one-year
redemption period had lapsed. Moreover, in Active Wood, title to the litigated property had not been
consolidated in the name of the mortgagee. Therefore, in that case, the mortgagee did not yet have an
absolute right over the property. In De Vera v. Agloro,13 we ruled:

The possession of land becomes an absolute right of the purchaser as confirmed owner. The purchaser can
demand possession at any time following the consolidation of ownership in his name and the issuance to
him of a new transfer certificate of title. After the consolidation of title in the buyer’s name for failure of
the mortgagor to redeem the property, the writ of possession becomes a matter of right.14

In another case involving these two parties, Fernandez and United Overseas Bank Phils. v. Espinoza,15 we
held:

Upon the expiration of the redemption period, the right of the purchaser to the possession of the foreclosed
property becomes absolute. The basis of this right to possession is the purchaser’s ownership of the
property.16

In this case, title to the litigated property had already been consolidated in the name of respondent, making
the issuance of a writ of possession a matter of right. Consequently, the consolidation of the petition for the
issuance of a writ of possession with the proceedings for nullification of foreclosure would be highly
improper. Otherwise, not only will the very purpose of consolidation (which is to avoid unnecessary delay)
be defeated but the procedural matter of consolidation will also adversely affect the substantive right of
possession as an incident of ownership.

Finally, petitions for the issuance of writs of possession, a land registration proceeding, do not fall within
the ambit of the Rules of Court.17 Thus, the rules on consolidation should not be applied.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED.

Costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.
RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice
Chairperson

WE CONCUR:

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice
Chairperson

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision
had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s
Division.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

Footnotes

1
Under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

2
Penned by Associate Justice Celia C. Librea-Leagogo and concurred in by Associate Justices
Rodrigo V. Cosico (retired) and Edgardo F. Sundiam (deceased) of the Sixth Division of the Court
of Appeals. Rollo, pp. 47-15.

3
Subsequently, the spouses Espinoza, their agents and representatives received notice to vacate
the premises. Id., pp. 49.

4
Under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.

5
Maliwat v. Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company, G.R. No. 165971, 3 September 2007, 532
SCRA 124, 128.

6
Id.
 7
G.R. No. 147820, 18 March 2005, 453 SCRA 756, 763-764.

8
Penson v. Maranan, G.R. No. 148630, 20 June 2006, 491 SCRA 396, 407.

9
De Vera v. Agloro, G.R. No. 155673, 14 January 2005, 448 SCRA 203, 213-314.

10
De Gracia v. San Jose, 94 Phil. 623 (1954); Marcelo Steel Corporation, et al. v. Tarin, et al.,
153 Phil 362 (1973); Songco v. The Presiding Judge, CFI of Rizal, et al., 212 Phil. 299; Mirasol v.
Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 67588, 20 June 1988, 162 SCRA 306.

11
G.R. No. 86603, 5 February 1990, 181 SCRA 774. The ruling in Active Wood was reiterated in
Philippine Savings Bank v. Mañalac (G.R. No. 145441, 26 April 2005, 457 SCRA 203).

12
The certificate of sale was registered on December 2, 1983. The petition for writ of possession
was filed on February 14, 1984. Supra note 11 at 776.

13
Supra note 9.

14
Id. at 214.

15
G.R. No. 156421, 14 April 2008.

16
Id. at 149.

17
Rules of Court, Rule 1, Sec. 4. In what cases not applicable. – These Rules shall not apply to
election cases, land registration, cadastral, naturalization and insolvency proceedings, and other
cases not herein provided for, except by analogy or in a suppletory character and whenever
practicable and convenient. (emphasis supplied)