Lecture-9 (Mens Rea & Statutory Crimes) IPC 1861
Lecture-9 (Mens Rea & Statutory Crimes) IPC 1861
Lecture-9 (Mens Rea & Statutory Crimes) IPC 1861
Applica'on
of
the
doctrine
to
statutory
crimes
The
maxim
‘actus
non
facit
reum
nisi
mens
sit
rea’
has
been
applied
to
all
common
law
crimes
in
England
without
any
reservations.
Its
application
to
statutory
offences
was,
however
uncertain
up
to
1947.
Application
of
this
doctrine
to
statutory
crimes
is
fully
discussed
in
two
leading
English
cases,
viz.
R
v.
Prince
(1875)
&
R
v.
Talson
(1889).
15/7/11
Lecture
9
2
R
v.
Prince
(1875)
It
was
held
that
the
prisoner’s
belief
about
the
age
of
the
girl
was
no
defense.
Sixteen
judges
tried
the
case
and
all
but
one
unanimously
held
the
Prince
guilty.
BRETT
J
who
gave
a
dissenting
judgment,
was
of
the
view,
that
in
order
to
constitute
an
offence
mens
rea
is
essential
and
it
was
necessary
for
the
prosecution
to
prove
mens
rea
on
the
part
of
the
accused.
15/7/11
Lecture
9
3
Contd..
BRAMWELL
J.
said
that
in
offences
which
are
legal
wrongs
(malum
prohibitum)
it
is
the
duty
of
the
prosecution
to
establish
mens
rea,
but
in
offences
which
are
malum
in
se
both
moral
as
well
as
legal
harm,
mens
rea
is
presumed
and
it
need
not
be
proved
specifically.
DENMON
J
convicted
the
prince
on
the
ground
that
he
knowingly
committed
a
civil
wrong
by
taking
the
girl
from
the
lawful
custody
of
her
parents.
BLACKBURN
J
took
the
view
that
the
intention
of
the
statute
sufficiently
appeared
to
have
been
to
punish
abduction
irrespective
of
any
knowledge
on
the
part
of
the
accused
about
the
girl’s
age.
The
real
ground
of
conviction,
however,
was
that
the
accused
had
committed
an
act
which
was
forbidden
by
the
statute
and
it
was
not
only
a
legal
wrong
but
also
a
moral
wrong.
15/7/11
Lecture
9
4
R
v.
Talson
(1889)
The
accused
was
tried
under
Section
57
of
the
Offences
Against
The
Person
Act,
1861
for
having
committed
the
offence
of
bigamy.
The
question
before
the
Court
of
Appeal
was
whether
Mrs.
Talson
had
guilty
intention
in
committing
the
offence
of
bigamy.
The
court
by
majority
set
aside
the
conviction
on
the
ground
that
a
bona
fide
belief
about
the
death
of
the
first
husband
at
the
time
of
second
marriage
is
a
good
defense
in
an
offence
of
bigamy.
The
court
also
laid
down
that
the
doctrine
of
mens
rea
would
be
applied
in
statutory
offences
also
unless
the
same
is
ruled
out
by
the
statute
either
expressly
or
by
necessary
implication.
15/7/11
Lecture
9
5
R
v.
Wheat
&
Stock
(1921)
2
KB
119
An
uneducated
man,
believing
in
good
faith
that
his
solicitor
according
to
his
instructions
had
obtained
divorce
from
his
first
wife,
married
another
lady.
He
was
convicted
for
the
offence
of
bigamy
on
the
ground
that
reasonable
belief
about
the
dissolution
of
marriage
is
no
defense
to
the
charge
of
bigamy.
15/7/11
Lecture
9
6
Sherras
v.
De
Rutzen
(1895)
1
QB
918
It
was
held
that
Section
16(2)
of
the
Licensing
Act,
1872
which
prohibits
the
supplying
of
liquor
by
a
licensed
person
to
a
constable
on
duty,
did
not
apply
where
the
licensed
person
bona
fide
believed
that
the
constable
was
off
duty.
WRIGHT
J,
said
:
“
There
is
a
presumption
that
mens
rea,
an
evil
intention,
or
a
knowledge
of
the
wrongfulness
of
the
act,
is
an
essential
ingredient
in
every
offence,
but
that
presumption
is
liable
to
be
displaced
either
by
the
words
of
the
statute
creating
the
offence
or
by
the
subject
matter
with
which
it
deals,
and
both
must
be
considered.”
15/7/11
Lecture
9
7
Mens
rea
and
Indian
Law
Sir
J.D.
Mayne,
Ratanlal
and
Gaur
says
that
the
Doctrine
of
Mens
rea
under
I.P.C.
is
wholly
out
of
place.
The
word
‘mens
rea’
has
no
where
been
used
in
I.P.C.
but
it
has
been
applied
in
two
different
ways:
(a)
While
defining
offences,
words
used
indicate
the
actual
criminal
intent
required
for
the
offence.
The
words,
fraudulently,
dishonestly,
voluntarily
&
intentionally
etc.
used
in
definitions
indicate
the
criminal
intent.
(b)
I.P.C.
contains
a
separate
chapter
on
General
Exceptions
which
indicates
the
circumstances
where
absence
of
criminal
intent
may
be
presumed.
The
doctrine
of
mens
rea
has
been
applied
by
courts
in
India
and
now
it
is
settled
law,
that
‘mens
rea’
is
an
essential
ingredient
of
offence.’
And
this
point
has
been
under
judicial
scrutiny
on
many
occasions.
15/7/11
Lecture
9
8
State
of
Maharashtra
v.
M.H.
George
AIR
1965
SC
722
The
accused
was
prosecuted
by
the
State
for
bringing
into
India
prohibited
quantity
of
gold
in
violation
of
statutory
prohibitions
imposed
u/s.
8
of
FERA,
1947
and
notification
issued
there
under.
Supreme
Court
held
the
accused
liable
and
observed
that,
unless
the
statute
either
clearly
or
by
necessary
implications
rules
out
mens
rea
as
a
constituent
part
of
a
crime,
an
accused
should
not
be
found
guilty,
unless
he
has
got
a
guilty
mind.
15/7/11
Lecture
9
9
Nathulal
v.
State
of
M.P.
AIR
1966
SC
43
The
accused
a
food
grain
dealer,
applied
for
a
license
and
deposited
the
requisite
license
fee.
He
without
the
knowledge
of
rejection
of
his
application
purchased
food
grains
and
sent
returns
to
the
licensing
authority
who
on
checking
found
that
it
was
in
excess
of
the
quantity
permitted
by
Sec.
7
of
M.P.
Food
Grains
Dealers
Licensing
Order,
1958.
The
accused
on
being
prosecuted
was
acquitted
on
the
ground
that
he
had
no
guilty
mind.
15/7/11
Lecture
9
11
Inder
Sain
v.
State
of
Punjab,
(1973)
2
SCC
372
Here,
the
accused
got
a
parcel
of
apples
released
from
the
railways.
On
being
intercepted
by
the
police,
the
parcel
was
found
to
contain
opium
along
with
apples.
He
was
held
guilty.
Section
10
of
the
Opium
Act,
1878
provides
:
“In
prosecutions
under
Sec.
9,
it
shall
be
presumed,
until
the
contrary
is
proved,
that
all
opium
for
which
the
accused
person
is
unable
to
account
satisfactorily
is
the
opium
in
respect
of
which
he
has
committed
an
offence
under
this
Act.”
15/7/11
Lecture
9
12
The
evil
intent
of
the
wrong
doer
is
indicated
by
the
use
of
such
words
as
intentionally,
voluntarily,
fraudulently,
dishonestly,
malignantly,
wantonly,
maliciously
etc.
15/7/11
Lecture
9
13
Voluntarily
Sec.
39
of
IPC
defines
the
word,
‘voluntarily’‐
A
person
is
said
to
cause
an
effect
“voluntarily”
when
he
causes
it
by
means
whereby
he
intended
to
cause
it,
or
by
means
which,
at
the
time
of
employing
those
means,
he
knew
or
had
reason
to
believe
to
be
likely
to
cause
it.
Illustration:
A
sets
fire,
by
night,
to
an
inhabited
house
in
a
large
town,
for
the
purpose
of
facilitating
a
robbery
and
thus
causes
the
death
of
a
person.
Here,
A
may
not
have
intended
to
cause
death;
and
may
even
be
sorry
that
death
has
been
caused
by
his
act;
yet,
if
he
knew
that
he
was
likely
to
cause
death,
he
has
caused
death
voluntarily.