Mercedita de Jesus, Complainant, vs. Atty. Juvy MELL SANCHEZ-MALIT, Respondent

8/13/2020 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 729
A.C. No. 6470. July 8, 2014.*

MERCEDITA DE JESUS, complainant, vs. ATTY. JUVY
MELL SANCHEZ-MALIT, respondent.
Notarial Law; The 2004 Rules on Notarial Law contain no

provision declaring the inadmissibility of documents obtained in
violation thereof.—The 2004 Rules on Notarial Law contain no
provision declaring the inadmissibility of documents obtained in
violation thereof. Thus, the IBP correctly considered in evidence
the other notarized documents submitted by complainant as
additional evidence. Respondent’s argument that the Urgent Ex-
Parte Motion of complainant constitutes a supplemental pleading
must fail as well. As its very name denotes, a supplemental
pleading only serves to bolster or adds something to the primary
pleading. Its usual office is to set up new facts which justify,
enlarge or change the kind of relief with respect to the same
subject matter as the controversy referred to in the original
complaint. Accordingly, it cannot be said that the Urgent Ex-Parte
Motion filed by complainant was a supplemental pleading. One of
her charges against respondent is that the latter notarized
incomplete documents, as shown by the SPAs and lease
agreement attached to the Affidavit-Complaint. Complainant is
not legally barred from submitting additional evidence to
strengthen the basis of her complaint.
Notarized Documents; Notarization converts a private
document into a public document, making it admissible in
evidence with-
_______________
* EN BANC.
273
VOL. 729, JULY 8, 2014 273
De Jesus vs. Sanchez-Malit
out further proof of its authenticity.—The important role a notary

public performs cannot be overemphasized. The Court has
www.central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/00000173e6695f6f684d054b003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False 1/14
repeatedly stressed that notarization is not an empty,

meaningless routinary act, but one invested with substantive
public interest. Notarization converts a private document into a
public document, making it admissible in evidence without
further proof of its authenticity. Thus, a notarized document is, by
law, entitled to full faith and credit upon its face. It is for this
reason that a notary public must observe with utmost care the
basic requirements in the performance of his notarial duties;
otherwise, the public’s confidence in the integrity of a notarized
document would be undermined.
Notary Public; Where the notary public admittedly has
personal knowledge of a false statement or information contained
in the instrument to be notarized, yet proceeds to affix the notarial
seal on it, the Supreme Court (SC) must not hesitate to discipline
the notary public accordingly as the circumstances of the case may
dictate.—Where the notary public admittedly has personal
knowledge of a false statement or information contained in the
instrument to be notarized, yet proceeds to affix the notarial seal
on it, the Court must not hesitate to discipline the notary public
accordingly as the circumstances of the case may dictate.
Otherwise, the integrity and sanctity of the notarization process
may be undermined, and public confidence in notarial documents
diminished. In this case, respondent fully knew that complainant
was not the owner of the mortgaged market stall. That
complainant comprehended the provisions of the real estate
mortgage contract does not make respondent any less guilty. If at
all, it only heightens the latter’s liability for tolerating a wrongful
act. Clearly, respondent’s conduct amounted to a breach of Canon
1 and Rules 1.01 and 1.02 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
Same; A notary public should not notarize a document unless
the persons who signed it are the very same ones who executed it
and who personally appeared before the said notary public to
attest to the contents and truth of what are stated therein.—A
notary public should not notarize a document unless the persons
who signed it are the very same ones who executed it and who
personally appeared before the said notary public to attest to the
contents and truth of what are stated therein. Thus, in
acknowledging that the parties personally came and appeared
before her, respondent also violated
274
274 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Rule 10.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and her oath

as a lawyer that she shall do no falsehood.
Attorneys; Legal Ethics; Disbarment; The rule is that
disbarment is meted out only in clear cases of misconduct that
seriously affect the standing and character of the lawyer as an
officer of the court and the Supreme Court (SC) will not disbar a
lawyer where a lesser penalty will suffice to accomplish the desired
end.—Respondent is unfit to continue enjoying the solemn office
of a notary public. In several instances, the Court did not hesitate
to disbar lawyers who were found to be utterly oblivious to the
solemnity of their oath as notaries public. Even so, the rule is that
disbarment is meted out only in clear cases of misconduct that
seriously affect the standing and character of the lawyer as an
officer of the court and the Court will not disbar a lawyer where a
lesser penalty will suffice to accomplish the desired end. The
blatant disregard by respondent of her basic duties as a notary
public warrants the less severe punishment of suspension from
the practice of law and perpetual disqualification to be
commissioned as a notary public.
ADMINISTRATIVE CASE in the Supreme Court.

Disbarment.
The facts are stated in the resolution of the Court.
Carmelita C. Reyes-Eleazar for respondent.
RESOLUTION
SERENO, CJ.:
Before the Court is a disbarment complaint filed by
Mercedita De Jesus (De Jesus) against respondent Atty.
Juvy Mell Sanchez-Malit (Sanchez-Malit) on the following
grounds: grave misconduct, dishonesty, malpractices, and
unworthiness to become an officer of the Court.
275
VOL. 729, JULY 8, 2014 275

The Facts of the Case

In the Affidavit-Complaint1 filed by complainant before
the Office of the Bar Confidant on 23 June 2004, she
alleged that on 1 March 2002, respondent had drafted and
notarized a Real Estate Mortgage of a public market stall
that falsely named the former as its absolute and
registered owner. As a result, the mortgagee sued
complainant for perjury and for collection of sum of money.
She claimed that respondent was a consultant of the local
government unit of Dinalupihan, Bataan, and was

therefore aware that the market stall was government-
owned.
Prior thereto, respondent had also notarized two
contracts that caused complainant legal and financial
problems. One contract was a lease agreement notarized by
respondent sometime in September 1999 without the
signature of the lessees. However, complainant only found
out that the agreement had not been signed by the lessees
when she lost her copy and she asked for another copy from
respondent. The other contract was a sale agreement over a
property covered by a Certificate of Land Ownership
Award (CLOA) which complainant entered into with a
certain Nicomedes Tala (Tala) on 17 February 1998.
Respondent drafted and notarized said agreement, but did
not advise complainant that the property was still covered
by the period within which it could not be alienated.
In addition to the documents attached to her complaint,
complainant subsequently submitted three Special Powers
of Attorney (SPAs) notarized by respondent and an
Affidavit of Irene Tolentino (Tolentino), complainant’s
secretary/treasurer. The SPAs were not signed by the
principals named therein and bore only the signature of the
named attorney-in-fact,
_______________
1 Rollo, pp. 1-15.
276

Florina B. Limpioso (Limpioso). Tolentino’s Affidavit

corroborated complainant’s allegations against
2
respondent.
On 4 August 2004, the Second Division of the Supreme
Court issued a Resolution requiring respondent to submit
her comment on the Complaint within ten (10) days from
receipt of notice.3
In her Comment,4 respondent explained that the
mortgage contract was prepared in the presence of
complainant and that the latter had read it before affixing
her signature. However, complainant urgently needed the
loan proceeds so the contract was hastily done. It was only
copied from a similar file in respondent’s computer, and the
phrase “absolute and registered owner” was inadvertently
left unedited. Still, it should not be a cause for disciplinary

action, because complainant constructed the subject public
market stall under a “Build Operate and Transfer” contract
with the local government unit and, technically, she could
be considered its owner. Besides, there had been a prior
mortgage contract over the same property in which
complainant was represented as the property’s absolute
owner, but she did not complain. Moreover, the cause of the
perjury charge against complainant was not the
representation of herself as owner of the mortgaged
property, but her guarantee that it was free from all liens
and encumbrances. The perjury charge was even
dismissed, because the prosecutor found that complainant
and her spouse had, indeed, paid the debt secured with the
previous mortgage contract over the same market stall.
With respect to the lease agreement, respondent
countered that the document attached to the Affidavit-
Complaint was actually new. She gave the court’s copy of
the agreement to complainant to accommodate the latter’s
request for an extra copy. Thus, respondent prepared and
notarized a new one,
_______________
2 Id., at pp. 14-29.

3 Id., at p. 30.
4 Id., at pp. 33-69.
277
VOL. 729, JULY 8, 2014 277

relying on complainant’s assurance that the lessees would

sign it and that it would be returned in lieu of the original
copy for the court. Complainant, however, reneged on her
promise.
As regards the purchase agreement of a property
covered by a CLOA, respondent claimed that complainant
was an experienced realty broker and, therefore, needed no
advice on the repercussions of that transaction. Actually,
when the purchase agreement was notarized, complainant
did not present the CLOA, and so the agreement
mentioned nothing about it. Rather, the agreement
expressly stated that the property was the subject of a case
pending before the Department of Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board (DARAB); complainant was thus
notified of the status of the subject property. Finally,
respondent maintained that the SPAs submitted by

complainant as additional evidence were properly
notarized. It can be easily gleaned from the documents that
the attorney-in-fact personally appeared before respondent;
hence, the notarization was limited to the former’s
participation in the execution of the document. Moreover,
the acknowledgment clearly stated that the document must
be notarized in the principal’s place of residence.
An exchange of pleadings ensued after respondent
submitted her Comment. After her rejoinder, complainant
filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for Submission of
Additional Evidence.5 Attached thereto were copies of
documents notarized by respondent, including the
following: (1) an Extrajudicial Deed of Partition which
referred to the SPAs naming Limpioso as attorney-in-fact;
(2) five SPAs that lacked the signatures of either the
principal or the attorney-in-fact; (3) two deeds of sale with
incomplete signatures of the parties thereto; (4) an
unsigned Sworn Statement; (5) a lease contract that lacked
the signature of the lessor; (6) five unsigned Affidavits; (7)
an unsigned insurance claim form (Annual Decla-
_______________
5 Id., at pp. 142-196.
278

ration by the Heirs); (8) an unsigned Invitation Letter to a

potential investor in Japan; (9) an unsigned Bank
Certification; and (10) an unsigned Consent to Adoption.
After the mandatory conference and hearing, the parties
submitted their respective Position Papers.6 Notably,
respondent’s Position Paper did not tackle the additional
documents attached to complainant’s Urgent Ex Parte
Motion.
The Findings of the IBP
In his 15 February 2008 Report, IBP Investigating

Commissioner Leland R. Villadolid, Jr. recommended the
immediate revocation of the Notarial Commission of
respondent and her disqualification as notary public for
two years for her violation of her oath as such by notarizing
documents without the signatures of the parties who had
purportedly appeared before her. He accepted respondent’s

explanations with respect to the lease agreement, sale
contract, and the three SPAs pertaining to Limpioso.
However, he found that the inaccurate crafting of the real
estate mortgage contract was a sufficient basis to hold
respondent liable for violation of Canon 187 and Rule
18.038 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Thus, he also recommended that she be suspended from the
practice of law for six months.9
The IBP Board of Governors, in its Resolution No.
XVIII-2008-245 dated 22 May 2008, unanimously adopted
and approved the Report and Recommendation of the
Investigating
_______________
6 Id., at pp. 256-285; pp. 286-356.

7 Canon 18 — A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and
diligence.
8 Rule 18.03 — A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to
him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him
liable.
9 Id., at p. 381.
279
VOL. 729, JULY 8, 2014 279

Commissioner, with the modification that respondent be

suspended from the practice of law for one year.10
Respondent filed her first Motion for Reconsideration11
and Second Motion for Reconsideration.12 She maintained
that the additional documents submitted by complainant
were inadmissible, as they were obtained without
observing the procedural requisites under Section 4, Rule
VI of Adm. No. 02-08-13 SC (2004 Rules on Notarial
Practice).13 Moreover, the Urgent Ex Parte Motion of
complainant was actually a supplemental pleading, which
was prohibited under the rules of procedure of the
Committee on Bar Discipline; besides, she was not the
proper party to question those documents. Hence, the
investigating commissioner should have expunged the
documents from the records, instead of giving them due
_______________
10 Id., at p. 365.
11 Id., at pp. 382-413.
12 Id., at pp. 495-572.

13 SECTION 4. Inspection, Copying and Disposal.—(a) In the notary’s
presence, any person may inspect an entry in the notarial register,
during regular business hours, provided:
(1) the person’s identity is personally known to the notary public or
proven through competent evidence of identity as defined in these
Rules;
(2) the person affixes a signature and thumb or other mark or other
recognized identifier, in the notarial register in a separate, dated
entry;
(3) the person specifies the month, year, type of instrument or
document, and name of the principal in the notarial act or acts sought;
and
(4) the person is shown only the entry or entries specified by him.
(b) The notarial register may be examined by a law enforcement officer
in the course of an official investigation or by virtue of a court order.
(c) If the notary public has a reasonable ground to believe that a person
has a criminal intent or wrongful motive in requesting information
from the notarial register, the notary shall deny access to any entry or
entries therein.
280

course. Respondent also prayed that mitigating

circumstances be considered, specifically the following:
absence of prior disciplinary record; absence of dishonest or
selfish motive; personal and emotional problems; timely
good faith effort to make restitution or to rectify the
consequences of her misconduct; full and free disclosure to
the disciplinary board or cooperative attitude toward the
proceedings; character or reputation; remorse; and
remoteness of prior offenses.
The IBP Board of Governors, in its Resolution No. XX-
2012-119 dated 10 March 2012, denied respondent’s motion
for reconsideration for lack of substantial reason to justify
a reversal of the IBP’s findings.14
Pursuant to Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court, Director
for Bar Discipline Pura Angelica Y. Santiago — through a
letter addressed to then acting Chief Justice Antonio T.
Carpio — transmitted the documents pertaining to the
disbarment Complaint against respondent.15
The Court’s Ruling
After carefully reviewing the merits of the complaint

against respondent and the parties’ submissions in this
case, the Court hereby modifies the findings of the IBP.
Before going into the substance of the charges against

respondent, the Court shall first dispose of some procedural
matters raised by respondent.
Respondent argues that the additional documents
submitted in evidence by complainant are inadmissible for
having been obtained in violation of Section 4, Rule VI of
the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice. A comparable
argument was raised in Tolentino v. Mendoza,16 in which
the respondent therein opposed the admission of the birth
certificates of his
_______________
14 Rollo, p. 575.
15 Id., at pp. 573-592.
16 483 Phil. 546; 440 SCRA 519 (2004).
281
VOL. 729, JULY 8, 2014 281

illegitimate children as evidence of his grossly immoral

conduct, because those documents were obtained in
violation Rule 24, Administrative Order No. 1, Series of
1993.17 Rejecting his argument, the Court reasoned as
follows:
Section 3, Rule 128 of the Revised Rules on Evidence provides

that “evidence is admissible when it is relevant to the issue and is
not excluded by the law or these rules.” There could be no dispute
that the subject birth certificates are relevant to the issue. The
only question, therefore, is whether the law or the rules provide
for the inadmissibility of said birth certificates allegedly for
having been obtained in violation of Rule 24, Administrative
Order No. 1, Series of 1993.
Note that Rule 24, Administrative Order No. 1,
Series of 1993 only provides for sanctions against persons
violating the rule on confidentiality of birth records, but nowhere
does it state that procurement of birth records in violation of said
rule would render said records inadmissible in evidence. On the
other hand, the Revised Rules of Evidence only provides for the
exclusion of evidence if it is obtained as a result of illegal searches
and seizures. It should be emphasized, however, that said rule
against unreasonable searches and seizures is meant only to
protect a person from interference by the
_______________
17 Rule 24. Non-Disclosure of Birth Records.—

(1) The records of a person’s birth shall be kept strictly confidential and
no information relating thereto shall be issued except on the request of
any of the following:
a. the concerned person himself, or any person authorized by him;
b. the court or proper public official whenever absolutely necessary in
administrative, judicial or other official proceedings to determine the
identity of the child’s parents or other circumstances surrounding his
birth; and
c. in case of the person’s death, the nearest of kin.
(2) Any person violating the prohibition shall suffer the penalty of
imprisonment of at least two months or a fine in an amount not
exceeding five hundred pesos, or both in the discretion of the court.
(Article 7, P.D. No. 603)
282

government or the state. In People vs. Hipol, we explained that:

The Constitutional proscription enshrined in the Bill of Rights
does not concern itself with the relation between a private
individual and another individual. It governs the relationship
between the individual and the State and its agents. The Bill of
Rights only tempers governmental power and protects the
individual against any aggression and unwarranted interference
by any department of government and its agencies. Accordingly, it
cannot be extended to the acts complained of in this case. The
alleged “warrantless search” made by Roque, a co-employee of
appellant at the treasurer’s office, can hardly fall within the
ambit of the constitutional proscription on unwarranted searches
and seizures.
Consequently, in this case where complainants, as private
individuals, obtained the subject birth records as evidence against
respondent, the protection against unreasonable searches and
seizures does not apply.
Since both Rule 24, Administrative Order No. 1, Series of 1993
and the Revised Rules on Evidence do not provide for the
exclusion from evidence of the birth certificates in question, said
public documents are, therefore, admissible and should be
properly taken into consideration in the resolution of this
administrative case against respondent.18
Similarly, the 2004 Rules on Notarial Law contain no

provision declaring the inadmissibility of documents
obtained in violation thereof. Thus, the IBP correctly
considered in evidence the other notarized documents
submitted by complainant as additional evidence.
_______________
18 Supra note 16 at pp. 557-558; pp. 530-531.
283
VOL. 729, JULY 8, 2014 283

Respondent’s argument that the Urgent Ex-Parte

Motion of complainant constitutes a supplemental pleading
must fail as well. As its very name denotes, a supplemental
pleading only serves to bolster or adds something to the
primary pleading. Its usual office is to set up new facts
which justify, enlarge or change the kind of relief with
respect to the same subject matter as the controversy
referred to in the original complaint.19 Accordingly, it
cannot be said that the Urgent Ex-Parte Motion filed by
complainant was a supplemental pleading. One of her
charges against respondent is that the latter notarized
incomplete documents, as shown by the SPAs and lease
agreement attached to the Affidavit-Complaint.
Complainant is not legally barred from submitting
additional evidence to strengthen the basis of her
complaint.
Going now into the substance of the charges against
respondent, the Court finds that she committed misconduct
and grievously violated her oath as a notary public.
The important role a notary public performs cannot be
overemphasized. The Court has repeatedly stressed that
notarization is not an empty, meaningless routinary act,
but one invested with substantive public interest.
Notarization converts a private document into a public
document, making it admissible in evidence without
further proof of its authenticity. Thus, a notarized
document is, by law, entitled to full faith and credit upon
its face. It is for this reason that a notary public must
observe with utmost care the basic requirements in the
performance of his notarial duties; otherwise, the public’s
confidence in the integrity of a notarized document would
be undermined.20
Where the notary public admittedly has personal
knowledge of a false statement or information contained in
the
_______________
19 Planters Development Bank v. LZK Holdings and Development Corp.,

496 Phil. 263; 456 SCRA 366 (2005).
20 Lustestica v. Bernabe, A.C. No. 6258, 24 August 2010, 628 SCRA 613.
284

instrument to be notarized, yet proceeds to affix the

notarial seal on it, the Court must not hesitate to discipline
the notary public accordingly as the circumstances of the
case may dictate. Otherwise, the integrity and sanctity of
the notarization process may be undermined, and public
confidence in notarial documents diminished.21 In this
case, respondent fully knew that complainant was not the
owner of the mortgaged market stall. That complainant
comprehended the provisions of the real estate mortgage
contract does not make respondent any less guilty. If at all,
it only heightens the latter’s liability for tolerating a
wrongful act. Clearly, respondent’s conduct amounted to a
breach of Canon 122 and Rules 1.0123 and 1.0224 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility.
Respondent’s explanation about the unsigned lease
agreement executed by complainant sometime in
September 199925 is incredulous. If, indeed, her file copy of
the agreement bore the lessees’ signatures, she could have
given complainant a certified photocopy thereof. It even
appears that said lease agreement is not a rarity in
respondent’s practice as a notary public. Records show that
on various occasions from 2002 to 2004, respondent has
notarized 22 documents that were either unsigned or
lacking signatures of the parties. Technically, each
document maybe a ground for disciplinary action, for it is
the duty of a notarial officer to demand that a document be
signed in his or her presence.26
_______________
21 Heirs of the Late Spouses Lucas and Francisca Villanueva v. Atty.
Salud P. Beradio, 541 Phil. 17; 512 SCRA 17 (2007).
22 CANON 1 — A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of
the land and promote respect for law and for legal processes.
23 Rule 1.01 — A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct.
24 Rule 1.02 — A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at
defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in the legal system.
25 Rollo, p. 8; Annex “C” of the Affidavit-Complaint.
26 Realino v. Villamor, 176 Phil. 632; 87 SCRA 318 (1978).
285
VOL. 729, JULY 8, 2014 285

A notary public should not notarize a document unless

the persons who signed it are the very same ones who
executed it and who personally appeared before the said
notary public to attest to the contents and truth of what
are stated therein.27 Thus, in acknowledging that the
parties personally came and appeared before her,
respondent also violated Rule 10.0128 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and her oath as a lawyer that
she shall do no falsehood.29
Certainly, respondent is unfit to continue enjoying the
solemn office of a notary public. In several instances, the
Court did not hesitate to disbar lawyers who were found to
be utterly oblivious to the solemnity of their oath as
notaries public.30 Even so, the rule is that disbarment is
meted out only in clear cases of misconduct that seriously
affect the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer
of the court and the Court will not disbar a lawyer where a
lesser penalty will suffice to accomplish the desired end.31
The blatant disregard by respondent of her basic duties as
a notary public warrants the less severe punishment of
suspension from the practice of law and perpetual
disqualification to be commissioned as a notary public.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Juvy Mell Sanchez-
Malit is found guilty of violating Canon 1 and Rules 1.01,
1.02, and 10.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
as well as her oath as notary public. Hence, she is
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for ONE YEAR
effective immediately. Her notarial commission, if still
existing, is IMMEDIATELY
_______________
27 Cabanilla v. Cristal-Tenorio, 461 Phil. 1; 415 SCRA 353 (2003).

28 Rule 10.01 — A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the
doing of any in Court; nor shall he mislead or allow the Court to be
misled by any artifice.
29 Fulgencio v. Atty. Martin, 451 Phil. 275; 403 SCRA 216 (2003).
30 See Lustestica v. Bernabe, supra note 20; Peña v. Paterno, A.C. No.
4191, 10 June 2013, 698 SCRA 1.
31 Bantolo v. Castillon, Jr., 514 Phil. 628; 478 SCRA 443 (2005).
286

REVOKED and she is hereby PERPETUALLY

DISQUALIFIED from being commissioned as a notary
public.
Let copies of this Resolution be entered into the personal
records of respondent as a member of the bar and furnished
to the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines,
and the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts of
the country for their information and guidance.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio, Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-De Castro, Brion, Peralta,

Bersamin, Del Castillo, Villarama, Jr., Perez, Mendoza,
Reyes, Perlas-Bernabe and Leonen, JJ., concur.
Respondent Atty. Juvy Mell Sanchez-Malit suspended

from practice of law for one (1) year for violating Canon 1
and Rules 1.01, 1.02, and 10.01 of Code of Professional
Responsibility as well as her oath as notary public. Her
notarial commission, if still existing, is immediately revoked
and is perpetually disqualified from being commissioned as
a notary public.
Notes.—It is settled that while a notarized document

enjoys the presumption of regularity, the fact that a deed is
notarized is not a guarantee of the validity of its contents;
The presumption of regularity of notarized documents is
not absolute and may be rebutted by clear and convincing
evidence to the contrary. (Manzano, Jr. vs. Garcia, 661
SCRA 350 [2011])
A notary public should not notarize a document unless
the person who signs it is the same person who executed it,
personally appearing before him to attest to the contents
and the truth of what are stated therein. (Isenhardt vs.
Real, 666 SCRA 20 [2012])
——o0o——
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8/13/2020 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 729

A.C. No. 6470. July 8, 2014.*

Notarial Law; The 2004 Rules on Notarial Law contain no

VOL. 729, JULY 8, 2014 273

De Jesus vs. Sanchez-Malit

out further proof of its authenticity.—The important role a notary

repeatedly stressed that notarization is not an empty,

274 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

De Jesus vs. Sanchez-Malit

Rule 10.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and her oath

ADMINISTRATIVE CASE in the Supreme Court.

VOL. 729, JULY 8, 2014 275

The Facts of the Case

government unit of Dinalupihan, Bataan, and was

1 Rollo, pp. 1-15.

276 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Florina B. Limpioso (Limpioso). Tolentino’s Affidavit

left unedited. Still, it should not be a cause for disciplinary

2 Id., at pp. 14-29.

VOL. 729, JULY 8, 2014 277

relying on complainant’s assurance that the lessees would

respondent maintained that the SPAs submitted by

5 Id., at pp. 142-196.

278 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

ration by the Heirs); (8) an unsigned Invitation Letter to a

The Findings of the IBP

In his 15 February 2008 Report, IBP Investigating

purportedly appeared before her. He accepted respondent’s

6 Id., at pp. 256-285; pp. 286-356.

VOL. 729, JULY 8, 2014 279

Commissioner, with the modification that respondent be

12 Id., at pp. 495-572.

280 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

course. Respondent also prayed that mitigating

The Court’s Ruling

After carefully reviewing the merits of the complaint

Before going into the substance of the charges against

VOL. 729, JULY 8, 2014 281

illegitimate children as evidence of his grossly immoral

Section 3, Rule 128 of the Revised Rules on Evidence provides

17 Rule 24. Non-Disclosure of Birth Records.—

282 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

government or the state. In People vs. Hipol, we explained that:

Similarly, the 2004 Rules on Notarial Law contain no

18 Supra note 16 at pp. 557-558; pp. 530-531.

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Respondent’s argument that the Urgent Ex-Parte

19 Planters Development Bank v. LZK Holdings and Development Corp.,

284 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

instrument to be notarized, yet proceeds to affix the

VOL. 729, JULY 8, 2014 285

A notary public should not notarize a document unless

27 Cabanilla v. Cristal-Tenorio, 461 Phil. 1; 415 SCRA 353 (2003).

286 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

REVOKED and she is hereby PERPETUALLY

Carpio, Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-De Castro, Brion, Peralta,

Respondent Atty. Juvy Mell Sanchez-Malit suspended

Notes.—It is settled that while a notarized document

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