Morality

Morality (from Latin: moralitas, lit. 'manner, character, proper

behavior') is the differentiation of intentions, decisions and actions
between those that are distinguished as proper and those that are
improper.[1] Morality can be a body of standards or principles derived
from a code of conduct from a particular philosophy, religion or
culture, or it can derive from a standard that a person believes should
be universal.[2] Morality may also be specifically synonymous with
"goodness" or "rightness".

Moral philosophy includes meta-ethics, which studies abstract issues

such as moral ontology and moral epistemology, and normative
ethics, which studies more concrete systems of moral decision-making
such as deontological ethics and consequentialism. An example of
Allegory with a portrait of a Venetian
normative ethical philosophy is the Golden Rule, which states that:
senator (Allegory of the morality of
"One should treat others as one would like others to treat earthly things), attributed to
oneself."[3][4] Tintoretto, 1585

Immorality is the active opposition to morality (i.e. opposition to that

which is good or right), while amorality is variously defined as an unawareness of, indifference toward, or
disbelief in any particular set of moral standards or principles.[5][6][7]

Contents
Philosophy
Ethics
Descriptive and normative
Realism and anti-realism
Anthropology
Tribal and territorial
In-group and out-group
Comparing cultures
Evolution
Psychology
Moral cognition
Neuroscience
Brain areas
Mirror neurons
Politics
Religion
Positions
Empirical analyses
See also
Notes
References
Further reading
External links

Philosophy

Ethics

Ethics (also known as moral philosophy) is the branch of philosophy

which addresses questions of morality. The word "ethics" is
"commonly used interchangeably with 'morality', and sometimes it is
used more narrowly to mean the moral principles of a particular
tradition, group, or individual."[8] Likewise, certain types of ethical
theories, especially deontological ethics, sometimes distinguish
between ethics and morals: "Although the morality of people and their
ethics amounts to the same thing, there is a usage that restricts
morality to systems such as that of Immanuel Kant, based on notions
such as duty, obligation, and principles of conduct, reserving ethics
for the more Aristotelian approach to practical reasoning, based on the
notion of a virtue, and generally avoiding the separation of 'moral'
considerations from other practical considerations."[9]

Descriptive and normative

In its descriptive sense, "morality" refers to personal or cultural Immanuel Kant introduced the
categorical imperative: "Act only
values, codes of conduct or social mores from a society that provides
according to that maxim whereby
these codes of conduct in which it applies and is accepted by an
you can, at the same time, will that it
individual. It does not connote objective claims of right or wrong, but
should become a universal law."
only refers to that which is considered right or wrong. Descriptive
ethics is the branch of philosophy which studies morality in this
sense.[10]

In its normative sense, "morality" refers to whatever (if anything) is actually right or wrong, which may be
independent of the values or mores held by any particular peoples or cultures. Normative ethics is the branch
of philosophy which studies morality in this sense.[10]

Realism and anti-realism

Philosophical theories on the nature and origins of morality (that is, theories of meta-ethics) are broadly divided
into two classes:

Moral realism is the class of theories which hold that there are true moral statements that report
objective moral facts. For example, while they might concede that forces of social conformity
significantly shape individuals' "moral" decisions, they deny that those cultural norms and
customs define morally right behavior. This may be the philosophical view propounded by
 ethical naturalists, however not all moral realists accept that position (e.g. ethical non-
naturalists).[11]
Moral anti-realism, on the other hand, holds that moral statements either fail or do not even
attempt to report objective moral facts. Instead, they hold that moral sentences are either
categorically false claims of objective moral facts (error theory); claims about subjective
attitudes rather than objective facts (ethical subjectivism); or else not attempts to describe the
world at all but rather something else, like an expression of an emotion or the issuance of a
command (non-cognitivism).

Some forms of non-cognitivism and ethical subjectivism, while considered anti-realist in the robust sense used
here, are considered realist in the sense synonymous with moral universalism. For example, universal
prescriptivism is a universalist form of non-cognitivism which claims that morality is derived from reasoning
about implied imperatives, and divine command theory and ideal observer theory are universalist forms of
ethical subjectivism which claim that morality is derived from the edicts of a god or the hypothetical decrees of
a perfectly rational being, respectively.

Anthropology

Tribal and territorial

Celia Green made a distinction between tribal and territorial morality.[12] She characterizes the latter as
predominantly negative and proscriptive: it defines a person's territory, including his or her property and
dependents, which is not to be damaged or interfered with. Apart from these proscriptions, territorial morality
is permissive, allowing the individual whatever behaviour does not interfere with the territory of another. By
contrast, tribal morality is prescriptive, imposing the norms of the collective on the individual. These norms
will be arbitrary, culturally dependent and 'flexible', whereas territorial morality aims at rules which are
universal and absolute, such as Kant's 'categorical imperative' and Geisler's graded absolutism. Green relates
the development of territorial morality to the rise of the concept of private property, and the ascendancy of
contract over status.

In-group and out-group

Some observers hold that individuals apply distinct sets of moral rules to people depending on their
membership of an "in-group" (the individual and those they believe to be of the same group) or an "out-group"
(people not entitled to be treated according to the same rules). Some biologists, anthropologists and
evolutionary psychologists believe this in-group/out-group discrimination has evolved because it enhances
group survival. This belief has been confirmed by simple computational models of evolution.[13] In
simulations this discrimination can result in both unexpected cooperation towards the in-group and irrational
hostility towards the out-group.[14] Gary R. Johnson and V.S. Falger have argued that nationalism and
patriotism are forms of this in-group/out-group boundary. Jonathan Haidt has noted[15] that experimental
observation indicating an in-group criterion provides one moral foundation substantially used by conservatives,
but far less so by liberals.

In-group preference is also helpful at the individual level for the passing on of one's genes. For example, a
mother who favors her own children more highly than the children of other people will give greater resources
to her children than she will to strangers', thus heightening her children's chances of survival and her own
gene's chances of being perpetuated. Due to this, within a population, there is substantial selection pressure
exerted toward this kind of self-interest, such that eventually, all parents wind up favoring their own children
(the in-group) over other children (the out-group).
Comparing cultures

Peterson and Seligman[16] approach the anthropological view looking across cultures, geo-cultural areas and
across millennia. They conclude that certain virtues have prevailed in all cultures they examined. The major
virtues they identified include wisdom / knowledge; courage; humanity; justice; temperance; and
transcendence. Each of these includes several divisions. For instance humanity includes love, kindness, and
social intelligence.

Still, others theorize that morality is not always absolute, contending that moral issues often differ along
cultural lines. A 2014 PEW research study among several nations illuminates significant cultural differences
among issues commonly related to morality, including divorce, extramarital affairs, homosexuality, gambling,
abortion, alcohol use, contraceptive use, and premarital sex. Each of the 40 countries in this study has a range
of percentages according to what percentage of each country believes the common moral issues are acceptable,
unacceptable, or not moral issues at all. Each percentage regarding the significance of the moral issue varies
greatly on the culture in which the moral issue is presented.[17]

Advocates of a theory known as moral relativism subscribe to the notion that moral virtues are right or wrong
only within the context of a certain standpoint (e.g., cultural community). In other words, what is morally
acceptable in one culture may be taboo in another. They further contend that no moral virtue can objectively be
proven right or wrong [18] Critics of moral relativism point to historical atrocities such as infanticide, slavery,
or genocide as counter arguments, noting the difficulty in accepting these actions simply through cultural
lenses.

Fons Trompenaars, author of Did the Pedestrian Die?, tested members of different cultures with various moral
dilemmas. One of these was whether the driver of a car would have his friend, a passenger riding in the car, lie
in order to protect the driver from the consequences of driving too fast and hitting a pedestrian. Trompenaars
found that different cultures had quite different expectations, from none to definite.[19]

Evolution
The development of modern morality is a process closely tied to sociocultural evolution. Some evolutionary
biologists, particularly sociobiologists, believe that morality is a product of evolutionary forces acting at an
individual level and also at the group level through group selection (although to what degree this actually
occurs is a controversial topic in evolutionary theory). Some sociobiologists contend that the set of behaviors
that constitute morality evolved largely because they provided possible survival or reproductive benefits (i.e.
increased evolutionary success). Humans consequently evolved "pro-social" emotions, such as feelings of
empathy or guilt, in response to these moral behaviors.

On this understanding, moralities are sets of self-perpetuating and biologically driven behaviors which
encourage human cooperation. Biologists contend that all social animals, from ants to elephants, have modified
their behaviors, by restraining immediate selfishness in order to improve their evolutionary fitness. Human
morality, although sophisticated and complex relative to the moralities of other animals, is essentially a natural
phenomenon that evolved to restrict excessive individualism that could undermine a group's cohesion and
thereby reducing the individuals' fitness.[20]

On this view, moral codes are ultimately founded on emotional instincts and intuitions that were selected for in
the past because they aided survival and reproduction (inclusive fitness). Examples: the maternal bond is
selected for because it improves the survival of offspring; the Westermarck effect, where close proximity
during early years reduces mutual sexual attraction, underpins taboos against incest because it decreases the
likelihood of genetically risky behaviour such as inbreeding.
The phenomenon of reciprocity in nature is seen by evolutionary biologists as one way to begin to understand
human morality. Its function is typically to ensure a reliable supply of essential resources, especially for
animals living in a habitat where food quantity or quality fluctuates unpredictably. For example, some vampire
bats fail to feed on prey some nights while others manage to consume a surplus. Bats that did eat will then
regurgitate part of their blood meal to save a conspecific from starvation. Since these animals live in close-knit
groups over many years, an individual can count on other group members to return the favor on nights when it
goes hungry (Wilkinson, 1984)

Marc Bekoff and Jessica Pierce (2009) have argued that morality is a suite of behavioral capacities likely
shared by all mammals living in complex social groups (e.g., wolves, coyotes, elephants, dolphins, rats,
chimpanzees). They define morality as "a suite of interrelated other-regarding behaviors that cultivate and
regulate complex interactions within social groups." This suite of behaviors includes empathy, reciprocity,
altruism, cooperation, and a sense of fairness.[21] In related work, it has been convincingly demonstrated that
chimpanzees show empathy for each other in a wide variety of contexts.[22] They also possess the ability to
engage in deception, and a level of social politics[23] prototypical of our own tendencies for gossip and
reputation management.

Christopher Boehm (1982)[24] has hypothesized that the incremental development of moral complexity
throughout hominid evolution was due to the increasing need to avoid disputes and injuries in moving to open
savanna and developing stone weapons. Other theories are that increasing complexity was simply a correlate
of increasing group size and brain size, and in particular the development of theory of mind abilities.

Psychology
In modern moral psychology, morality is considered to change
through personal development. A number of psychologists have
produced theories on the development of morals, usually going
through stages of different morals. Lawrence Kohlberg, Jean Piaget,
and Elliot Turiel have cognitive-developmental approaches to moral
development; to these theorists morality forms in a series of
constructive stages or domains. In the Ethics of care approach
established by Carol Gilligan, moral development occurs in the
context of caring, mutually responsive relationships which are based
on interdependence, particularly in parenting but also in social
relationships generally.[25] Social psychologists such as Martin
Hoffman and Jonathan Haidt emphasize social and emotional
development based on biology, such as empathy. Moral identity
theorists, such as William Damon and Mordechai Nisan, see moral
commitment as arising from the development of a self-identity that is
defined by moral purposes: this moral self-identity leads to a sense of
responsibility to pursue such purposes. Of historical interest in
psychology are the theories of psychoanalysts such as Sigmund
Kohlberg's model of moral
Freud, who believe that moral development is the product of aspects
development
of the super-ego as guilt-shame avoidance.

Because we are naturally prone to be empathic and moral, we have a

sense of responsibility to pursue moral purposes,[26][27] we still, at least occasionally, engage in immoral
behavior. Such behaviors jeopardize our moral self-image; however, when we engage in immoral behaviors
we still feel as though we are moral individuals. Moral self-licensing attempts to explain this phenomenon and
proposes that self-image security increases our likelihood to engage in immoral behavior. When our moral self-
image is threatened, we can gain confidence from our past moral behavior. The more confident we are, the less
we will worry about our future behavior which actually increases the likelihood that we will engage in
immoral behaviors.[28][29] Monin and Miller (2001)[28] examined the moral self-licensing effect and found
that when participants established credentials as non-prejudiced persons, they were more willing to express
politically incorrect opinions despite the fact that the audience was unaware of their credentials.

As an alternative to viewing morality as an individual trait, some sociologists as well as social- and discursive
psychologists have taken upon themselves to study the in-vivo aspects of morality by examining how persons
conduct themselves in social interaction.[30][31][32][33]

Moral cognition

Moral cognition refers to cognitive processes that allow a person to act or decide in morally permissible ways.
It consists of several domain-general cognitive processes, ranging from perception of a morally salient stimulus
to reasoning when faced with a moral dilemma. While it's important to mention that there is not a single
cognitive faculty dedicated exclusively to moral cognition,[34][35] characterizing the contributions of domain-
general processes to moral behavior is a critical scientific endeavor to understand how morality works and how
it can be improved.[36]

Cognitive psychologists and neuroscientists investigate the inputs to these cognitive processes and their
interactions, as well as how these contribute to moral behavior by running controlled experiments.[37] In these
experiments putatively moral versus nonmoral stimuli are compared to each other, while controlling for other
variables such as content or working memory load. Often, the differential neural response to specifically moral
statements or scenes, are examined using functional neuroimaging experiments.

Critically, the specific cognitive processes that are involved depend on the prototypical situation that a person
encounters.[38] For instance, while situations that require an active decision on a moral dilemma may require
active reasoning, an immediate reaction to a shocking moral violation may involve quick, affect-laden
processes. Nonetheless certain cognitive skills such as being able to attribute mental states—beliefs, intents,
desires, emotions to oneself, and to others is a common feature of a broad range of prototypical situations. In
line with this, a meta-analysis found overlapping activity between moral emotion and moral reasoning tasks,
suggesting a shared neural network for both tasks.[39] The results of this meta-analysis, however, also
demonstrated that the processing of moral input is affected by task demands.

It has been recently found that moral judgment consists in concurrent evaluations of three different components
that align with precepts from three dominant moral theories (virtue ethics, deontology, and consequentialism):
the character of a person (Agent-component, A); their actions (Deed-component, D); and the consequences
brought about in the situation (Consequences-component, C).[40] This, implies that various inputs of the
situation a person encounters affect moral cognition.

Neuroscience

The brain areas that are consistently involved when humans reason about moral issues have been investigated
by multiple quantitative large-scale meta-analyses of the brain activity changes reported in the moral
neuroscience literature.[41][39][42][43] The neural network underlying moral decisions overlaps with the
network pertaining to representing others' intentions (i.e., theory of mind) and the network pertaining to
representing others' (vicariously experienced) emotional states (i.e., empathy). This supports the notion that
moral reasoning is related to both seeing things from other persons' points of view and to grasping others'
feelings. These results provide evidence that the neural network underlying moral decisions is probably
domain-global (i.e., there might be no such things as a "moral module" in the human brain) and might be
dissociable into cognitive and affective sub-systems.[41]
Brain areas

An essential, shared component of moral judgment involves the capacity to detect morally salient content
within a given social context. Recent research implicated the salience network in this initial detection of moral
content.[44] The salience network responds to behaviorally salient events [45] and may be critical to modulate
downstream default and frontal control network interactions in the service of complex moral reasoning and
decision-making processes.

The explicit making of moral right and wrong judgments coincides with activation in the ventromedial
prefrontal cortex (VMPC) while intuitive reactions to situations containing implicit moral issues activates the
temporoparietal junction area.[46][44]

Stimulation of the VMPC by transcranial magnetic stimulation, has been shown to inhibit the ability of human
subjects to take into account intent when forming a moral judgment. According to this investigation, TMS did
not disrupt participants' ability to make any moral judgment. On the contrary, moral judgments of intentional
harms and non-harms were unaffected by TMS to either the RTPJ or the control site; presumably, however,
people typically make moral judgments of intentional harms by considering not only the action's harmful
outcome but the agent's intentions and beliefs. So why were moral judgments of intentional harms not affected
by TMS to the RTPJ? One possibility is that moral judgments typically reflect a weighted function of any
morally relevant information that is available at the time. On the basis of this view, when information
concerning the agent's belief is unavailable or degraded, the resulting moral judgment simply reflects a higher
weighting of other morally relevant factors (e.g., outcome). Alternatively, following TMS to the RTPJ, moral
judgments might be made via an abnormal processing route that does not take belief into account. On either
account, when belief information is degraded or unavailable, moral judgments are shifted toward other morally
relevant factors (e.g., outcome). For intentional harms and non-harms, however, the outcome suggests the
same moral judgment as the intention. Thus, the researchers suggest that TMS to the RTPJ disrupted the
processing of negative beliefs for both intentional harms and attempted harms, but the current design allowed
the investigators to detect this effect only in the case of attempted harms, in which the neutral outcomes did not
afford harsh moral judgments on their own.[47]

Similarly VMPC-impaired persons will judge an action purely on its outcome and are unable to take into
account the intent of that action.[48]

Mirror neurons

Mirror neurons are neurons in the brain that fire when another person is observed doing a certain action. The
neurons fire in imitation of the action being observed, causing the same muscles to act minutely in the observer
as are acting grossly in the person actually performing the action. Research on mirror neurons, since their
discovery in 1996,[49] suggests that they may have a role to play not only in action understanding, but also in
emotion sharing empathy. Cognitive neuroscientist Jean Decety thinks that the ability to recognize and
vicariously experience what another individual is undergoing was a key step forward in the evolution of social
behavior, and ultimately, morality.[50] The inability to feel empathy is one of the defining characteristics of
psychopathy, and this would appear to lend support to Decety's view.[51][52]

Politics
If morality is the answer to the question 'how ought we to live' at the individual level, politics can be seen as
addressing the same question at the social level, though the political sphere raises additional problems and
challenges.[53] It is therefore unsurprising that evidence has been found of a relationship between attitudes in
morality and politics. Moral foundations theory, authored by Jonathan Haidt and colleagues,[54][55] has been
used to study the differences between liberals and conservatives, in this regard.[15][56][57] Haidt found that
Americans who identified as liberals tended to value care and fairness higher than loyalty, respect and purity.
Self-identified conservative Americans valued care and fairness less and the remaining three values more. Both
groups gave care the highest over-all weighting, but conservatives valued fairness the lowest, whereas liberals
valued purity the lowest. Haidt also hypothesizes that the origin of this division in the United States can be
traced to geo-historical factors, with conservatism strongest in closely knit, ethnically homogenous
communities, in contrast to port-cities, where the cultural mix is greater, thus requiring more liberalism.

Group morality develops from shared concepts and beliefs and is often codified to regulate behavior within a
culture or community. Various defined actions come to be called moral or immoral. Individuals who choose
moral action are popularly held to possess "moral fiber", whereas those who indulge in immoral behavior may
be labeled as socially degenerate. The continued existence of a group may depend on widespread conformity
to codes of morality; an inability to adjust moral codes in response to new challenges is sometimes credited
with the demise of a community (a positive example would be the function of Cistercian reform in reviving
monasticism; a negative example would be the role of the Dowager Empress in the subjugation of China to
European interests). Within nationalist movements, there has been some tendency to feel that a nation will not
survive or prosper without acknowledging one common morality, regardless of its content. Political Morality is
also relevant to the behavior internationally of national governments, and to the support they receive from their
host population. The Sentience Institute, co-founded by Jacy Reese Anthis, analyzes the trajectory of moral
progress in society via the framework of an expanding moral circle.[58] Noam Chomsky states that[59][60]

... if we adopt the principle of universality : if an action is right (or wrong) for others, it is right (or
wrong) for us. Those who do not rise to the minimal moral level of applying to themselves the
standards they apply to others—more stringent ones, in fact—plainly cannot be taken seriously
when they speak of appropriateness of response; or of right and wrong, good and evil. In fact,
one of the, maybe the most, elementary of moral principles is that of universality, that is, If
something's right for me, it's right for you; if it's wrong for you, it's wrong for me. Any moral
code that is even worth looking at has that at its core somehow.

Religion
Religion and morality are not synonymous. Morality does not depend upon religion although for some this is
"an almost automatic assumption".[61] According to The Westminster Dictionary of Christian Ethics, religion
and morality "are to be defined differently and have no definitional connections with each other. Conceptually
and in principle, morality and a religious value system are two distinct kinds of value systems or action
guides."[62]

Positions

Within the wide range of moral traditions, religious value systems co-exist with contemporary secular
frameworks such as consequentialism, freethought, humanism, utilitarianism, and others. There are many types
of religious value systems. Modern monotheistic religions, such as Islam, Judaism, Christianity, and to a
certain degree others such as Sikhism and Zoroastrianism, define right and wrong by the laws and rules set
forth by their respective scriptures and as interpreted by religious leaders within the respective faith. Other
religions spanning pantheistic to nontheistic tend to be less absolute. For example, within Buddhism, the
intention of the individual and the circumstances should be accounted for to determine if an action is right or
wrong.[63] A further disparity between the values of religious traditions is pointed out by Barbara Stoler
Miller, who states that, in Hinduism, "practically, right and wrong are decided according to the categories of
social rank, kinship, and stages of life. For modern Westerners, who have been raised on ideals of universality
and egalitarianism, this relativity of values and obligations is the aspect of Hinduism most difficult to
understand".[64]

Religions provide different ways of dealing with moral dilemmas. For example, there is no absolute
prohibition on killing in Hinduism, which recognizes that it "may be inevitable and indeed necessary" in
certain circumstances.[65] In monotheistic traditions, certain acts are viewed in more absolute terms, such as
abortion or divorce.[a] Religion is not always positively associated with morality. Philosopher David Hume
stated that, "the greatest crimes have been found, in many instances, to be compatible with a superstitious piety
and devotion; Hence it is justly regarded as unsafe to draw any inference in favor of a man's morals, from the
fervor or strictness of his religious exercises, even though he himself believe them sincere."[66]

Religious value systems can diverge from commonly held contemporary moral positions, such as those on
murder, mass atrocities, and slavery. For example, Simon Blackburn states that "apologists for Hinduism
defend or explain away its involvement with the caste system, and apologists for Islam defend or explain away
its harsh penal code or its attitude to women and infidels".[67] In regard to Christianity, he states that the "Bible
can be read as giving us a carte blanche for harsh attitudes to children, the mentally handicapped, animals, the
environment, the divorced, unbelievers, people with various sexual habits, and elderly women",[68] and notes
morally suspect themes in the Bible's New Testament as well.[69][e] Christian apologists address Blackburn's
viewpoints[70] and construe that Jewish laws in the Hebrew Bible showed the evolution of moral standards
towards protecting the vulnerable, imposing a death penalty on those pursuing slavery and treating slaves as
persons and not property.[71] Elizabeth Anderson holds that "the Bible contains both good and evil teachings",
and it is "morally inconsistent".[72] Humanists like Paul Kurtz believe that we can identify moral values across
cultures, even if we do not appeal to a supernatural or universalist understanding of principles - values
including integrity, trustworthiness, benevolence, and fairness. These values can be resources for finding
common ground between believers and nonbelievers.[73]

Empirical analyses

A number of studies have been conducted on the empirics of morality in various countries, and the overall
relationship between faith and crime is unclear.[b] A 2001 review of studies on this topic found "The existing
evidence surrounding the effect of religion on crime is varied, contested, and inconclusive, and currently no
persuasive answer exists as to the empirical relationship between religion and crime."[74] Phil Zuckerman's
2008 book, Society without God, based on studies conducted during a 14-month period in Scandinavia in
2005–2006, notes that Denmark and Sweden, "which are probably the least religious countries in the world,
and possibly in the history of the world", enjoy "among the lowest violent crime rates in the world [and] the
lowest levels of corruption in the world".[75][c]

Dozens of studies have been conducted on this topic since the twentieth century. A 2005 study by Gregory S.
Paul published in the Journal of Religion and Society stated that, "In general, higher rates of belief in and
worship of a creator correlate with higher rates of homicide, juvenile and early adult mortality, STD infection
rates, teen pregnancy, and abortion in the prosperous democracies," and "In all secular developing
democracies a centuries long-term trend has seen homicide rates drop to historical lows" with the exceptions
being the United States (with a high religiosity level) and "theistic" Portugal.[76][d] In a response, Gary Jensen
builds on and refines Paul's study.[77] His conclusion is that a "complex relationship" exists between religiosity
and homicide "with some dimensions of religiosity encouraging homicide and other dimensions discouraging
it". In April 2012, the results of a study which tested their subjects' pro-social sentiments were published in the
Social Psychological and Personality Science journal in which non-religious people had higher scores
showing that they were more inclined to show generosity in random acts of kindness, such as lending their
possessions and offering a seat on a crowded bus or train. Religious people also had lower scores when it
came to seeing how much compassion motivated participants to be charitable in other ways, such as in giving
money or food to a homeless person and to non-believers.[78][79]

See also
Applied ethics
Appeal to tradition
Buddhist ethics
Christian ethics
Emotional intelligence
Ethical dilemma
Good and evil
Ideology
Index of ethics articles
Islamic ethics
Moral agency
Moral character
Moral intelligence
Moral panic
Moral skepticism
Outline of ethics
Value theory
Worldview

Notes
a.^ Studies on divorce in the United States done by the Barna Group suggested that atheists
and agnostics have lower divorce rates than faith groups on average (though some faith
groups had lower rates still).[80][81] The study notes that fewer atheists and agnostics enter
into marriage relative to faith-based individuals.
b.^ Some studies appear to show positive links in the relationship between religiosity and
moral behavior[82][83][84] Modern research in criminology also suggests an inverse
relationship between religion and crime,[85] with some studies establishing this
connection.[86] A meta-analysis of 60 studies on religion and crime concluded, "religious
behaviors and beliefs exert a moderate deterrent effect on individuals' criminal behavior".[74]
c.^ Zuckerman identifies that Scandinavians have "relatively high rates of petty crime and
burglary", but "their overall rates of violent crime—such as murder, aggravated assault, and
rape—are among the lowest on earth" (Zuckerman 2008, pp. 5–6).
d.^ The authors also state that "A few hundred years ago rates of homicide were
astronomical in Christian Europe and the American colonies,"[87] and "the least theistic
secular developing democracies such as Japan, France, and Scandinavia have been most
successful in these regards."[88] They argue for a positive correlation between the degree of
public religiosity in a society and certain measures of dysfunction,[89] an analysis published
later in the same journal argues that a number of methodological problems undermine any
findings or conclusions in the research.[90]
 e.^ Blackburn provides examples such as the phrase in Exodus 22:18 that has "helped to
burn alive tens or hundreds of thousands of women in Europe and America": "Thou shalt not
suffer a witch to live," and notes that the Old Testament God apparently has "no problems
with a slave-owning society", considers birth control a crime punishable by death, and "is
keen on child abuse".[91] Others interpret these passages differently, arguing for example that
Jewish laws show the evolution of moral standards in society: that Jews actually threatened
those who pursued forced slavery with the death penalty, held that slaves were persons
instead of property, and protected them in several ways.[70][71][92]

References
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s/morality-definition/). Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford University. Retrieved
22 March 2014.
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association with The MacMillan Press. p. 134. ISBN 9780333262047. "The maxim 'Treat others
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Further reading
Churchland, Patricia Smith (2011). Braintrust : What Neuroscience Tells Us about Morality (http
s://books.google.com/books?id=tLsIzyFR08IC). Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University
Press. ISBN 978-0-691-13703-2. (Reviewed in The Montreal Review (http://www.themontrealre
view.com/2009/What-neuroscience-tells-us-about-morality.php))
Richard Dawkins, "The roots of morality: why are we good?", in The God Delusion, Black
Swan, 2007 (ISBN 978-0-552-77429-1).
Harris, Sam (2010). The Moral Landscape: How Science Can Determine Human Values. New
York: Free Press. ISBN 978-1-4391-7121-9.
Lunn, Arnold, and Garth Lean (1964). The New Morality. London: Blandford Press.
John Newton, Complete Conduct Principles for the 21st Century, 2000. ISBN 0967370574.
Prinz, Jesse (Jan–Feb 2013). "Morality is a Culturally Conditioned Response" (http://philosoph
ynow.org/issues/82/Morality_is_a_Culturally_Conditioned_Response). Philosophy Now.
Stace, Walter Terence (1937). The Concept of Morals (https://archive.org/details/conceptofmora
ls029360mbp). New York: The MacMillan Company; Reprinted 1975 by permission of
Macmillan Publishing Co. Inc., and also reprinted by Peter Smith Publisher Inc, January 1990.
ISBN 978-0-8446-2990-2.
Trompenaars, Fons (2003). Did the Pedestrian Die?: Insights from the World's Greatest Culture
Guru (https://books.google.com/books?id=BAYKAQAAMAAJ). Oxford: Capstone. ISBN 978-1-
84112-436-0.
Yandell, Keith E. (1973). God, man, and religion: readings in the philosophy of religion (https://a
rchive.org/details/godmanreligionre0000yand). McGraw-Hill. containing articles by Paterson
Brown:
"Religious Morality" (https://web.archive.org/web/20101227173500/http://metalog.org/files/t
pb/rel.m.html), (from Mind, 1963).
 "Religious Morality: a Reply to Flew and Campbell" (https://web.archive.org/web/20101227
180203/http://metalog.org/files/tpb/reply.html), (from Mind, 1964).
"God and the Good" (https://web.archive.org/web/20101125212955/http://metalog.org/files/t
pb/god.g.html), (from Religious Studies, 1967).
Ashley Welch, "Virtuous behaviors sanction later sins: people are quick to treat themselves
after a good deed or healthy act" (http://www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id=license-to-si
n) March 4, 2012.
Roberto Andorno, "Do our moral judgements need to be guided by principles?" (https://www.ac
ademia.edu/1488903/Do_our_moral_judgements_need_to_be_guided_by_principles)
Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics, 2012, 21(4), 457–65.

External links
The Definition of Morality (https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/morality-definition/), Stanford
Encyclopedia of Philosophy
Boston College's Morality Lab (http://moralitylab.bc.edu/publications/)
Morality and Judaism (http://www.chabad.org/search/keyword.asp?kid=1222), chabad.org
"The Moral Instinct" (https://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/13/magazine/13Psychology-t.html?pag
ewanted=print) by Steven Pinker, The New York Times, 13 January 2008

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