Chapter Outline: Chapter 8: Business Crisis and Continuity Management and Planning
Chapter Outline: Chapter 8: Business Crisis and Continuity Management and Planning
Chapter Outline: Chapter 8: Business Crisis and Continuity Management and Planning
Chapter Outline
Introduction
All organizations from all sectors (public, private and not-for-profit) face the possibility
of disruptive events that have impacts ranging from mere inconvenience and short-lived
disruption of normal operations to the very destruction of the organization.
Organizational functions supporting business1 disruption prevention, preparedness,
response and recovery such as risk management, contingency planning, crisis
management, emergency response, and business resumption and recovery are thus
1
The term business refers to any organization in any sector (public, private, or not-for-profit) that provides
a product or service to its customers.
1
established and resourced based upon the organization’s perception of its relevant
environments and the risks within those environments.
Unlike public sector emergency management, which is a primary function at all levels of
government, Business Crisis and Continuity Management (the term Business Crisis and
Continuity Management [BCCM] will be defined in the next section] remains largely a
supporting project or program that is discretionary except in highly regulated industries
such as healthcare2 and banking3 where BCCM related requirements and standards have
been established. The preparations for Y2K and the impacts of the 9/11 attacks have
provided some impedance for the more widespread recognition and acceptance of BCCM
as a strategic function and have resulted in the development of voluntary BCCM
standards/guidelines across the private sector and not-for-profit sectors such as National
Fire Protection Association (NFPA) 1600 Standard on Disaster/Emergency Management
and Business Continuity Programs4 and the ASIS International Business Continuity
Guideline.5
Despite these recent advances in BCCM, resources required to develop an ongoing and
robust program still compete with other organizational priorities which may result in a
less than optimal program with functional deficiencies, poor integration and dispersed
authority and responsibility. Witness the August 2005 study Disaster Planning in the
Private Sector: A Look at the State of Business Continuity in the U.S. conducted by the
International Association of Emergency Managers and AT&T. 6 This study found that
business continuity planning is not a high priority at four in ten companies surveyed and
that almost one third of the companies have no business continuity plans. The reasons for
this low priority may extend beyond resource considerations to a lack of understanding of
what actually comprises a comprehensive BCCM program. A functional framework for
BCCM, displaying the component functions and their relationships to one another is
provided in this chapter and is intended to be simple enough to be understandable at all
levels of the organization, yet complete enough to identify and support the need for the
various functions and their integration. This functional BCCM framework should be
considered in the context of the case studies presented in this chapter.
The hybrid term business crisis and continuity has been introduced as a title for an
enterprise wide strategic program and process. It is necessary to include a brief
2
JCHAO Standard EC.4.10 Emergency Management
3
U. S. Securities and Exchange Commission. Interagency Paper on Sound Practices to Strengthen the
Resilience of the U.S. Financial System http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/34-47638.htm. Last accessed
08/26/06
4
NFPA 1600 Standard on Disaster/Emergency Management and Business Continuity Programs.
www.nfpa.org/PDF/nfpa1600.pdf?src=nfpa. Last accessed 08/26/05
5
ASIS International Web Site. Business Continuity Guideline: A Practical Approach for Emergency
Preparedness, Crisis Management, and Disaster Recovery (2005),
http://www.asisonline.org/guidelines/guidelines.htm. Last accessed August 9, 2005.
6
Disaster Planning in the Private Sector: A Look at the State of Business Continuity in the U.S.2005.
http://www.att.com/presskit/_business_continuity.
2
discussion of the creation and choice of this term since much of the current literature and
business practices use the individual terms crisis management or business continuity
management separately and often interchangeably while recognizing that they work
together to support overall business enterprise management. The Business Continuity
Institute’s Business Continuity Management: Good Practices Guidelines (Smith, 2002)
and the Standards Australia draft Business Continuity Handbook (Standards Australia
2003) use the term Business Continuity Management as a unifying process and the
umbrella under which multiple supporting functions, including crisis management and
business continuity operate and integrate. United States based organizations such as
Disaster Recovery Institute International (DRII 2004), ASIS International (ASIS 2004),
and the Association of Contingency Planners (ACP 2004) also use the term Business
Continuity Management or Business Continuity Planning as an umbrella with crisis
management as an essential component. Noted experts such as Ian Mitroff (Mitroff and
Pauchant 1992) and Stephen Fink (Fink 1986) use crisis management as their umbrella
term with business continuity as one of many supporting functions.
Despite the difference in terminology, there is little debate in the business continuity and
crisis management literature that crisis management, business continuity management,
and their supporting functions need to be thoroughly integrated in support of overall
business enterprise management. Business Continuity Management: Good Practices
Guidelines explains the inconsistency in terminology by stating “Crisis Management and
BCM (Business Continuity Management) are not seen as mutually exclusive albeit that
they can of necessity stand alone based on the type of event. It is fully recognized that
they are two elements in an overall business continuity process and frequently one is not
found without the other.” (Smith 2002)
Thus, in an attempt to emphasize the inter relatedness and equal importance of crisis
management and business continuity management, Business Crisis and Continuity
Management has been chosen as the umbrella term for this proposed research study and
is defined as:
The reality of business is that increasing and dynamic natural, technological and human
induced threats, business complexity, government regulation, corporate governance
requirements, and media and public scrutiny demand a comprehensive and integrated
approach to BCCM. Classic natural, technological and human induced events such as
Hurricane Andrew (1992), the Northridge Earthquake (1994), the Exxon Valdez oil spill
(1989), the Bhopal chemical release (1984), the World Trade Center attack of 1993, and
3
the Tylenol poisoning case (1982) have provided lessons learned that emphasize each of
these factors and the need for coordination and cooperation within and between
organizations, and between all levels of government, the private and not-for-profit
sectors. The tragic events of September 11th, 2001 and the implications for businesses
directly and indirectly impacted by the physical events further reinforce the need for
enterprise wide recognition and coordination of the multiple functions supporting BCCM.
Figure 1
Business Continuity Planning Steps
Figure 2
Disaster Recovery Institute International Professional Practices for
Business Continuity Professionals
7
Wold, Goeffrey. Disaster Recovery Planning Process. Disaster Recovery Journal. 1992.
http://www.drj.com/new2dr/w2_002.htm.
8
Disaster Recovery Institute International Professional Practices for Business Continuity Professionals.
2005. http://www.drii.org.
4
6. Developing and Implementing Business Continuity
Plans
7. Awareness and training Programs
8. Exercising and Maintaining Business continuity Plans
9. Crisis communications
10. Coordination with External Agencies
5
There is no argument that these are necessary steps/elements, however a mere listing falls
short of emphasizing the inter relationships and temporal nature of the functions that
comprise a comprehensive and ongoing program and the establishment of widely
accepted standards. In the aftermath of 9/11, there have been several initiatives to define
and communicate such standards.
Figure 3
NFPA 1600 2004 Edition Disaster/Emergency Management and Business Continuity
Programs Elements
1. General
2. Law and Authorities
3. Hazard Identification, Risk Assessment and Impact
Analysis
4. Hazard Mitigation
5. Resource Management
6. Mutual Aid
7. Planning
8. Direction, Control and Coordination
9. Communications and Warning
10. Operations and Procedures
11. Logistics and Facilities
12. Training
13. Exercises, Evaluations, and Corrective Actions
14. Crisis Communication and Public Information
15. Finance and administration
9
NFPA 1600 Standard on Disaster/Emergency Management and Business Continuity Programs 2004
Edition. Quincy, MA. 2004
10
9/11 Commission Report. U. S. Government Printing Office. Washington, DC. 2004.
11
United States Government. Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004. Section 7305.
Private Sector Preparedness. Washington, DC. 2005.
6
Complementing the NFPA Standard, ASIS International, a preeminent organization not-
for-profit organization dedicated to increasing the effectiveness and productivity of
security professionals published its ‘all sector’ Business Continuity Guideline 12document
which provides a generic planning guide applicable to any organization. The Guideline
makes the following statement which places the importance of the Business
Continuity/Continuity of Operations process in the context of organizational survival and
success:
The ASIS Business Continuity Guideline does provide a functional framework (figure 4)
which provides a means of visualizing some BCCM functions, but falls short of
providing a level of detail necessary to capture and explain the totality of a
comprehensive program.
Figure 10
ASIS Business Continuity Framework
12
ASIS International Web Site. Business Continuity Guideline: A Practical Approach for Emergency
Preparedness, Crisis Management, and Disaster Recovery.
http://www.asisonline.org/guidelines/guidelines.htm
7
A Functional Framework for BCCM
The intent of this chapter is not to be critical of any of the before mentioned lists of
steps/elements and the ASIS framework, but to recommend areas of improvement. Each
of them were the result of a consensus process representing multiple constituencies and
present a logical and necessary first step in the development of national standards written
at a level of detail that can be used to define and measure compliance. As presented, they
provide relatively broad descriptions of the program steps/elements with minimal detail
and remain open to very liberal interpretations as to what actually comprises compliance
at the function and program level. A listing of the program elements is useful, but a
graphical presentation of the elements, their hierarchy and interdependency could assist
in the understanding and marketing of a comprehensive program that truly integrates the
component parts.
The functional framework presented below (Figure 5), which displays the hierarchy of
the functions (from top to bottom) and the temporal nature of each (from left to right),
accompanied by functional area and function definitions (provided following the
functional diagram) provides such a graphical presentation. This framework reflects the
following research process as documented in the Journal of Homeland Security and
Emergency Management article The Core Competencies Required of Executive Level
Business Crisis and Continuity Managers (2004).13
13
Shaw, Gregory. L. and Harrald, John. R. Required Competencies for Executive Level Business Crisis
and Continuity Managers. Journal of Homeland Security and Emergency Management. Jan. 2004.
8
Figure 5
Business Crisis and Continuity Management Framework
ENTERPRISE MANAGEMENT
Crisis Management
KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT
Environmental Sensing, Signal Detection and Monitoring
Organizational Learning
Crisis Communication
RISK MANAGEMENT
Risk Assessment
Business Area Analysis
Business Impact Analysis
Risk Communication
Risk-Based Decision Making
Planning
Program Implementation
Systems Monitoring
Awareness/Training/Exercising
Incident Management
Incident Response
BUSINESS CONTINUITY
Business Recovery
Business Resumption
Time
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It must be emphasized that the BCCM framework, as presented, is in no way intended to
prescribe a model organization chart for any business. It is merely the representation of
multiple functions that require integration and coordination for the sake of program
effectiveness and efficiency. Definitions for each of the functions are provided as a
common point of understanding since there is significant disparity in the various
glossaries of Business Crisis Management and Business Continuity Management found in
sources such as NFPA 1600, The Business Continuity Institute, Disaster Recovery
Institute International, and the Business Contingency Planning Group.
Crisis Management – The coordination of efforts to control a crisis event consistent with
strategic goals of an organization. Although generally associated with response, recovery
and resumption operations during and following a crisis event, crisis management
responsibilities extend to pre-event mitigation, prevention and preparedness and post
event restoration and transition.
Risk Management – The synthesis of the risk assessment, business area analysis, business
impact analysis, risk communication and risk-based decision making functions to make
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strategic and tactical decisions on how business risks will be treated – whether ignored,
reduced, transferred, or avoided.
Risk-Based Decision Making – Drawing upon the results of the risk assessment,
business area analysis, and business impact analysis, the development of strategic
and tactical risk management (risk reduction, risk transfer, risk avoidance, and/or
risk acceptance) goals and objectives and the allocation of resources to meet those
objectives. Risk-based decision-making is a continual process that requires
dialogue with stakeholders, monitoring and adjustment in light of economic,
public relations, political and social impacts of the decisions made and
implemented. Risk-based decision making requires the consideration of the
following questions:
Business Impact Analysis – Applying the results of the risk assessment to the
business area analysis to analyze the potential consequences/impacts of identified
risks on the business and to identify preventive, preparedness, response, recovery,
continuity and restoration controls to protect the business in the event of business
disruption. Business impact analysis requires consideration of the following
questions:
11
Risk Communication - The exchange of risk related information, concerns,
perceptions, and preferences within an organization and between an organization
and its external environment that ties together overall enterprise management with
the risk management function. Risk communication requires consideration of the
following questions:
Planning – Based upon the results of risk management and within the overall context of
enterprise management, the development of plans, policies and procedures to address the
physical and/or business consequences of residual risks which are above the level of
acceptance to a business, its assets and its stakeholders. Plans may be stand alone or
consolidated but must be integrated. Some example plans include:
Incident Response – The tactical reaction to the physical consequences/impacts (if any)
of a crisis event to protect personnel and property, assess the situation, stabilize the
situation and conduct response operations that support the economic viability of a
business.
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Business Continuity – The business specific plans and actions that enable an organization
to respond to a crisis event in a manner such that business functions, sub-functions and
processes are recovered and resumed according to a predetermined plan, prioritized by
their criticality to the economic viability of the business. Business continuity includes the
functions of business resumption and business (disaster) recovery.
Business Recovery – Plans and actions to recover essential business systems that
support business resumption and eventual business restoration and transition. The
alternative term of “disaster recovery” is often used interchangeably with business
recovery and carries with it an information technology (IT) connotation. For the
purpose of this research, business recovery applies to all business systems and not
just those related to IT.
Business Resumption - Plans and actions to resume (continue) the most time
sensitive (critical) business functions, sub-functions, processes and procedures
essential to the economic viability of a business.
Restoration and Transition - Plans and actions to restore and transition a business to “new
normal” operations following a crisis event.
Conclusion
Business Crisis and Continuity Management, by what ever title it is assigned (Business
Continuity, Crisis Management, Disaster Planning, etc.), is a strategic program with
supporting functions that must be integrated for the sake of overall efficiency and
effectiveness. A functional framework and function definitions are presented to visualize
the structure and inter dependencies of the components of a comprehensive BCCM
program. The following case studies should be considered in the context of this
framework.
In the case of the 2003 Northeast Blackout, would a BCCM program have assisted
individual businesses and overall industries, prevent, prepare for, respond to and recover
from the highly disruptive event.
13
References
Association of Contingency Planners – International. Web Site. Oak Creek, WI. 2004.
http://www.acp-international.com/.
Disaster Planning in the Private Sector: A Look at the State of Business Continuity in the
U.S.2005. http://www.att.com/presskit/_business_continuity.
Fink, Steven. Crisis Management: Planning for the Inevitable. Authors Guild Backprint
Edition. 1986, 2002.
Laye, John. Avoiding Disaster: How to Keep Your Business Going When Catastrophe
Strikes. John Wiley and Sons, Inc. Hoboken, NJ. 2002.
Mitroff, Ian. I. Managing Crises Before They Happen: What Every Executive and
Manager Needs to Know About Crisis Management. Amaco. New York, NY. 2001.
Shaw, Gregory. L. and Harrald, John. R. Required Competencies for Executive Level
Business Crisis and Continuity Managers. Journal of Homeland Security and Emergency
Management. Jan. 2004.
14
Smith, David, J. Editor. Business Continuity Management: Good Practices Guidelines.
The Business Continuity Institute. London, England. 2002. http://www.thebci.org .
United States Government. Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004.
Section 7305. Private Sector Preparedness. Washington, DC. 2005.
White House Administrative Office. National Strategy for the Physical Protection
of Critical Infrastructures and Key Assets. Washington, DC. February 2003.
Wold, Goeffrey. Disaster Recovery Planning Process. Disaster Recovery Journal. 1992.
http://www.drj.com/new2dr/w2_002.htm
15
Case 8.1: The 2003 Northeast Blackout
Introduction
On August 14, 2003, the largest power blackout in North American history occurred,
affected eight U.S. States and the Province of Ontario. In less than an hour,
approximately 50 million people were left without electricity. Though much of the
power was returned within 29 hours, outages persisted for up to two weeks in some
places.
For many businesses, electricity is a vital resource without which they would not survive.
Many businesses take for granted the fact that electricity flows into their buildings each
day, rarely considering what they would do should the power disappear. Some
businesses, however, have performed business continuity planning, and have worked
through what they could do to ensure that they are able to remain operational in the event
of a power outage. Such planning, or the lack thereof, determined who suffered that hot
August day in 2003.
This case will examine the effect of the 2003 blackout on small businesses. It will give a
brief background on the causes and the events surrounding the blackout. An analysis of
business performance in the aftermath of the blackout will be given. Finally, lessons
learned will be provided.
The Event
August 14 started out like any other day in the North-Central and Northeast United
States, other than that it was slightly warmer than usual. Then, at about 1:30 in the
afternoon, a power generation plant in Ohio, FirstEnergy Unit 5, shut down due to
conditions that were not necessarily out of the ordinary. However, another plant in the
area, FirstEnergy’s Davis-Besse nuclear power plant, had just previously been shut down
for maintenance. The combination of the two outages set into motion the series of events
that led to the great power outage that followed.
Power grids in the United States are tightly interconnected, and depend upon each other
to an extent to both supply and receive generated power. The primary components of
these grids are the generation plants and transmission lines. The demand load on any
power grid must be matched exactly by the amount of power supplied, and its ability to
transmit that power must not be impeded. Because any great overload of a power
transmission line, or under- or overload of a generator, can cause costly and difficult-to-
repair damage, the power grid is disconnected whenever a serious imbalance is detected.
Whenever a single generation plant is taken out of the grid, the power that was being
routed through that local grid becomes backed up, and must be accommodated by the
remaining plants and transmission lines that exist nearby. They do this by increasing or
16
decreasing their own power output to adjust to the changes in supply and demand. When
parts of the grid are taken off line, the power transmitted through the lines still connected
increases for some time, making the transmission lines heat up and sag. If they sag far
enough such that they make contact with a tree branches that have not been pruned, they
ground out, causing that section of the grid to automatically trip off. This phenomenon is
what began to occur throughout Ohio after FirstEnergy Unit 5 shut down.
Operators are able to reverse to flow of electricity through the transmission lines when
events like this occur, to reduce the amount of power flowing through the transmission
lines. However, four main systems of transmission lines were out of service before
power was routed out of the area, including 200 megawatts that was coming in from
Michigan. When this reversal happened, the load on the systems in Michigan increased
significantly, and by 4:06 pm, the direction of the power was reversed again such that it
was flowing back into the already-strained Ohio lines. More and more lines sagged and
tripped off, causing increased power loads on systems throughout several states,
including Tennessee, Kentucky, Missouri, Michigan and Ontario in Canada.
To avoid damaging their systems, and unaware of the growing problems throughout the larger
system of power grids, many of these individual plants independently chose to take themselves
‘offline’. Within minutes, several plants were taken offline, and individual grids began reversing
power away from their transmission lines to avoid tripping them off. However, due to the number
of plants that were down, taking the electricity out of the system become impossible due to the
backups that resulted, and one by one more plants and transmission lines were shut down in
rapidly-increasing succession.
Crews immediately began working on restoring power to customers. Power was restored
by the night of August 14th in New Jersey, parts of Pennsylvania and Ohio, parts of Long
Island, NY, and in eastern Connecticut. New York City, however, went that entire night
without power (though Kennedy and LaGuardia airports had power by that first night). It
was not until the evening of August 16th that all of New York City was back online.
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Consequences
Virtually all systems that require the use of electrical power were affected,
and many that did not, but were associated with systems that did were
affected as well. The following section describes a sample of the affected
systems, and provides examples of how the systems were affected.
Power Generation
Under normal circumstances, if one or two generation plants is taken offline, other plants
are able to fill in for the lost power or accommodate the surge that results from the line
disruption. However, with the cascading failures that occurred, almost all of the plants
were shut down entirely, and the nuclear power plants were placed into a ‘safe mode’ to
prevent accidents. Restarting them from this mode is a slow process. Other fossil fuel
plants were able to go back online soon after the blackout, but were unable to supply all
of the necessary power required. To accommodate these shortfalls, people and
businesses were asked to use only as much power as they absolutely required to avoid
further failures. Though the power companies were the source of this disaster, it must be
noted that these facilities are businesses themselves, and the losses they incurred are
included in the overall cost of the disaster.
Water Supply
Because many of the public water systems run on electric pumps, many people and
businesses lost water pressure. Many businesses depend upon a constant source of water,
without which their production ceases (such as restaurants, chemical plants, among
others). The low pressure and failing pressure in the water systems resulted in many
cases of water supply contamination as a result of the backwashing that occurred. There
were many instances of sewage systems spilling out raw sewage into rivers, confounding
this problem. In many cities, including Detroit, a ‘boil advisory’ was issued to prevent
outbreaks of waterborne diseases. Many restaurants in the affected area were ordered
closed pending water decontamination. There were also cases of chemical plants
accidentally releasing chemicals into the water due to problems the power outage caused
to their pumping systems.
Transportation
Trains, which run primarily on electricity, were severely impacted by the outage. All
Amtrak lines north of Philadelphia, including all going in and out of New York City,
were out of service during the blackout. Commuter trains leaving New York City, and
the New York City subway system were out of service as well. Many commuters,
including hundreds of thousands in New York City, were unable to return home, and
images of workers in business suits sleeping in the streets dominated the news.
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Although airplanes did not require electricity, the passenger screening systems were not
operational, and therefore flights were cancelled. The same was true for ticketing issues,
which continued even after power had been restored at many airports.
Gas stations that lost power were unable to provide gasoline, limiting the amount of
transportation in personal vehicles that could be conducted. Major trucking lines were
held up due to the inability to purchase fuel as well. Traffic in some areas was backed up
due to cars running out of gas on major roadways and highways. Gas station operators
that did have power tended to raise their gas prices significantly to guard against the
possibility that they might not be able to operate should their tanks not be able to be
refilled in a timely manner. Many of the refineries on the East Coast that produced
gasoline for the area were unable to operate as well, justifying the station operators’ fears.
Communication
Land-based (‘wired’) telephone systems were mostly unaffected by the outage. Their
services, however, were severely impeded due to a dramatically increased call volume.
Cellular systems, on the other hand, were out of service for most of the duration of the
blackout. Most radio stations had backup power and were able to remain online. Though
television media stations were able to remain online, most of their transmissions were
disrupted because the cable companies, upon which customers relied, were without
power, as were the customers’ homes, rendering their televisions useless. Cable internet
service was disconnected during the blackout, but dialup service was unaffected.
ICF Consulting estimated that the blackout would cause financial impacts ranging from
$7 to $10 billion (basing their figures on estimates of direct costs per kilowatt-hour
(kWh) of the power outage (e.g., losses due to food spoilage, lost production and
overtime wages) and indirect costs due to the secondary effects of the direct costs.) ICF
asserts that these estimates have been corroborated by simulations of potential outages in
California. Anderson Economic Group, however, estimated that the impact ultimately
fell between $4.5 and $8.2 billion (with a mid-point of $6.4 billion.) These figures
include $4.2 billion in lost income to workers and investors, $15 to $100 million in extra
costs to government agencies (e.g., due to overtime and emergency service costs), $1 to
$2 billion in costs to the affected utilities, and between $380 and $940 million in costs
associated with lost or spoiled commodities. The most frequently cited cost estimate for
the blackout, established by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), is about $6 billion.
(Electricity Consumers Resource Council, 2004).
One month after the blackout, a survey of affected companies was conducted by Mirafex
Systems, LLC, and the Weatherhead School of Management. In total, 142 companies
were interviewed, across the full range of locations, sizes, and industries. The purpose of
the survey was to determine the costs incurred by businesses during the blackout period.
The following points detail their findings:
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Two-thirds of the businesses surveyed (66.2%) lost at least a full business day due
to the blackout. One-quarter (25%) of the businesses surveyed were impacted for
two or more business days.
Over one-fifth of the businesses surveyed (21.9%) lost more than $50,000 per
hour of downtime—meaning at least $400,000 for an 8-hour day. One business in
ten, lost between $100,000 - $500,000 per hour. And 3.5% of businesses surveyed
lost more than $1 million for each hour of downtime.
Nearly half of the businesses surveyed (47%) said lost employee productivity was
the largest contributor to losses suffered due to the blackout. Employee
productivity is largely impacted by availability of information technology
resources and workplace environmental conditions (e.g. drinking water, sanitary
systems, HVAC, etc.).
Production/Manufacturing was the area of business hardest hit (31.7%) followed
by Sales and Marketing (18.3%) and Information Technology (14.8%). Also,
Customer Services was identified as being impacted (12.7%) by The blackout.
Though half say the blackout will have “no impact” on their company’s plans for
the future, nearly 10% say the blackout will affect their decision-making with
regards to either growth or relocation. Nearly 27% say future plans will involve
Disaster Recovery & Risk Management initiatives.
More than a third of the businesses surveyed (34.5%) felt it was somewhat or very
likely that the region’s image would suffer as a result of the blackout.
More than half the businesses surveyed say the top threat of future interruption is
either Cyber-Crime (26%) or a Utility Outage (26%), outdistancing other
concerns more than 2:1. The loss of key staff (13.4%) and Regulatory Changes
(8.4%) were also identified as key areas of concern (Mirafex Systems, LLC, and
Weatherhead School of Management, 2004).
Businesses of all kinds were affected by the blackout, no matter their size. Whether a
family owned business with one computer or a multinational company with several plants
employing thousands, it seemed that all suffered some negative consequence. The
following list, compiled by the Electricity Consumers Resource Council, profiles many of
these individual consequences.
At least 70 auto and parts plants and several offices were shutdown by the blackout,
idling over 100,000 workers. General Motors Corporation reported that the blackout
affected approximately 47,000 employees at 19 manufacturing facilities and three parts
warehouses in Michigan, Ohio and Ontario.
The Ford Motor Company reported that 23 of Ford’s 44 plants in North America were
shut down, as were numerous office, engineering and product development facilities in
southeastern Michigan. Other facilities were affected by disruptions in parts supply lines.
At Ford’s casting plant in Brook Park, Ohio, the outage caused molten metal to cool and
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solidify inside one of the plant’s furnaces. The company reported that a week would be
required to clean and rebuild the furnace.
The North American operating units of DaimlerChrysler AG, lost production at 14 of its
31 plants. Six of those plants were assembly plants with paint shops. All the vehicles that
were moving through the paint shop at the time of the outage had to be scrapped. The
company reported that, in total, 10,000 vehicles had to be scrapped.
Petroleum Refineries
The blackout affected at least eight oil refineries in the U.S. and Canada. The loss of
production at the damaged refineries threatened a gasoline shortage in the Detroit
Metropolitan Area, creating the potential for a broader energy emergency. As a result the
Governor of Michigan issued two Declarations of Energy Emergency on August 22 that,
in part, suspended certain air quality regulations that might have exacerbated a gasoline
shortage.
Much of the 2 million bpd system, the world’s longest for crude oil and petroleum
products shipments, was shut down east of Lake Superior. Enbridge reported that it was
forced to cut volumes moving to its terminal at Superior, Wisconsin, from Alberta to
prevent overfilling storage tanks.
The blackout was responsible for triggering emergency shutdown procedures at the
Marathon Oil Corporation’s Marathon Ashland refinery about 10 miles south of Detroit.
During those procedures, a carbon monoxide boiler failed to shut down properly, causing
a small explosion and the release of a mixture of hydrocarbons and steam. As a pre-
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cautionary measure, police evacuated a one-mile strip around the 183-acre complex and
forced hundreds of residents to seek shelter elsewhere. The Marathon refinery can
process 76,000 barrels of crude oil per day into a variety of petroleum products.
Approximately half the production from the refinery is gasoline designed to meet the air
quality requirements in southeastern Michigan. Full production was not restored at the
refinery until eight days after the onset of the outage. During that time the company was
unable to deliver to the local market approximately 500,000 barrels of gasoline and other
products.
Steel Industry
United States Steel’s Great Lakes Works, the company’s second largest plant, resumed
production on August 18, four days after the blackout knocked the plant off line. U.S.
Steel is the largest integrated steel maker in the country. The Great Lakes Works is
located in Ecorse and River Rouge, Michigan.
Rouge Industries Inc. reported that its huge Dearborn, Michigan, plant was completely
shutdown for 24 hours with only limited power for several days thereafter. The company
lost the equivalent of four days’ worth of production.
The International Steel Group Inc. reported that its Cleveland Works was shut down by
the blackout and did not restart steel production until four days later. When the plant lost
power, 1,250 tons of molten iron had to be dumped into two slag pits along the west bank
of the Cuyahoga River. ISG said that the plant suffered some damage as a result of the
outage.
AK Steel Corporation’s Manfield, Ohio, facility lost power at 4:15 pm on the day of the
blackout. The plant’s melt shop had six heats of steel in process, all of which were lost.
Also in Manfield, Bunting Bearings Corporation, a manufacturer of bronze, plastic,
powdered metal and aluminum bearings and solid bars, could not cast for four days.
BCS Cuyahoga LLC reported that its Cleveland plant was shutdown until August 18.
When the power failed, plant personnel had to manually fill the water-cooling jackets on
the reheat furnaces to prevent damage.
An explosion and fire caused significant damage to Republic Engineered Products’ No. 3
Blast Furnace in Lorain, Ohio, as a result of the blackout. No one was injured due to the
explosion. Within 15 to 30 minutes after the outage began, the plant lost the ability to
cool the iron inside the furnace and the molten metal burned through the side of the
structure and started spilling inside the building. Several fires erupted sending an orange-
gray plume of smoke that was visible throughout the city. Company officials refused to
allow firefighters on the premise, but the company’s workers were able to successfully
contain the fires. The company announced that it expected to resume production at Lorain
by the middle of September. Republic is North America’s leading producer of special bar
quality (SBQ) steel. On October 6, 2003, Republic announced that it had been forced to
22
file for protection under Chapter 11 of the U.S. Bankruptcy laws. It cited the August 14
explosion and fire at Lorain as a contributing factor.
Chemical Industry
Over thirty chemical, petrochemical and oil refining facilities are located in the
“Chemical Valley” area near Sarnia, Ontario. All the plants suffered some form of outage
resulting in the flaring of products at most of the facilities. Massive clouds of black
smoke were visible throughout the area. Estimates of the cost to producers in the Valley
range from $10 to $20 million per hour of outage.
Nova Chemicals Corporation reported that plant outages resulting from the blackout
reduced third-quarter earnings by $10 million or 12 cents per share. The power outage hit
production at its Corunna, Moore Township, Sarnia, and Sti. Clair River, Ontario, and
Painesville, Ohio, facilities. Nova stated that it lost a total of 150 million pounds of
ethylene and co-products, polyethylene (PE), styrene and expandable polystyrene (EPS)
production by the time its facilities returned to normal. The company declared force
majeure on ethylene co-product deliveries from Corunna. Nova restarted its ethylene
plant at Corunna and its styrene plant at Sarnia, as well as portions of its Moore
Township complex about a week after the outage began.
DuPont reported that all five plants in Ontario were downed by the blackout. The
company produces nylon and nylon intermediates at Kingston and Maitland, specialty
polymers at Sarnia, polyethylene films at Whitby, and automotive finishes at Ajax. Three
DuPont facilities in the U.S. were also affected by the blackout. DuPont said that sodium
and lithium production at Niagara Falls and operations in Buffalo, NY, where Corian®
solid surfaces and Tedlar® PVF film are manufactured, were shut down on Thursday,
August 14, but were back to full power by Thursday night. Its automotive finishes facility
in Mount Clemens, Michigan, suffered a complete outage but started to receive power a
day later. The facility at Kingston, Ontario, was down for more than week.
Approximately ten Praxair, Inc. air separation plants in Connecticut, Michigan, New
Jersey, New York, Ohio and Pennsylvania, as well as three in Ontario, Canada, were out
of service as a result of the regional electricity failure at 4:11 p.m. on August 14, 2003.
All plants either returned to service when power was restored or temporarily remained
off-line at the request of the local utility on Friday and Saturday. Praxair plant operations
and logistics responded to the sudden power outage safely and successfully. The North
American Logistics Center in Tonawanda, NY, took steps to shift product deliveries to
customers in the affected area.
Alcan Inc., the world’s second largest aluminum producer, reported that its cold rolling
plant in Kingston, Ontario, was shutdown by the blackout.
23
Revere Copper Products Inc., in Rome, New York, lost copper and alloy production as a
result of the blackout. The plant facilities include melting, casting, hot rolling, cold
rolling extrusion, bar making and testing equipment. Paper-maker Domtar Inc. shutdown
its pulp mill in Espanola, Ontario, and a paper mill in Cornwall, Ontario, as a result of the
blackout. Forestry company Tembec Inc. shutdown sawmills in Timmins,Cochrane,
Huntsville and Hearst, Ontario, a pulp mill in Smooth Rock Falls, Ontario, and a
newsprint mill in Kapuskasing.
The National City Corporation reported that across the bank’s six-state franchise,
approximately 174 branches were closed due to the power situation: 30 in Ohio, 134 in
Detroit, Michigan and 10 in Pennsylvania.
Kroger Company, the largest U.S. supermarket chain, reported that 60 of its stores were
without power as a result of the August Blackout. Most of the stores were in Michigan.
The Associated Food Dealers of Michigan estimates that over $50 million in perishable
foods were lost due to the lack of refrigeration caused by the blackout.
Local telephone service was also jeopardized by the energy emergency created by the
blackout. SBC, the dominant carrier in Michigan, requested assistance from Michigan’s
State Emergency Operations Center (SEOC) to locate supplemental supplies of petroleum
liquids to assure the continued operation of the local telephone system. This fuel was
needed for both standby generators and company vehicles to allow travel to remote
locations to assure continued operation of telephone equipment.
Duane Reade Inc., the largest drug store chain in the metropolitan New York City area,
reported that the August 14th Blackout forced the closure of all of the company’s 237
stores. The company estimates that as a result of the interruption, lost sales totaled
approximately $3.3 million.
Airports were closed in Toronto, Newark, New York, Detroit, Cleveland, Montreal,
Ottawa, Islip, Syracuse, Buffalo, Rochester, Erie, and Hamilton.
The New York City comptroller’s office estimated that losses topped $1 billion,
including $800 million in gross city product. The figure includes $250 million in frozen
and perishable food that had to be dumped. The Restaurant Association calculated that
the city’s 22,000 restaurants lost between $75 and $100 million in wasted food and lost
business. Broadway lost approximately $1 million because of cancelled performances.
New York City’s mayor estimated that the city would pay almost $10 million in overtime
related to the outage.
Lessons Learned
Nearly one in five businesses suffer a major disaster every year (Global Partnership for
Preparedness, 2004). No matter where a business is located, and regardless of how small
it’s employee base, it can never be fully removed from the effects of disasters. These
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“disasters” need not materialize in the form of a hurricane, flood, or terrorist attack.
Power outages, denial-of-service internet attacks, economic downturns, robberies and
civil unrest can all prove equally or more devastating in the consequences they produce.
That approximately $6 billion in losses were incurred during the 2003 blackout indicates
that a great number of businesses were not prepared for a sudden, unexpected loss of
electrical power. For some of these companies, even if their facilities were not directly
impacted, it was the case that their suppliers, their customers, or their transportation
services were impacted, which in turn indirectly caused them to suffer. In comprehensive
continuity planning, all of these ‘upstream’ and ‘downstream’ factors are considered.
This event was relatively short lived. Power outages can and have lasted for much longer
than occurred in this event. Following hurricanes, tornadoes, ice storms, floods, and
other disasters where the power generation and transmission infrastructure is damaged or
destroyed, it can be several days or even weeks before full production capacity is
returned. Businesses must consider how they will continue to operate under these
circumstances before the event occurs, and invest in these measures as they see
appropriate.
In the Mirafex / Weatherhead survey (Mirafex Systems, LLC, and Weatherhead School
of Management, 2004), it was discovered that over one-third of firms surveyed (34%)
had no risk management or disaster recovery plans in place when the blackout occurred.
Another study, by Info-Tech Research, found that 60 percent of businesses did not have
plans to help IT departments deal with the blackout, even if they did have business
continuity plans. While these figures may seem unforgivable, they are not necessarily
surprising. Business continuity planning can require both time and money to conduct,
which many companies may be unwilling to commit. Many feel that they do not have the
resources or even the ability to perform business continuity planning – others have
convinced themselves that it is not necessary. The survey also found, however, that
nearly half (46%) of the businesses surveyed claimed they would be investing more in
risk management, business continuity and/or disaster recovery in the future. Apparently,
this was a lesson learned through the difficult experience of negative consequences. Not
all businesses should have to suffer before they commit to planning for emergencies.
It has been predicted that power outages like that which occurred in 2003 could become
much more common as infrastructure ages and demand for electricity increases. The
blame for the 2003 outage boils down most simply to poor tree-trimming by a single
component in the greater power transmission interconnected system. Though Congress
has since addressed the issue of the power system’s fragile nature, companies cannot
assume that they need not worry about the issue any longer. The 2003 blackout should
serve as a wake-up call to all businesses that do not currently have comprehensive
business continuity plans.
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References:
Electricity Consumers Resource Council. 2004. The Economic Impacts of the August
2003 Blackout. February 9.
Global Partnership for Preparedness. 2004. “What is being done for businesses: The
Facts.” GPP Small Business Preparedness Campaign.
http://www.globalpreparedness.org/
Government Accountability Office (GAO). 2003. “2003 Blackout Identifies Crisis and
Opportunities for the Electricity Sector. November. GAO-04-204.
New York Independent System Operator (NYISO). 2004. “Interim Report on the August
14, 2003 Blackout.” January 8.
http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/hepg/Papers/NYISO.blackout.report.8.Jan.04.pdf
Small Business Computing. 2003. “Most Businesses Unprepared for Blackout.” August
22.
26
Figure 8.1.1: Area Affected by the 2003 Blackout
27
Sidebar 8.1.1: Timeline of the Blackout
28
4:12 p.m. Rochester Gas & Electric's Ginna nuclear plant near Rochester, N.Y., shuts
down automatically after losing power.
4:12 p.m. Nine Mile Point nuclear reactor near Oswego, N.Y., shuts down
automatically after losing power.
4:15 p.m. FirstEnergy's Sammis-Star 345-kilovolt line, in northeast Ohio, trips and
reconnects a second time.
4:16 p.m. Oyster Creek nuclear plant in Forked River, N.J., shuts down automatically
because of power fluctuations on the grid.
4:17 p.m. The Enrico Fermi Nuclear plant near Detroit shuts down automatically after
losing power.
4:17-4:21 p.m. Numerous power transmission lines in Michigan trip.
4:25 p.m. Indian Point nuclear power plants 2 and 3 in Buchanan, N.Y., shut down
automatically after losing power.
Source: Associated Press, August 17, 2003. Published on CNN, August 17, 2003,
http://edition.cnn.com/2003/US/08/17/blackout.chron.ap/.
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Case 8.3: The University of Washington’s Experience With the FEMA Disaster
Resistant Universities Program
Introduction
During the late 1990’s, in partnership with six major universities, FEMA developed the
Disaster Resistant University (DRU) Program. FEMA officials recognized at that time
the major role universities played in both the structure and stability of the local economy
within which they operated, and postulated that the result of a hazard impact that forced
one of these institutions to close would have a dramatic negative effect on the
surrounding community. Universities are unique organizations that not only serve their
communities and states, but also the Federal government which has invested significant
economic and social capital in them. Each year, in fact, Federal agencies fund
approximately $15 billion in university research. Much of these research grants and
allocations are multi-year programs, and the value of ongoing research is understandably
even higher (Comerio 2000).
The Disaster Resistant University program was established within the Pre-disaster
Mitigation Grant Program, to be funded by competitive grants (FEMA, 2003). The DRU
Program’s primary objective is to encourage universities to implement mitigation through
actions that extend beyond simple life safety codes and that focus on safeguarding their
research capacity as well as the human capital associated with their academic
environment.
This case study will briefly examine the history of disasters on the campuses of United
States universities, and the impact these disasters have inflicted. The historical
background of the DRU program as it relates to these disasters will follow. Finally, an
examination of the DRU program and its implementation at the University of Washington
will be provided.
In the past decade alone, disasters have caused tens of millions of dollars of damages at
US universities. Examples include, but are not limited to, earthquake damage at Stanford
University and California State University, Northridge; hurricane damage at the
University of Miami, Tulane University and East Carolina University; a power outage at
Columbia University; flooding damage and business interruption at the University of
North Dakota, Colorado State University, Syracuse University, and many others. The
following five examples, representing only a small sample of all recognized impacts, are
provided to expand upon these details:
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The Northridge earthquake, which struck southern California in January of 1994,
caused significant damage to three universities in the Los Angeles area.
California State University, Northridge suffered the most of the three: nearly all
of its buildings were damaged and the university was forced to close for one
month. It was able to resume classes for approximately 30,000 students that were
enrolled at the time through the use of 450 trailers that served as temporary
classrooms. Damages to the university were estimated to be about $380 million
(FEMA, 2003).
Hurricane Andrew passed over the city of Miami in 1992, which is home to the
University of Miami. The storm resulted in $17 million in damage to the
University. As result of these damages, the school was forced to close for almost
one month because of a lack of both water and electricity. The university
incurred the cost of round-trip transportation for all of its student body in order to
help them return to their homes during this period. As a result of this disaster, the
University’s insurance premiums increased dramatically (FEMA, 2003).
On Labor Day in 1998, a severe windstorm occurred in central New York State.
The storm damaged or destroyed many buildings, trees, and utilities on the
Syracuse University campus. After the storm had passed, the university found
itself having to close residence halls. Six-hundred students needed to be relocated
immediately. The final cost to the university for repairs to roofs, windows, and
masonry, and for the removal of debris, exceeded $4 million (FEMA, 2003).
In July of 1997, a local creek that passed through the Colorado State University
overflowed. Water poured into both the library and the bookstore, damaging
hundreds of thousands of books and other valuable documents. Most of the
campus was closed for one to two weeks while clean up was underway. Damages
exceeded $100 million (FEMA, 2003).
In June of 2001, Tropical Storm Allison inundated the Houston Area and its
universities and colleges with 10 to 24 inches of rain. The University of Texas at
Houston Medical School Building had 22 ft. of water in it, causing the hospital to
close for the first time in its history and seriously disrupting its research efforts.
Damage to the Medical School has been estimated at more than $205 million.
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In 2000 a study was conducted for the University of Berkeley entitled The Economic
Benefits of a Disaster Resistant University: Earthquake Loss Estimation for UC
Berkeley. This study, performed by Mary Comerio of the Institute of Urban and Regional
Development of UC Berkeley, examined earthquake hazards and the associated economic
consequences of potential losses at the University of California. Comerio estimated that
the cost of replacements and repairs to the facilities of UC Berkeley that would result
from an earthquake could range from $600 million to $2.6 billion (assuming that
buildings with 60 percent or more structural damage would be replaced.) She also found
that, in the event that an earthquake of 7.0 magnitude (“rare”) occurred, approximately 40
to 60 percent of all campus space would require more than twenty months for repairs.
The study further estimated that an earthquake of 7.25 (“very rare”) magnitude or greater
could close the campus for up to one year. As an illustration of the uncertainty involved
in such estimations, whose reality universities must contemplate, the study displayed how
building damage and the time needed for repair varies significantly depending upon the
location of the epicenter, the duration and directivity of the ground motions, and the
availability of money and materials for repair (Comerio, 2000).
A fact that was not lost on the officials at FEMA who developed the DRU program was
that universities helped to drive the economic engine in the communities where they
resided. The universities helped to provide jobs, a source of income for residents
(through the students’ needs and the local services required by the university itself), and
even a certain level prestige and identity to the community. Comerio’s study reinforced
these findings, reporting that a severely damaged UC Berkley would have a significant
impact on the surrounding Berkeley, CA community through a loss of capital flow
(operating expenditures, salaries, and income) from the University. The study found that
a yearlong campus closure would result in the loss of approximately 8,900 jobs, $680
million in personal income, and $861 million in sales. While these losses would be offset
in the larger economy by the increase in construction jobs generated, it is important to
note that the losses and gains are in very different sectors of the economy (Comerio,
2000).
In her study, Comerio also addressed the issue of vulnerability. She found that 50
percent of the research funded projects, as a measure of dollars funded to the university,
were concentrated in just seven buildings, or 12 percent of campus space. Expanding
upon these findings, the study reported that 75 percent of research funded projects are
located in just 17 buildings – or one third of campus space. The seismic ratings of eleven
of these buildings are such that they would be closed for an extensive period following an
earthquake of 7.0 magnitude (Comerio, 2000).
The study also looked at some of the indirect benefits that universities provide, that were
at risk from the impacts of disasters, such as the long-term contribution that students
made to the local economy. Comerio reported that a significant number of out-of-state
students continued to reside in California after graduation. Each additional out-of-state
graduate that remained in California resulted in almost a million dollars in increased state
output (gross domestic product), and $100,000 in state tax revenue, over their lifetime, in
32
present value terms (Comerio, 2000). It can be assumed that, in the event of a closure of
one year, many of these out-of-state students would seek enrollment elsewhere.
The Disaster Resistant Universities first grew out of the FEMA Mitigation Division
“Project Impact: Building Disaster Resistant Communities” initiative. The Project
Impact program had begun to show progress in reducing both the human and economic
impacts of disasters within the communities where it had been adapted. In recognition of
the important role universities played within the communities where they operated, it was
proposed by FEMA Director James Lee Witt that there be a special program that
addressed the unique mitigation and preparedness needs of university communities.
FEMA leadership began developing the program in late 1998 and early 1999 together
with six universities from around the country that showed a dedication to disaster
prevention and preparedness. The UC Berkeley study, described above in detail, was part
of this developmental effort. The six universities and FEMA leadership met several
times during this developmental period to hash out the details of the program, and to
agree upon a program that was satisfactory in scope and requirement by all participants.
On October 2nd of 2000, FEMA selected these same six universities to serve as pilots for
a larger future program. The six universities were:
Tulane University
University of Alaska at Fairbanks
University of California at Berkley
University of North Carolina at Wilmington
University of Miami
University of Washington.
Each of these selected universities was awarded a $100,000 grant from FEMA, which
they were required to match 100%. These universities were tasked with developing and
implementing sustainable, long-term mitigation projects on their campuses as prescribed
by the program’s guidelines (FEMA, 2000).
Building upon their collective efforts, the six universities and FEMA leadership
developed prescriptive publications for use by other universities interested in performing
emergency preparedness and mitigation on their campuses, including the widely-accepted
self-help guide entitled, "Building a Disaster-Resistant University." This guide became
the prescriptive text for future awardees within the DRU program.
In recognition of the success of the six pilot programs that received grant funds in 2000,
FEMA offered over $3.4 million in competitive Pre-Disaster Mitigation (PDM) Disaster
Resistant University grants in fiscal year 2003 (FEMA-PDM, 2003). These DRU funds
were competitively awarded within the bounds of a national priority of ensuring that the
program funds benefited a representative range of universities, based on hazard type,
33
size, geography, and academic community served, which included consideration of
Historically Black Colleges and Universities and Tribal Colleges and Universities. In
total, 28 universities were awarded funds in this round. Figure 8.3.1 lists these awards.
FEMA provides Pre-Disaster Mitigation (PDM) funds through its DRU initiative to assist
universities, through State and local governments, to implement a sustainable pre-disaster
natural hazard mitigation program that seeks to reduce overall risk to facilities, research
assets, students and faculty. The primary objective of the PDM DRU grant program is to
raise risk awareness of the importance of disaster mitigation and planning by universities
and communities, and to reduce the Nation's disaster losses at universities through pre-
disaster mitigation planning. The DRU grant-funded programs are expected to include
the implementation of planned, pre-identified, cost effective mitigation measures
designed to reduce injuries, loss of life, and damage and destruction of property from all
hazards, including damage to critical facilities, and research operations (FEMA-PDM,
2003). The implementation of the DRU program at one of the six pilot universities,
University of Washington, will be examined in the analysis of the Disaster Resistant
University program.
The University of Washington is the oldest State institution of higher education on the
West Coast, is the largest university in the Pacific Northwest, and is consistently ranked
as one of the top public universities in the nation. The University is also very well
recognized for the comprehensive medical services it provides through its teaching
hospital. Its School of Medicine consistently ranks at or near the top of the nation's
primary-care medical schools. The University is among the nation's top five institutions
in Federal research grants and contracts awarded to its faculty, which directly contributes
to the educational goals of graduates, professional students, and undergraduates. In
addition, the University serves as a hub for cultural resources and events, and a
recreational center for the community and region (UW, 2002).
Through its primary mission of education and research, the UW makes a substantial
economic impact on the State of Washington. The UW employs almost 23,000 people on
its three campuses and has an annual budget of $1.9 billion. The funds spent on salaries,
34
equipment, goods, services, and capital expenditures circulate through the economy,
generating even more economic activity through job creation, and more demand for local
goods and services. This re-circulation of money through the economy, known as the
"multiplier effect," was estimated to be $5.1 billion in 1999 alone. Furthermore, the
presence of the UW is estimated to have indirectly resulted in the creation of 46,000 jobs
in addition to the 23,000 people employed directly by the University. As the UW has
become more integrated into the economy, the total economic impact made by the
university on the local economy has increased from $3.4 billion in 1995 to $5.1 billion in
2002 - even as State Investment in the University has remained under $400 million per
year (UW-Return Investment, 2000).
The University of Washington followed the DRU guidelines in creating their Emergency
Response Management Plan (ERMP). The DRU Guidelines, as illustrated in the FEMA
Guidebook “Building A Disaster Resistant University,” in turn follow FEMA's mitigation
planning guidance for local communities. This follows in line with the recognition of
universities themselves being small or medium-sized communities that are capable of
drawing upon important lessons learned through the efforts of counties and municipalities
(FEMA, 2003).
The four phases of the DRU's mitigation process are described as:
Each of these phases will be described in brief below, with an examination of the actions
taken by the University of Washington to fulfill the phase requirements.
Phase 1
In Phase 1, "Organize Resources," the university is instructed to take the initial step of
identifying stakeholders from within both the university and the surrounding community,
and to inventory the resources that are available to the planners. An advisory committee
is created out of these efforts, after all appropriate parties have been identified and invited
to join. FEMA advises that, “Planning organizations exist at many levels of the
university, and it is important to identify all of the various planning committees that
might share an interest or have jurisdiction in the area of hazard mitigation before the
planning process gets too far.” Clearly, only by having a representative from each of
these levels and components can a committee ensure that they have considered all of the
universities needs and vulnerabilities.
35
They also included members of the community that had a stake in the planning process,
such as emergency management coordinators and planners. The included officials
selected were those that were able to (and continue to) design and develop the plan, and
then subsequently provide guidance and day-to-day program oversight for the
University's emergency and disaster management programs that result from the process.
To ensure that the planning process was thorough, open, and transparent to the
community at large, all meetings were and continue to be open to any member of the
campus community. To see a list of the committee members, see sidebar 8.3.1.
FEMA stresses that an important objective for the first meeting of the advisory
committee is to develop a mission statement to help committee members understand what
outcomes they will seek to achieve. Doing so, they claim, will build a common
understanding of the mitigation plan's purpose (FEMA, 2003). The University of
Washington did just this, stating that the mission of their Hazard Mitigation Planning
process was to "Guide the University in protecting its people, its facilities, environment,
equipment and systems by identifying appropriate initiatives and projects.” The
statement continued to say that the plan “will also help the University to prepare business
resumption plans in order to resume normal education and research operations as quickly
as possible following a disaster" (UW, 2004).
Once the initial inventory of resources has been completed, stakeholders identified,
advisory committee formed, project manager determined, and timeline established,
FEMA recommends moving into Phase-2 of the program – Hazard Identification and
Risk Assessment.
Phase 2
Natural Hazards
Earthquake
Severe Local Storm
Snow Storm
Fire
36
Man-made Hazards
Civil Disturbance
Hazardous Materials Release
Terrorism
Transportation Accident
Urban Fire
In the HIVA, UW assessed terrorism, urban fires and earthquakes as the most destructive
hazards that it faces. They also assessed those hazards that have a local presence, but
from which the campus would experience have minimal impact potential. This was done
in order to minimize the later mitigation efforts dedicated to them in favor of more likely
hazards. These less-likely hazards include:
Avalanches
Drought
Flood
Landslide
Tsunami
Volcano
Included as Sidebars 8.3.2 are two examples of hazard profiles created by the university
during this process. Also included as Sidebars 8.3.3 and 8.3.4 are the UW Hazards
Worksheet and Hazard Impact Matrix completed by the university for their Disaster
Resistant Universities Project. As part of a detailed hazard analysis, the UW defined
each hazard in order to understand the nature of the hazard, the direct and indirect effects,
and the secondary impacts that maybe created. This included a historical data to provide
documentation of the reality of the hazards that UW has faced in past and to calibrate
planning and preparedness efforts. The main goal was to assess the vulnerability of the
University's people, property, and environment to hazards in order to their impact, and to
develop strategies for mitigation and emergency preparedness (UW, 2003).
Phase 3
After the campus’ risks have been identified and vulnerabilities to these hazards assessed,
the university can continue on to Phase 3, "Developing the Mitigation Plan." This step
focuses on the development of the hazard mitigation plan upon which the committee will
base its future actions for disaster reduction and preparedness.
FEMA stresses that the development of a comprehensive hazard mitigation plan should
draw from, and complement existing plans, to include those of local and state
jurisdictions (the FEMA how-to guide Developing the Mitigation Plan (386-3) provides
helpful guidance for state and local governments on this process and may assist a college
or university in aligning their mitigation plan with those of their surrounding jurisdictions
(FEMA, 2003)). A university's mitigation plan should address all of the hazards that
were identified in the HIVA and prioritize those hazards based on the vulnerability of the
37
institution to a particular natural and man-made hazards (FEMA, 2003). FEMA advises
that the university’s mitigation plan do the following:
The hazard mitigation plan documents how a university will reduce its vulnerability to
natural and man-made disasters. The plan details the purpose of the planning effort, the
process that was followed, and the actions that need to be taken. Once the plan is
finalized, the next step is for it be formally approved and implemented. (FEMA, 2003).
In 2003, the University of Washington developed a Hazard Mitigation Plan as part of its
DRU program. This plan is attached as Sidebar 8.3.5. The University's plan includes
hazard mitigation action items that provide guidance and suggests specific activities that
academic and operational units can undertake to reduce risk and prevent loss from
earthquake or severe storms. Each action item is accompanied by ideas for
implementation, which can be considered by decision-makers as opportunities arise for
funding (FEMA, February 2004). In developing a University Hazard Mitigation Plan,
UW followed the previously discussed process from FEMA's "Building a Disaster-
Resistant University." The Senior Advisory Committee which was facilitated by an
Emergency Management Specialist developed mitigation plan's mission, goals and action
items (UW, 2004). The Committee also reviewed all materials proved by the Hazard
Mitigation Plan (HMP) coordinator for additions, comments and corrections (UW, 2004).
As part of this process the HMP coordinator conducted more than 50 interviews with
individuals associated with key academic and administrative units in order to identify
common concerns related to natural and technical hazards (UW, 2004). Also, in
developing the HMP the coordinator informed and consulted with the University's senior
leadership (UW, 2004). As recommended in Phase-1 of the DRU Guide, the HPM
coordinator examined State and Federal guidelines and requirements for mitigation plans.
Consulted with the Washington State Emergency Management Division, FEMA, the City
of Seattle Emergency Management Office, the King County Office of Emergency
Management, the Seattle Fire Department and the Seattle Police Department (UW, 2004).
With this plan in hand, the University of Washington was armed to submit an application
to FEMA for a Pre Disaster Mitigation (PDM) grant for DRU funding in the FY2003
round of grants Because of their comprehensive efforts, the University of Washington
was recipient of the largest amount of funding from the program. The following
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summary list highlights the eight priority initiatives proposed by UW in its 2003 Disaster
Resistant University PDM Grant application (for which they were awarded $500,000):
Phase 4
The final phase in the disaster-resistant university process is the adoption and
implementation of the mitigation plan. Adoption and implementation go hand in hand.
Adoption refers to the formal and informal acceptance of the plan by appropriate entities,
such as a formal vote or a statement of support or memorandum of understanding.
Implementation refers to putting the plan into action by taking steps to adopt the
mitigation actions described in the plan. At some point in this process, it is expected that
the university will hold a press conference or other means of announcing their work in
progress to the community (FEMA, 2003).
At UW the Executive Vice President and Provost were given the responsible for adopting
the University's HMP because of their authority to promoting University policy regarding
hazards. The University's Office of Emergency Management, with oversight by the
Capital Facilities Committee, is responsible for coordinating the overall implementation
of the mitigation plan and undertaking the formal review process every six months (UW,
2004). A key objective of the University's implementation strategy is to use existing
programs existing programs to address identified hazard mitigation goals and objectives
(UW, 2004).
Lessons Learned
39
Conduct the HIVA in-house with committed and knowledgeable staff of campus
activities, operations, and its physical layout.
The individual(s) conducting the HIVA should have an established and positive
relationship with faculty, staff and students as well as local emergency response
agencies.
UW had no formal archives of information related to specific hazard events.
There is a lack of communication between the academic side of the University
and the operational side implementing hazard mitigation strategies.
Facilities information not available on Geographic Information Systems (GIS)
limited ability to analyze infrastructure.
Having completed its goals for the pilot DRU Program, the University Washington has
established the following objectives for its second round DRU Program awarded in 2003:
Conclusion
For any major teaching and research institution where operations are threatened by
natural disasters, hazards mitigation and post-disaster recovery strategies must be a
regular part of the ongoing planning in every academic department and management unit.
In implementing hazard mitigation and post-disaster recovery strategies the University of
Washington is only one of many universities that has since demonstrated that the Disaster
Resistant University Program is an effective enabler towards accomplishing these
objectives. UC Berkley has initiated both structural and non-structural mitigation
programs to limit the economic impact of an earthquake, including performing above
life-safety criteria seismic retrofits of identified critical infrastructure for continued
operations after a large earthquake and also a campus-wide non-structural mitigation
program aimed at loss reduction of the contents in laboratories, libraries, classrooms and
40
offices (Comerio, 2000). At the University of Washington, the DRU program seed
money was a catalyst for many other disaster mitigation and preparedness activities
throughout the campus community (UW, 2004).
As a result of the DRU process, the University of Washington has since hired a full-time
professional Emergency Manager, established an Office of Emergency Management, and
is aggressively pursuing several structural and non-structural mitigation programs (UW,
2004). This action, in concert with the creation of the plan described in this case, helps to
ensure that disaster mitigation and planning at the university remain ongoing and
adaptable. As stated by Sandra Lier, the Associate VP for Business Services of the
University of Washington in the introduction to their Emergency Response Management
Plan, “This plan is not the end of emergency planning; it is just the beginning.”
References:
41
University of Washington. 2003. Disaster Resistant University/PDM Grant Proposal.
Provided by University of Washington's Office of Emergency
Management.
University of Washington. 2004. Agency Annex for the 2003 Washington State Hazard
Mitigation Plan. http://www.washington.edu/admin/business/oem/mitigate/hmp.html
42
Figure 8.3.1: List of Universities Funded by the DRU Program in FY 2003.
43
Source: FEMA, 2003.
44
Sidebar 8.3.1: University of Washington’s Senior Advisory Committee for Disaster
Resistant University Program
45
Sidebar 8.3.2: UW Emergency Management Planning Committee
46
Sidebar 8.3.2: Examples of Risk Profiles from the UW HIVA
LANDSLIDE
Definition
There is tension between stresses
increase water pressure within the slope. Usually, the most catastrophic landslides occur
on slopes that already have a low margin of safety and are struck by a sudden event.
Determining a slope’s slide potential rests on discovering the inherent stability of the
Slumps and block slides are the least dangerous because the material does not usually
move far and does not break apart. Mudflows are the most dangerous because they move
quickly and run out far from the slope where they are. Sometimes they are even
classified as flash floods.
47
The Seattle HIVA cites one prominent study that argues that landslides are not well
understood nationally as a threat to public safety. It has been estimated they cause
between $245 million and $1.5 billion of damage, kill 25 people annually, and cause
numerous transportation problems (Seattle HIVA, 1999). It concludes that they are often
perceived as individual events rather than symptoms of a wider problem.
History
Landslides are common in Seattle. Some that have occurred near the University include:
1941 - Several slides during December around Sand Point
1965 - SR 520 threatened, one lane closed, Roanoke interchange on I-5 closed
1983 - Queen Anne slide closes Aurora for a day. Mud travels as far as Lake Union
1997 - Over 100 slides and the accompanying snow caused approximately $100 million
in damages. Slides occur on most slide prone slopes throughout the Seattle area in a
continuation of the wet winter.
Vulnerability
Late winter and early spring are the most common times for slides in Seattle. According
to Tubbs (1975), the probability of sliding rises after a wet, cold winter, especially if a
freeze occurs in late winter and early spring. The ground becomes saturated over the
winter, and then porous following a freeze, so a subsequent rain will penetrate the surface
while the high water table will prevent the ground from absorbing it. The water increases
the stress to the slope by adding weight and by increasing pore pressure within the soil.
In the past, the greatest vulnerability has been to property rather than public safety. Most
landslides in Seattle start as slumps that develop slowly, giving people in danger some
warning.
Landslides can also disrupt roads and other lifelines, with roads most frequently affected.
The University is vulnerable since several arterials run along slopes with potential for
landslides, including Montlake Blvd. and the 45th St. viaduct, as well as the Montlake
Cut. Structures that could be affected include Fluke Hall, residence halls, Nuclear
Physics Lab, and Plant Services. According to the Shannon & Wilson report,
intermediate or transitional soils in Zones B, C, and D may be at moderate hazard of
ground instability, such as earthquake-induced landslides or liquefaction (Earthquake
Microzonation Study, 1991).
Effects
Significant impacts could include the interruption of lifeline services, such as water,
sewer and transportation. Landslides can induce other disasters, particularly flooding
storm drains and lead to releases of hazardous materials by destroying waste and storage
sites.
48
Any attempt to mitigate the damage must weigh the potential harm against the costs of
prevention; there is a gap in knowledge. Until more information exists, it will be hard for
the University to plan for mitigation and recovery efforts.
49
TERRORISM
Definition
Terrorism is the unlawful, premeditated use of violence, or threat of violence committed
by a group of two or more individuals against persons or property to intimidate or coerce
a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of a
political or social objective.
Terrorists use threats to create fear among the public, to try to convince citizens that their
government is powerless to prevent these acts of violence, and to get immediate public
recognition for their causes. Bombing, kidnapping, sabotage, assassination, and
extortion, whether politically or criminally motivated, are included under the definition of
terrorist activity. The types of terrorist organizations that may be operating in the United
States include:
The media play an important role for terrorists and give them a powerful new voice
worldwide. The ability and willingness of television to bring terrorists’ acts of violence
into the homes of Americans has greatly enhanced terrorism as an effective weapon.
Terrorism has come to depend on the mass media to extend their audience from local to
global and to greatly exaggerate the impression of violence and its results (Snohomish
County HIVA, 2000).
Until recently, most recent terrorist incidents in the United States have involved
“conventional” threats in the form of plastic explosives, agricultural chemicals (fertilizer
mixed with diesel fuel), and car, pipe, or letter bombs using materials easily obtainable
through open markets. The increasing accessibility of more exotic agents, such as
50
biological, chemical, and possibly even nuclear (WMDs) weapons, heightens the concern
about terrorism in the U.S.
History
During the 1960's-1970's several University buildings were bombed by the
domestic terrorist groups. The bombings and other related anti-Viet Nam
activities influenced the development of the Seattle Police Bomb Squad.
In recent years, some UW researchers have been targeted by animal rights
extremist groups. Crimes have included threats, vandalism to University and
private property, and criminal trespass and vandalism at researchers’ homes. In
one incident, just before the 1999 World Trade Organization (WTO) meeting, an
extremist kicked in the front door of a primate researcher’s home in Seattle.
Other crimes that targeted primate researchers included mail (letters) booby
trapped with razor blades. The letters also included a threatening letter giving the
researcher a year to get out of their line of research or face retribution.
Doctors on the Organ Transplant Committee have been threatened because they
make life and death decisions on who will and will not receive transplants. Other
Doctors who perform abortions or work with fetal tissue have been victims of
harassment, home visits by demonstrators, and have had lectures disrupted.
The most recent domestic terrorist incident in May, 2001, was the arson fire at
Merrill Hall, for which the group Earth Liberation Front claimed responsibility. It
resulted in the total loss of the building and significant loss of contents and
research materials. The current replacement cost of the building is estimated at
$4.5 million.
Vulnerability
A basic and fundamental function of the University is to carry out research in an open
and unrestricted manner, with complete freedom to publish or otherwise disseminate the
results of its search for knowledge. The requirements of secrecy and restrictions on
freedom to publish that are inherent in security classification, or the restrictions on
dissemination that derive from proprietary rights of privately sponsored research, are in
direct opposition to this function (UW Handbook, 1995).
The inherent open environment of an academic research institution makes the University
of Washington vulnerable to terrorist attack. A daytime population of 60,000 moving
freely around the campus makes it difficult to track activities of individuals who might
chose to harm the University’s people, programs, and properties. Large concentrations of
University people (Stadium, Pavilion, lecture halls, etc.) could be at risk from external as
well as internal threats.
Employment
Pre-employment criminal history checks are only carried out on individuals as currently
required by specific statute for prospective employees who will be driving commercial
vehicles, working with children or dependent populations, handling cash or drugs, or
51
working for the UW Medical Center or the UW Police Department (only UWPD
applicants are fingerprinted). This means that individuals who may wish to harm the
University could be provided with access to facilities, vehicles, laboratories, food
supplies, and other potentially vulnerable areas of the campus.
Health Sciences
The Health Sciences complex is of particular concern because of the large concentration
of research dollars and sensitive research located in the complex. Security measures
may need to be upgraded. The complex has a large transient population ranging from
7,000 to 10,000 people per day; staff, faculty, and students are not required to wear photo
I.D.; and individuals can enter freely from the UW Medical Center into HSC. Between
midnight and 8:00 a.m., one security guard walks the 22 miles of corridor (Stephanie
Steppe, Personal Interview, Oct. 2001).
Animal and genetic engineering research have been threatened or attacked in the recent
past by extremist groups. The UWPD has identified groups and individuals who pose
threats.
A key missing piece is the early identification of potentially sensitive research projects
that may need additional security. While research projects proposed for outside funding
are reviewed for use of animals, human subjects, biohazards, and other elements,
currently there is no systematic review for special safety or security requirements. In the
light of experience in recent years, this needs to be addressed. Departments and
Schools/Colleges should be reviewing at the local level, and consulting with UWPD,
C&C, Risk Management, etc., as needed.
In the HSC, specific security response plans have been developed for research projects
using animals and fetal tissue. Individual departments have developed health and safety
plans, and building emergency/evacuation plans are in place. Recent UW Medical Center
work has developed a plan for mass decontamination and quarantine space;
Environmental Health and Safety is inventorying laboratories for hazardous substances.
52
As a large complex with 285 buildings on campus, the University faces a critical issue in
locating sensitive research in secure spaces. Other buildings with specific vulnerabilities
are:
o Fluke and Wilcox Halls contain poisonous gases used for research. The gas is
stored in exposed containers. Containers are located behind locked gates, but they
are vulnerable to individuals determined to tamper with them.
o The residence halls on the Northeast campus are located near these tanks (large
tanks of liquid oxygen) and near the Cyclotron. Several residence halls have
parking garages located beneath them (vulnerable to car bombs).
o Clark Hall where the ROTC department is located and Gerberding Hall were in
the past the locations of bombings and violent protests. Also adjacent to
Gerberding Hall lies the underground Central Plaza Garage.
o Applied Physics Laboratory/Henderson Hall is located at the edge of the West
Campus near the University Bridge. Currently it conducts some classified
research funded by the military.
o Bryant Building, location of EOC and UW Police Department, sits exposed on the
waterfront and has a number of storage lockers below it that are easily accessible.
o Power Plant and West Receiving Station receive power from Seattle City Light.
They are located on busy arterial streets with additional road access around the
area.
o Utility Tunnels that carry normal and emergency power throughout the campus
can be accessed through many buildings. Access to the tunnels is restricted, and
there's a special key. Accesses from the West Receiving Station and the Power
Plant are alarmed. Maintenance staff are in the tunnels every day. Hatches out on
the campus sometimes have been vandalized--and when discovered by UWPD or
maintenance personnel are reported and repaired immediately.
UW EH&S has close ties with the State Department of Health and participates in special
Department of Health task forces, e.g., bioterrorism. UW EH&S is involved in efforts to
plan the distribution of medication in case of an emergency and works closely with the
Seattle Fire Department about the buildings and potentially hazardous materials located
on the campus.
53
An inventory of chemicals used on camps is maintained by EH&S in an online database.
A similar database for biological agents has not been developed. A key concern is that
assembling and recording this kind of information may subject it to public records
requests and thus increase the University’s vulnerability to harm.
Radioactive materials used for research are tightly controlled and monitored, and are least
likely to cause problems. The Nuclear Reactor is no longer in operation (radioactive core
is gone) although it is still considered a contaminated site. EH&S is in communication
with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the State Health Department regarding
decommissioning of the site.
Faculty are working with EH&S to track who, what, when, and where select agents are
located, yet it is assumed that the University has a low number of these select agents
located on the campus. A Federal law requires registration of any select agent obtained
and its transfer to other facilities (Van Dusen, Personal Interview, Nov. 2001). Major
surveys of laboratories are done once a year, however the staff conducting these surveys
is small to deal with the 1,000+ laboratories on campus. Any new laboratory
construction undergoes plan review with Capital Projects Office and EH&S, which also
requires certain kinds of laboratory equipment and facilities to ensure health and safety
protection (Van Dusen). Any project involving animals used must go through the animal
care committee and must be reviewed by EH&S before release. EH&S also reviews the
record of the laboratory’s performance.
Responsibility for oversight of laboratories rests with their home colleges and
departments. EH&S’s role is to provide advice and assistance, not oversight, and
bioagent research is particularly hard to keep track of. EH&S reviews research projects
at the proposal stage, but there is no direct feedback to EH&S regarding which projects
get funded. Emergency communications network needs to be improved to rapidly
disseminate information on response efforts, including building evacuations. There is no
campus-wide evacuation plan.
Communications
Communications is the heart in any major organization where intellectual
property, personnel information, medical records, and other information if not securely
protected could be accessed and used for illegal purposes or to harm the institution. A
staff of three people in Computing and Communications (C&C) are dedicated to dealing
with network security, including working with law enforcement agencies. In addition,
C&C offers consulting services to other departments on campus, and provides
recommendations to strengthen computer security, because it is seen as essential to have
54
security measures in place, as there are constant attempts to break into the system even
though in most cases they do not constitute terrorist attack. Yet most departments have
not taken advantage of these services, and usually wait till after an attack occurs.
Other forms of terrorism can make C& C vulnerable to attack. C&C’s location in part of
a building that is not owned by the University raises concerns about control of security.
The building also contains a four story parking garage with a majority of the spaces
utilized by the public. Although a key card is required to enter most parts of the building,
500 individuals have these cards. The building is located at a major intersection, very
close to the street, with an alley behind the building. C& C is reassessing the risks
associated with its location and reviewing building security (Tom Profit, Personal
Interview, October 2001).
Effects
The disaster potential of terrorism is unknown. There are no areas safe from terrorist
violence. Terrorism is a battle with no quarter, and to most terrorists, anything and
anyone is fair game; nothing is too sacred to be considered a target (Snohomish County
HIVA, 2000).
Other forms of terrorism could have major implications for the University. Cyber
terrorism attack on communications and computer systems could cause large amounts of
intellectual data, personnel information, and records to be destroyed or used for illegal
purposes.
55
Biological attacks can be far more difficult to respond to than conventional terrorist
attacks. They are covert rather than overt, so it could take some time to discover that an
attack had occurred. For example, with anthrax, up to 80 percent of people infected by
inhaled spores die within days if untreated (Weiss, 2001). By the time symptoms
appear--fever, rash, and congested lungs—it is usually too late.
56
Sidebar 8.3.3: University of Washington – DRU HAZARDS WORKSHEET
Hazardous - Fire There is a - High - Annual 1. Fixed sites, (i.e., labs and other research facilities), are the
Materials - moderate casualties Magnuson inspection most common locations for accidents, but the greatest
Incident Transportation chance for - Damage to Health conducted by vulnerability is to transportation accidents
accidents a built env’t Sciences Environment 2. Other disasters (i.e., earthquakes, landslides) could produce
- Epidemic hazardous - Disruption to Center, al Health and hazardous materials incidents.
outbreaks of materials academic - UW Safety 3. Areas up to one half mile downwind from an accident site are
illnesses incident to research and Medical considered vulnerable according to the US Dept. of
occur on business Center, Transportation, which could affect thousands of people in
campus in functions - densely populated areas.
a given - Disrupt Henderso 4. Incidents in other locations demonstrate that a single
year. transportation- n Hall, hazardous materials incident can kill or injure hundreds of
moderate -EH&S people.
impact on Storage 5. Most incidents would be localized emergencies without large
economic Building, economic impact on the University
activity - Bagley
- Increase in Hall
respiratory
aliments and
other health
problems
- Overwhelm
local
emergency
personnel, and
hospitals
Terrorism - Fires There is a - High - - Highly 1. Terrorist use threats to create fear among the public.
-Epidemic moderate casualties Magnuson controversial 2. Bombing, kidnapping, sabotage, assassination and extortion
outbreaks of chance for - Damage to Health visitors, are included in the definition of terrorist activity.
illnesses a terrorist built Sciences research or 3. Terrorism has come to depend on the mass media to extend
- Hazardous act occur environment Center event their audience from local to global and to greatly exaggerate the
naterial on campus - Disruption to - - impression of violence and its results.
releases in a given Academic Henderso Announceme 4. Weapons of Mass Destruction and increased accessibility of
- Structural year. research and n Hall nt of a more exotic agents, such as biological, chemical and nuclear
failures of business - controversial weapons heightens the concern about terrorism.
61
Primary Secondary Frequency Possible Location Ability to Major predicted impacts on UW
Hazard Hazard of Events Effects Predict
buildings functions Gerberdin decision 5. The inherent open environment of an academic research
- Non- - Disrupt g Hall - Football institution makes the UW vulnerable to terrorist activity.
structural transportation- - Clark Game Days 6. Health Sciences complex is of particular concern because of
failures of Moderate Hall, large concentration of research dollars and sensitive research
building impact on - 4545 located in the complex.
components economic building 7. Cyber terrorism attack on communications and computer
- Damaged activity - Power systems could cause large amounts of intellectual data,
lifelines - Increase in Plant personnel information, and records to be destroyed or used for
- Rioting and health illegal purposes.
looting problems 8. Contagious diseases--unlike explosions--keep spreading long
- Overwhelm after an initial attack.
local 9. Fear alone could create a mass exodus of faculty and students
emergency that could affect the financial future of this institution.
personnel,
hospitals and
blood banks
Trans- - Hazardous There is a - Human injury - - High 1. The two major effects of transportation accidents are human
portation material high and mass Montlake volume injury and hazardous material releases.
Accident release chance for casualties Blvd. traffic times 2. In heavily populated areas like the University District, there
- Fire a - Traffic jam - Pacific - Football are secondary problems such as crowd control and slow
- Civil transportati - Crowd Ave. Game Days emergency response time due to congestion.
disturbance on accident control - Stevens - Foggy or 3. For three hours, six days a year during Husky football games
to occur on problems Way inclement the chances of a major traffic accident on the University campus
campus or - Inability of - NE 45th weather increase.
in the emergency St. - High speed 4. Bigger the volume on SR520 or I-5 the greater the impact on
vicinity personnel to - SR 520 zones the University.
each day. access site - I-5 5. Draw bridge failure could cause major problems for traffic
- Overwhelm - NE 15th flow Southbound.
local Ave. 6. 28,000 people out of approximately 60,000 live within 5
emergency miles of the campus.
personnel,
hospitals and
blood banks
Urban Fire Hazardous There is a - Human injury - Older - Annual 1. Fires are caused by criminal acts, residential accidents and
material high and mass buildings inspections industrial accidents.
release chance for casualties without by EH&S, 2. Large structural fires are a substantial risk and are most
- an urban - Damage to fire Seattle Fire likely to occur in older buildings.
Conflagration fire to built suppressio Department 3. Any fire can become disastrous because any one can cause
62
Primary Secondary Frequency Possible Location Ability to Major predicted impacts on UW
Hazard Hazard of Events Effects Predict
or Fire storm occur on environment n systems, and high casualties and induce secondary impacts such as hazardous
- Civil campus in - Disruption to Magnuson Insurance materials release and damaged lifelines
disturbance a given academic Health Companies 4. A large fire could close off a large part of campus and block
- Explosion year. research and Sciences major roadways to facilitate movement of emergency vehicles.
- Structural business Center, 5. The worst case scenario would probably be connected with
failures of functions - UW an earthquake or riot.
buildings - Disruption to Medical
- Non- transportation Center,
structural - Crowd -
failures of control Henderso
building problems n Hall,
components - Inability of -EH&S
- Damaged emergency Storage
lifelines personnel to Building,
- Power access site - Bagley
outage - Overwhelm Hall
local
emergency
personnel,
hospitals and
blood banks
63
University of Washington - Hazard Impact Matrix
Expected Hazards UW Casualties Disruption Utilities Transportation Structures Non Mass Care & Secondary
Campus of Academic structural Medical Hazards
Area Research Services
Affected
Civil Disturbance High High Moderate Low Moderate Moderate High High High
Earthquake High High High High High High High High High
Flooding Low Low Low Low Low Low Low Low Low
Hazardous Materials Moderate High High Moderate High High High High High
Incident
Landslide Low Low Low Low Low Low Low Low Low
Severe Local Storm High Low Moderate Moderate High Moderate High Low High
Snow Storm High Low Moderate High High Low Low Low Moderate
Terrorism High High High Low High Moderate Moderate High High
Transportation Accident Moderate Moderate Low Low High Low Low High Moderate
Tsunami/Seiche Low High Moderate Moderate High High Moderate Low Moderate
Urban Fire High High High High High High High High High
Volcanic Eruption High Low High High High Moderate Moderate Moderate Low
Water Shortage High Low High High Low Low Low Low Low
Wind Storm High Low High High High Moderate High Low Low
HIGH: There is strong potential for a disaster of major proportions during the next 25 years; or History suggests the occurrence of multiple disasters
of moderate proportions during the next 25 years. The threat is significant enough to warrant major program effort to prepare for, respond to, recover
from, and mitigate against this hazard. This hazard should be a major focus of the County's emergency management training and exercise program.
MEDIUM: There is moderate potential for a disaster of less than major proportions during the next 25 years. The threat is great enough to warrant
modest effort to prepare for, respond to, recover from, and mitigate against this hazard. This hazard should be included in the county's emergency
management training and exercise program.
64
LOW: There is little potential for a disaster during the next 25 years. The threat is such as to warrant no special effort to prepare for, respond to,
recover from, or mitigate against this hazard. This hazard need not be specifically addressed in the county's emergency management training and
exercise program except as generally dealt with during hazard awareness training. Source: Thurston County Office of Emergency Management –
HIVA
65
Sidebar 8.3.5: Excerpts from the UW Annex for the 2003 Washington State Hazard Mitigation Plan
Through the primary missions of education, research and public service, the University
makes a substantial economic impact on the state of Washington. The University
employs the full-time equivalent of 23,000 people and has a $2.2 billion annual budget
(Fueling Our State’s Economic Future, 2002). The funds spent on salaries, equipment,
goods, services and capital expenditures circulate through the economy, generating even
more economic activity through job creation and demand for goods and services. This
recirculation of money through the economy was estimated to be $6 billion (Fueling Our
State’s Economic Future, 2002). Furthermore, the presence of the University is estimated
to have created an additional 56,000 jobs. As the University has become more integrated
into the economy, the total economic impact that it makes has increased from $3.4 billion
1995 to $4.8 billon today, even as state investment in the University has remained under
$414 million per year (Fueling Our State’s Economic Future, 2002).
With its 643-acre campus located in the city of Seattle, the University is a powerful
magnet for attracting investment and produces a highly educated workforce for the Puget
Sound region and the state. A significant natural or human-caused hazard would affect
the University’s people, programs and facilities. Hazards affecting the Seattle Main
Campus were evaluated in the 2001 University of Washington Hazard Identification and
Vulnerability Assessment (UW HIVA), prepared as part of the FEMA-funded Disaster
Resistant University (DRU) Project.
Along with terrorism and urban fire, earthquakes are the most destructive natural hazard
the University faces. Three major earthquakes have affected the University in the past 52
years (in 1949, 1965 and 2001). New information about the nature and extent of the
seismic threats in Seattle and the Puget Sound region increases the urgency for University
planning. The majority of potential damage and causalities would come from building
damage and the effects of unsecured equipment and other non-structural elements throughout
campus buildings. The secondary hazards of fire and release of hazardous materials could
overwhelm University resources. If the University prepares for earthquake, the impacts of the
other hazards would be mitigated as well.
This report also addresses severe storms, which, based on an historical record of high frequency,
could affect the entire campus. According to the UW HIVA, the following natural hazards have
been assessed to have minimal impact on the University’s Seattle Main Campus:
Avalanche: University of Washington Seattle Main Campus is not located in an area for
avalanche activity.
Drought: University of Washington Seattle campus will have minimal direct impact
from water shortages.
Flood: University of Washington Seattle campus is not located in a NFIP designated
flood hazard zone.
Landslide: University of Washington does not have designated landslide areas on the
Seattle Main Campus.
Tsunami: University of Washington Seattle campus is not located in a tsunami
inundation zone.
Volcano: University of Washington Seattle campus is not located in a volcano hazard
zone and will not be impacted directly from a lahar.
Future updates to the Agency Annex for the 2003 Washington State Hazard Mitigation
Plan will evaluate terrorism and urban fire in more detail. Future updates will also include the
vulnerabilities of the UW Tacoma and UW Bothell campuses as well as University-owned off-
campus sites. Essentially, the University must have an all-hazards
approach to recovering quickly from natural and human-caused events in order to
preserve the institution and its valuable services.
As a condition of receiving federal mitigation financial assistance after November 1, 2003, states
and localities must prepare a plan that addresses natural hazards following a
FEMA requirement as set forth in Section 322, Mitigation Planning, of the Robert T.
Stafford Disaster Relief Emergency Assistance Act, enacted by Section 104 of the
Disaster Mitigation Act of 2000.
The Agency Annex for the 2003 Washington State Hazard Mitigation Plan will guide the
University in protecting its people, its facilities, environment, equipment and systems by
identifying appropriate initiatives and projects. It will also help the University to prepare
business resumption plans in order to resume normal education and research operations
as quickly as possible following a disaster.
67
Establish mutual aid agreements with local utility providers, as well as with out-of- area
campuses and contractors, to quickly restore loss of critical infrastructure systems.
68
Cooperate with the City of Seattle and adjacent communities to improve traffic flow on
street networks surrounding and leading to the University.
Develop a campus evacuation plan including staged departures and designated alternate
route to ensure a safe and orderly evacuation of campus in coordination with the City of
Seattle and surrounding communities.
For security reasons, other sections of the Hazard Mitigation Plan are not available for public
viewing. Please call the UW Office of Emergency Management at (206) 897-8000 or email at
disaster@u.washington.edu for more information.
69
Additional Sources of Information on the 2003 Blackout
70
University of Central Oklahoma DRU Program
http://nemesis.ucok.edu/ucodru/index.htm
71
Glossary of Terms:
Cold Rolling - The rolling of metal at a temperature below the softing point of the metal. This
allows work hardening during forming
Force Majeure - French for an act of God; an inevitable, unpredictable act of nature, not
dependent on an act of man. Used in insurance contracts to refer to acts of nature such as
earthquakes or lightning
HVAC - A system that provides heating, ventilation and/or cooling within or associated with a
building
Kilowatt-Hour (kWh) - 1,000 watts for one hour. A measure of electric power consumption.
Power Grid - A network of electric power lines and associated equipment used to transmit and
distribute electricity over a geographic area.
Y2K Crisis - Year 2000. The Year 2000 problem was the possibility that financial institutions'
computer systems would fail on 1 January 2000 and spark a loss of public confidence in
individual institutions or at worst, in the financial system as a whole. In the event, the arrival of
Y2K was virtually incident-free.
72
Acronyms:
73
Discussion Questions
General
1. Why should a business consider the risks of suppliers and customers when conducting
BCCM planning?
3. Are there any benefits that a business can enjoy as result of BCCM planning outside of
times of disaster?
4. Should the government require BCCM planning for publicly traded companies? Why or
why not?
5. What BCCM requirements are placed on private sector businesses by the National
Response Plan (2004) and the National Incident Management System (2004)?
6. What are the similarities between municipal emergency planning and BCCM planning?
What are the differences?
7. Why does a business need to look beyond the data needs of the company when
conducting BCCM planning?
2003 Blackout
1. Is it surprising that so much money was lost by US businesses during the 2003 blackout?
Would you have expected that much, more, or less? Explain your answer.
2. Should the utility companies be liable for business losses during blackouts? Why or why
not?
5. Is it possible to bring the amount of business lost during a blackout like the one that
occurred in 2003 to zero dollars? Explain your answer.
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Disaster Resistant Universities
1. How are universities like traditional businesses? How are they different? How do these
similarities and differences affect Business Continuity Planning?
2. What is the appropriate role for students in the development and implementation of
Business Continuity Planning and Emergency Preparedness and Response at a
University?
3. What lessons and experience can universities borrow from municipal emergency
management?
4. Why is it vital to the DRU process that participation is garnered from members of the
greater community within which the university operates?
5. Should the Federal Government require that this process be conducted by all US
universities? Why or why not?
6. If your university were to close, in what ways would the community be affected?
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Suggested Out Of Class Exercises
1. Learn the basics of business continuity planning. Contact a small business in your
community and offer to volunteer your time to help them prepare a business continuity
plan.
2. Research and critique your Universities’ Business Continuity Plan and overall emergency
response readiness. Is the Business Continuity Plan appropriately available and
communicated to all stakeholders?
3. Find out if your university participates in the DRU program. If so, discuss with them the
planning process, and report your findings to the class. If they are not participating, find
out what they have done to prepare for disasters and report these findings to the class
instead.
4. Contact your local emergency management office. Interview the emergency manager to
find out how local businesses participate in the emergency planning process of the
community. Report your findings to the class.
5. Visit the website of the Public Entity Risk Institute (PERI – www.riskinstitute.org).
Download their publications describing BCP for municipal offices. Learn the differences
and similarities between businesses and public entities.
6. Download and take the free FEMA Higher Education Project course entitled “Business
and Industry Crisis Management.”
(http://www.training.fema.gov/emiweb/edu/busind.asp)
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