LETTER FROM THE EXECUTIVE BOARD

Greetings, Delegates!

It gives us immense pleasure to welcome you to this simulation of the United Nations General
Assembly (DISEC) at IIM Rohtak Model UN Conference 2020.

This guide endeavors to serve a purpose, to provoke you into asking questions, not only in the
context of disarmament, on political expediency and its role in provocation of conflict, bi-
polarization and capitalism and their role in military proliferation, morality of foreign military
bases, but also on more fundamental questions so that we are able to sensitize ourselves to these
grave issues.

This guide will definitely attempt to give a comprehensive conceptual understanding to the
technicalities of our committee and the agenda. However, to acquaint oneself with the various
perspectives of the agenda, policy specific research is also required. This guide shall provide an
overview of a multitude of concepts concerning the agenda and will give numerous links to
documents and videos for your reference. This simulation of the UN General Assembly shall
establish an atmosphere very conducive for debate to ensure that we are able to hone our problem
solving and negotiation skills and secure a productive output of this committee. This simulation
shall follow the UNA USA Rules of Procedure with slight modifications. However, the will of
the committee shall be of paramount importance. No decision shall be taken arbitrarily by the
Executive Board and complete transparency and accountability will be maintained throughout the
committee proceedings.

For those attending a Model UN Conference for the first time, we will attempt to make this a
holistic learning experience for you. We urge you to go through the Rules of Procedure,
Background Guide and the Bibliography Section thoroughly. Do not be anxious about awards,
because what ultimately matters is what you take back from the committee in terms of your
development, skills and ways of analysis.

Please note that our obligations as members of the Executive Board transcend the two days of this
conference. All our activities must be justifiable and subject to scrutiny. In case you are concerned
regarding any act of the members of the Executive Board, we request you to point it out
immediately. We shall remain accountable to all participants after the conference. You may consult
us regarding any justifications or feedback after the conference.

We wish you the very best and reiterate our hope for fruitful debate and a productive conference.

Regards,
The Executive Board
UN General Assembly (DISEC)
Bhawna Chowdhary (President) (bhawnarojh@gmail.com)
Kartik Kalra (Vice President) (kartik.kalra601@gmail.com)
PROOF/EVIDENCE IN UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY

Evidence or proof is acceptable from sources, with regards to establishing veracity of facts
including through points of order. However, that in no way should deter you to refer to a
broad spectrum of resources for your research.

1. News Sources
● Reuters: Any Reuters’ article which unambiguously makes mention of the fact stated or is
in contradiction of the fact being stated by another delegate in council can be used to
substantiate arguments in the committee. (https://in.reuters.com/news/world)
● State-operated News Agencies: These reports can be used in support of or against the
State that owns the News Agency. They, however, can be denied by any other country in the
council. Some examples are:
○ RIA Novosti (Russia): https://ria.ru/
○ IRNA (Iran): http://www.irna.ir/ENIndex.htm
○ Xinhua News Agency and CCTV (PR China): http://cctvnews.cntv.cn/

2. Government Reports: These reports can be used in a similar way as the State Operated
News Agencies reports and can, in all circumstances, be denied by another country. However, a
report being denied by a certain country can still be accepted by the Executive Board as credible
information. Some examples are:

● Government Websites like the State Department of the United States of America
http://www.state.gov/index.htm or the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation
http://www.eng.mil.ru/en/index.htm

● Ministry of Foreign Affairs of various nations like India

(http://www.mea.gov.in/) or People’s Republic of China
(http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/)

● Permanent Representatives to the United Nations Reports

https://protocol.un.org/dgacm/pls/site.nsf/files/HoM/$FILE/HeadsofMissions.p df

● Multilateral Organizations:
o NATO (http://www.natolibguides.info/nato-russia/reports)
o ASEAN (http://www.aseansec.org/)
o OPEC (https://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/publications/336.htm)

3. UN Reports: All UN Reports are considered are credible information for this
simulation.
 ● UN Bodies:
○ UNSC (https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/)
○ UNGA (https://www.un.org/en/sections/general/documents/index.html).

● UN Affiliated bodies:
○ International Atomic Energy Agency (https://www.iaea.org/)
○ World Bank (https://www.worldbank.org/)
○ International Monetary Fund (https://www.imf.org/external/index.htm)
○ International Committee of the Red Cross (https://www.icrc.org/en).

● Treaty Based Bodies:

○ Antarctic Treaty System (https://www.ats.aq/e/ats.htm)
○ International Criminal Court (https://www.icc-cpi.int/)

4. Subsidiary Organs of the UN

○ Peacebuilding Commission
(https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/content/repertoire/peacebuilding-
commission)

○ International Law Commission: (http://legal.un.org/ilc/)

5. Under no circumstances would sources including and reminiscent to:

o Wikipedia (https://www.wikipedia.org/) or
o Amnesty International (https://www.amnesty.org/en/) be accepted in the
Committee.
CONTENTS
Agenda I: The Destabilizing Effect of Foreign Military Bases in Sovereign StatesError! Bookmark not
defined.
Agenda II: Development in the field of information and telecommunications in the context of international security
........................................................................................................................... Error! Bookmark not defined.
Letter from the executive board ...........................................................................2
PROOF/EVIDENCE IN UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY ............................................................3
1. News Sources......................................................................................................................................3
4. Subsidiary Organs of the UN............................................................................................................4
Agenda I ........................................................................................................6
The Destabilizing Effect of Foreign Military Bases in Sovereign States.....................6
Foreign Military Bases: The Issue ...........................................................................6
Why States Wish to Establish Foreign Bases: A Case Study ....................................7
The Argument of National Security ....................................................................8
Foreign Military Bases Under International Law .........................................................9
The Visiting Force and The Status of Force Agreements ........................................9
Impacts of Foreign Military Bases in Host States ............................................... 11
Sustainability of Foreign Military Bases ........................................................... 11
Important Topics for Discussion ..................................................................... 13
Agenda II....................................................................................................... 14
DEVELOPMENT IN THE FIELD OF INFORMATION AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS IN THE CONTEXT OF
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ............................................................................................................................. 14
INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................... 14
Inception ...................................................................................................... 14
Inherent Issues ............................................................................................... 15
The Process From 1999 To 2003 ......................................................................... 17
2004 GGE .................................................................................................... 18
2009 GGE .................................................................................................... 19
Key Developments And Positions So Far ................................................................ 20
Looking Forward – The 2012-13 GGE .................................................................... 21
REFERENCES .............................................................................................. 24
AGENDA I
THE DESTABILIZING EFFECT OF FOREIGN MILITARY BASES IN
SOVEREIGN STATES

Foreign Military Bases: The Issue

Till World War II, foreign military bases indicated extraordinary international behavior such as
occupation during hostilities or colonial dominance. The British Colonial Naval Base System
was the first of this sort, and has undergone extensive normalization since.

It is estimated that the US and USSR alone deploy more then one million men in their foreign
bases. US military presence worldwide is more dispersed in 1,500 locations in over a hundred
countries.

Since the end of World War II and the early days of the Cold War, when the United States built or
acquired most of its overseas bases, Americans have considered it normal to have U.S. military
installations in other countries, on other people’s land. The presence of bases overseas has long
been accepted unquestioningly and treated as an obvious good, essential to national security and
global peace. Perhaps these bases

register in our consciousness when there’s an anti-base protest in Okinawa or an

accident in Germany. Quickly, however, they’re forgotten. Of course, people living near U.S.
bases in countries worldwide pay them more attention.

For many, U.S. bases are one of the most prominent symbols of the United States, along with
Hollywood movies, pop music, and fast food. While there are no freestanding foreign bases on
U.S. soil, today there are around eight hundred U.S. bases in foreign countries, occupied by
hundreds of thousands of U.S. troops.

Although the United States has long had some bases in foreign lands, this massive global
deployment of military force was unknown in U.S. history before World War

II. Now, seventy years after that war, there are still, according to the Pentagon, 174
U.S. bases in Germany, 113 in Japan, and 83 in South Korea. There are hundreds more
dotting the planet in Aruba and Australia, Bahrain and Bulgaria, Colombia, Kenya, and
Qatar.

Worldwide, the US has bases in more than seventy countries. Although few U.S. citizens realize
it, the US probably has more bases in other people’s lands than any other people, nation, or
empire in world history. And yet the subject is barely discussed in the media. Rarely does
anyone ask whether the US needs hundreds of bases overseas, or whether they can afford them.
Rarely does anyone consider how US citizens would feel with a foreign base on U.S. soil, or how
they would react if China, Russia, or Iran built even a single base somewhere near our borders
today. For most in the United States, the idea of even the nicest, most benign foreign troops
arriving with their tanks, planes, and high-powered weaponry and making themselves at home
in our country—occupying and fencing off hundreds or thousands of acres of our land—is
unthinkable.

Rafael Correa, the president of Ecuador, highlighted this rarely considered truth in 2009 when
he refused to renew the lease for a U.S. base in his country. Correa told

reporters that he would approve the lease renewal on one condition: “They let us put a base in
Miami—an Ecuadorian base.” “If there’s no problem having foreign soldiers on a country’s soil,”
Correa quipped, “surely they’ll let us have an Ecuadorian base in the United States.”

Why States Wish to Establish Foreign Bases: A Case Study

After the end of World War II, the idea that US should have a large collection of bases and
hundreds of thousands of troops permanently stationed overseas has been a quasi- religious
dictum of U.S. foreign and national security policy. The opening words of a

U.S. Army War College study bluntly declare: “U.S. national security strategy requires
access to overseas military bases.”

The policy underlying this deeply held belief is known as the “forward strategy.” These two
words, this wonky term of art, have had profound implications. Cold War policy held that the
United States should maintain large concentrations of military forces and bases as close as
possible to the Soviet Union, in order to hem in and

“contain” supposed Soviet expansionism. Suddenly, as the historian George Stambuk explains,
“the security of the United States, in the minds of policy-makers, lost much of its former
inseparability from the concept of the territory of the United States.”

Two decades after the Soviet Union’s collapse, in a world without another superpower rival, people
across the political spectrum still believe as a matter of faith that overseas bases and troops are
essential to protecting the country. At a time when bipartisanship has hit all-time lows, there are
few issues more widely agreed upon by both Republicans and Democrats alike. The George W.
Bush administration, for

example, proclaimed that bases abroad have “maintained the peace” and provided
“symbols of … U.S. commitments to allies and friends.” The Obama administration, for its part,
declared that “forward-stationed and rotationally deployed U.S. forces

continue to be relevant and required” as they “provide a stabilizing influence abroad.”

The Argument of National Security

Most crucially, it’s not at all clear that U.S. bases overseas actually protect national security and
global peace. During the Cold War, there was an argument to be made that to some extent U.S.
bases in Europe and Asia played a legitimate defensive role. In the absence of a superpower
enemy today, however, the argument that bases many thousands of miles from U.S. shores are
necessary to defend the United States—or even its allies—is much harder to sustain.

To the contrary, the global collection of bases has generally been offensive in nature, making it all
too easy to launch interventionist wars of choice that have resulted in repeated disasters, costing
millions of lives from Vietnam to Iraq and Afghanistan.

There are also questions about the degree to which bases actually increase host country safety.
The presence of U.S. bases can turn a country into a target for foreign powers or militants.

Rather than stabilizing dangerous regions, foreign bases frequently heighten military tensions and
discourage diplomatic solutions to conflicts. Placing U.S. bases near the borders of countries such
as China, Russia, and Iran, for example, increases threats to their security and encourages them to
respond by boosting their own military spending. Again, imagine how U.S. leaders would respond
if Iran were to build even a single small base in Mexico, Canada, or the Caribbean.

Notably, the most dangerous moment during the Cold War—the Cuban missile crisis—revolved
around the creation of Soviet nuclear missile facilities roughly ninety miles from the U.S. border.
Similarly, one of the most dangerous episodes in the post– Cold War era—Russia’s seizure of
Crimea and its involvement in the war in Ukraine—has come after the United States encouraged
the enlargement of NATO and built a growing number of bases closer and closer to Russian
borders.

Indeed, a major motivation behind Russia’s actions has likely been its interest in maintaining
perhaps the most important of its small collection of foreign bases, the naval base in the Crimean
port Sevastopol. West-leaning Ukrainian leaders’ desire to join NATO posed a direct threat to the
base, and thus to the power of the Russian navy.

Perhaps most troubling of all, the creation of new U.S. bases to protect against an alleged future
Chinese or Russian threat runs the risk of becoming a self-fulfilling prophecy. By provoking a
Chinese and Russian military response, these bases may help create the very threat against which
they are supposedly designed to protect. In other words, far from making the world a safer place,
U.S. bases overseas can actually make war more likely and America less secure.

Foreign Military Bases Under International Law

By definition, a military base is an installation created to serve as support for military operations
and logistics. These facilities can play different roles, being related to several types of bases, such
as navy, land or air bases. Depending on the role it takes, there are many functions that these
settlements can exert: test-ranges for new weaponry, posts of intelligence operations, platforms
for military operations, weaponry stock or even as host for military corps.

The main controversial issue concerning military bases is its establishment in foreign states’
territory, a common practice related to global distribution of power in spheres of influence.
Usually linked with great powers’ foreign policy, military installations abroad have led the
international community to many debates associated with the principle of sovereignty.
Sovereignty is a concept which has its roots in philosophers from Socrates to Thomas Hobbes.
However, the idea formally became a principle in the Westphalian context where the Nation-
states were born. It represents the highest authority exerted by a legal state within its territory.

Thus, state sovereignty is directly linked with the notion of borders and territory. Territory is
simultaneously a condition for a state to exist and a limitation to its rights: in principle, a state is
sovereign only in its territory.

Sovereignty, in regard to a portion of the globe, has been described as a right to exercise
therein, to the exclusion of any other state, the function of a state.

Therefore, according to this concept of sovereignty, no other state can impose its jurisdiction
abroad, only inside its own territory. In other words, the principle of sovereignty of a state
clashes with the implementation of military bases belonging to other country inside another
one’s territory.

In this sense, as the presence of foreign military bases increased since the late of the 20th
century, the need to solve this paradox and the importance of regulating this situation based on
International Law have become apparent .The results of this discussion were the Visiting Force
Agreement (VFA) and the Status of Force Agreement (SOFA).

The Visiting Force and The Status of Force Agreements

The Visiting Force Agreement (VFA) and the Status of Force Agreement (SOFA) have basically the
same meanings. The only substantial difference between them is their scope: the VFA covers
forces which are temporally present in a foreign territory, while the SOFA regulates the situation
of military installations effectively established in a host state.
Both agreements are created to formalize the superiority of extraterritorial jurisdiction on civil
law. The principle of extraterritoriality refers to the exercise of legal power beyond a state’s
territorial borders.

Thus, VFAs and SOFAs are multilateral or bilateral agreements that generally
establish the framework under which a state’s military forces can operate in a foreign country.

However, a formal document which specifies the guidelines of these agreements does not exist yet.
Then, VFAs and SOFAs are required by states when it is necessary for a specific purpose, but these
agreement’s rules are shaped according to the negotiations among countries involved.

Commonly, the main issue concerning SOFAs is related to the jurisdiction which will prevail in
that specific area, but other provisions dealing with subjects such as taxes and fees, test-ranges for
weaponry and number of troops are also included in the SOFA’s scope.

The most important multilateral SOFA is the NATO SOFA, from 1949, among USA and NATO’s
countries. This is the only Status of Force Agreement concluded as part of a treaty. Composed of
20 articles, the NATO SOFA is an example of shared jurisdictions.

Under the shared jurisdiction framework, each of the respective countries is provided exclusive
jurisdiction in specific circumstances, generally when an offense is only punishable by one of the
country’s laws. In that case, the country whose law has been offended has exclusive jurisdiction
over the offender.

When the offense violates the laws of both countries, concurrent jurisdiction is present and
additional qualifications are used to determine which country will be allowed to assert jurisdiction
over the offender.

This shared jurisdiction gives a cooperative nature to NATO SOFA, unlike what happens with
other bilateral agreement such as the VFA between USA and Mongolia. Based on this document,
the USA have exclusive jurisdiction over US personnel,

according to US laws. Any offense against Mongolia’s laws shall be referred to US authorities.
There is no requirement for the United States to waive jurisdiction, only to give “sympathetic
consideration” of any such request.

Finally, the other multilateral SOFA of great importance is the United Nations SOFA. It is based
on pacific principles, being the official guidelines to peace-keeping operations. Since 2002, in the
context of the peace-keeping mission in Bosnia, the USA and other countries started to request
immunity to their troops for fear of being prosecuted for a crime by the International Criminal
Court (ICC). As a result, UN has adopted a SOFA for peace-keeping operations that provides
broader sending-state criminal jurisdiction than the NATO SOFA.

Therefore, with all these agreements, the establishment of foreign military bases has become
more regulated in accordance to International Law. With this, great powers can appeal to the
principle of extraterritoriality, which is the main base of Visiting Forces and Status of Force
Agreements, to extend the protection of their law to their forces installed abroad.

Impacts of Foreign Military Bases in Host States

Normally, one nation allows another states’ foreign presence in its territory if they are allies or if
they share the same perception of a common threat

However, the long-term presence of a country in a host state can result in political,
environmental and social problems. The establishment of overseas bases can bring political
instability to the region in question.

If agreements as SOFA’s are negotiated with non-popular local governments, the foreign presence
can be seen as an authoritarian policy by the population and by other states as well.

Moreover, in the course of time, a military infrastructure can represent a threat to the host
country, undermining regional security and representing vulnerability to foreign attacks. Finally,
being a host nation effectively means losing sovereignty over part of its own territory to another
state.

From the environmental viewpoint, military bases can be aggressions practiced at the local level.
The testing of new weaponry, including chemical and nuclear weapons, might represent a risk of
contamination and of accidents. Substances based on uranium, for example, can infect the soil
and the water, reaching the whole population.

Social instabilities are resultants of political and environmental problems associated with
crimes that involve foreign personnel as well.

Sustainability of Foreign Military Bases

Keeping military bases abroad represents huge costs to great powers: large investments in
infrastructure result in heavy burdens to public budgets, even to the USA.
Bases system depends on relative positions regarding sources of supply, boundaries of enemies’
territories and targets’ localizations. These conditions associated with costs for defense in the area
make international projection an expensive undertaking.

It is expected that costs will rise even higher as a consequence of the new self- governing posture
adopted by many host countries. Since large foreign presence can bring internal vulnerabilities,
it has become a common practice to charge fees from great powers wanting to establish bases in
foreign territories.

Thus, it has become essential to establish international guidelines which regulate the impacts and
the sustainability of foreign military bases. The existence of a vast number of situations where
military bases abroad are employed makes this an even more complex discussion, which, in the
end, aims to create standards by which states and the International Law could control great
powers’ presence overseas.
Important Topics for Discussion

1. Discussing the Efficacy and Practicality of Foreign Military Bases

2. Discussing National Security Concerns of Host States
3. Discussing the Validity of Such Bases Under International Law
4. Discussion over Social Anxiety and Fear Caused by Foreign Military Presence in Host
States
5. State Sovereignty and Foreign Military Bases
AGENDA II
DEVELOPMENT IN THE FIELD OF INFORMATION AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS
IN THE CONTEXT OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

INTRODUCTION

With the UN General Assembly convening the third time a Group of Governmental Experts (GGE)
in 2012 to address threats to international information security in the Disarmament and
International Security Committee (also known as the First Committee), here we will have the
debate regarding the work done by the First Committee in the field of international information
security, highlights key national positions and discussion and looks at the challenges facing the
upcoming GGE discussions.

The Disarmament and International Security Committee (also the First Committee) is one of the
six so-called ‘main’ committees enabling the General Assembly to ‘parallel process’ items on its
agenda during each session. Holding permanent status since 1956, the First Committee deals with
international peace and security and is suited to evaluate aspects of information security that could
pose a threat to international peace and security and, consequently, could, upon national initiative,
go before the Security Council for an actual enforcement action.

The past activities of the First Committee include international concerns of nuclear non-
proliferation, chemical and biological weapons and weapons of mass destruction. Further, the
disarmament of outer space and prevention of a space arms race has been addressed by the First
Committee, as well as issues involving regional security and terrorism.

Inception

The first tabling by Russia of developments in the field of information and communications in the
context of international security with the First Committee in 1998 was hardly fortuitous. After
years of pursuing strict control over the acquisition of advanced technology by the Eastern Bloc the
US had focused on the commercial potential of the Internet while at the same time increasingly
integrating information and communication technologies (ICTs) into its military doctrine.
Following an unsuccessful attempt to negotiate a bilateral presidential statement on international
information security with the US, Russia selected the UN as one of the key forums to promote
international information security.

A special letter was sent by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation to the UN
Secretary-General in September 1998, accompanied by a draft resolution on “Developments in the
field of information and telecommunications in the context of international security” (hereinafter
the Resolution).The initial draft of the Resolution proposed an ‘inventory of information
technologies’ in order to ‘prevent military applications thereof that may be compared to the use of
weapons of mass destruction’.

A month later Russia introduced an edited version of the Resolution to the First Committee and
after further minor revisions the General Assembly adopted the Resolution by consensus.

Inherent Issues

From the beginning a deep and constructive discussion of international information security in the
UN First Committee has been challenged by principally different approaches to “information
security” by the US and other liberal democracies on one side and the Shanghai Cooperation
Organization (SCO) countries on the other. Disagreement extends to key definitions; exact scoping
of the topic; threat perception as well as the mandate and role of the UN in general and the First
Committee in particular in resolving international information security issues.

Russia’s definition of international information security promotes stability and elimination of

threats to both information and communication infrastructure and the information itself. Liberal
democracies have taken a principled position on Freedom of Expression grounds against the notion
that concepts of security should include the information itself and have focused exclusively on the
security of infrastructure and networks.

Having avoided defining terms like “information security”, “information network and
infrastructure security” and “cybersecurity”, the US has emphasized information security as an
aspect of global communications, economic cooperation and trade, intellectual property rights, law
enforcement, anti-terrorist cooperation and international peace and security and promoted
ensuring the reliability, availability and integrity of national and global information networks. On a
separate note the US has pointed out that the general topic of information security is much larger
than projected for the First Committee.

The Resolution addresses criminal, terrorist and military uses of ICTs. On the one hand this has led
to several countries focusing their replies to aspects of general telecommunications and criminal
uses of ICTs, of which others have simply noted that these issues have already been addressed by
other forums.

Conceptual differences extend to perceived threats to information and telecommunications in the

context of international security. In the face of Russia and a few others conceptualizing information
itself as a weapon, some countries analogizing the potential danger posed by information weapons
and information warfare to those of weapons of mass destruction and western block has hardly
touched upon the issue of information warfare and weapons, principally rejecting the need for
disarmament and non-proliferation and emphasizing the criminal misuse of IT is a challenge to the
interests of all States.

With differing views as to the object and nature of the threat, it is not surprising that countries also
disagree about the role of the First Committee in addressing international information security.
Russia and others have projected the UN and the First Committee as an appropriate forum to
address a wide spectrum of threats to include military, terrorist and criminal uses of ICT, whereas
the United States, Australia and the EU countries have been willing to accept a more limited role of
the First Committee in information security. Russia has emphasized ‘obvious need’ for
international legal regulation of the worldwide development of civilian and military

information technology. Others have opined that a legal instrument that would restrict the
development or use of certain civil and/ or military technologies is unnecessary and that the law of
armed conflict is applicable to military applications of information technologies. Further countries
have agreed with the need to develop international principles to address information security. Still
others have emphasized the applicability of other international norms in the field of information
security.

In the absence of a common understanding about the scope and focus of information security both
in the context of the First Committee discussions and on a more global scale, the US has proposed
that formulation of overarching principles pertaining to information security in all its aspects
would be premature, that ‘a substantive amount of systematic thinking’ is needed before going
further. Brazil has recommended that the issue of criminal and terrorist activities be separated from
that of cyberwarfare and the potential need for disarmament and non- proliferation.

The Process From 1999 To 2003

With the US, Australia and the EU countries particularly unenthusiastic about engaging in a debate
about disarmament in the context of ICT, the process, between 1999 and 2004, mainly involved
written input from national governments not engaging in a deeper discussion on the topic in the
First Committee.

In 2001, after two years of sponsoring the Resolution, Russia proposed the establishment of a
special group of governmental experts (GGE) to consider existing and potential threats in the
sphere of information security, possible cooperative measures, and to conduct a study of
international information security issues. This proposal was followed up with a list of issues to be
addressed by the group. Russia expected to ‘give the international community a unique opportunity
to examine the entire range of issues involved’ as ‘no generally accepted appropriate international
standards or instruments exist dealing with questions of information security from the standpoint
of measures to reduce existing and potential global threats to information security’.

In response, the US reiterated that the key threats to cyber security are criminal attacks by
organized crime, individual hackers and non-State actors, including terrorists. ‘The benefits of
cyberspace can best be protected by focusing both on the effective criminalization by States of the
misuse of information technology and on the systematic national implementation of measures
designed to prevent damage to critical information infrastructures no matter the source of the
threat’. With respect to military applications of information technology, the US considered an
international convention to be ‘completely unnecessary’ as ‘the law of armed conflict and its
principles of necessity, proportionality and limitation of collateral damage already govern the use
of such technologies’.

Remaining generally sceptical about the role of the First Committee in international information
security discussions, the US, supported by Australia and the EU countries, suggested that the
GGE’s efforts should be informed by recent multilateral efforts to enhance regional cyber security,
such as those of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Telecommunications Forum, the
Organization of American States, the World Summit on the Information Society and the G8.

Several countries supported assigning the UN should with the tasks related to a wide array of
information security aspects. Still others pointed out the potential of bilateral arrangements.

2004 GGE

In June 2004 the first GGE convened with experts appointed by the Secretary-General on the basis
of equitable geographical distribution. The group comprised nations including Belarus, Brazil,
China, France, Germany, India, Jordan, South Korea, Malaysia, Mali, Mexico, Russia, South Africa,
United Kingdom and the United States.

As A.V. Krutskikh, the Russian diplomat chairing the first (and later the second) GGE has
observed, the work of experts was characterized by significant differences on key aspects of
international information security with Russia, China, Brazil and Belarus promoting the right of
States to ensure their own information security without limitations and the adoption of a new
international regime and the US and ‘European countries’ rejecting any references to disarmament
in the report.

The considerable differences of views contributed to the failure to adopt a consensus report. In a
procedural report, Krutskikh referred to ‘very limited time in which to consider a whole range of
comprehensive issues that are confronting the international community with fundamentally new
and sensitive problems. He concluded that ‘even with the use of translation, the members of the
GGE spoke different languages with respect to essential issues related to international information
security’ and that ‘various States have different laws regulating issues related to ensuring
information security and cyber security’. Krutskikh further noted ‘differing interpretations of
current international law in the area of international information security’.

Despite the difficulties faced by the first GGE, Russia proposed to continue ‘consideration of
international information security in all its aspects’ and offered to resume the work of the GGE,
encouraging the participation of States in the group who did not have the opportunity to
participate from 2004-2005.
After the first GGE process, the dynamics of the First Committee discussions on international
information security changed considerably. Russia opened the resolution for co-sponsorship, while
the United States started voting against it in subsequent years. Between 2005 and 2008 the US was
the sole country to vote against the Resolution that attracted 30 co-sponsors during the same time.

2009 GGE

In the face of Russia favouring enlarging the group, the UN GA decided that the GGE, to begin work
in 2009, be set up under the same principles as the first one. The members of the 2009 GGE
included Belarus, Brazil, China, Estonia, France, Germany, India, Israel, Italy, South Korea,
Qatar, Russia, South Africa, United Kingdom and the United States.

The second GGE convened under rather different circumstances than its predecessor five years
earlier. Estonia had suffered a cyber incident of national security relevance in 2007, Georgia had
witnessed cyber-attacks accompanying kinetic warfare and Lithuania, after suffering politically
motivated cyber incidents in 2008, had reported that it regarded cyber security as an important
element of its national security. All these incidents had happened under the circumstances of
political tension between the victim nations and Russia and in every case, government level
statements had been made about Russia’s involvement in the incidents.

With the Obama administration having adopted a cooperative approach to international security
the US had engaged in bilateral discussions on cyber security with Russia and China, who, along
with Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan had signed an information
security agreement under the patronage of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. NATO was
beginning to consider cyber threats of military relevance.

Despite continuing differences regarding binding agreements and the need to address non-state
actors, the second GGE resulted in a general recognition of the existence of international security
relevant information security threats.

The main takeaways from the second GGE were a consensus to continue discussing norms
pertaining to State use of ICTs, to reduce collective risk and protect national and international
infrastructure. Further, the countries recommended confidence-building, stability and risk
reduction measures to address the implications of State use of ICTs, including further exchange of
national views on the use of ICTs in conflict.

Recommendations also met the request of several nations to elaborate common terms and
definitions relevant to the Resolution. Further, information exchange on national legislation and
national ICT security strategies, policies and best practices were recommended as well as
identification of measures to support capacity-building in less developed countries.

Key Developments and Positions So Far

Having regarded the First Committee as a rather remote forum for discussing information security
a decade ago, and initially doubting its role as a self-standing discussion venue, nations have over
time acknowledged the niche of the First Committee in dealing with information security threats of
international security relevance. By its mandate, position and membership, the First Committee is
a unique forum for discussing the ‘high end’ of information security threats.

With over 50 nations having contributed to the First Committee discussions on international
information security over the past 15 years, the key strategic players in the process have been Russia
and the United States, each having gathered a coalition of like-minded partners.

Additionally, a series of bilateral talks and programs related to security in the context of uses of
ICTs have been initiated between Russia, China and the United States as well as between several
other UN countries.

In September 2011, China, Russia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan submitted to the UN GA a proposal
for an International Code of Conduct for Information Security. A US House Resolution earlier this
year has called on the Obama administration to oppose the Code of Conduct.

One of the few points all countries seem to have accepted is the general need for international
cooperation and collaboration for the purposes of global information security. With the definition
of the latter still open, the scope and nature of cooperation is still to be defined.
Governments also seem, in principle, have acknowledged state responsibility for acts and
omissions in the field of information security and noted that insufficient protection of vital
resources and systems may pose a threat to national and international security.

Many governments have accepted the applicability of existing law to international information
security issues, although sometimes questioning the consistency of its application. More recently,
proposals have been tabled on developing politically binding norms of acceptable state behaviour
in cyberspace. Russia, having pointed out ‘the obvious need for international legal regulation’ in
the past, has recently taken a more flexible approach and acknowledged the possibility of a soft law
approach.

Some governments have emphasized the right of every country to protect its information and
telecommunication systems (the terms and definitions differ by governments), often with
additional emphasis on the consistency of such measures with the sovereign rights of other nations.
The extent of national sovereignty remains an open question with China having stated that each
government has the right to manage its own cyberspace in accordance with its domestic legislation.

Looking Forward – The 2012-13 GGE

With experts from Argentina, Australia, Belarus, Canada, China, Egypt, Estonia, France, Germany,
India, Indonesia, Japan, Russia, United Kingdom and the United States the third GGE is now
preparing to make a contribution that would produce useful and actionable input for national
governments.

The lessons learned from the first and second GGE underline the need for better focusing the
discussions on international peace and security. This would give the discussions in the First
Committee greater weight and legitimacy among the international community and allow them to
add a substantive layer to the work done in other forums. With additional discussion on confidence
building measures (CBMs) in the OSCE and the ASEAN Regional Forum and bilaterally between
selected nations, a more constructive dialogue on CBMs and their effect on international
information security is feasible.

While the ‘language issue’ could, theoretically, be overcome by developing a glossary for the group
or simply defining the terms used in the next report, it is also likely that countries’ positions will
over time align in proportion with systematic thinking about uses of ICTs in the context of
international peace and security.

To produce added value, the GGE would need to take into account relevant parallel processes in
other organizations and their implications on international peace and security. It might be
worthwhile to clearly separate the issues of criminal and terrorist uses of ICTs from those directly
relevant to international peace and security and adjust the request for national views and
assessments accordingly.

In the absence of verifiable data about relevant threats and incidents of international security
relevance, expert discussions in the First Committee will run the risk of oversimplification, or, in
contrast, excess complexity and emotion. In this context, national input on specific national and
international peace and security concerns related to the use of ICTs could be requested and
considered in the future work of the First Committee.

Also, there are a few outstanding issues from the previous phases of discussions, likely to continue
to be addressed. It is expected that the legal issues (such as the applicability of the law governing
the use of force, the law of armed conflict, implementation and interpreting of the legal concepts of
sovereignty and state responsibility) will form a considerable part of the third round of GGE
discussions. Also relevant for national and international peace and security might be a discussion of
activities that might not invoke the applicability of jus ad bellum/jus in bello, but might breach
customary international law on state responsibility or neutrality.

Another open issue, maybe less evident from the perspective of the mandate of the First Committee
is the division of information security tasks between national governments and the international
community. Several countries have pointed out the protection of information and information-
based systems as a responsibility for governments, while others have emphasized the need for
international cooperation and collective measures.

Further, the disagreement between the US-lead wing and the SCO countries on the Internet
governance model is likely to shape discussions. In sum, although overall responsibility with
respect to state-on-state behaviour is with governments, taking action depends on close working
with elements of the private sector, e.g. ISPs, companies involved in providing critical national
infrastructure.
Somewhat surprisingly, issues often addressed in non-diplomatic forums, such as the threshold to
justify the involvement of the Security Council or, potentially, self-defense by the victimized nations,
the qualification of (and appropriate responses to) cyber- attacks against national critical
(information) infrastructure and avoiding the escalation of conflict under limited attribution, have
so far not been tabled in the First Committee. In face of frequent governmental concerns about
cyber incidents of national and international security relevance and along with the refinement of
the First Committee mandate the GGE and governments may want to be prepared to discuss these
issues in a not so distant future.
REFERENCES

• /theme/humans.txt. (n.d.). General Assembly - OEWG on ICTS - 2019 Organizational

Session - Programme. Retrieved from
https://papersmart.unmeetings.org/ga/oewg-on-icts/2019-organizational-
session/programme/
• Retrieved from https://citizenlab.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/08/UN-GGE-
Brief-2012.pdf
• A/AC.290/2019/1 - E - A/AC.290/2019/1. (n.d.). Retrieved from
https://undocs.org/en/A/AC.290/2019/1
• CCDCOE. (n.d.). Retrieved from https://ccdcoe.org/incyder-articles/united- nations-
recent-developments-in-the-field-of-information-and-telecommunications- in-the-
context-of-international-security/#identifier_0_2548
• Developments in the field of information and telecommunications in the context of
international security. Retrieved from
http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-
fora/1com/1com12/statements/L30_Sweden-joint.pdf
• Developments in the field of information and telecommunications in the context of
international security. (n.d.). United Nations Official Document. Retrieved from
https://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/67/404
• Group of Governmental Experts on Developments in the Field of Information and
Telecommunications in the Context of International Security. (n.d.). Retrieved from
https://www.unidir.org/files/medias/pdfs/developments-in-the-field-of-information-
and-telecommunications-in-the-context-of-international-security- 2012-2013-a-68-98-
eng-0-518.pdf
• UN GGE and OEWG | GIP Digital Watch observatory for Internet governance and digital
policy. (n.d.). Retrieved from https://dig.watch/processes/un-gge
• UN Group of Governmental Experts on Developments in the Field of Information and
Telecommunications in the Context of International Security: Third Session. (2017, May
19). Retrieved from https://www.giplatform.org/events/un-group-
governmental-experts-developments-field-information-and-telecommunications-
context-0