G.R. NO.

145470 December 9, 2005 After due proceedings, the RTC rendered a Decision on April 3, 1998 in favor of
respondents. The decretal portion of the decision provides:
SPS. LUIS V. CRUZ and AIDA CRUZ, Petitioners,
vs. PREMISES CONSIDERED, the herein plaintiffs was able to prove by preponderance of
SPS. ALEJANDRO FERNANDO, SR., and RITA FERNANDO, Respondents. evidence the case of accion publiciana, against the defendants and judgment is hereby
rendered as follows:
DECISION
1. Ordering defendants and all persons claiming under them to vacate placefully (sic) the
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.: premises in question and to remove their house therefore (sic);

For resolution is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, 2. Ordering defendants to pay plaintiff the sum of ₱500.00 as reasonable rental per month
assailing the Decision1 dated October 3, 2000 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV beginning October 21, 1994 when the case was filed before this Court and every month
No. 61247, dismissing petitioners’ appeal and affirming the decision of the Regional Trial thereafter until they vacate the subject premises and to pay the costs of suit.
Court (RTC) of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 79, in Civil Case No. 877-M-94.
The counter claim is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
SO ORDERED.5
Luis V. Cruz and Aida Cruz (petitioners) are occupants of the front portion of a 710-square
meter property located in Sto. Cristo, Baliuag, Bulacan. On October 21, 1994, spouses Petitioners appealed the RTC decision but it was affirmed by the CA per its Decision dated
Alejandro Fernando, Sr. and Rita Fernando (respondents) filed before the RTC a complaint October 3, 2000.
for accion publiciana against petitioners, demanding the latter to vacate the premises and
to pay the amount of ₱500.00 a month as reasonable rental for the use thereof. Hence, the present petition raising the following issues:
Respondents alleged in their complaint that: (1) they are owners of the property, having
bought the same from the spouses Clodualdo and Teresita Glorioso (Gloriosos) per Deed of 1. Whether the Honorable Court of Appeals committed an error of law in holding that the
Sale dated March 9, 1987; (2) prior to their acquisition of the property, the Gloriosos Agreement (Kasunduan) between the parties was a "mere offer to sell," and not a perfected
offered to sell to petitioners the rear portion of the property but the transaction did not "Contract of Purchase and Sale"?
materialize due to petitioners’ failure to exercise their option; (3) the offer to sell is
embodied in a Kasunduan dated August 6, 1983 executed before the Barangay Captain; (4)
due to petitioners’ failure to buy the allotted portion, respondents bought the whole 2. Whether the Honorable Court of Appeals committed an error of law in not holding that
property from the Gloriosos; and (5) despite repeated demands, petitioners refused to where the parties clearly gave the petitioners a period of time within which to pay the price,
vacate the property.2 but did not fix said period, the remedy of the vendors is to ask the Court to fix the period
for the payment of the price, and not an "accion publiciana"?
Petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss but the RTC dismissed it for lack of merit in its Order
dated March 6, 1995.3 Petitioners then filed their Answer setting forth the affirmative 3. Whether the Honorable Court of Appeals committed an error of law in not ordering
defenses that: (1) the Kasunduan is a perfected contract of sale; (2) the agreement has respondents to at least deliver the "back portion" of the lot in question upon payment of the
already been "partially consummated" as they already relocated their house from the rear agreed price thereof by petitioners, assuming that the Regional Trial Court was correct in
portion of the lot to the front portion that was sold to them; (3) Mrs. Glorioso prevented the finding that the subject matter of the sale was said "back portion", and not the "front"
complete consummation of the sale when she refused to have the exact boundaries of the portion of the property?
lot bought by petitioners surveyed, and the existing survey was made without their
knowledge and participation; and (4) respondents are buyers in bad faith having bought 4. Whether the Honorable Court of Appeals committed an error of law in affirming the
that portion of the lot occupied by them (petitioners) with full knowledge of the prior sale decision of the trial court ordering the petitioners, who are possessors in good faith, to pay
to them by the Gloriosos.4 rentals for the portion of the lot possessed by them?6
The RTC dwelt on the issue of which portion was being sold by the Gloriosos to In a contract of sale, the title to the property passes to the vendee upon the delivery of the
petitioners, finding that it was the rear portion and not the front portion that was being sold; thing sold, as distinguished from a contract to sell where ownership is, by agreement,
while the CA construed the Kasunduan as a mere contract to sell and due to petitioners’ reserved in the vendor and is not to pass to the vendee until full payment of the purchase
failure to pay the purchase price, the Gloriosos were not obliged to deliver to them price.8 Otherwise stated, in a contract of sale, the vendor loses ownership over the property
(petitioners) the portion being sold. and cannot recover it until and unless the contract is resolved or rescinded; whereas, in a
contract to sell, title is retained by the vendor until full payment of the price. In the latter
Petitioners, however, insist that the agreement was a perfected contract of sale, and their contract, payment of the price is a positive suspensive condition, failure of which is not a
failure to pay the purchase price is immaterial. They also contend that respondents have no breach but an event that prevents the obligation of the vendor to convey title from
cause of action against them, as the obligation set in the Kasunduan did not set a period, becoming effective.
consequently, there is no breach of any obligation by petitioners.
The Kasunduan provides for the following terms and conditions: (a) that the Gloriosos
The resolution of the issues in this case principally is dependent on the interpretation of agreed to sell to petitioners a portion of the property with an area of 213 meters at the price
the Kasunduan dated August 6, 1983 executed by petitioners and the Gloriosos. of ₱40.00 per square meter; (b) that in the title that will be caused to be issued, the
The Kasunduan provided the following pertinent stipulations: aggregate area is 223 square meters with 10 meters thereof serving as right of way; (c) that
the right of way shall have a width of 1.75 meters from Lopez Jaena road going towards the
a. Na pumayag ang mga maysumbong (referring to the Gloriosos) na pagbilhan ang mga back of the lot where petitioners will build their house on the portion of the lot that they
ipinagsumbong (referring to petitioners) na bahagi ng lupa at ang ipagbibili ay may sukat will buy; (d) that the expenses for the survey and for the issuance of the title will be divided
na 213 metrong parisukat humigit kumulang sa halagang ₱40.00 bawat metrong parisukat; between the parties with each party giving an amount of no less than ₱400.00; and (e) that
petitioners will definitely relocate their house to the portion they bought or will buy by
January 31, 1984.
b. Na sa titulong papapanaugin ang magiging kabuuang sukat na mauukol sa mga
ipinagsusumbong ay 223 metrong parisukat at ang 10 metro nito ay bilang kaloob ng mga
maysumbong sa mga Ipinagsusumbong na bahagi ng right of way; The foregoing terms and conditions show that it is a contract to sell and not a contract of
sale. For one, the conspicuous absence of a definite manner of payment of the purchase
price in the agreement confirms the conclusion that it is a contract to sell. This is because
c. Na ang right of way ay may luwang na 1.75 meters magmula sa daang Lopez the manner of payment of the purchase price is an essential element before a valid
Jaena patungo sa likuran ng lote na pagtatayuan ng bahay ng mga Ipinagsusumbong and binding contract of sale can exist.9 Although the Civil Code does not expressly state
na kanyang bibilhin; that the minds of the parties must also meet on the terms or manner of payment of the
price, the same is needed, otherwise there is no sale.10 As held in Toyota Shaw, Inc. vs.
d. Na ang gugol sa pagpapasukat at pagpapanaog ng titulo ay paghahatian ng magkabilang Court of Appeals,11 a definite agreement on the manner of payment of the price is an
panig na ang panig ay magbibigay ng halagang hindi kukulanging sa halagang tig-AAPAT essential element in the formation of a binding and enforceable contract of sale.
NA DAANG PISO (₱400.00);
The Kasunduan does not establish any definite agreement between the parties concerning
e. Na ang ipinagsusumbong ay tiyakang ililipat ang bahay sa bahaging kanilang nabili o the terms of payment. What it merely provides is the purchase price for the 213-square
mabibili sa buwan ng Enero 31, 1984;7 (Emphasis supplied) meter property at ₱40.00 per square meter.

Under Article 1458 of the Civil Code, a contract of sale is a contract by which one of the For another, the telltale provision in the Kasunduan that: "Na pumayag ang mga
contracting parties obligates himself to transfer the ownership and to deliver a determinate maysumbong na pagbilhan ang mga ipinagsumbong na bahagi ng lupa at
thing, and the other to pay therefor a price certain in money or its equivalent. Article 1475 ang ipagbibili ay may sukat na 213 metrong parisukat humigit kumulang sa halagang
of the Code further provides that the contract of sale is perfected at the moment there is ₱40.00 bawat metrong parisukat," simply means that the Gloriosos only agreed to sell a
meeting of the minds upon the thing which is the object of the contract and upon the price. portion of the property and that the portion to be sold measures 213 square meters.
From that moment the parties may reciprocally demand performance subject to the
provisions of the law governing the form of contracts. Another significant provision is that which reads: "Na ang ipinagsusumbong ay tiyakang
ililipat ang bahay sa bahaging kanilang nabili o mabibili sa buwan ng Enero 31, 1984."
The foregoing indicates that a contract of sale is yet to be consummated and ownership of
the property remained in the Gloriosos. Otherwise, why would the alternative term Petitioners question the survey made, asserting that it is a "table survey" made without their
"mabibili" be used if indeed the property had already been sold to petitioners. knowledge and participation. It should be pointed out that the Kasunduan merely provides
that the expenses for the survey will be divided between them and that each party should
In addition, the absence of any formal deed of conveyance is a strong indication that the give an amount of no less than ₱400.00. Nowhere is it stated that the survey is a condition
parties did not intend immediate transfer of ownership.12 precedent for the payment of the purchase price.

Normally, in a contract to sell, the payment of the purchase price is the positive suspensive Petitioners further claim that respondents have no cause of action against them because
condition upon which the transfer of ownership depends.13 The parties, however, are not their obligation to pay the purchase price did not yet arise, as the agreement did not provide
prohibited from stipulating other lawful conditions that must be fulfilled in order for the for a period within which to pay the purchase price. They argue that respondents should
contract to be converted from a contract to sell or at the most an executory sale into an have filed an action for specific performance or judicial rescission before they can avail
executed one.14 of accion publiciana.

In the present case, aside from the payment of the purchase price, there existed another Notably, petitioners never raised these arguments during the proceedings before the RTC.
suspensive condition, i.e.: that petitioners will relocate their house to the portion they Suffice it to say that issues raised for the first time on appeal and not raised timely in the
bought or will buy by January 31, 1984. proceedings in the lower court are barred by estoppel.16 Matters, theories or arguments not
brought out in the original proceedings cannot be considered on review or appeal where
Petitioners failed to abide by the express condition that they should relocate to the rear they are raised for the first time. To consider the alleged facts and arguments raised
portion of the property being bought by January 31, 1984. Indeed, the Kasunduan discloses belatedly would amount to trampling on the basic principles of fair play, justice and due
that it is the rear portion that was being sold by the Gloriosos, and not the front portion as process.17
petitioners stubbornly claim. This is evident from the provisions establishing a right of way
from Lopez Jaena road going towards the back of the lot, and requiring them to relocate Moreover, it would be inutile for respondents to first petition the court to fix a period for
their house to the portion being sold by January 31, 1984. Petitioners are presently the performance of the contract. In the first place, respondents are not parties to
occupying the front portion of the property. Why the need for a right of way and for the Kasunduan between petitioners and the Gloriosos, and they have no standing
petitioners to relocate if the front portion on which their house stands is the portion being whatsoever to seek such recourse. In the second place, such recourse properly pertains to
sold? petitioners. It was they who should have sought the court’s intercession. If petitioners
believed that they have an actionable contract for the sale of the property, prudence and
This condition is a suspensive condition noncompliance of which prevented the Gloriosos common sense dictate that they should have sought its enforcement forthwith. Instead,
from proceeding with the sale and ultimately transferring title to petitioners; and petitioners whiled away their time.
the Kasunduan from having obligatory force.15 It is established by evidence that the
petitioners did not transfer their house located in the front portion of the subject property to Furthermore, there is no need for a judicial rescission of the Kasunduan for the simple
the rear portion which, under the Kasunduan, they intended to buy. Thus, no obligation reason that the obligation of the Gloriosos to transfer the property to petitioners has not yet
arose on the part of the Gloriosos to consider the subject property as having been sold to arisen. There can be no rescission of an obligation that is nonexistent, considering that the
petitioners because the latter’s non-fulfillment of the suspensive condition rendered the suspensive conditions therefor have not yet happened.18
contract to sell ineffective and unperfected.
Hence, petitioners have no superior right of ownership or possession to speak of. Their
Petitioners admit that they have not paid a single centavo to the Gloriosos. However, occupation of the property was merely through the tolerance of the owners. Evidence on
petitioners argue that their nonpayment of the purchase price was due to the fact that there record shows that petitioners and their predecessors were able to live and build their house
is yet to be a survey made of the property. But evidence shows, and petitioners do not on the property through the permission and kindness of the previous owner, Pedro Hipolito,
dispute, that as early as August 12, 1983, or six days after the execution of the Kasunduan, who was their relative,19 and subsequently, Teresita Glorioso, who is also their relative.
a survey has already been made and the property was subdivided into Lot Nos. 565-B-1 They have no title or, at the very least, a contract of lease over the property. Based as it was
(front portion) and 565-B-2 (rear portion), with Lot No. 565-B-2 measuring 223 square on mere tolerance, petitioners’ possession could neither ripen into ownership nor operate to
meters as the portion to be bought by petitioners. bar any action by respondents to recover absolute possession thereof.20
There is also no merit to petitioners’ contention that respondents are buyers in bad faith. As G.R. CV No. 85258, reversing the March 2, 2005 Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court,
explained in Coronel vs. Court of Appeals: Branch 18, Malolos, Bulacan (RTC), in an action for quieting of title and recovery of
possession with damages.
In a contract to sell, there being no previous sale of the property, a third person buying
such property despite the fulfillment of the suspensive condition such as the full The Facts
payment of the purchase price, for instance, cannot be deemed a buyer in bad
faith and the prospective buyer cannot seek the relief of reconveyance of the The case draws its origin from a complaint4 for quieting of title and recovery of possession
property. There is no double sale in such case. Title to the property will transfer to the with damages filed by petitioner Rogelio Dantis (Rogelio) against respondent Julio
buyer after registration because there is no defect in the owner-seller’s title per se, but the Maghinang, Jr. (Julio, Jr.) before the RTC, docketed as Civil Case No. 280-M-2002.
latter, of course, may be sued for damages by the intending buyer.21 (Emphasis supplied) Rogelio alleged that he was the registered owner of a parcel of land covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-125918, with an area of 5,657 square meters, located in
A person who occupies the land of another at the latter's forbearance or permission without Sta. Rita, San Miguel, Bulacan; that he acquired ownership of the property through a deed
any contract between them is necessarily bound by an implied promise that he will vacate of extrajudicial partition of the estate of his deceased father, Emilio Dantis (Emilio), dated
upon demand.22 December 22, 1993; that he had been paying the realty taxes on the said property; that
Julio, Jr. occupied and built a house on a portion of his property without any right at all;
Considering that petitioners’ continued possession of the property has already been that demands were made upon Julio, Jr. that he vacate the premises but the same fell on
rendered unlawful, they are bound to pay reasonable rental for the use and occupation deaf ears; and that the acts of Julio, Jr. had created a cloud of doubt over his title and right
thereof, which in this case was appropriately pegged by the RTC at ₱500.00 per month of possession of his property. He, thus, prayed that judgment be rendered declaring him to
beginning October 21, 1994 when respondents filed the case against them until they vacate be the true and real owner of the parcel of land covered by TCT No. T-125918; ordering
the premises. Julio, Jr. to deliver the possession of that portion of the land he was occupying; and
directing Julio, Jr. to pay rentals from October 2000 and attorney’s fees of ₱100,000.00.
Finally, petitioners seek compensation for the value of the improvements introduced on the
property. Again, this is the first time that they are raising this point. As such, petitioners are He added that he was constrained to institute an ejectment suit against Julio, Jr. before the
now barred from seeking such relief.23 Municipal Trial Court of San Miguel, Bulacan (MTC), but the complaint was dismissed for
lack of jurisdiction and lack of cause of action.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated
October 3, 2000 in CA-G.R. CV No. 61247 is AFFIRMED. In his Answer,5 Julio, Jr. denied the material allegations of the complaint. By way of an
affirmative defense, he claimed that he was the actual owner of the 352 square meters
SO ORDERED. (subject lot) of the land covered by TCT No. T-125918 where he was living; that he had
been in open and continuous possession of the property for almost thirty (30) years; the
subject lot was once tenanted by his ancestral relatives until it was sold by Rogelio’s father,
G.R. No. 191696               April 10, 2013 Emilio, to his father, Julio Maghinang, Sr. (Julio, Sr.); that later, he succeeded to the
ownership of the subject lot after his father died on March 10, 1968; and that he was
ROGELIO DANTIS, Petitioner, entitled to a separate registration of the subject lot on the basis of the documentary
vs. evidence of sale and his open and uninterrupted possession of the property.
JULIO MAGHINANG, JR., Respondent.
As synthesized by the RTC from the respective testimonies of the principal witnesses, their
DECISION diametrically opposed positions are as follows:

MENDOZA, J.: Plaintiff Rogelio Dantis testified that he inherited 5,657 square meters of land, identified as
Lot 6-D-1 of subdivision plan Psd-031421-054315, located at Sta. Rita, San Miguel,
This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to reverse and set aside the January 25, Bulacan, through an Extrajudicial Partition of Estate of Emilio Dantis, executed in
2010 Decision1 and the March 23, 2010 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA). in CA- December 1993 which land was titled later on under his name, Rogelio Dantis, married to
Victoria Payawal, as shown by copy of Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-125918, issued
by the Register of Deeds of Bulacan on September 29, 1998, declared for taxation purposes 1. quieting the title and removing whatever cloud over the title on the parcel of land, with
as Tax Declaration with ARP No. C20-22-043-07-046. According to him, defendant and area of 5,647 sq. meters, more or less, located at Sta. Rita, San Miguel, Bulacan, covered
his predecessor-in-interest built the house located on said lot. When he first saw it, it was by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-125918 issued by the Register of Deeds of Bulacan
only a small hut but when he was about 60 years old, he told defendant not to build a in the name of "Rogelio Dantis, married to Victoria Payawal";
bigger house thereon because he would need the land and defendant would have to vacate
the land. Plaintiff, however, has not been in physical possession of the premises. 2. declaring that Rogelio Dantis, married to Victoria Payawal, is the true and lawful owner
of the aforementioned real property; and
Defendant Julio Maghinang, Jr., presented by plaintiff as adverse witness, testified that he
has no title over the property he is occupying. He has not paid realty taxes thereon. He has 3. ordering defendant Julio Maghinang, Jr. and all persons claiming under him to
not paid any rental to anybody. He is occupying about 352 square meters of the lot. He peacefully vacate the said real property and surrender the possession thereof to plaintiff or
presented an affidavit executed on September 3, 1953 by Ignacio Dantis, grandfather of latter’s successors-in-interest.
Rogelio Dantis and the father of Emilio Dantis. The latter was, in turn, the father of
Rogelio Dantis. No pronouncement as to costs in this instance.

The affidavit, according to affiant Ignacio Dantis, alleged that Emilio Dantis agreed to sell SO ORDERED.9
352 square meters of the lot to Julio Maghinang on installment. Defendant was then 11
years old in 1952.
Julio, Jr. moved for a reconsideration of the March 2, 2005 Decision, but the motion was
denied by the RTC in its May 3, 2005 Order.10 Feeling aggrieved, Julio, Jr. appealed the
Defendant Julio Maghinang, Jr. likewise testified for the defendant’s case as follows: He decision to the CA.
owns that house located at Sta. Rita, San Miguel, Bulacan, on a 352 square meter lot. He
could not say that he is the owner because there is still question about the lot. He claimed
that his father, Julio Maghinang (Sr.), bought the said lot from the parents of Rogelio On January 25, 2010, the CA rendered the assailed decision in CA-G.R. CV NO. 85258,
Dantis. He admitted that the affidavit was not signed by the alleged vendor, Emilio Dantis, finding the appeal to be impressed with merit. It held that Exhibit "4" was an indubitable
the father of Rogelio Dantis. The receipt he presented was admittedly a mere photocopy. proof of the sale of the 352-square meter lot between Emilio and Julio, Sr. It also ruled that
He spent ₱50,000.00 as attorney’s fees. Since 1953, he has not declared the property as his the partial payment of the purchase price, coupled with the delivery of the res, gave
nor paid the taxes thereon because there is a problem.6 efficacy to the oral sale and brought it outside the operation of the statute of frauds. Finally,
the court a quo declared that Julio, Jr. and his predecessors-in-interest had an equitable
claim over the subject lot which imposed on Rogelio and his predecessors-in-interest a
On March 2, 2005, the RTC rendered its decision declaring Rogelio as the true owner of personal duty to convey what had been sold after full payment of the selling price. The
the entire 5,657-square meter lot located in Sta. Rita, San Miguel, Bulacan, as evidenced by decretal portion of the CA decision reads:
his TCT over the same. The RTC did not lend any probative value on the documentary
evidence of sale adduced by Julio, Jr. consisting of: 1) an affidavit allegedly executed by
Ignacio Dantis (Ignacio), Rogelio’s grandfather, whereby said affiant attested, among IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision appealed from is reversed. The heirs of
others, to the sale of the subject lot made by his son, Emilio, to Julio, Sr. (Exhibit "3")7; and Julio Maghinang Jr. are declared the owners of the 352-square meter portion of the lot
2) an undated handwritten receipt of initial downpayment in the amount of ₱100.00 covered by TCT No. T-125968 where the residence of defendant Julio Maghinang is
supposedly issued by Emilio to Julio, Sr. in connection with the sale of the subject lot located, and the plaintiff is ordered to reconvey the aforesaid portion to the aforesaid heirs,
(Exhibit "4").8 The RTC ruled that even if these documents were adjudged as competent subject to partition by agreement or action to determine the exact metes and bounds and
evidence, still, they would only serve as proofs that the purchase price for the subject lot without prejudice to any legal remedy that the plaintiff may take with respect to the unpaid
had not yet been completely paid and, hence, Rogelio was not duty-bound to deliver the balance of the price.
property to Julio, Jr. The RTC found Julio, Jr. to be a mere possessor by tolerance. The
dispositive portion of the RTC decision reads: SO ORDERED.11

WHEREFORE, Judgment is hereby rendered as follows: The motion for reconsideration12 filed by Rogelio was denied by the CA in its March 23,
2010 Resolution. Unfazed, he filed this petition for review on certiorari before this Court.
Issues: The petition is meritorious.

The fundamental question for resolution is whether there is a perfected contract of sale It is an age-old rule in civil cases that he who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it and
between Emilio and Julio, Sr. The determination of this issue will settle the rightful a mere allegation is not evidence.17 After carefully sifting through the evidence on record,
ownership of the subject lot. the Court finds that Rogelio was able to establish a prima facie case in his favor tending to
show his exclusive ownership of the parcel of land under TCT No. T-125918 with an area
Rogelio submits that Exhibit "3" and Exhibit "4" are devoid of evidentiary value and, of 5,657 square meters, which included the 352-square meter subject lot. From the records,
hence, deserve scant consideration. He stresses that Exhibit "4" is inadmissible in evidence it appears that TCT No. T-125918 is a derivative of TCT No. T-256228, which covered a
being a mere photocopy, and the existence and due execution thereof had not been bigger area of land measuring 30,000 square meters registered in the name of Emilio
established. He argues that even if Exhibit "4" would be considered as competent and Dantis; that Emilio died intestate on November 13, 1952; that Emilio’s five heirs, including
admissible evidence, still, it would not be an adequate proof of the existence of the alleged Rogelio, executed an extra-judicial partition of estate on December 22, 1993 and divided
oral contract of sale because it failed to provide a description of the subject lot, including among themselves specific portions of the property covered by TCT No. T-256228, which
its metes and bounds, as well as its full price or consideration.13 were already set apart by metes and bounds; that the land known as Lot 6-D-1 of the
subdivision plan Psd-031421-054315 with an area of 5,657 sq. m. went to Rogelio, the
Rogelio argues that while reconveyance may be availed of by the owner of a real property property now covered by TCT No. T-125918; and that the property was declared for realty
wrongfully included in the certificate of title of another, the remedy is not obtainable herein tax purpose in the name of Rogelio for which a tax declaration was issued in his name; and
since he is a transferee in good faith, having acquired the land covered by TCT No. T- that the same had not been transferred to anyone else since its issuance.
125918, through a Deed of Extrajudicial Partition of Estate.14 He asserts that he could not
be considered a trustee as he was not privy to Exhibit "4." In any event, he theorizes that In light of Rogelio’s outright denial of the oral sale together with his insistence of
the action for reconveyance on the ground of implied trust had already prescribed since ownership over the subject lot, it behooved upon Julio, Jr. to contravene the former’s claim
more than 10 years had lapsed since the execution of Exhibit "4" in 1953. It is the and convince the court that he had a valid defense. The burden of evidence shifted to Julio,
petitioner’s stance that Julio, Jr. did not acquire ownership over the subject lot by Jr. to prove that his father bought the subject lot from Emilio Dantis. In Jison v. Court of
acquisitive prescription contending that prescription does not lie against a real property Appeals,18 the Court held:
covered by a Torrens title. He opines that his certificate of title to the subject lot cannot be
collaterally attacked because a Torrens title is indefeasible and must be respected unless Simply put, he who alleges the affirmative of the issue has the burden of proof, and upon
challenged in a direct proceeding.15 the plaintiff in a civil case, the burden of proof never parts. However, in the course of trial
in a civil case, once plaintiff makes out a prima facie case in his favor, the duty or the
The Court’s Ruling burden of evidence shifts to defendant to controvert plaintiff’s prima facie case, otherwise,
a verdict must be returned in favor of plaintiff. Moreover, in civil cases, the party having
In the case at bench, the CA and the RTC reached different conclusions on the question of the burden of proof must produce a preponderance of evidence thereon, with plaintiff
whether or not there was an oral contract of sale. The RTC ruled that Rogelio Dantis was having to rely on the strength of his own evidence and not upon the weakness of the
the sole and rightful owner of the parcel of land covered by TCT No. T-125918 and that no defendant’s. The concept of "preponderance of evidence" refers to evidence which is of
oral contract of sale was entered into between Emilio Dantis and Julio Maghinang, Sr. greater weight, or more convincing, that which is offered in opposition to it; at bottom, it
involving the 352-square meter portion of the said property. The CA was of the opposite means probability of truth.19
view. The determination of whether there existed an oral contract of sale is essentially a
question of fact. Julio, Jr. failed to discharge this burden. His pieces of evidence, Exhibit "3" and Exhibit
"4," cannot prevail over the array of documentary and testimonial evidence that were
In petitions for review under Rule 45, the Court, as a general rule, does not venture to re- adduced by Rogelio. The totality of Julio, Jr.’s evidence leaves much to be desired.
examine the evidence presented by the contending parties during the trial of the case
considering that it is not a trier of facts and the findings of fact of the CA are conclusive To begin with, Exhibit "3," the affidavit of Ignacio, is hearsay evidence and, thus, cannot
and binding upon this Court. The rule, however, admits of several exceptions. One of be accorded any evidentiary weight. Evidence is hearsay when its probative force depends
which is when the findings of the CA are contrary to those of the trial court.16 Considering on the competency and credibility of some persons other than the witness by whom it is
the incongruent factual conclusions of the CA and the RTC, this Court is constrained to sought to be produced. The exclusion of hearsay evidence is anchored on three reasons: 1)
reassess the factual circumstances of the case and reevaluate them in the interest of justice. absence of cross-examination; 2) absence of demeanor evidence; and 3) absence of oath.20
Jurisprudence dictates that an affidavit is merely hearsay evidence where its affiant/maker A: Eleven years old, Sir.
did not take the witness stand.21 The sworn statement of Ignacio is of this kind. The
affidavit was not identified and its averments were not affirmed by affiant Ignacio. Q: So that was 1953?
Accordingly, Exhibit "3" must be excluded from the judicial proceedings being an
inadmissible hearsay evidence. It cannot be deemed a declaration against interest for the A: Yes, Sir.
matter to be considered as an exception to the hearsay rule because the declarant was not
the seller (Emilio), but his father (Ignacio). Exhibit "4," on the other hand, is considered
secondary evidence being a mere photocopy which, in this case, cannot be admitted to Q: And you were then…?
prove the contents of the purported undated handwritten receipt. The best evidence rule
requires that the highest available degree of proof must be produced. For documentary A: I was born October 1942, Sir.
evidence, the contents of a document are best proved by the production of the document
itself to the exclusion of secondary or substitutionary evidence, pursuant to Rule 130, Q: You were eleven (11) years old?
Section 322.
A: Yes, Sir.
A secondary evidence is admissible only upon compliance with Rule 130, Section 5, which
states that: when the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, the Q: And you mean to say that you witnessed the signing allegedly of the original of Exhibit
offeror, upon proof of its execution or existence and the cause of its unavailability without "4" when you were eleven (11) years old?
bad faith on his part, may prove its contents by a copy, or by a recital of its contents in
some authentic document, or by the testimony of witnesses in the order stated.
A: Yes, Sir.
Accordingly, the offeror of the secondary evidence is burdened to satisfactorily prove the
predicates thereof, namely: (1) the execution or existence of the original; (2) the loss and
destruction of the original or its non-production in court; and (3) the unavailability of the Q: And you remember what was signed in this receipt. From your memory can you tell the
original is not due to bad faith on the part of the proponent/offeror. Proof of the due title of this Exhibit "4"?
execution of the document and its subsequent loss would constitute the basis for the
introduction of secondary evidence.23 In MCC Industrial Sales Corporation v. Ssangyong A: What I can say that it is a Sale, Sir.
Corporation,24 it was held that where the missing document is the foundation of the action,
more strictness in proof is required than where the document is only collaterally involved. Q: So, when you said that you witnessed an alleged sale you are referring to Exhibit "4"?

Guided by these norms, the Court holds that Julio, Jr. failed to prove the due execution of A: Yes, Sir.25 (Emphasis supplied)
the original of Exhibit "4" as well as its subsequent loss. A nexus of logically related
circumstance rendered Julio, Jr.’s evidence highly suspect. Also, his testimony was riddled Second, Julio, Jr.’s testimony pertinent to the alleged loss of the original of Exhibit "4" is
with improbabilities and contradictions which tend to erode his credibility and raise doubt laden with inconsistencies that detract from his credibility. His testimony bears the
on the veracity of his evidence. earmarks of falsehood and, hence, not reliable. Julio, Jr. testified in this wise:

First, the claim of Julio, Jr. that Emilio affixed his signature on the original of Exhibit "4" Atty. Roldan Villacorta
in 1953 is highly improbable because record shows that Emilio died even before that year,
specifically, on November 13, 1952. Excerpts from Julio, Jr.’s testimony relative to this
(On Direct examination)
matter are as follows:

Q: Mr. Witness, I noticed that this document marked as Exhibit "4" is only a photocopy,
Atty. Vicente Millora (On Cross-examination)
where is the original of this document?
Q: You don’t remember how old you were when this according to you you witnessed
A: The original was with the safekeeping of my parents because of the lapse of time the
Emilio Dantis signed this?
original was misplaced, Sir.26
The above testimony of Julio, Jr. tends to give the impression that the original of the Q: In other words, it was your sister who lost the original, is that correct?
document was lost while it was in the possession of his parents. During cross-examination,
however, he testified that it was lost while it was in his possession. A: Yes, Sir, when I lent the original.28 (Emphasis supplied)

Atty. Vicente Millora The Court also notes the confused narration of Julio, Jr. regarding the last time he saw the
original of Exhibit "4."
(On Cross-examination)
Atty. Vicente Millora
Q: x x x Where did you keep that document?
(On Cross-examination)
A: I was the one keeping that document because I live in different places, [the said] it was
lost or misplaced, Sir. Q: And when did you last see the original?

Q: In other words, it was lost while the same was in your possession?? A: When my mother died in 1993 that was the last time I tried to see the original of the
document after her interment, Sir.
A: Yes, Sir.27 (Emphasis supplied)
Q: Where did you see this document?
Still, later, Julio, Jr. claimed that his sister was the one responsible for the loss of the
original of Exhibit "4" after borrowing the same from him. Atty. Vicente Millora A: From the safekeeping of my mother, Sir.29

(On Cross-examination) xxxx

Q: So, who is your sister to whom you gave the original? Q: When did you get this Exhibit "4" now, the photocopy from your sister?

A: Benedicta Laya, Sir. A: When the interment of my mother in September 1993, Sir.

Q: In other words now, you did not lost the document or the original of Exhibit "4" but you Q: Now, let us reform. Which one did you get after the interment of your mother, this
gave it to your sister, am I correct? Exhibit "4" or the original?

A: I just lent to her the original copy, Sir. A: I asked that xerox copy because I have lost the original and I could not find the same,
Sir.
Q: So, you lent this original of Exhibit "4" to your sister and your sister never returned the
same to you? Q: So, from the safe of your mother after her interment, what used you found and got this
Exhibit "4"?
A: Yes, Sir, because it was lost, that was the only one left in her custody.
A: Yes, Sir, from my sister.
Interpreter:
Q: So, not from your mother safe?
Witness referring to the xerox copy.
A: The original was taken from the safe of my mother, Sir.
Atty. Vicente Millora
Q: So after your mother’s death you never saw the original? Alamin ng sino mang

A: I did not see it anymore because the original was lost before she died, Makababasa
Sir.30 (Underscoring supplied)
Akong si Emilio Dantis may sapat na Gulang may asawa naninirahan sa Sta Rita San
Third, it is quite strange that two receipts were prepared for the initial payment of ₱100.00 Miguel Bul. ay kusang nagsasasay ng sumosunod.
in connection with the sale of the subject lot. The Court notes that the contents of Exhibit
"4" were similar to those of Annex "A"31 of Julio, Jr.’s Answer, dated June 9, 2002. Annex Na ako Tumanggap Kay Julio Maghinang ng ₱100.00 peso cuartang Pilipino, bilang
"A," however, was typewritten and the name of the recipient indicated therein was a certain paunang bayad sa Lupa niyang nilote sa akin 400 apat na raan mahigit na metro cudrado.
Cornelio A. Dantis, whose identity and participation in the alleged sale was never
explained. Testigo Tumangap,

Fourth, apart from the lone testimony of Julio, Jr., no other witness who knew or read Emilio a Dantis
Exhibit "4," much less saw it executed, was presented. In the absence of any shred of
corroborative evidence, the Court cannot help but entertain doubts on the truthfulness of
Julio, Jr.’s naked assertion. A perusal of the above document would readily show that it does not specify a determinate
subject matter. Nowhere does it provide a description of the property subject of the sale,
including its metes and bounds, as well as its total area. The Court notes that while Julio,
Assuming, in gratia argumenti, that Exhibit "4" is admissible in evidence, there will still be Jr. testified that the land subject of the sale consisted of 352 square meters, Exhibit "4,"
no valid and perfected oral contract for failure of Julio, Jr. to prove the concurrence of the however, states that it’s more than 400 square meters. Moreover, Exhibit "4" does not
essential requisites of a contract of sale by adequate and competent evidence. categorically declare the price certain in money. Neither does it state the mode of payment
of the purchase price and the period for its payment.
By the contract of sale, one of the contracting parties obligates himself to transfer the
ownership of, and to deliver, a determinate thing, and the other to pay therefor a price In Swedish Match, AB v. Court of Appeals,37 the Court ruled that the manner of payment
certain in money or its equivalent.32 A contract of sale is a consensual contract and, thus, is of the purchase price was an essential element before a valid and binding contract of sale
perfected by mere consent which is manifested by the meeting of the offer and the could exist. Albeit the Civil Code does not explicitly provide that the minds of the
acceptance upon the thing and the cause which are to constitute the contract.33 Until the contracting parties must also meet on the terms or manner of payment of the price, the
contract of sale is perfected, it cannot, as an independent source of obligation, serve as a same is needed, otherwise, there is no sale.38 An agreement anent the manner of payment
binding juridical relation between the parties.34 The essential elements of a contract of sale goes into the price so much so that a disagreement on the manner of payment is tantamount
are: a) consent or meeting of the minds, that is, consent to transfer ownership in exchange to a failure to agree on the price.39 Further, in Velasco v. Court of Appeals,40 where the
for the price; b) determinate subject matter; and c) price certain in money or its parties already agreed on the object of sale and on the purchase price, but not on how and
equivalent.35 The absence of any of the essential elements shall negate the existence of a when the downpayment and the installment payments were to be paid, this Court ruled:
perfected contract of sale.36
Such being the situation, it cannot, therefore, be said that a definite and firm sales
Seemingly, Julio, Jr. wanted to prove the sale by a receipt when it should be the receipt that agreement between the parties had been perfected over the lot in question. Indeed, this
should further corroborate the existence of the sale. At best, his testimony only alleges but Court has already ruled before that a definite agreement on the manner of payment of the
does not prove the existence of the verbal agreement. Julio, Jr. miserably failed to establish purchase price is an essential element in the formation of a binding and enforceable
by preponderance of evidence that there was a meeting of the minds of the parties as to the contract of sale. The fact, therefore, that the petitioners delivered to the respondent the sum
subject matter and the purchase price. of ₱10,000.00 as part of the down-payment that they had to pay cannot be considered as
sufficient proof of the perfection of any purchase and sale agreement between the parties
The chief evidence of Julio, Jr. to substantiate the existence of the oral contract of sale is herein under Art. 1482 of the new Civil Code, as the petitioners themselves admit that
Exhibit "4." For a better understanding and resolution of the issue at hand, Exhibit "4" is some essential matter - the terms of payment - still had to be mutually covenanted.41
being reproduced here:
The CA held that partial performance of the contract of sale- giving of a downpayment
coupled with the delivery of the res - took the oral contract out of the scope of the Statute
of Frauds. This conclusion arose from its erroneous finding that there was a perfected
contract of sale. The above disquisition, however, shows that there was none. There is,
therefore, no basis for the application of the Statute of Frauds. The application of the
Statute of Frauds presupposes the existence of a perfected contract.42 As to the delivery of
the res, it does not appear to be a voluntary one pursuant to the purported sale. If Julio, Jr.
happened to be there, it was because his ancestors tenanted the land. It must be noted that
when Julio, Jr. built his house, Rogelio protested.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed January 25, 2010 Decision and the
March 23, 2010 Resolution of the Court Appeals, in CA-G.R. CV No. 85258, are
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The March 2, 2005 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 18, in Civil Case No. 280-M-2002, is REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.