1. JOSELITO RANIERO J. DAAN vs. THE HON.

SANDIGANBAYAN
G.R. Nos. 163972-77. March 28, 2008
FACTS:
Joselito Daan and Benedicto Kuizon were charged before Sandiganbayan for three counts
of malversation of public funds which they purportedly tried to conceal by falsifying the time
book and payrolls for given period making it appear that some laborers worked on the
construction of the new municipal hall and collected their respective salaries when they did not.
In addition, they were also charged for three counts of falsification of public document by a
public officer or employee.
In the falsification cases, the accused offered to withdraw their plea of not guilty and
substitute the same with a plea of guilty, provided, the mitigating circumstances of confession or
plea of guilt and voluntary surrender will be appreciated in their favor. In the alternative, if such
proposal is not acceptable, said accused proposed instead to substitute their plea of not guilty to
the crime of falsification of public document by a public officer or employee with a plea of
guilty, but to the lesser crime of falsification of a public document by a private individual. On the
other hand, in the malversation cases, the accused offered to substitute their plea of not guilty
thereto with a plea of guilty, but to the lesser crime of failure of an accountable officer to render
accounts.
Insofar as the falsification cases are concerned, the prosecution found as acceptable the
proposal of the accused to plead guilty to the lesser crime of falsification of public document by
a private individual for it will strengthen the cases against the principal accused, Municipal
Mayor Kuizon who appears to be the mastermind of these criminal acts. As to the malversation
cases, the prosecution was likewise amenable to the offer of Daan to plead guilty to the lesser
crime of failure of an accountable officer to render accounts because he has already restituted the
amount involved.
However, the Sandiganbayan denied Daan’s Motion to Plea Bargain, despite favorable
recommendation by the prosecution, on the main ground that no cogent reason was presented to
justify its approval. Likewise, it denied Daan’s Motion for Reconsideration.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the plea of guilty to a lesser offense is proper in this case
HELD:
YES. In the present case, the Sandiganbayan rejected petitioner's plea offer on the ground
that petitioner and the prosecution failed to demonstrate that the proposal would redound to the
benefit of the public.
Apparently, the Sandiganbayan has proffered valid reasons in rejecting petitioner's plea
offer. However, subsequent events and higher interests of justice and fair play dictate that
petitioner's plea offer should be accepted. The present case calls for the judicious exercise of this
Court's equity jurisdiction and of its power of control and supervision over the proceedings of
lower courts, in order to afford equal justice to petitioner.
Moreover, the lesser offenses of Falsification by Private Individuals and Failure
to Render Account by an Accountable Officer are necessarily included in the crimes of
Falsification of Public Documents and Malversation of Public Funds, respectively, with which
petitioner was originally charged. Given, therefore, that some of the essential elements of
offenses charged in this case likewise constitute the lesser offenses, then petitioner may plead
guilty to such lesser offenses.
Section 2, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court presents the basic requisites upon which plea
bargaining may be made, i.e., that it should be with the consent of the offended party and the
prosecutor, and that the plea of guilt should be to a lesser offense which is necessarily included in
the offense charged. As regards plea bargaining during the pre-trial stage, as in the present case,
the trial court's exercise of its discretion should neither be arbitrary nor should it amount to a
capricious and whimsical exercise of discretion. 
2. PEOPLE v. MAMARION
G.R. No. 137554, 1 OCTOBER 2003
FACTS:
Roberta Cokin, also known as Obing, is a rich Filipino-Chinese businesswoman in
Bacolod City. She maintains a grocery store, commercial buildings, real estate, and agricultural
landholdings.
On or about July 16, 1995, in Bacolod City, accused together with John Doe, Peter Doe,
Richard Doe and Edward Doe whose true names, identities and whereabouts are still unknown,
conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another with the use of firearms of different
calibers by means of violence against and intimidation of person, did then, and there, kidnap
ROBERTA COKIN, detain and deprive her of her liberty for the period of more than three (3)
days for the purpose of extorting money in the amount of Two Million Pesos (P2,000,000.00)
from her sister, Teresita Cokin, for her release and that after the pay-off was intercepted and
accused John Mamarion was arrested: as a consequence thereof, victim Roberta Cokin was
inflicted multiple physical injuries on different parts of her body which caused her death, to the
damage and prejudice of her heirs.
Only accused Amado Gale, Jr, Mamarion, and Domingo were arraigned. Gale and
Domingo pleaded not guilty. As for Mamarion, the court entered a plea of not guilty for him as
he refused to enter any plea.

Accused Gale filed a motion, with the approval of the public prosecutor, seeking that he
be allowed to plead guilty to a lesser offense, from Kidnapping for Ransom to Slight Illegal
Detention. Acting on said motion, the trial court conferred with the victim's sister, Teresita
Cokin, and the latter agreed. There being no evidence presented as yet against Gale and on the
condition that he will testify for the prosecution, the trial court found no impediment to grant the
motion. Gale was re-arraigned and entered a plea of guilty to Slight Illegal Detention.
Accordingly, the trial court rendered a Decision dated May 13, 1997, sentencing Amado Gale
guilty of Slight Illegal Detention, with the consideration of mitigating circumstances of no
intention to commit so grave a wrong and voluntary surrender.

Upon conviction of Mamarion and Domingo as principals by direct participation, and

On July 15, 1995, at around 11:45 in the evening, ROBERTA COKIN passed by her
cockfarm in front of Bacolod National High School. She was driving her Toyota Hi-Lux. She
never made it home as a group of armed men took her away. On the following day, TERESITA
COKIN, her younger sister, saw Roberta’s Hi-lux abandoned in front of San Sebastian Cathedral.
Subsequently, she received a phone call from a certain BRAVO, informing her that Roberta was
kidnapped and would be released only after paying a ransom of 1 million.
Andrew Sumpay, Roberta’s nephew, while in her grocery store, noticed a man pacing the
sidewalk. As identified later on as JOHN MAMARION, he handed over to Andres a plastic bag
containing some papers containing Roberta’s driver’s license, and A PIECE OF YELLOW
PAPER CONTAINING A NOTE IN ROBERTA’S OWN HANDWRITING: “Teresita, please
give the bearer 1M for I am kidnap by them. Don’t tell the police or any law enforcer for my
security reason.” (Sgd) Obing. Please produce immediately same”
Without Teresita’s knowledge, Andres sought the help of a retired policeman Graciano
Reyes, and reported the kidnapping to him. The NBI sought the assistance of the Bacolod Anti-
Syndicated Crime Unit (BASCU) a unit of the Bacolod City Police specifically organized for the
purpose of going after syndicated crimes and big-time criminals. The NBI set up shop in the
house of Cokin and monitored the calls made by the kidnappers. Teresita, following the
instructions of the NBI, demanded that she be allowed to talk with her sister. Teresita heard the
voice of Roberta over the telephone but their conversation was very brief. All that Roberta said
was for her sister to be obedient to the wishes of her kidnappers. Bravo thereafter told Teresita
that the ransom money is raised to 2M. The NBI monitoring the call failed to trace its origin as
the call was made with the use of a cellular telephone.
Bravo wants the money to be delivered at the Holiday Restaurant in the place which is
known as the Shopping Center. The person who is carrying the money should wear a red cap and
the money should be given to one who will identify himself as Bravo. The pay-off time was at
5:30 p.m. Mario Mahusay was very conspicuous with his red cap inside the Holiday Restaurant
at about 5:30 p.m. that day, July 20, 1995. When the restaurant's telephone rung, Mario was told
that someone would like to talk with him. It was Bravo on the other end of the line and he
instructed Mario to take a taxi and proceed to the Tops Bowling Lanes which is about a little less
than a kilometer away. Fortuitously, a taxi was on hand when Mario stepped out of the
restaurant. Mario boarded the taxi and it immediately sped away. he NBI and the BASCU men
were caught unprepared by the sudden turn of events. Jumping on their vehicles, they sped
northward following the route taken by the taxi.
 The taxi, with Mario Mahusay on board, stopped in front of Tops Bowling Lanes and
Mario alighted. He went inside the building and waited. He did not wait long as in a few
moments, a man came and identified himself as Bravo. Mario delivered the bags containing the
2M to the man who took them. The man gave Mario P50.00 and they both left the premises of
Tops.The BASCU team moved towards the direction of the Queen of Peace Church near the
premises of Tops.

Before the BASCU team could reach the vicinity of the church, they chanced upon a man
with a bag walking hurriedly. When accosted, the man fired at the BASCU team. After a brief
firefight and the explosion of a grenade, the man was subdued. The bags containing the ransom
money were recovered. The BASCU team also took from the man a .357 caliber homemade
revolver with ammunitions and a holster (Exhs. A, B, C and D). The man was later identified as
John Mamarion.

The remains of Obing Cokin was discovered in a shallow grave in a secluded area of a
sugarcane plantation in the town of Anilao, Iloilo on August 7, 1995. Teresita Cokin positively
identified the corpse to be that of her elder sister, Obing. There is absolutely no doubt in this
identification as Teresita is intimately familiar with the features of her sister, including her
dentures. Moreover, she knew the blouse of Obing which has a red and white fish design and a
long sleeve.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the court erred in allowing Gale to plead to a lesser offense in consideration of
testifying as a prosecution witness?
RULING:
No. In this case, appellants assail Gale’s plea to a lesser offense arguing that it should
have been made during the plea bargaining stage and that it should not be subject to the
condition that he will testify against appellants. In the Brief for the State, the OSG maintains that
Gale was validly discharged as a state witness.
The OSG’s contention is wrong. Under the circumstances, Gale was not discharged as a
state witness under Section 17, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court. He was allowed to change his
plea pursuant to the then prevailing Section 2, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court which provides
that an accused, with the consent of the offended party and the prosecution, may be allowed to
plead guilty to a lesser offense.
In the case at bar, Gale moved to plead guilty to a lesser offense after the prosecution had
already rested its case. In such situation, jurisprudence has provided the trial court and the Office
of the Prosecutor with a yardstick within which their discretion may be properly exercised. Thus,
in People vs. Kayanan, we held that the rules allow such a plea only when the prosecution does
not have sufficient evidence to establish the guilt of the crime charged.

Gale's testimony was crucial to the prosecution as there was no other direct evidence
linking appellants to the commission of the crime. Hence, the trial court did not err in allowing
Gale to plead guilty to a lesser offense. The requisites provided in Sec. 17 on the discharge of
accused as state witness does not apply in this case. Gale was never a state witness to begin with.

Consequently, the court did not err in giving full faith and credit to Gale’s testimony.
As a general rule, the testimony of a co-conspirator is not sufficient for the conviction of
the accused unless other evidence supports such testimony. There is, however, an exception to
said rule. In People vs. Sala, the Court said:

It is true that the testimony of a co-conspirator is not sufficient for the conviction of the
accused unless such testimony is supported by other evidence. Such testimony comes from a
polluted source and, therefore, must be received with caution. As an exception, however, the
testimony of a co-conspirator, even if uncorroborated, will be considered sufficient if given in a
straightforward manner and it contains details which could not have been the result of deliberate
afterthought.
The testimony of Amado Gale on how the conspiracy to kidnap Roberta Cokin was
hatched and implemented resounds with all the earmarks of sincerity and truth. His testimony is
rich with details of persons, time, places and things and portrays with vivid imagery the action
and the happenings as he saw them. This is the kind of testimony that carries the hallmarks of
honesty and truth. Testimonies which are unequivocal, forthright and replete with details are
seals of self-authentication in their credibility. Moreover, Amado Gale is only a driver whose
educational attainment is only Grade II. It will require a good measure of ingenuity to invent a
story of kidnapping, abundant with all the gory details, an ingenuity which Amado certainly do
not possess.
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Bacolod City (Branch 50) in Criminal Case No. 96-17590, convicting appellants John Mamarion
y Hisugan, Charlito Domingo y Gorospe, Rolando Maclang y Ventura and Juliet Harisco y
Carrera of the crime of Kidnapping for Ransom, sentencing them to suffer the penalty of
DEATH and ordering them to pay jointly and severally, to the heirs of Roberta Cokin the amount
of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as civil indemnity with MODIFICATION that they are
further ordered to pay an additional amounts of Twenty Five Thousand Pesos (P25,000.00) as
temperate damages and One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00) as exemplary damages.
3. PEOPLE v. CFI OF QUEZON, BRANCH X
G.R. No. L-48817, 29 OCTOBER 1993
FACTS:
In an information, private respondent Gregorio Malco was charged before the then Court
of First Instance of Quezon with attempted rape, and whose case was raffled to Branch X of the
same court then presided by Judge Mapalad A. Nañadiego. However, after the case was
submitted to him for decision, Judge Nañadiego, retired and left it undecided. Judge Juan B.
Montecillo of Branch III took over Branch X in an acting capacity and decided the case.
Subsequently, Judge Conrado R. Antona was appointed Presiding Judge of Branch X. He took
his oath and assumed office thereby terminating ipso facto the temporary designation of Judge
Montecillo.
The Special Deputy Clerk of Court promulgated the decision penned by Judge Montecillo
acquitting Malco of attempted rape. The Provincial Fiscal instituted a petition contending that the
decision of Judge Montecillo was null and void since he was no longer judge-designated of
Branch X when his decision was promulgated as Judge Antona had already been appointed and
qualified.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a judgment of acquittal penned by a trial judge detailed to a vacant branch
of the Court but promulgated after a permanent judge has been duly appointed to the vacancy,
valid.
HELD:
Yes. The judgement of acquittal penned by Judge Montecillo must be declared valid. It is
not necessary that he be the presiding judge of Branch X at the time his decision was
promulgated since even after the expiration of his temporary designation at Branch X he
continued to be an incumbent of Branch III. After all, where a Court of First Instance (now
Regional Trial Court) is divided into several branches, each of the branches is not a court distinct
and separate from the others. Jurisdiction is vested in the court, not in the judges, so that when a
complaint or information is filed before one branch or judge, jurisdiction does not attach to said
branch of the judge alone, to the exclusion of the others. Indeed, it would have been difficult
altogether if the judge whose decision was promulgated had, prior to its promulgation, died,
resigned, retired, been dismissed, promoted to a higher court, or appointed to another office with
inconsistent functions. Then, he would no longer be an incumbent member of a court of equal
jurisdiction, and his decisions written thereafter would be invalid.
4. SANICO v. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 198753, 25 MARCH 2015
FACTS:
Jose (Sanico) was charged with trespassing and theft of minerals in the Municipal Circuit
Trial Court of Catmon-Sogod, Cebu. After trial, the MCTC convicted him and his co-accused,
Marsito Batiguin, with violation of Section 103 of the Philippine Mining Act of 1995, but
acquitted them of trespassing.  It also awarded damages in favour of the private complainant,
Jennifer Tenio.  Thus, on April 22, 2009, Jose’s counsel filed a Notice of Appeal of the MCTC
judgment.  On January 5, 2010, the RTC ordered him to file his memorandum on appeal, to
which Jose did not comply, hence upon motion of the private complainant, the RTC dismissed
his appeal.  Another lawyer for Jose, Atty. Canete, filed his motion for reconsideration, averring
that Jose was preoccupied with the condition of his ailing wife who subsequently died; likewise,
his counsel, Atty. Baring, suffered from a medical condition which caused her to forget how she
got the case and whom to contact as principal counsel. 
 The RTC denied the motion for its lack of verification and affidavit of service.  Thus, his
counsel filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals.   This time, the CA dismissed the
petition for review for various reasons: (a) the docket fees were not paid; (b) there was no proper
proof of service of a copy of the petition for review on the adverse party; (c) the petitioner did
not furnish to the RTC a copy of the petition for review; (d) there was no affidavit of service; (e) 
no written explanation for not resorting to personal filing was filed; (f) the documents appended
to the petition were only plain photocopies of the certified true copies; (g)  no copies of
pleadings and other material portions of the record were attached; (h) the verification and
certification of non-forum shopping were defective due to failure to contain a statement that the
allegations therein were based on the petitioner’s personal knowledge; (i) the  verification and
certification of non-forum shopping did not contain competent  evidence  of identity of  the
petitioner; and (j) the serial number of the commission of the notary public and the office address
of the notary public were not properly indicated.
On motion for reconsideration, the CA denied it, assuring that Jose was bound by the
mistakes of his counsel.  In the meantime, the RTC granted Jennifer Tenio moved for issuance of
writ of execution, and the record of the case indicated that it was granted and several properties
of Jose were levied on execution.
Jose elevated his case to the Supreme Court.  He argues that the RTC erred in dismissing
his appeal for non-filing of he memorandum on appeal.  The CA erred in not reversing the RTC
orders, and in finding him liable for the mistakes of his counsels.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the non-fling of the Memorandum of Appeal by Jose merits the dismissal
of his appeal by the RTC.
RULING:
No.
The failure to file the memorandum on appeal is a ground for the RTC to dismiss the
appeal only in civil cases. The same rule does not apply in criminal cases, because Section
9(c), supra, imposes on the RTC the duty to decide the appeal “on the basis of the entire record
of the case and of such memoranda or briefs as may have been filed” upon the submission of the
appellate memoranda or briefs, or upon the expiration of the period to file the same. Hence, the
dismissal of the petitioner’s appeal cannot be properly premised on the failure to file the
memorandum on appeal.
Having timely perfected his appeal by filing the notice of appeal in the MCTC, the
petitioner was entitled to expect that the RTC would resolve his appeal in due course, whether he
filed his memorandum on appeal or not. The unwarranted dismissal of the appeal by the RTC
was, therefore, an outright denial of due process to him in a manner that occasioned severe
prejudice because his conviction was not reviewed despite his first-time appeal being a matter of
right, and because his conviction was then declared to have attained finality, causing the
execution of the decision as to its civil aspect.
5. PEOPLE v. COGAED
G.R. No. 200334, 30 JULY 2014
FACTS:
Victor Cogaed was riding a jeepney with a bag from Barangay Lun-Oy and during a
checkpoint, the driver of the jeepney he rode made a signal to the police telling that Cogaed was
carrying marijuana inside Cogaed’s bag; the police officer then approached Cogaed and asked
the accused about the contents of his bags. Cogaed replied that he did not know what was inside
and that he was just transporting the bag in favor of Marvin, a barriomate. Cogaed subsequently
opened the bag revealing the bricks of marijuana inside. He was then arrested by the police
officers.

ISSUE:
Whether there was a valid search and seizure; and, whether the marijuana confiscated is
admissible as evidence.

RULING:
NO. There is no valid search and seizure; thus, the marijuana confiscated shall not be
admissible as evidence.

As a general rule, searches conducted with a warrant that meets all the requirements of
Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution are reasonable. This warrant requires the existence of
probable cause that can only be determined by a judge.

However, there are instances when searches are reasonable even when warrantless. The
known jurisprudential instances of reasonable warrantless searches and seizures are:

(1) Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest

The search involved in this case was initially a “stop and frisk” search, but it did not
comply with all the requirements of reasonability required by the Constitution.

“Stop and frisk” searches (sometimes referred to as Terry searches) are necessary for law
enforcement. That is, law enforcers should be given the legal arsenal to prevent the commission
of offenses. However, this should be balanced with the need to protect the privacy of citizens in
accordance with Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution. The balance lies in the concept of
“suspiciousness” present in the situation where the police officer finds himself or herself in. This
may be undoubtedly based on the experience of the police officer. It does not have to be probable
cause, but it cannot be mere suspicion. It has to be a “genuine reason to serve the purposes of the
“stop and frisk” exception.

The “stop and frisk” search was originally limited to outer clothing and for the purpose of
detecting dangerous weapons.

There was not a single suspicious circumstance in this case, and there was no
approximation for the probable cause requirement for warrantless arrest. The person searched
was not even the person mentioned by the informant. The informant gave the name of Marvin
Buya, and the person searched was Victor Cogaed. Even if it was true that Cogaed responded by
saying that he was transporting the bag to Marvin Buya, this still remained only as one
circumstance. This should not have been enough reason to search Cogaed and his belongings
without a valid search warrant.

Likewise, the facts of the case do not qualify as a search incidental to a lawful arrest. The
apprehension of Cogaed was not effected with a warrant of arrest. None of the instances
enumerated in Rule 113, Section 5 of the Rules of Court were present when the arrest was made.
At the time of his apprehension, Cogaed has not committed, was not committing, or was about to
commit a crime. There were no overt acts within plain view of the police officers that suggested
that Cogaed was in possession of drugs at that time. Also, Cogaed was not an escapee prisoner
that time; hence, he could not have qualified for the last allowable warrantless arrest.

There can be no valid waiver of Cogaed’s constitutional rights even if we assume that he
did not object when the police asked him to open his bags. Appellant’s silence should not be
lightly taken as consent to such search. The implied acquiescence to the search, if there was any,
could not have been more than mere passive conformity given under intimidating or coercive
circumstances and is thus considered no consent at all within the purview of the constitutional
guarantee.

The Constitution provides that any evidence obtained in violation of the right against
unreasonable searches and seizures shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.
Otherwise known as the exclusionary rule or the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine, this rule
prohibits the issuance of general warrants that encourage law enforcers to go on fishing
expeditions. Evidence obtained through unlawful seizures should be excluded as evidence
because it is “the only practical means of enforcing the constitutional injunction against
unreasonable searches and seizures.” It ensures that the fundamental rights to one’s person,
houses, papers, and effects are not lightly infringed upon and are upheld.

Considering that the prosecution and conviction of Cogaed were founded on the search of
his bags, a pronouncement of the illegality of that search means that there is no evidence left to
convict Cogaed.
 6. TOLENTINO v. CARLOS
G.R No. 46180, 30 AUGUST 1938
FACTS:
The fiscal of the City of Baguio filed an information against the petitioner charging him
with malversation of public funds in the City of Baguio. The information alleged that the
petitioner being then the postmaster in the post office of Baguio and an official of the
Commonwealth of the Philippines and having under his custody public funds in the amount of
P23,863.92 and postage stamps valued at P3,197.98, or a total of P27,061.90, which funds and
postage stamps belonged to the Commonwealth of the Philippines, and being under the legal
duty to keep custody thereof, account therefor, and return the same in due time to the said
Government, willfully, illegally and criminally misappropriated the said property, failed to
account therefor, and took the same for his own use and benefit. The criminal case thus filed
against him was docketed under No. 1602.
The suit had for its purpose the recovery from the petitioner of the same public funds and
postage stamps in the amount of P27,061.90. The complaint alleged that the petitioner had under
his custody the said public funds and postage stamps in his capacity as postmaster of the Baguio
post office, that as such public official he was under a duty to account therefor and to return the
same to the Commonwealth of the Philippines, that he was required to return and deliver the said
property but he could not do so because he took and misappropriated the same for his own use
and benefit to the prejudice of its owner.
At the end of the complaint Conrado Alcaraz, auditor of the City of Baguio, made a
verified statement stating that he had read the allegations of the complaint and that the same were
true according to his best knowledge and belief. In view of the verified petition and allegations
of the complaint, the respondent judge issued the writ of attachment and an officer of the court
attached the petitioner's property. The latter moved to dissolve the attachment, but the motion
was denied.
ISSUE:
(1) the affidavit in support thereof is insufficient and fatally defective;
(2) the Commonwealth of the Philippines did not file any bond before issuing the attachment, as
required by section 427 of the Code of Civil Procedure;
(3) the complaint filed in civil case No. 643 does not state any valid or legal cause of action
inasmuch as under its allegations the action brought, if any, was ex delicto, arising from the
crime of malversation of public funds alleged in the information filed in criminal case No. 1602;
and
(4) the respondent judge did not acquire jurisdiction, or acted without it, or abused his discretion
in issuing the writ of attachment
RULING:
(1) No. The petition for attachment was included in the complaint which was filed, and at the
end of the latter appears the verified statement of the auditor of the City of Baguio
wherein he avers that all the allegations of the complaint are true and correct to his
knowledge and belief. No petition or verified statement was filed separately to obtain the
attachment. The sworn statement of the auditor necessarily covered the allegations of the
complaint to the effect that the petitioner was a postmaster and public official, that he had
the property described under his custody, that it was his legal duty to account therefor and
to return the same to the Commonwealth, that he refused or he failed to return the same
upon demand, that he misappropriated the said property to the prejudice of its owner, that
the value of the property was not sufficiently secured, and that the petitioner had disposed
of his property or was trying to alienate the same in fraud of the Commonwealth of the
Philippines.

(2) No. Section 427 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that before the issuance of a
writ of attachment, the applicant therefor or any person in his name, should file a bond in
favor of the defendant for an amount not less than P400 nor more than the amount of the
claim, answerable for damages in case it is shown that the attachment was obtained
illegally or without sufficient cause; but in the case at bar the one who applied for and
obtained the attachment is the Commonwealth of the Philippines, as plaintiff, and under
the theory that the State is always solvent it was not bound to post the required bond and
the respondent judge did not exceed his jurisdiction in exempting it from such
requirement.

(3) In the complaint filed in the civil case, it is alleged, as already stated, that the petitioner
was a postmaster and public official who had custody of the property sought to be
recovered, charged with the legal duty to return and deliver the same upon demand to the
Commonwealth of the Philippines, and that he refused to return and deliver said property
when he was required to do so by the auditor of the City of Baguio. These allegation
alone constitute sufficient cause of action under section 633 of the Revised
Administrative Code providing that every officer of the Government of the Philippine
Islands whose duties permit or require the possession or custody of Government funds or
property of shall be accountable and directly responsible therefor. It is true that the
complaint sets out allegations which are substantially a reproduction of those in the
information for malversation of public funds filed in the criminal case, but these
allegations, in connection with the civil action, are unnecessary and may be overlooked.
The complaint could have been demurred to on the ground of ambiguity because it
alleged two different and independent causes of action; but as no demurrer was
interposed and as the complaint was not ordered amended, the Commonwealth mat try to
prove and confine itself to the action ex lege by abandoning the action ex delicto.
 (4) The respondent judge had full jurisdiction to issue the attachment applied for in the civil
case (section 425 of the Code of Civil Procedure) and he did not abuse the discretion
conferred upon him by law in granting the writ because the plaintiff Commonwealth had
complied with the requirements of sections 424, in connection with 412 and 426 of the
Code of Civil Procedure.

For the foregoing reasons, the writ prayed for is denied, with the costs to the petitioner. So
ordered.