Infante V Cunanan

[No. L-5180.
August 31, 1953]

CONSEJO INFANTE, petitioner, vs. JOSE CUNANAN, JUAN MIJARES and THE
COURT OF APPEALS, Second Division, respondents.
1.EVIDENCE; PAROLE EVIDENCE RULE; CONTRACTS AND OBLIGATIONS; PRINCIPAL AND
AGENT; AGENT'S COMMISSION.—Oral evidence is presented to the effect that while

the agents agreed to cancel the written authority given them by their principal,
they did so merely upon the principal's verbal assurance that, should the
property subject of .their contract of agency be sold to their own buyer, they
would b giveil the commission agreed upon. Held: The cancellation of the
written authority being in writing, parole evidence is not admissible under
section 22 of Rule 123.
2.ID ; ID.; ID.; ID. —If there is other evidence which would justify the agents' claim
for commission, even if such parol evidence is disregarded, they are entitled to
such commission.
692
692 Philippine Reports Annotated

Infants vs. Cunanan et al.
3.PRINCIPAL AND AGENT AGENT'S COMMISSION CANCELLATION OF AGENTS' AUTHORITY;

EFFECT OF CONCELLATION ON COMMISSION.—The principal took advantage of the
agents' services consisting in locating a buyer for the principal's land. The
principal, perhaps by stratagem advised the agents that she was no longer
interested in the deal and was able to prevail upon them to sign a document
agreeing to the cancellation of the written authority she had originally given the
agents, believing that she could evade payment of their commission. Then she
sold the property to the buyer found by the agents. Held: The principal's act is
unfair as would amount to bad faith, and cannot be sanctioned without according
to the agents the reward which is due them.
PETITION for review by certiorari of a decision of the Court of

Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Yuseco, Abdon & Yuseco for petitioner.
Jose E. Erfe and Maria Luiga Gomez for respondents,
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
This is a petition for review of a decision of the Court of Appeals
affirming the judgment of the court of origin which orders the
defendant to pay the plaintiffs the sum of P2,500 with legal interest
thereon from February 2, 1949 and the costs of action.
Consejo Infante, defendant herein, was the owner of two parcels
of land, together with a house built thereon, situated in the City of
Manila and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 61786. On
or before November 30, 1948, she contracted the services of Jose
Cunanan and Juan Mijares, plaintiffs herein, to sell the above-
mentioned property for a price of P30,000 subject to the condition
that the purchaser would assume the mortgage existing thereon in
favor of the Rehabilitation Finance Corporation. She agreed to pay
them a commission of 5 per cent on the purchase price plus
whatever overprice they may obtain for the property. Plaintiffs found
one Pio S. Noche who was willing to buy the property under the
terms agreed
693
VOL. 93, AUGUST 31, 1953 693

upon with defendant, but when they introduced him to defendant,

the latter informed them that she was no longer interested in selling
the property and succeeded in making them sign a document stating
therein that the written authority she had given them was already
cancelled. However, on December 20, 1948, defendant dealt directly
with Pio S. Noche selling to him the property for P31,000. Upon
learning this transaction, plaintiffs demanded from defendant the
payment of their commission, but she refused and so they brought
the present action.
Defendant admitted having contracted the services of the
plaintiffs to sell her property as set forth in the complaint, but stated
that she agreed to pay them a commission of P1,200 only on
condition that they buy her a property somewhere in Taft Avenue to
where she might transfer after selling her property. Defendant avers
that while plaintiffs took steps to sell her property as agreed upon,
they sold the property at Taft Avenue to another party and because of
this failure it was agreed that the authority she had given them be
cancelled.
The lower court found that the preponderance of evidence was in
favor of the plaintiffs and rendered judgment sentencing the
defendant to pay the plaintiffs the sum of P2,500 with legal interest
thereon from February 2, 1949 plus the costs of action. This decision
was affirmed in toto by the Court of Appeals.
There is no dispute that respondents were authorized by
petitioner to sell her property for the sum of P30,000 with the
understanding that they will be given a commission of 5 percent plus
whatever overprice they may obtain for the property. Petitioner,
however, contends that that authority has already been withdrawn on
November 30, 1948 when, by the voluntary act of respondents, they
executed a document stating that said authority shall be considered
cancelled and without any effect, so that when petitioner sold the
property to Pio S. Noche on
694

December 20, 1948, she was already free from her con, mitment
with respondents and, therefore, was not in duty bound to pay them
any commission for the transaction.
If the facts were as claimed by petitioner, there is indeed no
doubt that she would have no obligation to pay respondents the
commission which was promised them under the original authority
because, under the old Civil Code, her right to withdraw such
authority is recognized, A principal may withdraw the authority
given to an agent at will. (Article 1733.) But this fact is disputed.
Thus, respondents claim that while they agreed to cancel the written
authority given to them, they did so merely upon the verbal
assurance given by petitioner that, should the property be sold to
their own buyer, Pio S. Noche, they would be given the commission
agreed upon. True, this verbal assurance does not appear in the
written cancella, tion, Exhibit 1, and, on the other hand, it is
disputed by petitioner, but respondents were allowed to present oral
evidence to prove it, and this is now assigned as error in this petition
for review.
The plea that oral evidence should not have been allowed to
prove the alleged verbal assurance is well taken it appearing that the
written authority given to respondents has been cancelled in a
written statement. The rule on this matter is that "When the terms of
an agreement have been reduced to writing, it is to be considered as
containing all those terms, and, therefore, there can be, between the
parties and their successors in interest, no evidence of the terms of
the agreement other than the contents of the writing." (Section 22,
Rule 123, Rules of Court.) The only exceptions to this rule are . " (a)
Where a mistake or imperfection of the writing, or its failure to
express the true intent and agreement of the parties, or the validity of
the agreement is put in issue by the pleadings" ; and "(b) Where
there is an intrinsic ambiguity in the writing." (Ibid.) There is no
doubt that the point raised does not come under any of the cases
695
VOL. 93, AUGUST 31, 1953 695

excepted, for there is nothing therein that has been put in issue by
respondents in their complaint. The terms of the document, Exhibit
1, seem to be clear and they do not contain any reservation which
may in any way run counter to the clear intention of the parties.
But even disregarding the oral evidence adduced by respondents
in contravention of the parole evidence rule, we are, however, of the
opinion that there is enough justification for the conclusion reached
by the lower court as well as by the Court of Appeals to the effect
that re, spondents are entitled to the commission originally agreed
upon. It is a fact found by the Court of Appeals that after petitioner
had given the written authority to respondent to sell her land for the
sum of P30,000, respondents found
buyer in the person of one Pio S. Noche who was willing to buy
the property under the terms agreed upon, and this matter was
immediately brought to the knowledge of petitioner. But the latter,
perhaps by way of stratagem, advised respondents that she was no
longer interested it the deal and was able to prevail upon them to
sign a document agreeing to the cancellation of the written authority.
That petitioner had changed her mind even if respondents had
found a buyer who was willing to close the deal, is a matter that
would not give rise to a legal consequence if respondents agree to
call of the transaction in deference to the request of petitioner. But
the situation varies if one of the parties takes advantage of the
benevolence of the other and acts in a manner that would promote
his own selfish interest. This act is unfair as would amount to bad
faith. This act cannot be sanctioned without according to the party
prejudiced the reward which is due him. This is the situation in
which respondents were placed by petitioner. Petitioner took
advantage of the services rendered by respondents, but believing that
she, could evade payment of their commission, she made use of a
ruse by inducing them to sign the deed of cancellation Exhibit 1.
This act of subversion cannot be sanctioned
696

and cannot serve as basis for petitioner to escape payment of the

commission agreed upon.
Wherefore, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed, with
costs against petitioner.
Parás, C. J., Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla, Tuason, Monte-mayor,

Reyes, and Jugo, JJ., concur.
LABRADOR, J., concurring and dissenting:
I concur in the result. I can not agree, however, to the ruling
made in the majority decision that the petitioners can not introduce
evidence of the circumstances under which the document was
signed, i. e. upon promise by respondent that should the property be
sold to petitioner's buyer they would nevertheless be entitled to the
commission agreed upon. Such evidence is not excluded by the
parole evidence rule, because it does not tend to alter or vary the
terms of the document. This document was merely a withdrawal of
the authority granted the petitioner to sell the property, not an
agreement that they shall not be paid their commission.
Judgment affirmed.
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[No. L-5180.

August 31, 1953]

1.EVIDENCE; PAROLE EVIDENCE RULE; CONTRACTS AND OBLIGATIONS; PRINCIPAL AND

AGENT; AGENT'S COMMISSION.—Oral evidence is presented to the effect that while

692 Philippine Reports Annotated

3.PRINCIPAL AND AGENT AGENT'S COMMISSION CANCELLATION OF AGENTS' AUTHORITY;

PETITION for review by certiorari of a decision of the Court of

VOL. 93, AUGUST 31, 1953 693

upon with defendant, but when they introduced him to defendant,

694 Philippine Reports Annotated

VOL. 93, AUGUST 31, 1953 695

696 Philippine Reports Annotated

and cannot serve as basis for petitioner to escape payment of the

Parás, C. J., Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla, Tuason, Monte-mayor,

© Copyright 2018 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved.

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