Legal Profession

Legal Profession Singson, Trisha Marie
[G.R. No. 100113. September 3, 1991.]

RENATO L. CAYETANO, Petitioner, v. CHRISTIAN MONSOD, HON. JOVITO R.
SALONGA, COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS, and HON. GUILLERMO
CARAGUE in his capacity as Secretary of Budget and Management, Respondents.
Renato L. Cayetano for and in his own behalf.
Sabina E. Acut, Jr. and Mylene Garcia-Albano co-counsel for petitioner.
DECISION
PARAS, J.:
We are faced here with a controversy of far-reaching proportions While ostensibly only legal
issues are involved, the Court’s decision in this case would indubitably have a profound effect on
the political aspect of our national existence.
The 1987 Constitution provides in Section 1(1), Article IX-C:
"There shall be a Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and six Commissioners
who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their appointment, at least
thirty-five years of age, holders of a college degree, and must not have been candidates for any
elective position in the immediately preceding elections. However, a majority thereof, including
the Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of
law for at least ten years." (Emphasis supplied)
The aforequoted provision is patterned after Section 1(1), Article XII-C of the 1973 Constitution
which similarly provides:
"There shall be an independent Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and eight
Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their
appointment, at least thirty-five years of age and holders of a college degree. However, a
majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar who have been
engaged in the practice of law for al least ten years." (Emphasis supplied)
Regrettably, however, there seems to be no jurisprudence as to what constitutes practice of law as
a legal qualification to an appointive office.
Black defines "practice of law" as:
"The rendition of services requiring the knowledge and the application of legal principles and
technique to serve the interest of another with his consent. It is not limited to appearing in court,
or advising and assisting in the conduct of litigation, but embraces the preparation of pleadings,
and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, conveyancing, the preparation of
legal instruments of all kinds, and the giving of all legal advice to clients. It embraces all advice
to clients and all actions taken for them in matters connected with the law. An attorney engages
in the practice of law by maintaining an office where he is held out to be an attorney, using a
letterhead describing himself as an attorney, counseling clients in legal matters, negotiating with
opposing counsel about pending litigation, and fixing and collecting fees for services rendered by
his associate." (Black’s Law Dictionary, 3rd ed.).
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The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. (Land Title Abstract and Trust
Co. v. Dworken, 129 Ohio St. 23, 193 N.E. 650) A person is also considered to be in the practice
of law when he:
". . . for valuable consideration engages in the business of advising person, firms, associations or
corporations as to their rights under the law, or appears in a representative capacity as an
advocate in proceedings pending or prospective, before any court, commissioner, referee, board,
body, committee, or commission constituted by law or authorized to settle controversies and
there, in such representative capacity performs any act or acts for the purpose of obtaining or
defending the rights of their clients under the law. Otherwise stated, one who, in a representative
capacity, engages in the business of advising clients as to their rights under the law, or while so
engaged performs any act or acts either in court or outside of court for that purpose, is engaged
in the practice of law." (State ex. rel. Mckittrick v. C.S. Dudley and Co., 102 S.W. 2d 895, 340
Mo. 852).
This Court in the case of Philippine Lawyers Association v. Agrava, (105 Phil. 173, 176-177)
stated:
"The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces the
preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, the
management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts, and
in addition, conveying. In general, all advice to clients, and all action taken for them in matters
connected with the law incorporation services, assessment and condemnation services
contemplating an appearance before a judicial body, the foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement
of a creditor’s claim in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in
attachment, and in matters of estate and guardianship have been held to constitute law practice,
as do the preparation and drafting of legal instruments, where the work done involves the
determination by the trained legal mind of the legal effect of facts and conditions." (5 Am. Jr. p.
262, 263). (Emphasis supplied)
"Practice of law under modern conditions consists in no small part of work performed outside of
any court and having no immediate relation to proceedings in court. It embraces conveyancing,
the giving of legal advice on a large variety of subjects, and the preparation and execution of
legal instruments covering an extensive field of business and trust relations and other affairs.
Although these transactions may have no direct connection with court proceedings, they are
always subject to become involved in litigation. They require in many aspects a high degree of
legal skill, a wide experience with men and affairs, and great capacity for adaptation to difficult
and complex situations. These customary functions of an attorney or counselor at law bear an
intimate relation to the administration of justice by the courts. No valid distinction, so far as
concerns the question set forth in the order, can be drawn between that part of the work of the
lawyer which involves appearance in court and that part which involves advice and drafting of
instruments in his office. It is of importance to the welfare of the public that these manifold
customary functions be performed by persons possessed of adequate learning and skill, of sound
moral character, and acting at all times under the heavy trust obligations to clients which rests
upon all attorneys." (Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol. 3 [1953 ed.], p. 665-666,
citing In re Opinion of the Justices [Mass.], 194 N.E. 313, quoted in Rhode Is. Bar Assoc. v.
Automobile Service Assoc. [R.I.] 179 A. 139, 144). (Emphasis ours).
The University of the Philippines Law Center in conducting orientation briefing for new lawyers
(1974-1975) listed the dimensions of the practice of law in even broader terms as advocacy,
counseling and public service.
"One may be a practicing attorney in following any line of employment in the profession. If what
he does exacts knowledge of the law and is of a kind usual for attorneys engaging in the active
practice of their profession, and he follows some one or more lines of employment such as this
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he is a practicing attorney at law within the meaning of the statute." (Barr D. Cardell, 155 NW
312).
Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal
procedure, knowledge, training and experience. "To engage in the practice of law is to perform
those acts which are characteristics of the profession. Generally, to practice law is to give notice
or render any kind of service, which device or service requires the use in any degree of legal
knowledge or skill." (111 ALR 23).
The following records of the 1986 Constitutional Commission show that it has adopted a liberal
interpretation of the term "practice of law."
"MR. FOZ. Before we suspend the session, may I make a manifestation which I forgot to do
during our review of the provisions on the Commission on Audit. May I be allowed to make a
very brief statement?
"THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir).
The Commissioner will please proceed.
"MR. FOZ. This has to do with the qualifications of the members of the Commission on Audit.
Among others, the qualifications provided for by Section 1 is that ‘They must be Members of the
Philippine Bar’ — I am quoting from the provision — ‘who have been engaged in the practice of
law for at least ten years.’"
"To avoid any misunderstanding which would result in excluding members of the Bar who are
now employed in the COA or Commission on Audit, we would like to make the clarification that
this provision on qualifications regarding members of the Bar does not necessarily refer or
involve actual practice of law outside the COA. We have to interpret this to mean that as long as
the lawyers who are employed in the COA are using their legal knowledge or legal talent in their
respective work within COA, then they are qualified to be considered for appointment as
members or commissioners, even chairman, of the Commission on Audit.
"This has been discussed by the Committee on Constitutional Commissions and Agencies and we
deem it important to take it up on the floor so that this interpretation may be made available
whenever this provision on the qualifications as regards members of the Philippine Bar engaging
in the practice of law for at least ten years is taken up.
"MR. OPLE. Will Commissioner Foz yield to just one question.
"MR. FOZ. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer.
"MR. OPLE. Is he, in effect, saying that service in the COA by a lawyer is equivalent to the
requirement of a law practice that is set forth in the Article on the Commission on Audit?"
MR. FOZ. We must consider the fact that the work of COA although it is auditing, will
necessarily involve legal work; it will involve legal work. And, therefore, lawyers who are
employed in COA now would have the necessary qualifications in accordance with the provision
on qualifications under our provisions on the Commission on Audit. And, therefore, the answer is
yes.
"MR. OPLE. Yes. So that the construction given to this is that this is equivalent to the practice of
law.
"MR. FOZ. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer.
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"MR. OPLE. Thank you."

. . . (Emphasis supplied)
Section 1(1), Article IX-D of the 1987 Constitution, provides, among others, that the Chairman
and two Commissioners of the Commission on Audit (COA) should either be certified public
accountants with not less than ten years of auditing practice, or members of the Philippine Bar
who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. (Emphasis supplied)
Corollary to this is the term "private practitioner" and which is in many ways synonymous with
the word "lawyer." Today, although many lawyers do not engage in private practice, it is still a
fact that the majority of lawyers are private practitioners. (Gary Munneke, Opportunities in Law
Careers [VGM Career Horizons: Illinois), 1986], p. 15]).
At this point, it might be helpful to define private practice. The term, as commonly understood,
means "an individual or organization engaged in the business of delivering legal
services." (Ibid.). Lawyers who practice alone are often called "sole practitioners." Groups of
lawyers are called "firms." The firm is usually a partnership and members of the firm are the
partners. Some firms may be organized as professional corporations and the members called
shareholders. In either case, the members of the firm are the experienced attorneys. In most
firms, there are younger or more inexperienced salaried attorneys called "associates." (Ibid.).
The test that defines law practice by looking to traditional areas of law practice is essentially
tautologies, unhelpful defining the practice of law as that which lawyers do. (Charles W.
Wolfram, Modern Legal Ethics [West Publishing Co.: Minnesota, 1986], p. 593). The practice of
law is defined as "the performance of any acts . . . in or out of court, commonly understood to be
the practice of law. (State Bar Ass’n v. Connecticut Bank & Trust Co., 145 Conn. 222, 140 A. 2d
863, 870 [1958] [quoting Grievance Comm. v. Payne, 128 Conn. 325, 22 A. 2d 623, 626 [1941]).
Because lawyers perform almost every function known in the commercial and governmental
realm, such a definition would obviously be too global to be workable. (Wolfram, op. cit.)
The appearance of a lawyer in litigation in behalf of a client is at once the most publicly familiar
role for lawyers as well as an uncommon role for the average lawyer. Most lawyers spend little
time in courtrooms, and a large percentage spend their entire practice without litigating a case.
(Ibid., p. 593). Nonetheless, many lawyers do continue to litigate and the litigating lawyer’s role
colors much of both the public image and the self-perception of the legal profession. (Ibid.).
In this regard thus, the dominance of litigation in the public mind reflects history, not reality.
(Ibid.). Why is this so? Recall that the late Alexander Sycip, a corporate lawyer, once articulated
on the importance of a lawyer as a business counselor in this wise: "Even today, there are still
uninformed laymen whose concept of an attorney is one who principally tries cases before the
courts. The members of the bench and bar and the informed laymen such as businessmen, know
that in most developed societies today, substantially more legal work is transacted in law offices
than in the courtrooms. General practitioners of law who do both litigation and non-litigation
work also know that in most cases they find themselves spending more time doing what [is]
loosely describe[d] as business counseling than in trying cases. The business lawyer has been
described as the planner, the diagnostician and the trial lawyer, the surgeon. I[t] need not [be]
stress[ed] that in law, as in medicine, surgery should be avoided where internal medicine can be
effective." (Business Star, "Corporate Finance Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).
In the course of a working day the average general practitioner will engage in a number of legal
tasks, each involving different legal doctrines, legal skills, legal processes, legal institutions,
clients, and other interested parties. Even the increasing numbers of lawyers in specialized
practice will usually perform at least some legal services outside their specialty. And even within
a narrow specialty such as tax practice, a lawyer will shift from one legal task or role such as
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advice-giving to an importantly different one such as representing a client before an

administrative agency. (Wolfram, supra, p. 687).
By no means will most of this work involve litigation, unless the lawyer is one of the relatively
rare types — a litigator who specializes in this work to the exclusion of much else. Instead, the
work will require the lawyer to have mastered the full range of traditional lawyer skills of client
counselling, advice-giving, document drafting, and negotiation. And increasingly lawyers find
that the new skills of evaluation and mediation are both effective for many clients and a source of
employment. (Ibid.).
Most lawyers will engage in non-litigation legal work or in litigation work that is constrained in
very important ways, at least theoretically, so as to remove from it some of the salient features of
adversarial litigation. Of these special roles, the most prominent is that of prosecutor. In some
lawyers’ work the constraints are imposed both by the nature of the client and by the way in
which the lawyer is organized into a social unit to perform that work. The most common of these
roles are those of corporate practice and government legal service. (Ibid.).
In several issues of the Business Star, a business daily, herein below quoted are emerging trends
in corporate law practice, a departure from the traditional concept of practice of law.
We are experiencing today what truly may be called a revolutionary transformation in corporate
law practice. Lawyers and other professional groups, in particular those members participating in
various legal-policy decisional contexts, are finding that understanding the major emerging
trends in corporation law is indispensable to intelligent decision-making.
Constructive adjustment to major corporate problems of today requires an accurate
understanding of the nature and implications of the corporate law research function accompanied
by an accelerating rate of information accumulation. The recognition of the need for such
improved corporate legal policy formulation, particularly "model-making" and contingency
planning," has impressed upon us the inadequacy of traditional procedures in many decisional
contexts.
In a complex legal problem the mass of information to be processed, the sorting and weighing of
significant conditional factors, the appraisal of major trends, the necessity of estimating the
consequences of given courses of action, and the need for fast decision and response in situations
of acute danger have prompted the use of sophisticated concepts of information flow theory,
operational analysis, automatic data processing, and electronic computing equipment.
Understandably, an improved decisional structure must stress the predictive component of the
policy-making process, wherein a model", of the decisional context or a segment thereof is
developed to test projected alternative courses of action in terms of futuristic effects flowing
therefrom.
Although members of the legal profession are regularly engaged in predicting and projecting the
trends of the law, the subject of corporate finance law has received relatively little organized and
formalized attention in the philosophy of advancing corporate legal education. Nonetheless, a
cross-disciplinary approach to legal research has become a vital necessity.
Certainly, the general orientation for productive contributions by those trained primarily in the
law can be improved through an early introduction to multi-variable decisional contexts and the
various approaches for handling such problems. Lawyers, particularly with either a master’s or
doctorate degree in business administration or management, functioning at the legal policy level
of decision-making now have some appreciation for the concepts and analytical techniques of
other professions which are currently engaged in similar types of complex decision-making.
Truth to tell, many situations involving corporate finance problems would require the services of
an astute attorney because of the complex legal implications that arise from each and every
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necessary step in securing and maintaining the business issue raised. (Business Star, "Corporate
Finance Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).
In our litigation-prone country, a corporate lawyer is assiduously referred to as the "abogado de
campanilla." He is the "big-time" lawyer, earning big money and with a clientele composed of
the tycoons and magnates of business and industry.
Despite the growing number of corporate lawyers, many people could not explain what it is that
a corporate lawyer does. For one, the number of attorneys employed by a single corporation will
vary with the size and type of the corporation. Many smaller and some large corporations farm
out all their legal problems to private law firms. Many others have in-house counsel only for
certain matters. Other corporation have a staff large enough to handle most legal problems in-
house.
A corporate lawyer, for all intents and purposes, is a lawyer who handles the legal affairs of a
corporation. His areas of concern or jurisdiction may include, inter alia: corporate legal research,
tax laws research, acting out as corporate secretary (in board meetings), appearances in both
courts and other adjudicatory agencies (including the Securities and Exchange Commission), and
in other capacities which require an ability to deal with the law.
At any rate, a corporate lawyer may assume responsibilities other than the legal affairs of the
business of the corporation he is representing. These include such matters as determining policy
and becoming involved in management. (Emphasis supplied.)
In a big company, for example, one may have a feeling of being isolated from the action, or not
understanding how one’s work actually fits into the work of the organization. This can be
frustrating to someone who needs to see the results of his work first hand. In short, a corporate
lawyer is sometimes offered this fortune to be more closely involved in the running of the
business.
Moreover, a corporate lawyer’s services may sometimes be engaged by a multinational
corporation (MNC). Some large MNCs provide one of the few opportunities available to
corporate lawyers to enter the international law field. After all, international law is practiced in a
relatively small number of companies and law firms. Because working in a foreign country is
perceived by many as glamorous, this is an area coveted by corporate lawyers. In most cases,
however, the overseas jobs go to experienced attorneys while the younger attorneys do their
"international practice" in law libraries. (Business Star, "Corporate Law Practice," May 25, 1990,
p. 4).
This brings us to the inevitable, i.e., the role of the lawyer in the realm of finance. To borrow the
lines of Harvard-educated lawyer Bruce Wassertein, to wit: "A bad lawyer is one who fails to
spot problems, a good lawyer is one who perceives the difficulties, and the excellent lawyer is
one who surmounts them." (Business Star, "Corporate Finance Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).
Today, the study of corporate law practice direly needs a "shot in the arm," so to speak. No
longer are we talking of the traditional law teaching method of confining the subject study to the
Corporation Code and the Securities Code but an incursion as well into the intertwining modern
management issues.
Such corporate legal management issues deal primarily with three (3) types of learning: (1)
acquisition of insights into current advances which are of particular significance to the corporate
counsel; (2) an introduction to usable disciplinary skills applicable to a corporate counsel’s
management responsibilities; and (3) a devotion to the organization and management of the legal
function itself.
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These three subject areas may be thought of as intersecting circles, with a shared area linking
them. Otherwise known as "intersecting managerial jurisprudence," it forms a unifying theme for
the corporate counsel’s total learning.
Some current advances in behavior and policy sciences affect the counsel’s role. For that matter,
the corporate lawyer reviews the globalization process, including the resulting strategic
repositioning that the firms he provides counsel for are required to make, and the need to think
about a corporation’s strategy at multiple levels. The salience of the nation-state is being reduced
as firms deal both with global multinational entities and simultaneously with sub-national
governmental units. Firms increasingly collaborate not only with public entities but with each
other — often with those who are competitors in other arenas.
Also, the nature of the lawyer’s participation in decision-making within the corporation is rapidly
changing. The modern corporate lawyer has gained a new role as a stockholder — in some cases
participating in the organization and operations of governance through participation on boards
and other decision-making roles. Often these new patterns develop alongside existing legal
institutions and laws are perceived as barriers. These trends are complicated as corporations
organize for global operations. (Emphasis supplied).
The practising lawyer of today is familiar as well with governmental policies toward the
promotion and management of technology. New collaborative arrangements for promoting
specific technologies or competitiveness more generally require approaches from industry that
differ from older, more adversarial relationships and traditional forms of seeking to influence
governmental policies. And there are lessons to be learned from other countries. In Europe,
Esprit, Eureka and Race are examples of collaborative efforts between governmental and
business Japan’s MITI is world famous. (Emphasis supplied)
Following the concept of boundary spanning, the office of the Corporate Counsel comprises a
distinct group within the managerial structure of all kinds of organizations. Effectiveness of both
long-term and temporary groups within organizations has been found to be related to
indentifiable factors in the group-context interaction such as the groups actively revising their
knowledge of the environment, coordinating work with outsiders, promoting team achievements
within the organization. In general, such external activities are better predictors of team
performance than internal group processes.
In a crisis situation, the legal managerial capabilities of the corporate lawyer vis-a-vis the
managerial mettle of corporations are challenged. Current research is seeking ways both to
anticipate effective managerial procedures and to understand relationships of financial liability
and insurance considerations. (Emphasis supplied)
Regarding the skills to apply by the corporate counsel, three factors are apropos:
First System Dynamics. The field of systems dynamics has been found an effective tool for new
managerial thinking regarding both planning and pressing immediate problems. An
understanding of the role of feedback loops, inventory levels, and rates of flow, enable users to
simulate all sorts of systematic problems — physical, economic, managerial, social, and
psychological. New programming techniques now make the systems dynamics principles more
accessible to managers — including corporate counsels. (Emphasis supplied).
Second Decision Analysis. This enables users to make better decisions involving complexity and
uncertainty. In the context of a law department, it can be used to appraise the settlement value of
litigation, aid in negotiation settlement, and minimize the cost and risk involved in managing a
portfolio of cases. (Emphasis supplied)
Third Modeling for Negotiation Management. Computer-based models can be used directly by
parties and mediators in all kinds of negotiations. All integrated set of such tools provide
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coherent and effective negotiation support, including hands-on on instruction in these techniques.
A simulation case of an international joint venture may be used to illustrate the point.
[Be this as it may,] the organization and management of the legal function, concern three pointed
areas of consideration, thus:
Preventive Lawyering. Planning by lawyers requires special skills that comprise a major part of
the general counsel’s responsibilities. They differ from those of remedial law. Preventive
lawyering is concerned with minimizing the risks of legal trouble and maximizing legal rights for
such legal entities at that time when transactional or similar facts are being considered and made
Managerial Jurisprudence. This is the framework within which are undertaken those activities of
the firm to which legal consequences attach. It needs to be directly supportive of this nation’s
evolving economic and organizational fabric as firms change to stay competitive in a global,
interdependent environment. The practice and theory of "law" is not adequate today to facilitate
the relationships needed in trying to make a global economy work.
Organization and Functioning of the Corporate Counsel’s Office. The general counsel has
emerged in the last decade as one of the most vibrant subsets of the legal profession. The
corporate counsel hear responsibility for key aspects of the firm’s strategic issues, including
structuring its global operations, managing improved relationships with an increasingly
diversified body of employees, managing expanded liability exposure, creating new and varied
interactions with public decision-makers, coping internally with more complex make or by
decisions.
This whole exercise drives home the thesis that knowing corporate law is not enough to make
one a good general corporate counsel nor to give him a full sense of how the legal system shapes
corporate activities. And even if the corporate lawyer’s aim is not the understand all of the law’s
effects on corporate activities, he must, at the very least, also gain a working knowledge of the
management issues if only to be able to grasp not only the basic legal "constitution" or make-up
of the modern corporation. "Business Star, The Corporate Counsel," April 10, 1991, p. 4).
The challenge for lawyers (both of the bar and the bench) is to have more than a passing
knowledge of financial law affecting each aspect of their work. Yet, many would admit to
ignorance of vast tracts of the financial law territory. What transpires next is a dilemma of
professional security: Will the lawyer admit ignorance and risk opprobrium?; or will he feign
understanding and risk exposure? (Business Star, "Corporate Finance law," Jar. 11, 1989, p. 4).
Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon C. Aquino to the position of
Chairman of the COMELEC in a letter received by the Secretariat of the Commission on
Appointments on April 25, 1991. Petitioner opposed the nomination because allegedly Monsod
does not possess the required qualification of having been engaged in the practice of law for at
least ten years.
On June 5, 1991, the Commission on Appointments confirmed the nomination of Monsod as
Chairman of the COMELEC. On June 18, 1991, he took his oath of office. On the same day, he
assumed office as Chairman of the COMELEC.
Challenging the validity of the confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of Monsod’s
nomination, petitioner as a citizen and taxpayer, filed the instant petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition praying that said confirmation and the consequent appointment of Monsod as
Chairman of the Commission on Elections be declared null and void.
Atty. Christian Monsod is a member of the Philippine Bar, having passed the bar examinations of
1960 with a grade of 86.55%. He has been a dues paying member of the Integrated Bar of the
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Philippines since its inception in 1972-73. He has also been paying his professional license fees
as lawyer for more than ten years. (p. 124, Rollo).
After graduating from the College of Law (U.P.) and having hurdled the bar, Atty. Monsod
worked in the law office of his father. During his stint in the World Bank Group (1963-1970),
Monsod worked as an operations officer for about two years in Costa Rica and Panama, which
involved getting acquainted with the laws of member-countries, negotiating loans and
coordinating legal, economic, and project work of the Bank. Upon returning to the Philippines in
1970, he worked with the Meralco Group, served as chief executive officer of an investment
bank and subsequently of a business conglomerate, and since 1986, has rendered services to
various companies as a legal and economic consultant or chief executive officer. As former
Secretary-General (1986) and National Chairman (1987) of NAMFREL. Monsod’s work
involved being knowledgeable in election law. He appeared for NAMFREL in its accreditation
hearings before the Comelec. In the field of advocacy, Monsod, in his personal capacity and as
former Co-Chairman of the Bishops Businessmen’s Conference for Human Development, has
worked with the under privileged sectors, such as the farmer and urban poor groups, in initiating,
lobbying for and engaging in affirmative action for the agrarian reform law and lately the urban
land reform bill. Monsod also made use of his legal knowledge as a member of the Davide
Commission, a quasi-judicial body, which conducted numerous hearings (1990) and as a member
of the Constitutional Commission (1986-1987), and Chairman of its Committee on
Accountability of Public Officers, for which he was cited by the President of the Commission,
Justice Cecilia Muñoz-Palma for "innumerable amendments to reconcile government functions
with individual freedoms and public accountability and the party-list system for the House of
Representative." (pp. 128-129 Rollo) (Emphasis supplied)
Just a word about the work of a negotiating team of which Atty. Monsod used to be a member.
In a loan agreement, for instance, a negotiating panel acts as a team, and which is adequately
constituted to meet the various contingencies that arise during a negotiation. Besides top officials
of the Borrower concerned, there are the legal officer (such as the legal counsel), the finance
manager, and an operations officer (such as an official involved in negotiating the contracts) who
comprise the members of the team. (Guillermo V. Soliven, "Loan Negotiating Strategies for
Developing Country Borrowers," Staff Paper No. 2, Central Bank of the Philippines, Manila,
1982, p. 11). (Emphasis supplied)
After a fashion, the loan agreement is like a country’s Constitution; it lays down the law as far as
the loan transaction is concerned. Thus, the meat of any Loan Agreement can be
compartmentalized into five (5) fundamental parts: (1) business terms; (2) borrower’s
representation; (3) conditions of closing; (4) covenants; and (5) events of default. (Ibid., p. 13)
In the same vein, lawyers play an important role in any debt restructuring program. For aside
from performing the tasks of legislative drafting and legal advising, they score national
development policies as key factors in maintaining their countries’ sovereignty. (Condensed from
the work paper, entitled "Wanted: Development Lawyers for Developing Nations," submitted by
L. Michael Hager, regional legal adviser of the United States Agency for International
Development, during the Session on Law for the Development of Nations at the Abidjan World
Conference in Ivory Coast, sponsored by the World Peace Through Law Center on August 26-31,
1973). (Emphasis supplied).
Loan concessions and compromises, perhaps even more so than purely re negotiation policies,
demand expertise in the law of contracts, in legislation and agreement drafting and in re
negotiation. Necessarily, a sovereign lawyer may work with an international business specialist
or an economist in the formulation of a model loan agreement. Debt restructuring contract
agreements contain such a mixture of technical language that they should be carefully drafted
and signed only with the advise of competent counsel in conjunction with the guidance of
adequate technical support personnel. (See International Law Aspects of the Philippine External
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Debts, an unpublished dissertation, U.S.T. Graduate School of Law, 1987, p. 321). (Emphasis
supplied).
A critical aspect of sovereign debt restructuring/contract construction is the set of terms and
conditions which determines the contractual remedies for a failure to perform one or more
elements of the contract. A good agreement must not only define the responsibilities of both
parties, but must also state the recourse open to either party when the other fails to discharge an
obligation. For a complete debt restructuring represents a devotion to that principle which in the
ultimate analysis is sine qua non for foreign loan agreements — an adherence to the rule of law
in domestic and international affairs of whose kind U.S. Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell
Holmes, Jr. once said: ‘They carry no banners, they beat no drums; but where they are, men learn
that bustle and bush are not the equal of quiet genius and serene mastery.’ (See Ricardo J.
Romulo, "The Role of Lawyers in Foreign Investments," Integrated Bar of the Philippine
Journal, Vol. 15, Nos. 3 and 4, Third and Fourth Quarters, 1977, p. 265).
Interpreted in the light of the various definitions of the term "practice of law", particularly the
modern concept of law practice, and taking into consideration the liberal construction intended
by the framers of the Constitution, Atty. Monsod s past work experiences as a lawyer-economist,
a lawyer-manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a
lawyer-legislator of both the rich and the poor — verily more than satisfy the constitutional
requirement — that he has been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.
Besides in the leading case of Luego v. Civil Service Commission, 143 SCRA 327, the Court
said:
"Appointment is an essentially discretionary power and must be performed by the officer in
which it is vested according to his best lights, the only condition being that the appointee should
possess the qualifications required by law. If he does, then the appointment cannot be faulted on
the ground that there are others better qualified who should have been preferred. This is a
political question involving considerations of wisdom which only the appointing authority can
decide." (Emphasis supplied).
No less emphatic was the Court in the case of Central Bank v. Civil Service Commission, 171
SCRA 744) where it stated:
"It is well-settled that when the appointee is qualified, as in this case, and all the other legal
requirements are satisfied, the Commission has no alternative but to attest to the appointment in
accordance with the Civil Service Law. The Commission has no authority to revoke an
appointment on the ground that another person is more qualified for a particular position. It also
has no authority to direct the appointment of a substitute of its choice. To do so would be an
encroachment on the discretion vested upon the appointing authority. An appointment is
essentially within the discretionary power of whomsoever it is vested, subject to the only
condition that the appointee should possess the qualifications required by law." (Emphasis
supplied).
The appointing process in a regular appointment as in the case at bar, consists of four (4) stages:
(1) nomination; (2) confirmation by the Commission on Appointments; (3) issuance of a
commission (in the Philippines, upon submission by the Commission on Appointments of its
certificate of confirmation, the President issues the permanent appointment; and (4) acceptance
e.g., oath-taking, posting of bond, etc. . . . (Lacson v. Romero, No. L-3081, October 14, 1949;
Gonzales, Law on Public Officers, p. 200)
The power of the Commission on Appointments to give its consent to the nomination of Monsod
as Chairman of the Commission on Elections is mandated by Section 1(2) Sub-Article C, Article
IX of the Constitution which provides:
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"The Chairman and the Commissioners shall be appointed by the President with the consent of
the Commission on Appointments for a term of seven years without re appointment. Of those
first appointed, three Members shall hold office for seven years, two Members for five years, and
the last Members for three years, without re appointment. Appointment to any vacancy shall be
only for the unexpired term of the predecessor. In no case shall any Member be appointed or
designated in a temporary or acting capacity."
Anent Justice Teodoro Padilla’s separate opinion, suffice it to say that his definition of the
practice of law is the traditional or stereotyped notion of law practice, as distinguished from the
modern concept of the practice of law, which modern connotation is exactly what was intended
by the eminent framers of the 1987 Constitution. Moreover, Justice Padilla’s definition would
require generally a habitual law practice, perhaps practiced two or three times a week and would
outlaw say, law practice once or twice a year for ten consecutive years. Clearly, this is far from
the constitutional intent.
Upon the other hand, the separate opinion of Justice Isagani Cruz states that in my written
opinion, I made use of a definition of law practice which really means nothing because the
definition says that law practice." . . is what people ordinarily mean by the practice of law." True
I cited the definition but only by way of sarcasm as evident from my statement that the definition
of law practice by "traditional areas of law practice is essentially tautologous" or defining a
phrase by means of the phrase itself that is being defined.
Justice Cruz goes on to say in substance that since the law covers almost all situations, most
individuals, in making use of the law, or in advising others on what the law means, are actually
practicing law. In that sense, perhaps, but we should not lose sight of the fact that Mr. Monsod is
a lawyer, a member of the Philippine Bar, who has been practicing law for over ten years. This is
different from the acts of persons practicing law, without first becoming lawyers.
Justice Cruz also says that the Supreme Court can even disqualify an elected President of the
Philippines, say, on the ground that he lacks one or more qualifications. This matter, I greatly
doubt. For one thing, how can an action or petition be brought against the President? And even
assuming that he is indeed disqualified, how can the action be entertained since he is the
incumbent President?
We now proceed:
The Commission on the basis of evidence submitted during the public hearings on Monsod’s
confirmation, implicitly determined that he possessed the necessary qualifications as required by
law. The judgment rendered by the Commission in the exercise of such an acknowledged power
is beyond judicial interference except only upon a clear showing of a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. (Art. VIII, Sec. 1 Constitution). Thus, only where
such grave abuse of discretion is clearly shown shall the Court interfere with the Commission’s
judgment. In the instant case, there is no occasion for the exercise of the Court’s corrective
power, since no abuse, much less a grave abuse of discretion, that would amount to lack or
excess of jurisdiction and would warrant the issuance of the writs prayed, for has been clearly
shown.
Additionally, consider the following:
(1) If the Commission on Appointments rejects a nominee by the President, may the Supreme
Court reverse the Commission, and thus in effect confirm the appointment? Clearly, the answer is
in the negative.
(2) In the same vein, may the Court reject the nominee, whom the Commission has confirmed?
The answer is likewise clear.
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(3) If the United States Senate (which is the confirming body in the U.S. Congress) decides to
confirm a Presidential nominee, it would be incredible that the U.S. Supreme Court would still
reverse the U.S. Senate.
Finally, one significant legal maxim is:
"We must interpret not by the letter that killeth, but by the spirit that giveth life.”
Take this hypothetical case of Samson and Delilah. Once, the procurator of Judea asked Delilah
(who was Samson’s beloved) for help in capturing Samson. Delilah agreed on condition that —
"No blade shall touch his skin;
No blood shall flow from his veins."
When Samson (his long hair cut by Delilah) was captured, the procurator placed an iron rod
burning white-hot two or three inches away from in front of Samson’s eyes. This blinded the
man. Upon hearing of what had happened to her beloved, Delilah was beside herself with anger,
and fuming with righteous fury, Accused the procurator of reneging on his word. The procurator
calmly replied: "Did any blade touch his skin? Did any blood flow from his veins?" The
procurator was clearly relying on the letter, not the spirit of the agreement.
In view of the foregoing, this petition is hereby DISMISSED. SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Griño-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.
Melencio-Herrera, J., concurs in the result.
Feliciano, J., I certify that he voted to dismiss the petition. (Fernan, C.J.).
Sarmiento, J., is on leave.
Regalado and Davide, Jr., JJ., took no part.
Separate Opinions
NARVASA, J., concurring:

I concur with the decision of the majority written by Mr. Justice Paras, albeit only in the result; it
does not appear to me that there has been an adequate showing that the challenged determination
by the Commission on Appointments — that the appointment of respondent Monsod as
Chairman of the Commission on Elections should, on the basis of his stated qualifications and
after due assessment thereof, be confirmed — was attended by error so gross as to amount to
grave abuse of discretion and consequently merits nullification by this Court in accordance with
the second paragraph of Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution. I therefore vote to DENY the
petition.
PADILLA, J., dissenting:
The records of this case will show that when the Court first deliberated on the Petition at bar, I
voted not only to require the respondents to comment on the Petition, but I was the sole vote for
the issuance of a temporary restraining order to enjoin respondent Monsod from assuming the
position of COMELEC Chairman, while the Court deliberated on his constitutional qualification
for the office. My purpose in voting for a TRO was to prevent the inconvenience and even
embarrassment to all parties concerned were the Court to finally decide for respondent Monsod’s
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disqualification. Moreover, a reading of the Petition then in relation to established jurisprudence

already showed prima facie that respondent Monsod did not possess the needed qualification,
that is, he had not engaged in the practice of law for at least ten (10) years prior to his
appointment as COMELEC Chairman.
After considering carefully respondent Monsod’s comment, I am even more convinced that the
constitutional requirement of" practice of low for at least ten (10) years" has not been met.
The procedural barriers interposed by respondents deserve scant consideration because,
ultimately, the core issue to be resolved in this petition is the proper construal of the
constitutional provision requiring a majority of the membership of COMELEC, including the
Chairman thereof to "have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten (10) years." (Art
IX(C), Section 1(1), 1987 Constitution). Questions involving the construction of constitutional
provisions are best left to judicial resolution. As declared in Angara v. Electoral Commission, (63
Phil. 139) "upon the judicial department is thrown the solemn and inescapable obligation of
interpreting the Constitution and defining constitutional boundaries."
The Constitution has imposed clear and specific standards for a COMELEC Chairman. Among
these are that he must have been "engaged in the practice of law for at least ten (10) years." It is
the bounded duty of this Court to ensure that such standard is met and complied with.
What constitutes practice of law? As commonly understood, "practice" refers to the actual
performance or application of knowledge as distinguished from mere possession of knowledge; it
connotes an active, habitual, repeated or customary action. 1 To "practice" law, or any profession
for that matter, means, to exercise or pursue an employment or profession actively, habitually,
repeatedly or customarily.
Therefore, a doctor of medicine who is employed and is habitually performing the tasks of a
nursing aide, cannot be said to be in the "practice of medicine." A certified public accountant
who works as a clerk, cannot be said to practice his profession as an accountant. In the same
way, a lawyer who is employed as a business executive or a corporate manager, other than as
head or attorney of a Legal Department of a corporation or a governmental agency, cannot be
said to be in the practice of law.
As aptly held by this Court in the case of People v. Villanueva: 2
"Practice is more than an isolated appearance for it consists in frequent or customary actions, a
succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is frequent habitual exercise (State v.
Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan. 864, 42 LRA, M S. 768). Practice of law to fall within the prohibition
of statute has been interpreted as customarily or habitually holding one’s self out to the public as
a lawyer and demanding payment for such services (State v. Bryan, 4 S.E. 522, 98 N.C. 644,
647.) . . ." (Emphasis supplied).
It is worth mentioning that the respondent Commission on Appointments in a Memorandum it
prepared, enumerated several factors determinative of whether a particular activity constitutes
"practice of law." It states:
"1. Habituality. The term ‘practice of law’ implies customarily or habitually holding one’s self
out to the public as a lawyer (People v. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 109 citing State v. Boyen, 4 S.E.
522, 98 N.C. 644) such as when one sends a circular announcing the establishment of a law
office for the general practice of law (U.S. v. Ney Bosque, 8 Phil. 146), or when one takes the
oath of office as a lawyer before a notary public, and files a manifestation with the Supreme
Court informing it of his intention to practice law in all courts in the country (People v. De Luna,
102 Phil. 968).
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Practice is more than an isolated appearance for it consists in frequent or customary action, a
succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is a habitual exercise (People v.
Villanueva, 14 SCRA 109 citing State v. Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan, 864).
2. Compensation. Practice of law implies that one must have presented himself to be in the active
and continued practice of the legal profession and that his professional services are available to
the public for compensation, as a service of his livelihood or in consideration of his said services.
(People v. Villanueva, supra). Hence, charging for services such as preparation of documents
involving the use of legal knowledge and skill is within the term ‘practice of law’ (Ernani Paño,
Bar Reviewer in Legal and Judicial Ethics, 1988 ed., p. 8 citing People v. People’s Stockyards
State Bank, 176 N.B. 901) and, one who renders an opinion as to the proper interpretation of a
statute, and receives pay for it, is to that extent, practicing law (Martin, supra, p. 806 citing
Mendelaun v. Gilbert and Barket Mfg. Co., 290 N.Y.S. 462) If compensation is expected, `all
advice to clients and all action taken for them in matters connected with the law; are practicing
law. (Elwood Fitchette Et. Al., v. Arthur C. Taylor, 94A-L.R. 356-359).
3. Application of law, legal principle, practice, or procedure which calls for legal knowledge,
training and experience is within the term `practice of law’. (Martin supra).
4. Attorney-client relationship. Engaging in the practice of law presupposes the existence of
lawyer-client relationship. Hence, where a lawyer undertakes an activity which requires
knowledge of law but involves no attorney-client relationship, such as teaching law or writing
law books or articles, he cannot be said to be engaged in the practice of his profession or a
lawyer (Agpalo, Legal Ethics, 1989 ed., p. 30)." 3
The above-enumerated factors would, I believe, be useful aids in determining whether or not
respondent Monsod meets the constitutional qualification of practice of law for at least ten (10)
years at the time of his appointment as COMELEC Chairman.
The following relevant questions may be asked:
1. Did respondent Monsod perform any of the tasks which are peculiar to the practice of law?
2. Did respondent perform such tasks customarily or habitually?
3. Assuming that he performed any of such tasks habitually, did he do so HABITUALLY FOR
AT LEAST TEN (10) YEARS prior to his appointment as COMELEC Chairman?
Given the employment or job history of respondent Monsod as appears from the records, I am
persuaded that if ever he did perform any of the tasks which constitute the practice of law, he did
not do so HABITUALLY for at least ten (10) years prior to his appointment as COMELEC
Chairman.
While it may be granted that he performed tasks and activities which could be latitudinarianly
considered activities peculiar to the practice of law, like the drafting of legal documents and the
rendering of legal opinion or advice, such were isolated transactions or activities which do not
qualify his past endeavors as "practice of law." To become engaged in the practice of law, there
must be a continuity, or a succession of acts. As observed by the Solicitor General in People v.
Villanueva: 4
"Essentially, the word private practice of law implies that one must have presented himself to be
in the active and continued practice of the legal profession and that his professional services are
available to the public for a compensation, as a source of his livelihood or in consideration of his
said services."
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ACCORDINGLY, my vote is to GRANT the petition and to declare respondent Monsod as not
qualified for the position of COMELEC Chairman for not having engaged in the practice of law
for at least ten (10) years prior to his appointment to such position.
CRUZ, J., dissenting:
I am sincerely impressed by the ponencia of my brother Paras but find I must dissent just the
same. There are certain points on which I must differ with him while of course respecting his
viewpoint.
To begin with, I do not think we are inhibited from examining the qualifications of the
respondent simply because his nomination has been confirmed by the Commission on
Appointments. In my view, this is not a political question that we are barred from resolving.
Determination of the appointee’s credentials is made on the basis of the established facts, not the
discretion of that body. Even if it were, the exercise of that discretion would still be subject to
our review.
In Luego, which is cited in the ponencia, what was involved was the discretion of the appointing
authority to choose between two claimants to the same office who both possessed the required
qualifications. It was that kind of discretion that we said could not be reviewed.
If a person elected by no less than the sovereign people may be ousted by this Court for lack of
the required qualifications, I see no reason why we cannot disqualify an appointee simply
because he has passed the Commission on Appointments.
Even the President of the Philippines may be declared ineligible by this Court in an appropriate
proceeding notwithstanding that he has been found acceptable by no less than the enfranchised
citizenry. The reason is that what we would be examining is not the wisdom of his election but
whether or not he was qualified to be elected in the first place.
Coming now to the qualifications of the private respondent, I fear that the ponencia may have
been too sweeping in its definition of the phrase "practice of law" as to render the qualification
practically toothless. From the numerous activities accepted as embraced in the term, I have the
uncomfortable feeling that one does not even have to be a lawyer to be engaged in the practice of
law as long as his activities involve the application of some law, however peripherally. The stock
broker and the insurance adjuster and the realtor could come under the definition as they deal
with or give advice on matters that are likely "to become involved in litigation.”
The lawyer is considered engaged in the practice of law even if his main occupation is another
business and he interprets and applies some law only as an incident of such business. That covers
every company organized under the Corporation Code and regulated by the SEC under P.D. 902-
A. Considering the ramifications of the modern society, there is hardly any activity that is not
affected by some law or government regulation the businessman must know about and observe.
In fact, again going by the definition, a lawyer does not even have to be part of a business
concern to be considered a practitioner. He can be so deemed when, on his own, he rents a house
or buys a car or consults a doctor as these acts involve his knowledge and application of the laws
regulating such transactions. If he operates a public utility vehicle as his main source of
livelihood, he would still be deemed engaged in the practice of law because he must obey the
Public Service Act and the rules and regulations of the Energy Regulatory Board.
The ponencia quotes an American decision defining the practice of law as the "performance of
any acts . . . in or out of court, commonly understood to be the practice of law," which tells us
absolutely nothing. The decision goes on to say that "because lawyers perform almost every
function known in the commercial and governmental realm, such a definition would obviously be
too global to be workable."
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The effect of the definition given in the ponencia is to consider virtually every lawyer to be
engaged in the practice of law even if he does not earn his living, or at least part of it, as a
lawyer. It is enough that his activities are incidentally (even if only remotely) connected with
some law, ordinance, or regulation. The possible exception is the lawyer whose income is
derived from teaching ballroom dancing or escorting wrinkled ladies with pubescent pretensions.
The respondent’s credentials are impressive, to be sure, but they do not persuade me that he has
been engaged in the practice of law for ten years as required by the Constitution. It is conceded
that he has been engaged in business and finance, in which areas he has distinguished himself,
but as an executive and economist and not as a practicing lawyer. The plain fact is that he has
occupied the various positions listed in his resume by virtue of his experience and prestige as a
businessman and not as an attorney-at-law whose principal attention is focused on the law. Even
if it be argued that he was acting as a lawyer when he lobbied in Congress for agrarian and urban
reform, served in the NAMFREL and the Constitutional Commission (together with non-lawyers
like farmers and priests) and was a member of the Davide Commission, he has not proved that
his activities in these capacities extended over the prescribed 10-year period of actual practice of
the law. He is doubtless eminently qualified for many other positions worthy of his abundant
talents but not as Chairman of the Commission on Elections.
I have much admiration for respondent Monsod, no less than for Mr. Justice Paras, but I must
regretfully vote to grant the petition.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., dissenting:
When this petition was filed, there was hope that engaging in the practice of law as a
qualification for public office would be settled one way or another in fairly definitive terms.
Unfortunately, this was not the result.
Of the fourteen (14) member Court, 5 are of the view that Mr. Christian Monsod engaged in the
practice of law (with one of these 5 leaving his vote behind while on official leave but not
expressing his clear stand on the matter); 4 categorically stating that he did not practice law; 2
voting in the result because there was no error so gross as to amount to grave abuse of discretion;
one of official leave with no instructions left behind on how he viewed the issue; and 2 not taking
part in the deliberations and the decision.chanrobles law library
There are two key factors that make our task difficult. First is our reviewing the work of a
constitutional Commission on Appointments whose duty is precisely to look into the
qualifications of persons appointed to high office. Even if the Commission errs, we have no
power to set aside error. We can look only into grave abuse of discretion or whimsically and
arbitrariness. Second is our belief that Mr. Monsod possesses superior qualifications in terms of
executive ability, proficiency in management, educational background, experience in
international banking and finance, and instant recognition by the public. His integrity and
competence are not questioned by the petitioner. What is before us is compliance with a specific
requirement written into the Constitution.
Inspite of my high regard for Mr. Monsod, I cannot shirk my constitutional duty. He has never
engaged in the practice of law for even one year. He is a member of the bar but to say that he has
practiced law is stretching the term beyond rational limits.
A person may have passed the bar examinations. But if he has not dedicated his life to the law, if
he has not engaged in an activity where membership in the bar is a requirement I fail to see how
he can claim to have been engaged in the practice of law.
Engaging in the practice of law is a qualification not only for COMELEC chairman but also for
appointment to the Supreme Court and all lower courts. What kind of Judges or Justices will we
have if there main occupation is selling real estate, managing a business corporation, serving in
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fact-finding committee, working in media, or operating a farm with no active involvement in the
law, whether in Government or private practice, except that in one joyful moment in the distant
past, they happened to pass the bar examinations?
The Constitution uses the phrase "engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years." The
deliberate choice of words shows that the practice envisioned is active and regular, not isolated,
occasional, accidental, intermittent, incidental, seasonal, or extemporaneous. To be "engaged" in
an activity for ten years requires committed participation in something which is the result of
one’s decisive choice. It means that one is occupied and involved in the enterprise; one is obliged
or pledged to carry it out with intent and attention during the ten-year period.
I agree with the petitioner that based on the bio-data submitted by respondent Monsod to the
Commission on Appointments, the latter has not been engaged in the practice of law for at least
ten years. In fact, if appears that Mr. Monsod has never practiced law except for an alleged one
year period after passing the bar examinations when he worked in his father’s law firm. Even
then his law practice must have been extremely limited because he was also working for M.A.
and Ph. D. degrees in Economics at the University of Pennsylvania during that period. How
could he practice law in the United States while not a member of the Bar there?
The professional life of the respondent follows:
"1.15.1 Respondent Monsod’s activities since his passing the Bar examinations in 1961 consist
of the following:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
1. 1961-1963: M.A. in Economics (Ph. D. candidate), University of Pennsylvania
2. 1963-1970: World Bank Group — Economist, Industry Department; Operations, Latin
American Department; Division Chief, South Asia and Middle East, International Finance
Corporation
3. 1970-1973: Meralco Group Executive of various companies, i.e., Meralco Securities
Corporation, Philippine Petroleum Corporation, Philippine Electric Corporation
4. 1973-1976: Yujuico Group — President, Fil-Capital Development Corporation and affiliated
companies
5. 1976-1978: Finaciera Manila — Chief Executive Officer
6. 1978-1986: Guevent Group of Companies Chief Executive Officer
7. 1986-1987: Philippine Constitutional Commission — Member
8. 1989-1991: The Fact-Finding Commission on the December 1989 Coup Attempt — Member
9. Presently: Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer of the following
companies:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
a. ACE Container Philippines, Inc.
b. Dataprep, Philippines
c. Philippine SUN systems Products, Inc.
d. Semirara Coal Corporation
e. CBL Timber Corporation
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Member of the Board of the Following:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

a. Engineering Construction Corporation of the Philippines
b. First Philippine Energy Corporation
c. First Philippine Holdings Corporation
d. First Philippine Industrial Corporation
e. Graphic Atelier
f. Manila Electric Company
g. Philippine Commercial Capital, Inc.
h. Philippine Electric Corporation
i. Tarlac Reforestation and Environment Enterprises
j. Tolong Aquaculture Corporation
k. Visayan Aquaculture Corporation
l. Guimaras Aquaculture Corporation"
(Rollo, pp. 21-22)
There is nothing in the above bio-data which even remotely indicates that respondent Monsod
has given the law enough attention or a certain degree of commitment and participation as would
support in all sincerity and candor the claim of having engaged in its practice for at least ten
years. Instead of working as a lawyer, he has lawyers working for him. Instead of giving legal
advice of legal services, he was the one receiving that advice and those services as an executive
but not as a lawyer.
The deliberations before the Commission on Appointments show an effort to equate "engaged in
the practice of law" with the use of legal knowledge in various fields of endeavor such as
commerce, industry, civic work, blue ribbon investigations, agrarian reform, etc. where such
knowledge would be helpful.
I regret that I cannot join in playing fast and loose with a term, which even an ordinary layman
accepts as having a familiar and customary well-defined meaning. Every resident of this country
who has reached the age of discernment has to know, follow, or apply the law at various times in
his life. Legal knowledge is useful if not necessary for the business executive, legislator, mayor,
barangay captain, teacher, policeman, farmer, fisherman, market vendor, and student to name
only a few. And yet, can these people honestly assert that as such, they are engaged in the
practice of law?.
The Constitution requires having been "engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years." It is
not satisfied with having been "a member of the Philippine bar for at least ten years.."
Some American courts have defined the practice of law, as follows:
"The practice of law involves not only appearance in court in connection with litigation but also
services rendered out of court, and it includes the giving of advice or the rendering of any
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services requiring the use of legal skill or knowledge, such as preparing a will, contract or other
instrument, the legal effect of which, under the facts and conditions involved, must be carefully
determined. People ex rel. Chicago Bar Ass’n v. Tinkoff, 399 III. 282, 77 N.E.2d 693; People ex
rel. Illinois State Bar Ass’n v. People’s Stock Yards State Bank, 344 Ill. 462, 176 N.E. 901, and
cases cited.
It would be difficult, if not impossible to lay down a formula or definition of what constitutes the
practice of law.’Practicing law’ has been defined as ‘Practicing as an attorney or counselor at law
according to the laws and customs of our courts, is the giving of advice or rendition of any sort
of service by any person, firm or corporation when the giving of such advice or rendition of such
service requires the use of any degree of legal knowledge or skill.’ Without adopting that
definition, we referred to it as being substantially correct in People ex rel . Illinois State Bar
Ass’n v. People’s Stock Yards State Bank, 344 III. 462, 176 N.E. 901." (People v. Schafer, 87
N.E. 2d 773, 776).
For one’s actions to come within the purview of practice of law they should not only be activities
peculiar to the work of a lawyer, they should also be performed, habitually, frequently or
customarily, to wit:
x x x
"Respondent’s answers to questions propounded to him were rather evasive. He was asked
whether or not he ever prepared contracts for the parties in real-estate transactions where he was
not the procuring agent. He answered: ‘Very seldom.’ In answer to the question as to how many
times he had prepared contracts for the parties during the twenty-mine years of his business, he
said: ‘I have no idea.’ When asked if it would be more than half a dozen times his answer was I
suppose.’ Asked if he did not recall making the statement to several parties that he had prepared
contracts in a large number of instances, he answered: ‘I don’t recall exactly what was said.’
When asked if he did not remember saying that he had made a practice of preparing deeds,
mortgages and contracts and charging a fee to the parties therefor in instances where he was not
the broker in the deal, he answered: Well, I don’t believe so, that is not a practice.’ Pressed
further for an answer as to his practice in preparing contracts and deeds for parties where he was
not the broker, he finally answered: ‘I have done about everything that is on the books as far as
real estate is concerned.’
x x x
Respondent takes the position that because he is a real-estate broker he has a lawful right to do
any legal work in connection with real-estate transactions, especially in drawing of real-estate
contracts, deeds, mortgages, notes and the like. There is no doubt but that he has engaged in
these practices over the years and has charged for his services in that
x x x
". . . An attorney, in the most general sense, is a person designated or employed by another to act
in his stead; an agent; more especially, one of a class of persons authorized to appear and act for
suitors or defendants in legal proceedings. Strictly, these professional persons are attorneys at
law, and non-professional agents are properly styled ‘attorneys in fact;’ but the single word is
much used as meaning an attorney at law. A person may be an attorney in facto for another,
without being an attorney at law.’ Abb. Law Dict.’Attorney.’ ‘A public attorney, or attorney at
law, says Webster, ‘is an officer of a court of law, legally qualified to prosecute and defend
actions in such court on the retainer of clients.’The principal duties of an attorney are (1) to be
true to the court and to his client; (2) to manage the business of his client with care, skill, and
integrity; (3) to keep his client informed as to the state of his business; (4) to keep his secrets
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confided to him as such. . . . His rights are to be justly compensated for his services.’ Bouv. Law
Dict. tit.’Attorney.’ The transitive verb ‘practice,’ as defined by Webster, means ‘to do or perform
frequently, customarily, or habitually; to perform by a succession of acts, as, to practice gaining; .
. . to carry on in practice, or repeated action; to apply, as a theory, to real life; to exercise, as a
profession, trade, art. etc.; as, to practice law or medicine,’ etc. . . ." (State v. Bryan, S.E. 522,
523; Emphasis supplied)
In this jurisdiction, we have ruled that the practice of law denotes frequency or a succession of
acts. Thus, we stated in the case of People v. Villanueva (14 SCRA 109 [1965]):
x x x
". . . Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in frequent or customary actions,
a succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is frequent habitual exercise (State v.
Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan. 864, 42 LRA, M.S. 768). Practice of law to fall within the prohibition
of statute has been interpreted as customarily or habitually holding one’s self out to the public, as
a lawyer and demanding payment for such services. . . ." (at p. 112)
It is to be noted that the Commission on Appointment itself recognizes habituality as a required
component of the meaning of practice of law in a Memorandum prepared and issued by it, to wit:
"1. Habituality. The term ‘practice of law’ implies customarily or habitually holding one’s self
out to the public as a lawyer (People v. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 109 citing State v. Bryan, 4 S.E.
522, 98 N.C. 644) such as when one sends a circular announcing the establishment of a law
office for the general practice of law (U S. v. Noy Bosque, 8 Phil. 146), or when one takes the
oath of office as a lawyer before a notary public, and files a manifestation with the Supreme
Court informing it of his intention to practice law in all courts in the country (People v. De Luna,
102 Phil. 968).
Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in frequent or customary action, a
succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is a habitual exercise (People v.
Villanueva, 14 SCRA log citing State v. Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan, 864)." (Rollo, p. 115).
x x x
While the career as a businessman of respondent Monsod may have profited from his legal
knowledge, the use of such legal knowledge is incidental and consists of isolated activities which
do not fall under the denomination of practice of law. Admission to the practice of law was not
required for membership in the Constitutional Commission or in the Fact-Finding Commission
on the 1989 Coup Attempt. Any specific legal activities which may have been assigned to Mr.
Monsod while a member may be likened to isolated transactions of foreign corporations in the
Philippines which do not categorize the foreign corporations as doing business in the Philippines.
As in the practice of law, doing business also should be active and continuous. Isolated business
transactions or occasional, incidental and casual transactions are not within the context of doing
business. This was our ruling in the case of Antam Consolidated, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 143
SCRA 288 [1986]).
Respondent Monsod, corporate executive, civic leader, and member of the Constitutional
Commission may possess the background, competence, integrity, and dedication, to qualify for
such high offices as President, Vice-President, Senator, Congressman or Governor but the
Constitution in prescribing the specific qualification of having engaged in the practice of law for
at least ten (10) years for the position of COMELEC Chairman has ordered that he may not be
confirmed for that office. The Constitution charges the public respondents no less than this Court
to obey its mandate.
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I, therefore, believe that the Commission on Appointments committed grave abuse of discretion
in confirming the nomination of respondent Monsod as Chairman of the COMELEC.
I vote to GRANT the petition.
Bidin, J., dissents.
Bar Matter No. 553 June 17, 1993

MAURICIO C. ULEP, petitioner,
vs.
THE LEGAL CLINIC, INC., respondent.
R E SO L U T I O N
REGALADO, J.:
Petitioner prays this Court "to order the respondent to cease and desist from issuing
advertisements similar to or of the same tenor as that of annexes "A" and "B" (of said petition)
and to perpetually prohibit persons or entities from making advertisements pertaining to the
exercise of the law profession other than those allowed by law."
The advertisements complained of by herein petitioner are as follows:
Annex A
SECRET MARRIAGE?
P560.00 for a valid marriage.
Info on DIVORCE. ABSENCE.
ANNULMENT. VISA.
THE Please call: 521-0767 LEGAL 5217232, 5222041 CLINIC, INC. 8:30 am— 6:00 pm 7-Flr.
Victoria Bldg., UN Ave., Mla.
Annex B
GUAM DIVORCE.
DON PARKINSON
an Attorney in Guam, is giving FREE BOOKS on Guam Divorce through The Legal Clinic
beginning Monday to Friday during office hours.
Guam divorce. Annulment of Marriage. Immigration Problems, Visa Ext. Quota/Non-quota Res.
& Special Retiree's Visa. Declaration of Absence. Remarriage to Filipina Fiancees. Adoption.
Investment in the Phil. US/Foreign Visa for Filipina Spouse/Children. Call Marivic.
THE 7F Victoria Bldg. 429 UN Ave., LEGAL Ermita, Manila nr. US Embassy CLINIC, INC.1
Tel. 521-7232; 521-7251; 522-2041; 521-0767
It is the submission of petitioner that the advertisements above reproduced are champterous,
unethical, demeaning of the law profession, and destructive of the confidence of the community
in the integrity of the members of the bar and that, as a member of the legal profession, he is
ashamed and offended by the said advertisements, hence the reliefs sought in his petition as
hereinbefore quoted.
In its answer to the petition, respondent admits the fact of publication of said advertisement at its
instance, but claims that it is not engaged in the practice of law but in the rendering of "legal
support services" through paralegals with the use of modern computers and electronic machines.
Respondent further argues that assuming that the services advertised are legal services, the act of
advertising these services should be allowed supposedly
in the light of the case of John R. Bates and Van O'Steen vs. State Bar of Arizona,2 reportedly
decided by the United States Supreme Court on June 7, 1977.
Considering the critical implications on the legal profession of the issues raised herein, we
required the (1) Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), (2) Philippine Bar Association (PBA),
(3) Philippine Lawyers' Association (PLA), (4) U.P. Womens Lawyers' Circle (WILOCI), (5)
Women Lawyers Association of the Philippines (WLAP), and (6) Federacion International de
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Abogadas (FIDA) to submit their respective position papers on the controversy and, thereafter,
their memoranda. 3 The said bar associations readily responded and extended their valuable
services and cooperation of which this Court takes note with appreciation and gratitude.
The main issues posed for resolution before the Court are whether or not the services offered by
respondent, The Legal Clinic, Inc., as advertised by it constitutes practice of law and, in either
case, whether the same can properly be the subject of the advertisements herein complained of.
Before proceeding with an in-depth analysis of the merits of this case, we deem it proper and
enlightening to present hereunder excerpts from the respective position papers adopted by the
aforementioned bar associations and the memoranda submitted by them on the issues involved in
this bar matter.
1. Integrated Bar of the Philippines:
xxx xxx xxx
Notwithstanding the subtle manner by which respondent endeavored to distinguish the two
terms, i.e., "legal support services" vis-a-vis "legal services", common sense would readily
dictate that the same are essentially without substantial distinction. For who could deny that
document search, evidence gathering, assistance to layman in need of basic institutional services
from government or non-government agencies like birth, marriage, property, or business
registration, obtaining documents like clearance, passports, local or foreign visas, constitutes
practice of law?
xxx xxx xxx
The Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) does not wish to make issue with respondent's
foreign citations. Suffice it to state that the IBP has made its position manifest, to wit, that it
strongly opposes the view espoused by respondent (to the effect that today it is alright to
advertise one's legal services).
The IBP accordingly declares in no uncertain terms its opposition to respondent's act of
establishing a "legal clinic" and of concomitantly advertising the same through newspaper
publications.
The IBP would therefore invoke the administrative supervision of this Honorable Court to
perpetually restrain respondent from undertaking highly unethical activities in the field of law
practice as aforedescribed.4
xxx xxx xxx
A. The use of the name "The Legal Clinic, Inc." gives the impression that respondent corporation
is being operated by lawyers and that it renders legal services.
While the respondent repeatedly denies that it offers legal services to the public, the
advertisements in question give the impression that respondent is offering legal services. The
Petition in fact simply assumes this to be so, as earlier mentioned, apparently because this (is) the
effect that the advertisements have on the reading public.
The impression created by the advertisements in question can be traced, first of all, to the very
name being used by respondent — "The Legal Clinic, Inc." Such a name, it is respectfully
submitted connotes the rendering of legal services for legal problems, just like a medical clinic
connotes medical services for medical problems. More importantly, the term "Legal Clinic"
connotes lawyers, as the term medical clinic connotes doctors.
Furthermore, the respondent's name, as published in the advertisements subject of the present
case, appears with (the) scale(s) of justice, which all the more reinforces the impression that it is
being operated by members of the bar and that it offers legal services. In addition, the
advertisements in question appear with a picture and name of a person being represented as a
lawyer from Guam, and this practically removes whatever doubt may still remain as to the nature
of the service or services being offered.
It thus becomes irrelevant whether respondent is merely offering "legal support services" as
claimed by it, or whether it offers legal services as any lawyer actively engaged in law practice
does. And it becomes unnecessary to make a distinction between "legal services" and "legal
support services," as the respondent would have it. The advertisements in question leave no room
for doubt in the minds of the reading public that legal services are being offered by lawyers,
whether true or not.
B. The advertisements in question are meant to induce the performance of acts contrary to law,
morals, public order and public policy.
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It may be conceded that, as the respondent claims, the advertisements in question are only meant
to inform the general public of the services being offered by it. Said advertisements, however,
emphasize to Guam divorce, and any law student ought to know that under the Family Code,
there is only one instance when a foreign divorce is recognized, and that is:
Article 26. . . .
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is
thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the
Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine Law.
It must not be forgotten, too, that the Family Code (defines) a marriage as follows:
Article 1. Marriage is special contract of permanent union between a man and woman entered
into accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal and family life. It is the foundation of
the family and an inviolable social institution whose nature, consequences, and incidents are
governed by law and not subject to stipulation, except that marriage settlements may fix the
property relation during the marriage within the limits provided by this Code.
By simply reading the questioned advertisements, it is obvious that the message being conveyed
is that Filipinos can avoid the legal consequences of a marriage celebrated in accordance with
our law, by simply going to Guam for a divorce. This is not only misleading, but encourages, or
serves to induce, violation of Philippine law. At the very least, this can be considered "the dark
side" of legal practice, where certain defects in Philippine laws are exploited for the sake of
profit. At worst, this is outright malpractice.
Rule 1.02. — A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or at
lessening confidence in the legal system.
In addition, it may also be relevant to point out that advertisements such as that shown in Annex
"A" of the Petition, which contains a cartoon of a motor vehicle with the words "Just Married"
on its bumper and seems to address those planning a "secret marriage," if not suggesting a
"secret marriage," makes light of the "special contract of permanent union," the inviolable social
institution," which is how the Family Code describes marriage, obviously to emphasize its
sanctity and inviolability. Worse, this particular advertisement appears to encourage marriages
celebrated in secrecy, which is suggestive of immoral publication of applications for a marriage
license.
If the article "Rx for Legal Problems" is to be reviewed, it can readily be concluded that the
above impressions one may gather from the advertisements in question are accurate. The Sharon
Cuneta-Gabby Concepcion example alone confirms what the advertisements suggest. Here it can
be seen that criminal acts are being encouraged or committed
(a bigamous marriage in Hong Kong or Las Vegas) with impunity simply because the jurisdiction
of Philippine courts does not extend to the place where the crime is committed.
Even if it be assumed, arguendo, (that) the "legal support services" respondent offers do not
constitute legal services as commonly understood, the advertisements in question give the
impression that respondent corporation is being operated by lawyers and that it offers legal
services, as earlier discussed. Thus, the only logical consequence is that, in the eyes of an
ordinary newspaper reader, members of the bar themselves are encouraging or inducing the
performance of acts which are contrary to law, morals, good customs and the public good,
thereby destroying and demeaning the integrity of the Bar.
xxx xxx xxx
It is respectfully submitted that respondent should be enjoined from causing the publication of
the advertisements in question, or any other advertisements similar thereto. It is also submitted
that respondent should be prohibited from further performing or offering some of the services it
presently offers, or, at the very least, from offering such services to the public in general.
The IBP is aware of the fact that providing computerized legal research, electronic data
gathering, storage and retrieval, standardized legal forms, investigators for gathering of evidence,
and like services will greatly benefit the legal profession and should not be stifled but instead
encouraged. However, when the conduct of such business by non-members of the Bar
encroaches upon the practice of law, there can be no choice but to prohibit such business.
Admittedly, many of the services involved in the case at bar can be better performed by
specialists in other fields, such as computer experts, who by reason of their having devoted time
and effort exclusively to such field cannot fulfill the exacting requirements for admission to the
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Bar. To prohibit them from "encroaching" upon the legal profession will deny the profession of
the great benefits and advantages of modern technology. Indeed, a lawyer using a computer will
be doing better than a lawyer using a typewriter, even if both are (equal) in skill.
Both the Bench and the Bar, however, should be careful not to allow or tolerate the illegal
practice of law in any form, not only for the protection of members of the Bar but also, and more
importantly, for the protection of the public. Technological development in the profession may be
encouraged without tolerating, but instead ensuring prevention of illegal practice.
There might be nothing objectionable if respondent is allowed to perform all of its services, but
only if such services are made available exclusively to members of the Bench and Bar.
Respondent would then be offering technical assistance, not legal services. Alternatively, the
more difficult task of carefully distinguishing between which service may be offered to the
public in general and which should be made available exclusively to members of the Bar may be
undertaken. This, however, may require further proceedings because of the factual considerations
involved.
It must be emphasized, however, that some of respondent's services ought to be prohibited
outright, such as acts which tend to suggest or induce celebration abroad of marriages which are
bigamous or otherwise illegal and void under Philippine law. While respondent may not be
prohibited from simply disseminating information regarding such matters, it must be required to
include, in the information given, a disclaimer that it is not authorized to practice law, that
certain course of action may be illegal under Philippine law, that it is not authorized or capable of
rendering a legal opinion, that a lawyer should be consulted before deciding on which course of
action to take, and that it cannot recommend any particular lawyer without subjecting itself to
possible sanctions for illegal practice of law.
If respondent is allowed to advertise, advertising should be directed exclusively at members of
the Bar, with a clear and unmistakable disclaimer that it is not authorized to practice law or
perform legal services.
The benefits of being assisted by paralegals cannot be ignored. But nobody should be allowed to
represent himself as a "paralegal" for profit, without such term being clearly defined by rule or
regulation, and without any adequate and effective means of regulating his activities. Also, law
practice in a corporate form may prove to be advantageous to the legal profession, but before
allowance of such practice may be considered, the corporation's Article of Incorporation and By-
laws must conform to each and every provision of the Code of Professional Responsibility and
the Rules of Court.5
2. Philippine Bar Association:
xxx xxx xxx.
Respondent asserts that it "is not engaged in the practice of law but engaged in giving legal
support services to lawyers and laymen, through experienced paralegals, with the use of modern
computers and electronic machines" (pars. 2 and 3, Comment). This is absurd. Unquestionably,
respondent's acts of holding out itself to the public under the trade name "The Legal Clinic, Inc.,"
and soliciting employment for its enumerated services fall within the realm of a practice which
thus yields itself to the regulatory powers of the Supreme Court. For respondent to say that it is
merely engaged in paralegal work is to stretch credulity. Respondent's own commercial
advertisement which announces a certain Atty. Don Parkinson to be handling the fields of law
belies its pretense. From all indications, respondent "The Legal Clinic, Inc." is offering and
rendering legal services through its reserve of lawyers. It has been held that the practice of law is
not limited to the conduct of cases in court, but includes drawing of deeds, incorporation,
rendering opinions, and advising clients as to their legal right and then take them to an attorney
and ask the latter to look after their case in court See Martin, Legal and Judicial Ethics, 1984
ed., p. 39).
It is apt to recall that only natural persons can engage in the practice of law, and such limitation
cannot be evaded by a corporation employing competent lawyers to practice for it. Obviously,
this is the scheme or device by which respondent "The Legal Clinic, Inc." holds out itself to the
public and solicits employment of its legal services. It is an odious vehicle for deception,
especially so when the public cannot ventilate any grievance for malpractice against the business
conduit. Precisely, the limitation of practice of law to persons who have been duly admitted as
members of the Bar (Sec. 1, Rule 138, Revised Rules of Court) is to subject the members to the
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discipline of the Supreme Court. Although respondent uses its business name, the persons and
the lawyers who act for it are subject to court discipline. The practice of law is not a profession
open to all who wish to engage in it nor can it be assigned to another (See 5 Am. Jur. 270). It is a
personal right limited to persons who have qualified themselves under the law. It follows that not
only respondent but also all the persons who are acting for respondent are the persons engaged in
unethical law practice.6
3. Philippine Lawyers' Association:
The Philippine Lawyers' Association's position, in answer to the issues stated herein, are wit:
1. The Legal Clinic is engaged in the practice of law;
2. Such practice is unauthorized;
3. The advertisements complained of are not only unethical, but also misleading and patently
immoral; and
4. The Honorable Supreme Court has the power to supress and punish the Legal Clinic and its
corporate officers for its unauthorized practice of law and for its unethical, misleading and
immoral advertising.
xxx xxx xxx
Respondent posits that is it not engaged in the practice of law. It claims that it merely renders
"legal support services" to answers, litigants and the general public as enunciated in the Primary
Purpose Clause of its Article(s) of Incorporation. (See pages 2 to 5 of Respondent's Comment).
But its advertised services, as enumerated above, clearly and convincingly show that it is indeed
engaged in law practice, albeit outside of court.
As advertised, it offers the general public its advisory services on Persons and Family Relations
Law, particularly regarding foreign divorces, annulment of marriages, secret marriages, absence
and adoption; Immigration Laws, particularly on visa related problems, immigration problems;
the Investments Law of the Philippines and such other related laws.
Its advertised services unmistakably require the application of the aforesaid law, the legal
principles and procedures related thereto, the legal advices based thereon and which activities
call for legal training, knowledge and experience.
Applying the test laid down by the Court in the aforecited Agrava Case, the activities of
respondent fall squarely and are embraced in what lawyers and laymen equally term as "the
practice of law."7
4. U.P. Women Lawyers' Circle:
In resolving, the issues before this Honorable Court, paramount consideration should be given to
the protection of the general public from the danger of being exploited by unqualified persons or
entities who may be engaged in the practice of law.
At present, becoming a lawyer requires one to take a rigorous four-year course of study on top of
a four-year bachelor of arts or sciences course and then to take and pass the bar examinations.
Only then, is a lawyer qualified to practice law.
While the use of a paralegal is sanctioned in many jurisdiction as an aid to the administration of
justice, there are in those jurisdictions, courses of study and/or standards which would qualify
these paralegals to deal with the general public as such. While it may now be the opportune time
to establish these courses of study and/or standards, the fact remains that at present, these do not
exist in the Philippines. In the meantime, this Honorable Court may decide to make measures to
protect the general public from being exploited by those who may be dealing with the general
public in the guise of being "paralegals" without being qualified to do so.
In the same manner, the general public should also be protected from the dangers which may be
brought about by advertising of legal services. While it appears that lawyers are prohibited under
the present Code of Professional Responsibility from advertising, it appears in the instant case
that legal services are being advertised not by lawyers but by an entity staffed by "paralegals."
Clearly, measures should be taken to protect the general public from falling prey to those who
advertise legal services without being qualified to offer such services. 8
A perusal of the questioned advertisements of Respondent, however, seems to give the
impression that information regarding validity of marriages, divorce, annulment of marriage,
immigration, visa extensions, declaration of absence, adoption and foreign investment, which are
in essence, legal matters , will be given to them if they avail of its services. The Respondent's
name — The Legal Clinic, Inc. — does not help matters. It gives the impression again that
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Respondent will or can cure the legal problems brought to them. Assuming that Respondent is, as
claimed, staffed purely by paralegals, it also gives the misleading impression that there are
lawyers involved in The Legal Clinic, Inc., as there are doctors in any medical clinic, when only
"paralegals" are involved in The Legal Clinic, Inc.
Respondent's allegations are further belied by the very admissions of its President and majority
stockholder, Atty. Nogales, who gave an insight on the structure and main purpose of Respondent
corporation in the aforementioned "Starweek" article."9
5. Women Lawyer's Association of the Philippines:
Annexes "A" and "B" of the petition are clearly advertisements to solicit cases for the purpose of
gain which, as provided for under the above cited law, (are) illegal and against the Code of
Professional Responsibility of lawyers in this country.
Annex "A" of the petition is not only illegal in that it is an advertisement to solicit cases, but it is
illegal in that in bold letters it announces that the Legal Clinic, Inc., could work out/cause the
celebration of a secret marriage which is not only illegal but immoral in this country. While it is
advertised that one has to go to said agency and pay P560 for a valid marriage it is certainly
fooling the public for valid marriages in the Philippines are solemnized only by officers
authorized to do so under the law. And to employ an agency for said purpose of contracting
marriage is not necessary.
No amount of reasoning that in the USA, Canada and other countries the trend is towards
allowing lawyers to advertise their special skills to enable people to obtain from qualified
practitioners legal services for their particular needs can justify the use of advertisements such as
are the subject matter of the petition, for one (cannot) justify an illegal act even by whatever
merit the illegal act may serve. The law has yet to be amended so that such act could become
justifiable.
We submit further that these advertisements that seem to project that secret marriages and
divorce are possible in this country for a fee, when in fact it is not so, are highly reprehensible.
It would encourage people to consult this clinic about how they could go about having a secret
marriage here, when it cannot nor should ever be attempted, and seek advice on divorce, where
in this country there is none, except under the Code of Muslim Personal Laws in the Philippines.
It is also against good morals and is deceitful because it falsely represents to the public to be able
to do that which by our laws cannot be done (and) by our Code of Morals should not be done.
In the case (of) In re Taguda, 53 Phil. 37, the Supreme Court held that solicitation for clients by
an attorney by circulars of advertisements, is unprofessional, and offenses of this character
justify permanent elimination from the Bar. 10
6. Federacion Internacional de Abogados:
xxx xxx xxx
1.7 That entities admittedly not engaged in the practice of law, such as management consultancy
firms or travel agencies, whether run by lawyers or not, perform the services rendered by
Respondent does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that Respondent is not unlawfully
practicing law. In the same vein, however, the fact that the business of respondent (assuming it
can be engaged in independently of the practice of law) involves knowledge of the law does not
necessarily make respondent guilty of unlawful practice of law.
. . . . Of necessity, no one . . . . acting as a consultant can render effective service unless he is
familiar with such statutes and regulations. He must be careful not to suggest a course of conduct
which the law forbids. It seems . . . .clear that (the consultant's) knowledge of the law, and his
use of that knowledge as a factor in determining what measures he shall recommend, do not
constitute the practice of law . . . . It is not only presumed that all men know the law, but it is a
fact that most men have considerable acquaintance with broad features of the law . . . . Our
knowledge of the law — accurate or inaccurate — moulds our conduct not only when we are
acting for ourselves, but when we are serving others. Bankers, liquor dealers and laymen
generally possess rather precise knowledge of the laws touching their particular business or
profession. A good example is the architect, who must be familiar with zoning, building and fire
prevention codes, factory and tenement house statutes, and who draws plans and specification in
harmony with the law. This is not practicing law.
But suppose the architect, asked by his client to omit a fire tower, replies that it is required by the
statute. Or the industrial relations expert cites, in support of some measure that he recommends, a
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decision of the National Labor Relations Board. Are they practicing law? In my opinion, they are
not, provided no separate fee is charged for the legal advice or information, and the legal
question is subordinate and incidental to a major non-legal problem.
It is largely a matter of degree and of custom.
If it were usual for one intending to erect a building on his land to engage a lawyer to advise him
and the architect in respect to the building code and the like, then an architect who performed
this function would probably be considered to be trespassing on territory reserved for licensed
attorneys. Likewise, if the industrial relations field had been pre-empted by lawyers, or custom
placed a lawyer always at the elbow of the lay personnel man. But this is not the case. The most
important body of the industrial relations experts are the officers and business agents of the labor
unions and few of them are lawyers. Among the larger corporate employers, it has been the
practice for some years to delegate special responsibility in employee matters to a management
group chosen for their practical knowledge and skill in such matter, and without regard to legal
thinking or lack of it. More recently, consultants like the defendants have the same service that
the larger employers get from their own specialized staff.
The handling of industrial relations is growing into a recognized profession for which
appropriate courses are offered by our leading universities. The court should be very cautious
about declaring [that] a widespread, well-established method of conducting business is unlawful,
or that the considerable class of men who customarily perform a certain function have no right to
do so, or that the technical education given by our schools cannot be used by the graduates in
their business.
In determining whether a man is practicing law, we should consider his work for any particular
client or customer, as a whole. I can imagine defendant being engaged primarily to advise as to
the law defining his client's obligations to his employees, to guide his client's obligations to his
employees, to guide his client along the path charted by law. This, of course, would be the
practice of the law. But such is not the fact in the case before me. Defendant's primarily efforts
are along economic and psychological lines. The law only provides the frame within which he
must work, just as the zoning code limits the kind of building the limits the kind of building the
architect may plan. The incidental legal advice or information defendant may give, does not
transform his activities into the practice of law. Let me add that if, even as a minor feature of his
work, he performed services which are customarily reserved to members of the bar, he would be
practicing law. For instance, if as part of a welfare program, he drew employees' wills.
Another branch of defendant's work is the representations of the employer in the adjustment of
grievances and in collective bargaining, with or without a mediator. This is not per se the practice
of law. Anyone may use an agent for negotiations and may select an agent particularly skilled in
the subject under discussion, and the person appointed is free to accept the employment whether
or not he is a member of the bar. Here, however, there may be an exception where the business
turns on a question of law. Most real estate sales are negotiated by brokers who are not lawyers.
But if the value of the land depends on a disputed right-of-way and the principal role of the
negotiator is to assess the probable outcome of the dispute and persuade the opposite party to the
same opinion, then it may be that only a lawyer can accept the assignment. Or if a controversy
between an employer and his men grows from differing interpretations of a contract, or of a
statute, it is quite likely that defendant should not handle it. But I need not reach a definite
conclusion here, since the situation is not presented by the proofs.
Defendant also appears to represent the employer before administrative agencies of the federal
government, especially before trial examiners of the National Labor Relations Board. An agency
of the federal government, acting by virtue of an authority granted by the Congress, may regulate
the representation of parties before such agency. The State of New Jersey is without power to
interfere with such determination or to forbid representation before the agency by one whom the
agency admits. The rules of the National Labor Relations Board give to a party the right to
appear in person, or by counsel, or by other representative. Rules and Regulations, September
11th, 1946, S. 203.31. 'Counsel' here means a licensed attorney, and ther representative' one not a
lawyer. In this phase of his work, defendant may lawfully do whatever the Labor Board allows,
even arguing questions purely legal. (Auerbacher v. Wood, 53 A. 2d 800, cited in Statsky,
Introduction to Paralegalism [1974], at pp. 154-156.).
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1.8 From the foregoing, it can be said that a person engaged in a lawful calling (which may
involve knowledge of the law) is not engaged in the practice of law provided that:
(a) The legal question is subordinate and incidental to a major non-legal problem;.
(b) The services performed are not customarily reserved to members of the bar; .
(c) No separate fee is charged for the legal advice or information.
All these must be considered in relation to the work for any particular client as a whole.
1.9. If the person involved is both lawyer and non-lawyer, the Code of Professional
Responsibility succintly states the rule of conduct:
Rule 15.08 — A lawyer who is engaged in another profession or occupation concurrently with
the practice of law shall make clear to his client whether he is acting as a lawyer or in another
capacity.
1.10. In the present case. the Legal Clinic appears to render wedding services (See Annex "A"
Petition). Services on routine, straightforward marriages, like securing a marriage license, and
making arrangements with a priest or a judge, may not constitute practice of law. However, if the
problem is as complicated as that described in "Rx for Legal Problems" on the Sharon Cuneta-
Gabby Concepcion-Richard Gomez case, then what may be involved is actually the practice of
law. If a non-lawyer, such as the Legal Clinic, renders such services then it is engaged in the
unauthorized practice of law.
1.11. The Legal Clinic also appears to give information on divorce, absence, annulment of
marriage and visas (See Annexes "A" and "B" Petition). Purely giving informational materials
may not constitute of law. The business is similar to that of a bookstore where the customer buys
materials on the subject and determines on the subject and determines by himself what courses of
action to take.
It is not entirely improbable, however, that aside from purely giving information, the Legal
Clinic's paralegals may apply the law to the particular problem of the client, and give legal
advice. Such would constitute unauthorized practice of law.
It cannot be claimed that the publication of a legal text which publication of a legal text which
purports to say what the law is amount to legal practice. And the mere fact that the principles or
rules stated in the text may be accepted by a particular reader as a solution to his problem does
not affect this. . . . . Apparently it is urged that the conjoining of these two, that is, the text and
the forms, with advice as to how the forms should be filled out, constitutes the unlawful practice
of law. But that is the situation with many approved and accepted texts. Dacey's book is sold to
the public at large. There is no personal contact or relationship with a particular individual. Nor
does there exist that relation of confidence and trust so necessary to the status of attorney and
client. THIS IS THE ESSENTIAL OF LEGAL PRACTICE — THE REPRESENTATION AND
ADVISING OF A PARTICULAR PERSON IN A PARTICULAR SITUATION. At most the book
assumes to offer general advice on common problems, and does not purport to give personal
advice on a specific problem peculiar to a designated or readily identified person. Similarly the
defendant's publication does not purport to give personal advice on a specific problem peculiar to
a designated or readily identified person in a particular situation — in their publication and sale
of the kits, such publication and sale did not constitutes the unlawful practice of law . . . . There
being no legal impediment under the statute to the sale of the kit, there was no proper basis for
the injunction against defendant maintaining an office for the purpose of selling to persons
seeking a divorce, separation, annulment or separation agreement any printed material or
writings relating to matrimonial law or the prohibition in the memorandum of modification of the
judgment against defendant having an interest in any publishing house publishing his manuscript
on divorce and against his having any personal contact with any prospective purchaser. The
record does fully support, however, the finding that for the change of $75 or $100 for the kit, the
defendant gave legal advice in the course of personal contacts concerning particular problems
which might arise in the preparation and presentation of the purchaser's asserted matrimonial
cause of action or pursuit of other legal remedies and assistance in the preparation of necessary
documents (The injunction therefore sought to) enjoin conduct constituting the practice of law,
particularly with reference to the giving of advice and counsel by the defendant relating to
specific problems of particular individuals in connection with a divorce, separation, annulment of
separation agreement sought and should be affirmed. (State v. Winder, 348, NYS 2D 270 [1973],
cited in Statsky, supra at p. 101.).
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1.12. Respondent, of course, states that its services are "strictly non-diagnostic, non-advisory. "It
is not controverted, however, that if the services "involve giving legal advice or counselling,"
such would constitute practice of law (Comment, par. 6.2). It is in this light that FIDA submits
that a factual inquiry may be necessary for the judicious disposition of this case.
xxx xxx xxx
2.10. Annex "A" may be ethically objectionable in that it can give the impression (or perpetuate
the wrong notion) that there is a secret marriage. With all the solemnities, formalities and other
requisites of marriages (See Articles 2, et seq., Family Code), no Philippine marriage can be
secret.
2.11. Annex "B" may likewise be ethically objectionable. The second paragraph thereof (which is
not necessarily related to the first paragraph) fails to state the limitation that only "paralegal
services?" or "legal support services", and not legal services, are available." 11
A prefatory discussion on the meaning of the phrase "practice of law" becomes exigent for the
proper determination of the issues raised by the petition at bar. On this score, we note that the
clause "practice of law" has long been the subject of judicial construction and interpretation. The
courts have laid down general principles and doctrines explaining the meaning and scope of the
term, some of which we now take into account.
Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal
procedures, knowledge, training and experience. To engage in the practice of law is to perform
those acts which are characteristic of the profession. Generally, to practice law is to give advice
or render any kind of service that involves legal knowledge or skill. 12
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. It includes legal advice and
counsel, and the preparation of legal instruments and contract by which legal rights are secured,
although such matter may or may not be pending in a court. 13
In the practice of his profession, a licensed attorney at law generally engages in three principal
types of professional activity: legal advice and instructions to clients to inform them of their
rights and obligations, preparation for clients of documents requiring knowledge of legal
principles not possessed by ordinary layman, and appearance for clients before public tribunals
which possess power and authority to determine rights of life, liberty, and property according to
law, in order to assist in proper interpretation and enforcement of law. 14
When a person participates in the a trial and advertises himself as a lawyer, he is in the practice
of law. 15 One who confers with clients, advises them as to their legal rights and then takes the
business to an attorney and asks the latter to look after the case in court, is also practicing law. 16
Giving advice for compensation regarding the legal status and rights of another and the conduct
with respect thereto constitutes a practice of law. 17 One who renders an opinion as to the proper
interpretation of a statute, and receives pay for it, is, to that extent, practicing law. 18
In the recent case of Cayetano vs. Monsod, 19 after citing the doctrines in several cases, we laid
down the test to determine whether certain acts constitute "practice of law," thus:
Black defines "practice of law" as:
The rendition of services requiring the knowledge and the application of legal principles and
technique to serve the interest of another with his consent. It is not limited to appearing in court,
or advising and assisting in the conduct of litigation, but embraces the preparation of pleadings,
and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, conveyancing, the preparation of
legal instruments of all kinds, and the giving of all legal advice to clients. It embraces all advice
to clients and all actions taken for them in matters connected with the law.
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases on court.(Land Title Abstract and Trust
Co. v. Dworken , 129 Ohio St. 23, 193N. E. 650). A person is also considered to be in the
practice of law when he:
. . . . for valuable consideration engages in the business of advising person, firms, associations or
corporations as to their right under the law, or appears in a representative capacity as an advocate
in proceedings, pending or prospective, before any court, commissioner, referee, board, body,
committee, or commission constituted by law or authorized to settle controversies and there, in
such representative capacity, performs any act or acts for the purpose of obtaining or defending
the rights of their clients under the law. Otherwise stated, one who, in a representative capacity,
engages in the business of advising clients as to their rights under the law, or while so engaged
performs any act or acts either in court or outside of court for that purpose, is engaged in the
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practice of law. (State ex. rel. Mckittrick v. C.S. Dudley and Co., 102 S. W. 2d 895, 340 Mo.
852).
This Court, in the case of Philippines Lawyers Association v. Agrava (105 Phil. 173,
176-177),stated:
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces the
preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, the
management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts, and
in addition, conveying. In general, all advice to clients, and all action taken for them in matters
connected with the law incorporation services, assessment and condemnation services
contemplating an appearance before a judicial body, the foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement
of a creditor's claim in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in
attachment, and in matters or estate and guardianship have been held to constitute law practice,
as do the preparation and drafting of legal instruments, where the work done involves the
determination by the trained legal mind of the legal effect of facts and conditions. (5 Am. Jr. p.
262, 263).
Practice of law under modern conditions consists in no small part of work performed outside of
any court and having no immediate relation to proceedings in court. It embraces conveyancing,
the giving of legal advice on a large variety of subjects and the preparation and execution of legal
instruments covering an extensive field of business and trust relations and other affairs. Although
these transactions may have no direct connection with court proceedings, they are always subject
to become involved in litigation. They require in many aspects a high degree of legal skill, a
wide experience with men and affairs, and great capacity for adaptation to difficult and complex
situations. These customary functions of an attorney or counselor at law bear an intimate relation
to the administration of justice by the courts. No valid distinction, so far as concerns the question
set forth in the order, can be drawn between that part of the work of the lawyer which involves
appearance in court and that part which involves advice and drafting of instruments in his office.
It is of importance to the welfare of the public that these manifold customary functions be
performed by persons possessed of adequate learning and skill, of sound moral character, and
acting at all times under the heavy trust obligations to clients which rests upon all attorneys.
(Moran, Comments on the Rules o Court, Vol. 3 [1973 ed.], pp. 665-666, citing In Re Opinion of
the Justices [Mass], 194 N. E. 313, quoted in Rhode Is. Bar Assoc. v. Automobile Service Assoc.
[R.I.] 197 A. 139, 144).
The practice of law, therefore, covers a wide range of activities in and out of court. Applying the
aforementioned criteria to the case at bar, we agree with the perceptive findings and observations
of the aforestated bar associations that the activities of respondent, as advertised, constitute
"practice of law."
The contention of respondent that it merely offers legal support services can neither be seriously
considered nor sustained. Said proposition is belied by respondent's own description of the
services it has been offering, to wit:
Legal support services basically consists of giving ready information by trained paralegals to
laymen and lawyers, which are strictly non-diagnostic, non-advisory, through the extensive use
of computers and modern information technology in the gathering, processing, storage,
transmission and reproduction of information and communication, such as computerized legal
research; encoding and reproduction of documents and pleadings prepared by laymen or lawyers;
document search; evidence gathering; locating parties or witnesses to a case; fact finding
investigations; and assistance to laymen in need of basic institutional services from government
or non-government agencies, like birth, marriage, property, or business registrations; educational
or employment records or certifications, obtaining documentation like clearances, passports,
local or foreign visas; giving information about laws of other countries that they may find useful,
like foreign divorce, marriage or adoption laws that they can avail of preparatory to emigration to
the foreign country, and other matters that do not involve representation of clients in court;
designing and installing computer systems, programs, or software for the efficient management
of law offices, corporate legal departments, courts and other entities engaged in dispensing or
administering legal services. 20
While some of the services being offered by respondent corporation merely involve mechanical
and technical knowhow, such as the installation of computer systems and programs for the
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efficient management of law offices, or the computerization of research aids and materials, these
will not suffice to justify an exception to the general rule.
What is palpably clear is that respondent corporation gives out legal information to laymen and
lawyers. Its contention that such function is non-advisory and non-diagnostic is more apparent
than real. In providing information, for example, about foreign laws on marriage, divorce and
adoption, it strains the credulity of this Court that all the respondent corporation will simply do is
look for the law, furnish a copy thereof to the client, and stop there as if it were merely a
bookstore. With its attorneys and so called paralegals, it will necessarily have to explain to the
client the intricacies of the law and advise him or her on the proper course of action to be taken
as may be provided for by said law. That is what its advertisements represent and for the which
services it will consequently charge and be paid. That activity falls squarely within the
jurisprudential definition of "practice of law." Such a conclusion will not be altered by the fact
that respondent corporation does not represent clients in court since law practice, as the weight of
authority holds, is not limited merely giving legal advice, contract drafting and so forth.
The aforesaid conclusion is further strengthened by an article published in the January 13, 1991
issue of the Starweek/The Sunday Magazine of the Philippines Star, entitled "Rx for Legal
Problems," where an insight into the structure, main purpose and operations of respondent
corporation was given by its own "proprietor," Atty. Rogelio P. Nogales:
This is the kind of business that is transacted everyday at The Legal Clinic, with offices on the
seventh floor of the Victoria Building along U. N. Avenue in Manila. No matter what the client's
problem, and even if it is as complicated as the Cuneta-Concepcion domestic situation, Atty.
Nogales and his staff of lawyers, who, like doctors are "specialists" in various fields can take
care of it. The Legal Clinic, Inc. has specialists in taxation and criminal law, medico-legal
problems, labor, litigation, and family law. These specialist are backed up by a battery of
paralegals, counsellors and attorneys.
Atty. Nogales set up The Legal Clinic in 1984. Inspired by the trend in the medical field toward
specialization, it caters to clients who cannot afford the services of the big law firms.
The Legal Clinic has regular and walk-in clients. "when they come, we start by analyzing the
problem. That's what doctors do also. They ask you how you contracted what's bothering you,
they take your temperature, they observe you for the symptoms and so on. That's how we
operate, too. And once the problem has been categorized, then it's referred to one of our
specialists.
There are cases which do not, in medical terms, require surgery or follow-up treatment. These
The Legal Clinic disposes of in a matter of minutes. "Things like preparing a simple deed of sale
or an affidavit of loss can be taken care of by our staff or, if this were a hospital the residents or
the interns. We can take care of these matters on a while you wait basis. Again, kung baga sa
hospital, out-patient, hindi kailangang ma-confine. It's just like a common cold or diarrhea,"
explains Atty. Nogales.
Those cases which requires more extensive "treatment" are dealt with accordingly. "If you had a
rich relative who died and named you her sole heir, and you stand to inherit millions of pesos of
property, we would refer you to a specialist in taxation. There would be real estate taxes and
arrears which would need to be put in order, and your relative is even taxed by the state for the
right to transfer her property, and only a specialist in taxation would be properly trained to deal
with the problem. Now, if there were other heirs contesting your rich relatives will, then you
would need a litigator, who knows how to arrange the problem for presentation in court, and
gather evidence to support the case. 21
That fact that the corporation employs paralegals to carry out its services is not controlling. What
is important is that it is engaged in the practice of law by virtue of the nature of the services it
renders which thereby brings it within the ambit of the statutory prohibitions against the
advertisements which it has caused to be published and are now assailed in this proceeding.
Further, as correctly and appropriately pointed out by the U.P. WILOCI, said reported facts
sufficiently establish that the main purpose of respondent is to serve as a one-stop-shop of sorts
for various legal problems wherein a client may avail of legal services from simple
documentation to complex litigation and corporate undertakings. Most of these services are
undoubtedly beyond the domain of paralegals, but rather, are exclusive functions of lawyers
engaged in the practice of law. 22
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It should be noted that in our jurisdiction the services being offered by private respondent which
constitute practice of law cannot be performed by paralegals. Only a person duly admitted as a
member of the bar, or hereafter admitted as such in accordance with the provisions of the Rules
of Court, and who is in good and regular standing, is entitled to practice law. 23
Public policy requires that the practice of law be limited to those individuals found duly qualified
in education and character. The permissive right conferred on the lawyers is an individual and
limited privilege subject to withdrawal if he fails to maintain proper standards of moral and
professional conduct. The purpose is to protect the public, the court, the client and the bar from
the incompetence or dishonesty of those unlicensed to practice law and not subject to the
disciplinary control of the court. 24
The same rule is observed in the american jurisdiction wherefrom respondent would wish to
draw support for his thesis. The doctrines there also stress that the practice of law is limited to
those who meet the requirements for, and have been admitted to, the bar, and various statutes or
rules specifically so provide. 25 The practice of law is not a lawful business except for members
of the bar who have complied with all the conditions required by statute and the rules of court.
Only those persons are allowed to practice law who, by reason of attainments previously
acquired through education and study, have been recognized by the courts as possessing
profound knowledge of legal science entitling them to advise, counsel with, protect, or defend
the rights claims, or liabilities of their clients, with respect to the construction, interpretation,
operation and effect of law. 26 The justification for excluding from the practice of law those not
admitted to the bar is found, not in the protection of the bar from competition, but in the
protection of the public from being advised and represented in legal matters by incompetent and
unreliable persons over whom the judicial department can exercise little control.27
We have to necessarily and definitely reject respondent's position that the concept in the United
States of paralegals as an occupation separate from the law profession be adopted in this
jurisdiction. Whatever may be its merits, respondent cannot but be aware that this should first be
a matter for judicial rules or legislative action, and not of unilateral adoption as it has done.
Paralegals in the United States are trained professionals. As admitted by respondent, there are
schools and universities there which offer studies and degrees in paralegal education, while there
are none in the Philippines. 28 As the concept of the "paralegals" or "legal assistant" evolved in
the United States, standards and guidelines also evolved to protect the general public. One of the
major standards or guidelines was developed by the American Bar Association which set up
Guidelines for the Approval of Legal Assistant Education Programs (1973). Legislation has even
been proposed to certify legal assistants. There are also associations of paralegals in the United
States with their own code of professional ethics, such as the National Association of Legal
Assistants, Inc. and the American Paralegal Association. 29
In the Philippines, we still have a restricted concept and limited acceptance of what may be
considered as paralegal service. As pointed out by FIDA, some persons not duly licensed to
practice law are or have been allowed limited representation in behalf of another or to render
legal services, but such allowable services are limited in scope and extent by the law, rules or
regulations granting permission therefor. 30
Accordingly, we have adopted the American judicial policy that, in the absence of constitutional
or statutory authority, a person who has not been admitted as an attorney cannot practice law for
the proper administration of justice cannot be hindered by the unwarranted intrusion of an
unauthorized and unskilled person into the practice of law. 31 That policy should continue to be
one of encouraging persons who are unsure of their legal rights and remedies to seek legal
assistance only from persons licensed to practice law in the state. 32
Anent the issue on the validity of the questioned advertisements, the Code of Professional
Responsibility provides that a lawyer in making known his legal services shall use only true,
honest, fair, dignified and objective information or statement of facts. 33 He is not supposed to
use or permit the use of any false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive, undignified, self-laudatory
or unfair statement or claim regarding his qualifications or legal services. 34 Nor shall he pay or
give something of value to representatives of the mass media in anticipation of, or in return for,
publicity to attract legal business. 35 Prior to the adoption of the code of Professional
Responsibility, the Canons of Professional Ethics had also warned that lawyers should not resort
to indirect advertisements for professional employment, such as furnishing or inspiring
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newspaper comments, or procuring his photograph to be published in connection with causes in

which the lawyer has been or is engaged or concerning the manner of their conduct, the
magnitude of the interest involved, the importance of the lawyer's position, and all other like
self-laudation. 36
The standards of the legal profession condemn the lawyer's advertisement of his talents. A lawyer
cannot, without violating the ethics of his profession. advertise his talents or skill as in a manner
similar to a merchant advertising his goods. 37 The prescription against advertising of legal
services or solicitation of legal business rests on the fundamental postulate that the that the
practice of law is a profession. Thus, in the case of The Director of Religious Affairs. vs.
Estanislao R. Bayot 38 an advertisement, similar to those of respondent which are involved in the
present proceeding, 39 was held to constitute improper advertising or solicitation.
The pertinent part of the decision therein reads:
It is undeniable that the advertisement in question was a flagrant violation by the respondent of
the ethics of his profession, it being a brazen solicitation of business from the public. Section 25
of Rule 127 expressly provides among other things that "the practice of soliciting cases at law for
the purpose of gain, either personally or thru paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice." It
is highly unethical for an attorney to advertise his talents or skill as a merchant advertises his
wares. Law is a profession and not a trade. The lawyer degrades himself and his profession who
stoops to and adopts the practices of mercantilism by advertising his services or offering them to
the public. As a member of the bar, he defiles the temple of justice with mercenary activities as
the money-changers of old defiled the temple of Jehovah. "The most worthy and effective
advertisement possible, even for a young lawyer, . . . . is the establishment of a well-merited
reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust. This cannot be forced but must be the
outcome of character and conduct." (Canon 27, Code of Ethics.).
We repeat, the canon of the profession tell us that the best advertising possible for a lawyer is a
well-merited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust, which must be earned as
the outcome of character and conduct. Good and efficient service to a client as well as to the
community has a way of publicizing itself and catching public attention. That publicity is a
normal by-product of effective service which is right and proper. A good and reputable lawyer
needs no artificial stimulus to generate it and to magnify his success. He easily sees the
difference between a normal by-product of able service and the unwholesome result of
propaganda. 40
Of course, not all types of advertising or solicitation are prohibited. The canons of the profession
enumerate exceptions to the rule against advertising or solicitation and define the extent to which
they may be undertaken. The exceptions are of two broad categories, namely, those which are
expressly allowed and those which are necessarily implied from the restrictions. 41
The first of such exceptions is the publication in reputable law lists, in a manner consistent with
the standards of conduct imposed by the canons, of brief biographical and informative data.
"Such data must not be misleading and may include only a statement of the lawyer's name and
the names of his professional associates; addresses, telephone numbers, cable addresses;
branches of law practiced; date and place of birth and admission to the bar; schools attended with
dates of graduation, degrees and other educational distinction; public or quasi-public offices;
posts of honor; legal authorships; legal teaching positions; membership and offices in bar
associations and committees thereof, in legal and scientific societies and legal fraternities; the
fact of listings in other reputable law lists; the names and addresses of references; and, with their
written consent, the names of clients regularly represented." 42
The law list must be a reputable law list published primarily for that purpose; it cannot be a mere
supplemental feature of a paper, magazine, trade journal or periodical which is published
principally for other purposes. For that reason, a lawyer may not properly publish his brief
biographical and informative data in a daily paper, magazine, trade journal or society program.
Nor may a lawyer permit his name to be published in a law list the conduct, management or
contents of which are calculated or likely to deceive or injure the public or the bar, or to lower
the dignity or standing of the profession. 43
The use of an ordinary simple professional card is also permitted. The card may contain only a
statement of his name, the name of the law firm which he is connected with, address, telephone
number and special branch of law practiced. The publication of a simple announcement of the
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opening of a law firm or of changes in the partnership, associates, firm name or office address,
being for the convenience of the profession, is not objectionable. He may likewise have his name
listed in a telephone directory but not under a designation of special branch of law. 44
Verily, taking into consideration the nature and contents of the advertisements for which
respondent is being taken to task, which even includes a quotation of the fees charged by said
respondent corporation for services rendered, we find and so hold that the same definitely do not
and conclusively cannot fall under any of the above-mentioned exceptions.
The ruling in the case of Bates, et al. vs. State Bar of Arizona, 45 which is repeatedly invoked and
constitutes the justification relied upon by respondent, is obviously not applicable to the case at
bar. Foremost is the fact that the disciplinary rule involved in said case explicitly allows a
lawyer, as an exception to the prohibition against advertisements by lawyers, to publish a
statement of legal fees for an initial consultation or the availability upon request of a written
schedule of fees or an estimate of the fee to be charged for the specific services. No such
exception is provided for, expressly or impliedly, whether in our former Canons of Professional
Ethics or the present Code of Professional Responsibility. Besides, even the disciplinary rule in
the Bates case contains a proviso that the exceptions stated therein are "not applicable in any
state unless and until it is implemented by such authority in that state." 46 This goes to show that
an exception to the general rule, such as that being invoked by herein respondent, can be made
only if and when the canons expressly provide for such an exception. Otherwise, the prohibition
stands, as in the case at bar.
It bears mention that in a survey conducted by the American Bar Association after the decision in
Bates, on the attitude of the public about lawyers after viewing television commercials, it was
found that public opinion dropped significantly 47 with respect to these characteristics of lawyers:
Trustworthy from 71% to 14%
Professional from 71% to 14%
Honest from 65% to 14%
Dignified from 45% to 14%
Secondly, it is our firm belief that with the present situation of our legal and judicial systems, to
allow the publication of advertisements of the kind used by respondent would only serve to
aggravate what is already a deteriorating public opinion of the legal profession whose integrity
has consistently been under attack lately by media and the community in general. At this point in
time, it is of utmost importance in the face of such negative, even if unfair, criticisms at times, to
adopt and maintain that level of professional conduct which is beyond reproach, and to exert all
efforts to regain the high esteem formerly accorded to the legal profession.
In sum, it is undoubtedly a misbehavior on the part of the lawyer, subject to disciplinary action,
to advertise his services except in allowable instances 48 or to aid a layman in the unauthorized
practice of law. 49 Considering that Atty. Rogelio P. Nogales, who is the prime incorporator,
major stockholder and proprietor of The Legal Clinic, Inc. is a member of the Philippine Bar, he
is hereby reprimanded, with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts which are
involved in this proceeding will be dealt with more severely.
While we deem it necessary that the question as to the legality or illegality of the purpose/s for
which the Legal Clinic, Inc. was created should be passed upon and determined, we are
constrained to refrain from lapsing into an obiter on that aspect since it is clearly not within the
adjudicative parameters of the present proceeding which is merely administrative in nature. It is,
of course, imperative that this matter be promptly determined, albeit in a different proceeding
and forum, since, under the present state of our law and jurisprudence, a corporation cannot be
organized for or engage in the practice of law in this country. This interdiction, just like the rule
against unethical advertising, cannot be subverted by employing some so-called paralegals
supposedly rendering the alleged support services.
The remedy for the apparent breach of this prohibition by respondent is the concern and province
of the Solicitor General who can institute the corresponding quo warranto action, 50 after due
ascertainment of the factual background and basis for the grant of respondent's corporate charter,
in light of the putative misuse thereof. That spin-off from the instant bar matter is referred to the
Solicitor General for such action as may be necessary under the circumstances.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to RESTRAIN and ENJOIN herein respondent, The Legal
Clinic, Inc., from issuing or causing the publication or dissemination of any advertisement in any
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form which is of the same or similar tenor and purpose as Annexes "A" and "B" of this petition,
and from conducting, directly or indirectly, any activity, operation or transaction proscribed by
law or the Code of Professional Ethics as indicated herein. Let copies of this resolution be
furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Office of the Bar Confidant and the Office of
the Solicitor General for appropriate action in accordance herewith.
Narvasa, C.J., Cruz, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Davide, Jr., Romero, Nocon,
Bellosillo, Melo and Quiason, JJ., concur

# Footnotes
1 Rollo, 5. A facsimile of the scales of justice is printed together with and on the left side of "The
Legal Clinic, Inc." in both advertisements which were published in a newspaper of general
circulation.
2 433 U.S. 350, 53 L Ed 2d 810, 97 S Ct. 2691.
3 Resolution dated January 15, 1991, Rollo, 60; Resolution dated December 10, 1991, Rollo,
328.
4 Position Paper prepared by Atty. Basilio H. Alo, IBP Director for Legal Affairs, 1, 10; Rollo,
209, 218.
5 Memorandum prepared by Atty. Jose A. Grapilon, Chairman, Committee on Bar Discipline,
and Atty. Kenny H. Tantuico, 16-18, 27-29, Rollo 414-416, 425-427.
6 Position Paper prepared by Atty. Rafael D. Abiera, Jr., Chairman, Committee on Lawyers'
Rights and Legal Ethics, and Atty. Arturo M. del Rosario, President, 5-6; Rollo, 241-242.
7 Position Paper prepared by Atty. Lorenzo Sumulong, President, and Atty. Mariano M.
Magsalin, Vice-President, 2, 4-5; Rollo, 93, 95-96.
8 Position Paper prepared by Atty. Victoria C. de los Reyes, 1-2; Rollo, 105-106.
9 Memorandum prepared by Atty. Victoria C. de los Reyes, 10-11; Rollo, 370-371.
10 Position Paper prepared by Atty. Leticia E. Sablan, Officer-in-Charge, WLAP Free Legal Aid
Clinic, 1-2; Rollo, 169-170.
11 Position Paper prepared by Atty. Lily C. Limpe, President, and Atty. Barbara Anne C.
Migallos, 8-12, 23-24; Rollo, 139-143, 154-155.
12 Annotation: 111 ALR 23.
13 Howton vs. Morrow, 269 Ky. 1.
14 West Virginia State Bar vs. Earley, 109 S.E. 2d 420, 144 W.Va. 504; Rhode Island Bar Assoc.
vs. Automobile Service Assoc. (R.I.) 179 A. 139, 144.
15 People vs. Castleman, 88 Colo. 229.
16 Depew, et al. vs. Witchita Assn. of Credit Men., Inc., 142 Kan. 403.
17 Fitchette vs. Taylor, 94 ALR 356.
18 Mandelaum vs. Gilbert and Barker Mfg. Co., 290 NYS 46218.
19 201 SCRA 210 (1991).
20 Comment of Respondent, 3; Rollo, 15.
21 Rollo, 130-131.
22 Memorandum of U.P. WILOCI, 12-13; Rollo, 372-373.
23 Sec. 1, Rule 138, Rules of Court.
24 Phil. Ass'n. of Free Labor Unions, et al. vs. Binalbagan-Isabela Sugar Co., et al., 42 SCRA
302 (1971).
25 7 C.J.S., Attorney and Client, 863, 864.
26 Mounier vs. Regcinh, 170 So. 567.
27 Lowell Bar Ass'n. vs. Loeb. 52 N.E. 2d 27, 315 Mass. 176; 7 C.J.S., Attorney and Client 64,
865.
28 Comment of Respondent, 2; Rollo, 14.
29 Position Paper, U.P. Women Lawyers' Circle (WILOCI), 11-12, citing Statsky, Introduction to
Paralegalism, 214-224, West Publishing Co. (1974) and Shayne, The Paralegal Profession,
Oceana Publications, 1977, Appendix II and III; Rollo, 116-117.
30 Illustrations:
(a) A law student who has successfully completed his third year of the regular four-year
prescribed law curriculum and is enrolled in a recognized law school's clinical legal education
program approved by the Supreme Court (Rule 138-A, Rules of Court);
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(b) An official or other person appointed or designated in accordance with law to appear for the
Government of the Philippines in a case in which the government has an interest (Sec. 33, Rule
138, id.);
(c) An agent or friend who aids a party-litigant in a municipal court for the purpose of
conducting the litigation (Sec. 34, Rule 138, id.);
(d) A person, resident of the province and of good repute for probity and ability, who is
appointed counsel de oficio to defend the accused in localities where members of the bar are not
available (Sec. 4, Rule 116, id.);
(e) Persons registered or specially recognized to practice in the Philippine Patent Office (now
known as the Bureau of Patents, Trademarks and Technology Transfer) in trademark, service
mark and trade name cases (Rule 23, Rules of Practice in Trademark Cases);
(f) A non-lawyer who may appear before the National Labor Relations Commission or any Labor
Arbiter only if (1) he represents himself as a party to the case; (2) he represents an organization
or its members, provided that he shall be made to present written proof that he is properly
authorized; or (3) he is duly-accredited members of any legal aid office duly recognized by the
Department of Justice or the Integrated Bar of the Philippines in cases referred thereto by the
latter (New Rules of Procedure of the National Labor Relations Commission);
(g) An agent, not an attorney, representing the lot owner or claimant in a case falling under the
Cadastral Act (Sec. 9, Act No. 2259); and
(h) Notaries public for municipalities where completion and passing the studies of law in a
reputable university or school of law is deemed sufficient qualification for appointment (Sec.
233, Administrative Code of 1917). See Rollo, 144-145.
31 7 C.J.S., Attorney and Client, 866; Johnstown Coal and Coke Co. of New York vs. U.S., 102
Ct. Cl. 285.
32 Florida Bar vs. Brumbaugth, 355 So. 2d 1186.
33 Canon 3, Code of Professional Responsibility.
34 Rule 3.01, id.
35 Rule 3.04, id.
36 Canon 27, Canons of Professional Ethics.
37 People vs. Smith, 93 Am. St. Rep. 206.
38 74 Phil. 579 (1944).
39 The advertisement in said case was as follows: "Marriage license promptly secured thru our
assistance and the annoyance of delay or publicity avoided if desired, and marriage arranged to
wishes of parties. Consultation on any matter free for the poor. Everything confidential.".
40 Agpalo, Legal Ethics, Fourth Edition (1989), 79-80.
41 Op. cit., 80.
43 * * * Missing * * * .
44 Op. cit., 81, citing A.B.A. Op. 11 (May 11, 1927); A.B.A. Op. 24 (Jan. 24, 1930); A.B.A. Ops.
53 (Dec. 14, 1931), 123 (Dec. 14, 1934), (July 12, 1941), 241 (Feb. 21, 1942), 284 (Aug. 1951);
and 286 (Sept. 25, 1952). .
45 Supra, Fn 2.
46 Id., 810, 825.
47 Position Paper of the Philippine Bar Association, 12, citing the American Bar Association
Journal, January, 1989, p. 60; Rollo, 248.
48 In re Tagorda, 53 Phil. 37 (1929); The Director of Religious Affairs vs. Bayot, supra, Fn 38.
49 U.S. vs. Ney and Bosque, 8 Phil. 146 (1907); People vs. Luna, 102 Phil. 968 (1958).
50 Secs. 2 and 3, Rule 66, Rules of Court, in relation to Sec. 6(1), P.D. No. 902-A and Sec. 121,
Corporation Code.
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A.M. No. 09-5-2-SC December 14, 2010

IN THE MATTER OF THE BREWING CONTROVERSIES IN THE ELECTION IN
THE INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
A.C. No. 8292
ATTYS. MARCIAL M. MAGSINO, MANUEL M. MARAMBA and NASSER
MAROHOMSALIC, Complainants,
vs.
ATTYS. ROGELIO A. VINLUAN, ABELARDO C. ESTRADA, BONIFACIO T.
BARANDON, JR., EVERGISTO S. ESCALON and RAYMUND JORGE A. MERCADO,
Respondents.
RESOLUTION
CORONA, C.J.:
This resolves the above matter involving the leadership controversy at the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) and the administrative case that was filed against some of the high-ranking
officers of the IBP on account thereof.
I. Antecedents
The Court in an En Banc Resolution dated June 2, 2009 created a Special (Investigating)
Committee1 to look into the "brewing controversies in the IBP elections, specifically in the
elections of Vice-President for the Greater Manila Region and Executive Vice-President of the
IBP itself xxx and any other election controversy involving other chapters of the IBP, if any",
that includes as well the election of the Governors for Western Mindanao and Western Visayas.
Consequently, the Special Committee called the IBP officers involved to a preliminary
conference on June 10, 2009. With respect thereto, Atty. Rogelio A. Vinluan then submitted a
Preliminary Conference Brief on the same day. During the conference it was determined that the
investigation would focus on the following issues or controversies:
1. What is the correct interpretation of Section 31, Article V of the IBP By-Laws which provides:
"SEC. 31. Membership. – The membership (of Delegates) shall consist of all the Chapter
Presidents and, in the case of Chapters entitled to more than one Delegate each, the Vice-
Presidents of the Chapters and such additional Delegates as the Chapters are entitled to. Unless
the Vice-President is already a Delegate, he shall be an alternate Delegate. Additional Delegates
and alternates shall in proper cases be elected by the Board of Officers of the Chapter. Members
of the Board of Governors who are not Delegates shall be members ex officio of the House,
without the right to vote."
2. Who was validly elected Governor for the Greater Manila Region?
3. Who was validly elected Governor for Western Visayas Region?
4. Who was validly elected Governor for Western Mindanao Region?
5. Who was validly elected IBP Executive Vice President for the next term?
6. What is the liability, if any, of respondent Atty. Rogelio A. Vinluan under the administrative
complaint for "grave professional misconduct, violation of attorney’s oath, and acts inimical to
the IBP" filed against him by Attys. Marcial Magsino, Manuel Maramba and Nasser
Marohomsalic?
Meanwhile, a Supplemental Complaint dated June 11, 2009 was received from Attys. Magsino,
Maramba and Marohomsalic regarding the earlier complaint that they filed last May 21, 2009
against Atty. Vinluan.
As such, then IBP President Feliciano M. Bautista and then Executive Vice President (EVP)
Vinluan agreed to submit their respective position papers on the above issues and controversies.
Also, Atty. Vinluan was required to file his answer to the administrative complaint against him.
A Position Paper dated June 15, 2009 was then received from Atty. Vinluan. Attys. Elpidio G.
Soriano, III and Erwin M. Fortunato also filed their Position Papers both dated June 15, 2009. It
appears that an earlier Position Paper also dated June 15, 2009 was submitted by Atty. Benjamin
B. Lanto.
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For their part, Attys. Bautista, Maramba and Magsino filed their Position Paper dated June 16,
2009. Incidentally, in a Manifestation likewise dated June 16, 2009 Attys. Bautista, Maramba and
Marcial M. Magsino submitted the same paper but already bearing the signature of Atty.
Bautista.
Atty. Nasser A. Marohomsalic submitted his Position Paper dated June 17, 2009. The Special
Committee, in the course of its investigation, further received a letter dated June 22, 2009 from
Atty. Alex L. Macalawi, President of the IBP Lanao del Sur Chapter.
As to the administrative case filed against him, Atty. Vinluan, as respondent, filed his Comment
dated June 15, 2009. In turn, Attys. Magsino, Maramba and Marohomsalic, as complainants,
submitted their Reply dated June 23, 2009.
The Special Committee then submitted a Report and Recommendation dated July 9, 2009 the
dispositive portion of which read as follows:
A. That to avoid further controversy regarding its proper interpretation and implementation, Sec.
31, Article V, of the By-Laws should be amended as follows (suggested amendments are in bold
print):
"SEC. 31. Membership. – The membership of the House of Delegates shall consist of all the
Chapter Presidents and in the case of Chapters entitled to mo(r)e than on(e) Delegate each, the
Vice President of the Chapters and such additional Delegates as the Chapters are entitled to.
Unless the Vice President is already (a) delegate, he shall be an alternate Delegate. Additional
Delegates and their respective alternates shall be elected from, and by, the Board of Officers of
the Chapter. If the Delegate chosen is incapacitated, or disqualified, or resigns, or refuses to
serve, and there are enough members of the Board to be elected as Delegates, then the Board of
Officers shall elect the additional delegates and alternates from the general membership of the
Chapter, and his corresponding alternate shall take his place."
B. That to avoid any ambiguity as to how the President shall preside and vote in meetings of the
House of Delegates, paragraph (g), Sec. 33, Article V of the By-Laws should be amended as
follows:
"(g) In all meetings and deliberations of the House, whether in annual or special convention, the
President shall preside, or the Executive Vice President, if the President is absent or
incapacitated, but neither of them shall vote except to break a tie."
C. Similarly, Sec. 42, Article VI of the By-Laws, on meetings of the Board of Governors, should
be amended to read as follows:
"Sec. 42. Meetings. – The Board shall meet regularly once a month, on such date and such time
and place as it shall designate. Special meetings may be called by the President, and shall be
called by him upon the written request of five (5) members of the Board. The President shall not
vote except to break a tie in the voting. When for any reason, the President cannot preside on
account of his absence, incapacity, or refusal to call a meeting, the Executive Vice President shall
preside, there being a quorum to transact business, but he may not vote except to break a tie.
D. That Sec. 43, Article VI of the By-Laws, on the procedure for approving a resolution by the
Board of Governors without a meeting, should be amended by adding the following exception
thereto so that the procedure may not be abused in connection with any election in the IBP:
"This provision shall not apply when the Board shall hold an election or hear and decide an
election protest."
E. That the provision for the strict implementation of the rotation rule among the Chapters in the
Regions for the election of the Governor for the regions, (as ordered by this Honorable Court in
Bar Matter No. 586, May 14, 1991) should be incorporated in Sec. 39, Article VI of the By-
Laws, as follows:
"Sec. 39. Nomination and election of the Governors. – At least one (1) month before the national
convention the delegates from each region shall elect the Governor for their region, who shall be
chosen by rotation which is mandatory and shall be strictly implemented among the Chapters in
the region. When a Chapter waives its turn in the rotation order, its place shall redound to the
next Chapter in the line. Nevertheless, the former may reclaim its right to the Governorship at
any time before the rotation is completed; otherwise, it will have to wait for its turn in the next
round, in the same place that it had in the round completed.
F. That in view of the fact that the IBP no longer elects its President, because the Executive Vice
President automatically succeeds the President at the end of his term, Sec. 47, Article VII of the
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By-Laws should be amended by deleting the provision for the election of the President.
Moreover, for the strict implementation of the rotation rule, the Committee recommends that
there should be a sanction for its violation, thus:
"Sec. 47. National Officers. – The Integrated Bar of the Philippines shall have a President, an
Executive Vice President, and nine (9) regional Governors. The Executive Vice President shall
be elected on a strict rotation basis by the Board of Governors from among themselves, by the
vote of at least five (5) Governors. The Governors shall be ex officio Vice President for their
respective regions. There shall also be a Secretary and Treasurer of the Board of Governors.
"The violation of the rotation rule in any election shall be penalized by annulment of the election
and disqualification of the offender from election or appointment to any office in the IBP."
G. That Atty. Manuel M. Maramba should be declared the duly elected Governor of the Greater
Manila Region for the 2009-2011 term.
H. That Atty. Erwin Fortunato of the Romblon Chapter should be declared the duly elected
Governor of the Western Visayas Region for the 2009-2011 term.
I. That a special election should be held in the Western Mindanao Region, within fifteen (15)
days from notice, to elect the Governor of that region for the 2009-2011 term. In accordance with
the rotation rule, only the six (6) Chapters in the region that have not yet been elected to the
Board of Governors, namely: Zamboanga Sibugay, Zamboanga del Norte, Za(m)boanga del Sur,
Lanao del Norte, Misamis Occidental, and Maguindanao-Cotabato City, shall participate in the
election.
J. That, thereafter, a special election should also be held by the Board of Governors to elect the
Executive Vice President for the 2009-2011 term with strict observance of the rotation rule.
Inasmuch as for the past nine (9) terms, i.e., since the 1991-1993 term, the nominees of the
Western Visayas and Eastern Mindanao Regions have not yet been elected Executive Vice
President of the IBP, the special election shall choose only between the nominees of these two
(2) regions who shall become the Executive Vice President for the 2009-2011 term, in
accordance with the strict rotation rule.
K. That the high-handed and divisive tactics of Atty. Rogelio A. Vinluan and his group of
Governors, Abelardo Estrada, Bonifacio Barandon, Jr., Evergisto Escalon, and Raymund
Mercado, which disrupted the peaceful and orderly flow of business in the IBP, caused chaos in
the National Office, bitter disagreements, and ill-feelings, and almost disintegrated the Integrated
Bar, constituted grave professional misconduct which should be appropriately sanctioned to
discourage its repetition in the future.
II. Findings of the Special Committee
In its Report and Recommendation dated July 9, 2009, the Special Committee disclosed when it
was discussing the Board of Officers of each chapter that:
The government of a Chapter is vested in its Board of Officers composed of nine (9) officers,
namely: the President, Vice-President, Secretary, Treasurer, and five (5) Directors who shall be
elected by the members of the Chapter at the biennial meeting on the last Saturday of February,
and shall hold office for a term of two (2) years from the first day of April following their
election and until their successors shall have been duly chosen and qualified. For the 2009-2011
term, the election of Chapter officers was held on February 28, 2009.
In 1983 up to 1995, the Quezon City Chapter elected the usual nine (9) officers to its Board of
Officers and they were all delegates to the House of Delegates. Beginning with the 1997-1999
term, when it added a Public Relations Officer (P.R.O.) and Auditor to its Board of Officers, the
number of delegates allotted to the Chapter was also increased to eleven (11) like the
membership in its Board of Officers, pursuant to a reapportionment of delegates by the Board of
Governors under Sec. 30, Art. V of the By-Laws.
Up to the 2007-2009 term, all the officers of the QC Chapter were also the Chapter’s delegates to
the House of Delegates. Atty. Victoria Loanzon who has been an officer of the Chapter in various
capacities since 2003, like her fellow officers in the Board, automatically became a delegate
since 2003 up to this time.
For the 2009-2011 term, the Board of Officers of the IBP-QC Chapter that assumed office on
April 1, 2009, is composed of six (6) officers and (5) directors, namely:
President - - - - - - - - - - Tranquil Salvador III
Vice President - - - - - - Jonas Cabochan
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Secretary - - - - - - - - - - Christian Fernandez

Treasurer - - - - - - - - - - Victoria Loanzon
Auditor - - - - - - - - - - - Ginger Anne Castillo
P.R.O. - - - - - - - - - - - - Ernesto Tabujara III
Director - - - - - - - - - - - Annalou Nachura
Director - - - - - - - - - - - Melody Sampaga
Director - - - - - - - - - - - Francois Rivera
Director - - - - - - - - - - - Joseph Cerezo
Director - - - - - - - - - - - Marita Iris Laqui
It is important to be an officer of one’s Chapter and a delegate to the House of Delegates,
because a delegate gets to elect the Governor for the Region (which must rotate among the
Chapters in the region). The Governor of the Region becomes a member of the Board of
Governors, and gets to elect, or be elected, as the next IBP Executive Vice President who
automatically becomes President for the next succeeding term (which must also rotate among the
Regions).2
The Special Committee then pointed out that with respect to the IBP Board of Governors this
consists of "nine (9) Governors from the nine (9) Regions. One (1) Governor for each Region
shall be elected by the members of the House of Delegates from that region only. The Governors,
the President and the Executive Vice-President shall hold office for a term of two (2) years from
July 1 immediately following their election, up to June 30 of their second year in office and until
their successors shall have been duly chosen and qualified." It was further added by the
Committee that:
At least one (1) month before the national convention, the delegates from each Region shall elect
the Governor for their region. The IBP By-Laws provide that "starting in 1993-1995, the
principle on rotation shall be strictly implemented so that all prior elections for Governor in the
region shall be reckoned with or considered in determining who should be Governor to be
selected from the different chapters to represent the region in the Board of Governors. Hence, the
governorship of the region shall rotate among the chapters in the region.
The Governors-elect shall, by a vote of at least five (5), choose an Executive Vice-President, x x
x either from among themselves or from other members of the Integrated Bar. The Executive
Vice-President shall automatically become President for the next succeeding term. The
Presidency shall rotate among the nine (9) Regions.3
According to the Committee, the "rotation of the position of Governor of a region among the
Chapters was ordered by the Supreme Court in its Resolution dated May 14, 1991 in Bar Matter
No. 586 (Clarification Re: Bar Matter No. 491, Atty. Romulo T. Capulong petitioner)". With
respect thereto, it was revealed that:
Pursuant to the principle of rotation, the governorship of a region shall rotate once in as many
terms as the number of chapters there are in the region, to give every chapter a chance to
represent the region in the Board of Governors. Thus, in a region composed of 5 chapters, each
chapter is entitled to the governorship once in every 5 terms, or once every ten (10) years, since a
term is two (2) years.
The record of the National IBP Secretariat shows that during the past five (5) terms, from 1999
up to 2009, the GMR (Greater Manila Region) governorship was occupied by the five (5)
chapters of the region as follows:
1999-2001 ----- Jose P. Icaonapo ------------ Manila III
2001-2003 ----- Santos V. Catubay, Jr. ---- QuezonCity
2003-2005 ----- Rosario Setias-Reyes ------ Manila II
2005-2007 ----- Alicia A. Risos-Vidal ------ Manila I
2007-2009 ----- Marcial M. Magsino ------- Manila IV
In the next round, which starts with the 2009-2011 term, the same order of rotation should be
followed by the five (5) chapters, i.e., Manila III shall begin the round, to be followed by Quezon
City for 2011-2013 term, Manila for the 2013-2015 term, Manila I for the 2015-2017 term, and
Manila IV for the 2017-2019 term.
In the Western Visayas Region which is composed of ten (10) chapters, each chapter is entitled to
represent the governorship of the region once every ten (10) terms. The first chapter to occupy
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the governorship, must wait for the nine (9) other chapters to serve their respective terms, before
it may have its turn again as Governor of the region.
The same rule applies to the Western Mindanao Region which is composed of twelve (12)
chapters.
On April 25, 2009, the election of Governors for the nine (9) IBP regions proceeded as
scheduled, presided over by their respective outgoing Governor.4
It was then cited by the Special Committee that "Sec. 47, Art. VII of the By-Laws, as amended
by Bar Matter 491, Oct. 6, 1989, provides that the Executive Vice President shall be chosen by
the Board of Governors from among the nine (9) regional governors. The Executive Vice
President shall automatically become President for the next succeeding term. The Presidency
shall rotate among the nine Regions." Further, the Committee averred that:
The list of national presidents furnished the Special Committee by the IBP National Secretariat,
shows that the governors of the following regions were President of the IBP during the past nine
(9) terms (1991-2009):
Numeriano Tanopo, Jr. (Pangasinan) --- Central Luzon --- 1991-1993
Mervin G. Encanto (Quezon City) ------ Manila ------------ 1993-1995
Raul R. Angangco (Makati) -------------- Southern Luzon - 1995-1997
Jose Aguila Grapilon (Biliran) ----------- Eastern Visayas – 1997-1999
Arthur D. Lim (Zambasulta) ------------- Western Mindanao-1999-2001
Teofilo S. Pilando, Jr. (Kalinga-Apayao)-Northern Luzon – 2001-2003
Jose Anselmo I. Cadiz (Camarines Sur) –Bicolandia -------- 2003-2005
Jose Anselmo I. Cadiz (Camarines Sur) –Bicolandia ----2005-Aug 2006
Jose Vicente B. Salazar (Albay) ---------- Bicolandia --- Aug. 2006-2007
Feliciano M. Bautista (Pangasinan) ------ Central Luzon ---- 2007-2009
Only the governors of the Western Visayas and Eastern Mindanao regions have not yet had their
turn as Executive Vice President cum next IBP President, while Central Luzon and Bicolandia
have had two (2) terms already.
Therefore, either the governor of the Western Visayas Region, or the governor of the Eastern
Mindanao Region should be elected as Executive Vice-President for the 2009-2011 term. The
one who is not chosen for this term, shall have his turn in the next (2011-2013) term. Afterwards,
another rotation shall commence with Greater Manila in the lead, followed by Southern Luzon,
Eastern Visayas, Western Mindanao, Northern Luzon, Bicolandia, Central Luzon, and either
Western Visayas or Eastern Mindanao at the end of the round.5
The Committee then disclosed that the controversies involved herein and should be resolved are
the following: (I) the dispute concerning additional delegates of the QC Chapter to the House of
Delegates; (II) the election of the Governor for the Greater Manila Region (GMR); (III) the
election of Governor for the Western Visayas Region; (IV) the election of Governor for the
Western Mindanao Region; (V) the resolution of the election protests; (VI) the election of the
IBP Executive Vice President for the 2009-2011 term; and, (VII) the administrative complaint
against EVP Rogelio Vinluan.
In addressing the above controversies, the Committee arrived at the following findings and
conclusions:
I. The silence of Sec. 31, Art. V of the IBP By-Laws on who may be elected as additional
delegates and alternates by the remaining members of the Board of Officers of the Chapter when
the Chapter is entitled to more than two (2) delegates to the House of Delegates, is the root cause
of the conflicting resolutions of the Bautista and Vinluan factions on the proper interpretation of
the aforementioned provision of the By-Laws.
According to the Resolution No. XVIII-2009 dated April 17, 2009 of the Bautista Group, "the
additional delegate/s shall be elected by the Board of Officers of the Chapter only from among
the remaining duly elected officers and members of the Board, in consideration of their mandate
from the general membership.
According to the Resolution No. XVIII-2009 (Special-23 April 2009) of the Vinluan Group, "the
election of the additional delegate/s for the Chapters entitled to more than two (2) delegates shall
be elected by the Board of Officers of the Chapter from among the general membership who are
in good standing to include the remaining duly elected officers and members of the Board."
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The Committee finds the qualification introduced by Resolution No. XVIII-2009 – "that the
additional delegate/s and alternates must be elected from among the remaining officers of the
Chapter" – to be consistent with the precedent set by Section 31 itself in appointing members of
the Board of Officers, namely, (a) the president of the Chapter as the delegate, and the vice
president as the alternate, or second, delegate to the House of Delegates, when the Chapter is
entitled to two (2) delegates. There is a manifest intention in Sec. 31, Art. V of the By-Laws to
reserve membership in the House of Delegates (which is the deliberative body of the IBP) for the
elected officers of the Chapter since they have already received the mandate of the general
membership of the Chapter.
For the past four (4) terms (2003-2011), Atty. Loanzon has been an officer and delegate of the
QC Chapter to the House of Delegates, until the Vinluan Group introduced its own interpretation
of the aforementioned provision of the By-Laws and elected non-officers of the Chapter as
delegates to the House of Delegates in lieu of herself and Atty. Laqui.
We find the Vinluan Group’s interpretation of Sec. 31, Art. V, of the By-Laws in Resolution No.
XVIII-2009 (Special – 23 April 2009) to be in error and devoid of rational and historical bases.
II. Attys. Victoria Loanzon and Marite Laqui were properly recognized as delegates of the QC
Chapter by the Presiding Officer, GMR Governor Marcial Magsino, during the election on April
25, 2009 of the Governor for the Greater Manila Region, in accordance with the guideline in
Resolution No. XVIII-2009.
The argument of the QC-Chapter President Tranquil Salvador, that Attys. Loanzon and Laqui
were not delegates because they were not elected by the QC-Board of Officers, is not well taken.
Sec. 31, Art. V of the By-Laws provides that:
"Additional Delegates and alternates shall in proper cases be elected by the Board of Officers of
the Chapter."
The QC Chapter is not a "proper case" for the election of additional delegates by the Board of
Officers because the Chapter is entitled to the same number of delegates (11) to the House, as the
number of officers in its Board of Officers. Its officers are ipso facto the Chapter’s delegates to
the House. There is no need for the Board of Officers to conduct an election.
A "proper case" for the election of additional delegates and alternates by the Board of Officers
occurs when the number of additional delegates and alternates for the Chapter is less than the
members of the Board of Officers, for, then, the Board of Officers must select, and elect, who
among themselves should be the additional delegate/s and alternates of the Chapter to the House
of Delegates. That has never been the case of the QC Chapter.
III. Atty. Manuel Maramba (Manila III Chapter) was validly elected as GMR Governor for the
2009-2011 term, not only because he outvoted his rival, Atty. Elpidio Soriano (Quezon City
Chapter), but also because under the principle of rotation of the governorship (Bar Matter No.
586, May 14, 1991) since the five (5) chapters of the Greater Manila Region have all represented
the region in the Board of Governors during the past five (5) terms, in the following order:
1999-2001 -------- Manila III -------- Jose P. Icaonapo
2001-2003 -------- Quezon City ----- Santos V. Catubay, Jr.
2003-2005 -------- Manila II ---------- Rosario Setias-Reyes
2005-2007 -------- Manila I ----------- Alicia A. Risos-Vidal
2007-2009 -------- Manila IV --------- Marcial M. Magsino
it is now the turn of the representative of the Manila III Chapter to sit again in the Board of
Governors for the next round which begins in the 2009-2011 term. The Manila III representative,
Atty. Manuel M. Maramba, has every right to the position not only because he won the election
with 13 votes in his favor against 12 for Atty. Soriano, but also because his election follows the
rotation rule decreed by the Supreme Court.
On the other hand, the election of Atty. Soriano (QC Chapter) in the special election that was
presided over by EVP Vinluan on May 4, 2009, was a nullity on three (3) grounds: First, because
Atty. Soriano already lost the election on April 25, 2009. Second, the special election conducted
by the Vinluan Group on May 4, 2(00)8 was illegal because it was not called nor presided over
by the regional Governor. Third, Atty. Soriano is disqualified to run for GMR Governor for the
2009-2011 term because his "election" as such would violate the rotation rule which the Supreme
Court requires to be "strictly implemented". Under the rotation rule, the GMR governorship for
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the 2009-2011 term belongs to the Manila III Chapter, not to the QC Chapter, whose turn will
come two (2) years later, in 2011-2013 yet.
IV. Atty. Erwin Fortunato of the Romblon Chapter was duly elected as Governor for the Western
Visayas Region for the 2009-2011 term, not only because he obtained the highest number of
votes among the three (3) candidates for the position, but also because under the rotation rule, it
is now the turn of the Romblon Chapter to represent the Western Visayas Region in the IBP
Board of Governors.
The contention of the protestants, Attys. Cornelio Aldon (Antique Chapter) and Benjamin Ortega
(Negros Occidental Chapter) that the rotation rule in Sections 37 and 39 of the IBP By-Laws is
not mandatory but only directory, betrays their ignorance of the resolution of the Supreme Court
in Bar Matter No. 586 dated May 16, 1991, ruling that "the principle on rotation shall be strictly
implemented so that all prior elections for governor in the region shall be reckoned with or
considered in determining who should be the governor to be selected from the different chapters
to represent the region in the Board of Governors."
V. Neither Atty. Nasser Marohomsalic nor Atty. Benjamin Lanto is qualified to be elected
Governor of Western Mindanao Region. Sec. 39, Art. VI of the IBP By-Laws provides that:
"Starting in 1993-1995, the principle of rotation in the position of governor among the different
chapters to represent the region in the Board of Governors shall be strictly implemented.
Under Sec. 37, Art. VI of the By-Laws, the Governor of a region shall be elected by the members
of the House of Delegates from that region only. Since the delegate of a Chapter to the House of
Delegates is the President of the Chapter, not the Board of Officers, the nominee of the Chapter
President, not the nominee of the Board of Officers, is the valid nominee for Governor of the
Region.
However, under the rotation rule, it is not the Lanao del Sur Chapter that should represent the
Western Mindanao Region in the Board of Governors for the 2009-2011 term. The record of the
IBP National Secretariat shows that, starting in 1993-1995 when the strict implementation of the
rotation rule began, the 12-chapter Western Mindanao Region has been represented in the Board
of Governors by only six (6) Chapters, as follows:
1993-1995 ----- Lanao del Sur ------ Dimnatang T. Saro
1995-1997 ----- Cotabato ------------ George C. Jabido
1997-1999 ----- ZAMBASULTA -- Arthur D. Lim
1999-2001 ----- ZAMBASULTA -- Paulino R. Ersando
2001-2003 ----- North Cotabato --- Little Sarah A. Agdeppa
2003-2005 ----- Sultan Kudarat ---- Carlos L. Valdez, Jr.
2005-2007 ----- SOCSARGEN ----- Rogelio C. Garcia
2007-2009 ----- Sultan Kudarat ---- Carlos L. Valdez, Jr.
Therefore, pursuant to the strict rotation, the Lanao del Sur Chapter must wait for the six (6)
other Chapters in the region (Zamboanga Sibugay, Zamboanga del Norte, Zamboanga del Sur,
Lanao del Norte, Misamis Occidental, and Maguindanao-Cotabato City) to have their turn in the
Board of Governors before Lanao del Sur may again represent the Western Mindanao Region in
the Board of Governors.
Since both Attys. Nasser Marohomsalic and B(e)njamin Lanto belong to the Lanao del Sur
Chapter, both of them are disqualified to be elected as Governor of the Western Mindanao
Region for the 2009-2011 term. With respect to Atty. Benjamin Lanto, his nomination by the
Board of Officers was not only invalid, but also lost credibility after three (3), out of the thirteen
(13) signatories to his nomination, resigned from the Board of Officers, and six (6) others signed
"authorizations" in favor of Atty. Macalawi authorizing him to nominate and elect the Governor
for the Western Mindanao Region. That left only four (4) votes in favor of his nomination for
Governor of the Western Mindanao Region.
VI. The elections for the IBP Executive Vice President separately held on May 9, 2009 by the
Bautista and Vinluan Groups were null and void for lack of quorum. The presence of five (5)
Governors-elect is needed to constitute a quorum of the 9-member Board of Governors-elect
who shall elect the Executive Vice President.
As previously stated, there were two (2) simultaneous elections for the Executive Vice President
for the 2009-2011 term – one was called and presided over by EVP Vinluan in the Board Room
of the IBP National Office, while the other election for the same position was presided over by
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outgoing IBP Pres. Bautista in another room of the same building, at the same time, 9:00 A.M.,
on the same date, May 9, 2009.
Those present at the meeting of the Vinluan Group were:
1. Atty. Elpidio G. Soriano
2. Atty. Benjamin B. Lanto
3. Atty. Amador Tolentino, Jr., Governor-elect for Southern Luzon
4. Atty. Jose V. Cabrera, Governor-elect for Bicolandia
5. Atty. Erwin Fortunato, Governor-elect for Western Visayas
6. Atty. Roland B. Inting, Governor-elect for Eastern Visayas
Since both Attys. Soriano and Lanto were not validly elected as Governors respectively of the
Greater Manila Region and the Western Mindanao Region, they were disqualified to sit in the
incoming Board of Governors and participate in the election of the succeeding Executive Vice
President. The remaining four (4) Governors-elect – Governors Tolentino, Cabrera, Fortunato,
and Inting, did not constitute a quorum of the Board of Governors to conduct a valid election of
the IBP Executive Vice President. The election of Atty. Elpidio G. Soriano as Executive Vice
President by the Vinluan Group was invalid. Aside from lack of a quorum to conduct the
elections, EVP Vinluan wrongly presided over the election. Thus, Atty. Soriano was not duly
elected as Governor of the Greater Manila Region, hence, he is disqualified to sit in the Board of
Governors.
Neither did the meeting of the Bautista Group fare any better, for those present were:
1. Atty. Milagros Fernan-Cayosa, Governor-elect for Northern Luzon
2. Atty. Ferdinand Y. Miclat, Governor-elect for Central Luzon
3. Atty. Manuel M. Maramba, Governor-elect for Greater Manila
4. Atty. Roan Libarios, Governor-elect for Eastern Mindanao
5. Atty. Nasser Marohomsalic
Atty. Marohomsalic’s election as Governor for Western Mindanao was invalid for violating the
rotation rule. The four (4) remaining governors-elect (Attys. Cayosa, Miclat, Maramba and
Libarios) like those in the Vinluan Group, did not constitute a quorum to conduct the election of
the IBP Executive Vice President for the current term. The election of Governor Roan Libarios as
Executive Vice President by this group was therefore null and void.
Besides that flaw in his election, since the Eastern Visayas Region, represented by Governor Jose
Aguila Grapilon of Biliran, had succeeded to the presidency in 1997-1999, its next turn will
come after the eight (8) other regions shall have also served in the presidency. That will be after
sixteen years, or, in 2015-2017 yet.
VII. The administrative complaint against EVP Rogelio A. Vinluan and his Group of Governors
(Abelardo Estrada of Northern Luzon, Bonifacio Barandon of Bicolandia, Evergisto Escalon of
Eastern Visayas, and Raymund Mercado of Western Visayas) is meritorious, for their conduct
was fractious and high-handed, causing disunity and acrimonious disagreements in the IBP.
1. The request of the EVP Vinluan’s Group for a special meeting of the Board of Governors on
April 23, 2009 – two (2) days before the scheduled election of the regional Governors on April
25, 2009 – when IBP Pres. Bautista was in Zamboanga on IBP business, and the other Governors
had just returned to their respective regions to prepare for the April 25 election of the regional
governors, was unreasonable.
The special meeting on April 23, 2009 which he himself presided over, violated Sec. 42, Art. VI
of the By-Laws which provides that it is the President who shall call a special meeting, and it is
also the President who shall preside over the meeting, not Atty. Vinluan (Sec. 50, Art. VII, By-
Laws).
The proper recourse for the Vinluan Group, in view of President Bautista’s refusal to call a
special meeting as requested by them, is found in Section 43, Art. VI of the By-Laws which
provides that-
"The Board may take action, without a meeting, by resolution signed by at least five Governors
provided that every member of the Board shall have been previously apprised of the contents of
the resolution."
But the Vinluan Group ignored that procedure. They held a special meeting on April 23, 2009,
where they adopted Resolution No. XVIII-2009 (Special-23 April 2009) striking out as ultra
vires the earlier Resolution No. XVIII-2009 passed in the regular monthly meeting of the Board
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of Governors on April 17, 2009. That meeting was illegal, hence, the resolution adopted therein
was null and void.
2. The second special meeting held by the Vinluan Group on April 30, 2009 wherein they
approved Resolution XVIII-2009 (Special-A-30 April 2009) resolving the election protests in the
GMR, Western Visayas and Western Mindanao governors’ elections, with complete disregard for
the protestees’ right to due process, was likewise illegal, hence, the Group’s resolution of the
election protests was likewise null and void, and the new election of the GMR Governor which
they set on May 4, 2009 was invalid.
3. The "Board Resolution" which was adopted and faxed to the Governors-elect on May 8, 2009,
by the Vinluan Group, setting the election of the IBP Executive Vice President on May 9, 2009,
at 9:00 A.M.; declaring Pres. Bautista "unfit to preside" over the election and "designating EVP
Vinluan to preside over the election" in lieu of Pres. Bautista, was uncalled and unwarranted, and
caused disunity and disorder in the IBP. It was in effect a coup to unseat Pres. Bautista before the
end of his term, and prematurely install EVP Vinluan as president.
The actuations of Atty. Vinluan’s Group in defying the lawful authority of IBP President
Bautista, due to Atty. Vinluan’s overweening desire to propel his fraternity brother, Atty. Elpidio
G. Soriano, to the next presidency of the IBP, smacked of politicking, which is strongly
condemned and strictly prohibited by the IBP By-Laws and the Bar Integration Rule.6
Again, it must be noted that while the pending administrative case against Atty. Vinluan and his
co-respondents has not yet been resolved, Atty. Vinluan was not allowed to assume his position
as President of the IBP for 2009-2011. Instead, the Supreme Court designated retired Supreme
Court Associate Justice Santiago Kapunan as Officer-in-Charge of the IBP.
III. Rulings of the Court
The Court completely agrees with the recommendations of the Special Committee with respect
to, among others, the following:
1. Declaring Atty. Manuel M. Maramba (Manila III Chapter) as the duly elected Governor of the
Greater Manila Region for the 2009-2011 term7; and,
2. Declaring Atty. Erwin M. Fortunato (Romblon Chapter) as the duly elected Governor of the
Western Visayas Region for the 2009-2011 term8.
As far as the Court is concerned, there is no dispute that the election of Atty. Maramba was in
order. During the election held last April 25, 2009 which was duly presided over by then
outgoing Greater Manila Region Governor Marcial Magsino, it was Atty. Maramba who
garnered the highest number of votes among the delegates compared to Atty. Soriano, 13 votes to
12 votes. However, instead of accepting the said defeat graciously, Atty. Soriano then filed an
election protest on April 27, 2009 claiming that the said election was void because there were
non-delegates, particularly Attys. Loanzon and Laqui of the Quezon City Chapter, who were
allowed to vote. Consequently, Atty. Soriano got a favorable ruling from the group of Atty.
Vinluan, as EVP, and former Governors Estrada (Northern Luzon), Barandon, Jr. (Bicolandia),
Escalon (Eastern Visayas) and Mercado (Western Visayas) per Resolution No. XVIII-2009
(Special A-30 April 2009). This then resulted in the anomalous election of Atty. Soriano as
Governor of the Greater Manila Region last May 4, 2009.
In addressing the said controversy, and as already discussed, the Committee concluded that "the
Vinluan Group’s interpretation of Sec. 31, Art. V, of the By-Laws in Resolution No. XVIII-2009
(Special-23 April 2009) to be in error and devoid of rational and historical bases." It was then
pointed out that "(t)he argument of the QC-Chapter President Tranquil Salvador, (as well as by
Atty. Soriano), that Attys. Loanzon and Laqui were not delegates because they were not elected
by the QC-Board of Officers, is not well taken." Likewise, the Committee considered the
situation then involving the Quezon City Chapter as "not a ‘proper case’ for the election of
additional delegates by the Board of Officers because the Chapter is entitled to the same number
of delegates (11) to the House (of Delegates), as the number of officers in its Board of Officers.
Its officers are ipso facto the Chapter’s delegates to the House. There is no need for the Board of
Officers to conduct an election."
Thus, and as rightly determined by the Committee to which the Court subscribes to, "the election
of Atty. Soriano (QC Chapter) in the special election that was presided over by EVP Vinluan on
May 4, 2009, was a nullity on three (3) grounds: First, because Atty. Soriano already lost the
election on April 25, 2009. Second, the special election conducted by the Vinluan Group on May
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4, 2(009) was illegal because it was not called nor presided by the regional Governor (Atty.
Magsino). Third, Atty. Soriano is disqualified to run for GMR Governor for the 2009-2011 term
because his "election" as such would violate the rotation rule which the Supreme Court requires
to be "strictly implemented"." This being so, since he was not a duly elected Governor of the
Greater Manila Region, then Atty. Soriano cannot be voted as well as IBP Executive Vice
President for 2009-2011.
With respect to the case of Atty. Fortunato, his election as Governor for the Western Visayas
Region was upheld since "he obtained the highest number of votes among the three (3)
candidates for the position" and "also because under the rotation rule, it is now the turn of the
Romblon Chapter to represent the Western Visayas Region in the IBP Board of Governors." On
account thereof, the Court is convinced that the contentions of protestees Attys. Cornelio Aldon
(Antique Chapter) and Benjamin Ortega (Negros Occidental Chapter) cannot prosper. After all,
the Court already upheld per its Resolution in Bar Matter No. 586 dated May 16, 1991 that the
"rotation rule" under Sections 37 and 39 of the IBP By-Laws "shall be strictly implemented so
that all prior elections for governor in the region shall be reckoned with or considered in
determining who should be the governor to be selected from the different chapters to represent
the region in the Board of Governors." More so, when the concerned chapter invoked its right
thereto as in the case of Atty. Fortunato who came from the Romblon Chapter which was next in
the rotation.
To the Court, the election of Atty. Fortunato as Governor last April 25, 2009 is well-settled. He
did not only come from the chapter which is entitled to be elected for the said position, but also
got the highest number of votes among the candidates that included protestees Attys. Aldon and
Ortega. As the election was presided over by then outgoing Governor Raymund Mercado, the
Court finds no cogent reason as well to reverse the findings of the Committee insofar as
upholding the election of Atty. Fortunato is concerned. Suffice it to say, the Committee was
correct in not finding any anomaly with respect thereto.1avvphi1
On the nullification of the election of Atty. Nasser Marohomsalic as Governor for the Western
Mindanao Region, the Court does not agree with the recommendation of the Committee to hold a
special election in the said region9. Instead, the Court rules to uphold the election of Atty.
Marohomsalic last April 25, 2009 which was presided over by then outgoing Governor Carlos
Valdez, Jr.
It must be pointed out that Atty. Marohomsalic was duly nominated by Atty. Alex Macalawi,
President of the Lanao del Sur Chapter, and the official delegate of the said chapter to the House
of Delegates for the Western Mindanao Region during the elections held last April 25, 2009. On
the other hand, Atty. Benjamin Lanto was supposedly nominated by the Board of Officers of the
Lanao del Sur Chapter, except Atty. Macalawi, in Resolution No. 002-2009 dated February 28,
2009. However, it appears that, as discovered by the Committee, "three (3) signatories of the
resolution" apparently "resigned as members of the Board of Officers" since they are prosecutors
who are "ineligible for election or appointment to any position in the Integrated Bar or any
Chapter thereof", while "(s)ix (6) other signatories of the resolution" allegedly "recalled their
signatures" and they, instead, "signed an ‘authorization’ authorizing the Chapter President, Atty.
Macalawi, "to select and vote" "for the Regional Governor for Western Mindanao"." Thus, "(t)he
withdrawal of nine (9) signatures from the Resolution No. 002, left only four (4) votes in support
of Lanto’s nomination – a puny minority of the 14-member Board of Officers of the Lanao del
Sur Chapter." 10
The attempt of Atty. Vinluan and his group of Governors to nullify the election of Atty.
Marohomsalic through Resolution No. XVIII-2009 (Special A-30 April 2009) was clearly
irregular and unjustified. Based on the April 25, 2009 election results, Atty. Marohomsalic won
over his rival Atty. Lanto, 6 votes to 5 votes. Consequently, he was duly proclaimed as the
elected Governor of the Western Mindanao Region. On April 27, 2009, Atty. Lanto filed an
election protest, "questioning the validity of Atty. Marohomsalic’s nomination by Atty.
Macalawi, President of the IBP Lanao del Sur Chapter, and claiming that his (Lanto’s)
nomination by the Board of Officers of the Lanao del Sur Chapter was the valid nomination."
Immediately, on April 30, 2009, the group of Atty. Vinluan issued Resolution No. XVIII-2009
proclaiming Atty. Lanto as the duly elected Governor without affording Atty. Marohomsalic his
right to due process. More importantly, instead of calling for another election like what it did for
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the Greater Manila Region, the group of Atty. Vinluan proceeded to instantly declare Atty. Lanto
as having been duly elected "on the ground that the nomination of the protestee, Nasser
Marohomsalic, was contrary to the will of the Lanao del Sur Chapter expressed through Board
Resolution No. 00(2)-2009 of the Board of Officers (of the Lanao del Sur Chapter)."11
As borne out by the records, Atty. Marohomsalic was duly nominated by Atty. Alex Macalawi,
President of the Lanao del Sur Chapter, and the official delegate of the said chapter to the House
of Delegates for the Western Mindanao Region during the elections. On the other hand, Atty.
Lanto was supposedly nominated by the Board of Officers of the same Chapter in a resolution
dated February 28, 2009, which was not signed and approved by Atty. Macalawi. However, and
as already pointed out by the Committee, the "withdrawal of nine (9) signatures from the
Resolution No. 002, left only four (4) votes in support of Lanto’s nomination – a puny minority
of the 14-member Board of Officers of the Lanao del Sur Chapter."12
Thus, the Committee, citing Sec. 37, Art. VI of the By-Laws, clearly repudiated and overturned
Resolution No. XVIII-2009 (Special A- 30 April 2009) of Atty. Vinluan and his group of
Governors. In its Report, it declared that the "nominee of the Chapter President, not the nominee
of the Board of Officers, is the valid nominee for Governor of the Region,"13 thereby sustaining
the position of Atty. Marohomsalic and, in effect, the validity of his nomination by Atty.
Macalawi.
Despite the said findings, Atty. Marohomsalic was stripped of his electoral mandate and victory
when the Committee, invoking the strict application of the "rotation rule," proceeded to
altogether nullify the result of the elections duly conducted on April 25, 2009. According to the
Committee, neither Lanto nor Marohomsalic is qualified to be elected governor because it was
not the turn of Lanao del Sur chapter to represent the Western Mindanao Region in the Board of
Governors for the 2009-2011 term. As declared in the Report --
However, under the rotation rule, it is not the Lanao del Sur Chapter that should represent the
Western Mindanao Region in the Board of Governors for the 2009-2011 term. The record of the
IBP National Secretariat shows that, starting in 1993-1995 when the strict implementation of the
rotation rule began, the 12 –chapter Western Mindanao Region has been represented in the Board
of Governors only six (6) Chapters, as follows:
1993-1995---Lanao del Sur-----Dimnatang T. Saro
1995-1997---Cotatabato---------George C. Jabido
1997-1999---ZAMBASULTA—Arthur D. Lim
1999-2001---ZAMBASULTA---Paulino R. Ersando
2001-2003---North Cotabato---- Little Sarah A. Agdeppa
2003-2005---Sultan Kudarat-----Carlos L. Valdez, Jr.
2005-2007---SOCSARGEN-----Rogelio C. Garcia
2007-2009---Sultan Kudarat-----Carlos L. Valdez, Jr.
Therefore, pursuant to the strict rotation rule, the Lanao del Sur Chapter must wait for the six (6)
other Chapters in the region (Zamboanga Sibugay, Zamboanga del Norte, Zamboanga del Sur,
Lanao del Norte, Misamis Occidental, and Maguindanao-Cotabato City) to have their turn in the
Board of Governors before Lanao del Sur may again represent the Western Mindanao Region in
the Board of Governors.
Since both Attys. Nasser Marohomsalic and Benjamin Lanto belong to the Lanao del Sur
Chapter, both of them are disqualified to be elected as Governor of the Western Mindanao
Region for the 2009-2011 term.
The ruling of the Committee insofar as it nullified the election of Atty. Marohomsalic as
Governor of the Western Mindanao Region cannot be sustained for not being in full accord with
facts and the rules. While the Committee may have correctly pointed out that under the rotation
rule it was not yet the turn of IBP Lanao del Sur Chapter to represent the region in the Board of
Governors for the 2009-2011 term, it does not necessarily follow that the result of the elections
should be altogether nullified on that ground. Evidently, and as determined by the Committee
itself, there are instances when the "rotation rule" was not followed insofar as the elections in
1999 and 2007 were concerned with respect to the Western Mindanao Region.
In the regular election of April 25, 2009, there is no dispute that the voting delegates of IBP
Western Mindanao Region voted into office Atty. Marohomsalic of Lanao del Sur Chapter as
Governor for the 2009-2011 term. During the said election, his only rival was Atty. Benjamin
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Lanto who also belongs to the same Lanao del Sur Chapter. A third candidate, Atty. Escobar from
the Sarangani Chapter, was nominated but he declined the nomination.
While the Committee points out that six (6) chapters in the region, including Sarangani, are
entitled to precedence over the Lanao del Sur chapter in the order of rotation, the fact remains
that not one of them nominated or fielded a candidate from their respective ranks during the April
25, 2009 election. Neither did any one of them challenge the nominations of the Lanao del Sur
Chapter based on the order of rotation.
By not fielding a candidate for Governor and by declining the nomination raised in favor of its
Chapter President (Atty. Escobar), the IBP Sarangani Chapter is deemed to have waived its turn
in the rotation order. The same can be said of the remaining chapters. They too are deemed to
have waived their turn in the rotation as they opted not to field or nominate a candidate from
among their respective members. Neither did they invoke the rotation rule to challenge the
nominations from the Lanao del Sur Chapter. On the contrary, they fully expressed their
concurrence to the cited nominations, which may be interpreted as a waiver of their right to take
their turn to represent the region in the Board of Governors for the 2009-2011 term.
It need not be stressed that, as cited by the Committee itself, there were instances when the
Governor of the Western Mindanao Region came from the same chapter such as ZAMBASULTA
(1997-1999 & 1999-2001) and Sultan Kudarat (2003-2005 & 2007-2009). Thus, Atty.
Marohomsalic could not be faulted if the other chapters opted not to field or nominate their own
candidates. Having been validly nominated and duly proclaimed as the duly elected Governor of
Western Mindanao, Atty. Marohomsalic therefore deserves to assume his position during the
remainder of the term.
It would have been a different story if another Chapter in the order of rotation fielded its own
candidate or invoked the rotation rule to challenge Atty. Marohomsalic’s nomination. But the
record is bereft of any showing that his nomination and subsequent election was challenged on
that basis. If there was any challenge at all, it merely referred to his nomination by Atty.
Macalawi which the Committee itself has found to be in order. Thus, no compelling reason exists
to disregard the electoral mandate and nullify the will of the voting delegates as expressed
through the ballot.
The "rotation rule" is not absolute but subject to waiver as when the chapters in the order of
rotation opted not to field or nominate their own candidates for Governor during the election
regularly done for that purpose. If a validly nominated candidate obtains the highest number of
votes in the election conducted, his electoral mandate deserves to be respected unless obtained
through fraud as established by evidence. Such is not the case here.
Suffice it to say, the "rotation rule" should be applied in harmony with, and not in derogation of,
the sovereign will of the electorate as expressed through the ballot. Thus, Atty. Marohomsalic
cannot be divested and deprived of his electoral mandate and victory. The order of rotation is not
a rigid and inflexible rule as to bar its relaxation in exceptional and compelling circumstances.
If only to stress, compared to the case of Atty. Fortunato whose Romblon Chapter invoked the
"rotation rule," no chapter in the Western Mindanao Region which was next in the rotation
invoked the said rule.
Now, in its Report, the Committee nullified the elections for the IBP EVP separately and
simultaneously conducted by President Bautista and EVP Vinluan on May 9, 2009 and called for
a special election14 for the same. In the case of the election conducted by EVP Vinluan, the
results were nullified for lack of authority to preside over the election and for lack quorum, citing
the disqualification of Attys. Soriano and Lanto to sit in the incoming Board of Governors. The
finding deserves to be sustained.
In the same Report, the Committee also nullified the result of the election for the incoming EVP
conducted by President Bautista. While recognizing President Bautista’s authority to conduct the
election, the Committee nonetheless nullified the election results for lack of quorum, citing the
ineligibility of Atty. Marohomsalic to sit in the incoming Board of Governors, thereby leaving
only four (out of nine) Governors-elect in attendance which did not constitute a quorum.
With the election of Atty. Marohomsalic as Governor of Western Mindanao being deemed valid,
then the defect of lack of quorum that supposedly tainted the election proceedings for EVP
separately conducted by IBP President Bautista may have been cured, five (5) Governors being
sufficient to constitute a quorum.
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Be that as it may, the recommendation of the Committee to hold a special election for the EVP
for the remaining 2009-2011 term deserves to be upheld to heal the divisions in the IBP and
promote unity by enabling all the nine (9) Governors-elect to elect the EVP in a unified meeting
called for that purpose. This will enable matters to start on a clean and correct slate, free from the
politicking and the under handed tactics that have characterized the IBP elections for so long.
In the conduct of the unified election of the incoming EVP, the following findings and
recommendations of the Committee shall be adopted:
THE ROTATION OF THE PRESIDENCY AMONG THE REGIONS-
Sec. 47, Art. VII of the By-Laws, as amended by Bar Matter 491, Oct. 6, 1989, provides that the
Executive Vice President shall be chosen by the Board of Governors from among the nine (9)
regional governors. The Executive Vice President shall automatically become President for the
next succeeding term. The Presidency shall rotate among the nine Regions."
The list of national presidents furnished the Special Committee by the IBP National Secretariat,
shows that the governors of the following regions were President of the IBP during the past nine
(9) terms (1991-2009):
Numeriano Tanopo, Jr. (Pangasinan)…Central Luzon…1991-1993
Mervin G. Encanto (Quezon City)… Greater Manila 1993-1995
Raul R. Anchangco (Makati)…Southern Luzon…1995-1997
Jose Aguila Grapilon (Biliran)… Eastewrn Visayas … 1997-1999
Arthur D. Lim ( Zambasulta)…Western Mindanao…1999-2001
Teofilo S. Pilando, Jr. (Kalinga Apayao)…Northern Luzon…2001-2003
Jose Anselmo L. Cadiz (Camarines Sur)…Bicolandia…2005-Aug. 2006
Jose Vicente B. Salazar (Albay)…Bicolandia… Aug. 2006-2007
Feliciano M. Bautista (Pangasinan)…Central Luzon…2007-2009
Only the Governors of the Western Visayas and Eastern Mindanao regions have not yet had their
turn as Executive Vice President cum next IBP President, while Central Luzon and Bicolandia
have had two (2) terms already.
Therefore, either the governor of the Western Visayas Region, or the governor of the Eastern
Mindanao Region should be elected as Executive Vice President for the 2009-2011 term.
Accordingly, a special election shall be held by the present nine-man IBP Board of Governors to
elect the EVP for the remainder of the term of 2009-2011, which shall be presided over and
conducted by IBP Officer-in-Charge Justice Santiago Kapunan (Ret.) within seven (7) days from
notice.
Further, in its report, the Committee declared that "the high-handed and divisive tactics of Atty.
Rogelio A. Vinluan and his group of Governors, Abelardo Estrada, Bonifacio Barandon Jr.,
Evergisto Escalon, and Raymund Mercado, which disrupted the peaceful and orderly flow of
business in the IBP, caused chaos in the National Office, bitter disagreements, and ill-feelings,
and almost disintegrated the Integrated Bar, constituted grave professional misconduct which
should be appropriately sanctioned to discourage its repetition in the future." 15
The Committee, however, fell short of determining and recommending the appropriate penalty
for the grave professional misconduct found to have been committed by Atty. Vinluan and his
group of Governors. Still, with the above firm and unequivocal findings and declarations of the
Committee against Atty. Vinluan and his group that included Attys. Estrada, Barandon, Jr.,
Escalon and Mercado as "unprofessional" members of the IBP Board of Governors (2007-2009
term) they certainly do not deserve to hold such esteemed positions.
It has long been held that, as provided for in Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility16 that "(a) lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct." Added to this, Rule 7.03, Canon 7 requires that "(a) lawyer shall not engage in conduct
that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he whether in public or private life,
behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession." In the case at bar, such
canons find application.
In addition, it was clear to the Committee, and the Court agrees, that "(t)he actuations of Atty.
Vinluan’s Group in defying the lawful authority of IBP President Bautista, due to Atty. Vinluan’s
overweening desire to propel his fraternity brother, Atty. Elpidio G. Soriano, to the next
presidency of the IBP, smacked of politicking, which is strongly condemned and strictly
prohibited by the IBP By-Laws and the Bar Integration Rule." Indeed, said actuations of Atty.
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Vinluan and his group of former IBP Governors Estrada, Barandon, Jr., Escalon and Mercado
were grossly inimical to the interest of the IBP and were violative of their solemn oath as
lawyers. After all, what they did served only to benefit the apparently selfish goals of defeated
candidate Atty. Elpidio Soriano to be elected as IBP EVP and be the next IBP President for the
2011-2013 term by hook or by crook.
Bearing the above in mind, what Attys. Vinluan, Estrada, Barandon, Jr., Escalon and Mercado
conspired to do was truly "high-handed and divisive" that must not pass unsanctioned.
Otherwise, future leaders of the IBP, Governors at that, might be similarly inclined to do what
they did, much to the prejudice of the IBP and its membership. Surely, this should be addressed
without much delay so as to nip-in-the-bud such gross misconduct and unprofessionalism. They
all deserve to suffer the same fate for betraying as well the trust bestowed on them for the high
positions that they previously held.
The Resolution of the Court in the case of Re: 1989 Elections of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines17 already declared that unethical practices of lawyers during IBP elections cannot but
result in the stature of the IBP as an association of the practitioners of a noble and honored
profession being diminished. As held therein, "(r)espect for law is gravely eroded when lawyers
themselves, who are supposed to be minions of the law, engage in unlawful practices and
cavalierly brush aside the very rules that the IBP formulated for their observance." 18 Indeed, the
said strong and vigorous declaration of this Court on the 1989 IBP Election scandal is relevant
here.
While Atty. Vinluan and his group deserve to be stripped of their positions in the IBP, this can no
longer be done as their terms as Governors already expired, specially on the part of Attys.
Estrada, Barandon, Jr., Escalon and Mercado. However, in the case of Atty. Vinluan, as former
EVP of the IBP he would have automatically succeeded to the presidency for the term 2009-2011
but now should not be allowed to. After all, and considering the findings of the Committee, he
has clearly manifested his unworthiness to hold the said post. On account thereof, Atty. Vinluan
is thus declared unfit to assume the position of IBP President. To the Court, if Atty. Vinluan
cannot be fit to become a Governor and EVP of the IBP then he is not entitled to succeed as its
President for the 2009-2011 term.
Also, Atty. Vinluan and his group should no longer be allowed to run as national officers to
prevent such similar irregularity from happening again. Thus, in subsequent elections of the IBP,
they are disqualified to run as candidates.
On the recommendation of the Committee to amend Sections 3119, 33, par. (g) 20, 3921, 4222, and
4323, Article VI and Section 4724, Article VII of the IBP By-Laws, the Court finds the same in
order. As such, and in order to immediately effect reforms in the IBP, particularly in the holding
of its elections for national officers, the subject amendments are hereby adopted and approved.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court resolves that:
1. The elections of Attys. Manuel M. Maramba, Erwin M. Fortunato and Nasser A.
Marohomsalic as Governors for the Greater Manila Region, Western Visayas Region and
Western Mindanao Region, respectively, for the term 2009-2011 are UPHELD;
2. A special election to elect the IBP Executive Vice President for the 2009-2011 term is hereby
ORDERED to be held under the supervision of this Court within seven (7) days from receipt of
this Resolution with Attys. Maramba, Fortunato and Marohomsalic being allowed to represent
and vote as duly-elected Governors of their respective regions;
3. Attys. Rogelio Vinluan, Abelardo Estrada, Bonifacio Barandon, Jr., Evergisto Escalon and
Raymund Mercado are all found GUILTY of grave professional misconduct arising from their
actuations in connection with the controversies in the elections in the IBP last April 25, 2009 and
May 9, 2009 and are hereby disqualified to run as national officers of the IBP in any subsequent
election. While their elections as Governors for the term 2007-2009 can no longer be annulled as
this has already expired, Atty. Vinluan is declared unfit to hold the position of IBP Executive
Vice President for the 2007-2009 term and therefore barred from succeeding as IBP President for
the 2009-2011 term;
4. The proposed amendments to Sections 31, 33, par. (g), 39, 42, and 43, Article VI and Section
47, Article VII of the IBP By-Laws as contained in the Report and Recommendation of the
Special Committee dated July 9, 2009 are hereby approved and adopted; and
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5. The designation of retired SC Justice Santiago Kapunan as Officer-in-Charge of the IBP shall
continue, unless earlier revoked by the Court, but not to extend beyond June 30, 2011.
SO ORDERED.
RENATO C. CORONA
A.C. No. 3731 September 7, 2007

MANUEL S. SEBASTIAN, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. EMILY A. BAJAR, respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
On 18 October 1991, Manuel S. Sebastian (complainant) filed a disbarment complaint against
Atty. Emily A. Bajar (respondent) for "obstructing, disobeying, resisting, rebelling, and impeding
final decisions of Regional Trial Courts, the Court of Appeals and of the Honorable Supreme
Court, and also for submitting those final decisions for the review and reversal of the DARAB,
an administrative body, and for contemptuous acts and dilatory tactics."
The Facts
Complainant alleged the following:
1. Respondent is a lawyer of the Bureau of Agrarian Legal Assistance (BALA) of the Department
of Agrarian Reform who represented Fernando Tanlioco (Tanlioco) in numerous cases which
raised the same issues.1 Tanlioco is an agricultural lessee of a land owned by complainant’s
spouse and sister-in-law (landowners). The landowners filed an Ejectment case against Tanlioco
on the basis of a conversion order of the land use from agricultural to residential. The Regional
Trial Court (RTC) rendered judgment ordering Tanlioco’s ejectment subject to the payment of
disturbance compensation.2 The RTC’s judgment was affirmed by the Court of Appeals3 and the
Supreme Court.4
2. Respondent, as Tanlioco’s counsel, filed another case for Specific Performance to produce the
conversion order. The RTC dismissed the complaint due to res judicata and lack of cause of
action.5
3. Respondent filed a case for Maintenance of Possession with the Department of Agrarian
Reform Adjudication Board. The case raised the same issues of conversion and disturbance
compensation.6
4. Respondent has violated Rule 10.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility since she
misused the rules of procedure through forum-shopping to obstruct the administration of justice.7
On 18 November 1991, the Court issued a resolution requiring respondent to comment on the
complaint lodged against her.8
After a second Motion for Extension of Time to Submit Comment,9 respondent submitted her
Comment alleging the following:
1. Complainant is not the real party-in-interest. He is also not authorized to prosecute the
disbarment suit.10
2. Respondent has fulfilled allegiance to the "Attorney’s Oath" and performed duties in
accordance with Section 20 of Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court.11
3. Respondent’s client, Tanlioco, merely availed of all legal remedies to obtain benefits secured
for him by law.12
On 10 March 1992, complainant filed his Reply. Complainant alleged that respondent did not
confront the issues of her disbarment squarely but raised issues that were decided upon with
finality by the courts.13
On 25 March 1992, the Court issued a Resolution requiring respondent to file a Rejoinder within
10 days from notice.14
On 3 June 1992, complainant filed a Manifestation dated 2 June 1992 stating that respondent
failed to comply with the 25 March 1992 Court Resolution to file a Rejoinder.15
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On 7 October 1992, the Court ordered respondent to show cause why she should not be subjected
to disciplinary action for failure to comply with the Court’s 25 March 1992 Resolution. The
Court also required respondent to Comment on the complainant’s 2 June 1992 Manifestation.16
On 3 February 1993, respondent filed a Manifestation alleging that she had substantially
complied with the Court’s orders relative to her defenses. She advised the Court that she had
transferred to the Public Attorney’s Office and since she was no longer a "BALA lawyer," the
cases involved in this proceeding had become moot and academic.17
On 1 March 1993, the Court issued a Resolution stating that the administrative case against
respondent "has not been mooted and nothing set out in her ‘Manifestation’ excuses her failure to
obey this Court’s Resolutions of 25 March 1992 and 7 October 1992."18 The Court had also
resolved to impose a fine of P500 or imprisonment of five days and to require respondent to
comply with the 25 March 1992 and 7 October 1992 Resolutions.19
On 24 August 1993, complainant filed a Manifestation stating that respondent had not complied
with the Court’s orders.20
On 29 September 1993, the Court issued a Resolution ordering the arrest of respondent for
detention at the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) for five days. The Court reiterated that
respondent should comply with the 25 March 1992 and 7 October 1992 Resolutions.21
On 20 October 1993, the NBI arrested respondent. The NBI detained respondent for five days
and released her on 25 October 1993.22
On 10 November 1993, the Court issued a Resolution referring the case to the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines (IBP) for hearing and decision.23
On 11 November 1993, respondent filed a Rejoinder. Respondent claimed that complainant had
no legal personality to file this case.24 Respondent also alleged that she was merely protecting the
interest of Tanlioco as she was sworn to do so in her oath of office. Respondent contended that
"she had comported herself as [an] officer of the court, at the risk of being disciplined by the
latter if only to impart truth and justice."25
On 22 November 1995, Investigating Commissioner Plaridel C. Jose (Investigating
Commissioner Jose) submitted his report and recommendation to the IBP. Investigating
Commissioner Jose enumerated respondent’s violations of the Code of Professional
Responsibility that rendered her unfit to continue the practice of law:
1. Respondent appealed a case for purposes of delay which amounted to an obstruction of
justice.26
2. Respondent abused her right of recourse to the courts. The duplication or multiplication of
suits should be avoided,27 and respondent’s acts were tantamount to forum-shopping which is a
reprehensible manipulation of court processes and proceedings.28
3. Respondent uttered disrespectful language and shouted at everybody during the hearing on 25
May 1995.29 The want of intention is not an excuse for the disrespectful language used.
On 4 October 1996, the IBP transmitted to the Court a copy of IBP Resolution No. XII-96-149
dated 30 March 1996. The IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved Investigating
Commissioner Jose’s recommendation that respondent be "suspended indefinitely from the
practice of law for Unethical Practices and attitude showing her propensity and incorrigible
character to violate the basic tenets and requirements of the Code of Professional Responsibility
rendering her unfit to continue in the practice of law."30 Governor Angel R. Gonzales
recommended her "outright disbarment."31
In its 20 January 1997 Resolution, the Court noted the IBP Resolution suspending respondent
indefinitely.32
On 13 April 1999, the Court issued a Resolution directing the Office of the Court Administrator
(OCA) to circularize the resolution of the IBP dated 30 March 1996 suspending respondent
indefinitely from the practice of law.33
On 7 June 1999, the OCA, through Court Administrator Alfredo L. Benipayo, issued Circular
No. 30-99 informing all courts that respondent had been suspended indefinitely.
On 30 January 2003, respondent filed a Motion to Consider the Case Closed and Terminated.
Respondent apologized for her demeanor and prayed that the suspension be lifted.34
On 16 June 2003, the Court issued a Resolution referring the case to the IBP for report and
recommendation.35
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On 29 August 2003, Investigating Commissioner Demaree J.B. Raval (Investigating

Commissioner Raval) conducted a hearing. Respondent claimed that she did not receive any
notice of the OCA’s Circular on her indefinite suspension.36 Respondent alleged that the Court
Resolution which she received merely noted the IBP’s Resolution on her indefinite suspension.37
Respondent claimed that she only knew of the suspension when she filed an application for a
judicial position in Mandaluyong City.38
In the hearing, respondent admitted that she continued to practice law as a Prosecutor in
Mandaluyong City despite her suspension because she believed that a notation by the Court in
the 20 January 1997 Resolution did not mean an implementation of the IBP’s Resolution on her
indefinite suspension.39
Due to the absence of complainant and his counsel, another hearing was held on 19 September
2003. Complainant’s counsel asserted that respondent had been practicing law in the midst of her
suspension and this constituted a violation of the suspension order which she wanted to be
lifted.40 Investigating Commissioner Raval asked respondent to present a valid ground to lift the
suspension order.41 Respondent requested that her detention for five days at the NBI be converted
into a five-year suspension, one year for every day of detention such that she would have served
five years of indefinite suspension.42
Investigating Commissioner Raval then directed the parties to file simultaneously their Verified
Position Papers.43
In his Position Paper and Comment, complainant posited that respondent’s motion did not state
valid grounds to convince the Court to lift the suspension order. Complainant stated that by
continuing to practice law, "she is flaunting her defiance of the Supreme Court by showing that
she can hoodwink another branch of government."44 Complainant also prayed for respondent’s
disbarment due to the gravity of her offense.45
In respondent’s Position Paper, she reiterated that complainant is not the real party-in-interest
since the property that was litigated was owned by complainant’s wife. She asserted that she
never betrayed her client’s cause, she was never unfaithful to her oath, and it was complainant
who filed this case for harassment. Respondent prayed that the case be considered closed and
terminated due to lack of merit.46
Respondent also sent a letter to Investigating Commissioner Raval and attached a copy of a
Resolution in a Preliminary Investigation case which she handled. Respondent contended that in
this Preliminary Investigation case, she recommended its dismissal because the offended party
was not the real party-in-interest.47
Respondent insisted that complainant did not have the personality to file the disbarment
complaint against her; hence, it should have been dismissed outright.48
After the parties filed their position papers, the IBP Board of Governors issued Resolution No.
XVI-2004-229 dated 16 April 2004. The IBP adopted Investigating Commissioner Raval’s
Report and Recommendation that respondent be disbarred for her "manifest flagrant misconduct
in disobeying the SC Order of her Indefinite Suspension."49
As culled from the records, the Court had merely noted IBP Resolution No. XII-96-149 which
recommended respondent’s indefinite suspension. "The term ‘noted’ means that the Court has
merely taken cognizance of the existence of an act or declaration, without exercising a judicious
deliberation or rendering a decision on the matter — it does not imply agreement or approval."50
Hence, the penalty of indefinite suspension imposed by the IBP Board of Governors has not
attained finality. Section 12 of Rule 139-B provides:
Section 12. Review and Decision by the Board of Governors. —
xxx
(b) If the Board, by the vote of a majority of its total membership, determines that the respondent
should be suspended from the practice of law or disbarred, it shall issue a resolution setting forth
its findings and recommendations which, together with the whole record of the case, shall
forthwith be transmitted to the Supreme Court for final action. (Emphasis supplied)
Necessarily, the Court will now give its "final action" on this complaint.
The Ruling of the Court
After a careful review of the records, the Court finds the evidence on record sufficient to support
the IBP’s findings. However, the Court disagrees with the penalty imposed on respondent.
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Administrative proceedings against lawyers are sui generis51 and they belong to a class of their
own.52 They are neither civil nor criminal actions but rather investigations by the Court into the
conduct of its officer.53 They involve no private interest and afford no redress for private
grievance.54
A disciplinary action against a lawyer is intended to protect the administration of justice from the
misconduct of its officers. This Court requires that its officers shall be competent, honorable, and
reliable men in whom the public may repose confidence.55 "Lawyers must at all times faithfully
perform their duties to society, to the bar, to the courts, and to their clients. Their conduct must
always reflect the values and norms of the legal profession as embodied in the Code of
Professional Responsibility. On these considerations, the Court may disbar or suspend lawyers
for any professional or private misconduct showing them to be wanting in moral character,
honesty, probity, and good demeanor — or to be unworthy to continue as officers of the Court."56
Clear preponderant evidence is necessary to justify the imposition of the penalty in disbarment or
suspension proceedings.57
The evidence presented shows that respondent failed to comply with the Court’s lawful orders in
two instances:
1. In the 25 March 1992 Court Resolution, respondent was required to file a rejoinder within 10
days from notice. However, she only submitted the rejoinder on 11 November 1993 after she was
detained at the NBI for five days for failure to heed the Court’s order.
2. In the 7 October 1992 Court Resolution, respondent was required to comment on
complainant’s manifestation. She instead submitted a manifestation on 3 February 1993 or
almost four months thereafter. In her manifestation, respondent alleged that she had substantially
complied with the Court’s orders. However, the Court in its 1 March 1993 Resolution stated that
nothing set out in respondent’s manifestation excused her failure to obey the Court’s Resolutions.
These acts constitute willful disobedience of the lawful orders of this Court, which under Section
27, Rule 13858 of the Rules of Court is in itself a sufficient cause for suspension or disbarment.
Respondent’s cavalier attitude in repeatedly ignoring the orders of the Supreme Court constitutes
utter disrespect to the judicial institution.59 Respondent’s conduct indicates a high degree of
irresponsibility. A Court’s Resolution is "not to be construed as a mere request, nor should it be
complied with partially, inadequately, or selectively."60 Respondent’s obstinate refusal to comply
with the Court’s orders "not only betrays a recalcitrant flaw in her character; it also underscores
her disrespect of the Court’s lawful orders which is only too deserving of reproof."61
Lawyers are called upon to obey court orders and processes and respondent’s deference is
underscored by the fact that willful disregard thereof will subject the lawyer not only to
punishment for contempt but to disciplinary sanctions as well. In fact, graver responsibility is
imposed upon a lawyer than any other to uphold the integrity of the courts and to show respect to
their processes.62
Respondent’s failure to comply with the Court’s directive to file a Rejoinder and to file a
Comment also constitutes gross misconduct. The Court defined gross misconduct as "any
inexcusable, shameful, flagrant, or unlawful conduct on the part of the person concerned in the
administration of justice which is prejudicial to the rights of the parties or to the right
determination of a cause." It is a "conduct that is generally motivated by a premeditated,
obstinate, or intentional purpose."63
In Bernal Jr. v. Fernandez,64 the Court held that failure to comply with the Court’s directive to
comment on a letter-complaint constitutes gross misconduct and insubordination, or disrespect.
In Cuizon v. Macalino,65 a lawyer’s failure to comply with the Court’s Resolutions requiring him
to file his comment was one of the infractions that merited his disbarment.
Furthermore, respondent’s defenses are untenable. Firstly, respondent contends that complainant
is not the real party-in-interest since the property that was litigated was owned by complainant’s
wife. The Court is not persuaded with this defense.
The procedural requirement observed in ordinary civil proceedings that only the real party-in-
interest must initiate the suit does not apply in disbarment cases. In fact, the person who called
the attention of the court to a lawyer’s misconduct "is in no sense a party, and generally has no
interest in the outcome."66 "A compromise or withdrawal of charges does not terminate an
administrative complaint against a lawyer."67
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In Heck v. Santos,68 the Court held that "any interested person or the court motu proprio may
initiate disciplinary proceedings." The right to institute disbarment proceedings is not confined to
clients nor is it necessary that the person complaining suffered injury from the alleged
wrongdoing. Disbarment proceedings are matters of public interest and the only basis for the
judgment is the proof or failure of proof of the charges.69
Secondly, respondent avers that she merely availed of all the legal remedies for her client. In
Suzuki v. Tiamson,70 the Court enunciated that "while lawyers owe their entire devotion to the
interest of their clients and zeal in the defense of their client’s rights, they should not forget that
they are first and foremost, officers of the court, bound to exert every effort to assist in the
speedy and efficient administration of justice." Respondent’s act of filing cases with identical
issues in other venues despite the final ruling which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals and
the Supreme Court is beyond the bounds of the law. "To permit lawyers to resort to unscrupulous
practices for the protection of the supposed rights of their clients is to defeat one of the purposes
of the state — the administration of justice."71
Respondent abused her right of recourse to the courts. Respondent, acting as Tanlioco’s counsel,
filed cases for Specific Performance and Maintenance of Possession despite the finality of the
decision in the Ejectment case which involves the same issues. The Court held that "an important
factor in determining the existence of forum-shopping is the vexation caused to the courts and
the parties-litigants by the filing of similar cases to claim substantially the same reliefs.72 Indeed,
"while a lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client, it should not be at the expense of truth
and administration of justice."73
Canon 19 of the Code of Professional Responsibility mandates lawyers to represent their clients
with zeal but within the bounds of the law. It is evident from the records that respondent filed
other cases to thwart the execution of the final judgment in the Ejectment case. Clearly,
respondent violated the proscription in Canon 19.
The penalty of suspension or disbarment is meted out in clear cases of misconduct that seriously
affect the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the court. In this case, respondent
has shown her great propensity to disregard court orders. Respondent’s acts of wantonly
disobeying her duties as an officer of the court show an utter disrespect for the Court and the
legal profession. However, the Court will not disbar a lawyer if it finds that a lesser penalty will
suffice to accomplish the desired end.
Respondent’s acts constitute gross misconduct and willful disobedience of lawful orders of a
superior court. Respondent also violated Canon 19 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Her suspension is consequently warranted.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Emily A. Bajar is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of
law for a period of THREE YEARS effective from notice, with a STERN WARNING that a
repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant to be appended to
respondent’s personal record as an attorney, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Department
of Justice, and all courts in the country for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, C.J., Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Austria-Martinez, Corona,
Carpio-Morales, Azcuna, Tinga, Chico-Nazario, Garcia, Velasco, Jr., Nachura, Reyes, JJ.,
concur.
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A.C. No. 2040 March 4, 1998

IMELDA A. NAKPIL, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. CARLOS J. VALDES, respondent.
PUNO, J.:
The friendship of JOSE NAKPIL and respondent CARLOS J. VALDES dates back to the '50s
during their school days in De La Salle and the Philippine Law School. Their closeness extended
to their families and respondent became the business consultant, lawyer and accountant of the
Nakpils.
In 1965, Jose Nakpil became interested in purchasing a summer residence in Moran Street,
Baguio City.1 For lack of funds, he requested respondent to purchase the Moran property for him.
They agreed that respondent would keep the property in trust for the Nakpils until the latter could
buy it back. Pursuant to their agreement, respondent obtained two (2) loans from a bank (in the
amounts of P65,000.00 and P75,000.00) which he used to purchase and renovate the property.
Title was then issued in respondent's name.
It was the Nakpils who occupied the Moran summer house. When Jose Nakpil died on July 8,
1973, respondent acted as the legal counsel and accountant of his widow, complainant IMELDA
NAKPIL. On March 9, 1976, respondent's law firm, Carlos J. Valdes & Associates, handled the
proceeding for the settlement of Jose's estate. Complainant was appointed as administratrix of
the estate.
The ownership of the Moran property became an issue in the intestate proceedings. It appears
that respondent excluded the Moran property from the inventory of Jose's estate. On February
13, 1978, respondent transferred his title to the Moran property to his company, the Caval Realty
Corporation.
On March 29, 1979, complainant sought to recover the Moran property by filing with the then
Court of First Instance (CFI) of Baguio City an action for reconveyance with damages against
respondent and his corporation. In defense, respondent claimed absolute ownership over the
property and denied that a trust was created over it.
During the pendency of the action for reconveyance, complainant filed this administrative case to
disbar the respondent. She charged that respondent violated professional ethics when he:
I. Assigned to his family corporation the Moran property (Pulong Maulap) which belonged to the
estate he was settling as its lawyer and auditor.
II. Excluded the Moran property from the "inventory of real estate properties" he prepared for a
client-estate and, at the same time, charged the loan secured to purchase the said excluded
property as a liability of the estate, all for the purpose of transferring the title to the said property
to his family corporation.
III. Prepared and defended monetary claims against the estate that retained him as its counsel and
auditor.2
On the first charge, complainant alleged that she accepted respondent's offer to serve as lawyer
and auditor to settle her husband's estate. Respondent's law firm then filed a petition for
settlement of the estate of the deceased Nakpil but did not include the Moran property in the
estate's inventory. Instead, respondent transferred the property to his corporation, Caval Realty
Corporation, and title was issued in its name. Complainant accused respondent of maliciously
appropriating the property in trust knowing that it did not belong to him. She claimed that
respondent has expressly acknowledged that the said property belonged to the late Nakpil in his
correspondences3 with the Baguio City Treasurer and the complainant.
On the second charge, complainant alleged that respondent's auditing firm (C. J. Valdes & Co.,
CPAs) excluded the Moran property from the inventory of her husband's estate, yet included in
the claims against the estate the amounts of P65,000.00 and P75,000.00, which respondent
represented as her husband's loans applied "probably for the purchase of a house and lot in
Moran Street, Baguio City."
As to the third charge, complainant alleged that respondent's law firm (Carlos J. Valdes and
Associates) filed the petition for the settlement of her husband's estate in court, while
respondent's auditing firm (C.J. Valdes & Co., CPAs) acted as accountant of both the estate and
two of its creditors. She claimed that respondent represented conflicting interests when his
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accounting firm prepared the list of claims of creditors Angel Nakpil and ENORN, Inc. against
her husband's estate which was represented by respondent's law firm. Complainant averred that
there is no distinction between respondent's law and auditing firms as respondent is the senior
and controlling partner of both firms which are housed in the same building.
We required respondent to answer the charges against him. In his ANSWER, 4 respondent
initially asserted that the resolution of the first and second charges against him depended on the
result of the pending action in the CFI for reconveyance which involved the issue of ownership
of the Moran property.
On the merit of the first charge, respondent reiterated his defense in the reconveyance case that
he did not hold the Moran property in trust for the Nakpils as he is its absolute owner.
Respondent explained that the Nakpils never bought back the Moran property from him, hence,
the property remained to be his and was rightly excluded from the inventory of Nakpil's estate.
As to the second charge, respondent denied preparing the list of claims against the estate which
included his loans of P65,000.00 and P75,000.00 for the purchase and renovation of the Moran
property. In charging his loans against the estate, he stressed that the list drawn up by his
accounting firm merely stated that the loans in respondent's name were applied "probably for the
purchase of the house and lot in Moran Street, Baguio City." Respondent insisted that this was
not an admission that the Nakpils owned the property as the phrase "probably for the purchase"
did not imply a consummated transaction but a projected acquisition.
Respondent also disclaimed knowledge or privity in the preparation of a letter (Exhibit "H") of
his accounting firm to the Baguio City treasurer remitting the real estate taxes for the Moran
property on behalf of the Nakpils. He contended that the letter could be a mere error or oversight.
Respondent averred that it was complainant who acknowledged that they did not own the Moran
property for: (1) complainant's February 1979 Statement of Assets and Liabilities did not include
the said property, and; (2) complainant, as administratrix, signed the Balance Sheet of the Estate
where the Moran property was not mentioned.
Respondent admitted that complainant retained the services of his law and accounting firms in
the settlement of her husband's estate.5 However, he pointed out that he has resigned from his
law and accounting firms as early as 1974. He alleged that it was Atty. Percival Cendaña (from
the law firm Carlos Valdes & Associates) who filed the intestate proceedings in court in 1976.
As to the third charge, respondent denied there was a conflict of interest when his law firm
represented the estate in the intestate proceedings while his accounting firm (C.J. Valdes & Co.,
CPAs) served as accountant of the estate and prepared the claims of creditors Angel Nakpil and
ENORN, Inc. against the estate. He proffered the following reasons for his thesis: First, the two
claimants were closely related to the late Nakpil. Claimant ENORN, Inc. is a family corporation
of the Nakpils of which the late Nakpil was the President. Claimant Angel Nakpil is a brother of
the late Nakpil who, upon the latter's death, became the President of ENORN, Inc. These two
claimants had been clients of his law and accounting firms even during the lifetime of Jose
Nakpil. Second, his alleged representation of conflicting interests was with the knowledge and
consent of complainant as administratrix. Third, there was no conflict of interests between the
estate and the claimants for they had forged a modus vivendi, i.e., that the subject claims would
be satisfied only after full payment of the principal bank creditors. Complainant, as
administratrix, did not controvert the claims of Angel Nakpil and ENORN, Inc. Complainant has
started paying off the claims of Angel Nakpil and ENORN, Inc. after satisfying the banks'
claims. Complainant did not assert that their claims caused prejudice to the estate. Fourth, the
work of Carlos J. Valdes & Co. as common auditor redounded to the benefit of the estate for the
firm prepared a true and accurate amount of the claim. Fifth, respondent resigned from his law
and accounting firms as early as August 15, 1974.6 He rejoined his accounting firm several years
later. He submitted as proof the SEC's certification of the filing of his accounting firm of an
Amended Articles of Partnership. Thus, it was not he but Atty. Percival Cendaña, from the firm
Carlos J. Valdes & Associates, who filed the intestate proceedings in court. On the other hand,
the claimants were represented by their own counsel Atty. Enrique O. Chan. Sixth, respondent
alleged that in the remote possibility that he committed a breach of professional ethics, he
committed such "misconduct" not as a lawyer but as an accountant who acted as common
auditor of the estate and its creditors. Hence, he should be held accountable in another forum.
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On November 12, 1979, complainant submitted her REPLY.7 She maintained that the pendency
of the reconveyance case is not prejudicial to the investigation of her disbarment complaint
against respondent for the issue in the latter is not the ownership of the Moran property but the
ethics and morality of respondent's conduct as a CPA-lawyer.
Complainant alleged that respondent's Annexes to his Reply (such as the Statement of Assets &
Liability of the Nakpils and the Balance Sheet of the Estate) which showed that complainant did
not claim ownership of the Moran property were all prepared by C.J. Valdes & Co. as accountant
of the estate of Jose Nakpil and filed with the intestate court by C.J. Valdes & Associates as
counsel for the estate. She averred that these Annexes were not proofs that respondent owned the
Moran property but were part of respondent's scheme to remove the property from the estate and
transfer it to his family corporation. Complainant alleged that she signed the documents because
of the professional counsel of respondent and his firm that her signature thereon was required.
Complainant charged respondent with greed for coveting the Moran property on the basis of
defects in the documents he himself prepared..
Complainant urged that respondent cannot disown unfavorable documents (the list of claims
against the estate and the letter regarding Nakpil's payment of realty tax on the Moran property)
which were prepared by his law and accounting firms and invoke other documents prepared by
the same firms which are favorable to him. She averred that respondent must accept
responsibility not just for some, but for all the representations and communications of his firms.
Complainant refuted respondent's claim that he resigned from his firms from March 9, 1976 to
"several years later." She alleged that none of the documents submitted as evidence referred to
his resignation from his law firm. The documents merely substantiated his resignation from his
accounting firm.
In his REJOINDER,8 respondent insisted that complainant cannot hold him liable for
representing the interests of both the estate and the claimants without showing that his action
prejudiced the estate. He urged that it is not per se anomalous for respondent's accounting firm to
act as accountant for the estate and its creditors. He reiterated that he is not subject to the
jurisdiction of this Court for he acted not as lawyer, but as accountant for both the estate and its
claimants.
He alleged that his accounting firm merely prepared the list of claims of the creditors Angel
Nakpil and ENORN, Inc. Their claims were not defended by his accounting or law firm but by
Atty. Enrique Chan. He averred that his law firm did not oppose these claims as they were
legitimate and not because they were prepared by his accounting firm. He emphasized that there
was no allegation that the claims were fraudulent or excessive and that the failure of respondent's
law firm to object to these claims damaged the estate.
In our January 21, 1980 Resolution,9 we deferred further action on the disbarment case until after
resolution of the action for reconveyance between the parties involving the issue of ownership by
the then CFI of Baguio. Complainant moved for reconsideration on the ground that the issue of
ownership pending with the CFI was not prejudicial to her complaint which involved an entirely
different issue, i.e., the unethical acts of respondent as a CPA-lawyer. We granted her motion and
referred the administrative case to the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) for investigation,
report and recommendation. 10
In 1983, the CFI of Baguio dismissed the action for reconveyance. The trial court ruled that
respondent held the Moran property in trust for the Nakpils but found that complainant waived
her right over it.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court. The appellate court held that respondent
was the absolute owner of the Moran property. The Decision was elevated to this Court.
On February 18, 1986, during the pendency of complainant's appeal to this Court, the OSG
submitted its Report 11 on the disbarment complaint. The OSG relied heavily on the decision of
the Court of Appeals then pending review by this Court. The OSG found that respondent was not
put on notice of complainant's claim over the property. It opined that there was no trust
agreement created over the property and that respondent was the absolute owner thereof. Thus, it
upheld respondent's right to transfer title to his family corporation. It also found no conflict of
interests as the claimants were related to the late Jose Nakpil. The OSG recommended the
dismissal of the administrative case.
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Prefatorily, we note that the case at bar presents a novel situation as it involves the disbarment of
a CPA-lawyer for his demeanor in his accounting profession and law practice in connection with
the property of his client.
As a rule, a lawyer is not barred from dealing with his client but the business transaction must be
characterized with utmost honesty and good faith. 12 The measure of good faith which an
attorney is required to exercise in his dealings with his client is a much higher standard than is
required in business dealings where the parties trade at "arms length." 13 Business transactions
between an attorney and his client are disfavored and discouraged by the policy of the law.
Hence, courts carefully watch these transactions to assure that no advantage is taken by a lawyer
over his client. This rule is founded on public policy for, by virtue of his office, an attorney is in
an easy position to take advantage of the credulity and ignorance of his client. Thus, no
presumption of innocence or improbability of wrongdoing is considered in an attorney's favor. 14
In the case at bar, we cannot subscribe to the findings of the OSG in its Report. These findings
were based mainly on the decision of the Court
of Appeals in the action for reconveyance which was reversed by this Court in 1993. 15
As to the first two charges, we are bound by the factual findings of this Court in the
aforementioned reconveyance case. 16 It is well-established that respondent offered to the
complainant the services of his law and accounting firms by reason of their close relationship
dating as far back as the '50s. She reposed her complete trust in respondent who was the lawyer,
accountant and business consultant of her late husband. Respondent and the late Nakpil agreed
that the former would purchase the Moran property and keep it in trust for the latter. In violation
of the trust agreement, respondent claimed absolute ownership over the property and refused to
sell the property to complainant after the death of Jose Nakpil. To place the property beyond the
reach of complainant and the intestate court, respondent later transferred it to his corporation.
Contrary to the findings of the OSG, respondent initially acknowledged and respected the trust
nature of the Moran property. Respondent's bad faith in transferring the property to his family
corporation is well discussed in this Court's Decision,17 thus:
. . . Valdes (herein respondent) never repudiated the trust during the lifetime of the late Jose
Nakpil. On the contrary, he expressly recognized it. . . . (H)e repudiated the trust when (he)
excluded Pulong Maulap from the list of properties of the late Jose Nakpil submitted to the
intestate court in 1973. . . .
x x x x x x x x x
The fact that there was no transfer of ownership intended by the parties . . . can be bolstered by
Exh. "I-2," an annex to the claim filed against the estate proceedings of the late Jose Nakpil by
his brother, Angel Nakpil, which was prepared by Carlos J. Valdes & Co., the accounting firm of
herein respondent. Exhibit "I-2," which is a list of the application of the proceeds of various FUB
loans contracted as of 31 December 1973 by the late Jose Nakpil, . . . contains the two (2) loans
contracted in the name of respondent. If ownership of Pulong Maulap was already transferred or
ceded to Valdes, these loans should not have been included in the list.
Indeed, as we view it, what the parties merely agreed to under the arrangement outlined in Exh.
"J" was that respondent Valdes would . . . "take over the total loan of P140,000.00 and pay all of
the interests due on the notes" while the heirs of the late Jose Nakpil would continue to live in
the disputed property for five (5) years without remuneration save for regular maintenance
expenses. This does not mean, however, that if at the end of the five-year period petitioner
(Nakpil) failed to reimburse Valdes for his advances, . . . Valdes could already automatically
assume ownership of Pulong Maulap. Instead, the remedy of respondents Carlos J. Valdes and
Caval Realty Corporation was to proceed against the estate of the late Jose M. Nakpil and/or the
property itself." (emphasis supplied)
In the said reconveyance case, we further ruled that complainant's documentary evidence
(Exhibits "H", "J" and "L"), which she also adduced in this administrative case, should estop
respondent from claiming that he bought the Moran property for himself, and not merely in trust
for Jose Nakpil. 18
It ought to follow that respondent's act of excluding the Moran property from the estate which
his law firm was representing evinces a lack of fidelity to the cause of his client. If respondent
truly believed that the said property belonged to him, he should have at least informed
complainant of his adverse claim. If they could not agree on its ownership, respondent should
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have formally presented his claim in the intestate proceedings instead of transferring the property
to his own corporation and concealing it from complainant and the judge in the estate
proceedings. Respondent's misuse of his legal expertise to deprive his client of the Moran
property is clearly unethical.
To make matters worse, respondent, through his accounting firm, charged the two loans of
P65,000.00 and P75,000.00 as liability of the estate, after said loans were obtained by respondent
for the purchase and renovation of the property which he claimed for himself. Respondent seeks
to exculpate himself from this charge by disclaiming knowledge or privity in the preparation of
the list of the estate's liabilities. He theorizes that the inclusion of the loans must have been a
mere error or oversight of his accounting firm. It is clear that the information as to how these two
loans should be treated could have only come from respondent himself as the said loans were in
his name. Hence, the supposed error of the accounting firm in charging respondent's loans
against the estate could not have been committed without respondent's participation. Respondent
wanted to "have his cake and eat it too" and subordinated the interest of his client to his own
pecuniary gain. Respondent violated Canon 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which
provides that a lawyer owes fidelity to his client's cause and enjoins him to be mindful of the
trust and confidence reposed on him.
As regards the third charge, we hold that respondent is guilty of representing conflicting
interests. It is generally the rule, based on sound public policy, that an attorney cannot represent
adverse interests. It is highly improper to represent both sides of an issue. 19 The proscription
against representation of conflicting interests finds application where the conflicting interests
arise with respect to the same general matter 20 and is applicable however slight such adverse
interest may be. It applies although the attorney's intentions and motives were honest and he
acted in good faith. 21 However, representation of conflicting interests may be allowed where the
parties consent to the representation, after full disclosure of facts. Disclosure alone is not enough
for the clients must give their informed consent to such representation. The lawyer must explain
to his clients the nature and extent of the conflict and the possible adverse effect must be
thoroughly understood by his clients. 22
In the case at bar, there is no question that the interests of the estate and that of its creditors are
adverse to each other. Respondent's accounting firm prepared the list of assets and liabilities of
the estate and, at the same time, computed the claims of two creditors of the estate. There is
clearly a conflict between the interest of the estate which stands as the debtor, and that of the two
claimants who are creditors of the estate. In fact, at one instance, respondent's law firm
questioned the claims of creditor Angel Nakpil against the estate.
To exculpate himself, respondent denies that he represented complainant in the intestate
proceedings. He points out that it was one Atty. Percival Cendaña, from his law firm Carlos J.
Valdes & Associates, who filed the intestate case in court. However, the fact that he did not
personally file the case and appear in court is beside the point. As established in the records of
this case and in the reconveyance case, 23 respondent acted as counsel and accountant of
complainant after the death of Jose Nakpil. Respondent's defense that he resigned from his law
and accounting firms as early as 1974 (or two years before the filing of the intestate case) is
unworthy of merit. Respondent's claim of resignation from his law firm is not supported by any
documentary proof. The documents on record 24 only show respondent's resignation from his
accounting firm in 1972 and 1974. Even these documents reveal that respondent returned to his
accounting firm on July 1, 1976 and as of 1978, the intestate proceedings for the settlement of
Jose's estate had not yet been terminated. It does not escape us that when respondent transferred
the Moran property to his corporation on February 13, 1978, the intestate proceedings was still
pending in court. Thus, the succession of events shows that respondent could not have been
totally ignorant of the proceedings in the intestate case.
Respondent claims that complainant knew that his law firm Carlos J. Valdes & Associates was
the legal counsel of the estate 25 and his accounting firm, C.J. Valdes & Co., CPAs, was the
auditor of both the estate and the two claimants against it. 26 The fact, however, that complainant,
as administratrix, did not object to the set-up cannot be taken against her as there is nothing in
the records to show that respondent or his law firm explained the legal situation and its
consequences to complainant. Thus, her silence regarding the arrangement does not amount to an
acquiescence based on an informed consent.
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We also hold that the relationship of the claimants to the late Nakpil does not negate the conflict
of interest. When a creditor files a claim against an estate, his interest is per se adverse to the
estate. As correctly pointed out by complainant, if she had a claim against her husband's estate,
her claim is still adverse and must be filed in the intestate proceedings.
Prescinding from these premises, respondent undoubtedly placed his law firm in a position where
his loyalty to his client could be doubted. In the estate proceedings, the duty of respondent's law
firm was to contest the claims of these two creditors but which claims were prepared by
respondent's accounting firm. Even if the claims were valid and did not prejudice the estate, the
set-up is still undesirable. The test to determine whether there is a conflict of interest in the
representation is probability, not certainty of conflict. It was respondent's duty to inhibit either of
his firms from said proceedings to avoid the probability of conflict of interest.
Respondent advances the defense that assuming there was conflict of interest, he could not be
charged before this Court as his alleged "misconduct" pertains to his accounting practice.
We do not agree. Respondent is a CPA-lawyer who is actively practicing both professions. He is
the senior partner of his law and accounting firms which carry his name. In the case at bar,
complainant is not charging respondent with breach of ethics for being the common accountant
of the estate and the two creditors. He is charged for allowing his accounting firm to represent
two creditors of the estate and, at the same time, allowing his law firm to represent the estate in
the proceedings where these claims were presented. The act is a breach of professional ethics and
undesirable as it placed respondent's and his law firm's loyalty under a cloud of doubt. Even
granting that respondent's misconduct refers to his accountancy practice, it would not prevent
this Court from disciplining him as a member of the Bar. The rule is settled that a lawyer may be
suspended or disbarred for ANY misconduct, even if it pertains to his private activities, as long
as it shows him to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity or good demeanor. 27
Possession of good moral character is not only a prerequisite to admission to the bar but also a
continuing requirement to the practice of law.
Public confidence in law and lawyers may be eroded by the irresponsible and improper conduct
of a member of the bar. Thus, a lawyer should determine his conduct by acting in a manner that
would promote public confidence in the integrity of the legal profession. Members of the Bar are
expected to always live up to the standards embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility
as the relationship between an attorney and his client is highly fiduciary in nature and demands
utmost fidelity and good faith.28 In the case at bar, respondent exhibited less than full fidelity to
his duty to observe candor, fairness and loyalty in his dealings and transactions with his clients.
29
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Court finds respondent ATTY. CARLOS J. VALDES guilty of
misconduct. He is suspended from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year effective from
receipt of this Decision, with a warning that a similar infraction shall be dealt with more severely
in the future.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished all courts, as well as the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and the Office of the Bar Confidant.
SO ORDERED.
Regalado, Mendoza and Martinez, JJ., concur.
Melo, J., took no part.
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A.C. No. 6010 August 28, 2006

ST. LOUIS UNIVERSITY LABORATORY HIGH SCHOOL (SLU-LHS) FACULTY and
STAFF, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. ROLANDO C. DELA CRUZ, Respondent.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This is a disbarment case filed by the Faculty members and Staff of the Saint Louis University-
Laboratory High School (SLU-LHS) against Atty. Rolando C. Dela Cruz, principal of SLU-LHS,
predicated on the following grounds:
1) Gross Misconduct:
From the records of the case, it appears that there is a pending criminal case for child abuse
allegedly committed by him against a high school student filed before the Prosecutor’s Office of
Baguio City; a pending administrative case filed by the Teachers, Staff, Students and Parents
before an Investigating Board created by SLU for his alleged unprofessional and unethical acts
of misappropriating money supposedly for the teachers; and the pending labor case filed by SLU-
LHS Faculty before the NLRC, Cordillera Administrative Region, on alleged illegal deduction of
salary by respondent.
2) Grossly Immoral Conduct:
In contracting a second marriage despite the existence of his first marriage; and
3) Malpractice:
In notarizing documents despite the expiration of his commission.
According to complainant, respondent was legally married to Teresita Rivera on 31 May 1982 at
Tuba, Benguet, before the then Honorable Judge Tomas W. Macaranas. He thereafter contracted
a subsequent marriage with one Mary Jane Pascua, before the Honorable Judge Guillermo
Purganan. On 4 October 1994, said second marriage was subsequently annulled for being
bigamous.
On the charge of malpractice, complainant alleged that respondent deliberately subscribed and
notarized certain legal documents on different dates from 1988 to 1997, despite expiration of
respondent’s notarial commission on 31 December 1987. A Certification1 dated 25 May 1999
was issued by the Clerk of Court of Regional Trial Court (RTC), Baguio City, to the effect that
respondent had not applied for commission as Notary Public for and in the City of Baguio for the
period 1988 to 1997. Respondent performed acts of notarization, as evidenced by the following
documents:
1. Affidavit of Ownership2 dated 8 March 1991, executed by Fernando T. Acosta, subscribed and
sworn to before Rolando Dela Cruz;
2. Affidavit3 dated 26 September 1992, executed by Maria Cortez Atos, subscribed and sworn to
before Rolando Dela Cruz;
3. Affidavit4 dated 14 January 1992, executed by Fanolex James A. Menos, subscribed and sworn
to before Rolando Dela Cruz;
4. Affidavit5 dated 23 December 1993, executed by Ponciano V. Abalos, subscribed and sworn to
before Rolando Dela Cruz;
5. Absolute Date of Sale6 dated 23 June 1993, executed by Danilo Gonzales in favor of Senecio
C. Marzan, notarized by Rolando Dela Cruz;
6. Joint Affidavit By Two Disinherited Parties7 dated 5 March 1994, executed by Evelyn C.
Canullas and Pastora C. Tacadena, subscribed and sworn to before Rolando Dela Cruz;
7. Sworn Statement8 dated 31 May 1994, executed by Felimon B. Rimorin, subscribed and sworn
to before Rolando Dela Cruz;
8. Deed of Sale9 dated 17 August 1994, executed by Woodrow Apurado in favor of Jacinto
Batara, notarized by Rolando Dela Cruz;
9. Joint Affidavit by Two Disinterested Parties10 dated 1 June 1994, executed by Ponciano V.
Abalos and Arsenio C. Sibayan, subscribed and sworn to before Rolando Dela Cruz;
10. Absolute Deed of Sale11 dated 23 March 1995, executed by Eleanor D.Meridor in favor of
Leonardo N. Benter, notarized by Rolando Dela Cruz;
11. Deed of Absolute Sale12 dated 20 December 1996, executed by Mandapat in favor of Mario
R. Mabalot, notarized by Rolando Dela Cruz;
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12. Joint Affidavit By Two Disinterested Parties13 dated 17 April 1996, executed by Villiam C.
Ambong and Romeo L. Quiming, subscribed and sworn to before Rolando Dela Cruz;
13. Conditional Deed of Sale14 dated 27 February 1997, executed by Aurelia Demot Cados in
favor of Jose Ma. A. Pangilinan, notarized by Rolando Dela Cruz;
14. Memorandum of Agreement15 dated 19 July 1996, executed by JARCO represented by Mr.
Johnny Teope and AZTEC Construction represented by Mr. George Cham, notarized by Rolando
Dela Cruz.
Quite remarkably, respondent, in his comment, denied the charges of child abuse, illegal
deduction of salary and others which are still pending before the St. Louis University (SLU),
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) and the Prosecutor’s Office. He did not discuss
anything about the allegations of immorality in contracting a second marriage and malpractice in
notarizing documents despite the expiration of his commission.
After the filing of comment, We referred16 the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP),
for investigation, report and recommendation.
The IBP conducted the mandatory preliminary conference.
The complainants, thereafter, submitted their position paper which is just a reiteration of their
allegations in their complaint.
Respondent, on his part, expressly admitted his second marriage despite the existence of his first
marriage, and the subsequent nullification of the former. He also admitted having notarized
certain documents during the period when his notarial commission had already expired.
However, he offered some extenuating defenses such as good faith, lack of malice and noble
intentions in doing the complained acts.
After the submission of their position papers, the case was deemed submitted for resolution.
On 30 March 2005, Commissioner Acerey C. Pacheco submitted his report and recommended
that:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully recommended that respondent be
administratively penalized for the following acts:
a. For contracting a second marriage without taking the appropriate legal steps to have the first
marriage annulled first, he be suspended from the practice of law for one (1) year, and
b. For notarizing certain legal documents despite full knowledge of the expiration of his notarial
commission, he be suspended from the practice of law for another one (1) year or for a total of
two (2) years.17
On 17 December 2005, the IBP Board of Governors, approved and adopted the recommendation
of Commissioner Pacheco, thus:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report
and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made
part of this Resolution as Annex "A" and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the
evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and considering that Respondent
contracted a second marriage without taking appropriate legal steps to have the first marriage
annulled, Atty. Rolando C. dela Cruz is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one
(1) year and for notarizing legal documents despite full knowledge of the expiration of his
notarial commission Atty. Rolando C. dela Cruz is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for
another one (1) year, for a total of two (2) years Suspension from the practice of law.18
This Court finds the recommendation of the IBP to fault respondent well taken, except as to the
penalty contained therein.
At the threshold, it is worth stressing that the practice of law is not a right but a privilege
bestowed by the State on those who show that they possess the qualifications required by law for
the conferment of such privilege. Membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions.
A lawyer has the privilege and right to practice law only during good behavior, and he can be
deprived of it for misconduct ascertained and declared by judgment of the court after opportunity
to be heard has been afforded him. Without invading any constitutional privilege or right, an
attorney’s right to practice law may be resolved by a proceeding to suspend, based on conduct
rendering him unfit to hold a license or to exercise the duties and responsibilities of an attorney.
It must be understood that the purpose of suspending or disbarring him as an attorney is to
remove from the profession a person whose misconduct has proved him unfit to be entrusted
with the duties and responsibilities belonging to an office of attorney and, thus, to protect the
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public and those charged with the administration of justice, rather than to punish an attorney.
Elaborating on this, we said on Maligsa v. Atty. Cabanting,19 that the Bar should maintain a high
standard of legal proficiency as well as of honesty and fair dealing. A lawyer brings honor to the
legal profession by faithfully performing his duties to society, to the bar, to the courts and to his
clients. A member of the legal fraternity should refrain from doing any act which might lessen in
any degree the confidence and trust reposed by the public in the fidelity, honesty and integrity of
the legal profession. Towards this end, an attorney may be disbarred or suspended for any
violation of his oath or of his duties as an attorney and counselor, which include statutory
grounds enumerated in Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, all of these being broad
enough to cover practically any misconduct of a lawyer in his professional or private capacity.
Equally worthy of remark is that the law profession does not prescribe a dichotomy of standards
among its members. There is no distinction as to whether the transgression is committed in the
lawyer’s professional capacity or in his private life. This is because a lawyer may not divide his
personality so as to be an attorney at one time and a mere citizen at another.20 Thus, not only his
professional activities but even his private life, insofar as the latter may reflect unfavorably upon
the good name and prestige of the profession and the courts, may at any time be the subject of
inquiry on the part of the proper authorities.21
One of the conditions prior to admission to the bar is that an applicant must possess good moral
character. Possession of such moral character as requirement to the enjoyment of the privilege of
law practice must be continuous. Otherwise, "membership in the bar may be terminated when a
lawyer ceases to have good moral conduct."22
In the case at bench, there is no dispute that respondent and Teresita Rivera contracted marriage
on 31 May 1982 before Judge Tomas W. Macaranas. In less than a year, they parted ways owing
to their irreconcilable differences without seeking judicial recourse. The union bore no offspring.
After their separation in-fact, respondent never knew the whereabouts of Teresita Rivera since he
had lost all forms of communication with her. Seven years thereafter, respondent became
attracted to one Mary Jane Pascua, who was also a faculty member of SLU-LHS. There is also
no dispute over the fact that in 1989, respondent married Mary Jane Pascua in the Municipal
Trial Court (MTC) of Baguio City, Branch 68. Respondent even admitted this fact. When the
second marriage was entered into, respondent’s prior marriage with Teresita Rivera was still
subsisting, no action having been initiated before the court to obtain a judicial declaration of
nullity or annulment of respondent’s prior marriage to Teresita Rivera or a judicial declaration of
presumptive death of Teresita Rivera.
Respondent was already a member of the Bar when he contracted the bigamous second marriage
in 1989, having been admitted to the Bar in 1985. As such, he cannot feign ignorance of the
mandate of the law that before a second marriage may be validly contracted, the first and
subsisting marriage must first be annulled by the appropriate court. The second marriage was
annulled only on 4 October 1994 before the RTC of Benguet, Branch 9, or about five years after
respondent contracted his second marriage. The annulment of respondent’s second marriage has
no bearing to the instant disbarment proceeding. Firstly, as earlier emphasized, the annulment
came after the respondent’s second bigamous marriage. Secondly, as we held in In re: Almacen, a
disbarment case is sui generis for it is neither purely civil nor purely criminal but is rather an
investigation by the court into the conduct of its officers. Thus, if the acquittal of a lawyer in a
criminal action is not determinative of an administrative case against him, or if an affidavit of
withdrawal of a disbarment case does not affect its course, then neither will the judgment of
annulment of respondent’s second marriage also exonerate him from a wrongdoing actually
committed. So long as the quantum of proof - clear preponderance of evidence - in disciplinary
proceedings against members of the Bar is met, then liability attaches.23
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court cites grossly immoral conduct as a ground for
disbarment.
The Court has laid down with a common definition of what constitutes immoral conduct, vis-à-
vis, grossly immoral conduct. Immoral conduct is "that conduct which is willful, flagrant, or
shameless, and which shows a moral indifference to the opinion of the good and respectable
members of the community" and what is "grossly immoral," that is, it must be so corrupt and
false as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree."24
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Undoubtedly, respondent’s act constitutes immoral conduct. But is it so gross as to warrant his
disbarment? Indeed, he exhibited a deplorable lack of that degree of morality required of him as
a member of the Bar. In particular, he made a mockery of marriage which is a sacred institution
demanding respect and dignity. His act of contracting a second marriage while the first marriage
was still in place, is contrary to honesty, justice, decency and morality.25
However, measured against the definition, we are not prepared to consider respondent’s act as
grossly immoral. This finds support in the following recommendation and observation of the IBP
Investigator and IBP Board of Governors, thus:
The uncontested assertions of the respondent belies any intention to flaunt the law and the high
moral standard of the legal profession, to wit:
a. After his first failed marriage and prior to his second marriage or for a period of almost seven
(7) years, he has not been romantically involved with any woman;
b. His second marriage was a show of his noble intentions and total love for his wife, whom he
described to be very intelligent person;
c. He never absconded from his obligations to support his wife and child;
d. He never disclaimed paternity over the child and husbandry (sic) with relation to his wife;
e. After the annulment of his second marriage, they have parted ways when the mother and child
went to Australia;
f. Since then up to now, respondent remained celibate.26
In the case of Terre v. Terre,27 respondent was disbarred because his moral character was deeply
flawed as shown by the following circumstances, viz: he convinced the complainant that her
prior marriage to Bercenilla was null and void ab initio and that she was legally single and free to
marry him. When complainant and respondent had contracted their marriage, respondent went
through law school while being supported by complainant, with some assistance from
respondent’s parents. After respondent had finished his law course and gotten complainant
pregnant, respondent abandoned the complainant without support and without the wherewithal
for delivering his own child safely to a hospital.
In the case of Cojuangco, Jr. v. Palma,28 respondent was also disbarred for his grossly immoral
acts such as: first, he abandoned his lawful wife and three children; second, he lured an innocent
young woman into marrying him; third, he mispresented himself as a "bachelor" so he could
contract marriage in a foreign land; and fourth, he availed himself of complainant’s resources by
securing a plane ticket from complainant’s office in order to marry the latter’s daughter. He did
this without complainant’s knowledge. Afterwards, he even had the temerity to assure
complainant that "everything is legal."
Such acts are wanting in the case at bar. In fact, no less than the respondent himself
acknowledged and declared his abject apology for his misstep. He was humble enough to offer
no defense save for his love and declaration of his commitment to his wife and child.
Based on the reasons stated above, we find the imposition of disbarment upon him to be unduly
harsh. The power to disbar must be exercised with great caution, and may be imposed only in a
clear case of misconduct that seriously affects the standing and character of the lawyer as an
officer of the Court. Disbarment should never be decreed where any lesser penalty could
accomplish the end desired.29 In line with this philosophy, we find that a penalty of two years
suspension is more appropriate. The penalty of one (1) year suspension recommended by the IBP
is too light and not commensurate to the act committed by respondent.
As to the charge of misconduct for having notarized several documents during the years
1988-1997 after his commission as notary public had expired, respondent humbly admitted
having notarized certain documents despite his knowledge that he no longer had authority to do
so. He, however, alleged that he received no payment in notarizing said documents.
It has been emphatically stressed that notarization is not an empty, meaningless, routinary act.
On the contrary, it is invested with substantive public interest, such that only those who are
qualified or authorized may act as notaries public. Notarization of a private document converts
the document into a public one making it admissible in court without further proof of its
authenticity. A notarial document is by law entitled to full faith and credit upon its face and, for
this reason, notaries public must observe with the utmost care the basic requirements in the
performance of their duties. Otherwise, the confidence of the public in the integrity of this form
of conveyance would be undermined.30
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The requirements for the issuance of a commission as notary public must not be treated as a mere
casual formality. The Court has characterized a lawyer’s act of notarizing documents without the
requisite commission to do so as "reprehensible, constituting as it does not only malpractice but
also x x x the crime of falsification of public documents."31
The Court had occasion to state that where the notarization of a document is done by a member
of the Philippine Bar at a time when he has no authorization or commission to do so, the offender
may be subjected to disciplinary action or one, performing a notarial act without such
commission is a violation of the lawyer’s oath to obey the laws, more specifically, the Notarial
Law. Then, too, by making it appear that he is duly commissioned when he is not, he is, for all
legal intents and purposes, indulging in deliberate falsehood, which the lawyer’s oath similarly
proscribes. These violations fall squarely within the prohibition of Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides: "A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct." By acting as a notary public without the proper
commission to do so, the lawyer likewise violates Canon 7 of the same Code, which directs
every lawyer to uphold at all times the integrity and dignity of the legal profession.
In the case of Buensuceso v. Barera,32 a lawyer was suspended for one year when he notarized
five documents after his commission as Notary Public had expired, to wit: a complaint for
ejectment, affidavit, supplemental affidavit, a deed of sale, and a contract to sell. Guided by the
pronouncement in said case, we find that a suspension of two (2) years is justified under the
circumstances. Herein respondent notarized a total of fourteen (14) documents33 without the
requisite notarial commission.
Other charges constituting respondent’s misconduct such as the pending criminal case for child
abuse allegedly committed by him against a high school student filed before the Prosecutor’s
Office of Baguio City; the pending administrative case filed by the Teachers, Staff, Students and
Parents before an Investigating Board created by SLU; and the pending labor case filed by SLU-
LHS Faculty before the NLRC, Cordillera Administrative Region, on alleged illegal deduction of
salary by respondent, need not be discussed, as they are still pending before the proper forums.
At such stages, the presumption of innocence still prevails in favor of the respondent.
WHEREFORE, finding respondent Atty. Rolando Dela Cruz guilty of immoral conduct, in
disregard of the Code of Professional Responsibility, he is hereby SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for a period of two (2) years, and another two (2) years for notarizing documents
despite the expiration of his commission or a total of four (4) years of suspension.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished all the courts of the land through the Court
Administrator, as well as the IBP, the Office of the Bar Confidant, and recorded in the personal
records of the respondent.
SO ORDERED.
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice
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A.C. No. 6313 September 7, 2006

CATHERINE JOIE P. VITUG, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. DIOSDADO M. RONGCAL, respondent.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
The allegations raised in this complaint for disbarment are more sordid, if not tawdry, from the
usual. As such, close scrutiny of these claims is called for. Disbarment and suspension of a
lawyer, being the most severe forms of disciplinary sanction, should be imposed with great
caution and only in those cases where the misconduct of the lawyer as an officer of the court and
a member of the bar is established by clear, convincing and satisfactory proof.1
Under consideration is the administrative complaint for disbarment filed by Catherine Joie P.
Vitug (complainant) against Atty. Diosdado M. Rongcal (respondent). A classic case of "he said,
she said," the parties' conflicting versions of the facts as culled from the records are hereinafter
presented.
Complainant narrates that she and respondent met sometime in December 2000 when she was
looking for a lawyer to assist her in suing Arnulfo Aquino ("Aquino"), the biological father of
her minor daughter, for support. Her former classmate who was then a Barangay Secretary
referred her to respondent. After several meetings with complainant, respondent sent a demand
letter2 in her behalf to Aquino wherein he asked for the continuance of the monthly child support
Aquino used to give, plus no less than P300,000.00 for the surgical operation their daughter
would need for her congenital heart ailment.
At around this point, by complainant's own admission, she and respondent started having a
sexual relationship. She narrates that this twist in the events began after respondent started
calling on her shortly after he had sent the demand letter in her behalf. Respondent allegedly
started courting her, giving her financial aid. Soon he had progressed to making sexual advances
towards complainant, to the accompaniment of sweet inducements such as the promise of a job,
financial security for her daughter, and his services as counsel for the prospective claim for
support against Aquino. Complainant acknowledges that she succumbed to these advances,
assured by respondent's claim that the lawyer was free to marry her, as his own marriage had
already been annulled.
On 9 February 2001, respondent allegedly convinced complainant to sign an Affidavit of
Disclaimer3 ("Affidavit") categorically stating that even as Aquino was denoted as the father in
the birth certificate4 of her daughter, he was, in truth, not the real father. She was not allowed to
read the contents of the Affidavit, she claims. Respondent supposedly assured her that the
document meant nothing, necessary as it was the only way that Aquino would agree to give her
daughter medical and educational support. Respondent purportedly assured complainant that
despite the Affidavit, she could still pursue a case against Aquino in the future because the
Affidavit is not a public document. Because she completely trusted him at this point, she signed
the document "without even taking a glance at it."5
On 14 February 2001, respondent allegedly advised complainant that Aquino gave him
P150,000.00 cash and P58,000.00 in two (2) postdated checks to answer for the medical
expenses of her daughter. Instead of turning them over to her, respondent handed her his personal
check6 in the amount of P150,000.00 and promised to give her the balance of P58,000.00 soon
thereafter. However, sometime in April or May 2001, respondent informed her that he could not
give her the said amount because he used it for his political campaign as he was then running for
the position of Provincial Board Member of the 2nd District of Pampanga.
Complainant maintains that inspite of their sexual relationship and the fact that respondent kept
part of the money intended for her daughter, he still failed in his promise to give her a job.
Furthermore, he did not file the case against Aquino and referred her instead to Atty. Federico S.
Tolentino, Jr. ("Atty. Tolentino").
Sometime in 2002, assisted by Atty. Tolentino, complainant filed a criminal case for child abuse
as well as a civil case against Aquino. While the criminal case was dismissed, the civil case was
decided on 30 August 2004 by virtue of a compromise agreement.7 It was only when said cases
were filed that she finally understood the import of the Affidavit.
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Complainant avers that respondent failed to protect her interest when he personally prepared the
Affidavit and caused her to sign the same, which obviously worked to her disadvantage. In
making false promises that all her problems would be solved, aggravated by his assurance that
his marriage had already been annulled, respondent allegedly deceived her into yielding to his
sexual desires. Taking advantage of the trust and confidence she had in him as her counsel and
paramour, her weak emotional state, and dire financial need at that time, respondent was able to
appropriate for himself money that rightfully belonged to her daughter. She argues that
respondent's aforementioned acts constitute a violation of his oath as a lawyer as well as the
Code of Professional Responsibility ("Code"), particularly Rule 1.01, Rule 1.02, Rule 16.01,
Rule 16.02, and Canon 7.8 Hence, she filed the instant complaint9 dated 2 February 2004.
Expectedly, respondent presents a different version. According to him, complainant needed a
lawyer who would file the aforementioned action for support. Complainant's former high school
classmate Reinilda Bansil Morales, who was also his fellow barangay official, referred her to
him. He admits sending a demand letter to her former lover, Aquino, to ask support for the
child.10 Subsequently, he and Aquino communicated through an emissary. He learned that
because of Aquino's infidelity, his relationship with his wife was strained so that in order to settle
things the spouses were willing to give complainant a lump sum provided she would execute an
affidavit to the effect that Aquino is not the father of her daughter.
Respondent relayed this proposal to complainant who asked for his advice. He then advised her
to study the proposal thoroughly and with a practical mindset. He also explained to her the pros
and cons of pursuing the case. After several days, she requested that he negotiate for an out-of-
court settlement of no less than P500,000.00. When Aquino rejected the amount, negotiations
ensued until the amount was lowered to P200,000.00. Aquino allegedly offered to issue four
postdated checks in equal amounts within four months. Complainant disagreed. Aquino then
proposed to rediscount the checks at an interest of 4% a month or a total of P12,000.00. The
resulting amount was P188,000.00.
Complainant finally agreed to this arrangement and voluntarily signed the Affidavit that
respondent prepared, the same Affidavit adverted to by complainant. He denies forcing her to
sign the document and strongly refutes her allegation that she did not know what the Affidavit
was for and that she signed it without even reading it, as he gave her the draft before the actual
payment was made. He notes that complainant is a college graduate and a former bank employee
who speaks and understands English. He likewise vehemently denies pocketing P58,000.00 of
the settlement proceeds. When complainant allegedly signed the Affidavit, the emissary handed
to her the sum of P150,000.00 in cash and she allegedly told respondent that he could keep the
remaining P38,000.00, not P58,000.00 as alleged in the complaint. Although she did not say
why, he assumed that it was for his attorney's fees.
As regards their illicit relationship, respondent admits of his sexual liaison with complainant. He,
however, denies luring her with sweet words and empty promises. According to him, it was more
of a "chemistry of (sic) two consensual (sic) adults,"11 complainant then being in her thirties. He
denies that he tricked her into believing that his marriage was already annulled. Strangely,
respondent devotes considerable effort to demonstrate that complainant very well knew he was
married when they commenced what was to him, an extra-marital liaison. He points out that,
first, they had met through his colleague, Ms. Morales, a friend and former high school classmate
of hers. Second, they had allegedly first met at his residence where she was actually introduced
to his wife. Subsequently, complainant called his residence several times and actually spoke to
his wife, a circumstance so disturbing to respondent that he had to beg complainant not to call
him there. Third, he was the Punong Barangay from 1994 to 2002, and was elected President of
the Association of Barangay Council ("ABC") and as such was an ex-officio member of the
Sangguniang Bayan of Guagua, Pampanga. He ran for the position of Provincial Board Member
in 2001. Thus, he was known in his locality and it was impossible for complainant not to have
known of his marital status especially that she lived no more than three (3) kilometers away from
his house and even actively helped him in his campaign.
Respondent further alleges that while the demand for support from Aquino was being worked
out, complainant moved to a rented house in Olongapo City because a suitor had promised her a
job in the Subic Naval Base. But months passed and the promised job never came so that she had
to return to Lubao, Pampanga. As the money she received from Aquino was about to be
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exhausted, she allegedly started to pester respondent for financial assistance and urged him to file
the Petition for Support against Aquino. While respondent acceded to her pleas, he also advised
her "to look for the right man"12 and to stop depending on him for financial assistance. He also
informed her that he could not assist her in filing the case, as he was the one who prepared and
notarized the Affidavit. He, however, referred her to Atty. Tolentino.
In August 2002, respondent finally ended his relationship with complainant, but still he agreed to
give her monthly financial assistance of P6,000.00 for six (6) months. Since then, they have
ceased to meet and have communicated only through an emissary or by cellphone. In 2003,
complainant begged him to continue the assistance until June when her alleged fiancé from the
United States would have arrived. Respondent agreed. In July 2003, she again asked for financial
assistance for the last time, which he turned down. Since then he had stopped communicating to
her.
Sometime in January 2004, complainant allegedly went to see a friend of respondent. She told
him that she was in need of P5,000.00 for a sari-sari store she was putting up and she wanted him
to relay the message to respondent. According to this friend, complainant showed him a prepared
complaint against respondent that she would file with the Supreme Court should the latter not
accede to her request. Sensing that he was being blackmailed, respondent ignored her demand.
True enough, he alleges, she filed the instant complaint.
On 21 July 2004, the case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines ("IBP") for
investigation, report and recommendation.13 After the parties submitted their respective position
papers and supporting documents, the Investigating Commissioner rendered his Report and
Recommendation14 dated 2 September 2005. After presenting the parties' conflicting factual
versions, the Investigating Commissioner gave credence to that of complainant and concluded
that respondent clearly violated the Code, reporting in this wise, to wit:
Respondent, through the above mentioned acts, clearly showed that he is wanting in good moral
character, putting in doubt his professional reputation as a member of the BAR and renders him
unfit and unworthy of the privileges which the law confers to him. From a lawyer, are (sic)
expected those qualities of truth-speaking, high sense of honor, full candor, intellectual honesty
and the strictest observance of fiduciary responsibility all of which throughout the passage of
time have been compendiously described as MORAL CHARACTER.
Respondent, unfortunately took advantage and (sic) every opportunity to entice complainant to
his lascivious hungerness (sic). On several occasions[,] respondent kept on calling complainant
and dropped by her house and gave P2,000.00 as aid while waiting allegedly for the reply of (sic)
their demand letter for support. It signals the numerous visits and regular calls all because of
[l]ewd design. He took advantage of her seeming financial woes and emotional dependency.
xxxx
Without doubt, a violation of the high moral standards of the legal profession justifies the
impositions (sic) of the appropriate penalty, including suspension and disbarment. x x x15
It was then recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for six (6)
months and that he be ordered to return to complainant the amount of P58,000.00 within two
months. The IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the said Report and
Recommendation in a Resolution16 dated 17 December 2005, finding the same to be fully
supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and "considering
Respondent's obviously taking advantage of the lawyer-client relationship and the financial and
emotional problem of his client and attempting to mislead the Commission,"17 respondent was
meted out the penalty of suspension for one (1) year with a stern warning that a repetition of
similar acts will merit severe sanctions. He was likewise ordered to return P58,000.00 to
complainant.
Respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration with Motion to Set Case for Clarificatory
Questioning18 ("Motion") dated 9 March 2006 with the IBP and a Motion to Reopen/Remand
Case for Clarificatory Questioning dated 22 March 2006 with the Supreme Court. He reiterates
his own version of the facts, giving a more detailed account of the events that transpired between
him and complainant. Altogether, he portrays complainant as a shrewd and manipulative woman
who depends on men for financial support and who would stop at nothing to get what she wants.
Arguing that the IBP based its Resolution solely on complainant's bare allegations that she failed
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to prove by clear and convincing evidence, he posits the case should be re-opened for
clarificatory questioning in order to determine who between them is telling the truth.
In a Resolution19 dated 27 April 2006, the IBP denied the Motion on the ground that it has no
more jurisdiction over the case as the matter had already been endorsed to the Supreme Court.
While we find respondent liable, we adjudicate the matter differently from what the IBP has
recommended.
On the charge of immorality, respondent does not deny that he had an extra-marital affair with
complainant, albeit brief and discreet, and which act is not "so corrupt and false as to constitute a
criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree"20 in order to merit
disciplinary sanction. We disagree.
One of the conditions prior to admission to the bar is that an applicant must possess good moral
character. Said requirement persists as a continuing condition for the enjoyment of the privilege
of law practice, otherwise, the loss thereof is a ground for the revocation of such privilege.21 As
officers of the court, lawyers must not only in fact be of good moral character but must also be
seen to be of good moral character and leading lives in accordance with the highest moral
standards of the community.22 The Court has held that to justify suspension or disbarment the act
complained of must not only be immoral, but grossly immoral.23 A grossly immoral act is one
that is so corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled or disgraceful as to
be reprehensible to a high degree.24 It is a willful, flagrant, or shameless act that shows a moral
indifference to the opinion of the good and respectable members of the community.25
While it is has been held in disbarment cases that the mere fact of sexual relations between two
unmarried adults is not sufficient to warrant administrative sanction for such illicit behavior,26 it
is not so with respect to betrayals of the marital vow of fidelity.27 Even if not all forms of extra-
marital relations are punishable under penal law, sexual relations outside marriage is considered
disgraceful and immoral as it manifests deliberate disregard of the sanctity of marriage and the
marital vows protected by the Constitution and affirmed by our laws.28
By his own admission, respondent is obviously guilty of immorality in violation of Rule 1.01 of
the Code which states that a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct. The next question to consider is whether this act is aggravated by his alleged deceitful
conduct in luring complainant who was then in low spirits and in dire financial need in order to
satisfy his carnal desires. While the IBP concluded the question in the affirmative, we find
otherwise.
Complainant's allegations that she succumbed to respondent's sexual advances due to his
promises of financial security and because of her need for legal assistance in filing a case against
her former lover, are insufficient to conclude that complainant deceived her into having sexual
relations with her. Surely, an educated woman like herself who was of sufficient age and
discretion, being at that time in her thirties, would not be easily fooled into sexual congress by
promises of a job and of free legal assistance, especially when there is no showing that she is
suffering from any mental or physical disability as to justify such recklessness and/or
helplessness on her part.29 Respondent's numerous visits and regular calls to complainant do not
necessarily prove that he took advantage of her. At best, it proves that he courted her despite
being a married man, precisely the fact on which the finding of immorality is rooted. Moreover,
the circumstance that he gave her P2,000.00 as aid does not induce belief that he fueled her
financial dependence as she never denied pleading with, if not badgering, him for financial
support.
Neither does complainant's allegation that respondent lied to her about his marital status inspire
belief. We find credence in respondent's assertion that it was impossible for her not to have
known of his subsisting marriage. She herself admitted that they were introduced by her friend
and former classmate, Ms. Morales who was a fellow barangay official of respondent. She
admitted that she knew his residence phone number and that she had called him there. She also
knew that respondent is an active barangay official who even ran as Provincial Board Member in
2001. Curiously, she never refuted respondent's allegations that she had met and talked to his
wife on several occasions, that she lived near his residence, that she helped him in his campaign,
or that she knew a lot of his friends, so as not to have known of his marital status. Considering
that she previously had an affair with Aquino, who was also a married man, it would be
unnatural for her to have just plunged into a sexual relationship with respondent whom she had
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known for only a short time without verifying his background, if it were true that she preferred
"to change [her] life for the better,"30 as alleged in her complaint. We believe that her
aforementioned allegations of deceit were not established by clear preponderant evidence
required in disbarment cases.31 We are left with the most logical conclusion that she freely and
wittingly entered into an illicit and immoral relationship with respondent sans any
misrepresentation or deceit on his part.
Next, complainant charged respondent of taking advantage of his legal skills and moral control
over her to force her to sign the clearly disadvantageous Affidavit without letting her read it and
without explaining to her its repercussions. While acting as her counsel, she alleged that he
likewise acted as counsel for Aquino.
We find complainant's assertions dubious. She was clearly in need of financial support from
Aquino especially that her daughter was suffering from a heart ailment. We cannot fathom how
she could abandon all cares to respondent who she had met for only a couple of months and
thereby risk the welfare of her child by signing without even reading a document she knew was
related to the support case she intended to file. The Affidavit consists of four short sentences
contained in a single page. It is unlikely she was not able to read it before she signed it.
Likewise obscure is her assertion that respondent did not fully explain to her the contents of the
Affidavit and the consequences of signing it. She alleged that respondent even urged her "to use
her head as Arnulfo Aquino will not give the money for Alexandra's medical and educational
support if she will not sign the said Affidavit of Disclaimer."32 If her own allegation is to be
believed, it shows that she was aware of the on-going negotiation with Aquino for the settlement
of her claim for which the latter demanded the execution of the Affidavit. It also goes to show
that she was pondering on whether to sign the same. Furthermore, she does not deny being a
college graduate or that she knows and understands English. The Affidavit is written in short and
simple sentences that are understandable even to a layman. The inevitable conclusion is that she
signed the Affidavit voluntarily and without any coercion whatsoever on the part of respondent.
The question remains as to whether his act of preparing and notarizing the Affidavit, a document
disadvantageous to his client, is a violation of the Code. We rule in the negative.
It was not unlawful for respondent to assist his client in entering into a settlement with Aquino
after explaining all available options to her. The law encourages the amicable settlement not only
of pending cases but also of disputes which might otherwise be filed in court.33 Moreover, there
is no showing that he knew for sure that Aquino is the father of complainant's daughter as
paternity remains to be proven. As complainant voluntarily and intelligently agreed to a
settlement with Aquino, she cannot later blame her counsel when she experiences a change of
heart. Besides, the record is bereft of evidence as to whether respondent also acted as Aquino's
counsel in the settlement of the case. Again, we only have complainant's bare allegations that
cannot be considered evidence.34 Suspicion, no matter how strong, is not enough. In the absence
of contrary evidence, what will prevail is the presumption that the respondent has regularly
performed his duty in accordance with his oath.35
Complainant further charged respondent of misappropriating part of the money given by Aquino
to her daughter. Instead of turning over the whole amount, he allegedly issued to her his personal
check in the amount of P150,000.00 and pocketed the remaining P58,000.00 in violation of his
fiduciary obligation to her as her counsel.
The IBP did not make any categorical finding on this matter but simply ordered respondent to
return the amount of P58,000.00 to complainant. We feel a discussion is in order.
We note that there is no clear evidence as to how much Aquino actually gave in settlement of
complainant's claim for support. The parties are in agreement that complainant received the
amount of P150,000.00. However, complainant insists that she should have received more as
there were two postdated checks amounting to P58,000.00 that respondent never turned over to
her. Respondent essentially agrees that the amount is in fact more than P150,000.00 – but only
P38,000.00 more – and complainant said he could have it and he assumed it was for his
attorney's fees.
We scrutinized the records and found not a single evidence to prove that there existed two
postdated checks issued by Aquino in the amount of P58,000.00. On the other hand, respondent
admits that there is actually an amount of P38,000.00 but presented no evidence of an agreement
for attorney's fees to justify his presumption that he can keep the same. Curiously, there is on
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record a photocopy of a check issued by respondent in favor of complainant for P150,000.00. It

was only in his Motion for Reconsideration where respondent belatedly proffers an explanation.
He avers that he cannot recall what the check was for but he supposes that complainant requested
for it as she did not want to travel all the way to Olongapo City with a huge sum of money.
We find the circumstances rather suspicious but evidence is wanting to sustain a finding in favor
of either party in this respect. We cannot and should not rule on mere conjectures. The IBP relied
only on the written assertions of the parties, apparently finding no need to subject the veracity of
the assertions through the question and answer modality. With the inconclusive state of the
evidence, a more in-depth investigation is called for to ascertain in whose favor the substantial
evidence level tilts. Hence, we are constrained to remand the case to the IBP for further reception
of evidence solely on this aspect.
We also are unable to grant complainant's prayer for respondent to be made liable for the cost of
her child's DNA test absent proof that he misappropriated funds exclusively earmarked for the
purpose.
Neither shall we entertain complainant's claim for moral damages and attorney's fees. Suffice it
to state that an administrative case against a lawyer is sui generis, one that is distinct from a civil
or a criminal action.36 It is an investigation by the Court into the fitness of a lawyer to remain in
the legal profession and be allowed the privileges as such. Its primary objective is to protect the
Court and the public from the misconduct of its officers with the end in view of preserving the
purity of the legal profession and the proper and honest administration of justice by requiring
that those who exercise this important function shall be competent, honorable and reliable men
and women in whom courts and clients may repose confidence.37 As such, it involves no private
interest and affords no redress for private grievance.38 The complainant or the person who called
the attention of the court to the lawyer's alleged misconduct is in no sense a party, and has
generally no interest in the outcome except as all good citizens may have in the proper
administration of justice.39
Respondent's misconduct is of considerable gravity. There is a string of cases where the Court
meted out the extreme penalty of disbarment on the ground of gross immorality where the
respondent contracted a bigamous marriage,40 abandoned his family to cohabit with his
paramour,41 cohabited with a married woman,42 lured an innocent woman into marriage,43 or was
found to be a womanizer.44 The instant case can be easily differentiated from the foregoing cases.
We, therefore, heed the stern injunction on decreeing disbarment where any lesser penalty, such
as temporary suspension, would accomplish the end desired.45 In Zaguirre v. Castillo,46
respondent was found to have sired a child with another woman who knew he was married. He
therein sought understanding from the Court pointing out the polygamous nature of men and that
the illicit relationship was a product of mutual lust and desire. Appalled at his reprehensible and
amoral attitude, the Court suspended him indefinitely. However, in Fr. Sinnott v. Judge Barte,47
where respondent judge consorted with a woman not his wife, but there was no conclusive
evidence that he sired a child with her, he was fined P10,000.00 for his conduct unbecoming a
magistrate despite his retirement during the pendency of the case.
We note that from the very beginning of this case, herein respondent had expressed remorse over
his indiscretion and had in fact ended the brief illicit relationship years ago. We take these as
signs that his is not a character of such severe depravity and thus should be taken as mitigating
circumstances in his favor.48 Considering further that this is his first offense, we believe that a
fine of P15,000.00 would suffice. This, of course, is without prejudice to the outcome of the
aspect of this case involving the alleged misappropriation of funds of the client.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we find Atty. Diosdado M. Rongcal GUILTY of
immorality and impose on him a FINE of P15,000.00 with a stern warning that a repetition of the
same or similar acts in the future will be dealt with more severely.
The charge of misappropriation of funds of the client is REMANDED to the IBP for further
investigation, report and recommendation within ninety (90) days from receipt of this Decision.
Let a copy of this decision be entered in the personal record of respondent as an attorney and as a
member of the Bar, and furnished the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and
the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country.
SO ORDERED.
Quisumbing, Chairperson, Carpio, Carpio-Morales, Velasco, Jr., J.J., , concur.
72 of 122
July 30, 1979

PETITION FOR AUTHORITY TO CONTINUE USE OF THE FIRM NAME "SYCIP,
SALAZAR, FELICIANO, HERNANDEZ & CASTILLO." LUCIANO E. SALAZAR,
FLORENTINO P. FELICIANO, BENILDO G. HERNANDEZ. GREGORIO R.
CASTILLO. ALBERTO P. SAN JUAN, JUAN C. REYES. JR., ANDRES G.
GATMAITAN, JUSTINO H. CACANINDIN, NOEL A. LAMAN, ETHELWOLDO E.
FERNANDEZ, ANGELITO C. IMPERIO, EDUARDO R. CENIZA, TRISTAN A.
CATINDIG, ANCHETA K. TAN, and ALICE V. PESIGAN, petitioners.
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR AUTHORITY TO CONTINUE USE OF
THE FIRM NAME "OZAETA, ROMULO, DE LEON, MABANTA & REYES."
RICARDO J. ROMULO, BENJAMIN M. DE LEON, ROMAN MABANTA, JR., JOSE
MA, REYES, JESUS S. J. SAYOC, EDUARDO DE LOS ANGELES, and JOSE F.
BUENAVENTURA, petitioners.
RESOLUTION
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J
Two separate Petitions were filed before this Court 1) by the surviving partners of Atty.
Alexander Sycip, who died on May 5, 1975, and 2) by the surviving partners of Atty. Herminio
Ozaeta, who died on February 14, 1976, praying that they be allowed to continue using, in the
names of their firms, the names of partners who had passed away. In the Court's Resolution of
September 2, 1976, both Petitions were ordered consolidated.
Petitioners base their petitions on the following arguments:
1. Under the law, a partnership is not prohibited from continuing its business under a firm name
which includes the name of a deceased partner; in fact, Article 1840 of the Civil Code explicitly
sanctions the practice when it provides in the last paragraph that: têñ.£îhqwâ£
The use by the person or partnership continuing the business of the partnership name, or the
name of a deceased partner as part thereof, shall not of itself make the individual property of the
deceased partner liable for any debts contracted by such person or partnership. 1
2. In regulating other professions, such as accountancy and engineering, the legislature has
authorized the adoption of firm names without any restriction as to the use, in such firm name, of
the name of a deceased partner; 2 the legislative authorization given to those engaged in the
practice of accountancy — a profession requiring the same degree of trust and confidence in
respect of clients as that implicit in the relationship of attorney and client — to acquire and use a
trade name, strongly indicates that there is no fundamental policy that is offended by the
continued use by a firm of professionals of a firm name which includes the name of a deceased
partner, at least where such firm name has acquired the characteristics of a "trade name." 3
3. The Canons of Professional Ethics are not transgressed by the continued use of the name of a
deceased partner in the firm name of a law partnership because Canon 33 of the Canons of
Professional Ethics adopted by the American Bar Association declares that: têñ.£îhqwâ£
... The continued use of the name of a deceased or former partner when permissible by local
custom, is not unethical but care should be taken that no imposition or deception is practiced
through this use. ... 4
4. There is no possibility of imposition or deception because the deaths of their respective
deceased partners were well-publicized in all newspapers of general circulation for several days;
the stationeries now being used by them carry new letterheads indicating the years when their
respective deceased partners were connected with the firm; petitioners will notify all leading
national and international law directories of the fact of their respective deceased partners' deaths.
5
5. No local custom prohibits the continued use of a deceased partner's name in a professional
firm's name; 6 there is no custom or usage in the Philippines, or at least in the Greater Manila
Area, which recognizes that the name of a law firm necessarily Identifies the individual members
of the firm. 7
6. The continued use of a deceased partner's name in the firm name of law partnerships has been
consistently allowed by U.S. Courts and is an accepted practice in the legal profession of most
countries in the world.8
73 of 122
The question involved in these Petitions first came under consideration by this Court in 1953
when a law firm in Cebu (the Deen case) continued its practice of including in its firm name that
of a deceased partner, C.D. Johnston. The matter was resolved with this Court advising the firm
to desist from including in their firm designation the name of C. D. Johnston, who has long been
dead."
The same issue was raised before this Court in 1958 as an incident in G. R. No. L-11964, entitled
Register of Deeds of Manila vs. China Banking Corporation. The law firm of Perkins & Ponce
Enrile moved to intervene as amicus curiae. Before acting thereon, the Court, in a Resolution of
April 15, 1957, stated that it "would like to be informed why the name of Perkins is still being
used although Atty. E. A. Perkins is already dead." In a Manifestation dated May 21, 1957, the
law firm of Perkins and Ponce Enrile, raising substantially the same arguments as those now
being raised by petitioners, prayed that the continued use of the firm name "Perkins & Ponce
Enrile" be held proper.
On June 16, 1958, this Court resolved: têñ.£îhqwâ£
After carefully considering the reasons given by Attorneys Alfonso Ponce Enrile and Associates
for their continued use of the name of the deceased E. G. Perkins, the Court found no reason to
depart from the policy it adopted in June 1953 when it required Attorneys Alfred P. Deen and
Eddy A. Deen of Cebu City to desist from including in their firm designation, the name of C. D.
Johnston, deceased. The Court believes that, in view of the personal and confidential nature of
the relations between attorney and client, and the high standards demanded in the canons of
professional ethics, no practice should be allowed which even in a remote degree could give rise
to the possibility of deception. Said attorneys are accordingly advised to drop the name
"PERKINS" from their firm name.
Petitioners herein now seek a re-examination of the policy thus far enunciated by the Court.
The Court finds no sufficient reason to depart from the rulings thus laid down.
A. Inasmuch as "Sycip, Salazar, Feliciano, Hernandez and Castillo" and "Ozaeta, Romulo, De
Leon, Mabanta and Reyes" are partnerships, the use in their partnership names of the names of
deceased partners will run counter to Article 1815 of the Civil Code which provides: têñ.£îhqwâ£
Art. 1815. Every partnership shall operate under a firm name, which may or may not include the
name of one or more of the partners.
Those who, not being members of the partnership, include their names in the firm name, shall be
subject to the liability, of a partner.
It is clearly tacit in the above provision that names in a firm name of a partnership must either be
those of living partners and. in the case of non-partners, should be living persons who can be
subjected to liability. In fact, Article 1825 of the Civil Code prohibits a third person from
including his name in the firm name under pain of assuming the liability of a partner. The heirs
of a deceased partner in a law firm cannot be held liable as the old members to the creditors of a
firm particularly where they are non-lawyers. Thus, Canon 34 of the Canons of Professional
Ethics "prohibits an agreement for the payment to the widow and heirs of a deceased lawyer of a
percentage, either gross or net, of the fees received from the future business of the deceased
lawyer's clients, both because the recipients of such division are not lawyers and because such
payments will not represent service or responsibility on the part of the recipient. " Accordingly,
neither the widow nor the heirs can be held liable for transactions entered into after the death of
their lawyer-predecessor. There being no benefits accruing, there ran be no corresponding
liability.
Prescinding the law, there could be practical objections to allowing the use by law firms of the
names of deceased partners. The public relations value of the use of an old firm name can tend to
create undue advantages and disadvantages in the practice of the profession. An able lawyer
without connections will have to make a name for himself starting from scratch. Another able
lawyer, who can join an old firm, can initially ride on that old firm's reputation established by
deceased partners.
B. In regards to the last paragraph of Article 1840 of the Civil Code cited by petitioners, supra,
the first factor to consider is that it is within Chapter 3 of Title IX of the Code entitled
"Dissolution and Winding Up." The Article primarily deals with the exemption from liability in
cases of a dissolved partnership, of the individual property of the deceased partner for debts
contracted by the person or partnership which continues the business using the partnership name
74 of 122
or the name of the deceased partner as part thereof. What the law contemplates therein is a hold-
over situation preparatory to formal reorganization.
Secondly, Article 1840 treats more of a commercial partnership with a good will to protect rather
than of a professional partnership, with no saleable good will but whose reputation depends on
the personal qualifications of its individual members. Thus, it has been held that a saleable
goodwill can exist only in a commercial partnership and cannot arise in a professional
partnership consisting of lawyers. 9têñ.£îhqwâ£
As a general rule, upon the dissolution of a commercial partnership the succeeding partners or
parties have the right to carry on the business under the old name, in the absence of a stipulation
forbidding it, (s)ince the name of a commercial partnership is a partnership asset inseparable
from the good will of the firm. ... (60 Am Jur 2d, s 204, p. 115) (Emphasis supplied)
On the other hand, têñ.£îhqwâ£
... a professional partnership the reputation of which depends or; the individual skill of the
members, such as partnerships of attorneys or physicians, has no good win to be distributed as a
firm asset on its dissolution, however intrinsically valuable such skill and reputation may be,
especially where there is no provision in the partnership agreement relating to good will as an
asset. ... (ibid, s 203, p. 115) (Emphasis supplied)
C. A partnership for the practice of law cannot be likened to partnerships formed by other
professionals or for business. For one thing, the law on accountancy specifically allows the use
of a trade name in connection with the practice of accountancy.10 têñ.£îhqwâ£
A partnership for the practice of law is not a legal entity. It is a mere relationship or association
for a particular purpose. ... It is not a partnership formed for the purpose of carrying on trade or
business or of holding property." 11 Thus, it has been stated that "the use of a nom de plume,
assumed or trade name in law practice is improper. 12
The usual reason given for different standards of conduct being applicable to the practice of law
from those pertaining to business is that the law is a profession.
Dean Pound, in his recently published contribution to the Survey of the Legal Profession, (The
Lawyer from Antiquity to Modern Times, p. 5) defines a profession as "a group of men pursuing a
learned art as a common calling in the spirit of public service, — no less a public service because
it may incidentally be a means of livelihood."
xxx xxx xxx
Primary characteristics which distinguish the legal profession from business are:
1. A duty of public service, of which the emolument is a byproduct, and in which one may attain
the highest eminence without making much money.
2. A relation as an "officer of court" to the administration of justice involving thorough sincerity,
integrity, and reliability.
3. A relation to clients in the highest degree fiduciary.
4. A relation to colleagues at the bar characterized by candor, fairness, and unwillingness to
resort to current business methods of advertising and encroachment on their practice, or dealing
directly with their clients. 13
"The right to practice law is not a natural or constitutional right but is in the nature of a privilege
or franchise. 14 It is limited to persons of good moral character with special qualifications duly
ascertained and certified. 15 The right does not only presuppose in its possessor integrity, legal
standing and attainment, but also the exercise of a special privilege, highly personal and
partaking of the nature of a public trust." 16
D. Petitioners cited Canon 33 of the Canons of Professional Ethics of the American Bar
Association" in support of their petitions.
It is true that Canon 33 does not consider as unethical the continued use of the name of a
deceased or former partner in the firm name of a law partnership when such a practice is
permissible by local custom but the Canon warns that care should be taken that no imposition or
deception is practiced through this use.
It must be conceded that in the Philippines, no local custom permits or allows the continued use
of a deceased or former partner's name in the firm names of law partnerships. Firm names, under
our custom, Identify the more active and/or more senior members or partners of the law firm. A
glimpse at the history of the firms of petitioners and of other law firms in this country would
75 of 122
show how their firm names have evolved and changed from time to time as the composition of
the partnership changed. têñ.£îhqwâ£
The continued use of a firm name after the death of one or more of the partners designated by it
is proper only where sustained by local custom and not where by custom this purports to Identify
the active members. ...
There would seem to be a question, under the working of the Canon, as to the propriety of adding
the name of a new partner and at the same time retaining that of a deceased partner who was
never a partner with the new one. (H.S. Drinker, op. cit., supra, at pp. 207208) (Emphasis
supplied).
The possibility of deception upon the public, real or consequential, where the name of a deceased
partner continues to be used cannot be ruled out. A person in search of legal counsel might be
guided by the familiar ring of a distinguished name appearing in a firm title.
E. Petitioners argue that U.S. Courts have consistently allowed the continued use of a deceased
partner's name in the firm name of law partnerships. But that is so because it is sanctioned by
custom.
In the case of Mendelsohn v. Equitable Life Assurance Society (33 N.Y.S. 2d 733) which
petitioners Salazar, et al. quoted in their memorandum, the New York Supreme Court sustained
the use of the firm name Alexander & Green even if none of the present ten partners of the firm
bears either name because the practice was sanctioned by custom and did not offend any
statutory provision or legislative policy and was adopted by agreement of the parties. The Court
stated therein: têñ.£îhqwâ£
The practice sought to be proscribed has the sanction of custom and offends no statutory
provision or legislative policy. Canon 33 of the Canons of Professional Ethics of both the
American Bar Association and the New York State Bar Association provides in part as follows:
"The continued use of the name of a deceased or former partner, when permissible by local
custom is not unethical, but care should be taken that no imposition or deception is practiced
through this use." There is no question as to local custom. Many firms in the city use the names
of deceased members with the approval of other attorneys, bar associations and the courts. The
Appellate Division of the First Department has considered the matter and reached The
conclusion that such practice should not be prohibited. (Emphasis supplied)
xxx xxx xxx
Neither the Partnership Law nor the Penal Law prohibits the practice in question. The use of the
firm name herein is also sustainable by reason of agreement between the partners. 18
Not so in this jurisdiction where there is no local custom that sanctions the practice. Custom has
been defined as a rule of conduct formed by repetition of acts, uniformly observed (practiced) as
a social rule, legally binding and obligatory. 19 Courts take no judicial notice of custom. A
custom must be proved as a fact, according to the rules of evidence. 20 A local custom as a source
of right cannot be considered by a court of justice unless such custom is properly established by
competent evidence like any other fact. 21 We find such proof of the existence of a local custom,
and of the elements requisite to constitute the same, wanting herein. Merely because something
is done as a matter of practice does not mean that Courts can rely on the same for purposes of
adjudication as a juridical custom. Juridical custom must be differentiated from social custom.
The former can supplement statutory law or be applied in the absence of such statute. Not so
with the latter.
Moreover, judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws form part of the legal system. 22
When the Supreme Court in the Deen and Perkins cases issued its Resolutions directing lawyers
to desist from including the names of deceased partners in their firm designation, it laid down a
legal rule against which no custom or practice to the contrary, even if proven, can prevail. This is
not to speak of our civil law which clearly ordains that a partnership is dissolved by the death of
any partner. 23 Custom which are contrary to law, public order or public policy shall not be
countenanced. 24
The practice of law is intimately and peculiarly related to the administration of justice and should
not be considered like an ordinary "money-making trade." têñ.£îhqwâ£
... It is of the essence of a profession that it is practiced in a spirit of public service. A trade ...
aims primarily at personal gain; a profession at the exercise of powers beneficial to mankind. If,
as in the era of wide free opportunity, we think of free competitive self assertion as the highest
76 of 122
good, lawyer and grocer and farmer may seem to be freely competing with their fellows in their
calling in order each to acquire as much of the world's good as he may within the allowed him by
law. But the member of a profession does not regard himself as in competition with his
professional brethren. He is not bartering his services as is the artisan nor exchanging the
products of his skill and learning as the farmer sells wheat or corn. There should be no such thing
as a lawyers' or physicians' strike. The best service of the professional man is often rendered for
no equivalent or for a trifling equivalent and it is his pride to do what he does in a way worthy of
his profession even if done with no expectation of reward, This spirit of public service in which
the profession of law is and ought to be exercised is a prerequisite of sound administration of
justice according to law. The other two elements of a profession, namely, organization and
pursuit of a learned art have their justification in that they secure and maintain that spirit. 25
In fine, petitioners' desire to preserve the Identity of their firms in the eyes of the public must
bow to legal and ethical impediment.
ACCORDINGLY, the petitions filed herein are denied and petitioners advised to drop the names
"SYCIP" and "OZAETA" from their respective firm names. Those names may, however, be
included in the listing of individuals who have been partners in their firms indicating the years
during which they served as such.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee, Concepcion, Jr., Santos, Fernandez, Guerrero and De Castro, JJ., concur
Fernando, C.J. and Abad Santos, J., took no part.
Separate Opinions
FERNANDO, C.J., concurring:
The petitions are denied, as there are only four votes for granting them, seven of the Justices
being of the contrary view, as explained in the plurality opinion of Justice Ameurfina Melencio-
Herrera. It is out of delicadeza that the undersigned did not participate in the disposition of these
petitions, as the law office of Sycip, Salazar, Feliciano, Hernandez and Castillo started with the
partnership of Quisumbing, Sycip, and Quisumbing, the senior partner, the late Ramon
Quisumbing, being the father-in-law of the undersigned, and the most junior partner then,
Norberto J. Quisumbing, being his brother- in-law. For the record, the undersigned wishes to
invite the attention of all concerned, and not only of petitioners, to the last sentence of the
opinion of Justice Ameurfina Melencio-Herrera: 'Those names [Sycip and Ozaeta] may, however,
be included in the listing of individuals wtes
AQUINO, J., dissenting:
I dissent. The fourteen members of the law firm, Sycip, Salazar, Feliciano, Hernandez & Castillo,
in their petition of June 10, 1975, prayed for authority to continue the use of that firm name,
notwithstanding the death of Attorney Alexander Sycip on May 5, 1975 (May he rest in peace).
He was the founder of the firm which was originally known as the Sycip Law Office.
On the other hand, the seven surviving partners of the law firm, Ozaeta, Romulo, De Leon,
Mabanta & Reyes, in their petition of August 13, 1976, prayed that they be allowed to continue
using the said firm name notwithstanding the death of two partners, former Justice Roman
Ozaeta and his son, Herminio, on May 1, 1972 and February 14, 1976, respectively.
They alleged that the said law firm was a continuation of the Ozaeta Law Office which was
established in 1957 by Justice Ozaeta and his son and that, as to the said law firm, the name
Ozaeta has acquired an institutional and secondary connotation.
Article 1840 of the Civil Code, which speaks of the use by the partnership of the name of a
deceased partner as part of the partnership name, is cited to justify the petitions. Also invoked is
the canon that the continued use by a law firm of the name of a deceased partner, "when
permissible by local custom, is not unethical" as long as "no imposition or deception is practised
through this use" (Canon 33 of the Canons of Legal Ethics).
I am of the opinion that the petition may be granted with the condition that it be indicated in the
letterheads of the two firms (as the case may be) that Alexander Sycip, former Justice Ozaeta and
Herminio Ozaeta are dead or the period when they served as partners should be stated therein.
Obviously, the purpose of the two firms in continuing the use of the names of their deceased
founders is to retain the clients who had customarily sought the legal services of Attorneys Sycip
77 of 122
and Ozaeta and to benefit from the goodwill attached to the names of those respected and
esteemed law practitioners. That is a legitimate motivation.
The retention of their names is not illegal per se. That practice was followed before the war by
the law firm of James Ross. Notwithstanding the death of Judge Ross the founder of the law firm
of Ross, Lawrence, Selph and Carrascoso, his name was retained in the firm name with an
indication of the year when he died. No one complained that the retention of the name of Judge
Ross in the firm name was illegal or unethical.
# Separate Opinions
FERNANDO, C.J., concurring:
The petitions are denied, as there are only four votes for granting them, seven of the Justices
being of the contrary view, as explained in the plurality opinion of Justice Ameurfina Melencio-
Herrera. It is out of delicadeza that the undersigned did not participate in the disposition of these
petitions, as the law office of Sycip, Salazar, Feliciano, Hernandez and Castillo started with the
partnership of Quisumbing, Sycip, and Quisumbing, the senior partner, the late Ramon
Quisumbing, being the father-in-law of the undersigned, and the most junior partner then,
Norberto J. Quisumbing, being his brother- in-law. For the record, the undersigned wishes to
invite the attention of all concerned, and not only of petitioners, to the last sentence of the
opinion of Justice Ameurfina Melencio-Herrera: 'Those names [Sycip and Ozaeta] may, however,
be included in the listing of individuals wtes
AQUINO, J., dissenting:
I dissent. The fourteen members of the law firm, Sycip, Salazar, Feliciano, Hernandez & Castillo,
in their petition of June 10, 1975, prayed for authority to continue the use of that firm name,
notwithstanding the death of Attorney Alexander Sycip on May 5, 1975 (May he rest in peace).
He was the founder of the firm which was originally known as the Sycip Law Office.
On the other hand, the seven surviving partners of the law firm, Ozaeta, Romulo, De Leon,
Mabanta & Reyes, in their petition of August 13, 1976, prayed that they be allowed to continue
using the said firm name notwithstanding the death of two partners, former Justice Roman
Ozaeta and his son, Herminio, on May 1, 1972 and February 14, 1976, respectively.
They alleged that the said law firm was a continuation of the Ozaeta Law Office which was
established in 1957 by Justice Ozaeta and his son and that, as to the said law firm, the name
Ozaeta has acquired an institutional and secondary connotation.
Article 1840 of the Civil Code, which speaks of the use by the partnership of the name of a
deceased partner as part of the partnership name, is cited to justify the petitions. Also invoked is
the canon that the continued use by a law firm of the name of a deceased partner, "when
permissible by local custom, is not unethical" as long as "no imposition or deception is practised
through this use" (Canon 33 of the Canons of Legal Ethics).
I am of the opinion that the petition may be granted with the condition that it be indicated in the
letterheads of the two firms (as the case may be) that Alexander Sycip, former Justice Ozaeta and
Herminio Ozaeta are dead or the period when they served as partners should be stated therein.
Obviously, the purpose of the two firms in continuing the use of the names of their deceased
founders is to retain the clients who had customarily sought the legal services of Attorneys Sycip
and Ozaeta and to benefit from the goodwill attached to the names of those respected and
esteemed law practitioners. That is a legitimate motivation.
The retention of their names is not illegal per se. That practice was followed before the war by
the law firm of James Ross. Notwithstanding the death of Judge Ross the founder of the law firm
of Ross, Lawrence, Selph and Carrascoso, his name was retained in the firm name with an
indication of the year when he died. No one complained that the retention of the name of Judge
Ross in the firm name was illegal or unethical.
78 of 122
A.M. Case No. 3195. December 18, 1989

MA. LIBERTAD SJ CANTILLER, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. HUMBERTO V. POTENCIANO, respondent.
Eduardo Cabreros, Jr. for complainant.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM
Public interest requires that an attorney exert his best efforts and ability in the prosecution or
defense of his client's cause. A lawyer who performs that duty with diligence and candor not only
protects the interests of his client; he also serves the ends of justice, does honor to the bar and
helps maintain the respect of the community to the legal profession. This is so because the
entrusted privilege to practice law carries with it the correlative duties not only to the client but
also to the court, to the bar or to the public. That circumstance explains the public concern for the
maintenance of an untarnished standard of conduct by every attorney towards his client. 1
Subject of this administrative complaint is Humberto V. Potenciano, a practicing lawyer and a
member of the Philippine Bar under Roll No. 21862. He is charged with deceit, fraud, and
misrepresentation, and also with gross misconduct, malpractice and of acts unbecoming of an
officer of the court.
The essential facts are as follows: 2
Complainant herein is the sister of Peregrina Cantiller, defendant in an action for "ejectment"
docketed as Civil Case No. 6046 before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila, Branch 57, San
Juan, Metro Manila.
Another action, likewise involving Peregrina but this time as plaintiff, was then pending before
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 168, Pasig, Metro Manila docketed as Civil Case No. 54117 for
"reconveyance with damages." Both actions involve the apartment unit being rented by
complainant and her sister.
When the two cases were concluded, Peregrina came out the losing party. Civil Case No. 54117
for reconveyance was ordered dismissed by the Regional Trial Court on June 8, 1987 while Civil
Case No. 6046 for ejectment was decided by the Metropolitan Trial Court against her.
On October 8, 1987 pursuant to the writ of execution issued in Civil Case No. 6046 for
ejectment, complainant and Peregrina were served a notice to vacate the rented premises within
four (4) days from receipt of notice.
Desperate and at a loss on what to do, they consulted a certain Sheriff Pagalunan, on the matter.
Pagalunan, in turn, introduced them to herein respondent. After such introduction, the parties
"impliedly agreed" that respondent would handle their case. Forthwith, a petition entitled
"Annulment of Judgment, Annulment of Sale and Damages with prayer for Preliminary
Injunction and/or Status Quo Order, etc." was prepared by respondent to forestall the execution
of the order to vacate in Civil Case No. 6046.
In the afternoon of October 9,1987, the complainant was made to sign by respondent what she
described as a "[h]astily prepared, poorly conceived, and haphazardly composed 3 petition for
annulment of judgment. Complainant alleges that respondent promised her that the necessary
restraining order would be secured if only because the judge who would hear the matter was his
"katsukaran" (close friend).
Thereupon, the petition was filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 153, Pasig, Metro
Manila and docketed as Civil Case No. 55118. Respondent demanded from the complainant one
thousand pesos (P l,000.00) as attorney's fee which the latter paid that same afternoon.
However, when the case was raffled and assigned to Branch 153, the presiding judge asked
respondent to withdraw as counsel in the case on the ground of their friendship.
On October 11, 1987, respondent went to the house of complainant and asked her to be ready
with two thousand pesos (P 2,000.00) to be given to another judge who will issue the restraining
order in the ejectment case (Civil Case No. 6046). Complainant and her sister were only able to
raise the amount of one thousand pesos which they immediately gave to respondent.
Later respondent informed the complainant and her sister that he could not locate the judge who
would issue the restraining order. The parties, then, instead went to the Max's Restaurant where
79 of 122
respondent ordered some food - including two plastic bags of food allegedly to be given to the
judge who would issue the restraining order. At this juncture, respondent asked for the remaining
balance of the two thousand pesos (P 2,000.00) which he earlier demanded. Complainant gave
her last money-a ten dollar ($ 10.00) bill.
Sometime after the filing of Civil Case No. 55118, respondent informed complainant and
Peregrina that there was a need to file another case with the Regional Trial Court to enable them
to retain possession of the apartment. For this purpose, respondent told complainant to prepare
the amount of Ten Thousand Pesos (P 10,000.00) allegedly to be deposited with the Treasurer's
Office of Pasig as purchase price of the apartment and another one thousand pesos (P 1,000.00)
to cover the expenses of the suit. Respondent stressed to the complainant the need and urgency of
filing the new complaint.
Complainant and Peregrina raised the said amounts through the kindness of some friends and
relatives. On October 26,1987, the money was handed over to the respondent.
On the same date, a complaint for "Specific Performance, Annulment of Simulated or Spurious
Sale with Damages," later docketed as Civil Case No. 55210, was filed by respondent with the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 165, Pasig, Metro Manila.
At the hearing of the preliminary injunction in Civil Case No. 55118 on October 30, 1987,
respondent, contrary to his promise that he would secure a restraining order, withdrew his
appearance as counsel for complainant. Complainant was not able to get another lawyer as
replacement. Thus, no restraining order or preliminary injunction was obtained. As a
consequence, the order to vacate in Civil Case No. 6046 was eventually enforced and executed.
Sometime thereafter, it came to complainant's knowledge that there was really no need to make a
deposit of ten thousand pesos (P l0,000.00) relative to Civil Case No. 55210. After further
inquiry, she found out that in fact there was no such deposit made. Thus, on December 23,1987,
complainant sent a demand letter to respondent asking for the return of the total amount of
eleven thousand pesos (P 11,000.00) which the former earlier gave to the latter. However, this
letter was never answered and the money was never returned. Hence, complainant lodged this
administrative complaint against herein respondent.
Meanwhile, on December 29,1987, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 153, dismissed Civil Case
No. 55118 for failure to state a cause of action.4 On January 20,1988, Civil Case No. 5521 0 was
likewise dismissed for being identical with Civil Case No. 55118. 5
Respondent in his answer contends that the filing of Civil Cases Nos. 55118 and 55210 was done
in good faith and that the allegations of complainant relative to the administrative charge against
him are all lies, product of one's imagination and only intended to harrass him. 6
This Court agrees that the petitions in Civil Cases Nos. 55118 and 55210 appear to be poorly
prepared and written. having represented himself capable of picking up the cudgels for the
apparently lost cause of complainant respondent should have carefully prepared the pleadings if
only to establish the justness of his representation. The little time involved is no excuse.
Complainant reposed full faith in him. His first duty was to file the best pleading within his
capability. Apparently respondent was more interested in getting the most out of the complainant
who was in a hopeless situation. He bragged about his closeness to the judge concerned in one
case and talked about the need to "buy" the restraining order in the other. Worse still he got P
10,000.00 as alleged deposit in court which he never deposited. Instead he pocketed the same.
The pattern to milk the complainant dry is obvious.
When a lawyer takes a client's cause, he thereby covenants that he will exert all effort for its
prosecution until its final conclusion. The failure to exercise due diligence or the abandonment of
a client's cause makes such lawyer unworthy of the trust which the client had reposed on him.
The acts of respondent in this case violate the most elementary principles of professional ethics .
7
The Court finds that respondent failed to exercise due diligence in protecting his client's interests.
Respondent had knowledge beforehand that he would be asked by the presiding judge in Civil
Case No. 55118 to withdraw his appearance as counsel by reason of their friendship. Despite
such prior knowledge, respondent took no steps to find a replacement nor did he inform
complainant of this fact.
Even assuming that respondent had no previous knowledge that he would be asked to withdraw,
the record is quite clear that four (4) days prior to the hearing of the preliminary injunction in
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Civil Case No. 55118 respondent already filed a motion therein withdrawing as complainant's
counsel interposing as reason therefor his frequent attacks of pain due to hemorrhoids. Despite
this void, respondent failed to find a replacement. He did not even ask complainant to hire
another lawyer in his stead. 8
His actuation is definitely inconsistent with his duty to protect with utmost dedication the interest
of his client and of the fidelity, trust and confidence which he owes his client. 9 More so in this
case, where by reason of his gross negligence complainant thereby suffered by losing all her
cases.
The filing of Civil Case No. 55210 on October 26, 1987, the same day that he had already filed a
motion to withdraw as counsel for complainant in Civil Case No. 55118, reveals his lack of good
faith as an advocate. He also failed to appear for the complainant in said case. It was all a show
to get more money from her. This adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law. When
confronted with this evident irregularity, he lamely stated that while he did not physically appear
for complainant he nevertheless prepared and drafted the pleadings.
His services were engaged by complainant hoping that the property subject of the ejectment
proceeding would be returned to her. In fact, it was respondent who persuaded complainant that
the filing of these two cases simultaneously were the means by which this objective can be
achieved. His duty was not only to prepare the pleadings but to represent complainant until the
termination of the cases. This he failed to do.
His representation that there was an immediate need to file Civil Case No. 55210 when he
already knew that he could no longer physically handle the same is an act of deception of his
client.10 It shows lack of fidelity to his oath of office as a member of the Philippine bar.
The allegation of respondent that the ten thousand pesos (P 10,000.00) was given to him as fee
for his services, is simply incredible. Indeed, such amount is grossly disproportionate with the
service he actually rendered. 11 And his failure to return even a portion of the amount upon
demand of complainant all the more bolsters the protestation of complainant that respondent
does not deserve to remain as an officer of the court.
Lawyers are indispensable part of the whole system of administering justice in this jurisdiction.
At a time when strong and disturbing criticisms are being hurled at the legal profession, strict
compliance with one's oath of office and the canons of professional ethics is an imperative.
Lawyers should be fair, honest, respectable, above suspicion and beyond reproach in dealing
with their clients. The profession is not synonymous with an ordinary business proposition. It is a
matter of public interest.
WHEREFORE, after considering the entirety of the circumstances present in this case, this Court
finds Atty. Humberto V. Potenciano to be guilty of the charges against him and hereby
SUSPENDS him from the practice of law for an indefinite period until such time he can
demonstrate that he has rehabilitated himself as to deserve to resume the practice of law.
Finally, respondent is hereby ordered to return to complainant herein the sum of eleven thousand
pesos (P11,000.00) with legal interest from the date of this resolution until it is actually returned.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco,
Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento, Cortes, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.
81 of 122
A.C. No. 2505 February 21, 1992

EVANGELINE LEDA, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. TREBONIAN TABANG, respondent.
PER CURIAM:
Complainant, Evangeline Leda, squarely puts in issue respondent Atty. Trebonian Tabang's good
moral character, in two Complaints she had filed against him, one docketed as Bar Matter No. 78
instituted on 6 January 1982, and the present Administrative Case No. 2505, which is a Petition
for Disbarment, filed on 14 February 1983.
It appears that on 3 October 1976, Respondent and Complainant contracted marriage at
Tigbauan, Iloilo. The marriage, solemnized by Judge Jose T. Tavarro of Tigbauan, was performed
under Article 76 of the Civil
Code1 as one of exceptional character (Annex "A", Petition).
The parties agreed to keep the fact of marriage a secret until after Respondent had finished his
law studies (began in l977), and had taken the Bar examinations (in 1981), allegedly to ensure a
stable future for them. Complainant admits, though, that they had not lived together as husband
and wife (Letter-Complaint, 6 January 1982).
Respondent finished his law studies in 1981 and thereafter applied to take the Bar. In his
application, he declared that he was "single." He then passed the examinations but Complainant
blocked him from taking his Oath by instituting Bar Matter No. 78, claiming that Respondent
had acted fraudulently in filling out his application and, thus, was unworthy to take the lawyer's
Oath for lack of good moral character. Complainant also alleged that after Respondent's law
studies, he became aloof and "abandoned" her (Petition, par. 5).
The Court deferred Respondent's Oath-taking and required him to answer the Complaint.
Respondent filed his "Explanation," dated 26 May 1982 which was received on 7 June 1982.
Said "Explanation" carries Complainant's conformity (Records, p. 6). Therein, he admitted that
he was "legally married" to Complainant on 3 October 1976 but that the marriage "was not as yet
made and declared public" so that he could proceed with his law studies and until after he could
take the Bar examinations "in order to keep stable our future." He also admitted having indicated
that he was "single" in his application to take the Bar "for reason that to my honest belief, I have
still to declare my status as single since my marriage with the complainant was not as yet made
and declared public." He further averred that he and Complainant had reconciled as shown by
her conformity to the "Explanation," for which reason he prayed that the Complaint be
dismissed.
Respondent also filed a Motion to Dismiss, dated 2 June 1982. Attached to it was Complainant's
Affidavit of Desistance, which stated that Bar Matter No. 78 arose out of a misunderstanding and
communication gap and that she was refraining from pursuing her Complaint against
Respondent.
Acting on the aforesaid Motion and Comment, the Court dismissed Bar Matter No. 78 and
allowed Respondent to take his Oath in a Resolution dated 20 August 1982.
On 14 February 1983, however, Complainant filed this Administrative Case, this time praying for
Respondent's disbarment based on the following grounds:
a. For having made use of his legal knowledge to contract an invalid marriage with me assuming
that our marriage is not valid, and making a mockery of our marriage institution.
b. For having misrepresented himself as single when in truth he is already married in his
application to take the bar exam.
c. For being not of good moral character contrary to the certification he submitted to the Supreme
Court;
d. For (sic) guilty of deception for the reason that he deceived me into signing of the affidavit of
desistance and the conformity to his explanation and later on the comment to his motion to
dismiss, when in truth and in fact he is not sincere, for he only befriended me to resume our
marriage and introduced me to his family, friends and relatives as his wife, for a bad motive that
is he wanted me to withdraw my complaint against him with the Supreme Court.
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Attached to Complainant's Petition for Disbarment, as Annex "F," is an undated and unsigned
letter addressed to Complainant, allegedly written by Respondent after he had already taken his
Oath stating, among others, that while he was grateful for Complainant's help, he "could not
force myself to be yours," did not love her anymore and considered her only a friend. Their
marriage contract was actually void for failure to comply with the requisites of Article 76 of the
Civil Code, among them the minimum cohabitation for five (5) years before the celebration of
the marriage, an affidavit to that effect by the solemnizing officer, and that the parties must be at
least twenty-one (21) years of age, which they were not as they were both only twenty years old
at the time. He advised Complainant not to do anything more so as not to put her family name
"in shame." As for him, he had "attain(ed) my goal as a full-pledge (sic) professional and there is
nothing you can do for it to take away from me even (sic) you go to any court." According to
Complainant, although the letter was unsigned, Respondent's initials appear on the upper left-
hand corner of the airmail envelope (Exh. "8-A-1").
Respondent denied emphatically that he had sent such a letter contending that it is Complainant
who has been indulging in fantasy and fabrications.
In his Comment in the present case, Respondent avers that he and Complainant had covenanted
not to disclose the marriage not because he wanted to finish his studies and take the Bar first but
for the reason that said marriage was void from the beginning in the absence of the requisites of
Article 76 of the Civil Code that the contracting parties shall have lived together as husband and
wife for at least five (5) years before the date of the marriage and that said parties shall state the
same in an affidavit before any person authorized by law to administer oaths. He could not have
abandoned Complainant because they had never lived together as husband and wife. When he
applied for the 1981 Bar examinations, he honestly believed that in the eyes of the law, he was
single.
On 7 May 1984, the Court referred the Complaint to the Solicitor General for investigation,
report and recommendation. On 5 March 1990, the Solicitor General submitted his Report, with
the recommendation that Respondent be exonerated from the charges against him since
Complainant failed to attend the hearings and to substantiate her charges but that he be
reprimanded for making inconsistent and conflicting statements in the various pleadings he had
filed before this Court.
On 26 March 1990, the Court referred the Solicitor General's Report to the Bar Confidant for
evaluation, report and recommendation. In an undated Report, the latter recommended the
indefinite suspension of Respondent until the status of his marriage is settled.
Upon the facts on Record even without testimonial evidence from Complainant, we find
Respondent's lack of good moral character sufficiently established.
Firstly, his declaration in his application for Admission to the 1981 Bar Examinations that he was
"single" was a gross misrepresentation of a material fact made in utter bad faith, for which he
should be made answerable. Rule 7.01, Canon 7, Chapter II of the Code of Professional
Responsibility explicitly provides: "A lawyer shall be answerable for knowingly making a false
statement or suppression of a material fact in connection with his application for admission to the
bar." That false statement, if it had been known, would have disqualified him outright from
taking the Bar Examinations as it indubitably exhibits lack of good moral character.
Respondent's protestations that he had acted in good faith in declaring his status as "single" not
only because of his pact with Complainant to keep the marriage under wraps but also because
that marriage to the Complainant was void from the beginning, are mere afterthoughts absolutely
wanting of merit. Respondent can not assume that his marriage to Complainant is void. The
presumption is that all the requisites and conditions of a marriage of an exceptional character
under Article 76 of the Civil Code have been met and that the Judge's official duty in connection
therewith has been regularly performed.
Secondly, Respondent's conduct in adopting conflicting positions in the various pleadings
submitted in Bar Matter No. 78 and in the case at bar is duplicitous and deplorable.
The records show that in Bar Matter No. 78, Respondent had submitted an "Explanation," in
paragraph 1, page 1 of which he admits having been "legally married" to Complainant. Yet,
during the hearings before the Solicitor General, he denied under oath that he had submitted any
such pleading (t.s.n., p. 21) contending instead that it is only the second page where his signature
appears that he meant to admit and not the averments on the first page which were merely of
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Complainant's own making (ibid., pp. 59-60). However, in his Comment in this Administrative
Case, he admits and makes reference to such "Explanation" (pars. 3[f]) and [g]; 4[b]).
Again, while in said "Explanation" he admitted having been "legally married" to Complainant
(par. 1), in this case, however, he denies the legality of the marriage and, instead, harps on its
being void ab initio. He even denies his signature in the marriage contract.
In Bar Matter No. 78, Respondent also averred that the fact of marriage was not to be made
public so as to allow him to finish his studies and take the Bar. In this case, however, he contends
that the reason it was kept a secret was because it was "not in order from the beginning."
Thirdly, Respondent denies that he had sent the unsigned letter (Annex "F," Petition) to
Complainant. However, its very tenor coincides with the reasons that he advances in his
Comment why the marriage is void from the beginning, that is, for failure to comply with the
requisites of Article 76 of the Civil Code.
Fourthly, the factual scenario gathered from the records shows that Respondent had reconciled
with Complainant and admitted the marriage to put a quick finish to Bar Matter No. 78 to enable
him to take the lawyer's Oath, which otherwise he would have been unable to do. But after he
had done so and had become a "full-pledge (sic) lawyer," he again refused to honor his marriage
to Complainant.
Respondent's lack of good moral character is only too evident. He has resorted to conflicting
submissions before this Court to suit himself. He has also engaged in devious tactics with
Complainant in order to serve his purpose. In so doing, he has violated Canon 10 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, which provides that "a lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith
to the court" as well as Rule 1001 thereof which states that "a lawyer should do no falsehood nor
consent to the doing of any in Court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the court to be misled by any
artifice." Courts are entitled to expect only complete candor and honesty from the lawyers
appearing and pleading before them (Chavez v. Viola, Adm. Case No. 2152, 19 April 1991, 196
SCRA 10). Respondent, through his actuations, has been lacking in the candor required of him
not only as a member of the Bar but also as an officer of the Court.
It cannot be overemphasized that the requirement of good moral character is not only a condition
precedent to admission to the practice of law; its continued possession is also essential for
remaining in the practice of law (People v. Tuanda, Adm. Case No. 3360, 30 January 1990, 181
SCRA 692). As so aptly put by Mr. Justice George A. Malcolm: "As good character is an
essential qualification for admission of an attorney to practice, when the attorney's character is
bad in such respects as to show that he is unsafe and unfit to be entrusted with the powers of an
attorney, the courts retain the power to discipline him (Piatt v. Abordo, 58 Phil. 350 [1933]).
WHEREFORE, finding respondent Trebonian C. Tabang grossly unfit and unworthy to continue
to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities belonging to the office of an attorney, he is
hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law until further Orders, the suspension to take effect
immediately.
Copies of this Decision shall be entered in his personal record as an attorney and served on the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Court Administrator who shall circulate the same to all
Courts in the country for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Griño-
Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero and Nocon, JJ., concur.
84 of 122
A.M. No. 3360 January 30, 1990

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, complainant
vs.
ATTY. FE T. TUANDA, respondent.
PER CURIAM:
In a Motion to Lift Order of Suspension dated 12 July 1989, respondent Fe T. Tuanda, a member
of the Philippine Bar, asks this Court to lift the suspension from the practice of law imposed
upon her by a decision of the Court of Appeals dated 17 October 1988 in C.A.-G.R. CR No.
05093.
On 17 December 1983, respondent received from one Herminia A. Marquez several pieces of
jewelry, with a total stated value of P36,000.00, for sale on a commission basis, with the
condition that the respondent would turn over the sales proceeds and return the unsold items to
Ms. Marquez on or before 14 February 1984. Sometime in February 1984, respondent, instead of
returning the unsold pieces of jewelry which then amounted to approximately P26,250.00, issued
three checks: (a) a check dated 16 February 1984 for the amount of P5,400.00; (b) a check dated
23 February 1984 also for the amount of P5,400.00; and (c) a check dated 25 February 1984 for
the amount of P15,450.00. Upon presentment for payment within ninety (90) days after their
issuance, all three (3) checks were dishonored by the drawee bank, Traders Royal Bank, for
insufficiency of funds. Notwithstanding receipt of the notice of dishonor, respondent made no
arrangements with the bank concerning the honoring of checks which had bounced and made no
effort to settle her obligations to Ms. Marquez.
Consequently, four (4) informations were filed against respondent with the Regional Trial Court
of Manila: (a) one for estafa, docketed as Criminal Case No. 85-38358; and (b) three (3) for
violation of B.P. Blg. 22, docketed respectively as Criminal Cases Nos. 85-38359, 85-38360 and
85-38361. In due time, after trial, the trial court rendered a decision dated 25 August 1987 which:
(a) acquitted respondent of the charge of estafa; and
(b) convicted respondent of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 in all three (3) cases, and sentenced
respondent to pay a fine of P6,000.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to
indemnify the complainant in the amount of P5,400.00 in Criminal Case No. 8538359;
to pay a fine of P 6,000.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to indemnify
the complainant in the amount of P5,400.00, in Criminal Case No. 85-38360; and
to pay a fine of P16,000.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to
indemnify the complainant in the amount of P15,450.00, in Criminal Case No. 85-38361, and to
pay the costs in all three (3) cases.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. CR No. 05093 affirmed in toto the decision of the
trial court but, in addition, suspended respondent Tuanda from the practice of law. The pertinent
portion of the decision read as follows:
For reasons above stated and finding the evidence sufficient to sustain the conviction, the
judgment is hereby AFFIRMED subject to this modification.
It appearing from the records that the accused Fe Tuanda is a member of the Bar, and the offense
for (sic) which she is found guilty involved moral turpitude, she is hereby ordered suspended
from the practice of law and shall not practice her profession until further action from the
Supreme Court, in accordance with Sections 27 and 28 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. A copy
of this decision must be forwarded to the Supreme Court as required by Section 29 of the same
Rule.
SO ORDERED. 1
On 16 December 1988, respondent filed a Notice of Appeal with the Court of Appeals. The Court
of Appeals, in a Resolution dated 9 January 1989, noted respondent's Notice of Appeal and
advised her "to address her Notice of Appeal to the Honorable Supreme Court, the proper
forum." On 1 February 1989, respondent filed with this Court a Notice of Appeal.
In a Resolution dated 31 May 1989, the Supreme Court noted without action respondent's Notice
of Appeal and declared that the Court of Appeals' decision of 17 October 1988 had become final
and executory upon expiration of the period for filing a petition for review on certiorari on 16
December 1988. In that Resolution, the Court found that respondent had lost her right to appeal
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by certiorari when she posted with this Court a Notice of Appeal instead of filing a petition for
review on certiorari under Section 1, Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court within the
reglementary period.
In the instant Motion to Lift Order of Suspension, respondent states:
that suspension from the practice of law is indeed a harsh if not a not painful penalty aggravating
the lower court's penalty of fine considering that accused-appellant's action on the case during
the trial on the merits at the lower court has always been motivated purely by sincere belief that
she is innocent of the offense charged nor of the intention to cause damage to the herein plaintiff-
appellee.
We read the above statement as a claim by the respondent that, she had not violated her oath as a
member of the Philippine Bar upon the ground that when she issued the checks which bounced,
she did not intend to cause damage to complainant Ms. Marquez.
The Court affirms the suspension from the practice of law imposed by the Court of Appeals upon
respondent Tuanda. The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that "the offense [of] which she is
found guilty involved moral turpitude." We should add that violation of B.P. Blg. 22 is a serious
criminal offense which deleteriously affects public interest and public order. In Lozano v.
Martinez,2 the Court explained the nature of the offense of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 in the
following terms:
x x x x x x x x x
The gravamen of the offense punished by B.P. Blg. 22 is the act of making and issuing a
worthless check or a check that is dishonored upon its presentation for payment. . . . The thrust of
the law is to prohibit under pain of penal sanctions, the making of worthless checks and putting
them in circulation. Because of its deleterious effects on the public interest, the practice is
prescribed by the law. The law punishes the act not as an offense against property but an offense
against public order.
x x x x x x x x x
The effects of the issuance of a worthless check transcends the private interests of the parties
directly involved in the transaction and touches the interests of the community at large. The
mischief it creates is not only a wrong to the payee or holder, but also an injury to the public.
The harmful practice of putting valueless commercial papers in circulation, multiplied a
thousandfold, can very well pollute the channels of trade and commerce, injure the banking
system and eventually hurt the welfare of society and the public interest. 3(Italics supplied)
Respondent was thus correctly suspended from the practice of law because she had been
convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude. Sections 27 and 28 of Rule 138 of the Revised
Rules of Court provide as follows:
Sec. 27. Attorneys renewed or suspended by Supreme Court on what grounds. A member of the
bar may be removed or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court of any
deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by
reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath
which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a wilful disobedience of any
lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or wilfully appearing as an attorney for a party
to a case without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of
gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice. (Italics
supplied)
Sec. 28. Suspension of attorney by the Court of Appeals or a Court of First Instance. — The
Court of Appeals or a Court of First Instance may suspend an attorney from practice for any of
the causes named in the last preceding section, and after such suspension such attorney shall not
practice his profession until further action of the Supreme Court in the premises. (Italics
supplied)
We should add that the crimes of which respondent was convicted also import deceit and
violation of her attorney's oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility under both of which
she was bound to "obey the laws of the land." Conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude
might not (as in the instant case, violation of B.P. Blg. 22 does not) relate to the exercise of the
profession of a lawyer; however, it certainly relates to and affects the good moral character of a
person convicted of such offense. In Melendrez v. Decena, 4 this Court stressed that:
86 of 122
the nature of the office of an attorney at law requires that she shall be a person of good moral
character.1âwphi1 This qualification is not only a condition precedent to an admission to the
practice of law; its continued possession is also essential for remaining in the practice of law. 5
ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to DENY the Motion to Lift Order of Suspension.
Respondent shall remain suspended from the practice of law until further orders from this Court.
A copy of this Resolution shall be forwarded to the Bar Confidant and to the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines and spread on the record of respondent.
Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin,
Sarmiento, Cortes and Griño-Aquino, JJ., concur.
Gutierrez, Jr., Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., in the result.
87 of 122
ADM. CASE No. 6595 April 15, 2005

JOSEPH SAMALA, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. ANTONUITTI K. PALAÑA, respondent.
RESOLUTION
AZCUNA, J.:
This is a complaint filed by Joseph Samala against respondent Atty. Antonuitti K. Palaña for
alleged fraudulent activities that violate the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Sometime in February 2001, complainant was looking for a company where he could invest his
dollar savings. He met Raymond Taino, a trader-employee of First Imperial Resources, Inc.
(FIRI), a company located at Legaspi Village, Makati City. Taino introduced him to FIRI
Manager Jun Agustin, Chief Trader Diosdado Bernal, and Legal Officer Antonuitti K. Palaña, the
respondent herein.
Complainant expressed his concern to the said three officers of FIRI about having been warned
of numerous fraudulent businesses in the Philippines. Respondent assured him that through FIRI
he would be directly putting his investment with Eastern Vanguard Forex Limited, a reputable
company based in the Virgin Islands which has been in the foreign exchange business for 13
years. The three officers presented to him their company profile and documents purporting to
establish their relationship with Eastern Vanguard Forex Limited.
Due to the personal representations and assurances of respondent, Agustin, and Bernal,
complainant was convinced and he invested his dollar savings with FIRI on March 9, 2001.
Subsequently, complainant decided to pull out his investment. On April 5, 2001, he sent FIRI a
letter requesting the withdrawal of his investment amounting to US$10,000 and giving FIRI 10
days to prepare the money.
On April 15, 2001, complainant asked Agustin when his money would be returned. Agustin told
him that the request was sent to Thomas Yiu of Eastern Vanguard at Ortigas Center.
Complainant went to see Thomas Yiu at his office. Yiu was surprised when he saw the
documents involving complainant's investment. Yiu phoned Agustin and demanded an
explanation as to where the money was. Agustin said that he would return complainant's
investment at FIRI's office in Makati. On the same day, in the presence of respondent, Agustin
delivered to complainant a check in the amount of P574,045.09, as the peso equivalent of
complainant's investment with FIRI. On May 2, 2001, the said check was dishonored because it
was drawn against insufficient funds.
Complainant informed respondent of the dishonor of the check. Respondent assured him that the
check would be replaced. On June 1, 2001, respondent, as legal officer of FIRI, gave
complainant P250,000 in cash and a check in the amount of P329,045.09. Respondent told
complainant that the check was signed by FIRI President Paul Desiderio in his (respondent's)
presence and assured complainant that the check would be funded. But on June 28, 2001, the
check was dishonored because it was drawn against insufficient funds.
On July 14, 2001, complainant charged Paul Desiderio of Estafa and Violation of Batas
Pambansa Bilang 22 at the Prosecutor's Office of Makati. On November 4, 2001, Judge Evelyn
Arcaya-Chua of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Makati City, issued a warrant of arrest against Paul
Desiderio.
On March 5, 2002, complainant joined three police officers in serving the warrant of arrest
against Paul Desiderio at No. 10 Damascus St., Northeast Executive Village, B.F. Homes,
Parañaque City. Complainant got the said address of Paul Desiderio from the documents of FIRI.
Although there was a street named Damascus in the said village, there was no residence
numbered "10." The police officers checked the existence of the said address and resident at the
office of the subdivision association. They were told that no such address existed and that no
resident named Paul Desiderio lived in the subdivision.
Complainant alleged that respondent's act of representing himself to be the legal officer of FIRI
and his assurance that the check he personally delivered to him was signed in his presence by
FIRI Officer Paul Desiderio, when no such person appears to exist, is clearly fraudulent and
violative of the Canons of Professional Ethics.1
Complainant requested the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for a thorough investigation of
respondent as a member of the bar.
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In an Order dated January 27, 2003, Director for Bar Discipline Victor C. Fernandez required
respondent to submit his Answer to the Complaint within 15 days from receipt thereof. Despite
receipt of said order as evidenced by a registry return receipt dated February 3, 2003, respondent
did not submit an Answer.
The case was referred to Commissioner Lydia A. Navarro of the Commission on Bar Discipline
for investigation. Respondent failed to appear when the case was set for hearing on April 8,
2003, despite due notice. Hence, respondent was declared in default and the case was heard ex
parte.
Based on the evidence adduced, Commissioner Navarro reported, thus:
[R]espondent was instrumental in the issuance of the check signed by the alleged President of
FIRI, Paul Desiderio, whose whereabouts could not be located and whose identity was
unknown[,] for respondent was the one who handed personally to the herein complainant the
check which was dishonored due to insufficient funds, when it was the very respondent, Atty.
Palaña, who allegedly assured that the check was funded. Respondent was also one of those
alleged officers of FIRI who assured complainant that his investment was directly placed in a
re[p]utable company.
Further investigation by the complainant with the assistance of NBI officers showed that
respondent Palaña was also linked with Belkin's whose activity was the same as the FIRI and the
SEC has on file the By-Laws of FIRI wherein it was stated that[,] to wit: "the primary purpose of
which is to act as consultant in providing professional expertise and reliable data analysis related
to partnership and so on. And the corporation shall not engage in the business as securities
advisor, stockbroker or investment house[:] Q. x x x A. First Imperial is prohibited from
engaging in foreign exchange business. Q. x x x A. And despite [. . .] this prohibition, they went
on and engaged in activities which are prohibited specifically in their by-laws" (TSN pages 16
and 17 of July 17, 2003, CBD Case No. 02-1048).
It is evident from the foregoing that respondent and his cohorts violated the main purpose of the
FIRI By-Laws particularly investment or foreign exchange business which must have been the
reason why Yiu was surprised and got mad when complainant approached him about his dollar
savings investment of USD10,000 received by the respondent as Legal Officer and the two (2)
other alleged officers Agustin and Bernal of the FIRI[,] a transaction expressly prohibited by the
FIRI By-laws.2
Respondent was found to have violated Rule 7.03 of Canon 7 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, which states:
Rule 7.03 – A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice
law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit
of the legal profession.
Commissioner Navarro thus recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of
law for six (6) months.
In its Resolution dated July 30, 2004, the Board of Governors of the IBP adopted and approved
the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner with the modification that
respondent should be suspended from the practice of law for three (3) years.
This Court agrees with the IBP Board of Governors.
The Code of Professional Responsibility mandates that "a lawyer shall at all times uphold the
integrity and dignity of the legal profession.3 To this end, nothing should be done by any
member of the legal fraternity which might tend to lessen in any degree the confidence of the
public in the fidelity, honesty and integrity of the profession.4
In this case, respondent assured complainant that by investing his dollar savings with FIRI, his
investment was in a stable company, even if, as it was later discovered, the by-laws of FIRI
prohibited it from engaging in investment or foreign exchange business and its primary purpose
is "to act as consultant in providing professional expertise and reliable data analysis related to
partnership and so on."
When complainant decided to withdraw his investment from FIRI, the first check given to him in
the amount of his total investment bounced. Thereafter, respondent, as legal officer of FIRI,
gave complainant P250,000 in cash and a check for P329,045.09. Respondent assured
complainant that the second check was a "good check" and that it was signed by Paul Desiderio,
the alleged president of FIRI. However, the said check bounced because it was drawn against
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insufficient funds, and the drawer of the check, Paul Desiderio, could not be located when sought
to be served a warrant of arrest since his identity was unknown and his residential address was
found to be non-existent.
Hence, it is clear that the representations of respondent as legal officer of FIRI caused material
damage to complainant. In so doing, respondent failed to uphold the integrity and dignity of the
legal profession and lessened the confidence of the public in the honesty and integrity of the
same.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Antonuitti K. Palaña is found GUILTY of violating Rule 7.03
of the Code of Professional Responsibility and hereby suspended from the practice of law for a
period of three (3) years effective from receipt of this Resolution, with a warning that a repetition
of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely. Let a copy of this resolution be
spread on the records of respondent, and furnished to all courts, the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, and the Office of the Bar Confidant.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J. Puno, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio,
Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., Tinga, Chico-Nazario, and Garcia, JJ.,
concur.
G.R. Nos. 151809-12. April 12, 2005

PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT (PCGG), Petitioners,
vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN (Fifth Division), LUCIO C. TAN, CARMEN KHAO TAN,
FLORENCIO T. SANTOS, NATIVIDAD P. SANTOS, DOMINGO CHUA, TAN HUI NEE,
MARIANO TAN ENG LIAN, ESTATE OF BENITO TAN KEE HIONG (represented by
TARCIANA C. TAN), FLORENCIO N. SANTOS, JR., HARRY C. TAN, TAN ENG
CHAN, CHUNG POE KEE, MARIANO KHOO, MANUEL KHOO, MIGUEL KHOO,
JAIME KHOO, ELIZABETH KHOO, CELSO RANOLA, WILLIAM T. WONG,
ERNESTO B. LIM, BENJAMIN T. ALBACITA, WILLY CO, ALLIED BANKING CORP.,
ALLIED LEASING AND FINANCE CORPORATION, ASIA BREWERY, INC., BASIC
HOLDINGS CORP., FOREMOST FARMS, INC., FORTUNE TOBACCO CORP.,
GRANDSPAN DEVELOPMENT CORP., HIMMEL INDUSTRIES, IRIS HOLDINGS
AND DEVELOPMENT CORP., JEWEL HOLDINGS, INC., MANUFACTURING
SERVICES AND TRADE CORP., MARANAW HOTELS AND RESORT CORP.,
NORTHERN TOBACCO REDRYING PLANT, PROGRESSIVE FARMS, INC.,
SHAREHOLDINGS, INC., SIPALAY TRADING CORP., VIRGO HOLDINGS &
DEVELOPMENT CORP., and ATTY. ESTELITO P. MENDOZA, Respondents.
DECISION
PUNO, J.:
This case is prima impressiones and it is weighted with significance for it concerns on one hand,
the efforts of the Bar to upgrade the ethics of lawyers in government service and on the other, its
effect on the right of government to recruit competent counsel to defend its interests.
In 1976, General Bank and Trust Company (GENBANK) encountered financial difficulties.
GENBANK had extended considerable financial support to Filcapital Development Corporation
causing it to incur daily overdrawings on its current account with the Central Bank.1 It was later
found by the Central Bank that GENBANK had approved various loans to directors, officers,
stockholders and related interests totaling ₱172.3 million, of which 59% was classified as
doubtful and ₱0.505 million as uncollectible.2 As a bailout, the Central Bank extended
emergency loans to GENBANK which reached a total of ₱310 million.3 Despite the mega
loans, GENBANK failed to recover from its financial woes. On March 25, 1977, the Central
Bank issued a resolution declaring GENBANK insolvent and unable to resume business with
safety to its depositors, creditors and the general public, and ordering its liquidation.4 A public
bidding of GENBANK’s assets was held from March 26 to 28, 1977, wherein the Lucio Tan
group submitted the winning bid.5 Subsequently, former Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza
filed a petition with the then Court of First Instance praying for the assistance and supervision
of the court in GENBANK’s liquidation as mandated by Section 29 of Republic Act No. 265.
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In February 1986, the EDSA I revolution toppled the Marcos government. One of the first acts of
President Corazon C. Aquino was to establish the Presidential Commission on Good
Government (PCGG) to recover the alleged ill-gotten wealth of former President Ferdinand
Marcos, his family and his cronies. Pursuant to this mandate, the PCGG, on July 17, 1987, filed
with the Sandiganbayan a complaint for "reversion, reconveyance, restitution, accounting
and damages" against respondents Lucio Tan, Carmen Khao Tan, Florencio T. Santos, Natividad
P. Santos, Domingo Chua, Tan Hui Nee, Mariano Tan Eng Lian, Estate of Benito Tan Kee Hiong,
Florencio N. Santos, Jr., Harry C. Tan, Tan Eng Chan, Chung Poe Kee, Mariano Khoo, Manuel
Khoo, Miguel Khoo, Jaime Khoo, Elizabeth Khoo, Celso Ranola, William T. Wong, Ernesto B.
Lim, Benjamin T. Albacita, Willy Co, Allied Banking Corporation (Allied Bank), Allied Leasing
and Finance Corporation, Asia Brewery, Inc., Basic Holdings Corp., Foremost Farms, Inc.,
Fortune Tobacco Corporation, Grandspan Development Corp., Himmel Industries, Iris Holdings
and Development Corp., Jewel Holdings, Inc., Manufacturing Services and Trade Corp.,
Maranaw Hotels and Resort Corp., Northern Tobacco Redrying Plant, Progressive Farms, Inc.,
Shareholdings, Inc., Sipalay Trading Corp., Virgo Holdings & Development Corp., (collectively
referred to herein as respondents Tan, et al.), then President Ferdinand E. Marcos, Imelda R.
Marcos, Panfilo O. Domingo, Cesar Zalamea, Don Ferry and Gregorio Licaros. The case was
docketed as Civil Case No. 0005 of the Second Division of the Sandiganbayan.6 In connection
therewith, the PCGG issued several writs of sequestration on properties allegedly acquired by
the above-named persons by taking advantage of their close relationship and influence with
former President Marcos.
Respondents Tan, et al. repaired to this Court and filed petitions for certiorari, prohibition and
injunction to nullify, among others, the writs of sequestration issued by the PCGG.7 After the
filing of the parties’ comments, this Court referred the cases to the Sandiganbayan for proper
disposition. These cases were docketed as Civil Case Nos. 0096-0099. In all these cases,
respondents Tan, et al. were represented by their counsel, former Solicitor General Estelito P.
Mendoza, who has then resumed his private practice of law.
On February 5, 1991, the PCGG filed motions to disqualify respondent Mendoza as counsel
for respondents Tan, et al. with the Second Division of the Sandiganbayan in Civil Case Nos.
00058 and 0096-0099.9 The motions alleged that respondent Mendoza, as then Solicitor General10
and counsel to Central Bank, "actively intervened" in the liquidation of GENBANK, which
was subsequently acquired by respondents Tan, et al. and became Allied Banking Corporation.
Respondent Mendoza allegedly "intervened" in the acquisition of GENBANK by respondents
Tan, et al. when, in his capacity as then Solicitor General, he advised the Central Bank’s officials
on the procedure to bring about GENBANK’s liquidation and appeared as counsel for the
Central Bank in connection with its petition for assistance in the liquidation of GENBANK
which he filed with the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Manila and was
docketed as Special Proceeding No. 107812. The motions to disqualify invoked Rule 6.03 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility. Rule 6.03 prohibits former government lawyers from
accepting "engagement or employment in connection with any matter in which he had intervened
while in said service."
On April 22, 1991 the Second Division of the Sandiganbayan issued a resolution denying
PCGG’s motion to disqualify respondent Mendoza in Civil Case No. 0005.11 It found that the
PCGG failed to prove the existence of an inconsistency between respondent Mendoza’s former
function as Solicitor General and his present employment as counsel of the Lucio Tan group. It
noted that respondent Mendoza did not take a position adverse to that taken on behalf of the
Central Bank during his term as Solicitor General.12 It further ruled that respondent Mendoza’s
appearance as counsel for respondents Tan, et al. was beyond the one-year prohibited period
under Section 7(b) of Republic Act No. 6713 since he ceased to be Solicitor General in the year
1986. The said section prohibits a former public official or employee from practicing his
profession in connection with any matter before the office he used to be with within one year
from his resignation, retirement or separation from public office.13 The PCGG did not seek any
reconsideration of the ruling.14
It appears that Civil Case Nos. 0096-0099 were transferred from the Sandiganbayan’s Second
Division to the Fifth Division.15 In its resolution dated July 11, 2001, the Fifth Division of the
Sandiganbayan denied the other PCGG’s motion to disqualify respondent Mendoza.16 It
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adopted the resolution of its Second Division dated April 22, 1991, and observed that the
arguments were the same in substance as the motion to disqualify filed in Civil Case No. 0005.
The PCGG sought reconsideration of the ruling but its motion was denied in its resolution dated
December 5, 2001.17
Hence, the recourse to this Court by the PCGG assailing the resolutions dated July 11, 2001 and
December 5, 2001 of the Fifth Division of the Sandiganbayan via a petition for certiorari and
prohibition under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.18 The PCGG alleged that the
Fifth Division acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
issuing the assailed resolutions contending that: 1) Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility prohibits a former government lawyer from accepting employment in connection
with any matter in which he intervened; 2) the prohibition in the Rule is not time-bound; 3) that
Central Bank could not waive the objection to respondent Mendoza’s appearance on behalf of the
PCGG; and 4) the resolution in Civil Case No. 0005 was interlocutory, thus res judicata does not
apply.19
The petition at bar raises procedural and substantive issues of law. In view, however, of the
import and impact of Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility to the legal profession
and the government, we shall cut our way and forthwith resolve the substantive issue.
I
Substantive Issue
The key issue is whether Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility applies to
respondent Mendoza. Again, the prohibition states: "A lawyer shall not, after leaving government
service, accept engagement or employment in connection with any matter in which he had
intervened while in the said service."
I.A. The history of Rule 6.03
A proper resolution of this case necessitates that we trace the historical lineage of Rule 6.03 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility.
In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, ethical standards for lawyers were pervasive in
England and other parts of Europe. The early statements of standards did not resemble modern
codes of conduct. They were not detailed or collected in one source but surprisingly were
comprehensive for their time. The principal thrust of the standards was directed towards the
litigation conduct of lawyers. It underscored the central duty of truth and fairness in litigation as
superior to any obligation to the client. The formulations of the litigation duties were at times
intricate, including specific pleading standards, an obligation to inform the court of falsehoods
and a duty to explore settlement alternatives. Most of the lawyer's other basic duties --
competency, diligence, loyalty, confidentiality, reasonable fees and service to the poor --
originated in the litigation context, but ultimately had broader application to all aspects of a
lawyer's practice.
The forms of lawyer regulation in colonial and early post-revolutionary America did not differ
markedly from those in England. The colonies and early states used oaths, statutes, judicial
oversight, and procedural rules to govern attorney behavior. The difference from England was in
the pervasiveness and continuity of such regulation. The standards set in England varied over
time, but the variation in early America was far greater. The American regulation fluctuated
within a single colony and differed from colony to colony. Many regulations had the effect of
setting some standards of conduct, but the regulation was sporadic, leaving gaps in the
substantive standards. Only three of the traditional core duties can be fairly characterized as
pervasive in the formal, positive law of the colonial and post-revolutionary period: the duties of
litigation fairness, competency and reasonable fees.20
The nineteenth century has been termed the "dark ages" of legal ethics in the United States.
By mid-century, American legal reformers were filling the void in two ways. First, David Dudley
Field, the drafter of the highly influential New York "Field Code," introduced a new set of
uniform standards of conduct for lawyers. This concise statement of eight statutory duties
became law in several states in the second half of the nineteenth century. At the same time, legal
educators, such as David Hoffman and George Sharswood, and many other lawyers were
working to flesh out the broad outline of a lawyer's duties. These reformers wrote about legal
ethics in unprecedented detail and thus brought a new level of understanding to a lawyer's duties.
A number of mid-nineteenth century laws and statutes, other than the Field Code, governed
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lawyer behavior. A few forms of colonial regulations – e.g., the "do no falsehood" oath and the
deceit prohibitions -- persisted in some states. Procedural law continued to directly, or indirectly,
limit an attorney's litigation behavior. The developing law of agency recognized basic duties of
competence, loyalty and safeguarding of client property. Evidence law started to recognize with
less equivocation the attorney-client privilege and its underlying theory of confidentiality. Thus,
all of the core duties, with the likely exception of service to the poor, had some basis in formal
law. Yet, as in the colonial and early post-revolutionary periods, these standards were isolated
and did not provide a comprehensive statement of a lawyer's duties. The reformers, by contrast,
were more comprehensive in their discussion of a lawyer's duties, and they actually ushered a
new era in American legal ethics.21
Toward the end of the nineteenth century, a new form of ethical standards began to guide
lawyers in their practice — the bar association code of legal ethics. The bar codes were detailed
ethical standards formulated by lawyers for lawyers. They combined the two primary sources of
ethical guidance from the nineteenth century. Like the academic discourses, the bar association
codes gave detail to the statutory statements of duty and the oaths of office. Unlike the academic
lectures, however, the bar association codes retained some of the official imprimatur of the
statutes and oaths. Over time, the bar association codes became extremely popular that states
adopted them as binding rules of law. Critical to the development of the new codes was the re-
emergence of bar associations themselves. Local bar associations formed sporadically during the
colonial period, but they disbanded by the early nineteenth century. In the late nineteenth century,
bar associations began to form again, picking up where their colonial predecessors had left off.
Many of the new bar associations, most notably the Alabama State Bar Association and the
American Bar Association, assumed on the task of drafting substantive standards of conduct for
their members.22
In 1887, Alabama became the first state with a comprehensive bar association code of ethics.
The 1887 Alabama Code of Ethics was the model for several states’ codes, and it was the
foundation for the American Bar Association's (ABA) 1908 Canons of Ethics.23
In 1917, the Philippine Bar found that the oath and duties of a lawyer were insufficient to attain
the full measure of public respect to which the legal profession was entitled. In that year, the
Philippine Bar Association adopted as its own, Canons 1 to 32 of the ABA Canons of
Professional Ethics.24
As early as 1924, some ABA members have questioned the form and function of the canons.
Among their concerns was the "revolving door" or "the process by which lawyers and others
temporarily enter government service from private life and then leave it for large fees in private
practice, where they can exploit information, contacts, and influence garnered in government
service."25 These concerns were classified as adverse-interest conflicts" and "congruent-
interest conflicts." "Adverse-interest conflicts" exist where the matter in which the former
government lawyer represents a client in private practice is substantially related to a matter that
the lawyer dealt with while employed by the government and the interests of the current and
former are adverse.26 On the other hand, "congruent-interest representation conflicts" are
unique to government lawyers and apply primarily to former government lawyers.27 For several
years, the ABA attempted to correct and update the canons through new canons, individual
amendments and interpretative opinions. In 1928, the ABA amended one canon and added
thirteen new canons.28 To deal with problems peculiar to former government lawyers, Canon 36
was minted which disqualified them both for "adverse-interest conflicts" and "congruent-interest
representation conflicts."29 The rationale for disqualification is rooted in a concern that the
government lawyer’s largely discretionary actions would be influenced by the temptation to take
action on behalf of the government client that later could be to the advantage of parties who
might later become private practice clients.30 Canon 36 provides, viz.:
36. Retirement from judicial position or public employment
A lawyer should not accept employment as an advocate in any matter upon the merits of which
he has previously acted in a judicial capacity.
A lawyer, having once held public office or having been in the public employ should not,
after his retirement, accept employment in connection with any matter he has investigated
or passed upon while in such office or employ.
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Over the next thirty years, the ABA continued to amend many of the canons and added Canons
46 and 47 in 1933 and 1937, respectively.31
In 1946, the Philippine Bar Association again adopted as its own Canons 33 to 47 of the ABA
Canons of Professional Ethics.32
By the middle of the twentieth century, there was growing consensus that the ABA Canons
needed more meaningful revision. In 1964, the ABA President-elect Lewis Powell asked for the
creation of a committee to study the "adequacy and effectiveness" of the ABA Canons. The
committee recommended that the canons needed substantial revision, in part because the ABA
Canons failed to distinguish between "the inspirational and the proscriptive" and were thus
unsuccessful in enforcement. The legal profession in the United States likewise observed that
Canon 36 of the ABA Canons of Professional Ethics resulted in unnecessary disqualification of
lawyers for negligible participation in matters during their employment with the government.
The unfairness of Canon 36 compelled ABA to replace it in the 1969 ABA Model Code of
Professional Responsibility.33 The basic ethical principles in the Code of Professional
Responsibility were supplemented by Disciplinary Rules that defined minimum rules of conduct
to which the lawyer must adhere.34 In the case of Canon 9, DR 9-101(b)35 became the applicable
supplementary norm. The drafting committee reformulated the canons into the Model Code of
Professional Responsibility, and, in August of 1969, the ABA House of Delegates approved the
Model Code.36
Despite these amendments, legal practitioners remained unsatisfied with the results and indefinite
standards set forth by DR 9-101(b) and the Model Code of Professional Responsibility as a
whole. Thus, in August 1983, the ABA adopted new Model Rules of Professional
Responsibility. The Model Rules used the "restatement format," where the conduct standards
were set-out in rules, with comments following each rule. The new format was intended to give
better guidance and clarity for enforcement "because the only enforceable standards were the
black letter Rules." The Model Rules eliminated the broad canons altogether and reduced the
emphasis on narrative discussion, by placing comments after the rules and limiting comment
discussion to the content of the black letter rules. The Model Rules made a number of
substantive improvements particularly with regard to conflicts of interests.37 In particular, the
ABA did away with Canon 9, citing the hopeless dependence of the concept of impropriety
on the subjective views of anxious clients as well as the norm’s indefinite nature.38
In cadence with these changes, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) adopted a
proposed Code of Professional Responsibility in 1980 which it submitted to this Court for
approval. The Code was drafted to reflect the local customs, traditions, and practices of the bar
and to conform with new realities. On June 21, 1988, this Court promulgated the Code of
Professional Responsibility.39 Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility deals
particularly with former government lawyers, and provides, viz.:
Rule 6.03 – A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service, accept engagement or
employment in connection with any matter in which he had intervened while in said service.
Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility retained the general structure of paragraph
2, Canon 36 of the Canons of Professional Ethics but replaced the expansive phrase
"investigated and passed upon" with the word "intervened." It is, therefore, properly
applicable to both "adverse-interest conflicts" and "congruent-interest conflicts."
The case at bar does not involve the "adverse interest" aspect of Rule 6.03. Respondent
Mendoza, it is conceded, has no adverse interest problem when he acted as Solicitor General in
Sp. Proc. No. 107812 and later as counsel of respondents Tan, et al. in Civil Case No. 0005 and
Civil Case Nos. 0096-0099 before the Sandiganbayan. Nonetheless, there remains the issue of
whether there exists a "congruent-interest conflict" sufficient to disqualify respondent
Mendoza from representing respondents Tan, et al.
I.B. The "congruent interest" aspect of Rule 6.03
The key to unlock Rule 6.03 lies in comprehending first, the meaning of "matter" referred to in
the rule and, second, the metes and bounds of the "intervention" made by the former
government lawyer on the "matter." The American Bar Association in its Formal Opinion 342,
defined "matter" as any discrete, isolatable act as well as identifiable transaction or conduct
involving a particular situation and specific party, and not merely an act of drafting, enforcing or
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interpreting government or agency procedures, regulations or laws, or briefing abstract principles

of law.
Firstly, it is critical that we pinpoint the "matter" which was the subject of intervention by
respondent Mendoza while he was the Solicitor General. The PCGG relates the following acts of
respondent Mendoza as constituting the "matter" where he intervened as a Solicitor General,
viz:40
The PCGG’s Case for Atty. Mendoza’s Disqualification
The PCGG imputes grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Sandiganbayan (Fifth Division)
in issuing the assailed Resolutions dated July 11, 2001 and December 5, 2001 denying the
motion to disqualify Atty. Mendoza as counsel for respondents Tan, et al. The PCGG insists that
Atty. Mendoza, as then Solicitor General, actively intervened in the closure of GENBANK by
advising the Central Bank on how to proceed with the said bank’s liquidation and even filing the
petition for its liquidation with the CFI of Manila.
As proof thereof, the PCGG cites the Memorandum dated March 29, 1977 prepared by certain
key officials of the Central Bank, namely, then Senior Deputy Governor Amado R. Brinas, then
Deputy Governor Jaime C. Laya, then Deputy Governor and General Counsel Gabriel C.
Singson, then Special Assistant to the Governor Carlota P. Valenzuela, then Asistant to the
Governor Arnulfo B. Aurellano and then Director of Department of Commercial and Savings
Bank Antonio T. Castro, Jr., where they averred that on March 28, 1977, they had a conference
with the Solicitor General (Atty. Mendoza), who advised them on how to proceed with the
liquidation of GENBANK. The pertinent portion of the said memorandum states:
Immediately after said meeting, we had a conference with the Solicitor General and he advised
that the following procedure should be taken:
1. Management should submit a memorandum to the Monetary Board reporting that studies and
evaluation had been made since the last examination of the bank as of August 31, 1976 and it is
believed that the bank can not be reorganized or placed in a condition so that it may be permitted
to resume business with safety to its depositors and creditors and the general public.
2. If the said report is confirmed by the Monetary Board, it shall order the liquidation of the bank
and indicate the manner of its liquidation and approve a liquidation plan.
3. The Central Bank shall inform the principal stockholders of Genbank of the foregoing decision
to liquidate the bank and the liquidation plan approved by the Monetary Board.
4. The Solicitor General shall then file a petition in the Court of First Instance reciting the
proceedings which had been taken and praying the assistance of the Court in the liquidation of
Genbank.
The PCGG further cites the Minutes No. 13 dated March 29, 1977 of the Monetary Board where
it was shown that Atty. Mendoza was furnished copies of pertinent documents relating to
GENBANK in order to aid him in filing with the court the petition for assistance in the bank’s
liquidation. The pertinent portion of the said minutes reads:
The Board decided as follows:
...
E. To authorize Management to furnish the Solicitor General with a copy of the subject
memorandum of the Director, Department of Commercial and Savings Bank dated March 29,
1977, together with copies of:
1. Memorandum of the Deputy Governor, Supervision and Examination Sector, to the Monetary
Board, dated March 25, 1977, containing a report on the current situation of Genbank;
2. Aide Memoire on the Antecedent Facts Re: General Bank and Trust Co., dated March 23,
1977;
3. Memorandum of the Director, Department of Commercial and Savings Bank, to the Monetary
Board, dated March 24, 1977, submitting, pursuant to Section 29 of R.A. No. 265, as amended
by P.D. No. 1007, a repot on the state of insolvency of Genbank, together with its attachments;
and
4. Such other documents as may be necessary or needed by the Solicitor General for his use in
then CFI-praying the assistance of the Court in the liquidation of Genbank.
Beyond doubt, therefore, the "matter" or the act of respondent Mendoza as Solicitor General
involved in the case at bar is "advising the Central Bank, on how to proceed with the said bank’s
liquidation and even filing the petition for its liquidation with the CFI of Manila." In fine, the
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Court should resolve whether his act of advising the Central Bank on the legal procedure to
liquidate GENBANK is included within the concept of "matter" under Rule 6.03. The
procedure of liquidation is given in black and white in Republic Act No. 265, section 29, viz:
The provision reads in part:
SEC. 29. Proceedings upon insolvency. – Whenever, upon examination by the head of the
appropriate supervising or examining department or his examiners or agents into the condition of
any bank or non-bank financial intermediary performing quasi-banking functions, it shall be
disclosed that the condition of the same is one of insolvency, or that its continuance in business
would involve probable loss to its depositors or creditors, it shall be the duty of the department
head concerned forthwith, in writing, to inform the Monetary Board of the facts, and the Board
may, upon finding the statements of the department head to be true, forbid the institution to do
business in the Philippines and shall designate an official of the Central Bank or a person of
recognized competence in banking or finance, as receiver to immediately take charge of its assets
and liabilities, as expeditiously as possible collect and gather all the assets and administer the
same for the benefit of its creditors, exercising all the powers necessary for these purposes
including, but not limited to, bringing suits and foreclosing mortgages in the name of the bank or
non-bank financial intermediary performing quasi-banking functions.
...
If the Monetary Board shall determine and confirm within the said period that the bank or non-
bank financial intermediary performing quasi-banking functions is insolvent or cannot resume
business with safety to its depositors, creditors and the general public, it shall, if the public
interest requires, order its liquidation, indicate the manner of its liquidation and approve a
liquidation plan. The Central Bank shall, by the Solicitor General, file a petition in the Court of
First Instance reciting the proceedings which have been taken and praying the assistance of the
court in the liquidation of such institution. The court shall have jurisdiction in the same
proceedings to adjudicate disputed claims against the bank or non-bank financial intermediary
performing quasi-banking functions and enforce individual liabilities of the stockholders and do
all that is necessary to preserve the assets of such institution and to implement the liquidation
plan approved by the Monetary Board. The Monetary Board shall designate an official of the
Central Bank, or a person of recognized competence in banking or finance, as liquidator who
shall take over the functions of the receiver previously appointed by the Monetary Board under
this Section. The liquidator shall, with all convenient speed, convert the assets of the banking
institution or non-bank financial intermediary performing quasi-banking functions to money or
sell, assign or otherwise dispose of the same to creditors and other parties for the purpose of
paying the debts of such institution and he may, in the name of the bank or non-bank financial
intermediary performing quasi-banking functions, institute such actions as may be necessary in
the appropriate court to collect and recover accounts and assets of such institution.
The provisions of any law to the contrary notwithstanding, the actions of the Monetary Board
under this Section and the second paragraph of Section 34 of this Act shall be final and
executory, and can be set aside by the court only if there is convincing proof that the action is
plainly arbitrary and made in bad faith. No restraining order or injunction shall be issued by the
court enjoining the Central Bank from implementing its actions under this Section and the
second paragraph of Section 34 of this Act, unless there is convincing proof that the action of the
Monetary Board is plainly arbitrary and made in bad faith and the petitioner or plaintiff files with
the clerk or judge of the court in which the action is pending a bond executed in favor of the
Central Bank, in an amount to be fixed by the court. The restraining order or injunction shall be
refused or, if granted, shall be dissolved upon filing by the Central Bank of a bond, which shall
be in the form of cash or Central Bank cashier(s) check, in an amount twice the amount of the
bond of the petitioner or plaintiff conditioned that it will pay the damages which the petitioner or
plaintiff may suffer by the refusal or the dissolution of the injunction. The provisions of Rule 58
of the New Rules of Court insofar as they are applicable and not inconsistent with the provisions
of this Section shall govern the issuance and dissolution of the restraining order or injunction
contemplated in this Section.
Insolvency, under this Act, shall be understood to mean the inability of a bank or non-bank
financial intermediary performing quasi-banking functions to pay its liabilities as they fall due in
the usual and ordinary course of business. Provided, however, That this shall not include the
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inability to pay of an otherwise non-insolvent bank or non-bank financial intermediary

performing quasi-banking functions caused by extraordinary demands induced by financial panic
commonly evidenced by a run on the bank or non-bank financial intermediary performing quasi-
banking functions in the banking or financial community.
The appointment of a conservator under Section 28-A of this Act or the appointment of a receiver
under this Section shall be vested exclusively with the Monetary Board, the provision of any law,
general or special, to the contrary notwithstanding. (As amended by PD Nos. 72, 1007, 1771 &
1827, Jan. 16, 1981)
We hold that this advice given by respondent Mendoza on the procedure to liquidate GENBANK
is not the "matter" contemplated by Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. ABA
Formal Opinion No. 342 is clear as daylight in stressing that the "drafting, enforcing or
interpreting government or agency procedures, regulations or laws, or briefing abstract
principles of law" are acts which do not fall within the scope of the term "matter" and cannot
disqualify.
Secondly, it can even be conceded for the sake of argument that the above act of respondent
Mendoza falls within the definition of matter per ABA Formal Opinion No. 342. Be that as it
may, the said act of respondent Mendoza which is the "matter" involved in Sp. Proc. No.
107812 is entirely different from the "matter" involved in Civil Case No. 0096. Again, the
plain facts speak for themselves. It is given that respondent Mendoza had nothing to do with the
decision of the Central Bank to liquidate GENBANK. It is also given that he did not participate
in the sale of GENBANK to Allied Bank. The "matter" where he got himself involved was in
informing Central Bank on the procedure provided by law to liquidate GENBANK thru the
courts and in filing the necessary petition in Sp. Proc. No. 107812 in the then Court of First
Instance. The subject "matter" of Sp. Proc. No. 107812, therefore, is not the same nor is
related to but is different from the subject "matter" in Civil Case No. 0096. Civil Case No.
0096 involves the sequestration of the stocks owned by respondents Tan, et al., in Allied Bank
on the alleged ground that they are ill-gotten. The case does not involve the liquidation of
GENBANK. Nor does it involve the sale of GENBANK to Allied Bank. Whether the shares of
stock of the reorganized Allied Bank are ill-gotten is far removed from the issue of the
dissolution and liquidation of GENBANK. GENBANK was liquidated by the Central Bank due,
among others, to the alleged banking malpractices of its owners and officers. In other words, the
legality of the liquidation of GENBANK is not an issue in the sequestration cases. Indeed, the
jurisdiction of the PCGG does not include the dissolution and liquidation of banks. It goes
without saying that Code 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility cannot apply to
respondent Mendoza because his alleged intervention while a Solicitor General in Sp. Proc.
No. 107812 is an intervention on a matter different from the matter involved in Civil Case
No. 0096.
Thirdly, we now slide to the metes and bounds of the "intervention" contemplated by Rule
6.03. "Intervene" means, viz.:
1: to enter or appear as an irrelevant or extraneous feature or circumstance . . . 2: to occur, fall, or
come in between points of time or events . . . 3: to come in or between by way of hindrance or
modification: INTERPOSE . . . 4: to occur or lie between two things (Paris, where the same city
lay on both sides of an intervening river . . .)41
On the other hand, "intervention" is defined as:
1: the act or fact of intervening: INTERPOSITION; 2: interference that may affect the interests
of others.42
There are, therefore, two possible interpretations of the word "intervene." Under the first
interpretation, "intervene" includes participation in a proceeding even if the intervention is
irrelevant or has no effect or little influence.43 Under the second interpretation, "intervene" only
includes an act of a person who has the power to influence the subject proceedings.44 We hold
that this second meaning is more appropriate to give to the word "intervention" under Rule 6.03
of the Code of Professional Responsibility in light of its history. The evils sought to be remedied
by the Rule do not exist where the government lawyer does an act which can be considered as
innocuous such as "x x x drafting, enforcing or interpreting government or agency procedures,
regulations or laws, or briefing abstract principles of law."
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In fine, the intervention cannot be insubstantial and insignificant. Originally, Canon 36

provided that a former government lawyer "should not, after his retirement, accept employment
in connection with any matter which he has investigated or passed upon while in such office or
employ." As aforediscussed, the broad sweep of the phrase "which he has investigated or passed
upon" resulted in unjust disqualification of former government lawyers. The 1969 Code
restricted its latitude, hence, in DR 9-101(b), the prohibition extended only to a matter in which
the lawyer, while in the government service, had "substantial responsibility." The 1983 Model
Rules further constricted the reach of the rule. MR 1.11(a) provides that "a lawyer shall not
represent a private client in connection with a matter in which the lawyer participated
personally and substantially as a public officer or employee."
It is, however, alleged that the intervention of respondent Mendoza in Sp. Proc. No. 107812 is
significant and substantial. We disagree. For one, the petition in the special proceedings is an
initiatory pleading, hence, it has to be signed by respondent Mendoza as the then sitting
Solicitor General. For another, the record is arid as to the actual participation of respondent
Mendoza in the subsequent proceedings. Indeed, the case was in slumberville for a long number
of years. None of the parties pushed for its early termination. Moreover, we note that the petition
filed merely seeks the assistance of the court in the liquidation of GENBANK. The principal role
of the court in this type of proceedings is to assist the Central Bank in determining claims of
creditors against the GENBANK. The role of the court is not strictly as a court of justice but as
an agent to assist the Central Bank in determining the claims of creditors. In such a proceeding,
the participation of the Office of the Solicitor General is not that of the usual court litigator
protecting the interest of government.
II
Balancing Policy Considerations
To be sure, Rule 6.03 of our Code of Professional Responsibility represents a commendable
effort on the part of the IBP to upgrade the ethics of lawyers in the government service. As
aforestressed, it is a take-off from similar efforts especially by the ABA which have not been
without difficulties. To date, the legal profession in the United States is still fine tuning its DR
9-101(b) rule.
In fathoming the depth and breadth of Rule 6.03 of our Code of Professional Responsibility, the
Court took account of various policy considerations to assure that its interpretation and
application to the case at bar will achieve its end without necessarily prejudicing other values of
equal importance. Thus, the rule was not interpreted to cause a chilling effect on government
recruitment of able legal talent. At present, it is already difficult for government to match
compensation offered by the private sector and it is unlikely that government will be able to
reverse that situation. The observation is not inaccurate that the only card that the government
may play to recruit lawyers is have them defer present income in return for the experience and
contacts that can later be exchanged for higher income in private practice.45 Rightly, Judge
Kaufman warned that the sacrifice of entering government service would be too great for most
men to endure should ethical rules prevent them from engaging in the practice of a technical
specialty which they devoted years in acquiring and cause the firm with which they become
associated to be disqualified.46 Indeed, "to make government service more difficult to exit can
only make it less appealing to enter."47
In interpreting Rule 6.03, the Court also cast a harsh eye on its use as a litigation tactic to
harass opposing counsel as well as deprive his client of competent legal representation. The
danger that the rule will be misused to bludgeon an opposing counsel is not a mere guesswork.
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia has noted "the tactical use of motions to
disqualify counsel in order to delay proceedings, deprive the opposing party of counsel of its
choice, and harass and embarrass the opponent," and observed that the tactic was "so prevalent in
large civil cases in recent years as to prompt frequent judicial and academic commentary."48 Even
the United States Supreme Court found no quarrel with the Court of Appeals’ description of
disqualification motions as "a dangerous game."49 In the case at bar, the new attempt to
disqualify respondent Mendoza is difficult to divine. The disqualification of respondent Mendoza
has long been a dead issue. It was resuscitated after the lapse of many years and only after
PCGG has lost many legal incidents in the hands of respondent Mendoza. For a fact, the recycled
motion for disqualification in the case at bar was filed more than four years after the filing of
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the petitions for certiorari, prohibition and injunction with the Supreme Court which were
subsequently remanded to the Sandiganbayan and docketed as Civil Case Nos. 0096-0099.50 At
the very least, the circumstances under which the motion to disqualify in the case at bar were
refiled put petitioner’s motive as highly suspect.
Similarly, the Court in interpreting Rule 6.03 was not unconcerned with the prejudice to
the client which will be caused by its misapplication. It cannot be doubted that granting a
disqualification motion causes the client to lose not only the law firm of choice, but probably an
individual lawyer in whom the client has confidence.51 The client with a disqualified lawyer must
start again often without the benefit of the work done by the latter.52 The effects of this prejudice
to the right to choose an effective counsel cannot be overstated for it can result in denial of due
process.
The Court has to consider also the possible adverse effect of a truncated reading of the rule
on the official independence of lawyers in the government service. According to Prof.
Morgan: "An individual who has the security of knowing he or she can find private employment
upon leaving the government is free to work vigorously, challenge official positions when he or
she believes them to be in error, and resist illegal demands by superiors. An employee who lacks
this assurance of private employment does not enjoy such freedom."53 He adds: "Any system that
affects the right to take a new job affects the ability to quit the old job and any limit on the ability
to quit inhibits official independence."54 The case at bar involves the position of Solicitor
General, the office once occupied by respondent Mendoza. It cannot be overly stressed that the
position of Solicitor General should be endowed with a great degree of independence. It is
this independence that allows the Solicitor General to recommend acquittal of the innocent; it is
this independence that gives him the right to refuse to defend officials who violate the trust of
their office. Any undue dimunition of the independence of the Solicitor General will have a
corrosive effect on the rule of law.
No less significant a consideration is the deprivation of the former government lawyer of
the freedom to exercise his profession. Given the current state of our law, the disqualification
of a former government lawyer may extend to all members of his law firm.55 Former government
lawyers stand in danger of becoming the lepers of the legal profession.
It is, however, proffered that the mischief sought to be remedied by Rule 6.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility is the possible appearance of impropriety and loss of public
confidence in government. But as well observed, the accuracy of gauging public perceptions is a
highly speculative exercise at best56 which can lead to untoward results.57 No less than Judge
Kaufman doubts that the lessening of restrictions as to former government attorneys will have
any detrimental effect on that free flow of information between the government-client and its
attorneys which the canons seek to protect.58 Notably, the appearance of impropriety theory
has been rejected in the 1983 ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct59 and some courts
have abandoned per se disqualification based on Canons 4 and 9 when an actual conflict of
interest exists, and demand an evaluation of the interests of the defendant, government, the
witnesses in the case, and the public.60
It is also submitted that the Court should apply Rule 6.03 in all its strictness for it correctly
disfavors lawyers who "switch sides." It is claimed that "switching sides" carries the danger that
former government employee may compromise confidential official information in the
process. But this concern does not cast a shadow in the case at bar. As afore-discussed, the act of
respondent Mendoza in informing the Central Bank on the procedure how to liquidate
GENBANK is a different matter from the subject matter of Civil Case No. 0005 which is about
the sequestration of the shares of respondents Tan, et al., in Allied Bank. Consequently, the
danger that confidential official information might be divulged is nil, if not inexistent. To be sure,
there are no inconsistent "sides" to be bothered about in the case at bar. For there is no question
that in lawyering for respondents Tan, et al., respondent Mendoza is not working against the
interest of Central Bank. On the contrary, he is indirectly defending the validity of the action of
Central Bank in liquidating GENBANK and selling it later to Allied Bank. Their interests
coincide instead of colliding. It is for this reason that Central Bank offered no objection to the
lawyering of respondent Mendoza in Civil Case No. 0005 in defense of respondents Tan, et al.
There is no switching of sides for no two sides are involved.
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It is also urged that the Court should consider that Rule 6.03 is intended to avoid conflict of
loyalties, i.e., that a government employee might be subject to a conflict of loyalties while still in
government service.61 The example given by the proponents of this argument is that a lawyer
who plans to work for the company that he or she is currently charged with prosecuting might be
tempted to prosecute less vigorously.62 In the cautionary words of the Association of the Bar
Committee in 1960: "The greatest public risks arising from post employment conduct may well
occur during the period of employment through the dampening of aggressive administration of
government policies."63 Prof. Morgan, however, considers this concern as "probably excessive."64
He opines "x x x it is hard to imagine that a private firm would feel secure hiding someone who
had just been disloyal to his or her last client – the government. Interviews with lawyers
consistently confirm that law firms want the ‘best’ government lawyers – the ones who were
hardest to beat – not the least qualified or least vigorous advocates."65 But again, this particular
concern is a non factor in the case at bar. There is no charge against respondent Mendoza that
he advised Central Bank on how to liquidate GENBANK with an eye in later defending
respondents Tan, et al. of Allied Bank. Indeed, he continues defending both the interests of
Central Bank and respondents Tan, et al. in the above cases.
Likewise, the Court is nudged to consider the need to curtail what is perceived as the "excessive
influence of former officials" or their "clout."66 Prof. Morgan again warns against extending
this concern too far. He explains the rationale for his warning, viz: "Much of what appears to be
an employee’s influence may actually be the power or authority of his or her position, power that
evaporates quickly upon departure from government x x x."67 More, he contends that the concern
can be demeaning to those sitting in government. To quote him further: "x x x The idea that,
present officials make significant decisions based on friendship rather than on the merit says
more about the present officials than about their former co-worker friends. It implies a lack of
will or talent, or both, in federal officials that does not seem justified or intended, and it ignores
the possibility that the officials will tend to disfavor their friends in order to avoid even the
appearance of favoritism."68
III
The question of fairness
Mr. Justices Panganiban and Carpio are of the view, among others, that the congruent interest
prong of Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility should be subject to a prescriptive
period. Mr. Justice Tinga opines that the rule cannot apply retroactively to respondent Mendoza.
Obviously, and rightly so, they are disquieted by the fact that (1) when respondent Mendoza was
the Solicitor General, Rule 6.03 has not yet adopted by the IBP and approved by this Court, and
(2) the bid to disqualify respondent Mendoza was made after the lapse of time whose length
cannot, by any standard, qualify as reasonable. At bottom, the point they make relates to the
unfairness of the rule if applied without any prescriptive period and retroactively, at that. Their
concern is legitimate and deserves to be initially addressed by the IBP and our Committee on
Revision of the Rules of Court.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition assailing the resolutions dated July 11, 2001 and December
5, 2001 of the Fifth Division of the Sandiganbayan in Civil Case Nos. 0096-0099 is denied.
No cost.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez,
Corona and Garcia, JJ., concur.
Panganiban and Tinga, JJ., Please see separate opinion.
Carpio-Morales and Callejo, Sr., JJ., Please see dissenting opinion.
Azcuna, J., I was former PCGG Chair.
Chico-Nazario, J., No part.
DISSENTING OPINION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
The Code of Professional Responsibility is not designed for Holmes’ proverbial "bad man" who
wants to know just how many corners he may cut, how close to the line he may play, without
running into trouble with the law. Rather, it is drawn for the "good man" as a beacon to assist
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him in navigating an ethical course through the sometimes murky waters of professional
conduct.1
With due respect, I dissent from the majority opinion. I believe that the present case behooves
the Court to strictly apply the Code of Professional Responsibility and provide an ethical
compass to lawyers who, in the pursuit of the profession, often find themselves in the
unchartered sea of conflicting ideas and interests. There is certainly, without exception, no
profession in which so many temptations beset the path to swerve from the line of strict integrity;
in which so many delicate and difficult questions of duty are continually arising.2 The Code of
Professional Responsibility establishes the norms of conduct and ethical standards in the legal
profession and the Court must not shirk from its duty to ensure that all lawyers live up to its
provisions. Moreover, the Court must not tolerate any departure from the "straight and narrow"
path demanded by the ethics of the legal profession and enjoin all lawyers to be like Caesar’s
wife – to be pure and appear to be so.3
Factual and Procedural Antecedents
On July 17, 1987, pursuant to its mandate under Executive Order No. 14 of then President
Corazon C. Aquino, the PCGG, on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines, filed with the
Sandiganbayan a complaint for "reversion, reconveyance, restitution, accounting and damages"
against respondents Lucio Tan, Carmen Khao Tan, Florencio T. Santos, Natividad P. Santos,
Domingo Chua, Tan Hui Nee, Mariano Tanenglian,5 Estate of Benito Tan Kee Hiong (represented
by Tarciana C. Tan), Florencio N. Santos, Jr., Harry C. Tan, Tan Eng Chan, Chung Poe Kee,
Mariano Khoo, Manuel Khoo, Miguel Khoo, Jaime Khoo, Elizabeth Khoo, Celso Ranola,
William T. Wong, Ernesto B. Lim, Benjamin T. Albacita, Willy Co, Allied Banking Corporation,
Allied Leasing and Finance Corporation, Asia Brewery, Inc., Basic Holdings Corp., Foremost
Farms, Inc., Fortune Tobacco Corporation, Grandspan Development Corp., Himmel Industries,
Iris Holdings and Development Corp., Jewel Holdings, Inc., Manufacturing Services and Trade
Corp., Maranaw Hotels and Resort Corp., Northern Tobacco Redrying Plant, Progressive Farms,
Inc., Shareholdings, Inc., Sipalay Trading Corp., Virgo Holdings and Development Corp.
(collectively referred to herein as respondents Tan, et al., for brevity), then President Ferdinand
E. Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos, Panfilo O. Domingo, Cesar Zalamea, Don Ferry and Gregorio
Licaros. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 0005 of the Sandiganbayan (Second Division).
In connection therewith, the PCGG issued several writs of sequestration on properties allegedly
acquired by the above-named persons by means of taking advantage of their close relationship
and influence with former President Marcos.
Shortly thereafter, respondents Tan, et al. filed with this Court petitions for certiorari, prohibition
and injunction seeking to, among others, nullify the writs of sequestration issued by the PCGG.
After the filing of the comments thereon, this Court referred the cases to the Sandiganbayan
(Fifth Division) for proper disposition, docketed therein as follows:
a. Civil Case No. 0096 – Lucio Tan, Mariano Tanenglian, Allied Banking Corp., Iris Holding and
Development Corp., Virgo Holdings Development Corp. and Jewel Holdings, Inc. v. PCGG,
which seeks to nullify the PCGG’s Order dated June 19, 1986 sequestering the shares of stock in
Allied Banking Corporation held by and/or in the name of respondents Lucio Tan, Mariano
Tanenglian, Iris Holding and Development Corp., Virgo Holdings Development Corp. and Jewel
Holdings, Inc.;
b. Civil Case No. 0097 – Lucio Tan, Carmen Khao Tan, Florencio T. Santos, Natividad Santos,
Florencio N. Santos, Jr., and Foremost Farms, Inc. v. PCGG, which seeks to nullify the PCGG’s
Order dated August 12, 1986 sequestering the shares of stock in Foremost Farms, Inc. held by
and/or in the name of Lucio Tan, Carmen Khao Tan, Florencio T. Santos, Natividad Santos and
Florencio N. Santos, Jr.;
c. Civil Case No. 0098 – Lucio Tan, Carmen Khao Tan, Mariano Tanenglian, Florencio T.
Santos, Natividad Santos, Florencio N. Santos, Jr., Shareholdings, Inc. and Fortune Tobacco
Corp. v. PCGG, which seeks to nullify the PCGG’s Order dated July 24, 1986 sequestering the
shares of stock in Fortune Tobacco Corp. held by and/or in the name of Lucio Tan, Carmen Khao
Tan, Mariano Tanenglian, Florencio T. Santos, Natividad Santos, Florencio N. Santos, Jr.,
Shareholdings, Inc.; and
d. Civil Case No. 0099 – Lucio Tan, Carmen Khao Tan, Mariano Tanenglian, Florencio T.
Santos, Natividad Santos and Shareholdings, Inc. v. PCGG, which seeks to nullify the PCGG’s
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Order dated July 24, 1986 sequestering the shares of stock in Shareholdings, Inc. held by and/or
in the name of Lucio Tan, Carmen Khao Tan, Mariano Tanenglian, Florencio T. Santos and
Natividad Santos.
In all these cases, respondents Tan, et al. are represented by their counsel Atty. Estelito P.
Mendoza, who served as the Solicitor General from 1972 to 1986 during the administration of
former President Marcos.
The PCGG filed with the Sandiganbayan (Fifth Division) a motion to disqualify Atty. Mendoza
as counsel for respondents Tan, et al. The PCGG alleged that Atty. Mendoza, as then Solicitor
General and counsel to the Central Bank, "actively intervened" in the liquidation of General
Bank and Trust Company (GENBANK), which was subsequently acquired by respondents Tan,
et al. and became Allied Banking Corporation. As shown above, among the litigated properties
are the sequestered shares of stocks in Allied Banking Corp. (Civil Case No. 0096).
The acquisition of GENBANK by respondents Tan, et al. is outlined by the PCGG as follows:
1. In 1976, General Bank and Trust Company (GENBANK) got into financial difficulties. The
Central Bank then extended an emergency loan to GENBANK reaching a total of ₱310 million.
In extending this loan, the Central Bank, however, took control of GENBANK with the
execution of an irrevocable proxy by 2/3 of GENBANK’s outstanding shares in favor of the
Central Bank and the election of seven (7) Central Bank nominees to the 11-member Board of
Directors of GENBANK. Subsequently, on March 25, 1977, the Monetary Board of the Central
Bank issued a Resolution declaring GENBANK insolvent, forbidding it to do business and
placing it under receivership.
2. In the meantime, a public bidding for the sale of GENBANK assets and liabilities was
scheduled at 7:00 P.M. on March 28, 1977. Among the conditions for the bidding were: (a)
submission by the bidder of a letter of credit issued by a bank acceptable to Central Bank to
guaranty payment or as collateral of the Central Bank emergency loan; and (b) a 2-year period to
repay the said Central Bank emergency loan. On March 29, 1977, the Central Bank, through a
Monetary Board Resolution, approved the bid of the group of respondents Lucio Tan and Willy
Co. This bid, among other things, offered to pay only ₱500,000.00 for GENBANK assets
estimated at ₱688,201,301.45; Capital Accounts of ₱103,984,477.55; Cash of ₱25,698,473.00;
and the takeover of the GENBANK Head Office and branch offices. The required letter of credit
was also not attached to the bid. What was attached to the bid was a letter of Panfilo O.
Domingo, as PNB President, promising to open an irrevocable letter of credit to secure the
advances of the Central Bank in the amount of ₱310 million. Without this letter of commitment,
the Lucio Tan bid would not have been approved. But such letter of commitment was a fraud
because it was not meant to be fulfilled. Ferdinand E. Marcos, Gregorio Licaros and Panfilo O.
Domingo conspired together in giving the Lucio Tan group undue favors such as the doing away
with the required irrevocable letter of credit, the extension of the term of payment from two
years to five years, the approval of second mortgage as collateral for the Central Bank advances
which was deficient by more than ₱90 Million, and many other concessions to the great
prejudice of the government and of the GENBANK stockholders.
3. GENBANK eventually became the Allied Banking Corporation in April 1977. Respondents
Lucio Tan, Willy S. Co and Florencio T. Santos are not only incorporators and directors but they
are also the major shareholders of this new bank.6
Atty. Mendoza allegedly "intervened" in the acquisition of GENBANK by respondents Tan, et al.
since Atty. Mendoza, in his capacity as the Solicitor General, advised the Central Bank’s officials
on the procedure to bring about GENBANK’s liquidation. Further, he appeared as counsel for the
Central Bank in connection with its petition for assistance in the liquidation of GENBANK. He
filed the said petition with the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Manila and
docketed therein as Special Proceeding No. 107812.7
The PCGG opined that Atty. Mendoza’s present appearance as counsel for respondents Tan, et al.
in the case involving the sequestered shares of stock in Allied Banking Corp. runs afoul of Rule
6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility proscribing former government lawyers from
accepting "engagement or employment in connection with any matter in which he had intervened
while in said service."
102 of 122
Acting on the said motion, the Sandiganbayan (Fifth Division) issued the assailed Resolution
dated July 11, 2001 stating:
Acting on the PCGG’s "MOTION TO DISQUALIFY ATTY. ESTELITO P. MENDOZA AS
COUNSEL FOR PETITIONER" dated February 5, 1991 which appears not to have been
resolved by then Second Division of this Court, and it appearing that (1) the motion is exactly the
same in substance as that motion filed in Civil Case No. 0005 as in fact, Atty. Mendoza in his
"OPPOSITION" dated March 5, 1991 manifested that he was just adopting his opposition to the
same motion filed by PCGG in Civil Case No. 0005 and (2) in the Court’s Order dated March 7,
1991, the herein incident was taken-up jointly with the said same incident in Civil Case No. 0005
(pp. 134-135, Vol. I, Record of Civil Case No. 0096), this Division hereby reiterates and adopts
the Resolution dated April 22, 1991 in Civil Case No. 0005 of the Second Division (pp.
1418-1424, Vol. III, Record of Civil Case No. 0005) denying the said motion as its Resolution in
the case at bar.8
The PCGG sought the reconsideration thereof but its motion was denied in the assailed
Resolution dated December 5, 2001, which reads:
Acting on respondent PCGG’s "MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION" dated August 1, 2001
praying for the reconsideration of the Court’s Resolution dated July 12, 2001 denying its motion
to disqualify Atty. Estelito P. Mendoza as counsel for petitioners, to which petitioners have filed
an "OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION DATED AUGUST 1, 2001" dated
August 29, 2001, as well as the respondent’s "REPLY (To Opposition to Motion for
Reconsideration) dated November 16, 2001, it appearing that the main motion to disqualify Atty.
Mendoza as counsel in these cases was exactly the same in substance as that motion to disqualify
Atty. Mendoza filed by the PCGG in Civil Case No. 0005 (re: Republic vs. Lucio Tan, et al.) and
the resolutions of this Court (Second Division) in Civil Case No. 0005 denying the main motion
as well as of the motion for reconsideration thereof had become final and executory when PCGG
failed to elevate the said resolutions to the Supreme Court, the instant motion is hereby
DENIED.9
The Resolution10 dated April 22, 1991 of the Sandiganbayan (Second Division) in Civil Case No.
0005, which was adopted by the Fifth Division in Civil Cases Nos. 0096-0099, denied the similar
motion to disqualify Atty. Mendoza as counsel for respondents Tan, et al. holding, in essence,
that the PCGG "has failed to prove that there exists an inconsistency between Atty. Mendoza’s
former function as Solicitor General and his present employment as counsel of the Lucio Tan
group."11 The Sandiganbayan (Second Division) explained, thus:
... It has been said that the test of inconsistency in cases of the character under consideration is
not whether the attorney has ever appeared for the party against whom he proposes to appear, but
whether his accepting the new retainer will require him, in forwarding the interests of his new
client, to do anything which will injuriously affect his former client in any matter in which he
formerly represented against him, and whether he will be called upon, in his new relation, to use
against his former client any knowledge or information acquired through their former
connection. Nor does the rule imposing disability on the attorney mean that he, having once been
employed by a client, shall never thereafter appear in any matter against him but merely forbids
the attorney’s appearance or acting against the client where the attorney can use, to the detriment
of such client, the information and confidences acquired during the existence of their relation as
attorney and client (7 C.J.S., Pp. 828-829, cited in Primavera Farms, Inc., et al. vs. PCGG,
supra). Significantly, PCGG’s "Reply" does not controvert Atty. Mendoza’s claim that in
appearing in the instant case, he does not take a position adverse to that he had taken in behalf of
the Central Bank of the Philippines in SP No. 107812. Neither did it challenge Atty. Mendoza’s
claim that the position he took as Solicitor General in behalf of the Central Bank in 1977 when
he filed the said case (SP No. 107812) has been maintained by his successors in office. In fact,
even incumbent Central Bank Governor Jose Cuisia had interposed no objection to Atty.
Mendoza’s appearance as counsel for the Lucio Tan group for as long as he maintains the same
position he has taken on behalf of the Central Bank of the Philippines as Solicitor General, which
position refers to the various resolutions of the Monetary Board and actions of the Central Bank
in regard General Bank and Trust Co. as being regular and in accordance with law (Annex "A",
Rejoinder, Records, Pp. 1404-1405).12
103 of 122
The Sandiganbayan (Second Division) further observed that Atty. Mendoza’s appearance as
counsel for respondents Tan, et al. was well beyond the one-year prohibited period under Section
7(b) of Republic Act No. 6713 since he ceased to be the Solicitor General in the year 1986. The
said provision prohibits a former public official or employee from practicing his profession in
connection with any matter before the office he used to be with within one year from his
resignation, retirement or separation from public office.
As earlier stated, the April 22, 1991 Resolution of the Sandiganbayan (Second Division) was
adopted by the Fifth Division in the resolutions now being assailed by the PCGG. Hence, the
recourse to this Court by the PCGG.
Procedural Issues
The following procedural issues are raised by respondents Tan, et al.: (1) whether the assailed
Sandiganbayan (Fifth Division) Resolutions dated July 11, 2001 and December 5, 2001 are final
and executory; hence, the PCGG should have filed a petition for review on certiorari under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court and not the instant petition for certiorari under Rule 65 thereof; and (2)
whether the instant petition is already barred by the Sandiganbayan (Second Division)
Resolution dated April 22, 1991 under the doctrine of res judicata.
In contending that the PCGG availed itself of the wrong remedy in filing the instant petition for
certiorari, respondents Tan, et al. rely on Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court which reads:
Section 1. Filing of petition with Supreme Court. - A party desiring to appeal by certiorari from a
judgment or final order or resolution of the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Regional
Trial Court or other courts whenever authorized by law, may file with the Supreme Court a
verified petition for review on certiorari. The petition shall raise only questions of law which
must be distinctly set forth.
Section 7 of Presidential Decree No. 1606, as amended by Section 3 of Rep. Act No. 7975,
likewise, states:
Sec. 7. Form, Finality and Enforcement of Decisions. –
…
Decisions and final orders of the Sandiganbayan shall be appealable to the Supreme Court.
I am not persuaded by the arguments proffered by respondents Tan, et al. The above-mentioned
rules do not preclude the resort to this Court by way of a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court of orders or resolutions of the Sandiganbayan. The special civil action of
certiorari may be availed of where there is no appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy
in the ordinary course of law.13
In this case, the remedy of appeal is not available to the PCGG because the denial of its motion
to disqualify Atty. Mendoza as counsel for respondents Tan, et al. is an interlocutory order;
hence, not appealable. The word "interlocutory" refers to "something intervening between the
commencement and the end of a suit which decides some point or matter, but is not a final
decision of the whole controversy."14 An interlocutory order does not terminate nor does it finally
dispose of the case; it does not end the task of the court in adjudicating the parties’ contentions
and determining their rights and liabilities as against each other but leaves something yet to be
done by the court before the case is finally decided on the merits.15
Accordingly, this Court, in not a few cases, had taken cognizance of petitions for certiorari of
resolutions of the Sandiganbayan which were in the nature of interlocutory orders. For example,
in Serapio v. Sandiganbayan,16 we took cognizance of, albeit dismissed, the petition for
certiorari which assailed the resolutions of the Sandiganbayan denying the petition for bail,
motion for a reinvestigation and motion to quash filed by accused Edward Serapio. Also, in San
Miguel Corporation v. Sandiganbayan,17 we took cognizance of, albeit dismissed, the petitions
for certiorari of several resolutions of the Sandiganbayan involving the sequestered shares of
stock in the San Miguel Corp.
To my mind, the PCGG properly filed the instant petition for certiorari under Rule 65 to assail
the resolutions of the Sandiganbayan (Fifth Division) denying its motion to disqualify Atty.
Mendoza as counsel for respondents Tan, et al. in Civil Cases Nos. 0096-0099.
With respect to the second procedural issue raised by respondents Tan, et al., i.e., the instant
petition is already barred by the Sandiganbayan (Second Division) Resolution dated April 22,
1991 in Civil Case No. 0005 under the doctrine of res judicata, I submit that the doctrine of res
judicata finds no application in this case.
104 of 122
Section 47, Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court reads in part:

Sec. 47. Effect of judgments or final orders. – The effect of a judgment or final order rendered by
a court of the Philippines, having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment or final order, may be
as follows:
…
(b) In other cases, the judgment or final order is, with respect to the matter directly adjudged or
as to any other matter that could have been raised in relation thereto, conclusive between the
parties and their successors-in-interest by title subsequent to the commencement of the action or
special proceeding, litigating for the same thing and under the same title and in the same
capacity; and
(c) In any other litigation between the same parties or their successors-in-interest, that only is
deemed to have been adjudged in a former judgment or final order which appears upon its face to
have been so adjudged, or which was actually and necessarily included therein or necessary
thereto.
The doctrine of res judicata comprehends two distinct concepts – (1) bar by former judgment
and (2) conclusiveness of judgment.18 Paragraph (b) embodies the doctrine of res judicata or res
adjudicata or bar by prior judgment, while paragraph (c) estoppel by judgment or conclusiveness
of judgment.19 In Macahilig v. Heirs of Grace M. Magalit,20 Justice Artemio Panganiban
explained that the term "final" in the phrase judgments or final orders in the above section has
two accepted interpretations. In the first sense, it is an order that one can no longer appeal
because the period to do so has expired, or because the order has been affirmed by the highest
possible tribunal involved.21 The second sense connotes that it is an order that leaves nothing else
to be done, as distinguished from one that is interlocutory.22 The phrase refers to a final
determination as opposed to a judgment or an order that settles only some incidental, subsidiary
or collateral matter arising in an action; for example, an order postponing a trial, denying a
motion to dismiss or allowing intervention. Orders that give rise to res judicata or conclusiveness
of judgment apply only to those falling under the second category.23
For res judicata to serve as an absolute bar to a subsequent action, the following elements must
concur: (1) there is a final judgment or order; (2) the court rendering it has jurisdiction over the
subject matter and the parties; (3) the judgment is one on the merits; and (4) there is, between the
two cases, identity of parties, subject matter and cause of action.24 When there is no identity of
causes of action, but only an identity of issues, there exists res judicata in the concept of
conclusiveness of judgment.25
In any case, whether as a bar by prior judgment or in the concept of conclusiveness of judgment,
the doctrine of res judicata applies only when there is a judgment or final order which, as earlier
discussed, leaves nothing else to be done. As explained by Justice Panganiban, a judgment or an
order on the merits is one rendered after a determination of which party is upheld, as
distinguished from an order rendered upon some preliminary or formal or merely technical
point.26 To reiterate, the said judgment or order is not interlocutory and does not settle only some
incidental, subsidiary or collateral matter arising in an action.
The Resolution dated April 22, 1991 of the Sandiganbayan (Second Division) in Civil Case No.
0005 denying the PCGG’s similar motion to disqualify Atty. Mendoza as counsel for respondents
Tan, et al. therein was evidently an interlocutory order as it did not terminate or finally dispose of
the said case. It merely settled an incidental or collateral matter arising therein. As such, it cannot
operate to bar the filing of another motion to disqualify Atty. Mendoza in the other cases because,
strictly speaking, the doctrine of res judicata, whether to serve as a bar by prior judgment or in
the concept of conclusiveness of judgment, does not apply to decisions or orders adjudicating
interlocutory motions.27
Substantive Issue
The substantive issue in this case is whether the present engagement of Atty. Mendoza as counsel
for respondents Tan, et al. in Civil Cases Nos. 0096-0099 violates the interdiction embodied in
Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Canon 6 of our Code of Professional Responsibility reads:
CANON 6 – THESE CANONS SHALL APPLY TO LAWYERS IN GOVERNMENT SERVICE
IN THE DISCHARGE OF THEIR OFFICIAL DUTIES.
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Rule 6.01 – The primary duty of a lawyer in public prosecution is not to convict but to see that
justice is done. The suppression of facts or the concealment of witnesses capable of establishing
the innocence of the accused is highly reprehensible and is cause for disciplinary action.
Rule 6.02 – A lawyer in government service shall not use his public position to promote or
advance his private interests, nor allow the latter to interfere with his public duties.
Rule 6.03 – A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service, accept engagement or
employment in connection with any matter in which he had intervened while in said
service.
A good number of the Canons in our present Code of Professional Responsibility were adopted
from the Canons of Professional Ethics of the American Bar Association (ABA).28 Rule 6.03, in
particular, is a restatement of Canon 36 of the Canons of Professional Ethics which provided:
36. RETIREMENT FROM JUDICIAL POSITION OR PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT.
A lawyer, having once held public office or having been in the public employ, should not
after his retirement accept employment in connection with any matter which he has
investigated or passed upon while in such office or employ.
Indeed, the restriction against a public official from using his public position as a vehicle to
promote or advance his private interests extends beyond his tenure on certain matters in which he
intervened as a public official.29 Rule 6.03 makes this restriction specifically applicable to
lawyers who once held public office. A plain reading of the rule shows that the interdiction (1)
applies to a lawyer who once served in the government, and (2) relates to his accepting
"engagement or employment in connection with any matter in which he had intervened while in
said service."
In the United States, an area of concern involving ethical considerations applicable to former
government lawyers is called the "revolving door" – the process by which lawyers temporarily
enter government service from private life then leave it for large fees in private practice, where
they can exploit information, contacts, and influence garnered in government service.30 To
address this, the disqualification of a former government lawyer who has entered private practice
may be sought based either on "adverse-interest conflict" or "congruent-interest representation
conflict."
In the "adverse-interest conflict," a former government lawyer is enjoined from representing a
client in private practice if the matter is substantially related to a matter that the lawyer dealt with
while employed by the government and if the interests of the current and former clients are
adverse.31 It must be observed that the "adverse-interest conflict" applies to all lawyers in that
they are generally disqualified from accepting employment in a subsequent representation if the
interests of the former client and the present client are adverse and the matters involved are the
same or substantially related.32 On the other hand, in "congruent-interest representation conflict,"
the disqualification does not really involve a conflict at all, because it prohibits the lawyer from
representing a private practice client even if the interests of the former government client and the
new client are entirely parallel.33 The "congruent-interest representation conflict," unlike the
"adverse-interest conflict," is unique to former government lawyers.
I believe that Atty. Mendoza’s present engagement as counsel for respondents Tan, et al. in Civil
Case No. 0096, which involves the sequestered shares of stocks in Allied Banking Corp., violates
the ethical precept embodied in Rule 6.03 of our Code of Professional Responsibility, which is
akin to the doctrine of "congruent-interest representation conflict."
Contrary to the majority opinion, the subject
matter in Civil Case No. 0096 is connected with
or related to a "matter," i.e. the liquidation
of GENBANK, in which Atty. Mendoza had
intervened as the Solicitor General
The qualifying words or phrases that define the prohibition in Rule 6.03 are (1) "any matter" and
(2) "he had intervened" thereon while he was in the government service.34
The United States’ ABA Formal Opinion No. 324 recognized that it is difficult to formulate a
precise definition of "matter" as used in their Disciplinary Rule (DR), nonetheless, it suggested
106 of 122
that the term "contemplates a discrete and isolatable transaction or set of transaction between
identifiable parties."35
There is no dispute that Atty. Mendoza, as the Solicitor General, advised the Central Bank on the
procedure to bring about the liquidation of GENBANK. It is, likewise, admitted by respondents
Tan, et al. that Atty. Mendoza filed with the then CFI of Manila, the petition for assistance in the
liquidation of GENBANK (Special Proceeding No. 107812).36 GENBANK was subsequently
acquired by respondents Tan, et al. and became Allied Banking Corp., whose shares of stocks
have been sequestered by the PCGG and presently subject of Civil Case No. 0096.
The majority opinion downplays the role of Atty. Mendoza by stating that he "merely advised the
Central Bank on the legal procedure to liquidate GENBANK" which procedure is "given in
black and white in R.A. No. 265, section 29." This procedural advice, according to the majority
opinion, "is not the matter contemplated by Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility."
On the contrary, the acts of Atty. Mendoza may be rightfully considered as falling within the
contemplation of the term "matter" within the meaning of Rule 6.03. Specifically, Atty.
Mendoza’s giving counsel to the Central Bank on the procedure to go about GENBANK’s
liquidation and the filing of the petition therefor in Special Proceedings No. 107812 did not
merely involve the drafting, enforcing or interpreting government or agency procedures,
regulations or laws, or briefing abstract principles of law.37 These acts were discrete, isolatable as
well as identifiable transactions or conduct involving a particular situation and specific party, i.e.,
the procedure for the liquidation of GENBANK. Consequently, the same can be properly
considered "matter" within the contemplation of Rule 6.03.
Moreover, contrary to the contention of respondents Tan, et al., the interdiction in Rule 6.03 does
not only apply if precisely the same legal issues are involved in each representation.38 The
Comments of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) that drafted our Code of Professional
Responsibility explained that the restriction covers "engagement or employment, which means
that he cannot accept any work or employment from anyone that will involve or relate to the
matter in which he intervened as a public official."39 The sequestration of the shares of stock in
Allied Banking Corp. in the names of respondents Tan, et al., which is subject of Civil Case No.
0096, necessarily involves or relates to their acquisition of GENBANK upon its liquidation, in
which Atty. Mendoza had intervened as the Solicitor General.
It should be emphasized that Atty. Mendoza’s participation in GENBANK’s liquidation is
sufficient to place his present engagement as counsel for respondents Tan, et al. in Civil Case No.
0096 within the ambit of Rule 6.03. His role was significant and substantial. The Memorandum
dated March 29, 1977 prepared by certain key officials40 of the Central Bank, is revealing:
Immediately after said meeting, we had a conference with the Solicitor General and he
advised that the following procedure should be taken:
1. Management should submit a memorandum to the Monetary Board reporting that studies and
evaluation had been made since the last examination of the bank as of August 31, 1976 and it is
believed that the bank can not be reorganized or placed in a condition so that it may be permitted
to resume business with safety to its depositors and creditors and the general public.
2. If the said report is confirmed by the Monetary Board, it shall order the liquidation of the bank
and indicate the manner of its liquidation and approve a liquidation plan.
3. The Central Bank shall inform the principal stockholders of Genbank of the foregoing decision
to liquidate the bank and the liquidation plan approved by the Monetary Board.
4. The Solicitor General shall then file a petition in the Court of First Instance reciting the
proceedings which had been taken and praying the assistance of the Court in the liquidation of
Genbank.41
The Minutes No. 13 dated March 29, 1977 of the Monetary Board likewise shows that Atty.
Mendoza was furnished copies of pertinent documents relating to GENBANK in order to aid him
in filing with the court the petition for assistance in the bank’s liquidation. The pertinent portion
of the said minutes reads:
The Board decided as follows:
…
107 of 122
E. To authorize Management to furnish the Solicitor General with a copy of the subject
memorandum of the Director, Department of Commercial and Savings Bank dated March
29, 1977, together with copies of:
1. Memorandum of the Deputy Governor, Supervision and Examination Sector, to the Monetary
Board, dated March 25, 1977, containing a report on the current situation of Genbank;
2. Aide Memoire on the Antecedent Facts Re: General Bank and Trust Co., dated March 23,
1977;
3. Memorandum of the Director, Department of Commercial and Savings Bank, to the Monetary
Board, dated March 24, 1977, submitting, pursuant to Section 29 of R.A. No. 265, as amended
by P.D. No. 1007, a report on the state of insolvency of Genbank, together with its attachments;
and
4. Such other documents as may be necessary or needed by the Solicitor General.
for his use in filing a petition in the Court of First Instance praying the assistance of the Court in
the liquidation of Genbank."42
By advising the Central Bank on the procedure to bring about the liquidation of GENBANK and,
more significantly, by filing the petition for assistance in its liquidation, Atty. Mendoza had
clearly intervened in the liquidation of GENBANK and its subsequent acquisition by respondents
Tan, et al.
I disagree with the ponencia’s holding that Atty. Mendoza could not be considered as having
intervened as it describes the participation of Atty. Mendoza by stating that he "had no iota of
participation in the decision of the Central Bank to liquidate GENBANK."
That the decision to declare GENBANK insolvent was made wholly by the Central Bank,
without the participation of Atty. Mendoza, is not in question. Rather, it was his participation in
the proceedings taken subsequent to such declaration, i.e., his giving advise to the Central Bank
on how to proceed with GENBANK’s liquidation and his filing of the petition in Special
Proceeding No. 107812 pursuant to Section 2943 of Rep. Act No. 265, that constitutes
"intervention" as to place him within the contemplation of Rule 6.03. To intervene means –
1: to enter or appear as an irrelevant or extraneous feature or circumstance; 2: to occur, fall or
come between points of time or events; 3: to come in or between by way of hindrance or
modification: INTERPOSE; 4: to occur or lie between two things …44
Further, "intervention" is defined as –
1: the act or fact of intervening: INTERPOSITION;
2: interference that may affect the interests of others …45
With the foregoing definitions, it is not difficult to see that by giving counsel to the Central Bank
on how to proceed with GENBANK’s liquidation and filing the necessary petition therefor with
the court, Atty. Mendoza "had intervened," "had come in," or "had interfered," in the liquidation
of GENBANK and the subsequent acquisition by respondents Tan, et al. of the said banking
institution. Moreover, his acts clearly affected the interests of GENBANK as well as its
stockholders.
Contrary to the majority opinion, Rule 6.03 applies
even if Atty. Mendoza did not "switch sides" or did not
take inconsistent sides. Rule 6.03 applies even if
no conflict of interest exists between Atty. Mendoza’s
former government client (Central Bank) and
his present private practice clients (respondents Tan, et al.)
As earlier intimated, Rule 6.03 is a restatement of Canon 36 of the ABA’s Canons of Professional
Ethics, now superseded by the ABA’s Code of Professional Responsibility. In lieu of the old
Canon 36, Canon 9 of the ABA’s Code of Professional Responsibility mandates that:
A lawyer should avoid even the appearance of professional impropriety.
Providing specificity to this general caveat, Disciplinary Rule (DR) 9–101(B) commands, thus:
A lawyer shall not accept private employment in a matter in which he had substantial
responsibility while he was a public employee.
The purpose of the interdiction, as stated in the ABA Committee on Professional Ethics, Opinion
No. 37, is –
108 of 122
"[to avoid] the manifest possibility that … [a former Government lawyer’s] action as a public
legal official might be influenced (or open to the charge that it had been influenced) by the hope
of later being employed privately to uphold or upset what he had done.46
The old Canon 36, as well as the present Canon 9 and DR9-101(B), rest on the policy
consideration that an attorney must seek to avoid even the appearance of evil.47
Being undoubtedly of American origin, the interpretation adopted by the American courts and the
ABA has persuasive effect on the interpretation of Rule 6.03.48 Accordingly, I find the case of
General Motors Corporation v. City of New York,49 where the pertinent ethical precepts were
applied by the United States Court of Appeals (2nd Circuit), particularly instructive. The said US
court disqualified the privately retained counsel of the City of New York in the antitrust case it
filed against the General Motors Corp. because the said counsel, a former lawyer of the US
Department of Justice, had not only participated in the latter’s case against General Motors Corp.
but signed the complaint in that action.
George D. Reycraft, the counsel whose disqualification was sought in that case, served as a trial
attorney assigned at the General Litigation Services of the Antitrust Division of the US
Department of Justice from 1952 to 1962. Sometime in 1954, he participated in the investigation
of the alleged monopolization by General Motors Corp. of the city and intercity bus business.
The investigation culminated with the filing of the antitrust complaint against General Motors
Corp. in 1956. Reycraft signed the said complaint but alleged that after 1958 through the time
that he left the Department of Justice in 1962, he no longer had any participation in that case.
In disqualifying Reycraft, the US Court gave short shrift to the argument that Reycraft "has not
changed sides" – i.e. "there is nothing antithetical in the postures of the two governments in
question," stating that, per Opinion No. 37 of the ABA Commission on Professional Ethics, the
ethical precepts of Canon 9 and DR9-101(B) apply irrespective of the side chosen in private
practice. The said court believed that it "is as it should be for there lurks great potential for
lucrative returns in following into private practice the course already charted with the aid of
governmental resources."50
The US Court stressed that Reycraft not only participated in the investigation, but he signed the
complaint in that action and admittedly had "substantial responsibility" in its investigatory and
preparatory stages. It thus concluded that "where the overlap of issues is so plain and the
involvement while in Government employ is so direct, the appearance of impropriety must be
avoided through disqualification."51
The General Motors case is illustrative of the "congruent-interest representation conflict"
doctrine. It bears stressing that this doctrine applies uniquely to former government lawyers and
has been distinguished from the normal rule applicable for non-government lawyers in this wise
–
To illustrate the normal rule for non-government lawyers, imagine that the lawyer has
represented passenger A and has recovered substantial damages in a suit against a driver. No
conflict of interest principle or rule restricts the lawyer from later representing passenger B
against the driver with respect to exactly the same accident. B may obtain the benefits of the
lawyer’s help regardless of the fact that the lawyer might be able to employ to B’s advantage
information and strategies developed in the representation of A. The critical element is that the
interest of A and B do not conflict.
The analysis does not change if we move from an area that is entirely private into one that is
arguably more connected with the public interest. Suppose a lawyer in private practice represents
Small Soap Company in its suit for damages under the federal antitrust laws against Giant Soap
Company. The lawyer would not be disqualified from representing Medium Soap Company
against Giant Soap in a succeeding suit for damages based on precisely the same conspiracy. The
congruence of interests between Small Soap and Medium Soap would almost certainly mean that
the lawyer could represent both clients. In the absence of a conflict – an opposing interest
between the two clients – the existence of a substantial relationship between the matters involved
in both cases is irrelevant.
Now, suppose the lawyer has filed suit in behalf of the government against Giant Soap Company
to force divestiture of an acquired company on a theory that, because of the acquisition, Giant
Soap has monopolized an industry in conflict with antitrust laws. May the lawyer, after leaving
government service and while in private practice, represent Medium Soap Company against
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Giant Soap in a suit for damages based on the same antitrust conspiracy? Does the absence of
opposing interests between Medium Soap and the lawyer’s former government client similarly
mean that there should be no disqualification?
At this point, the rules for the former government lawyer diverge sharply from the normal
former-client conflict rules: the lawyer is disqualified from representing the successive client in
private practice, despite the fact that the interests of the client and the lawyer’s former
government client are apparently aligned. All that is required for disqualification is the
relationship between the former and the succeeding representations.52
The rationale for the "congruent-interest representation conflict" doctrine has been explained,
thus:
The rationale for disqualification is rooted in a concern with the impact that any other rule would
have upon the decisions and actions taken by the government lawyer during the course of the
earlier representation of the government. Both courts and commentators have expressed the fear
that permitting a lawyer to take action in behalf of a government client that later could be to the
advantage of private practice client would present grave dangers that a government lawyer’s
largely discretionary actions would be wrongly influenced by the temptation to secure private
practice employment or to favor parties who might later become private practice clients …
The fear that government lawyers will misuse government power in that way is not idle. Lawyers
who represent the government often exercise enormous discretion unchecked by an actual client
who oversees the lawyer’s work. For that reason a special rule is needed to remove the incentive
for government lawyers to take discretionary decisions with an eye cast toward advantages in
future, nongovernmental employment. The broad disqualification accomplishes that and,
particularly under rubrics that do not invariably require disqualification of the entire firm with
which the former government lawyer practices, does it without unnecessarily discouraging
lawyers from entering temporary public service.53
The foregoing disquisition applies to the case of Atty. Mendoza. Indeed, a textual reading of Rule
6.03 of our Code of Professional Responsibility reveals that no conflict of interests or adverse
interests is required for the interdiction to apply. If it were so, or if conflict of interests were an
element, then the general conflict of interests rule (Rule 15.03)54 would apply. Rather, the
interdiction in Rule 6.03 broadly covers "engagement or employment in connection with any
matter in which he had intervened while in the said service." To reiterate, the drafters of our
Code of Professional Responsibility had construed this to mean that a lawyer "cannot accept any
work or employment from anyone that will involve or relate to the matter in which he intervened
as a public official, except on behalf of the body or authority which he served during his public
employment."55
In Civil Case No. 0096, Atty. Mendoza is certainly not representing the Central Bank but
respondents Tan, et al. Granting arguendo that the interests of his present private practice clients
(respondents Tan, et al.) and former government client (Central Bank) are apparently aligned, the
interdiction in Rule 6.03 applies.
Rule 6.03 purposely does not contain an explicit
temporal limitation because cases have to be
resolved based on their peculiar circumstances
Unless the Code itself provides, the Court cannot set a prescriptive period for any of the
provisions therein. That Rule 6.03, in particular, contains no explicit temporal limitation is
deliberate. It recognizes that while passage of time is a factor to consider in determining its
applicability, the peculiarities of each case have to be considered. For example, in Control Data
Corp. v. International Business Mach. Corp.,56 the US District Court of Minnesota held that the
lawyer who, 15 years earlier, while an employee of the Department of Justice had been in charge
of negotiations in antitrust case against a corporation, was not disqualified from acting as counsel
for the plaintiffs suing such corporation. On the other hand, the lawyer whose conduct was the
subject of the ABA Opinion No. 37, earlier cited, was himself 10 years removed from the matter
over which he had substantial responsibility while in public employ at the time he accepted the
private engagement relating to the same matter.57 Clearly, it is the degree of involvement or
participation in the matter while in government service, not the passage of time, which is the
crucial element in Rule 6.03.
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The Code of Professional Responsibility is a codification of legal ethics, that "body of principles
by which the conduct of members of the legal profession is controlled. More specifically and
practically considered, legal ethics may be defined as that branch of moral science which treats
of the duties which the attorney-at-law owes to his clients, to the courts, to the bar, and to the
public."58 In this connection, the Court has consistently characterized disciplinary proceedings,
including disqualification cases, against lawyers as sui generis, neither purely civil nor purely
criminal, thus:
[D]isciplinary proceedings against lawyers are sui generis. Neither purely civil nor pure criminal,
they do not involve a trial of an action or a suit, but are rather investigations by the Court into the
conduct of one of its officers. Not being intended to inflict punishment, [they are] in no sense a
criminal prosecution. Accordingly, there is neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor therein. [They]
may be initiated by the Court motu propio. Public interest is [their] primary objective, and the
real question for determination is whether or not the attorney is still a fit person be allowed the
privileges as such. Hence, in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court merely calls upon
a member of the Bar to account for his actuations as an officer of the Court with the end view of
preserving the purity of the legal profession and the proper and honest administration of
justice…59
For this reason, the civil law concept of prescription of actions finds no application in
disqualification cases against lawyers.
In this case, while the liquidation of GENBANK took place in 1977, the period that had lapsed is
not sufficient to consider it far removed from the present engagement of Atty. Mendoza as
counsel for respondents Tan, et al. in Civil Case No. 0096. In fact, the validity of the said
liquidation is still pending with the Court.60 The validity of the sequestration of the shares in
Allied Banking Corp., which is the subject matter of Civil Case No. 0096, is necessarily
intertwined with Special Proceeding No. 107812 involving the liquidation of GENBANK and
the acquisition thereof by respondents Tan, et al. The issues presented in the two proceedings are
so overlapping and the involvement of Atty. Mendoza while in government employ is so plain,
direct and substantial, his disqualification as counsel for respondents Tan, et al. in Civil Case No.
0095 is warranted under Rule 6.03.
Contrary to the majority opinion, the peculiar
circumstances of this case justify the strict application
of Rule 6.03
The ponencia cautions against the strict application of Rule 6.03 because it would have a
"chilling effect on the right of government to recruit competent counsel to defend its interests."
This concern is similar to that raised by the City of New York in the General Motors case where
it argued that if Reycraft was disqualified, the US court would "chill the ardor for Government
service by rendering worthless the experience gained in Government employ."61 It appeared that
the City of New York relied on the pronouncement in the earlier case of United States v.
Standard Oil Co,62 known as the Esso Export Case, thus:
If the government service will tend to sterilize an attorney in too large an area of law for too long
a time, or will prevent him from engaging in the practice of a technical specialty which he has
devoted years in acquiring, and if that sterilization will spread to the firm which he becomes
associated, the sacrifice of entering government service will be too great for most men to make.63
Addressing this argument in General Motors, the same US court, through Justice Irving F.
Kaufman, also the ponente of the Esso Export Case, distinguished the two cases. It noted that the
said court denied the motion to disqualify the former government lawyer in Esso Export Case
because the lawyer therein "never investigated or passed upon the subject matter of the pending
case … never rendered or had any specific duty to render any legal advice in relation to the
regulations involved in the litigation."64 Hence, the accommodation between maintaining high
ethical standards for former Government employees, on the one hand, and encouraging entry into
Government service, on the other, was struck under far different circumstances of the Esso
Export Case.
In General Motors, the admonition voiced by Justice Kaufman in his article The Former
Government Attorney and the Canons of Professional Ethics65 was considered more to the point:
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If there was a likelihood that information pertaining to the pending matter reached the attorney,
although he did not "investigate" or "pass upon" it, …, there would undoubtedly be an
appearance of evil if he were not disqualified.66
Thus, it was concluded that the Esso Export Case unquestionably presented a case for the
cautious application of the "appearance-of-evil doctrine" because the former Government
lawyer’s connection with the matter at issue was the tenuous one of mere employment in the
same Government agency.
In contrast, in General Motors, Reycraft, not only participated in the investigatory and
preparatory stages, but also signed the complaint in the action. Thus, according to the US court,
where the overlap of issues is so plain, and the involvement while in Government employ so
direct, the resulting appearance of impropriety must be avoided through disqualification.
From the foregoing disquisition, it can be gleaned that disqualification cases involving former
government lawyers will have to be resolved on the basis of peculiar circumstances attending
each case. A balance between the two seemingly conflicting policy considerations of maintaining
high ethical standards for former Government employees, on the one hand, and encouraging
entry into Government service, on the other, must be struck based on, inter alia, the relationship
between the former and the succeeding representations of the former government lawyer.
Likewise, as already discussed, the degree of his involvement in the matter while in Government
employ is a crucial element in determining if his present representation is within the purview of
Rule 6.03.
In this case, not unlike in General Motors, the involvement of Atty. Mendoza in the liquidation
of GENBANK while he was the Solicitor General is so direct that the appearance of impropriety
must be avoided through disqualification.
Conclusion
Let me just clarify that the record is free from any intimation that Atty. Mendoza was improperly
influenced while in government service or that he is guilty of any impropriety in agreeing to
represent respondents Tan, et al. However, I am constrained to vote for his disqualification in
Civil Case No. 0096 in order to avoid any appearance of impropriety lest it taint both the public
and private segments of the legal profession.
ACCORDINGLY, I vote to PARTIALLY GRANT the petition. The Motion to Disqualify Atty.
Estelito P. Mendoza is GRANTED insofar as Civil Case No. 0096 is concerned.
SEPARATE OPINION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
The Petition in this case should be DISMISSED on two grounds: (1) res judicata, specifically,
conclusiveness of judgment; and (2) prescription.
In his Dissent, the esteemed Justice Romeo J. Callejo Sr. argues that Atty. Estelito P. Mendoza
violated Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,1 because after leaving his post as
solicitor general, he appeared as counsel in a "matter in which he had intervened while he was in
said service" (as solicitor general). He postulates that the Code of Professional Responsibility
should be a beacon to assist good lawyers "in navigating an ethical course through the sometimes
murky waters of professional conduct," in order "to avoid any appearance of impropriety." He
adds that the Code should be strictly construed and stringently enforced.
On the other hand, the distinguished Justice Reynato S. Puno contends in his ponencia that Rule
6.03 of the Code has been incorrectly applied by Justice Callejo, because the "procedural advice"
given by Atty. Mendoza is not the "matter" contemplated by the said Rule. The ponencia
explains that an "ultra restrictive reading of the Rule" would have "ill-effects in our jurisdiction."
With due respect to both Justices Puno and Callejo, I respectfully submit that there is no need to
delve into the question of whether Rule 6.03 has been transgressed; there is no need to discuss
the merits of the questioned Sandiganbayan Resolutions allowing Atty. Mendoza to represent
private respondents in Civil Case Nos. 0096-0099. After all, a Resolution issued by the same
court resolving the very same issue on the "disqualification" of Atty. Mendoza in a case
involving the same parties and the same subject matter has already become final and immutable.
It can no longer be altered or changed.
I believe that the material issue in the present controversy is whether Atty. Mendoza may still be
barred from representing these respondents despite (1) a final Order in another case resolving the
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very same ground for disqualification involving the same parties and the same subject matter as
the present case; and (2) the passage of a sufficient period of time from the date he ceased to be
solicitor general to the date when the supposed disqualification (for violation of the Code) was
raised.
Conclusiveness
of Judgment
The doctrine of res judicata is set forth in Section 47 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, the
relevant part of which I quote as follows:
"Sec. 47. Effect of judgments or final orders.
— The effect of a judgment or final order rendered by a court of the Philippines, having
jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment or final order, may be as follows:
xxxxxxxxx
"(b) In other cases, the judgment or final order is, with respect to the matter directly adjudged or
as to any other matter that could have been raised in relation thereto, conclusive between the
parties and their successors in interest by title subsequent to the commencement of the action or
special proceeding, litigating for the same thing and under the same title and in the same
capacity; and
"(c) In any other litigation between the same parties or their successors in interest, that only is
deemed to have been adjudged in a former judgment or final order which appears upon its face to
have been so adjudged, or which was actually and necessarily included therein or necessary
thereto."
The above provision comprehends two distinct concepts of res judicata: (1) bar by former
judgment and (2) conclusiveness of judgment. Under the first concept, res judicata serves as an
absolute proscription of a subsequent action when the following requisites concur: (1) the former
judgment or order was final; (2) it adjudged the pertinent issue or issues on their merits; (3) it
was rendered by a court that had jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; and (4)
between the first and the second actions, there was identity of parties, of subject matter, and of
causes of action.2
In regard to the fourth requirement, if there is no identity of causes of action but only an identity
of issues, res judicata exists under the second concept; that is, under conclusiveness of
judgment. In the latter concept, the rule bars the re-litigation of particular facts or issues
involving the same parties but on different claims or causes of action.3 Such rule, however, does
not have the same effect as a bar by former judgment, which prohibits the prosecution of a
second action upon the same claim, demand or cause of action.
In other words, conclusiveness of judgment finds application when a fact or question has been
squarely put in issue, judicially passed upon, and adjudged in a former suit by a court of
competent jurisdiction; it has thus been conclusively settled by a judgment or final order issued
therein. Insofar as the parties to that action (and persons in privity with them) are concerned, and
while the judgment or order remains unreversed or un-vacated by a proper authority upon a
timely motion or petition, such conclusively settled fact or question cannot again be litigated in
any future or other action between the same parties or their privies, in the same or in any other
court of concurrent jurisdiction, either for the same or for a different cause of action. Thus, the
only identities required for the operation of the principle of conclusiveness of judgment is that
between parties and issues.4
While it does not have the same effect as a bar by former judgment, which proscribes subsequent
actions, conclusiveness of judgment nonetheless operates as an estoppel to issues or points
controverted, on which the determination of the earlier finding or judgment has been anchored.5
The dictum laid down in such a finding or judgment becomes conclusive and continues to be
binding between the same parties, as long as the facts on which that judgment was predicated
continue to be the facts of the case or incident before the court. The binding effect and
enforceability of that dictum can no longer be re-litigated, since the said issue or matter has
already been resolved and finally laid to rest in the earlier case.6
Relevant Antecedents
Showing the Application of the
Conclusiveness Doctrine
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Let me now discuss some relevant antecedents to show the application to this case of res
judicata, specifically the principle of conclusiveness of judgment.
Pursuant to Executive Order No. 1 of then President Corazon C. Aquino, the Presidential
Commission on Good Government (PCGG) issued sometime in June to August 1986 several
Writs of Sequestration over certain properties of Respondents Lucio Tan et al., properties they
had supposedly acquired by taking advantage of their close relationship with former President
Ferdinand E. Marcos.
On August 17, 1987, the PCGG instituted before the Sandiganbayan a Complaint against the
same respondents for "reversion, reconveyance, restitution, accounting and damages" vis-à-vis
their sequestered properties. The Complaint was docketed as Civil Case No. 0005 and raffled to
the Second Division of the Sandiganbayan (SBN).
Meanwhile, in separate Petitions before this Court, the validity of the sequestration Writs was
questioned by herein respondents, but said Petitions were referred by the Court to the
Sandiganbayan for proper disposition. These cases were raffled to the SBN Fifth Division and
docketed as Civil Case Nos. 0096, 0097, 0098 and 0099. Civil Case No. 0096, in particular,
involved the validity of the Writ of Sequestration issued by the PCGG over herein private
respondents’ shares of stock in Allied Banking Corporation (formerly General Bank and Trust
Company or "GenBank").
In all the above-mentioned cases, Atty. Estelito P. Mendoza was the counsel of Tan et al.
On February 5, 1991, the PCGG filed in Civil Case No. 0005 a Motion7 to disqualify Atty.
Mendoza as counsel for therein Respondents Tan et al. In a Resolution8 dated April 22, 1991, the
Sandiganbayan (Second Division) denied that Motion. The anti-graft court likewise denied the
Motion for Reconsideration filed by the PCGG.9 Because the latter did not appeal the denial, the
Resolution became final and executory.
Similarly, in Civil Case Nos. 0096-0099, PCGG filed a Motion10 to disqualify Atty. Mendoza as
counsel for Respondents Lucio Tan et al. According to respondent court, "the motion is exactly
the same in substance as that motion filed in Civil Case No. 0005"; in fact, both incidents were
taken up jointly by the Second and the Fifth Divisions of the Sandiganbayan.11 Indeed, a perusal
of both Motions reveals that, except as to their respective captions, the contents of the Motions
are identically worded. Both Motions were anchored essentially on the same ground: that by
virtue of Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, Atty. Mendoza was prohibited
from acting as counsel of Tan et al. in the pending cases. During his tenure as solicitor general,
Atty. Mendoza had allegedly "intervened" in the dissolution of GenBank, Allied Bank’s
predecessor.
Thus, in its herein assailed July 11, 2001 Resolution, respondent court resolved to reiterate and
adopt "the Resolution dated April 22, 1991 in Civil Case No. 0005 of the Second Division x x x
denying the motion."
Resolution in Civil Case
No. 0005 a Final Order
As distinguished from an interlocutory order, a final judgment or order decisively puts an end to
(or disposes of) a case or a disputed issue; in respect thereto, nothing else -- except its execution
-- is left for the court to do. Once that judgment or order is rendered, the adjudicative task of the
court on the particular matter involved is likewise ended.12 Such an order may refer to the entire
controversy or to some defined and separate branch thereof.13 On the other hand, an order is
interlocutory if its effects are merely provisional in character and still leave substantial
proceedings to be further conducted by the issuing court in order to put the issue or controversy
to rest.14
I have no quarrel with the general test -- expounded, with acknowledged authorities, in the
Dissenting Opinions of Justices Conchita Carpio Morales and Callejo -- for determining whether
an order is interlocutory. Such test, however, applies to orders that dispose of incidents or issues
that are intimately related to the very cause of action or merits of the case. The exception lies
when the order refers to a "definite and separate branch" of the main controversy, as held by the
Court in Republic v. Tacloban City Ice Plant.15
Under the present factual milieu, the matter of disqualification of Atty. Mendoza as counsel for
respondents is a "defined and separate branch" of the main case for "reversion, reconveyance,
and restitution" of the sequestered properties. This matter has no direct bearing on the
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adjudication of the substantive issues in the principal controversy. The final judgment resolving
the main case does not depend on the determination of the particular question raised in the
Motion. The April 22, 1991 Resolution of the Sandiganbayan (Second Division) in Civil Case
No. 0005 had finally and definitively determined the issue of Atty. Mendoza’s disqualification to
act as counsel for Tan et al. Since that Resolution was not appealed, it became final and
executory. It became a conclusive judgment insofar as that particular question was concerned.
Applying the Doctrine of
Conclusiveness of Judgment
There is no question as regards the identity of the parties involved in Civil Case Nos. 0005 and
0096. Neither has the jurisdiction of the Second and the Fifth Divisions of the Sandiganbayan
been placed at issue. Clearly, the matter raised in the two Motions to Disqualify, though
separately filed at different times in those two cases, are likewise the same or identical. Also
undisputed is the fact that no appeal or certiorari petition was taken from the April 22, 1991
Resolution of the Second Division in Civil Case No. 0005, which had denied PCGG’s Motion.
To counter the application of res judicata, Justices Morales and Callejo opine that the said April
22, 1991 Resolution was merely interlocutory. It "merely settled an incidental or collateral matter
x x x; it cannot operate to bar the filing of another motion to disqualify Atty. Mendoza in the
other cases x x x," Justice Callejo explains. I beg to disagree.
True, there is, as yet, no final adjudication of the merits of the main issues of "reversion,
reconveyance and restitution." However, I submit that the question with respect to the
disqualification of Atty. Mendoza had nonetheless been conclusively settled. Indeed, the April 22,
1991 SBN Resolution had definitively disposed of the Motion to Disqualify on its merits. Since
no appeal was taken therefrom, it became final and executory after the lapse of the reglementary
period.16
While it merely disposed of a question that was collateral to the main controversy, the Resolution
should be differentiated from an ordinary interlocutory order that resolves an incident arising
from the very subject matter or cause of action, or one that is related to the disposition of the
main substantive issues of the case itself. Such an order is not appealable, but may still be
modified or rescinded upon sufficient grounds adduced before final judgment. Verily, res judicata
would not apply therein.17
But, as illustrated earlier, the issue of the disqualification of Atty. Mendoza is separate from and
independent of the substantive issues in the main case for "reversion, reconveyance and
restitution." This particular question, in relation to Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, was finally settled in the Resolution of April 22, 1991, issued by the SBN Second
Division. In fact, I submit that this question had to be squarely resolved before trial proceeded,
so as not to prejudice the movant in case its arguments were found to be meritorious. Otherwise,
the Motion would be rendered naught.
In 2001, ten years after its filing, the identical Motion to Disqualify Atty. Mendoza in Civil Case
Nos. 0096-0099 finally came up for deliberation before the Fifth Division of the Sandiganbayan.
The Fifth Division correctly noted that the pending Motion was "exactly the same in substance as
that Motion filed in Civil Case No. 0005." Thus, it resolved to reiterate and adopt the Second
Division’s April 22, 1991 Resolution denying the Motion. Interestingly and understandably, the
Fifth Division of the anti-graft court no longer separately reviewed the merits of the Motion
before it, because the Second Division’s Resolution disposing of exactly the same Motion and
involving the same parties and subject matter had long attained finality. That Resolution became
a conclusive judgment between the parties with respect to the subject matter involved therein.
Exception to Application of
Conclusiveness of Judgment
Justice Morales further cites Kilosbayan v. Morato,18 in which the Court19 said that "the rule on
conclusiveness of judgment or preclusion of issues or collateral estoppel does not apply to issues
of law, at least when substantially unrelated claims are involved." Explaining further, the Court
cited therein the "authoritative formulation" of the exception in Restatement of the Law 2d, on
Judgments, thus:
"§28. Although an issue is actually litigated and determined by a valid and final judgment, and
the determination is essential to the judgment, relitigation of the issue in a subsequent action
between the parties is not precluded in the following circumstances:
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xxxxxxxxx
(2) The issue is one of law and (a) the two actions involve claims that are substantially unrelated,
or (b) a new determination is warranted in order to take account or an intervening change in the
applicable legal context or otherwise to avoid inequitable administration of the laws; x x x.
[Emphasis and omissions in the original.]"
In accordance with the above exception to the rule, Justice Morales believes that the doctrine of
conclusiveness of judgment does not apply to this case, because the issue at bar --
disqualification of counsel -- "is undoubtedly a legal question" and "Civil Case No. 005 and Civil
Case No. 0096 involve two different substantially unrelated claims."
I respectfully disagree with respect to her second point, which actually qualifies the exception. I
believe that the two cases involve substantially related claims. Civil Case No. 0005 seeks to
recover alleged ill-gotten shares of stock of respondents Tan et al. in Allied Bank. Civil Case No.
0096 questions the validity of the Sequestration Writ over the same shares of stock involved in
Civil Case No. 0005. In the ultimate analysis, both cases refer to the determination of who has a
valid ownership claim over said stockholdings.
In any event and as earlier discussed, in our jurisdiction, the only identities required for the
principle of conclusiveness of judgment to operate as an estoppel are those of parties and
issues.20
Similar Motions in
Other PCGG Cases
Parenthetically, it is worth mentioning that in their Memorandum,21 Respondents Tan et al. aver
that similar Motions to Disqualify Atty. Mendoza were likewise filed in Sandiganbayan Civil
Case Nos. 0095 and 0100. The former case, Sipalay Trading v. PCGG, involved shares of stock
of Lucio Tan in Maranaw Hotels and Resort Corporation; the latter case, Allied Banking
Corporation v. PCGG, sought the invalidation of an Order for the search and seizure of certain
documents of Allied Bank.
In both cases, the Sandiganbayan denied the separate Motions to Disqualify, as well as the
Motions for Reconsideration. No further actions were taken by the PCGG on such denials, which
thus became executory. Consequently, Atty. Mendoza was allowed to represent Lucio Tan in
those cases.
On the merits of the said cases, which were consolidated, the Sandiganbayan granted both
Petitions on August 23, 1993, by nullifying the Writ of Sequestration questioned in Civil Case
No. 0095, as well as the Search and Seizure Order assailed in Civil Case No. 0100. On March
29, 1996, the Supreme Court affirmed the SBN’s Decision in the aforementioned consolidated
cases.22 Consequently, now deemed res judicata are all issues raised in Civil Case Nos. 0095 and
0100 -- principal, incidental and corollary issues, including the matter of the alleged
disqualification of Atty. Mendoza.
Presence of Identities of
Parties and Issues
As earlier discussed, the only identities required for the principle of conclusiveness of judgment
to operate as an estoppel are those of parties and issues. In the case before us, both identities are
clearly present. Hence, the principle of conclusiveness of judgment applies and bars the present
Petition.
From the foregoing, I submit that this Petition should be dismissed on the ground of
conclusiveness of judgment. Parenthetically, the proper recourse to assail the July 11, 2001 and
the December 5, 2001 Resolutions of the Sandiganbayan (Fifth Division) should have been a
Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The certiorari proceeding before this
Court is apparently a substitute for a lost appeal, deserving only of outright dismissal.23 In any
event, contrary to the allegations of petitioner, respondent court did not commit grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it issued the assailed Resolutions.
Proscription
Time-Barred
True, Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility does not expressly specify the period
of its applicability or enforceability. However, I submit that one cannot infer that, ergo, the
prohibition is absolute, perpetual and permanent.
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All civil actions have a prescriptive period.24 Unless a law makes an action imprescriptible or
lays down no other period, the action is subject to a bar by prescription five (5) years after the
right of action accrued.25 Criminal offenses -- even the most heinous ones -- as well as the
penalties therefor, likewise prescribe.26 Relatedly, even so-called perpetual penalties and multiple
sentences have maximum periods.27
Relevantly, it is worth pointing out that Republic Act No. 6713 prohibits public officers and
employees from practicing their profession for only one year after their resignation, retirement or
separation from public office, in connection with any matter before their former office.28
Prescription is intended to suppress stale and fraudulent claims arising from transactions or facts
that have been obscured by defective memory or the lapse of time.29 It was designed to promote
justice by preventing surprises through the revival of claims that have been allowed to slumber
until relevant proofs are lost, memories faded, and witnesses no longer available.30 Consistent
with law and jurisprudence and the purpose of statutes of limitations, the prohibition on former
government attorneys from involvement in matters in which they took part long ago, pursuant to
their official functions while in public service, should likewise have an expiry or duration.
In the present case, the liquidation of GenBank, in which Atty. Mendoza purportedly participated
as then solicitor general, took place in 1977 or more than a quarter of a century ago. Since early
1986, he has ceased to be solicitor general and has since engaged in the private practice of law.
In 1987, he became counsel for Respondents Tan et al. in Civil Case No. 0005 and, since 1990,
in Civil Case Nos. 0095 to 0100.31 At the time, at least ten (10) years had passed since his alleged
involvement in the GenBank liquidation. Moreover, in 1991 when the separate Motions to
Disqualify were filed by PCGG in these aforementioned cases, he had been outside government
service for about five (5) years, and fifteen years had gone by since the said liquidation.
Now it is already 2005. If we go by the rationale behind prescription, the extent of the individual
participation of government officials in the GenBank liquidation may indeed "have become so
obscure from the lapse of time," if not from "defective memory."
It is undeniable that government lawyers usually handle a multitude of cases simultaneously or
within overlapping periods of time. This is in fact a common remonstration, especially among
prosecutors, public attorneys, solicitors, government corporate counsels, labor arbiters, even trial
and appellate judges. Yet, as dutiful public servants, they cannot reject or shrink from
assignments even if they are already overloaded with work. Similarly, lawyers in private
practice, whether by themselves or employed in law firms, are in a comparative plight.
It would not be strange or uncommon that, in a period of five years, an attorney in government
service would have handled or interfered in hundreds of legal matters involving varied parties.32
Thousands of attorneys who have chosen to dedicate their service to the government for some
years are in such a situation. Hence, to perpetually and absolutely ban them from taking part in
all cases involving some matter in which they have taken part in some distant past, pursuant to
their official functions then, would be unduly harsh, unreasonable and unfair. It would be
tantamount to an unwarranted deprivation of the exercise of their profession. Be it remembered
that a profession, trade or calling partakes of the nature of a property right within the meaning of
our constitutional guarantees.33
Moreover, to attribute to a former government lawyer a violation of some ethical rule because of
participation in a matter that has been forgotten in good faith due to the lapse of a long period of
time and does not involve interest adverse to the government would likewise be harsh,
unreasonable and unfair.
Similarly, there are many competent private practitioners who, at some point in their long
careers, would wish to serve the government. Would their fine and wide-ranging practice and
experience, which would otherwise be beneficial to the government, likewise forever bar them
from getting involved in matters that concern a party with whom they have had dealings several
years ago and whose interests are not adversely affected? In the case of acknowledged experts in
specific fields of law, of what use would their needed expertise be to the government if they have
to inhibit themselves from every case involving a party they have served in the distant past,
considering the limited number of parties that may actually be involved in a specific field (for
instance, intellectual property or bioethics law)?
I submit that the restraint on the exercise of one’s profession, or right of employment including
that of attorneys formerly in government service, must survive the test of fairness and
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reasonableness. The restriction should not be as pervasive and longer than is necessary to afford
a fair and reasonable protection to the interests of the government. After all, the disqualification
of government attorneys is a drastic measure, and courts should hesitate to impose it except when
necessary.34
Thus, I submit that the restriction on government lawyers -- specifically with respect to
subsequent engagement or employment in connection with matters falling under the "congruent-
interest representation" -- should be allowed to expire after a reasonable period when no further
prejudice to the public may be contemplated. The duration of this prohibition should be no more
than five (5) years from retirement or separation from government service. Five years is the
prescriptive period for suits for which no period is prescribed by law.35
It would be reasonable to assume that five years after separation from the service, one would
most likely have lost the loyalty of one’s former personal contacts, if not the loyal associates
themselves, who may be able to facilitate the acquisition of important information from the
former office. In all probability, the lapse of the said period would also naturally obscure to a
reasonable extent a lawyer’s memory of details of a specific case despite active participation in
the proceedings therein. This principle holds if, in the interval, one has handled countless other
legal matters as is so common among lawyers in government offices.
Consequently, after the said period, former government attorneys should be allowed to take up
cases involving matters that were brought before them during their incumbency in public office,
so long as such matters do not come within the "adverse-interest conflict" doctrine and the
conflict-of-interest rule36 applicable to all lawyers in general.
For the same reasons, the disqualification of members of the judiciary under Section 5(b) and
(d)37 of Canon 3 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct38 should also prescribe in five (5) years
from the time they assumed their judicial position; or from the time they retire from or otherwise
end their government service.
I realize that the application of Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Section
5 of Canon 3 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct is quite important to many members of the
bar who have served, or who aspire to serve, the government.
On the one hand, our rules of discipline should protect the interest of the public by discouraging
attorneys in government from so shaping their practice as to give unfair advantage to their future
private clients, or from jeopardizing confidential information learned while in government
service. On the other hand, government service should not be discouraged by overly strict ethical
rules that perpetually prohibit government lawyers from later making reasonable and appropriate
use in private practice of the expertise or experience they have gained.39
The reality is that the best lawyers will want to join the more lucrative private sector sooner or
later, and the government will hardly be able to attract them if they would later be unreasonably
restricted from putting their government experience to some use.40 After all, government service
should afford lawyers the opportunity to improve their subsequent private employment. The
nature of the job brings such lawyers into inevitable contact with clients interested in their fields
of expertise. Because the practice of law is becoming increasingly specialized, the likely
consequence of a wholesale approach to disqualification would be encouragement of a two-track
professional structure: government lawyer, private lawyer. The suspicion, and the reality, of
ethical improprieties unrelated to particular government cases would be eliminated -- but at the
cost of creating an insular, static legal bureaucracy.41
Such a pervasive, perpetual ban would deter too many competent attorneys from entering
government service, to the detriment of the public.42 The Court must strike a balance. I believe
that the adoption of the aforementioned period of limitation would achieve the purpose behind
Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, as well as Section 5 of Canon 3 of the New
Code of Judicial Conduct.
To summarize, the present Petition is barred by the principle of conclusiveness of judgment,
because the April 22, 1991 Resolution of the SBN Second Division in Civil Case No. 0005 --
which resolved on the merits the very same ground for the disqualification of Atty. Mendoza, and
which involved essentially the same parties and the same subject matter as the present case --
constituted a final and executory order, no timely appeal having been taken therefrom.
Furthermore, the disqualification of former government lawyers from congruent-interest
representation under Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility should be effective
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only for a period of five (5) years from the retirement or the separation from government service
of the official concerned. The purpose of such prescriptive period is to prevent undue restraint on
former government lawyers from the private practice of their profession, especially in the field of
expertise that they may have gained while in public office. Similarly, the disqualification of
members of the judiciary, under Section 5 (b) and (d) of Canon 3 of the New Code of Judicial
Conduct should end five (5) years after they assumed their judicial position.
Implications of the
Dissenting Opinions
Endless re-litigations of the same question, as well as forum shopping, are invited by the opinion
of the dissenters that the April 22, 1991 Resolution of the Sandiganbayan’s Second Division in
Civil Case No. 0005 does not bar the filing of another motion to disqualify Atty. Mendoza from
other cases between the same parties. Such a holding would effectively allow herein petitioner to
file exactly the same Motion in each of other and future cases involving the same parties or their
privies and the same subject matters, even after the first Motion involving the same question or
issue will have already been finally resolved in one of like cases.
Further, it would also allow petitioner to let a contrary resolution of the incident in one case
become final through petitioner’s withholding recourse to a higher court in order to await a
possible favorable ruling in one of the other cases. As it is, absurdity already surrounds the
handling of Civil Case No. 0005 and No. 0096, both of which involve the same parties and the
same subject matter.
In Civil Case No. 0005, which seeks to recover allegedly unlawfully acquired properties
consisting of shares of stock of Respondent Tan et al. in Allied Bank, Atty. Mendoza is allowed
to serve as their counsel. However, in Civil Case No. 0096, which merely questions the validity
of the Writ of Sequestration issued against the shares of stock in Allied Bank of the same
respondents, he is prohibited, per the dissenters, from acting as their counsel. This is
preposterous.
Moreover, treating the first Resolution as not yet final and executory, even if no appeal or
certiorari has timely been taken therefrom, would allow the questioned counsel to act as such
throughout the trial period until final judgment by the court a quo. Thereafter, on appeal, his
alleged "disqualification" may still be raised by the other party as an issue. If the appeals court or
this Tribunal ultimately finds that the said counsel is indeed disqualified on the ground of conflict
of interest or "congruent-interest representation conflict" and thus reverses the trial court’s ruling,
the case would necessarily be remanded for new trial. As a result, the entire proceedings would
become naught and thereby unnecessarily waste the precious time, effort and resources of the
courts as well as the parties. Worse, the evidence (or defense) adduced by the "disqualified"
counsel through his prior connections with the government (or the adverse party) could have
already created bias in the court or in the public mind.
These are precisely the procedural absurdities abhorred by the doctrine of res judicata, the
fundamental principle of due process and of the rule proscribing forum shopping.
Having already shown that Atty. Mendoza can no longer be disqualified at this point for his
alleged violation of Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, due to res judicata and
prescription, I submit that there is no more need to discuss on the merits whether indeed there
was in fact such violation. Such discussion would be merely academic and moot.
May I close this Opinion with this oft-quoted ruling of former Chief Justice Pedro L. Yap, who
was himself a former PCGG commissioner, on the soundness of upholding final judgments even
"at the risk of occasional errors":
"It is a general rule common to all civilized system of jurisprudence, that the solemn and
deliberate sentence of the law, pronounced by its appointed organs, upon a disputed fact or a
state of facts, should be regarded as a final and conclusive determination of the question litigated,
and should forever set the controversy at rest. Indeed, it has been well said that this maxim is
more than a mere rule of law, more than an important principle of public policy: and that it is not
too much to say that it is a fundamental concept in the organization of the jural sytem. Public
policy and sound practice demand that, at the risk of occasional errors, judgments of courts
should become final at some definite date fixed by law. The very object for which courts were
constituted was to put an end to controversies."43
WHEREFORE, I vote to DISMISS the Petition.
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SEPARATE OPINION
TINGA, J.:
My vote to grant the petition hinges on the reasons stated hereunder. They pertain to a significant
and material dimension to this case which deserves greater illumination.
To sustain the view that Atty. Estelito Mendoza (Atty. Mendoza) should be disqualified as
counsel in Civil Case No. 0096, as the dissenters are wont to hold, there should be a clear legal
basis that would mandate such disqualification. The dissenters would hold Atty. Mendoza liable
for violating Section 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, while the ponencia
disputes the assertion that the provision was indeed transgressed. I maintain that Section 6.03
cannot be made applicable in the present case to Atty. Mendoza, as to do so would be violative of
his right to due process.
I have qualms in holding any member of the Bar liable for violating Section 6.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, in connection with acts that they may have engaged in as
government officials before the enactment of the said Code. In this case, at the time Atty.
Mendoza entered the government service he had no idea of the kind of inhibition proposed to be
foisted on him currently. Indeed, he is being faulted for representing the respondents in Civil
Case No. 0096 notwithstanding the fact that as Solicitor General and in the discharge of his
official functions, he had advised the Central Bank on the procedure to bring about the
liquidation of General Bank and Trust Company, which was subsequently acquired by the
respondents. However, whether it be at the time then Solicitor General Mendoza participated in
the process of the dissolution of General Bank in 1977, or at sometime in 1987 when he agreed
to represent the respondents, the Code of Professional Responsibility had not yet been
promulgated.
The Code of Professional Responsibility was promulgated by the Supreme Court on 21 June
1988.1 Prior to its official adoption, there was no similar official body of rules or guidelines
enacted by the Supreme Court other than the provisions on Legal Ethics in the Rules of Court.
I fear it would set a dangerous precedent to hinge Atty. Mendoza’s culpability on the Code of
Professional Responsibility, as it would effectively imply that the Code of Professional
Responsibility has application even as to acts performed prior to its enactment. Our laws frown
upon the prospectivity of statutes. Article 4 of the Civil Code declares that "Laws shall have no
retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided." There is no declaration in the Code of
Professional Responsibility that gives retroactive effect to its canons and rules. It is settled that
the presumption is that all laws operate prospectively absent clear contrary language in the text,2
and that in every case of doubt, the doubt will be resolved against the retroactive operation of
laws.3
The Court in Co v. Court of Appeals provided an exhaustive disquisition on the scope of the rule
on the prospective application of statutes:
The principle of prospectivity of statutes, original or amendatory, has been applied in many
cases. These include: Buyco v. PNB, 961) 2 SCRA 682 (June 30, 1961), holding that Republic
Act No. 1576 which divested the Philippine National Bank of authority to accept back pay
certificates in payment of loans, does not apply to an offer of payment made before effectivity of
the act; Largado v. Masaganda, et al., 5 SCRA 522 (June 30, 1962), ruling that RA 2613, as
amended by RA 3090 on June, 1961, granting to inferior courts jurisdiction over guardianship
cases, could not be given retroactive effect, in the absence of a saving clause; Larga v. Ranada,
Jr., 64 SCRA 18, to the effect that Sections 9 and 10 of Executive Order No. 90, amending
Section 4 of PD 1752, could have no retroactive application; People v. Que Po Lay, 94 Phil. 640,
holding that a person cannot be convicted of violating Circular No. 20 of the Central Bank, when
the alleged violation occurred before publication of the Circular in the Official Gazette; Baltazar
v. C.A., 104 SCRA 619, denying retroactive application to P.D. No. 27 decreeing the
emancipation of tenants from the bondage of the soil, and P.D. No. 316 prohibiting ejectment of
tenants from rice and corn farmholdings, pending the promulgation of rules and regulations
implementing P.D. No. 27; Nilo v. Court of Appeals, 128 SCRA 519, adjudging that RA 6389
which removed "personal cultivation" as a ground for the ejectment of a tenant cannot be given
retroactive effect in the absence of a statutory statement for retroactivity; Tac-An v. CA, 129
SCRA 319, ruling that the repeal of the old Administrative Code by RA 4252 could not be
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accorded retroactive effect; Ballardo v. Borromeo, 161 SCRA 500, holding that RA 6389 should
have only prospective application; (See also Bonifacio v. Dizon, 177 SCRA 294 and Balatbat v.
CA, 205 SCRA 419).
The prospectivity principle has also been made to apply to administrative rulings and
circulars, to wit: ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation v. CTA, Oct. 12, 1981, 108 SCRA 142,
holding that a circular or ruling of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue may not be given
retroactive effect adversely to a taxpayer; Sanchez v. COMELEC, 193 SCRA 317, ruling that
Resolution No. 90-0590 of the Commission on Elections, which directed the holding of recall
proceedings, had no retroactive application; Romualdez v. CSC, 197 SCRA 168, where it was
ruled that CSC Memorandum Circular No. 29, s. 1989 cannot be given retrospective effect so as
to entitle to permanent appointment an employee whose temporary appointment had expired
before the Circular was issued.
The principle of prospectivity has also been applied to judicial decisions which, "although in
themselves not laws, are nevertheless evidence of what the laws mean, . . . (this being) the reason
why under Article 8 of the New Civil Code, 'Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws
or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal system . . .’"4
I believe that there is a greater demand to ward off the retroactive application of the Code of
Professional Responsibility for the Code is the source of penal liabilities against its infringers. It
is well entrenched that generally, penal laws or those laws which define offenses and prescribe
penalties for their violation operate prospectively.5 The Constitution itself bars the enactment of
ex-post facto laws.6 I do not think it necessary to flirt with the constitutional issue whether the
Code of Professional Responsibility operates as a penal statute within the definition of an ex-post
facto law, but I am satisfied with the general rules, affirmed by jurisprudence, that abhor the
retroactivity of statutes and regulations such as the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Hence, to impute culpability on the part of Atty. Mendoza, it would be necessary to ascertain
whether his accession to represent the respondents violated any binding law or regulation at the
time of the engagement. It is but proper to frame the question in such manner, for only then
could it be ascertained whether Atty. Mendoza knew or should have known that his professional
representation of the respondents was illegal. It would also be unfair to ascribe liability to any
lawyer whom, at the time he/she was in government service, was not guided by any definitive
rule prescribing the possible subsequent restrictions on the lawyer’s professional activity as a
consequence of the exercise of public office.
Ostensibly, Atty. Mendoza’s actions violated Canon 36 of the Canons of Professional Ethics,
which some authorities deemed as a source of legal ethics prior to the Code of Professional
Responsibility.7 Canon 36 states:
36. Retirement from judicial position or public employment
A lawyer, having once held public office or having been in the public employ should not, after
his retirement, accept employment in connection with any matter he has investigated or passed
upon while in such office or employ.
Canon 36 would apparently cover the allegations imputed to Atty. Mendoza. However, a
thorough review should first be examined on whether Canon 36 of the Canons of Professional
Ethics may be used as legal basis in resolving this case.
The Canons of Professional Ethics originated from the American Bar Association.8 They were
adopted by the Philippine Bar Association as its own in 1917 and in 1946.9 There is no denying
the high regard enjoyed by the Philippine Bar Association in the legal community in its nearly
one hundred years of existence. However, there is also no denying that the Philippine Bar
Association, a civic non-profit association,10 is a private entity of limited membership within the
Philippine bar. The rules or canons it has adopted are per se binding only on its members, and the
penalties for violation of the same could affect only the status or rights of the infringers as
members of the association.
At the same time, reference has been had by this Court to the Canons of Professional Ethics in
deciding administrative cases against lawyers, especially prior to the adoption of the Code of
Professional Ethics. Hence, the belief by some commentators that the said Canons may serve as a
source of legal ethics in this country. However, I think it would be grave error to declare that the
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Canons of Professional Ethics, on their own, serves as an indisputable source of obligations and
basis of penalties imposable upon members of the Philippine legal profession. This would violate
the long-established constitutional principle that it is the Supreme Court which is tasked with the
promulgation of rules governing the admission to the practice of law, as well as the pleading,
practice and procedure in all courts.11 The task of formulating ethical rules governing the practice
of law in the Philippines could not have been delegated to the Philippine Bar Association by the
Supreme Court. Neither could such rules as adopted by the private body be binding on the
Supreme Court or the members of the bar.
If provisions of the Canons of Professional Ethics of the Philippine Bar Association have
jurisprudentially been enforced, or acknowledged as basis for legal liability by the Supreme
Court, they may be recognized as a binding standard imposable upon members of the bar, but
not because said Canons or the Philippine Bar Association itself said so, but because the
Supreme Court said so. This is keeping in line with the entrenched rule, as evinced by Article 8
of the Civil Code, which states that "judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the
Constitution shall form a part of the legal system."
Thus, I would be willing to consider Canon 36 as binding on Atty. Mendoza when he deigned to
represent the respondents if at such time, this Court had expressly acknowledged Canon 36 as a
rule or standard which deserves obeisance by members of the bar. After all, it would only be
through such process of judicial recognition that these guidelines adopted by a private entity
could be considered as a normative rule compulsory on all practitioners. Unfortunately, no such
case exists in Philippine jurisprudence.
It might be possible to concede that this principle embodied under Canon 36 or even as stated in
American case law, subsisted within that penumbra of ethical standards from which the Court
could have derived a jurisprudential rule had one been called for by a particular case. However, it
remains that none such was pronounced by this Court in jurisprudence, and indeed the
prohibition under Canon 36 was not prescribed by this Court or by statute as a norm until the
enactment of the Code of Professional Responsibility in 21 June 1988. Accordingly, when Atty.
Mendoza agreed to represent the respondents, there was no definitive binding rule proscribing
him from such engagement or penalizing him for such representation.
I am mindful that what the Court is called upon to decide is whether the Sandiganbayan
committed grave abuse of discretion, and not just mere error in fact or law, in denying the motion
to disqualify Atty. Mendoza. The absence of a definitive disqualificatory rule that would have
guided Atty. Mendoza when he undertook the questioned acts sufficiently justifies the
Sandiganbayan’s denial of the motion.
We should not render insensate the concerns raised by the minority, arising as they do from an
understandable concern that the line dividing the professional activities and the government
services rendered by lawyers should remain distinct. Yet the majority likewise demonstrates that
there is no unanimity on prevalent legal thought on the matter, and a healthy debate on the issue
will result in no harm. Still, the due process dimension, as highlighted by the absence of a
definitive rule for which Atty. Mendoza could have been held accountable, proves determinative
to my mind. The Court is the enforcer of the constitutional guarantees of due process to all
persons, and my vote is but a consequence of this primordial duty.
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RENATO CAYETANO vs. CHRISTIAN MONSOD, et. al.
G.R. No. 100113 September 3, 1991
Ponente: PARAS, J.
FACTS:
Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon C. Aquino to the position of Chairman of the COMELEC.
Cayetano opposed the nomination because allegedly Monsod does not possess the required qualification of having
been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.
On June 5, 1991, the Commission on Appointments confirmed the nomination of Monsod as Chairman of the
COMELEC. On June 18, 1991, he took his oath of office. On the same day, he assumed office as Chairman of the
COMELEC.
Challenging the validity of the confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of Monsod's nomination, Cayetano
as a citizen and taxpayer, filed the instant petition for certiorari and Prohibition praying that said confirmation and the
consequent appointment of Monsod as Chairman of the Commission on Elections be declared null and void.
Atty. Christian Monsod is a member of the Philippine Bar, having passed the bar examinations of 1960 with a grade
of 86-55%. He has been a dues paying member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines since its inception in 1972-73.
He has also been paying his professional license fees as lawyer for more than ten years.
After graduating from the College of Law (U.P.) and having hurdled the bar, Atty. Monsod worked in the law office of
his father. During his stint in the World Bank Group (1963-1970), Monsod worked as an operations officer for about
two years in Costa Rica and Panama, which involved getting acquainted with the laws of member-countries
negotiating loans and coordinating legal, economic, and project work of the Bank. Upon returning to the Philippines in
1970, he worked with the Meralco Group, served as chief executive officer of an investment bank and subsequently
of a business conglomerate, and since 1986, has rendered services to various companies as a legal and economic
consultant or chief executive officer. As former Secretary-General (1986) and National Chairman (1987) of
NAMFREL. Monsod's work involved being knowledgeable in election law. He appeared for NAMFREL in its
accreditation hearings before the Comelec. In the field of advocacy, Monsod, in his personal capacity and as former
Co-Chairman of the Bishops Businessmen's Conference for Human Development, has worked with the under
privileged sectors, such as the farmer and urban poor groups, in initiating, lobbying for and engaging in affirmative
action for the agrarian reform law and lately the urban land reform bill. Monsod also made use of his legal knowledge
as a member of the Davide Commission, a quast judicial body, which conducted numerous hearings (1990) and as a
member of the Constitutional Commission (1986-1987), and Chairman of its Committee on Accountability of Public
Officers, for which he was cited by the President of the Commission, Justice Cecilia Muñoz-Palma for "innumerable
amendments to reconcile government functions with individual freedoms and public accountability and the party-list
system for the House of Representative.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Monsod was engaged in the practice of law.
HELD:
Yes. Monsod was engaged in the practice of law.
Interpreted in the light of the various definitions of the term “Practice of law,” particularly the modern concept of law
practice, and taking into consideration the liberal construction intended by the framers of the Constitution, Atty.
Monsod's past work experiences as a lawyer-economist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a
lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of both the rich and the poor — verily more than satisfy the
constitutional requirement — that he has been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.
Justice Cruz goes on to say in substance that since the law covers almost all situations, most individuals, in making
use of the law, or in advising others on what the law means, are actually practicing law. In that sense, perhaps, but
we should not lose sight of the fact that Mr. Monsod is a lawyer, a member of the Philippine Bar, who has been
practising law for over ten years. This is different from the acts of persons practising law, without first becoming
lawyers.
The Commission on the basis of evidence submitted doling the public hearings on Monsod's confirmation, implicitly
determined that he possessed the necessary qualifications as required by law. The judgment rendered by the
Commission in the exercise of such an acknowledged power is beyond judicial interference except only upon a clear
showing of a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. In the instant case, there is no
occasion for the exercise of the Court's corrective power, since no abuse, much less a grave abuse of discretion, that
would amount to lack or excess of jurisdiction and would warrant the issuance of the writs prayed, for has been
clearly shown.
Cayetano v. Monsod
G.R. No. 100113, September 3, 1991
Facts:
Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon C. Aquino to the position of Chairman of the
COMELEC in a letter received by the Secretariat of the Commission on Appointments on April 25, 1991. Petitioner
opposed the nomination because allegedly Monsod does not possess the required qualification of having been engaged
in the practice of law for at least ten years.
On June 5, 1991, the Commission on Appointments confirmed the nomination of Monsod as Chairman of the COMELEC.
On June 18, 1991, he took his oath of office. On the same day, he assumed office as Chairman of the COMELEC.
Challenging the validity of the confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of Monsod's nomination, petitioner as a
citizen and taxpayer, filed the instant petition for certiorari and Prohibition praying that said confirmation and the
consequent appointment of Monsod as Chairman of the Commission on Elections be declared null and void.
Issue:
Whether the appointment of Chairman Monsod of Comelec violates Section 1 (1), Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution?
Held:
The 1987 Constitution provides in Section 1 (1), Article IX-C, that there shall be a Commission on Elections composed of
a Chairman and six Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their
appointment, at least thirty-five years of age, holders of a college degree, and must not have been candidates for any
elective position in the immediately preceding elections. However, a majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall be
members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.
Atty. Christian Monsod is a member of the Philippine Bar, having passed the bar examinations of 1960 with a grade of 86-
55%. He has been dues paying member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines since its inception in 1972-73. He has
also been paying his professional license fees as lawyer for more than ten years.
At this point, it might be helpful to define private practice. The term, as commonly understood, means "an individual or
organization engaged in the business of delivering legal services." (Ibid.). Lawyers who practice alone are often called
"sole practitioners." Groups of lawyers are called "firms." The firm is usually a partnership and members of the firm are the
partners. Some firms may be organized as professional corporations and the members called shareholders. In either
case, the members of the firm are the experienced attorneys. In most firms, there are younger or more inexperienced
salaried attorneys called "associates."
Hence, the Commission on the basis of evidence submitted doling the public hearings on Monsod's confirmation, implicitly
determined that he possessed the necessary qualifications as required by law. The judgment rendered by the
Commission in the exercise of such an acknowledged power is beyond judicial interference except only upon a clear
showing of a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. (Art. VIII, Sec. 1 Constitution). Thus,
only where such grave abuse of discretion is clearly shown shall the Court interfere with the Commission's judgment. In
the instant case, there is no occasion for the exercise of the Court's corrective power, since no abuse, much less a grave
abuse of discretion, that would amount to lack or excess of jurisdiction and would warrant the issuance of the writs
prayed, for has been clearly shown.
Besides in the leading case of Luego v. Civil Service Commission, he Court said that, Appointment is an essentially
discretionary power and must be performed by the officer in which it is vested according to his best lights, the only
condition being that the appointee should possess the qualifications required by law. If he does, then the appointment
cannot be faulted on the ground that there are others better qualified who should have been preferred. This is a political
question involving considerations of wisdom which only the appointing authority can decide.
Ulep v. Legal Clinic, Inc. belied by respondent's own description of the services it has been
Rule 2.03 | June 17, 1993 | Regalado, J offering.
• While some of the services being offered by respondent corporation
Nature of Case: Original Petition in the SC merely involve mechanical and technical know-how, such as the
Petitioner: Mauricio Ulep installation of computer systems and programs for the efficient
Respondent: The Legal Clinic, Inc. management of law offices, or the computerization of research aids and
materials, these will not suffice to justify an exception to the general rule.
SUMMARY: Petitioner avers that the advertisements reproduced are • It is palpably clear that respondent corporation gives out legal
champertous, unethical, demeaning of the law profession, and destructive of information to laymen and lawyers. Its contention that such function is
the confidence of the community in the integrity of the members of the bar non-advisory and non-diagnostic is more apparent than real.
and that, as a member of the legal profession, he is ashamed and offended by • In providing information, for example, about foreign laws on marriage,
the said advertisements. Respondent admits the fact of publication of said divorce and adoption, it strains the credulity of this Court that all that
advertisements at its instance, but claims that it is not engaged in the practice respondent corporation will simply do is look for the law, furnish a copy
of law but in the rendering of "legal support services" through paralegals with thereof to the client, and stop there as if it were merely a bookstore
the use of modern computers and electronic machines. • It is clear that services offered by respondent fall within the ambit of the
practice of law. And only a person duly admitted as a member of the bar
DOCTRINE: The services offered by respondent include various legal and who is in good and regular stading is entitled to practice law.
problems wherein a client may avail of legal services from simple
documentation to complex litigation and corporate undertakings. Most of
these services are exclusive functions of lawyers engaged in the practice of ISSUE/S & RATIO:
law. Only a person duly admitted as a member of the bar and who is in good 1. WON the services offered by respondent, The Legal Clinic, Inc., as
and regular standing is entitled to practice law. advertised by it constitutes practice of law and, in either case, whether
the same can properly be the subject of the advertisements herein
FACTS: complained of – YES
• Mauricio C. Ulep, petitioner, prays for the Court "to order the The Legal Clinic is engaged in the practice of law and such practice is not
respondent, The Legal Clinic, Inc., to cease and desist from issuing allowed. Respondent is composed mainly of paralegals; the services it offers
advertisements similar to or of the same tenor as that of Annexes `A' and include various legal problems wherein a client may avail of legal services
`B' (of said petition) and to perpetually prohibit persons or entities from from simple documentation to complex litigation and corporate
making advertisements pertaining to the exercise of the law profession undertakings. Most of these services are undoubtedly beyond the domain of
other than those allowed by law.” paralegals, but rather, are exclusive functions of lawyers engaged in the
• Petitioner avers that the advertisements reproduced are champertous, practice of law. Under Philippine jurisdiction however, the services being
unethical, demeaning of the law profession, and destructive of the offered by Legal Clinic which constitute practice of law cannot be performed
confidence of the community in the integrity of the members of the bar by paralegals. Only a person duly admitted as a member of the bar and who
and that, as a member of the legal profession, he is ashamed and is in good and regular standing, is entitled to practice law.
offended by the said advertisements.
• Respondent admits the fact of publication of said advertisements at its
instance, but claims that it is not engaged in the practice of law but in the RULING: The Court Resolved to RESTRAIN and ENJOIN The Legal Clinic, Inc., from
rendering of "legal support services" through paralegals with the use of issuing or causing the publication or dissemination of any advertisement in any form
modern computers and electronic machines. which is of the same or similar tenor and purpose as Annexes "A" and "B" of this
• Respondent further argues that assuming that the services advertised are petition, and from conducting, directly or indirectly, any activity, operation or
legal services, the act of advertising these services should be allowed transaction proscribed by law or the Code of Professional Ethics as indicated herein.
supposedly in the light of the case of John R. Bates and Van O'Steen vs.
State Bar of Arizona, reportedly decided by the United States Supreme NOTE:
Court on June 7, 1977. Rule 2.03 - A lawyer shall not do or permit to be done any act designed primarily
• The contention of respondent that it merely offers legal support services to solicit legal business.
can neither be seriously considered nor sustained. Said proposition is

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Legal Profession Singson, Trisha Marie

[G.R. No. 100113. September 3, 1991.]

"MR. OPLE. Thank you."

advice-giving to an importantly different one such as representing a client before an

NARVASA, J., concurring:

disqualification. Moreover, a reading of the Petition then in relation to established jurisprudence

Member of the Board of the Following:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Bar Matter No. 553 June 17, 1993

newspaper comments, or procuring his photograph to be published in connection with causes in

A.M. No. 09-5-2-SC December 14, 2010

Secretary - - - - - - - - - - Christian Fernandez

A.C. No. 3731 September 7, 2007

On 29 August 2003, Investigating Commissioner Demaree J.B. Raval (Investigating

A.C. No. 2040 March 4, 1998

A.C. No. 6010 August 28, 2006

A.C. No. 6313 September 7, 2006

record a photocopy of a check issued by respondent in favor of complainant for P150,000.00. It

July 30, 1979

A.M. Case No. 3195. December 18, 1989

A.C. No. 2505 February 21, 1992

A.M. No. 3360 January 30, 1990

ADM. CASE No. 6595 April 15, 2005

G.R. Nos. 151809-12. April 12, 2005

interpreting government or agency procedures, regulations or laws, or briefing abstract principles

inability to pay of an otherwise non-insolvent bank or non-bank financial intermediary

In fine, the intervention cannot be insubstantial and insignificant. Originally, Canon 36

Section 47, Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court reads in part:

Whether or not Monsod was engaged in the practice of law.

Yes. Monsod was engaged in the practice of law.

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