February 6, 1922

G.R. No. 16215

FACTS:

Asuncion Larena de Villanueva, Maximiana Larena de Alviola, and Eustaquio Larena

The trail court dismissed their petition from which they appealed. However, in this
instance Asuncion Larena alone filed a brief and an assignment of errors.

In the year of 1900 Demetrio Larena contracted marriage with Josefina Rubio by whom
he had four children. The appellant, Asuncion Larena, is a natural daughter of Demetrio
Larena begotten by another woman at the time when both were free and could have
contracted marriage. Asuncion Larena was born in 1880 and from early childhood until
before the year 1889, when the Civil Code went into effect here, she had been living
with her father and enjoying the status of a daughter, not only within the family circle,
but also publicly on account of the acts of her father.

(The lower court based its decision upon the fact that since the appellant had attained
the age of majority in the year 1901, and her father having died in 1916, without any
effort on her part previous to that time looking to her acknowledgment as a natural child,
she had lost such right in view of article 1327 of the Civil Code which requires that
action for acknowledgment should be commenced during the lifetime of the father. This
is an error. The Civil Code is not applicable to this case. The appellant was born and
had enjoyed the status of the natural child by acts of acknowledgment of her father even
before the said Code was put in force here. Under the law at that time (Law 11 of Toro),
this tacit acknowledgment on the part of her father was in itself sufficient to give the
appellant the status of a natural child, and such acknowledgment could be established
by the ordinary means of evidence without any limitations as to time. This civil status
granted to the appellant by the former law, derived from the fact of her birth and from
the acts of implied acknowledgment of her father, having taken place under the former
legislation, give the appellant a vested interest inherent to her status which cannot in
any way be impaired by the provisions of the Civil Code. The transitory provisions of this
Code declare that the changes introduced by it, when prejudicial to the rights acquired
under the former civil legislation shall regulate all the rights arising under it although the
Civil Code may provide differently or may not recognize them.)
ISSUE: Whether or not the appellant has the right to the inheritance.

HELD:

Since the appellant is an acknowledged natural child of the deceased Demetrio Larena,
she has the right to participate in the inheritance left by the latter in accordance with the
provisions of the Civil Code. This is a right acknowledged by the Code for the first time.
However the trial court maintains that as her participation in the inheritance would
prejudice the rights to the legitime pertaining to the legitimate children of the deceased,
it should not be allowed, in view of section 2 of the transitory provisions of the Code.
This is also an error because this legal provision does not apply in this case. Section 2
of the said transitory provisions is to the effect that if the right is declared for the first
time in this Code it shall take effect this even though the source of such right is a former
legislation whenever no other right of the same origin arising under the former
legislation is prejudiced. The expression of the same origin means under the same
former legislation. In the statement of the bases for the amendments and additions
included in the new Civil Code we find: "But if the case should deal with a new and not
recognized by the former legislation, it must be governed by the same Code, even
though the fact of its origin had taken place under that legislation, unless it should work
an injustice to another right acquired under it, as in this case he who will suffer the
damage is more worthy of protection than he who will receive a gratuitous benefit."
Since the legitimate children of the deceased Demetrio Larena were born at the time
when the Civil Code was in force, their right to the inheritance did not arise from the
former legislation, and consequently, their right cannot annul the effects of the right of
the appellant to concur in the inheritance in accordance with the provisions of the Civil
Code. It should be noted that this case is different from that of Rocha vs. Tuason and
Rocah de Despujols (39 Phils., 976) upon which the court below based its decision. In
that case the natural sons and the legitimate son were born before the Civil Code went
into effect and the source of the rights of both was the former legislation, which is
precisely the subject matter of the exception established in section 2 of the transitory
provisions of the Civil Code.

The judgment appealed from is reversed and the appellant is hereby declared as the
acknowledged natural daughter of the deceased Demetrio Larena with the right to
participate in the inheritance under the provisions of the Civil Code. Without special
pronouncement as to costs. So ordered

G.R. No. L-6749             July 30, 1955

JEAN L. ARNAULT, petitioner-appellee, 
vs.
EUSTAQUIO BALAGTAS, as Director of Prisons, respondent-appellant.

FACTS:
This an appeal from judgment of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Pasay City Branch,
Honorable Jose F. Flores presiding, in habeas corpus proceeding, declaring that the
continued detention and confinement of Jean L. Arnault in the new Bilibid Prison, in
pursuance of Senate Resolution No. 114, dated November 8, 1952, is illegal, for the
reason that the Senate of the Philippines committed a clear abuse of discretion in
considering his answer naming one Jess D. Santos as the person to whom delivery of
the sum of P440,000 was made in the sale of the Buenavista and Tambobong Estate,
as a refusal to answer the question directed by the Senate committee to him, and on the
further ground that said Jean L. Arnault, by his answer has purged himself of contempt
and is consequently entitled to be released and discharged.
ISSUES:
1) that the Senate is not justified in finding that the petitioner-appellee did tell the truth
when he mentioned Jess D. Santos as the person to whom he gave the P440,000,
specially on the basis of the evidence submitted to it.
2) That the legislative purpose or intention, for which the Senate ordered the
confinement may be considered as having been accomplished, and, therefore, there is
no reason for petitioner-appellee's continued confinement.
HELD:
1) The question concerns the claim that the petitioner has purged himself of contempt,
because he says he has already answered the original question which he had
previously been required to answer. In order that the petitioner may be considered as
having purged himself of the contempt, it is necessary that he should have testified
truthfully, disclosing the real identity of the person subject of the inquiry. No person
guilty of contempt may purge himself by another lie or falsehood; this would be
repetition of the offense. It is true that he gave a name, Jess D. Santos, as that of the
person to whom delivery of the sum of P440,000 was made. The Senate Committee
refused to believe, and justly, that is the real name of the person whose identity is being
the subject of the inquiry. The Senate, therefore, held that the act of the petitioner
continued the original contempt, or reiterated it. Furthermore, the act further interpreted
as an affront to its dignity. It may well be taken as insult to the intelligence of the
honorable members of the body that conducted the investigation. The act of defiance
and contempt could not have been clearer and more evident. Certainly, the Senate
resolution declaring the petitioner in contempt may not be claimed as an exertion of an
arbitrary power.
2) One last contention of petitioner remains to be considered. It is the claim that as the
period of imprisonment has lasted for a period which exceeded that provided by law
punishment for contempt, i. e., 6 months of arresto mayor, the petitioner is now entitled
to be released. This claim is not justified by the record. Petitioner was originally confined
by Resolution No. 17 on May 15, 1950. On December 13, 1951, he executed his
affidavit and thereafter he was called to testify again before the Senate Committee. The
latter passed its Resolution No. 114 on November 6, 1952, and he presented the
petition for habeas corpus in this case on March 3, 1953, i. e., five months after the last
resolution when the Senate found that the petitioner committed another contempt. It is
not true, therefore, that the petitioner's punishment is beyond the full period prescribed
in the criminal law.
The judgment appealed from should be, as it hereby is, reversed, and the petition for
the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus denied. The order of the court allowing the
petitioner to give bail is declared null and void and the petitioner is hereby ordered to be
recommitted to the custody of the respondent. With cost against the petitioner-appellee.