Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 170810               August 7, 2007

AZUCENA B. DON, JOSEPH DETERA, NENITA B. GRESOLA, LETICIA L. ESPENILLA, EDITH G. DETOITO, JULNA
D. JAYCO, ROGER ARIARTE, CALVIN DEL VALLE, and ERLYN RAMIREZ, Petitioners,
vs.
RAMON H. LACSA as erstwhile Punong Barangay of Bacolod, Juban, Sorsogon, Respondent.

DECISION

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

Petitioners-public school teachers charged before the Sangguniang Bayan of Juban, Sorsogon respondent Ramon H.
Lacsa (respondent), then Punong Barangay of Bacolod, Juban, Sorsogon, with grave threats, oppression, grave
misconduct, and abuse of authority.

On the directive of the then vice mayor of the Municipality of Juban in his capacity as presiding officer of the Sangguniang
Bayan, respondent filed his Answer.1

A Special Investigating Committee (SIC) created by the Sangguniang Bayan to investigate the case found sufficient
evidence for the preventive suspension of respondent. The Sangguniang Bayan thus passed a resolution recommending
his preventive suspension.

Acting on the recommendation, the mayor slapped a two-month preventive suspension against respondent on January 7,
2005.2

The SIC later submitted its report finding respondent guilty of oppression, grave misconduct, and abuse of authority. 3 On
March 7, 2005, the Sangguniang Bayan issued Resolution No. 12-20054 adopting the SIC Report. By the same resolution,
respondent was removed from office.5

On March 8, 2005, the mayor issued Executive Order No. 8, Series of 2005 6 implementing Resolution No. 12-2005 of
the Sangguniang Bayan and installing Florencio H. Lacsa, the highest ranking Sangguniang Barangay member, in place of
Ramon H. Lacsa as Punong Barangay of Bacolod.7 On even date, respondent received a copy of the executive order,
together with a copy of Sangguniang Bayan  Resolution No. 12-2005.8

Twenty one days after receiving a copy of Sangguniang Bayan  Resolution No. 12-2005 or on March 29, 2005, respondent
filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Sorsogon a Petition for Certiorari (With Application for Temporary Restraining
Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction)9 against herein petitioners, along with the Sangguniang Bayan of Juban and
Mayor Ma. Teresa Guab-Fragata. The case was docketed as Special Civil Action No. 2005-7513.

By Decision of October 24, 2005, Branch 53 of the RTC of Sorsogon granted respondent’s petition and accordingly nullified
the mayor’s executive order. Thus the trial court ruled:

xxxx

[Respondent] is entitled to be informed and have a copy of the decision rendered by the Sangguniang Bayan of Juban,
Sorsogon pursuant to Section 66 of R.A. 7160, for him to seek the remedies afforded by law, if he so desires. x x x [He]
received Executive Order No. 8 and attached thereto is Sangguniang Bayan  Resolution No. 12-2005, on the same day,
March 8, 2005. It appears that the . . . Sangguniang Bayan furnished [him] with a copy of the said resolution not to afford
him his remedies on appeal in violation of Section 66 7160, but to execute said resolution hastily . . . in utmost disregard of
[his] constitutional right to due process. Pursuant to Section 67 of R.A. 7160, [he] has thirty (30) days from receipt of the
said resolution to file an appeal. [He] was not afforded the opportunity to elevate Resolution No. 12-2005 on appeal.

xxxx

Considering the foregoing findings . . . the municipal mayor gravely abused her discretion, amounting to lack of jurisdiction
in issuing and executing Executive Order No. 8 . . .

x x x x10 (Underscoring supplied)
The trial court thus disposed:

Wherefore, premises considered, this court grants the petition for certiorari and orders the following:

1. The annulment and setting aside of Executive Order No. 8 dated March 8, 2005 issued by the Municipal Mayor;

2. The reinstatement of . . . Ramon H. Lacsa to his position as Punong Barangay of Bacolod, Juban, Sorsogon;

3. The payment to the said petitioner of the emoluments/allowances accruing to him from the time of removal from
office up to the time of reinstatement thereat;

4. Directing the Sangguniang Bayan of Juban, Sorsogon to serve anew the petitioner with a copy of the
Decision/Resolution No. 12-2005 and from receipt of which the petitioner shall enjoy his right to appeal such
decision to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan pursuant to Section [6]7 of R.A. 7160.

With costs against the respondents Sangguniang Bayan Members and Municipal Mayor.

SO ORDERED.11

The trial court having denied12 petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration,13 the petitioners filed the present Petition for Review
on Certiorari, manifesting early on that they are raising only questions of law. They fault the trial court 14

1. . . . in holding that the Sangguniang Bayan of Juban, Sorsogon, furnished respondent with a copy of its
Resolution No. 12-2005, not to afford him his remedy of appeal, but to execute the said resolution hastily in
violation of Section 66 of R.A. 7160.

2. . . . in holding that the respondent Municipal Mayor issued Executive Order No. 8 in "utmost" disregard of
respondent’s right to due process, as pursuant to Section 67 of R.A. 7160, he has thirty days from receipt of the
aforesaid resolution to file an appeal.

3. . . . in holding that the municipal mayor, in promptly executing Sangguniang Bayan Resolution No. 12-2005,
committed "grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction."

4. The court a quo erred even more when it restored to respondent, through a writ of execution, the right of
administrative appeal which he had abandoned and lost. 15

The petition is impressed with merit.

The pertinent provision of R.A. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code, reads:

Sec. 61(c) – A complaint against any elective barangay official shall be filed before the sangguniang panlungsod or
Sangguniang Bayan concerned whose decision shall be final and executory." (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

The "final and executory" phrase used in the immediately-quoted provision was construed in Mendoza v. Laxina, Sr. 16 to be
"immediately executory," albeit the respondent may appeal the adverse decision to the proper office. Thus this Court
declared:

Sections 61 and 67 of the Local Government Code, provide:

Section 61. Form and Filing of Administrative Complaints.  A verified complaint against any erring local elective official shall
be prepared as follows:

xxxx

(c) A complaint against any elective barangay official shall be filed before the sangguniang
panlungsod or sangguniang bayan concerned whose decision shall be final and executory, (Italics supplied)

Sec. 67. Administrative Appeals.  – Decisions in administrative cases may, within thirty (30) days from receipt
thereof, be appealed to the following:

xxxx
 (b) the Office of the President, in the case of decisions of the sangguniang panlalawigan and the sangguniang
panlungsod of highly urbanized cities and independent component cities.

Decisions of the Office of the President shall be final and executory.

In interpreting the foregoing provisions, the trial court did not consider Section 68 of the same code which provides:

An appeal shall not prevent a decision from being final and executory. The respondent shall be considered as having been
placed under preventive suspension during the pendency of an appeal in the event that he wins such appeal. In the event
that the appeal results in exoneration, he shall be paid his salary and other such emoluments during the pendency of the
appeal.

Obviously, the said Code does not preclude the taking of an appeal. On the contrary, it specifically allows a party to appeal
to the Office of the President. The [phrase] "final and executory" x x x in Sections 67 and 68, respectively, of the Local
Government Code, are not, as erroneously ruled by the trial court, indicative of the appropriate mode of relief from the
decision of the Sanggunian concerned. These phrases simply mean that the administrative appeals will not prevent the
enforcement of the decisions. The decision is immediately executory but the respondent may nevertheless appeal the
adverse decision to the Office of the President or to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, as the case may be.17 (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)

The conditions that would afford respondent to file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court as he did file
one before the RTC – that a tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in
excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no
appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law – are not here present.1avvphi1

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The October 24, 2005 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Sorsogon City,
Branch 53 in Special Civil Action No. 2005-7513 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

Resolution No. 12-2005 issued by the Juban, Sorsogon Sangguniang Bayan and Executive Order No. 8, Series of 2005
issued by Mayor Ma. Teresa Guab-Fragata are REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, Petitioner,

DECISION

REYES, J.:

This is a petition for review1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court of the Decision 2 dated November 21, 2008 and
Resolution3 dated May 14, 2009 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 03498, which reversed and set aside the
Consolidated Decision4 dated June 30, 2005 of the Office of the Ombudsman-Visayas (Ombudsman) and absolved
respondent Cynthia E. Caberoy (Caberoy) of any administrative liability.

Caberoy is the principal of Ramon Avanceña National High School (RANHS) in Arevalo, Iloilo City. She was charged with
Oppression and Violation of Section 3(e) and (f) ofRepublic Act (R.A.) No. 3019 or the "Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act"by Angeles O. Tuares (Tuares) for allegedly withholding her salary for the month of June 2002. The case was docketed
as OMB-V-A-03-0239-E. Saidcase was consolidated with OMB-V-A-03-0572-I, which was a complaint filed by Tuares
against Ida B. Endonila, Erlinda G. Gencaya, Clarissa G. Zamora and Victoria T. Calunsod.

Caberoy denied the charge against her, alleging, among others, that the payrolls of June 1 to15, 2002 and June16 to 30,
2002 show that Tuares received her salary as shown by her signatures on lines no. 11 of the payrolls. 5

In the Consolidated Decision dated June 30, 2005 rendered by the Ombudsman, Caberoy was found guilty of Oppression
and was meted out the penalty of dismissal from service. The dispositive portion of the consolidated decision provides:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondent CYNTHIA E. CABEROY, Principal II, Ramon Avanceña National High
School, (RANHS), Arevalo, Iloilo City, is hereby found GUILTY of OPPRESSION and is hereby meted the penalty of
DISMISSAL FROM THE SERVICE WITH CANCELLATION OF CIVIL SERVICE ELIGIBILITY, FORFEITURE OFEARNED
LEAVECREDITS AND RETIREMENT BENEFITS, AND DISQUALIFICATION FROM REEMPLOYMENT IN THE
GOVERNMENT SERVICE. On the other hand, respondents IDA B. ENDONILA, Schools Division Superintendent,
ERLINDA G. GENCAYA, Asst. Schools Division Superintendent, CLARISSA G. ZAMORA, Administrative Officer III, all
three of the Division of Iloilo City, DepEd Region VI, Iloilo City, and VICTORIA T. CALUNSOD, Officer-In-
Charge/Secondary School Head Teacher III, Ramon Avanceña National High School, (RANHS) Arevalo, Iloilo City, are
found NOT GUILTYof the same offense and/or violating Sec. 3 (f) of R.A. 3019and thus these cases are considered
DISMISSED as far as they are concerned. Furthermore, on the administrative aspect of the counter-allegation of Perjury
against herein complainant ANGELES O. TUARES, Ramon Avanceña National High School, Arevalo, Iloilo City, the same
is likewise DISMISSED, for lack of merit.

SO DECIDED.6

Caberoy filed a joint motion for reconsideration, which was denied by the Ombudsman in its Order dated September 19,
2006.7

The Ombudsman found that Tuares was not paid any amount in June 2002 because of her failure to submit her clearance
and Performance Appraisal Sheet for Teachers (PAST), while the other teachers received their salaries for the same
month.8 The Ombudsman concluded that Tuares was "singled out by respondent Caberoy as the only one who did not
receive any amount from the school on June 2002 because, as established earlier, the former failed to submit her
clearance and PAST."9 The Ombudsman also took into consideration several infractions previously committed by Caberoy,
which allegedly displayed her "notoriousundesirability as a government officer for withholding teachers’ salaries without
authority."10 According to the Ombudsman, Caberoy could not honestly claim that she had not been forewarned by the
Ombudsman of the grave consequences of her repeated illegal act. 11 Caberoy filed a petition for certiorariwith the CA,
seeking the reversal of her dismissal from service, and in the assailed Decision dated November 21, 2008, the CA granted
Caberoy’s petition. The dispositive portion of the CA decision states:

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The consolidated decision dated June 30, 2005, of the respondent Ombudsman
is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and another judgment is hereby rendered ABSOLVING the petitioner of any
liability, with costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED.12

The Ombudsman filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied by the CA in the assailed Resolution dated May 14,
2009.
In clearing Caberoy from the charge against her, the CA found that no undue injury was caused to Tuares since she
received her June 2002 salary. According to the CA, since Caberoy was charged with Violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No.
3019 and the element of undue injury is absent in this case, Caberoy cannot be held liable for the offense. 13 The CA also
ruled that Caberoy’s "refusal" to release Tuares’ salary was justified and the element of "failure to so act x x x for the
purpose of obtaining, directly or indirectly, from any person interested in the matter some pecuniary or material benefit or
advantage in favor of an interestedparty, or [discrimination] against another" under Section 3(f) of R.A. No. 3019, is
likewise absent.14 Finally, the CA found that the acts of Caberoy are not constitutive of oppression. 15

Lastly, the CA ruled that the Ombudsman’s findings and conclusions are not supported by substantial evidencesince
Caberoy’s act of withholding Tuares’ salaries was clearly justified. 16 Hence, the present petition, based on the ground that:

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS’ REVERSAL OF THE PETITIONER OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN’S
DECISION FINDING [CABEROY] ADMINISTRATIVELY LIABLE FOR OPPRESSION IS AN ERROR OF LAW
CONSIDERING THAT ITS FINDINGS IS SUPPORTED BY SUBSTAN[T]IAL EVIDENCE. 17

The Ombudsman argues that it was error for the CA to exonerate Caberoy on the reasons that the withholding of Tuares’
salary was justified and that there was no undue injury onher part as she later received her salary. The Ombudsman
contends that Caberoy was found guilty of Oppression, which is an administrative offense under the Civil Service law, and
is distinct from the crime of Violation of R.A. No. 3019, from which she was absolved. According to the Ombudsman, the
quantum of proof in these two offenses (Oppression and Violation ofR.A. No. 3019) is distinct and the records of the case
disclose that there is substantial evidence to support its decision. The Ombudsman also contests the factual findings of the
CA that Tuares actually received her salary, stating that in the summary of payrolls and the checks, Tuares’ name does not
appear. Moreover, no evidence was presented by Caberoy to prove that Tuares actually received her salary, other than her
bare allegation. Finally, the Ombudsman states that Caberoy has already been penalized several times for previous
misconduct, which displays her propensity to commit the misdemeanor. 18

Ruling of the Court

Initially, it must be stated thatin a petition for review filed under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, the Court is limited only to a
review of errors of law committed by the CA, and the Court is not required to review all over again the evidence presented
before the Ombudsman.19 The rule, nevertheless, admits of exceptions, such as when the findings of the CA and the
Ombudsman are conflicting,20 which is what occurred in the present case. Hence, the Court must now look into the matter
of whether the CA committed a reversible error when it reversed the findings and conclusions of the Ombudsman.

Tuares charged Caberoy in OMB-V-A-03-0239-E with both Oppression and Violation of Section 3(e)(f) of R.A. No. 3019.
The Ombudsman, however, found Caberoy guilty only of Oppression.

Oppression is an administrative offense21 penalized under the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil
Service,22 which provides:

Section 52. Classification of Offenses.—Administrative offenses with corresponding penalties are classified into grave, less
grave or light, depending on their gravity or depravity and effects on the government service.

A. The following are grave offenses with their corresponding penalties:

xxxx

14. Oppression.

1st Offense – Suspension for six (6) months and one (1) day to one (1) year;

2nd Offense – Dismissal.

xxxx

Oppression is also known as grave abuse of authority, which is a misdemeanor committed by a public officer, who under
color of his office, wrongfully inflict upon any person any bodily harm, imprisonment or other injury. It is an act ofcruelty,
severity, or excessive use of authority.23 To be held administratively liable for Oppression or Grave Abuse of Authority,
there must be substantial evidence presented proving the complainant’s allegations. 24 Substantial evidence is that amount
of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept asadequate to support a conclusion. 25 In this case, the CA
correctly overturned the Ombudsman’s findings and conclusions, and explained the reasonsfor exculpating Caberoy, as
follows:

Evidently, from the foregoing disquisitions, respondent Ombudsman contradicted itself when it found and held
thatpetitioner was guilty of "oppression" for not paying the private respondent her June 2002 salary, because as a matter of
fact she has been paidalbeit delayed. Such payment is clearly and indubitably established from the table where it was
shown that private respondent received on July 17 and 25, 2002, her June 2002 salary in the amounts of ₱4,613.80 and
₱4,612.00, respectively.

xxxx

The above narration of facts do not show that petitioner committed acts constitutive of "oppression." Assuming petitioner’s
action is erroneous or overly zealous, this certainly does not merit the most severe penalty of dismissal from government
service. Apparently, the petitioner is only protecting herself from any future, adverse consequences if she allows the
disbursement of public funds without the appropriate supporting documents. "It is a well-known fact that in the government
service an employee must submit his daily time record duly accomplished and approved before one cancollect his salary."

xxxx

Finally, on the contention that the findings and conclusions of the respondent Ombudsman is considered conclusive and
deserve respect and finality is true only when the same is based on substantial evidence. As discussed above, the action
taken by petitioner in withholding the salaries of private respondent was clearly justified. It was a measure taken by a
superior against a subordinate who ignored the basic tenets of law by not submitting the required documents to support
payment of her salary and proportional vacation pay for the aforesaid period. x x x.

x x x [I]n this case before us, the records is bereft of substantial evidence to support respondent Ombudsman’s findings
and conclusion that petitioner committed oppressive acts against private respondent and violated Sections 3(e) and (f) of
RA 3019. On the contrary and as earlier discussed, respondent Ombudsman found and concluded that private respondent
was paid her June salaryalbeit late. Hence, it cannot be gainsaid that the act of respondent Ombudsman in concluding that
petitioner is guilty as charged despite absence of substantial evidence to support the same is totally unfounded and is
therefore, tantamount to grave abuse of discretion amounting to a lack or excess of discretion. x x x. 26 (Citations omitted)

The complaint filed by Tuares against Caberoy charged the latter with "manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross
inexcusable negligence for having ordered the payroll clerk of [RANHS] to cause the exclusion of [her] name in the payroll
of June 2002 x x x and [in spite of] the fact that [she has already] rendered full service during said days x x x without any
justifiable reason and without due process and without any authority under the law." 27 A perusal of Tuares’ allegations
shows that her claim pertains to the alleged withholding of her salary for the month of June 2002. Records show, however,
that Tuares was actually paid her salary for the month of June 2002. Thus, the vouchers for the payroll period of June 1 to
15, 200228 and June 16 to 30, 200229 showed Tuares’ name on line 11 and her signature acknowledging receipt of her
salary for such period. This was, in fact, confirmed in the 2002 salary payrolls submitted by the RANHS Office of the
Auditor and summarized by the Ombudsman,30 to wit:

Period Voucher No. Date of Check Tuares’ No. in the Payroll Amount Received
June (Proportional pay & salary) 101-02-6-161 June 25, 2002 Name not Found Name not Found
June (Proportional pay) 101-02-6-164 June 28, 2002 Name not Found Name not Found
June (Proportional pay) PS-02-7-182 July 4, 2002 Name not Found Name not Found
June (Proportional pay & salary) PS-02-7-195 July 17, 2002 11 ₱4,613.80
June (Proportional pay) PS-02-7-196 July 19, 2002 Name not Found Name not Found
June PS-02-7-200 July 25, 2002 11 ₱4,612.00
July 101-02-8-231 August 19, 2002 16 ₱4,694.72
1âwphi1

The amounts received and signed for by Tuares correspond essentially to the other amounts she received as salaryfor the
other periods in 2002. On this score, entries in the payroll, being entries in the course of business, enjoy the presumption
of regularity under Section 43, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, 31 and absent any evidence presented by Tuares showing the
contrary, good faith must be presumed in the preparation and signing of such payrolls. 32

Even assuming, as the Ombudsman asserted, that Tuares received her June 2002 salary only on July 2002, the same
does not constitute Oppression or Grave Abuse of Authority. The delay in the release of Tuares’ salary hardly qualifies as
an "act of crueltyor severity or excessive use of authority," especially when she contributed to the cause of the delay, that
is, she submitted her Form 48 (Daily Time Record) for June 2002 only on July 11, 2002. 33

Neither can the Court subscribe to the Ombudsman’s conclusion that Tuares was singled out by Caberoy.According to the
Ombudsman:
In other words, as far as these fortunate teachers are concerned, checks dated June 25 and 28, 2002 and July 04 and 19,
2002 actually and in paper covered their June 2002 salary; checks dated July 17 and 19, 2002 actually and in paper
covered their July 2002 salary; x x x.

Whereas on the part of complainant Tuares, this is what really happened: The checks dated July 17 and 25, 2002 were
technically for services rendered in June 2002 ascorrected by COA but the amounts corresponding to complainant’s
salaryfor the whole month of June 2002 was actually received by her only in July 2002 and that in effect means that she
did not really receive any amount from the school in June 2002; x x x.

Viewed from the discussion above, it is therefore crystal clear that complainant was singled out by respondent Caberoy as
the only one who did not receive any amount from the school on June 2002 because, as established earlier, the former
failed to submit her clearance and PAST.34

It must be stressed that like other grave offenses classified under the Civil Service laws, bad faith must attend the act
complained of. Bad faith connotes a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of a wrong; a breach
of sworn duty through some motive or intent or ill will; it partakes of the nature of fraud. 35 There must be evidence,
independent of the fact of such delay, which will lead to the inevitable conclusion that it was for the purpose of singling out
Tuares. The Court has consistently upheld the principle that in administrative cases, to be disciplined for grave misconduct
or any grave offense, the evidence against the respondent should be competent and must be derived from direct
knowledge.36 "Reliance on mere allegations, conjectures and suppositions will leave an administrative complaint with no
leg to stand on."37 Except for the Ombudsman’s deduction based on the dates of issuance of the vouchers and the checks
as shown in the payroll, the records of thiscase are bereft of evidence that will support its view that the delay in the release
of Tuares’ salary indicated that she was singled out. Moreover, as correctly pointed out by the CA, "[t]he certifications
issued by Acting Book keeper Hayde S. Momblan will show that it was not only [Tuares] who was not included in the June
2002 payrolls; there were other teachers who were not included because they failed to submit the required year-end
clearance. x x x Evidently, [Tuares] was not singled out or discriminated against as insisted by her and respondent
Ombudsman."38

All told, the Court finds that the CA did not commit a reversible error in exonerating Caberoy from the charge against her.

WHEREFORE, the petition for review is DENIED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice
A.M. No. P-11-2913               April 12, 2011
(Formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 08-2810-P)

MA. CHEDNA ROMERO, Complainant,

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

Before this Court is a Sworn Complaint1 filed on July 4, 2007, by complainant Ma. Chedna Romero (Romero), charging
respondent Pacifico B. Villarosa, Jr. (Sheriff Villarosa), Sheriff IV of Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 17, Palompon,
Leyte, with grave abuse of authority, conduct unbecoming of a government employee, dishonesty and estafa, for failing to
remit amounts owing to her by virtue of a compromise agreement.

In accordance with the recommendation of the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) dated April 21, 2008, the complaint
was referred on September 15, 2008 to Judge Apolinario M. Buaya (Investigating Judge), Executive Judge of the RTC of
Ormoc City, for investigation, report and recommendation.

The Investigating Judge submitted his Report2 on January 18, 2010, which was referred on September 6, 2010 to the OCA
for evaluation, report and recommendation.

The facts, as culled from the records and the Report of the Investigating Judge, are as follows:

Romero was the plaintiff in a claim for damages, docketed as Civil Case No. 462, entitled "Maria Chedna Romero vs. Sps.
Valentin and Enriqueta A. Laurente," filed with the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Palompon. The case was amicably
settled by way of a Compromise Agreement3 dated December 8, 2005, duly approved by the MTC, where Spouses
Valentin Laurente and Enriqueta Laurente (Spouses Laurente) bound themselves to pay Romero a total amount of
₱30,000.00, ₱24,000.00 of which would be paid on or before March 2006, and the remaining balance of ₱6,000.00 on or
before October 2006.

On December 6, 2005, Romero had already received the amount of ₱10,000.00 from Enriqueta Laurente in partial
compliance with the obligation.4 Failing to receive the balance of ₱20,000.00 in accordance with the Compromise
Agreement, Romero filed a Motion for the Issuance of a Writ Execution dated April 18, 2006, for which a corresponding writ
was issued on August 8, 2006. In response thereto, Enriqueta Laurente attested 5 that she had delivered the amount of
₱20,000.00 to Sheriff Villarosa, as supported by a certification 6 executed by the latter himself, dated May 9, 2007, that they
had fully paid such amount. Romero added that Sheriff Villarosa demanded a total amount of ₱1,500.00 from her on two
occasions as sheriff’s fee.

In his Comment7 dated August 7, 2007, Sheriff Villarosa denied any wrongdoing. He admitted having received ₱200.00
from Romero for gasoline expenses for his trip to the residence of the spouses Laurente. He further admitted having
received the total amount of ₱13,000.00 from Enriqueta Laurente, evidenced by acknowledgment receipts, 8 as follows:

₱ 3,000.00 September 20, 2006

₱ 1,700.00 November 15, 2006

₱ 4,000.00 December 6, 2006

₱ 1,000.00 January 9, 2007

₱ 3,300.00 February 28, 2007

₱13,000.00

Of the above-stated ₱13,000.00, Sheriff Villarosa claimed that he had directly turned over ₱10,000.00 to Romero,
evidenced by acknowledgment receipts,9 as follows:

₱ 7,000.00 November 2006

₱ 3,000.00 January 10, 2007

₱10,000.00
Regarding the remaining ₱3,000.00, he claimed that it was given by Enriqueta Laurente directly to the Officer-in-
charge (OIC) Clerk of Court of RTC, Branch 17, Palompon.

On May 2, 2007, Romero received the amount of ₱4,000.00 directly from Enriqueta Laurente. 10 As stated in the earlier
mentioned Certification of Sheriff Villarosa, the full amount of ₱20,000.00 had already been fully paid by the spouses
Laurente as of May 9, 2007.

Also in May 2007, Sheriff Villarosa alleged that for unknown reasons, Romero refused to receive the final amount of
₱6,000.00 from him, prompting him to deposit the amount by way of consignation with the OIC Clerk of Court of the MTC
of Palompon. He claimed that a receipt11 was issued for the final amount only on November 27, 2008 because the acting
OIC refused to issue a receipt in such capacity. On April 17, 2009, Romero received the final amount of ₱6,000.00 from the
MTC Clerk of Court of Palompon.12

In sum, Romero received the full amount of the obligation in accordance with the Compromise Agreement, as follows:

₱10,000.00 December 6, 2005, received directly from Enriqueta Laurente

₱ 7,000.00 November 2006, received from Sheriff Villarosa

₱ 3,000.00 January 10, 2007, received from Sheriff Villarosa

P 4,000.00 May 2, 2007, received directly from Enriqueta Laurente

₱ 6,000.00 April 17, 2009, received from the Clerk of Court

₱30,000.00

Finding the above transactions of Sheriff Villarosa to be highly anomalous and irregular, the Investigating Judge found him
guilty of grave abuse of authority, conduct unbecoming of a government employee and dishonesty. He recommended his
suspension for a period of six months and the payment of a fine equivalent to three months’ salary, with a stern warning
that a repetition of the same offense would merit dismissal.

The OCA agreed with the factual findings of the Investigating Judge, and likewise found Sheriff Villarosa guilty of grave
misconduct and dishonesty, but recommended his outright dismissal from the service.

The factual findings of the Investigating Judge and recommendation of the OCA are well-taken and adopted by the Court.

Sheriffs are officers of the court who serve and execute writs addressed to them by the court, and who prepare and submit
returns on their proceedings. As officers, they must discharge their duties with great care and diligence, perform faithfully
and accurately what is incumbent upon them, and at all times show a high degree of professionalism in the performance of
their duties. Despite being exposed to the hazards that come with the implementation of a judgment, sheriffs must perform
their duties by the book.13 In contravention of his duties, numerous irregularities in the transactions of Sheriff Villarosa were
observed by the Investigating Judge and this Court.

First, Sheriff Villarosa admitted having received a total of ₱13,000.00 from Enriqueta Laurente but turned over only
₱10,000.00 to Romero. He claimed that the remaining ₱3,000.00 was given directly to the OIC Clerk of Court of the MTC
of Palompon but this assertion was plainly belied by the Affidavit 14 of Enriqueta Laurente and the Certification15 of the Clerk
of Court.

Second, Sheriff Villarosa remitted amounts to Romero different from the amounts he received from Enriqueta Laurente
which could only be indicative of his failure to immediately account therefor. In November 2006, ₱7,000.00 was remitted by
Sheriff Villarosa to Romero, when Enriqueta Laurente had so far only paid him the aggregate amount of ₱4,700.00. By
January 10, 2007, he had turned over to Romero the total amount of ₱10,000.00, when he had so far only received
₱9,700.00 from Enriqueta Laurente.

Third, Sheriff Villarosa only delivered the final balance of ₱6,000.00 to the MTC Clerk of Court of Palompon on November
27, 2008, or more than a year after Romero allegedly refused to receive such amount from him. He further failed to show
when he received such amount from Enriqueta Laurente, or the ₱3,000.00 from the Clerk of Court whom, he claimed,
directly received it. Furthermore, not only was he in delay in delivering the final balance, but he was also in delay in the
delivery of all the amounts remitted to him by Enriqueta Laurente.

Fourth, Sheriff Villarosa delivered the amounts he received from Enriqueta Laurente directly to Romero, the judgment
obligee, instead of the Clerk of Court.
Section 9 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides in part:

Sec. 9. Execution of judgments for money, how enforced.

(a) Immediate payment on demand. - The officer shall enforce an execution of a judgment for money by demanding from
the judgment obligor the immediate payment of the full amount stated in the writ of execution and all lawful fees. The
judgment obligor shall pay in cash, certified bank check payable to the judgment obligee or his authorized representative if
present at the time of payment. The lawful fees shall be handed under proper receipt to the executing sheriff who shall turn
over the said amount within the same day to the clerk of court of the court that issued the writ.

If the judgment obligee or his authorized representative is not present to receive payment, the judgment obligor shall
deliver the aforesaid payment to the executing sheriff. The latter shall turn over all the amounts coming into his
possession within the same day to the clerk of court of the court that issued the writ, or if the same is not practicable,
deposit said amount to a fiduciary account in the nearest government depository bank of the Regional Trial Court of the
locality.

The clerk of said court shall thereafter arrange for the remittance of the deposit to the account of the court that issued the
writ whose clerk of court shall then deliver said payment to the judgment obligee in satisfaction of the judgment. The
excess, if any, shall be delivered to the judgment obligor while the lawful fees shall be retained by the clerk of court for
disposition as provided by law. In no case shall the executing sheriff demand that any payment by check be made payable
to him.

xxx

From the above, it is clear that in the execution of judgments for money, where the judgment obligee is not present to
receive payment, the judgment obligor shall deliver payment to the executing sheriff who, in turn, shall turn over such
payment within the same day to the clerk of court who issued the writ, or if the same is not practicable, the amount should
be deposited to a fiduciary account in the nearest government depositary bank of the RTC of the locality. In either case, it
is the clerk of court, and not the sheriff, who should deliver the amount to the judgment obligee.

The Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees 16 enunciates the state policy to promote a
high standard of ethics in public service, and enjoins public officials and employees to discharge their duties with utmost
responsibility, integrity and competence. Section 4 of the Code lays down the norms of conduct which every public official
and employee shall observe in the discharge and execution of their official duties, specifically providing that they shall at all
times respect the rights of others, and refrain from doing acts contrary to law, good morals, good customs, public policy,
public order, and public interest. Thus, any conduct contrary to these standards would qualify as conduct unbecoming of a
government employee.

With regard to grave abuse of authority, such has been defined as a misdemeanor committed by a public officer, who
under color of his office, wrongfully inflicts upon any person any bodily harm, imprisonment or other injury; it is an act of
cruelty, severity, or excessive use of authority.17 On the other hand, dishonesty has been defined as the disposition to lie,
cheat, deceive, or defraud; untrustworthiness; lack of integrity; lack of honesty, probity or integrity in principle; lack of
fairness and straightforwardness; disposition to defraud, deceive or betray. 18

Guided by the foregoing, it is clear that Sheriff Villarosa is guilty of conduct unbecoming of a government employee, grave
abuse of authority, and dishonesty, characterized by serious nonfeasance.

Sheriff Villarosa manifestly failed to observe Section 9 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. Given the numerous amounts that
were remitted to him by Enriqueta Laurente on various occasions, at no instance did he turn over such amounts within the
same day that they were received by him. As regards the delivery of the final balance of ₱6,000.00, it was not shown when
such amount was received by him. Even counting from the time in May 2007 when he claimed that Romero refused to
receive such amount, more than a year had elapsed from such attempted delivery before he turned over the said amount
to the clerk of court. His defense that the acting OIC refused to issue a receipt in May 2007, is simply too tenuous to be
believed. Even granting such defense to be true, other dubious irregularities prevail in the case at bench.

Section 9 of Rule 39 states that when the judgment obligee is not present at the time the judgment obligor makes the
payment, the sheriff is authorized to receive it. However, the money received must be remitted to the clerk of court within
the same day or, if not practicable, deposited in a fiduciary account with the nearest government depository bank.
Evidently, sheriffs are not permitted to retain the money in their possession beyond the day when the payment was made
or to deliver the money collected directly to the judgment obligee. 19

It is recognized that the most difficult phase of any proceeding is the execution of judgment. Thus, officers charged with
this task must, in the absence of a restraining order, act with considerable dispatch so as not to unduly delay the
administration of justice; otherwise, the decisions, orders, or other processes of the courts of justice would be futile. 20 After
all, a decision left unexecuted or indefinitely delayed due to their inefficiency renders it useless. 21 Sheriff Villarosa’s
repeated and evident delays hindered the speedy administration of justice for Romero and the spouses Laurente.
Sheriff Villarosa’s delivery of amounts in excess of what was remitted to him by Enriqueta Laurente, also evinces a failure
of his duty as sheriff to properly account for all amounts received and turned over by him. As the amounts were received by
him by virtue of his office, it was his duty, as sheriff, to faithfully account for said money. 22 By failing to deliver the exact
amounts remitted to him by the judgment obligor, it is apparent that he failed to faithfully account for the money which he
received. Sheriffs have the duty to perform faithfully and accurately what is incumbent upon them, and any method of
execution falling short of the requirement of the law should not be countenanced. 231avvphi1

Sheriff Villarosa’s conduct is highly irregular and suspicious. He repeatedly failed to comply with his duties under the Rules.
Despite the several dates set for hearing, he did not appear and opted instead to submit his Position Paper 24 where he
failed to address any of the aforementioned irregularities.

In sum, Sheriff Villarosa’s failure to comply with Section 9 of Rule 39 by delaying the deposit of the final amount he
received and not delivering the other amounts to the Clerk of Court; and to faithfully account for the amounts he received
thru his failure to deliver the exact amounts and his inconsistent assertions regarding the ₱3,000.00, are clear
manifestation of conduct unbecoming a government employee, tantamount to grave abuse of authority and dishonesty. He
failed to perform his duty as sheriff in accordance with the Rules, thereby acting contrary to law, good morals, and public
policy, in disregard of the rights of the litigants. By acting under color of his office and in excess of his authority, he
wrongfully inflicted injury onto the parties involved. His conduct goes against the nature of the performance by a
government employee of his functions, and casts a shadow over his motives. His conduct and resulting nonfeasance reek
of a lack of integrity and honesty, and reveal a disposition to deceive.

Sheriff Villarosa’s guilt was thus proven by substantial evidence, which is that amount of relevant evidence that a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, such being the quantum of proof required in
administrative cases.25

A sheriff is a front-line representative of the justice system in this country. Once he loses the people’s trust, he diminishes
the people’s faith in the judiciary. 26 High standards of conduct are expected of sheriffs who play an important role in the
administration of justice. They are tasked with the primary duty to execute final judgments and orders of the courts. When a
writ is placed in the hands of a sheriff, it becomes his ministerial duty to proceed with reasonable celerity and promptness
to implement it in accordance with its mandate. It must be stressed that a judgment, if not executed, would be an empty
victory on the part of the prevailing party.27

All court employees, regardless of rank, being public servants in an office dispensing justice, must always act with a high
degree of professionalism and responsibility. Their conduct must not only be characterized by propriety and decorum, but
must also be in accordance with the law and court regulations. No position demands greater moral righteousness and
uprightness from its holder than an office in the judiciary. Court employees should be models of uprightness, fairness and
honesty to maintain the people’s respect and faith in the judiciary. The conduct of court personnel therefore, must not only
be, but must also be perceived to be, free from any whiff of impropriety, both with respect to their duties in the judiciary and
to their behavior outside the court. Any act or omission of any court employee diminishing or tending to diminish public trust
and confidence in the courts will not be tolerated. 28 The Court will not hesitate to impose the ultimate penalty on those who
fall short of their accountabilities. 29

Under Rule IV, Section 52(A)(14) of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, 30 grave abuse of
authority or oppression is a grave offense punishable with suspension of six (6) months and one (1) day to one (1) year for
the first offense, and dismissal from service for the second infraction. 31 While dishonesty, also a grave offense under
Section 52(A)(1) of the same Rule, is punishable by dismissal for the first offense. Sheriff Villarosa being guilty of
dishonesty, the penalty of dismissal is just and proper.

WHEREFORE, Pacifico B. Villarosa, Jr., Sheriff IV of Regional Trial Court, Branch 17, Palompon, Leyte, is hereby
found GUILTY of Conduct Unbecoming a Public Official, Grave Abuse of Authority, and Dishonesty, and is hereby
ordered DISMISSED from the service, with forfeiture of all benefits, except leave credits already accrued. He is further
barred from re-employment in any branch or office of the government, including government-owned or controlled
corporations.

SO ORDERED.