CALALAS Vs CA

#13
Calalas v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 122039 | May 31, 2000
DOCTRINE: ARTICLE 1756. In case of death of or injuries to passengers, common carriers are presumed
to have been at fault or to have acted negligently, unless they prove that they observed extraordinary
diligence as prescribed by articles 1733 and 1755.
FACTS:
On August 23, 1989, private respondent Eliza Jujeurche G. Sunga, then a college freshman
majoring in Physical Education at the Siliman University, took a passenger jeepney owned and operated by
petitioner Vicente Calalas. As the jeepney was filled to capacity of about 24 passengers, Sunga was given
by the conductor an "extension seat," a wooden stool at the back of the door at the rear end of the vehicle.
On the way to Poblacion Sibulan, the jeepney stopped to let a passenger off. Sunga gave way to the
outgoing passenger. Just as she was doing so, an Isuzu truck driven by Iglecerio Verena and owned by
Francisco Salva bumped the left rear portion of the jeepney which resulted to Sunga’s injury (fracture of the
distal third of the left tibia-fibula with severe necrosis of the underlying skin). Her surgeon certified that she
would have to remain on cast for 3 months. Sunga then filed a complaint for damages against Calalas for
violation of the contract of carriage. Calalas on the other hand filed a third-party complaint against
Francisco Salva, the owner of Isuzu truck. The lower court rendered judgment against Salva and absolved
Calalas of liability holding that it was the former who was responsible for the accident. The same lower
court took cognizance of another civil case (Civil Case 3490) filed by Calalas against Salva and his driver,
Verena, for quasi-delict which rendered a judgment holding both of them jointly liable to Calalas for the
damage to his jeepney. When appealed to the CA, it reversed the lower court’s decision and ruled that
Sunga’s cause of action was based on a contract of carriage, not quasi-delict, and that the common carrier
failed to exercise the diligence required under the civil Code. It further ordered Calalas to pay Sunga actual
and compensatory damages, moral damages, attorney’s fees, and expenses of litigation. Thus, the present
petition where Calalas asserts that the ruling in Civil Case 3490 already ruled out his liability when it held
that the driver of Isuzu truck was responsible for the accident for being negligent.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the ruling in Civil Case 3490 negated Calalas’ liability so as to absolve him in the
present case.
2. Whether or not Calalas breached the contract of carriage.
HELD:
1. No. The issues in the present case and in Civil Case 3490 were different. The issue in the former
was for his liability on his contract of carriage whereas the issue in the latter was whether Salva and his
driver Verena were liable for quasi-delict for the damage cause to petitioner’s jeepney. The first, breach of
contract or culpa contractual, is premised upon the negligence in the performance of a contractual
obligation. The second, quasi-delict, also known as culpa aquiliana or culpa extra contractual, has as its
source the negligence of the tortfeasor. Consequently, in quasi-delict, the negligence or fault should be
clearly established because it is the basis of the action, whereas in breach of contract, the action can be
prosecuted merely by proving the existence of the contract and the fact that the obligor, in this case the
common carrier, failed to transport his passenger safely to his destination. There is, thus, no basis for the
contention that the ruling in Civil Case No. 3490, finding Salva and his driver Verena liable for the damage
to petitioner’s jeepney, should be binding on Sunga. It is immaterial that the proximate cause of the
collision between the jeepney and the truck was the negligence of the truck driver. The doctrine of
proximate cause is applicable only in actions for quasi-delict, not in actions involving breach of
contract. The doctrine is a device for imputing liability to a person where there is no relation between him
and another party. In such a case, the obligation is created by law itself. But, where there is a pre-existing
contractual relation between the parties, it is the parties themselves who create the obligation, and the
function of the law is merely to regulate the relation thus created. Insofar as contracts of carriage are
concerned, some aspects regulated by the Civil Code are those respecting the diligence required of
common carriers with regard to the safety of passengers as well as the presumption of negligence in cases
of death or injury to passengers. Thus, the ruling in Civil Case 3490 did not negate Calalas’ liability in the
present case based on culpa contractual.
2. Yes. Article 1756 states that:
ARTICLE 1756. In case of death of or injuries to passengers, common carriers are presumed to have been
at fault or to have acted negligently, unless they prove that they observed extraordinary diligence as
prescribed by articles 1733 and 1755.
In the case at bar, upon the happening of the accident, the presumption of negligence at once
arose, and it became the duty of petitioner to prove that he had to observe extraordinary diligence in the
care of his passengers. The Court found that Calalas did not carry Sunga “safely as far as human care and
foresight could provide using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with due regard for all the
circumstances" as required by Art. 1755. First, as found by the Court of Appeals, the jeepney was not
properly parked, its rear portion being exposed about two meters from the broad shoulders of the highway,
and facing the middle of the highway in a diagonal angle. This is a violation of the R.A. No. 4136, as
amended, or the Land Transportation and Traffic Code. Second, it is undisputed that petitioner’s driver took
in more passengers than the allowed seating capacity of the jeepney, a violation of S32(a) of the same law.
The fact that Sunga was seated in an "extension seat" placed her in a peril greater than that to which the
other passengers were exposed. The Court also found it hard to give serious thought to petitioner’s
contention that Sunga’s taking an "extension seat" amounted to an implied assumption of risk. It is akin to
arguing that the injuries to the many victims of the tragedies in our seas should not be compensated
merely because those passengers assumed a greater risk of drowning by boarding an overloaded
ferry. Therefore, not only was petitioner unable to overcome the presumption of negligence imposed on
him for the injury sustained by Sunga, but also, the evidence shows he was actually negligent in
transporting passengers.

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#13

Calalas v. Court of Appeals

2. Yes. Article 1756 states that:

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