G.

Complex Crime (Art 48)

1. Compound
2. Complex Crime Proper
3. Special Complex Crimes (Art 266B, 267, 294, 297, and 320)
4. Continuing Crimes
5. Continued Crimes (delito continuado)

People vs. Tabaco

G.R. No. 100382-100385
19 March 1997
Plaintiff-appellee: People of the Philippines
Accused-appellant: Mario Tabaco
Ponente: Hermosisima, Jr., J.

Facts:
In four related informations, Mario Tabaco was charged with four counts of Murder for shooting to death
on March 22, 1987 Capt. Oscar Tabulog (Criminal Case No. 10-259), Ex-Mayor Jorge Arreola (Criminal
Case No. 10-270), Felicito Rigunan (Criminal Case No. 10-284) and Pat. Romeo Regunton (Criminal
Case No. 10-317). In the evening of March 22, 1987, the 117th PC stationed at Aparri, Cagayan, under
then Lt. James Andres Melad, sponsored a cock derby, under the name of Jose Ting, at the Octagon
Cockpit Arena located at Aparri, Cagayan.

This being so, peace officers in uniform with long firearms were assigned as guards to maintain peace and
order at the cockpit arena namely: (1) Sgt. Benito Raquepo; (2) CIS Roque P. Datugan, both from the
117th PC and (3) Pat. Andres Semana, INP, Aparri, Cagayan. Accused Mario Tabaco who was in civilian
clothes claims to have been also assigned by his Commanding Officer of 117th PC, to verify the presence
of NPAs and assist in the protection of VIPs in the cockpit arena, bringing with him his M-14 issued
firearm. Other peace officers who came to participate were: (1) Policeman Mariano Retreta of INP,
Buguey, Cagayan, who arrived with the deceased Jorge Siriban and Licerio Antiporda, Jr., Licerio
Antiporda II; (2) Sgt. Rogelio Ferrer of 117th PC Company; (3) Policeman Romeo Regunton (deceased)
who was also armed, arrived in company with the deceased Ex-Mayor Arreola; (4) Fireman Rogelio
Guimmayen, INP Buguey; (5) Pat. Barba; and (6) CIC PC Paragas. At about nine o'clock in the evening
of same date, the group of the late Mayor Jorge Arreola of Buguey, Cagayan, arrived at the cockpit arena.
His companions were (1) Antonio Villasin; (2) Rosario Peneyra; (3) victim Loreto Pita, Jr. and/or five (5)
of them including the Mayor. They occupied and were (4th row) north western part cockpit-gate. Others
seated with the Mayor were: (1) the late Capt. Oscar Tabulog; (2) the late Pat. Romeo Regunton, who was
at the back of the mayor; (3) the late Felicito Rigunan. The accused CIC Tabaco was seated on the arm of
the bench situated at the lower portion of the arena about more than three (3) meters away, (in front and a
little bit in the west), from the place where the late Mayor and his group were seated (at the 4th row of
seats upper portion). During the ocular inspection conducted, the Court noticed the distance to be more
than three (3) meters, and/or probably 4-5 meters. At about ten o'clock 1987, while the accused Mario
Tabaco was seated as described above, he suddenly without warning or provocation, shot the late mayor
Jorge Arreola, with his M-14 rifle, followed by several successive burst of gunfire, resulting in the
shooting to death of the late Mayor Arreola, Capt. Oscar Tabulog, Felicito Rigunan and Pat. Romeo
Regunton, although the latter managed to run passing through the western gate near the gaffers cage but
was chased by accused Tabaco. Regunton was later found dead inside the canteen of Mrs. Amparo Go
inside the Octagon cockpit arena.

Issue:
Whether or not the criminal cases Nos. 259, 270, 284 and 317, involving the killings of Oscar Tabulog,
Jorge Arreola, Felicito Rigunan and Romeo Regunton, respectively, are complex crimes and should have
been prosecuted under only one information?

Held:
We hold that the trial court was in error in imposing only a single penalty of reclusion perpetua for all
four murder cases. The trial court holding that a complex crime was committed since "the evidence shows
that the four victims were FELLED by one single shot/burst of fire and/or successive automatic gun fires,
meaning continuous (emphasis ours) does not hold water. Of course, to justify the penalty imposed, the
trial court relied on the doctrines enunciated in People vs. Pama (not People vs. Dama, as cited by the trial
court), People vs. Lawas, and People vs. Pineda. The trial court misappreciated the facts in People vs.
Pama. In said case, there was only one bullet which killed two persons. Hence, there was only a single act
which produced two crimes, resulting in a specie of complex crime known as a compound crime, wherein
a single act produces two or more grave or less grave felonies. In the case at bench, there was more than
one bullet expended by the accused-appellant in killing the four victims. The evidence adduced by the
prosecution show that Tabaco entered the cockpit with a fully loaded M-14 sub-machine gun. 28 He fired
the weapon, which contained 20 rounds of bullets in its magazine, continuously. When the rifle was
recovered from Tabaco, the magazine was already empty. Moreover, several spent shells were recovered
from the scene of the crime. Hence, the ruling enunciated in People vs. Pama cannot be applied. On the
contrary, what is on all fours with the case at bench is the ruling laid down in People vs. Desierto. 29 The
accused in that case killed five persons with a Thompson sub-machine gun, an automatic firearm which,
like the M-14, is capable of firing continuously.

In the case at bar, Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code is not applicable because the death of each of the
five persons who were killed by appellant and the physical injuries inflicted upon each of the two other
persons injured were not caused by the performance by the accused of one simple act as provided for by
said article. Although it is true that several successive shots were fired by the accused in a short space of
time, yet the factor which must be taken into consideration is that, to each death caused or physical
injuries inflicted upon the victims, corresponds a distinct and separate shot fired by the accused, who thus
made himself criminally liable for as many offenses as those resulting from every single act that produced
the same. Although apparently he perpetrated a series of offenses successively in a matter of seconds, yet
each person killed and each person injured by him became the victim, respectively, of a separate crime of
homicide or frustrated homicide. Except for the fact that five crimes of homicide and two cases of
frustrated homicide were committed successively during the tragic incident, legally speaking there is
nothing that would connect one of them with its companion offenses.

In Desierto, although the burst of shots was caused by one single act of pressing the trigger of the
Thompson sub-machine gun, in view of its special mechanism, the person firing it has only to keep
pressing the trigger with his finger and it would fire continually. Hence, it is not the act of pressing the
trigger which should produce the several felonies, but the number of bullets which actually produced
them.

The trial court also misread People vs. Pineda. True, the case of Pineda provided us with a definition of
what a complex crime is. But that is not the point. What is relevant is that Art. 48, was not applied in the
said case because the Supreme Court found that there were actually several homicides committed by the
perpetrators. Had the trial court read further, it would have seen that the Supreme Court in fact recognized
the deeply rooted doctrine that when various victims expire from separate shots, such acts constitute
separate and distinct crimes." Clarifying the applicability of Art. 48 of the Revised Penal Code, the
Supreme Court further stated in Pineda that to apply the first half of Article 48, there must be singularity
of criminal act; singularity of criminal impulse is not written into the law. The firing of several bullets by
Tabaco, although resulting from one continuous burst of gunfire, constitutes several acts. Each person,
felled by different shots, is a victim of a separate crime of murder. There is no showing that only a single
missile passed through the bodies of all four victims. The killing of each victim is thus separate and
distinct from the other. In People vs. Pardo we held that: Where the death of two persons does not result
from a single act but from two different shots, two separate murders, and not a complex crime, are
committed. Furthermore, the trial court's reliance on the case of People vs. Lawas is misplaced. The
doctrine enunciated in said case only applies when it is impossible to ascertain the individual deaths
caused by numerous killers. In the case at bench, all of the deaths are attributed, beyond a shadow of a
doubt, to the accused-appellant. Consequently, the four murders which resulted from a burst of gunfire
cannot be considered a complex crime. They are separate crimes. The accused-appellant must therefore be
held liable for each and every death he has caused, and sentenced accordingly to four sentences of
reclusion perpetua.

Ivler vs. San Pedro, GR No. 172716, 17 November 2010 (Yao)

Petitioners: Jason Ivler y Agular
Respondents: Hon. Maria Rowena Modesto-San Pedro
Ponente: Carpio, J.

FACTS
1. Following a vehicular collision, Jason Ivler is charged before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig
City with two separate offenses namely 1) Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical
Injuries for injuries sustained by Evangeline L. Ponce and 2) Reckless Imprudence Resulting
in Homicide and Damage to Property for the death of the husband Nestor C. Ponce and damage
to the spouses' vehicle.
2. Petitioner pleaded guilty to the charge of Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical
Injuries. He then moved to quash the second charge against him invoking double jeopardy
because of a second punishment for the same act of reckless imprudence.
3. The MeTC refused to quash. After unsuccessfully seeking reconsideration, petitioner elevated the
matter to the RTC of Pasig City in a petition for certiorari.
4. MeTC issued a resolution denying petitioner's previous motion to suspend the proceedings and
postponed his arraignment until after his arrest. RTC also dismissed his motion for certiorari and
affirms the MeTC. Petitioner elevates the case to the Supreme Court.
ISSUES
1. W/N petitioner's constitutional right under the Double Jeopardy Clause bars further proceedings?
YES.
2. Should petitioner be liable to Article 365 (quasi-offenses) OR Article 45 (complex crimes) under
the revised penal code. Article 365 used.

HELD
1. Petitioner's conviction bars his prosecution in the subsequent charge. Reckless Imprudence is a
single crime, its consequences on persons and property are material only to determine the
penalty.
2. Reckless Imprudence and Simple Imprudence are Quasi-offenses. Quasi-offenses whether
reckless or simple are distinct species of crime set apart from intentional crimes, and separately
defined and penalized under the framework of penal laws. The correct way in alleging quasi-
crimes is to state its commission results in damage either to person or property.
3. Prior Conviction or Acquittal of Reckless Imprudence bars subsequent prosecution for the same
Quasi-Offense under Article 365. Quasi-offenses are not merely a means to commit other crimes.
A single quasi-crime is a crime by itself.
4. Article 48 referring to complex crimes and Article 365 referring to quasi-crimes are both under
the revised penal code. Article 45 allows a single prosecution of multiple felonies, while Article
365 is a substantial rule penalizing not the act defined as a felony, but the mental attitude xxx
behind the act, the dangerous recklessness, lack of care or foresight xxx, a single mental
attitude regardless of the resulting consequences. Thus Article 365 was crafted as one quasi-
crime resulting in one or more consequences. In this case, ARTICLE 365 is used since it
provides protection from double jeopardy, which shall charge a stronger and simpler protection of
constitutional rights.

DECISION
SC grants petition. RTC is REVERSED and second information in criminal case against Jason
Ivler DISMISSED.

People vs. Gonzalez Jr GRNo. 139542

Petitioner: People of the Philippines
Respondent: Inocencio Gonzales Jr.
Ponente: Gonzaga-Reyes J.

Facts:

On Oct 31, 1998 both families of Noel Andres (with pregnant wife, son, nephew and sister-in-law) and
Inocencio Gonzales Jr. were leaving Loyola Memorial Park. At an intersection, the vehicles of the two
almost collided. Inocencio continued to drive along his way and Noel chased after him and cut him off.
Noel got out of his car and knocked on Inocencio’s window.

There are conflicting sides to this part of the story. Noel alleged that he calmly told Inocencio to be
careful while driving. He saw that the latter was fuming red so he went back to his car, but was blocked
by Inocencio’s son, Dino who asked him “and problems mo sa erpat ko.” Feeling threatened, he went
inside his car and opened the window to talk back to Dino. Suddenly, one of his passengers said “binaril
kami.” He turned and saw that his wife was bloodied and unconscious, and his son and nephew were also
wounded.

On Inocencio’s account, he said that Noel repeatedly cursed at him. Noel went back to his vehicle and
positioned it straight in front of Inocenscio’s car. Dino, who rode in another vehicle, noticed his father
was not behind him and went back to find his father and Noel having an altercation. Then they said Noel
reached for something in his car. Thinking that his son was in imitate danger, Inocencio got his gun from
his car, but when he saw that Noel did not have a weapon, he lowered his. This was when Trisha,
Inocencio’s daughter, hugged her father and held his hand that was holding the gun. Inocencio said that
the weight of his daughter caused him to lose balance and accidentally fire the gun towards the direction
of Noel’s car. Inocencio said that he did not know he shot someone until Noel’s sister in law brought out
a bloodied boy. He claimed that he did not try to flee and even tried to help the victims.

Information of complex crimes of murder, attempted murder and double frustrated murder were filed
against Inocencio to which he pleaded not guilty. Records show that Noel’s wife died of gunshot wound
but did not die instantly and was able to give birth to a baby girl.

In the trial court’s investigations, they focused on the weapon used by Inocencio to prove murder with
treachery. They demonstrated that the said gun will not fire even if the bullet was loaded in the chamber if
the hammer is unlocked; or even If cocked if safety pin was engaged and that the gun should be leveled to
the target to hit it. Trial court found this as enough proof to prove that there is treachery when offender
committed the crime. (Treachery is done when 1. The employment of means of execution gives person
attacked no opportunity to defend or retaliate; and 2. That the means were deliberately or consciously
adopted.) So trial court found appellant guilty of the crimes and penalized with jail time + payments of
civil liabilities as provided.

Issue:
Did trial court err in saying Treachery was present? YES
Did court fail to consider mitigating circumstances? NO

Held: OSG finds that the decision of the trial court to equate the type of gun that was used with treachery
to be false. Treachery has to be assailed by qualifying circumstances - mode of attack implored by the
accused. Since the shooting was done after a heated argument and was done impulsively, there was no
proof that Inocencio deliberately implored means to attack Noel and his family and while doing so
eliminating chances for defense and retaliation. Therefore the death of Noel’s wife should be declared
homicide, not murder. With respect to the injuries of the 2 kids, the OSG said that it was still frustrated
homicide since the injuries could have killed them. And with regards to the mitigating circumstances,
witnesses claimed that Inocencio actually tried to flee the scene of the crime but was prevented to do so
by traffic.

SC found that the appeal of Inocencio has merit.

SC affirms the position of the OSG that the death of Noel’s wife was homicide, since there was no
treachery. SC added that Noel lied in his testimony saying that he was calm in telling Inocencio to be
careful. It was highly improbable for Inocencio to be mad if Noel approached him calmly.

Also, eyewitnesses claimed that if Inocencio intended to kill Noel, he could have done so since they were
in close proximity; that there was no one or nothing stopping him from killing Noel. Inocencio shot the
left side of Noel’s car, not knowing that there were people inside the car since Noel’s car was heavily
tinted. This proves that there was no intent to kill Noel.

With regards to the children’s injuries, the court said that the crime was supposed to be two counts of
slight physical injuries. The lack of intent to kill ascertained that the crime committed against the children
was not frustrated homicide. Also, physicians examined the wounds of the children and found that they
are not actually fatal in itself, but fatal if left untreated.

Concerning the mitigating circumstances Inocencio brings forward, the SC found witnesses stating that
indeed Inocencio tried to flee the scene of the crime but was blocked by Noel and onlookers. Also, SC
added that provocation cannot be a mitigating circumstance - while it was true that Noel manifested
aggressive behavior, it was not sufficient provocation to shoot the vehicle.

Additional info: rules of imposition of complex crimes under Art48 of the RPC cannot be applicable since
the rules require 2 or more grave and/or less grave and/or less grave felonies.

Decision: Decision of the trial court is MODIFIED. Appellant is guilty of homicide, sentencing him to
prison mayor in its medium period as minimum to reclusion temporal in its medium period as maximum.
For each count of slight physical injuries, appellant is sentenced to 20 days arrests menor. + awards for
moral damages.

Mallari vs. People (SUNGCAD)

G.R. No. L-58886
Ponente: Fernan, J.
December 8, 1988
Facts
1. SUBSTANTIVE FACTS – Remegio Tapawan (the victim) stated that Consuelo Mallari
(Petitioner) visited the former to ask for money for her “cousin” Leonora Balderas. The former denied at
first, but upon the petitioner’s return 5 days later, Tapawan loaned her half of what she needed and went
to his mother-in-laws house to ask for the other half which Mallari needed. They then proceeded to the
office of Atty. Hallazgo for the preparation of the documents. Atty. Hallzago called Leonora Balderas
whom was introduced to Tapawan and his mother-in-law. After which, all the documents were signed,
and the money was delivered to Leonora, who turned out to be a man dressing up as a woman.
2. PROCEDURAL FACTS - Petitioner was accused of Estafa thru Falsification of Public Document
before the CFI of Manila. The court ruled her Guilty and sentenced her to imprisonment of 1 year and pay
costs. Upon appeal (docketed CA-GR. No. 19849-CR), the decision was affirmed. In petitioner’s motion
for reconsideration, she contended that she is being punished for the same offense she had been charged
with in CA-G.R. No. 20817-CR.
Issues
1. W/N the 2nd conviction places the petitioner in double jeopardy?
Disposition
Petition GRANTED
Rationale
1. YES, the 2nd conviction puts the petitioner in double jeopardy. When a person is charged with an
offense and the case is terminated either by acquittal or conviction or in any other manner without the
consent of the accused, the latter cannot again be charged with the same or Identical offense. To raise the
defense of double jeopardy, there are 3 requisites: (a) the 1 st jeopardy must attach prior to the 2nd; (b) the
1st must be validly terminated; (3) the 2nd must be for the same offense as the first. The CA contends that
the charges of the first and 2nd conviction are different. However, after looking at the 2 informations and
the 2 finding of facts, they are identical. Therefore, the second cannot prosper because it places the
accused in jeopardy for the second time for the same offense.
2. (MAIN) When comparing the informations, they refer to the same series of acts. These series of
acts are known as a continued, continuous, or continuing offense. A continued crime is a single crime
consisting of a series of acts but all arising from one criminal resolution. A continuous unlawful act/s set
foot by a single impulse, however long a time it may occupy. Although there is a series of acts, there is
only one crime committed (One penalty Imposed).

People vs. De Guzman, October 5, 1993, Vitug, J. (YAO)

Petitioners: People of the Philippines
Respondents: Hon. Jose De Guzman (RTC-QC), AND Spouses Danilo A. Alcantara and Isabelita
Esguerra-Alcantara

FACTS
1. Robbery was committed in QC in the house of Jose L. Obillos, Sr., where various pieces of
precious jewelry alleged to be worth millions of pesos were taken.
2. An information was instituted in the RTC-QC against perpetrators. Subsequently, an information
for violation of PD 1612, otherwise known as the "Anti-Fencing Law," was also filed in the RTC-
QC against spouses Danilo A. Alcantara and Isabelita Esguerra-Alcantara, for whose possession
the jewelries stolen were recovered in Antipolo, Rizal.
3. Respondents ask for motion to quash on the ground that the Court has no jurisdiction to try the
offense charged since the crime took place in Antipolo, Rizal and not in QC. The motion to quash
is granted by the RTC.
4. Private prosecutor's MR was denied, hence the instant petition.

ISSUE
1. W/N fencing is a continuous crime? NO.

HELD
 1. A “continuing crime” is a single crime consisting of a series of acts arising from a single criminal
resolution or intent not susceptible of division. In this case, there are actually two separate crimes
which are robbery and fencing. They are independent of each other. The law on fencing does
not require the accused to have participated in the criminal design to commit, or to have been in
any wise involved in the commission of, the crime of robbery or theft. Neither is the crime of
robbery or theft made to depend on an act of fencing in order that it can be consummated.
Alcantara should be prosecuted in Antipolo because that’s where the crime of fencing was
allegedly committed.
2. In People vs. Ledesma
a. a "continuous crime" is a single crime consisting of a series of acts arising from a single
criminal resolution or intent not susceptible to division.
b. According to Cuello Calon, when the actor, there being unity of purpose and of right
violated, commits diverse acts each of which, although of a delictual character merely
constitutes a partial execution of a single particular delict, such concurrence of delictual
acts is called a, "delito continuado".

HELD
Petition is DISMISSED, and the RTC is AFFIRMED.

Batulanon v People GRNo. 139857

Petitioner: Leonila Batulanon
Respondent: People of the PH
Ponente: Ynarez-Santiago, J.

Facts: Polomok Credit Cooperative Incorporated (PCCI) employed Leonila Batulanon as its
Cashier/Manager from May 1980 up to December 22, 1982. She was in charge of receiving deposits from
and releasing loans to the member of the cooperative.

During an audit conducted in December 1982, certain irregularities concerning the release of loans were
discovered. It was found that Batulanon falsified four commercial documents, all checks/cash vouchers
representing granted loans to different persons namely: Omadlao, Oracion, Arroyo and Dennis Batulanon,
making it appear that said names were granted a loan and received the amount of the checks/cash
vouchers when in truth and in fact the said persons never received a grant, never received the checks, and
never signed the check vouchers issued in their names. In furtherance, Batulanon released to herself the
checks and received the loans and thereafter misappropriated and converted it to her own use and benefit.

Thereafter, four Informations for Estafa through Falsification of Commercial Documents were filed
against Batulanon. The prosecution presented Medallo, Gopio, Jr. and Jayoma as witnesses. Medallo, the
posting clerk whose job was to assist Batulanon in the preparation of cash vouchers testified that
Batulanon forged the signatures of Omadlao, Oracion and Arroyo. Gopio, Jr. stated that Oracion is
Batulanon’ sister-in-law and Dennis Batulanon is her son who was only 3 years old in 1982 adding that
membership for the cooperative was not open to minors.
On April 15, 1993, the trial court rendered a Decision convicting Batulanon of Estafa through
Falsification of Commercial Documents. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court and
her MR was denied, hence this petition.

Issue: Whether the crime committed by Batulanon was falsification of private documents.

Held: Yes. Although the offense charged in the Information is Estafa through Falsification of Commercial
Documents, Batulanon could be convicted of Falsification of Private Documents under the well-settled
rule that it is the allegation in the information that determines the nature of the offense and not the
technical name given in the preamble of the information.

As there is no complex crime of Estafa through Falsification of Private Documents, it is important to

ascertain whether the offender is to be charged with Falsification of a Private Document or with Estafa.
If the falsification of a private document is committed as a means to commit estafa, the proper crime to be
charged is falsification. If the Estafa can be committed without the necessity of falsifying a document, the
proper crime is Estafa. We find that the Court of Appeals correctly held Batulanon guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of Falsification of Private Documents in the cases of Omadlao, Oracion and Arroyo.

But in the case of Dennis Batulanon, the crime committed was estate, not fascification. Records show that
Batulanon did not falsify the signature of Dennis. What she did was to sign: “by: Ibatulanon” to indicate
that she received the proceeds of the loan in behalf of Dennis. Said act does not fall under any of the
modes of Falsification under Article 171 because there is nothing untruthful about the fact that she used
the name of Dennis and that as representative of the latter, obtained the proceeds of the loan from PCCI.
Batulanon, knowing that she was no longer eligible for a loan, fraudulently used the name of her son; who
was also ineligible.

The essence of falsification is the act of making untruthful or false statements, which is not attendant in
this case. As to whether, such representation involves fraud which caused damage to PCCI is a different
matter which will make her liable for estafa, but not for falsification. Hence, it was an error for the courts
below to hold that Batulanon is also guilty of Falsification of Private Document with respect to the case
involving the cash voucher of Dennis Batulanon.

Decision: Decision appealed is AFFIRMED with modifications. Batulanon is guilty of 3 counts of

Falsification and is also guilty of estafa.

People vs. Madrigal-Gonzalez

People v. Madrigal-Gonzales
GR Nos. L-16688-90 - 30 April 1963
Ponente - Paredes, J.

Facts:
Aug. 23, 1956 - Pacita Madrigal-Gonzales was charged with malversation of public funds (as a Social
Welfare Administration officer) amounting to P104,000 which was allegedly stolen on five different
occasions within Feb.1954-Sept.1955. The defendant along with 7 other people were charged with
falsification of public documents under 27 separate informations done within Dec.1954-Sept.1955. Cash
aids were said to be given when none were distributed to the persons named and that certain relief
supplies were purchased when in fact none were true. The 27 informations were identical in format and
style except for the two differing acts (cash aids and relief supply purchases).

The prosecution filed a petition to consolidate the 27 falsification cases and the one malversation case
before one branch which was granted by the CFI.

The prosecution suddenly reversed their stand and asked for a distribution of the 27 cases into 18 different
branches. The defendants (with a motion to quash) claimed that this put them into double jeopardy. They
further claim that the numerous falsifications were done with one single criminal impulse or intent and
must be considered to be a continuing offense thus should be indicted under 1 proceeding. The court
granted the motion to quash.

3 separate branches acquitted the defendants. The defendants then contend that these acquittals should
bar the petitioners from filing other cases in any other branch.

Issue:
W/N the 27 falsification cases were derived from one criminal intent hence making it a continuous
offense (and barring the prosecution from furthering the 24 other cases)? NO.

Held:
It was contended that the motive of the falsification was to conceal the malversation, hence connecting all
the offenses together. The court ruled that the absence of proof that the falsification is clearly linked to
the malversation debunks that theory. Without solid proof, it must be assumed that the separate acts had
separate intent. The uniformity of the information is countered by the different amounts which show that
different acts of falsification were committed. There is no continuing offense if the facts alleged in the
informations show different acts of falsification. The acts were independent from each other and were
executed by different voluntary actions.

Ruling:
Lower court decisions dismissing the first 3 cases SET ASIDE and REMANDED for further proceedings.

People vs. Ibanez

No. L-178 November 29, 1946 Chief Justice Moran
FACTS:
Sixto Ibanez summoned Cosme Magalong to discuss a transaction regarding the sale of some
hogs, as both Sixto and Cosme were hog dealers. Irineo Ibanez, Sixto’s brother, also joined the
discussion. As the discussion was ongoing, a quarrel ensued, in which one of the three mentioned the
word “fight”. Cosme started to run toward his house, but Sixto caught up with him. Sixto held Cosme
around the neck from behind and proceeded to tighten his grip (think of a sleeper hold). While Sixto and
Cosme were struggling, Irineo fatally stabbed Cosme with a dagger. Irineo and Sixto fled the scene.
Cosme died twenty minutes later. While Irineo is still at large, Cosme was apprehended, tried, and was
sentenced guilty of murder. Hence, the present appeal.
ISSUES:
- W/N there was conspiracy between the two Ibanez brothers to kill Cosme (NO)
- W/N Sixto is liable for the death of Cosme (NO)
RULING:
- There was no preconceived plan of agreement between Sixto and Irineo to assault Cosme, as
what was supposed to happen that day was a business transaction. The records of the case show the
spontaneity of the occurrence.
- The fact that Sixto and Irineo pursued Cosme does not necessarily mean that they intended to
kill Cosme. Rather, it is established by the evidence that their intention was to prevent Cosme from
getting a weapon from his house. As such, the pursuit was a legitimate defense to prevent unlawful
aggression.
o Neither can it be said that Sixto’s act of holding Cosme was proof of his intent to kill.
In holding Cosme, Sixto did not necessarily know that Irineo was going to stab Cosme, as
was shown by his reaction (asking Irineo “what did you do?”) after the stabbing.
Furthermore, eyewitness accounts proved that Irineo’s act of stabbing Cosme was so
sudden and unexpected. Simultaneousness does not of itself demonstrate the concurrence
of will nor the unity of action or purpose.
- Given that Sixto’s participation in the criminal intent and design in the killing of Cosme has
not been proven before reasonable doubt, and given that such participation is essential to the criminal
responsibility charged in the Information (which is murder), Sixto is ACQUITTED, with costs de
oficio.
DISSENT (Tuason)
- Sixto should be liable as an accomplice, since his act of restraining Cosme made sure that
Cosme couldn’t defend himself. As such, Sixto cooperated with Irineo in the murder of Cosme by
acts prior or simultaneous to the act of stabbing, which is a prerequisite of conspiracy.