Great - Pacific - Life - Assurance - Corp PDF
Great - Pacific - Life - Assurance - Corp PDF
Great - Pacific - Life - Assurance - Corp PDF
DECISION
MEDIALDEA , J : p
The main issue, in this petition is whether private respondent, Rosa Allado
voluntarily resigned from her work at petitioner corporation, Great Paci c Life
Assurance Corporation, or whether the corporation constructively dismissed her or
forced her to resign.
Ms. Rosa Allado alleged that she was hired by GREPALIFE as clerk in its regional
o ce in Laoag, Ilocos Norte sometime in January, 1969. After only three (3) months on
the job, she was promoted to Regional Cashier at the same station. In 1971, she was
transferred to Baguio City, following the transfer of the corporation's regional o ce to
that city, where she remained with the company until May 25, 1984. At the time of her
separation she was receiving P2,230.00 a month.
She further alleged that on April 4, 1984, Ms. Rosa Y. Choa, the corporation's
Assistant Vice President, issued an inter-o ce memorandum to Ms. Ana Marie
Barredo, head of the Human Resources Administration Department, instructing the
latter to implement the decision taken by the company to transfer Allado to "IL
Accounting Department-Premium Section" at Metro Manila to take the place of one Ms.
Paz Francisco who resigned March 30, 1984. The reason given for the transfer, as
stated in the memorandum, was for the company to cut down on its expenses at its
Baguio o ce the function of Allado as Regional Cashier to be assumed by the Regional
Administrator.
Barredo noti ed Allado of the foregoing stating that though the corporation was
"well aware of [her] reservation about relocating to Manila" "present circumstances
leave the company no other recourse," and informed her that she was entitled to a
"relocation expense" of P1,000.00 subject to liquidation. Allado wrote the president of
the corporation requesting reconsideration of the decision of her transfer. She
reasoned that with the salary she was receiving she could not afford to live in a highly
urbanized area as Metro Manila, and "more importantly," she wrote, she has
"dependents who are studying in Baguio City whom she cannot simply leave" behind. Cdpr
On July 28, 1986 the labor arbiter promulgated his decision nding that Rosa
Allado was illegally dismissed and ordered her reinstatement to her former position in
Baguio City without loss of seniority rights and for the payment to her of backwages
equivalent to one year pay minus the amount she already received from the corporation
as a consequence of her "resignation." The labor arbiter found that the transfer of
Allado would cause her and her family " nancial dislocation" and, therefore, "such
transfer . . . amounts to constructive dismissal." The contention of GREPALIFE that
Allado voluntarily resigned was rejected, the labor arbiter reasoning that Allado wanted
to continue to work for the company, as shown by her repeated pleas, but, forced to
accept a position two-grades lower than her present status and at a place inconvenient
for her, and presented with Valero's representation that he could work it out for Allado
to receive one month pay for every year of service as her separation pay. This, to the
mind of the labor arbiter, gave .Allado no choice but to resign and sign the quitclaim for
her to receive her separation pay.
From this decision both parties appealed, Allado asking for full back wages while
the corporation disputed the ruling that complainant was constructively dismissed. On
January 18, 1989, the NLRC affirmed the decision of the labor arbiter agreeing that:
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"Under the circumstances, [Allado] had no choice. Hers was one of adherence. She
had no better alternative. Faced by the harsh realities of being rendered jobless,
she had to accept the token gratuity being proferred to her even if it was much
less than what was expected by her earlier. She had to make something under the
circumstances or else she would have nothing at hand and with dependents to
support at that. Payment of her severance pay was conditional, hence, she had to
sign the release and quitclaim papers and thereafter her services were terminated
by respondent on account of 'resignation.'
The NLRC modified, however, the award given by the labor arbiter in this wise: LLjur
". . . with modi cation by hereby ordering and directing respondent company to
pay complainant full backwages without quali cation effective from her date of
separation from the service on May 24, 1984 up to her actual reinstatement to her
former position or to an equivalent or comparable position without loss of
seniority rights, subject to the three (3) years limitation. In the event that
complainant's reinstatement becomes impractical due to a lawful supervening
event, . . ., complainant is entitled to one (1) month separation pay based on her
latest salary, in addition to her backwages as herein decreed, but deducting
therefrom the bene ts she had earlier received as decreed by the Labor Arbiter, . .
." (p. 39, Rollo)
GREPALIFE moved for reconsideration pointing out, inter alia, that there is
nothing in the records which would show that the abolition of the position of Regional
Cashier was contrived to ease or force Allado out of employment, but this was denied.
Hence, this petition for certiorari.
For initial consideration is the question of whether the decision of the NLRC had
matured into nality considering that, as private respondent Allado points out,
GREPALIFE received the order of the NLRC denying its motion for reconsideration on
March 13, 1989 whereas the instant petition was led only after fty-seven (57) days
therefrom or only on May 9, 1989. It is basic, however, that a special civil action of
certiorari may be led within a reasonable time and there is no time frame xed by Rule
65 of the Rules of Court (Cubar v. Mendoza , No. 55035, February 23, 1983, 120 SCRA
768; Magna Rubber Manufacturing Corporation v. Drilon , G.R. No. 81771, December 29,
1988, 168 SCRA 726). Thus, in Santos v. NLRC , G.R. No. 76991, October 28, 1988, 166
SCRA 759, We entertained a petition for certiorari notwithstanding the fact that it was
led only after seven (7) months from the promulgation of the NLRC decision
considering that it has not yet been executed and the substantial issues raised merited
this Court's attention. And after a careful reading of this case, We are of the opinion that
the instant petition has merit.
Much has been said regarding the transfer of Allado to Makati, Metro Manila
disregarding the reason for such transfer which is the abolition of Allado's position of
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Regional Cashier in Baguio City. That it has in fact been abolished is not disputed. It is
also not disputed that the Regional Administrator had assumed the function of
Regional Cashier and GREPALIFE had not hired anyone in Allado's stead. In fact, there is
no serious challenge at all to the decision of GREPALIFE deleting Allado's item. It is, of
course, a management prerogative to abolish a position which it deems no longer
necessary and this Court, absent any ndings of malice on the part of management,
cannot erase that initiative simply to protect the person holding that o ce. And We do
not see anything that would indicate that Allado's position was abolished to ease her
out of employment. The deletion of Allado's o ce, therefore, should be accepted as a
valid exercise of management prerogative.
But GREPALIFE sought to accommodate Allado by ordering her to transfer to a
position recently vacated. Whether that position is two grades lower than a Regional
Cashier is immaterial because GREPALIFE could have then terminated Allado's services
when it abolished her position. Her proposed transfer was merely an accommodation.
It is erroneous, therefore, to conclude that a situation was created by GREPALIFE to
force Allado to resign. cdll
Based on this premise, however, that Allado's services could have been
terminated after her position as Regional Cashier was abolished, We adopt by analogy
Article 283 of the Labor Code which provides that in case of termination of
employment due to installation of labor-saving devices or redundancy, the worker
affected shall be entitled to a separation pay of at least one (1) month pay or to at least
one (1) month pay for every year of service whichever is higher. We took consideration
of the fact that Allado's proposed transfer to Makati, Metro Manila would indeed entail
much sacri ce on her part and the nding of the NLRC that the position Allado was to
assume is two grades lower than a Regional Cashier so much so that GREPALIFE's
accommodation to her is almost illusory. Thus, in the interest of justice, Allado should
be entitled to receive one (1) month pay for every year of service as her separation pay.
Since Allado was already paid one-half (1/2) month pay for every year of service she is
only entitled to the balance.
ACCORDINGLY, the decision of the NLRC, dated January 18, 1989, and its order,
dated February 28, 1989, are SET ASIDE and a new one entered nding no case of
illegal dismissal on the part of petitioner GREPALIFE but holding it liable for the balance
of Rosa Allado's separation pay as above decreed.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, Cruz, Gancayco and Griño-Aquino, JJ., concur.