THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 106435. July 14, 1999.]

PAMECA WOOD TREATMENT PLANT, INC., HERMINIO G. TEVES,

VICTORIA V. TEVES and HIRAM DIDAY R. PULIDO , petitioners, vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE
PHILIPPINES , respondents.

Americo H. Acosta for petitioners.

Bonifacio M. Abad and Vicente Cuison for private respondent.

SYNOPSIS

This is a review on certiorari of a judgment of the Court of Appeals a rming in toto

the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Makati to award respondent bank's de ciency
claim, arising from a loan secured by a chattel mortgage.
The Court denied the petition. It held that since the Chattel Mortgage Law bars the
creditor-mortgagee from retaining the excess of the sale proceeds, there is a corollary
obligation on the part of the debtor-mortgagor to pay the de ciency in case of a reduction
in the price at public auction.
As to petitioners' contention that the public auction sale is void on ground of fraud
and inadequacy of price, the Court ruled that parties may not bring on appeal issues that
were not raised on trial. Petitioners never assailed the validity of the sale in the RTC and
only in the Court of Appeals did they attempt to prove inadequacy of price. Moreover, fraud
is a serious allegation that requires full and convincing evidence and may not be inferred
from the lone circumstance that it was only respondent bank that bid in the sale of the
foreclosed properties. TAaIDH

SYLLABUS

1. CIVIL LAW; CHATTEL MORTGAGE LAW (ACT NO. 1508, AS AMENDED);

DEBTOR-MORTGAGOR BARRED FROM RETAINING EXCESS OF SALE PROCEEDS AND
OBLIGED TO PAY DEFICIENCY IN CASE OF REDUCTION IN PRICE AT PUBLIC AUCTION. —
It is clear from Section 14 of Act No. 1508, as amended that the effects of foreclosure
under the Chattel Mortgage Law run inconsistent with those of pledge under Article 2115.
Whereas, in pledge, the sale of the thing pledged extinguishes the entire principal
obligation, such that the pledgor may no longer recover proceeds of the sale in excess of
the amount of the principal obligation, Section 14 of the Chattel Mortgage Law expressly
entitles the mortgagor to the balance of the proceeds, upon satisfaction of the principal
obligation and costs. Since the Chattel Mortgage Law bars the creditor-mortgagee from
retaining the excess of the sale proceeds there is a corollary obligation on the part of the
debtor-mortgagee to pay the de ciency in case of a reduction in the price at public
auction. (Manila Trading and Supply Co. vs. Tamaraw Plantation Co. , cited in Ablaza vs.
Ignacio, G.R. No. L-11466, May 23, 1958 [unpublished]). We nd no reason to disturb the
ruling in Ablaza vs. Ignacio, and the cases reiterating. it. DEaCSA

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 2. ID.; CIVIL LAW; ARTICLE 1484 CLEARLY APPLIES TO SALE OF PERSONAL
PROPERTY IN INSTALLMENT BASIS. — Neither do We nd tenable the application by
analogy of Article 1484 of the Civil Code to the instant case. As correctly pointed out by
the trial court, the said article applies clearly and solely to the sale of personal property the
price of which is payable in installments. Although Article 1484, paragraph (3) expressly
bars any further action against the purchaser to recover an unpaid balance of the price,
where the vendor opts to foreclose the chattel mortgage on the thing sold, should the
vendee's failure to pay cover two or more installments, this provision is speci cally
applicable to sale on installments.
3. ID.; EQUITY; APPLIED ONLY IN ABSENCE OF STATUTORY LAW OR JUDICIAL
RULES OF PROCEDURE. — To accommodate petitioners' prayer even on the basis of equity
would be to expand the application of the provisions of Article 1484 to situations beyond
its speci c purview, and ignore the language and intent of the Chattel Mortgage Law.
Equity, which has been aptly described as "justice outside legality", is applied only in the
absence of, and never against, statutory law or judicial rules of procedure.
4. REMEDIAL LAW; ACTIONS; APPEALS; PARTIES MAY NOT BRING ON APPEAL
ISSUES NOT RAISED ON TRIAL. — We are also unable to nd merit in petitioners'
submission that the public auction sale is void on grounds of fraud and inadequacy of
price. Petitioners never assailed the validity of the sale in the RTC, and only in the Court of
Appeals did they attempt to prove inadequacy of price through the documents, i.e., the
"Open-End Mortgage on Inventory" and inventory dated March 31, 1980, likewise attached
to their Petition before this Court. Basic is the rule that parties may not bring on appeal
issues that were not raised on trial.AEcIaH

5. ID.; EVIDENCE; PRESUMPTION OF REGULARITY IN CONDUCT OF PUBLIC

SALE; CASE AT BAR. — Furthermore, the mere fact that respondent bank was the sole
bidder for the mortgaged properties in the public sale does not warrant the conclusion
that the transaction was attended with fraud. Fraud is a serious allegation that requires full
and convincing evidence, and may not be inferred from the lone circumstance that it was
only respondent bank that bid in the sale of the foreclosed properties. The sparseness of
petitioners' evidence in this regard leaves Us no discretion but to uphold the presumption
of regularity in the conduct of the public sale.
6. ID.; ID.; FINDINGS OF FACT OF TRIAL COURT ON JOINT AND SOLIDARY
LIABILITY OF PETITIONER CORPORATION IN LOAN AFFIRMED ON APPEAL; CASE AT BAR.
— We likewise a rm private petitioners' joint and several liability with petitioner
corporation in the loan. As found by the trial court and the Court of Appeals, the terms of
the promissory note unmistakably set forth the solidary nature of private petitioners'
commitment. From the foregoing, it is clear that private petitioners intended to bind
themselves solidarily with petitioner PAMECA in the loan. As correctly submitted by
respondent bank, private petitioners are not made to answer for the corporate act of
petitioner PAMECA, but are made liable because they made themselves co-makers with
PAMECA under the promissory note. DACIHc

DECISION

GONZAGA-REYES , J : p

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 Before Us for review on certiorari is the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals
in CA G.R. CV No. 27861, promulgated on April 23, 1992, 1 a rming in toto the decision of
the Regional Trial Court of Makati 2 to award respondent bank's de ciency claim, arising
from a loan secured by chattel mortgage. LLpr

The antecedents of the case are as follows:

On April 17, 1980, petitioner PAMECA Wood Treatment Plant, Inc. (PAMECA)
obtained a loan of US$267,881.67, or the equivalent of P2,000,000.00 from respondent
Bank. By virtue of this loan, petitioner PAMECA, through its President, petitioner Herminio
C. Teves, executed a promissory note for the said amount, promising to pay the loan by
installment. As security for the said loan, a chattel mortgage was also executed over
PAMECA's properties in Dumaguete City, consisting of inventories, furniture and
equipment, to cover the whole value of the loan.
On January 18, 1984, and upon petitioner PAMECA's failure to pay, respondent bank
extrajudicially foreclosed the chattel mortgage, and, as sole bidder in the public auction,
purchased the foreclosed properties for a sum of P322,350.00. On June 29, 1984,
respondent bank led a complaint for the collection of the balance of P4,366,332.46 3 with
Branch 132 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City against petitioner PAMECA and
private petitioners herein, as solidary debtors with PAMECA under the promissory note.
On February 8, 1990, the RTC of Makati rendered a decision on the case, the
dispositive portion of which we reproduce as follows:
"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the defendants to pay
jointly and severally plaintiff the (1) sum of P4,366,332.46 representing the
de ciency claim of the latter as of March 31, 1984, plus 21% interest per annum
and other charges from April 1, 1984 until the whole amount is fully paid and (2)
the costs of the suit. SO ORDERED." 4 cdasia

The Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC decision. Hence, this Petition.
The petition raises the following grounds:
"1. Respondent appellate court gravely erred in not reversing the decision of
the trial court, and in not holding that the public auction sale of petitioner
PAMECA's chattels were tainted with fraud, as the chattels of the said
petitioner were bought by private respondent as sole bidder in only 1/6 of
the market value of the property, hence unconscionable and inequitable,
and therefore null and void.
2. Respondent appellate court gravely erred in not applying by analogy Article
1484 and Article 2115 of the Civil Code by reading the spirit of the law, and
taking into consideration the fact that the contract of loan was a contract
of adhesion.
3. The appellate court gravely erred in holding the petitioners Herminio Teves,
Victoria Teves and Hiram Diday R. Pulido solidarily liable with PAMECA
Wood Treatment Plant, Inc. when the intention of the parties was that the
loan is only for the corporation's benefit."
LLphil

Relative to the rst ground, petitioners contend that the amount of P322,350.00 at
which respondent bank bid for and purchased the mortgaged properties was
unconscionable and inequitable considering that, at the time of the public sale, the
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 mortgaged properties had a total value of more than P2,000,000.00. According to
petitioners, this is evident from an inventory dated March 31, 1980, 5 which valued the
properties at P2,518,621.00, in accordance with the terms of the chattel mortgage
contract 6 between the parties that required that the inventories "be maintained at a level
no less than P2 million". Petitioners argue that respondent bank's act of bidding and
purchasing the mortgaged properties for P322,350.00 or only about 1/6 of their actual
value in a public sale in which it was the sole bidder was fraudulent, unconscionable and
inequitable, and constitutes sufficient ground for the annulment of the auction sale.
To this, respondent bank contends that the above-cited inventory and chattel
mortgage contract were not in fact submitted as evidence before the RTC of Makati, and
that these documents were rst produced by petitioners only when the case was brought
to the Court of Appeals. 7 The Court of Appeals, in turn, disregarded these documents for
petitioners' failure to present them in evidence, or to even allude to them in their
testimonies before the lower court. 8 Instead, respondent court declared that it is not at all
unlikely for the chattels to have su ciently deteriorated as to have fetched such a low
price at the time of the auction sale. 9 Neither did respondent court nd anything irregular
or fraudulent in the circumstance that respondent bank was the sole bidder in the sale, as
all the legal procedures for the conduct of a foreclosure sale have been complied with,
thus giving rise to the presumption of regularity in the performance of public duties. 1 0
Petitioners also question the ruling of respondent court, a rming the RTC, to hold
private petitioners, o cers and stockholders of petitioner PAMECA, liable with PAMECA
for the obligation under the loan obtained from respondent bank, contrary to the doctrine
of separate and distinct corporate personality. 11 Private petitioners contend that they
became signatories to the promissory note "only as a matter of practice by the respondent
bank", that the promissory note was in the nature of a contract of adhesion, and that the
loan was for the benefit of the corporation, PAMECA, alone. 12
Lastly, invoking the equity jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, petitioners submit that
Articles 1484 1 3 and 2115 1 4 of the Civil Code be applied in analogy to the instant case to
preclude the recovery of a deficiency claim. 1 5
Petitioners are not the rst to posit the theory of the applicability of Article 2115 to
foreclosures of chattel mortgage. In the leading case of Ablaza vs. Ignacio, 1 6 the lower
court dismissed the complaint for collection of deficiency judgment in view of Article 2141
of the Civil Code, which provides that the provisions of the Civil Code on pledge shall also
apply to chattel mortgages, insofar as they are not in con ict with the Chattel Mortgage
Law. It was the lower court's opinion that, by virtue of Article 2141, the provisions of Article
2115 which deny the creditor-pledgee the right to recover de ciency in case the proceeds
of the foreclosure sale are less than the amount of the principal obligation, will apply. prcd

This Court reversed the ruling of the lower court and held that the provisions of the
Chattel Mortgage Law regarding the effects of foreclosure of chattel mortgage, being
contrary to the provisions of Article 2115, Article 2115 in relation to Article 2141, may not
be applied to the case.
Section 14 of Act No. 1508, as amended, or the Chattel Mortgage Law, states:
"xxx xxx xxx
The o cer making the sale shall, within thirty days thereafter, make in
writing a return of his doings and le the same in the o ce of the Registry of
Deeds where the mortgage is recorded, and the Register of Deeds shall record the
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 same. The fees of the o cer for selling the property shall be the same as the
case of sale on execution as provided in Act Numbered One Hundred and Ninety,
and the amendments thereto, and the fees of the Register of Deeds for registering
the o cer's return shall be taxed as a part of the costs of sale, which the o cer
shall pay to the Register of Deeds. The return shall particularly describe the
articles sold, and state the amount received for each article, and shall operate as
a discharge of the lien thereon created by the mortgage. The proceeds of such
sale shall be applied to the payment, rst, of the costs and expenses of keeping
and sale, and then to the payment of the demand or obligation secured by such
mortgage, and the residue shall be paid to persons holding subsequent
mortgages in their order, and the balance, after paying the mortgage, shall be paid
to the mortgagor or persons holding under him on demand." (Emphasis supplied)
cdasia

It is clear from the above provision that the effects of foreclosure under the Chattel
Mortgage Law run inconsistent with those of pledge under Article 2115. Whereas, in
pledge, the sale of the thing pledged extinguishes the entire principal obligation, such that
the pledgor may no longer recover proceeds of the sale in excess of the amount of the
principal obligation, Section 14 of the Chattel Mortgage Law expressly entitles the
mortgagor to the balance of the proceeds, upon satisfaction of the principal obligation
and costs.
Since the Chattel Mortgage Law bars the creditor-mortgagee from retaining the
excess of the sale proceeds there is a corollary obligation on the part of the debtor-
mortgagee to pay the de ciency in case of a reduction in the price at public auction. As
explained in Manila Trading and Supply Co. vs. Tamaraw Plantation Co. , 1 7 cited in Ablaza
vs. Ignacio, supra:
"While it is true that section 3 of Act No. 1508 provides that 'a chattel
mortgage is a conditional sale', it further provides that it 'is a conditional sale of
personal property as security for the payment of a debt, or for the performance of
some other obligation speci ed therein.' The lower court overlooked the fact that
the chattels included in the chattel mortgage are only given as security and not as
a payment of the debt, in case of a failure of payment. cdtai

The theory of the lower court would lead to the absurd conclusion that if
the chattels mentioned in the mortgage, given as security, should sell for more
than the amount of the indebtedness secured, that the creditor would be entitled
to the full amount for which it might be sold, even though that amount was
greatly in excess of the indebtedness. Such a result certainly was not
contemplated by the legislature when it adopted Act No. 1508. There seems to be
no reason supporting that theory under the provision of the law. The value of the
chattels changes greatly from time to time, and sometimes very rapidly. If, for
example, the chattels should greatly increase in value and a sale under that
condition should result in largely overpaying the indebtedness, and if the creditor
is not permitted to retain the excess, then the same token would require the debtor
to pay the de ciency in case of a reduction in the price of the chattels between
the date of the contract and a breach of the condition.

Mr. Justice Kent, in the 12th Edition of his Commentaries, as well as other
authors on the question of chattel mortgages, have said, that 'in case of a sale
under a foreclosure of a chattel mortgage, there is no question that the mortgagee
or creditor may maintain an action for the deficiency, if any should occur.' And the
fact that Act No. 1508 permits a private sale, such sale is not, in fact, a
satisfaction of the debt, to any greater extent than the value of the property at the
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 time of the sale. The amount received at the time of the sale, of course, always
requiring good faith and honesty in the sale, is only a payment, pro tanto, and an
action may be maintained for a deficiency in the debt."

We nd no reason to disturb the ruling in Ablaza vs. Ignacio, and the cases
reiterating it. 1 8
Neither do We nd tenable the application by analogy of Article 1484 of the Civil
Code to the instant case. As correctly pointed out by the trial court, the said article applies
clearly and solely to the sale of personal property the price of which is payable in
installments. Although Article 1484, paragraph (3) expressly bars any further action
against the purchaser to recover an unpaid balance of the price, where the vendor opts to
foreclose the chattel mortgage on the thing sold, should the vendee's failure to pay cover
two or more installments, this provision is specifically applicable to a sale on installments.
To accommodate petitioners' prayer even on the basis of equity would be to expand
the application of the provisions of Article 1484 to situations beyond its speci c purview,
and ignore the language and intent of the Chattel Mortgage Law. Equity, which has been
aptly described as "justice outside legality", is applied only in the absence of, and never
against, statutory law or judicial rules of procedure. 1 9
We are also unable to nd merit in petitioners' submission that the public auction
sale is void on grounds of fraud and inadequacy of price. Petitioners never assailed the
validity of the sale in the RTC, and only in the Court of Appeals did they attempt to prove
inadequacy of price through the documents, i.e., the "Open-End Mortgage on Inventory" and
inventory dated March 31, 1980, likewise attached to their Petition before this Court. Basic
is the rule that parties may not bring on appeal issues that were not raised on trial. LLpr

Having nonetheless examined the inventory and chattel mortgage document as part
of the records, We are not convinced that they effectively prove that the mortgaged
properties had a market value of at least P2,000,000.00 on January 18, 1984, the date of
the foreclosure sale. At best, the chattel mortgage contract only indicates the obligation of
the mortgagor to maintain the inventory at a value of at least P2,000,000.00, but does not
evidence compliance therewith. The inventory, in turn, was as of March 31, 1980, or even
prior to April 17, 1980, the date when the parties entered into the contracts of loan and
chattel mortgage, and is far from being an accurate estimate of the market value of the
properties at the time of the foreclosure sale four years thereafter. Thus, even assuming
that the inventory and chattel mortgage contract were duly submitted as evidence before
the trial court, it is clear that they cannot su ce to substantiate petitioners' allegation of
inadequacy of price.
Furthermore, the mere fact that respondent bank was the sole bidder for the
mortgaged properties in the public sale does not warrant the conclusion that the
transaction was attended with fraud. Fraud is a serious allegation that requires full and
convincing evidence, 2 0 and may not be inferred from the lone circumstance that it was
only respondent bank that bid in the sale of the foreclosed properties. The sparseness of
petitioners' evidence in this regard leaves Us no discretion but to uphold the presumption
of regularity in the conduct of the public sale.
We likewise a rm private petitioners' joint and several liability with petitioner
corporation in the loan. As found by the trial court and the Court of Appeals, the terms of
the promissory note unmistakably set forth the solidary nature of private petitioners'
commitment. Thus: cdrep

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 "On or before May 12, 1980, for value received, PAMECA WOOD
TREATMENT PLANT, INC., a corporation organized and existing under the laws of
the Philippines, with principal o ce at 304 El Hogar Filipina Building, San Juan,
Manila, promise to pay to the order of DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE
PHILIPPINES at its o ce located at corner Buendia and Makati Avenues, Makati,
Metro Manila, the principal sum of TWO HUNDRED SIXTY SEVEN THOUSAND
EIGHT HUNDRED AND EIGHTY ONE & 67/100 US DOLLARS (US$267,881.67)
with interest at the rate of three per cent (3%) per annum over DBP's borrowing
rate for these funds. Before the date of maturity, we hereby bind ourselves, jointly
and severally, to make partial payments as follows:"
xxx xxx xxx
"In case of default in the payment of any installment above, we bind
ourselves to pay DBP for advances . . ."
xxx xxx xxx
"We further bind ourselves to pay additional interest and penalty charges
on loan amortizations or portion thereof in arrears as follows:"
xxx xxx xxx

"In addition to the above, we also bind ourselves to pay for bank advances
for insurance premiums, taxes . . ."

xxx xxx xxx

"We further bind ourselves to reimburse DBP on a pro-rata basis for all
costs incurred by DBP on the foreign currency borrowings from where the loan
shall be drawn . . ."
xxx xxx xxx

"In case of non-payment of the amount of this note or any portion of it on

demand, when due, or any other amount or amounts due on account of this note,
the entire obligation shall become due and demandable, and if, for the
enforcement of the payment thereof, the DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE
PHILIPPINES is constrained to entrust the case to its attorneys, we jointly and
severally bind ourselves to pay for attorney's fees as provided for in the mortgage
contract, in addition to the legal fees and other incidental expenses. In the event
of foreclosure of the mortgage securing this note, we further bind ourselves jointly
and severally to pay the deficiency, if any." (Emphasis supplied) 2 1
The promissory note was signed by private petitioners in the following manner: cdll

"PAMECA WOOD TREATMENT PLANT, INC.

By:
(Sgd) HERMINIO G. TEVES
(For himself & as President of above-named corporation)

(Sgd) HIRAM DIDAY PULIDO

(Sgd) VICTORIA V. TEVES" 2 2

From the foregoing, it is clear that private petitioners intended to bind themselves
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 solidarily with petitioner PAMECA in the loan. As correctly submitted by respondent bank,
private petitioners are not made to answer for the corporate act of petitioner PAMECA, but
are made liable because they made themselves co-makers with PAMECA under the
promissory note. LibLex

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Petition is DENIED and the Decision of the Court
of Appeals dated April 23, 1992 in CA G.R. CV No. 27861 is hereby AFFIRMED. Costs
against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Romero, Vitug, Panganiban and Purisima, JJ., concur.

Footnotes
1. Penned by Justice Lorna S. Lombos-dela Fuente, with the concurrence of Justices
Salome A. Montoya and Quirino D. Abad-Santos, Jr.
2. Civil Case No. 7734, Branch 132, presided over by Judge Herminio I. Benito.
3. Representing the deficiency claim of respondent bank, inclusive of interest charges, as of
March 31, 1984.
4. Rollo, 47; Decision of the RTC, 4.
5. Rollo, 11; Annex "F" of the Petition.
6. Ibid., Open-End Mortgage on Inventory, Annex "G" of the Petition, 1.
7. Ibid., 69; Comment of Private Respondents, 2.
8. Ibid., 28; Decision of the Court of Appeals, 3.
9. Ibid.
10. Ibid., 28-29; Decision of the Court of Appeals, 3-4.
11. Ibid., 18-21; Petition, 13-16.
12. Ibid.
13. "Art. 1484. In a contract of sale of personal property the price of which is payable in
installments, the vendor may exercise the following remedies:
(1) Exact fulfillment of the obligation, should the vendee fail to pay;
(2) Cancel the sale, should the vendee’s failure to pay cover two or more
installments;
(3) Foreclose the chattel mortgage on the thing sold, if one has been constituted,
should the vendee’s failure to pay cover two or more installments. In this case,
he shall have no further action against the purchaser to recover any unpaid
balance of the price. Any agreement to the contrary shall be void." (Emphasis
supplied)
14. "Art. 2115. The sale of the thing pledged shall extinguish the principal obligation,
whether or not the proceeds of the sale are equal to the amount of the obligation, interest
and expenses in a proper case. If the price of the sale is more than said amount, the
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 debtor shall not be entitled to the excess, unless otherwise agreed. If the price of the sale
is less, neither shall the creditor be entitled to recover the deficiency notwithstanding any
stipulation to the contrary." (Emphasis supplied)
15. Rollo, 14-18; Petition, 9-13.
16. G.R. No. L-11466, May 23, 1958 (unpublished).
17. 47 Phil. 513.
18. See Garrido vs. Tuason, 133 Phil. 717; Philippine National Bank vs. Manila Investment
and Construction, Inc., 38 SCRA 462.
19. Conte vs. Commission on Audit, 264 SCRA 19; Mendiola vs. Court of Appeals, 258
SCRA 492; Causapin vs. Court of Appeals, 233 SCRA 615.
20. P.T. Cerna Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 221 SCRA 19; Benitez vs. Intermediate
Appellate Court, 154 SCRA 41; Filinvest Corporation vs. Relova, 117 SCRA 420.
21. Rollo, 29-30, 34-35; Annex "C" of the Petition; Decision of the CA, 4-5.
22 Rollo, 35; Annex "C" of the Petition; Decision of the CA, 5.

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