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G.R. No. 207133. March 9, 2015.*


 
SWIRE REALTY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION,
petitioner, vs. JAYNE YU, respondent.

Administrative Agencies; Administrative Proceedings; Appeals;


Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board; The period to appeal
decisions of the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB)
Board of Commissioners is fifteen (15) days from receipt thereof
pursuant to Section 15 of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 957 and
Section 2 of PD No. 1344 which are special laws that provide an
exception to Section 1 of Administrative Order (AO) No. 18.—The
period to appeal

_______________

*  THIRD DIVISION.

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136 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED


Swire Realty Development Corporation vs. Yu

the decision of the HLURB Board of Commissioners to the Office


of the President has long been settled in the case of SGMC Realty
Corporation v. Office of the President, 339 SCRA 275 (2000), as
reiterated in the cases of Maxima Realty Management and
Development Corporation v. Parkway Real Estate Development
Corporation, 422 SCRA 572 (2004) and United Overseas Bank
Philippines, Inc. v. Ching, 486 SCRA 655 (2006). In the
aforementioned cases, we ruled that the period to appeal decisions of
the HLURB Board of Commissioners is fifteen (15) days from receipt
thereof pursuant to Section 15 of PD No. 957 and Section 2 of PD No.
1344 which are special laws that provide an exception to Section 1 of
Administrative Order No. 18.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Section 1 of Administrative Order
(AO) No. 18 provides that the time during which a motion for
reconsideration has been pending with the ministry or agency
concerned shall be deducted from the period for appeal.—
Concomitantly, Section 1 of Administrative Order No. 18 provides that
the time during which a motion for reconsideration has been pending
with the ministry or agency concerned shall be deducted from the
period for appeal. Petitioner received the HLURB Board Resolution
denying its Motion for Reconsideration on July 23, 2007 and filed its
appeal only on August 7, 2007. Consequently therefore, petitioner had
only four days from July 23, 2007, or until July 27, 2007, within which
to file its appeal to the OP as the filing of the motion for
reconsideration merely suspended the running of the 15-day period.
However, records reveal that petitioner only appealed to the OP on
August 7, 2007, or eleven days late. Ergo, the HLURB Board of
Commissioners’ decision had become final and executory on account
of the fact that petitioner did not promptly appeal with the OP.
Procedural Rules and Technicalities; Time and again, we have
held that rules of procedure exist for a noble purpose, and to disregard
such rules, in the guise of liberal construction, would be to defeat such
purpose. Procedural rules are not to be disdained as mere
technicalities.—In an avuncular case, we have held that while the
dismissal of an appeal on purely technical grounds is concededly
frowned upon, it bears emphasizing that the procedural requirements
of the rules on appeal are not harmless and trivial technicalities that
litigants can just discard and disregard at will. Neither being a natural
right nor a part of due process, the rule is settled that the right to
appeal is merely a statutory privilege which may be exercised only in
the manner and in accordance with the provisions

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Swire Realty Development Corporation vs. Yu
of the law. Time and again, we have held that rules of procedure
exist for a noble purpose, and to disregard such rules, in the guise of
liberal construction, would be to defeat such purpose. Procedural rules
are not to be disdained as mere technicalities. They may not be ignored
to suit the convenience of a party. The reason for the liberal application
of the rules before quasi-judicial agencies cannot be used to perpetuate
injustice and hamper the just resolution of the case. Neither is the rule
on liberal construction a license to disregard the rules of procedure.
Civil Law; Obligations; Rescission; Basic is the rule that the
right of rescission of a party to an obligation under Article 1191 of the
Civil Code is predicated on a breach of faith by the other party who
violates the reciprocity between them.—Basic is the rule that the right
of rescission of a party to an obligation under Article 1191 of the Civil
Code is predicated on a breach of faith by the other party who violates
the reciprocity between them. The breach contemplated in the said
provision is the obligor’s failure to comply with an existing obligation.
When the obligor cannot comply with what is incumbent upon it, the
obligee may seek rescission and, in the absence of any just cause for
the court to determine the period of compliance, the court shall decree
the rescission.
Same; Same; Same; The delay in the completion of the project as
well as of the delay in the delivery of the unit are breaches of statutory
and contractual obligations which entitle respondent to rescind the
contract, demand a refund and payment of damages.—It is evident that
the report on the ocular inspection conducted on the subject
condominium project and subject unit shows that the amenities under
the approved plan have not yet been provided as of May 3, 2002, and
that the subject unit has not been delivered to respondent as of August
28, 2002, which is beyond the period of development of December
1999 under the license to sell. Incontrovertibly, petitioner had incurred
delay in the performance of its obligation amounting to breach of
contract as it failed to finish and deliver the unit to respondent within
the stipulated period. The delay in the completion of the project as well
as of the delay in the delivery of the unit are breaches of statutory and
contractual obligations which entitle respondent to rescind the
contract, demand a refund and payment of damages.

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138 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Swire Realty Development Corporation vs. Yu

PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and


resolution of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
  Gordon, Dario, Reyes, Buted, Hocson, Viado, Blanco Law
Offices for petitioner.
  Fernandez & Associates Law Firm for respondent.

 
PERALTA, J.:
 
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure which seeks to reverse and
set aside the Decision1 dated January 24, 2013 and Resolution2
dated April 30, 2013 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in C.A.-G.R.
S.P. No. 121175.
The facts follow.
Respondent Jayne Yu and petitioner Swire Realty
Development Corporation entered into a Contract to Sell on
July 25, 1995 covering one residential condominium unit,
specifically Unit 3007 of the Palace of Makati, located at P.
Burgos corner Caceres Sts., Makati City, with an area of 137.30
square meters for the total contract price of P7,519,371.80,
payable in equal monthly installments until September 24,
1997. Respondent likewise purchased a parking slot in the same
condominium building for P600,000.00.
On September 24, 1997, respondent paid the full purchase
price of P7,519,371.80 for the unit while making a down
payment of P20,000.00 for the parking lot. However,
notwithstanding full payment of the contract price, petitioner
failed to complete and deliver the subject unit on time. This
prompted respondent to file a Complaint for Rescission of

_______________

1  Penned by Associate Justice Japar B. Dimaampao, with Associate Justices


Elihu A. Ybañez and Edwin D. Sorongon, concurring; Rollo, pp. 43-52.
2  Id., at pp. 54-55.
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Swire Realty Development Corporation vs. Yu

Contract with Damages before the Housing and Land Use


Regulatory Board (HLURB) Expanded National Capital Region
Field Office (ENCRFO).
On October 19, 2004, the HLURB ENCRFO rendered a
Decision3 dismissing respondent’s complaint. It ruled that
rescission is not permitted for slight or casual breach of the
contract but only for such breaches as are substantial and
fundamental as to defeat the object of the parties in making the
agreement. It disposed of the case as follows:

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, judgment is hereby


rendered ordering [petitioner] the following:
1. To finish the subject unit as pointed out in the inspection Report;
2. To pay [respondent] the following:
a. the amount of P100,000 as compensatory damages for the minor
irreversible defects in her unit [respondent], or, in the alternative,
conduct the necessary repairs on the subject unit to conform to the
intended specifications;
b. moral damages of P20,000.00; and
c. Attorney’s fees of P20,000.00.
On the other hand, [respondent] is hereby directed to immediately
update her account insofar as the parking slot is concerned, without
interest, surcharges or penalties charged therein.
All other claims and counterclaims are hereby dismissed for lack of
merit.
IT IS SO ORDERED.4

 
Respondent then elevated the matter to the HLURB Board
of Commissioners.

_______________

3  Id., at pp. 75-79.


4  Id., at pp. 78-79.
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140 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED


Swire Realty Development Corporation vs. Yu

In a Decision5 dated March 30, 2006, the HLURB Board of


Commissioners reversed and set aside the ruling of the HLURB
ENCRFO and ordered the rescission of the Contract to Sell,
ratiocinating:

We find merit in the appeal. The report on the ocular inspection


conducted on the subject condominium project and subject unit shows
that the amenities under the approved plan have not yet been provided
as of May 3, 2002, and that the subject unit has not been delivered to
[respondent] as of August 28, 2002, which is beyond the period of
development of December 1999 under the license to sell. The delay in
the completion of the project as well as of the delay in the delivery of
the unit are breaches of statutory and contractual obligations which
entitles [respondent] to rescind the contract, demand a refund and
payment of damages.
The delay in the completion of the project in accordance with the
license to sell also renders [petitioner] liable for the payment of
administrative fine.
Wherefore, the decision of the Office below is set aside and a new
decision is rendered as follows:
1. Declaring the contract to sell as rescinded and directing
[petitioner] to refund to [respondent] the amount of P7,519,371.80 at
6% per annum from the time of extrajudicial demand on January 05,
2001: subject to computation and payment of the correct filing fee;
2. Directing [petitioner] to pay respondent attorney’s fees in the
amount of P20,000.00;
3. Directing [petitioner] to pay an administrative fine of P10,000.00
for violation of Section 20, in relation to Section 38 of P.D. 957.
SO ORDERED.6

_______________

5  Id., at pp. 66-68.


6  Id., at pp. 67-68.
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Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but the same was


denied by the HLURB Board of Commissioners in a
Resolution7 dated June 14, 2007.
Unfazed, petitioner appealed to the Office of the President
(OP) on August 7, 2007.
In a Decision8 dated November 21, 2007, the OP, through
then Deputy Executive Secretary Manuel Gaite, dismissed
petitioner’s appeal on the ground that it failed to promptly file
its appeal before the OP. It held:

Records show that [petitioner] received its copy of the 30 March


2006 HLURB Decision on 17 April 2006 and instead of filing an
appeal, it opted first to file a Motion for Reconsideration on 28 April
2006 or eleven (11) days thereafter. The said motion interrupted the
15-day period to appeal.
On 23 July 2007, [petitioner] received the HLURB Resolution
dated 14 June 2007 denying the Motion for Reconsideration.
Based on the ruling in United Overseas Bank Philippines, Inc. v.
Ching (486 SCRA 655), the period to appeal decisions of the HLURB
Board of Commissioners to the Office of the President is 15 days from
receipt thereof pursuant to Section 15 of P.D. No. 957 and Section 2 of
P.D. No. 1344 which are special laws that provide an exception to
Section 1 of Administrative Order No. 18.
Corollary thereto, par. 2, Section 1 of Administrative Order No. 18,
Series of 1987 provides that:
The time during which a motion for reconsideration has been
pending with the Ministry/Agency concerned shall be deducted from
the period of appeal. But where such a motion for reconsideration has
been filed during office hours of the last day of the period

_______________

7  Id., at pp. 71-73.


8  Id., at pp. 80-82.
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142 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED


Swire Realty Development Corporation vs. Yu

herein provided, the appeal must be made within the day following
receipt of the denial of said motion by the appealing party.
(Underscoring supplied)
x x x x
Accordingly, the [petitioner] had only four (4) days from receipt on
23 July 2007 of HLURB Resolution dated 14 June 2007, or until 27
July 2007 to file the Notice of Appeal before this Office. However,
[petitioner] filed its appeal only on 7 August 2007 or eleven (11) days
late.
Thus, this Office need not delve on the merits of the appeal filed as
the records clearly show that the said appeal was filed out of time.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, [petitioner]’s appeal is
hereby DISMISSED, and the HLURB Decision dated 30 March 2006
and HLURB Resolution dated 14 June 2007 are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.9

 
Immediately thereafter, petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration against said decision.
In a Resolution10 dated February 17, 2009, the OP, through
then Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita, granted petitioner’s
motion and set aside Deputy Executive Secretary Gaite’s
decision. It held that after a careful and thorough evaluation and
study of the records of the case, the OP was more inclined to
agree with the earlier decision of the HLURB ENCRFO as it
was more in accord with facts, law and jurisprudence relevant
to the case. Thus:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Motion for


Reconsideration is hereby GRANTED. The Decision and Resolution
of the HLURB Third Division Board of Commissioners, dated March
30, 2006 and June 14, 2007, respectively, are hereby SET ASIDE, and
the

_______________
9   Id., at pp. 81-82. (Emphasis in the original)
10  Id., at pp. 56-61.

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HLURB ENCRFO Decision dated October 19, 2004 is hereby


REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.11

 
Respondent sought reconsideration of said resolution,
however, the same was denied by the OP in a Resolution12
dated August 18, 2011.
Consequently, respondent filed an appeal to the CA.
In a Decision dated January 24, 2013, the CA granted
respondent’s appeal and reversed and set aside the Order of the
OP. The fallo of its decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed


Resolution dated 17 February 2009 and Order dated 18 August 2011 of
the Office of the President, in O.P. Case No. 07-H-283, are hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the Decision dated 30
March 2006 and Resolution dated 14 June 2007 of the HLURB Board
of Commissioners in HLURB Case No. REM-A-050127-0014, are
REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.13

 
Petitioner moved for reconsideration, however, the CA
denied the same in a Resolution dated April 30, 2013.
Hence, the present petition wherein petitioner raises the
following grounds to support its petition:

THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN IGNORING


THE LEGAL PRECEPTS THAT:
A. TECHNICAL RULES ARE NOT BINDING UPON
ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES; and
B. RESCISSION WILL BE ORDERED ONLY WHERE THE
BREACH COMPLAINED OF IS SUBSTANTIAL AS TO DEFEAT
THE OBJECT

_______________

11  Id., at p. 61.  (Emphasis in the original)


12  Id., at pp. 62-64.
13  Id., at p. 51.  (Emphasis in the original)

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Swire Realty Development Corporation vs. Yu

OF THE PARTIES IN ENTERING INTO THE AGREEMENT.14

 
In essence, the issues are: (1) whether petitioner’s appeal
was timely filed before the OP; and (2) whether rescission of
the contract is proper in the instant case.
We shall resolve the issues in seriatim.
First, the period to appeal the decision of the HLURB Board
of Commissioners to the Office of the President has long been
settled in the case of SGMC Realty Corporation v. Office of the
President,15 as reiterated in the cases of Maxima Realty
Management and Development Corporation v. Parkway Real
Estate Development Corporation16 and United Overseas Bank
Philippines, Inc. v. Ching.17
In the aforementioned cases, we ruled that the period to
appeal decisions of the HLURB Board of Commissioners is
fifteen (15) days from receipt thereof pursuant to Section 1518
of PD No. 95719

_______________

14  Id., at p. 23.
15  393 Phil. 697; 339 SCRA 275 (2000).
16  467 Phil. 190; 422 SCRA 572 (2004).
17  521 Phil. 146; 486 SCRA 655 (2006).
18   Section 15. Decision.—The case shall be decided within thirty (30)
days from the time the same is submitted for decision. The Decision may order
the revocation of the registration of the subdivision or condominium project, the
suspension, cancellation, or revocation of the license to sell and/or forfeiture, in
whole or in part, of the performance bond mentioned in Section 6 hereof. In
case forfeiture of the bond is ordered, the Decision may direct the provincial or
city engineer to undertake or cause the construction of roads and other
requirements for the subdivision or condominium as stipulated in the bond,
chargeable to the amount forfeited. Such decision shall be immediately
executory and shall become final after the lapse of 15 days from the date of
receipt of the Decision.
19  Regulating the Sale of Subdivision Lots and Condominiums, Providing
Penalties for Violations Thereof.

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and Section 220 of PD No. 134421 which are special laws


that provide an exception to Section 1 of Administrative Order
No. 18. Thus, in the SGMC Realty Corporation v. Office of the
President case, the Court explained:

As pointed out by public respondent, the aforecited administrative


order allows aggrieved party to file its appeal with the Office of the
President within thirty (30) days from receipt of the decision
complained of. Nonetheless, such thirty-day period is subject to the
qualification that there are no other statutory periods of appeal
applicable. If there are special laws governing particular cases which
provide for a shorter or longer reglementary period, the same shall
prevail over the thirty-day period provided for in the administrative
order. This is in line with the rule in statutory construction that an
administrative rule or regulation, in order to be valid, must not
contradict but conform to the provisions of the enabling law.
We note that indeed there are special laws that mandate a shorter
period of fifteen (15) days within which to appeal a case to public
respondent. First, Section 15 of Presidential Decree No. 957 provides
that the decisions of the National Housing Authority (NHA) shall
become final and executory after the lapse of fifteen (15) days from the
date of receipt of the decision. Second, Section 2 of Presidential
Decree No. 1344 states that decisions of the National Housing
Authority shall become final and executory after the lapse of fifteen
(15) days from the date of its receipt. The latter decree provides that
the

_______________

20   Section 2. The decision of the National Housing Authority shall


become final and executory after the lapse of fifteen (15) days from the date of
its receipt. It is appealable only to the President of the Philippines and in the
event the appeal is filed and the decision is not reversed and/or amended within
a period of thirty (30) days, the decision is deemed affirmed. Proof of the appeal
of the decision must be furnished the National Housing Authority.
21  Empowering the National Housing Authority to Issue Writ of Execution
in the Enforcement of its Decision Under Presidential Decree No. 957.

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Swire Realty Development Corporation vs. Yu

decisions of the NHA is appealable only to the Office of the


President. Further, we note that the regulatory functions of NHA
relating to housing and land development has been transferred to
Human Settlements Regulatory Commission, now known as HLURB.
x x x22

 
Records show that petitioner received a copy of the HLURB
Board of Commissioners’ decision on April 17, 2006.
Correspondingly, it had fifteen days from April 17, 2006 within
which to file its appeal or until May 2, 2006. However, on April
28, 2006, or eleven days after receipt of the HLURB Board of
Commissioner’s decision, it filed a Motion for Reconsideration,
instead of an appeal.
Concomitantly, Section 1 of Administrative Order No. 1823
provides that the time during which a motion for
reconsideration has been pending with the ministry or agency
concerned shall be deducted from the period for appeal.
Petitioner received the HLURB Board Resolution denying its
Motion for Reconsideration on July 23, 2007 and filed its
appeal only on August 7, 2007. Consequently therefore,
petitioner had only four days from July 23, 2007, or until July
27, 2007, within which to file its appeal to the OP as the filing
of the motion for reconsideration merely suspended the running
of the 15-day period. However, records reveal that petitioner
only appealed to the OP on August 7, 2007, or eleven days late.
Ergo, the HLURB Board of Commissioners’ decision had
become final and executory on account of the fact that
petitioner did not promptly appeal with the OP.
In like manner, we find no cogent reason to exempt
petitioner from the effects of its failure to comply with the
rules.
In an avuncular case, we have held that while the dismissal
of an appeal on purely technical grounds is concededly

_______________

22  SGMC Realty Corporation v. Office of the President, supra note 15 at pp.


703-704; pp. 279-280.
23  Prescribing Rules and Regulations Governing Appeals to the Office of
the President of the Philippines.

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frowned upon, it bears emphasizing that the procedural


requirements of the rules on appeal are not harmless and trivial
technicalities that litigants can just discard and disregard at will.
Neither being a natural right nor a part of due process, the rule
is settled that the right to appeal is merely a statutory privilege
which may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance
with the provisions of the law.24
Time and again, we have held that rules of procedure exist
for a noble purpose, and to disregard such rules, in the guise of
liberal construction, would be to defeat such purpose.
Procedural rules are not to be disdained as mere technicalities.
They may not be ignored to suit the convenience of a party.25
The reason for the liberal application of the rules before quasi-
judicial agencies cannot be used to perpetuate injustice and
hamper the just resolution of the case. Neither is the rule on
liberal construction a license to disregard the rules of
procedure.26
Thus, while there may be exceptions for the relaxation of
technical rules principally geared to attain the ends of justice,
petitioner’s fatuous belief that it had a fresh 15-day period to
elevate an appeal with the OP is not the kind of exceptional
circumstance that merits relaxation.
Second, Article 1191 of the Civil Code sanctions the right to
rescind the obligation in the event that specific performance
becomes impossible, to wit:

Article 1191. The power to rescind obligations is implied in


reciprocal ones, in case one of the obligors should not comply with
what is incumbent upon him.
The injured party may choose between the fulfillment and the
rescission of the obligation, with the pay-

_______________

24   J. Tiosejo Investment Corp. v. Ang, G.R. No. 174149, September 8,


2010, 630 SCRA 334, 343.
25  Po v. Dampal, 622 Phil. 523, 529; 608 SCRA 627, 634 (2009).
26  Loon v. Power Master, Inc., G.R. No. 189404, December 11, 2013, 712
SCRA 440, 453.

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Swire Realty Development Corporation vs. Yu

ment of damages in either case. He may also seek rescission, even


after he has chosen fulfillment, if the latter should become impossible.
The court shall decree the rescission claimed, unless there be just
cause authorizing the fixing of a period.
This is understood to be without prejudice to the rights of third
persons who have acquired the thing, in accordance with Articles 1385
and 1388 and the Mortgage Law.

 
Basic is the rule that the right of rescission of a party to an
obligation under Article 1191 of the Civil Code is predicated on
a breach of faith by the other party who violates the reciprocity
between them. The breach contemplated in the said provision is
the obligor’s failure to comply with an existing obligation.
When the obligor cannot comply with what is incumbent upon
it, the obligee may seek rescission and, in the absence of any
just cause for the court to determine the period of compliance,
the court shall decree the rescission.27
In the instant case, the CA aptly found that the completion
date of the condominium unit was November 1998 pursuant to
License No. 97-12-3202 dated November 2, 1997 but was
extended to December 1999 as per License to Sell No. 99-05-
3401 dated May 8, 1999. However, at the time of the ocular
inspection conducted by the HLURB ENCRFO, the unit was
not yet completely finished as the kitchen cabinets and fixtures
were not yet installed and the agreed amenities were not yet
available. Said inspection report states:

May 3, 2002:
1. The unit of the [respondent] is Unit 3007, which was labeled as
P2-07, at the Palace of Makati, located at the corner of P. Burgos Street
and Caceres Street, Poblacion, Makati City. Based on the approved
plans, the said unit is at the 26th Floor.

_______________

27   Velarde v. Court of Appeals, 413 Phil. 360, 373; 361 SCRA 56, 68
(2001).

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Swire Realty Development Corporation vs. Yu
2. During the time of inspection, the said unit appears to be
completed except for the installation of kitchen cabinets and fixtures.
3. Complainant pinpointed to the undersigned the deficiencies as
follows:
a. The delivered unit has high density fiber (HDF) floorings instead
of narra wood parquet.
b. The [petitioners] have also installed baseboards as borders
instead of pink porrino granite boarders.
c. Walls are newly painted by the respondent and the alleged
obvious signs of cladding could not be determined.
d. Window opening at the master bedroom conforms to the
approved plans. As a result it leaves a 3 inches (sic) gap between the
glass window and partitioning of the master’s bedroom.
e. It was verified and confirmed that a square column replaced the
round column, based on the approved plans.
f. At the time of inspection, amenities such as swimming pool and
change room are seen at the 31st floor only. These amenities are
reflected on the 27th  floor plan of the approved condominium plans.
Health spa for men and women, Shiatsu Massage Room, Two-Level
Sky Palace Restaurant and Hall for games and entertainments, replete
with billiard tables, a bar, indoor golf with spectacular deck and
karaoke rooms were not yet provided by the [petitioner].
g. The [master’s] bedroom door bore sign of poor quality of
workmanship as seen below.
h. The stairs have been installed in such manner acceptable to the
undersigned.
i. Bathrooms and powder room have been installed in such manner
acceptable to the undersigned.28

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28  Rollo, pp. 76-77.

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Swire Realty Development Corporation vs. Yu
From the foregoing, it is evident that the report on the ocular
inspection conducted on the subject condominium project and
subject unit shows that the amenities under the approved plan
have not yet been provided as of May 3, 2002, and that the
subject unit has not been delivered to respondent as of August
28, 2002, which is beyond the period of development of
December 1999 under the license to sell. Incontrovertibly,
petitioner had incurred delay in the performance of its
obligation amounting to breach of contract as it failed to finish
and deliver the unit to respondent within the stipulated period.
The delay in the completion of the project as well as of the
delay in the delivery of the unit are breaches of statutory and
contractual obligations which entitle respondent to rescind the
contract, demand a refund and payment of damages.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is
DENIED. The Decision dated January 24, 2013 and Resolution
dated April 30, 2013 of the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. S.P.
No. 121175 are hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION
that moral damages be awarded in the amount of P20,000.00.
SO ORDERED.

Velasco, Jr. (Chairperson), Villarama, Jr., Reyes and


Jardeleza, JJ., concur.

Petition denied, judgment and resolution affirmed with


modification.

Notes.—The general rule is that in the absence of a


stipulation, a party cannot unilaterally and extrajudicially
rescind a contract. (Philnico Industrial Corporation vs.
Privatization and Management Office, 733 SCRA 703 [2014])
Generally, the power to rescind obligations is implied in
reciprocal ones, in case one of the obligors should not comply
with what is incumbent on him. (Cabrera vs. Ysaac, 740 SCRA
612 [2014])
——o0o——
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