BLOCK B 2015

ACADEMICS
COMMITTEE
 TABLE OF CONTENTS
page
PART 1: Introduction; History and Basic Concepts
1 A. Preliminary Readings
2 B. Constitutional Basis
5 C. Local Government, Decentralization, Autonomy
8 D. Local Governments, Administrative Regions, Autonomous Regions
11 1. Effectivity of the Code

PART 2: General Provisions

Title ONE: Basic Principles

12 A. Policy and Application
13 B. Rules of Interpretation
C. General Powers and Attributes
15 1. Creation of LGUs
18 2. De Facto Corporations
19 3. Plebiscite
21 4. Downgrading, Division, Merger
21 5. Abolition
22 6. Income
23 7. Population
23 8. Sub Provinces
24 D. Selection and Transfer of Local Government Site
25 E. Political and Corporate Nature of LGUs
27 F. General Welfare Clause
33 G. Basic Services and Facilities
38 H. Eminent Domain
42 I. Reclassification of Lands
44 J. Closure and Opening of Roads
46 K. Corporate Powers
49 L. Authority to Negotiate and Secure Grants
49 M. Liability for Damages
53 N. Intergovernmental Relationship – National Government
55 O. Consultations
57 P. Relations with PNP
59 Q. Inter-Local Government Relationship
61 R. Relationship with People’s and Non-Governmental Organizations
61 S. Local Prequalification, Biddings, and Awards Committee

Title TWO: Elective Officials

A. Qualifications and Elections
62 1. Members of the Sanggunian
63 2. Qualifications
70 3. Disqualifications
75 B. Term of Office

82 Supplementary Notes: The Electoral Remedies

 Sources:

B2015 Class Case Digest

B2015 Class Notes
The Local Government Code, by Aquilino Pimentel
UP Law Political Law Bar Reviewer
2009 LocGov Reviewer
D2014 LocGov Reviewer

Supplementary Documents:

B2015 Weekly Digest Compilations

Compilation of Special Laws for the Midterm Exams

Prepared By:

B2015 Academics Committee – LocGov Reviewer Ops

 PART 1 INTRODUCTION: HISTORY AND BASIC CONCEPTS
Taken from the 2009 Reviewer
PRELIMINARY READINGS
THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE OF
1991: KEY TO NATIONAL
DEVELOPMENT
BY PIMENTEL, AQUILINO JR1.
The Local Government Code (LGC) is a revolutionary piece of legislation
because it uproots decades of highly centralized decision-making in the
country and places upon local officials a major portion of the
responsibility for the modernization of the local communities.
- Substantial powers are granted to the LGUs

Devolution is the key to development. Before, the countryside was

highly dependent on the central government. With power devolved to
LGUs, they now have the power and money to respond more rapidly to
people’s needs and provide basic amenities without depending on the
central government.

The LGC devolves substantial powers to LGUs so that eventually, they

may develop their own localities at their own pace, with their own
resources at their own discretion.

Constitutional basis of LGC

- LGUs now more self-governing and can chart the course of
their own development (Sec. 2, Art. X)
- The President shall exercise general supervision, not control
(Sec. 4)
- LGUs have taxing power (Sec. 5)
- LGUs share in national tax increased (Sec. 6)
- Before, GOCCs did not pay LGUs for use and development of
natural resources, Now, LGUs are paid substantially (Sec. 7)
- The term of office of elective officials shortened from four to
3 years (Sec. 8)
- Sectoral representatives in Sanggunians (Sec. 9)
- Manner of creation of LGUs provided by the Code (Sec. 10)
- Power to create special metropolitan political subdivisions
granted to Congress (Sec. 11)
 But no such political subdivision has been created
 Metropolitan Manila was created during Martial Law
- Code classifies cities into highly urbanized, independent
component, and component cities (Sec. 12)
- LGUs may group together for beneficial purposes (Sec. 13)
- LGUs relate to the Regional Development Council in matters
concerning their own development (Sec. 14)

DECENTRALIZATION: RETHINKING GOVERNMENT

WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1999/2000,
WORLD BANK2
The success of decentralization depends on its design.

The success (or failure of decentralization) affects:

1. Political Stability
 When a country is divided along geographic or ethnic
lines, decentralization provides an institutional
mechanism for bringing opposition groups into a formal
rule-bound bargaining process

1
Taken from the D2014 Reviewer
2
 2. Public Service Performance
 Arguments for decentralization
 It increases efficiency and responsiveness of
government because:
a. Local elected leaders know their
constituents better than national
authorities
b. Physical proximity makes it easier for
citizens to hold local officials accountable
for performance
 It creates competition among local
governments to better satisfy citizen’s needs if
population is mobile
a. But supporting evidence is scanty because
the causal relationships are difficult to
prove
 Thus, how decentralization affects access and quality
of public service depends on the way it is designed
and implemented
 What local governments can achieve depend on
resources and responsibilities they are given
and the power of national governments to
override local government decisions

3. Equity
 Whether decentralization exacerbates income
differences depends on 2 factors:
a. Horizontal equity – the local government’s
capacity to generate funds so as to be able to
deliver an equivalent level of services to their
population
b. Within-state equity – the local government’s
willingness to redistribute income within its
borders
 As the cost of providing public service vary, most
decentralized fiscal systems include equalization
grants. A difficulty with these grants is that local
governments may differ in their willingness to raise
taxes. Grants create an incentive to understate their
tax bases or relative wealth in order to maximize
transfers
 In most countries, inequality is due more to
differences among individuals within a province than
among provinces. Thus, even dramatic redistribution
among regions will have limited results unless
targeting is improved within regions themselves.
This, in turn depends on the ability and willingness of
local governments to engage in redistribution
 Thus, the success in targeting the poor requires a
combination of national and subnational efforts

4. Macroeconomic stability
 Fiscal decentralization reduces the national
government’s control over public resources. Deficit
spending by local governments can also thwart
national government efforts to cool the economy by
restraining public expenditures
 When revenues are decentralized before expenditure
responsibilities, national governments are forced to
maintain spending level within a smaller resource
base, resulting in large deficits. By separating taxing
and spending powers local governments incur only a
fraction of the political and financial costs of their
expenditure

A system based on rules produces better results than one that is not.
Explicit rules setting out the division of functional responsibility
among levels of government reduce ambiguity and increase political
accountability.
 PARABLES AND PARADOXES IN DEVOLUTION
BY ALECKS P. PABICO CONSTITUTIONAL BASIS3
The LGC gave many “talents” to local governments to either nurture or
squander: The authority of local governments has both constitutional and
1. It mandated the transfer of the responsibility for the delivery statutory basis, as provided for in Art. X, 1987 Constitution, the
of basic services, including appropriate personnel, assets, Administrative Code, and the LGC.
equipment, programs, and projects to LGUs
2. It increased the financial resources available to local The LGC (RA 7160) operationalizes Art. X, 1987 Constitution.
governments by broadening their taxing powers and
increasing their internal revenue allotments (IRA)
3. It provided the legal and institutional infrastructure for Sec. 1. The territorial and political subdivisions of the Republic of the
expanded participation of civil society in local governance Philippines are the provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays.
(like NGOs and People’s Organizations) There shall be autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and the
Cordilleras as hereinafter provided.
However, even “successful” local governments have yet to reach the
point where they are already able to contribute to national The LGUs
development. That can be traced in part to the flaws in the Code, as well - The Republic is divided into territorial and political
as its implementation, among them the lack of fund resources to meet subdivisions called local government units:
all the budgetary requirements of the functions, programs, and projects 1. Provinces
2. Cities
devolved to the LGUs.
3. Municipalities
4. Barangays
- Can Congress create another territorial and political
subdivision such as a Luzon Region? Pimentel believes that it
cannot since the list is exclusive

The Autonomous Regions

- In addition to the 4 types of subdivisions, the Constitution
mandates the creation of 2 autonomous regions:
1. One for Muslim Mindanao
2. One for the Cordilleras
- Of the 2, only the ARMM was approved in a plebiscite

Nature of LGUs
- It is a political subdivision of the State which is constituted
by law and possessed o substantial control over its own
affairs
- An intra-sovereign subdivision of one sovereign nation
 Not intended to be an imperium in imperio
- Autonomous in a sense that it is given more powers,
authority, responsibilities and resources

Sec. 2. The territorial and political subdivisions shall enjoy local

autonomy.

All LGUs, by constitutional fiat are vested with local autonomy

- Local autonomy means “a more responsive and accountable
local government structure instituted through a system of
decentralization
- It does nothing more than to break up the monopoly of the
national government over the affairs of local governments
 It is not meant to end the relation of partnership and
interdependence between central administration and
LGU
 It does not usher in a regime of federalism

Decentralization is NOT Federalism

- Decentralization is a decision by the central government
authorizing its subordinates, whether geographically or
functionally defined, to exercise authority in certain areas
 Decision-making by sub-national units
 Typically delegated
- Differs from federalism in that the sub-units that have been
authorized by delegation do not possess any claim of right
against the national government

3 This is not part of the Syllabus but the Reviewer Committee thought it best to
include a discussion on the Constitutional basis of local governments
LGUs as Agents of national government
LGUs have the power to create sources of revenue
- National government did not relinquish all its powers over
- They now have taxing powers
LGUs; Only administrative powers or local affairs are
- Power to create sources of revenue is a means to spur
delegated
development
- Purpose of delegation is to make governance more directly
responsive and effective at local levels
- Policy-setting for the entire country still lies with the Sec. 6. Local government units shall have a just share, as determined
President and Congress by law, in the national taxes which shall be automatically released to
them.
Not Self-Executing
Share in National Taxes and Fiscal Autonomy
- Local autonomy is not self-executing
- The LGUs’ share in the national taxes has been increased
- It is subject to, among other things, the passage of a LGC, a
- They also enjoy fiscal autonomy
local tax law, income distribution legislation, a national
 This means that LGUs have the power to create their
representation law, and measures designed to realize
own sources of revenue in addition to their just share in
autonomy at the local level (Ganzon v. CA)
the national taxes, as well as the power to allocate their
resources in accordance with their own priorities
Sec. 3. The Congress shall enact a local government code which shall - Requisites before the President may interfere in local
provide for a more responsive and accountable local government matters:
structure instituted through a system of decentralization with effective 1. An unmanaged public sector deficit of the national
mechanism of recall, initiative and referendum, allocate among the government
different local government units their powers, responsibilities and 2. Consultations with the presiding officers of the Senate
resources, and provide for the qualifications, election, appointment and the House of Representatives and the presidents of
and removal, term, salaries, powers and functions, and duties of local the various local leagues
officials, and all other matters relating to the organization and 3. Corresponding recommendation of the secretaries of
operation of local units. the DOF, DILG, DBM
Comprehensive Code – the LGC covers farranging matters.
Automatic Release and the IRA
- Pimentel, Jr. v. Aguirre – a basic feature of local fiscal
Sec. 4. The President of the Philippines shall exercise general
autonomy is the automatic release of the shares of LGUs in
supervision over local governments. Provinces with respect to
the national internal revenue
component cities and municipalities, and cities and municipalities with
 Mandated by the Constitution
respect to component barangays shall ensure that the acts of their
 LGC also says that the release SHALL be made directly
component units are within the scope of their prescribed powers and
to the LGU concerned within 5 days after every quarter
functions.
of the year and SHALL NOT be subject to any lien or
Presidential Power of Supervision holdback that may be imposed by the national
- Power of President is now limited to supervision, not control government for whatever purpose
 He has to exercise this power through provinces when  NOTE: Any retention is prohibited, even if it be
he deals with component cities and municipalities and temporary
through the latter when he deals with barangays - IRA is part of LGU’s Income – as held in Alvarez v. Guingona,
 LGC defines income as all revenues and receipts
Meaning of General Supervision collected or received forming the gross accretions of
- President exercises general supervision but only to ensure funds of the LGUs
that local affairs are administered according to law  IRAs are part of income because they form part of the
 He cannot substitute his judgments with his own gross accretion of the funds of the LGU
- Supervision = overseeing or the authority of an officer to see  IRA automatically accrue to the local treasury
that the subordinate officers perform their duties
 If subordinate fails or neglects to fulfill duty, official Sec. 7. Local government units shall be entitled to an equitable share
may take such action as prescribed by law to make in the proceeds of the utilization and development of the national
them perform their duties wealth within their respective areas, in the manner provided by law,
- Presidential supervision means no more than the power of including sharing the same with the inhabitants by way of direct
ensuring that laws are faithfully executed, or the subordinate benefits.
acts within the law
LGUs share in the Wealth of Nation
Power to Discipline - Now, GOCCs pay the LGUs for exploitation of the latter’s
- Joson v. Executive Secretary – supervision is not incompatible resources.
with discipline
- His power over administrative disciplinary cases against Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay
elective officials is derived from his power of general officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be three years and no
supervision over LGUs such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms.
Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be
Power to Investigate considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the
- Power of general supervision implies the authority to inquire full term for which he was elected.
into facts and conditions in order to render the power real
Term of Local Officials Shortened by Constitution – Term is shortened
and effective
from 4 years to 3 years.
Sec. 5. Each local government unit shall have the power to create its
On Succession – When a Vice Mayor succeeds to the office of mayor by
own sources of revenue and to levy taxes, fees and charges subject to
operation of law and serves the remainder of the term, is he considered
such guidelines and limitations as the Congress may provide,
to have served in that office for the purpose of the three-term limit?
consistent with the basic policy of local autonomy. Such taxes, fees and
- NO, as held in Borja, Jr. v. Comelec
charges shall accrue exclusively to local governments.
- Term limit must be taken to refer to the right to be elected as
well as the right to serve in the same elective position
 - It is not enough that an individual has served 3 consecutive
terms in an elective local office Sec. 12. Cities that are highly urbanized, as determined by law, and
 He must also have been elected to the same position for component cities whose charters prohibit their voters from voting for
the same number of times before the disqualification provincial elective officials, shall be independent of the province. The
can apply voters of component cities within a province, whose charters contain
- Thus, if he is not serving a term for which he was elected no such prohibition, shall not be deprived of their right to vote for
because he is simply continuing the service of the official he elective provincial officials.
succeeds, such official cannot be considered to have fully
served the term notwithstanding his voluntary renunciation Classification of Cities
of office prior to its expiration - LGC classifies cities into:
1. Highly urbanized
Sec. 9. Legislative bodies of local governments shall have sectoral 2. Independent component
representation as may be prescribed by law. 3. Component cities
- They are classified based on their regular annual income
Sectoral representatives in the Sanggunians – Various sectors defined in  This is a substantial distinction
the Code are now entitled to representation in the Sanggunians. - Revenue of a city would show whether it is capable of
existence and development as a relatively independent
Sec. 10. No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, social, economic, and political unit
divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered,  It would show if it has a sufficient economic or
except in accordance with the criteria established in the local substantial activity as to warrant independence from
government code and subject to approval by majority of the votes cast the province
in a plebiscite in the political units affected.
No Violation of EPC and Right to Suffrage
Creation of LGUs - The practice of allowing voters in one component city to vote
- Manner of creating LGUs in general is dealt with under Sec. 6, for provincial officials and denying the same to voters in
7, and 8, LGC another component city is a matter of legislative discretion
- For specifics, see: (Ceniza v. Comelec)
a. Sec. 460-461 for Provinces
b. Sec. 449-450 for Cities Sec. 13. Local government units may group themselves, consolidate or
c. Sec. 441-442 for Municipalities coordinate their efforts, services and resources for purposes commonly
d. Sec. 385-386 for Barangays beneficial to them in accordance with law.
Plebiscite = LGU’s DIRECTLY affected LGU’s may group together for beneficial purposes
- Conduct of plebiscite is an indispensable requirement in the - LGUs may group themselves, coordinate, or consolidate any
creation, diversion, merger, abolition, and substantial activity for the benefit of their constituencies
boundary alteration of LGUs - Ex: Central Panay Economic Union – composed of the
 If no plebiscite, act is illegal and without effect municipalities of Jamindan and Tapaz in Capiz Province and
- Plebiscite conducted in ALL LGUs directly affected the municipalities of Libacao, Batan, and Altavas in Aklan
 Tan v. Comelec – in the creation of a new province, those
to be included in the plebiscite would be the people Sec. 14. The President shall provide for regional development councils or
living in the area of the proposed new province and other similar bodies composed of local government offices, and
those living in the parent province representatives from non-governmental organizations within the
regions for purposes of administrative decentralization to strengthen
Sec. 11. The Congress may, by law, create special metropolitan the autonomy of the units therein and to accelerate the economic and
political subdivisions, subject to a plebiscite as set forth in Section 10 social growth and development of the units in the region.
hereof. The component cities and municipalities shall retain their
LGUs Relationship with Regional Development Councils
basic autonomy and shall be entitled to their own local executives and
- LGUs relate to the Regional Development Council in matters
legislative assemblies. The jurisdiction of the metropolitan authority
that concern their own development
that will thereby be created shall be limited to basic services requiring
coordination,
Sec. 15. There shall be created autonomous regions in Muslim
Mindanao and in the Cordilleras consisting of provinces, cities,
Creation of Special Metropolitan Political Subdivision
- NOTE: Do not mistake the “special metropolitan political municipalities and geographical areas sharing common and
subdivisions” in Sec. 11 as another territorial and political distinctive historical and cultural heritage, economic and social
subdivision in Sec. 1 structures, and other relevant characteristics within the framework of
- Jurisdiction of the metropolitan authority is LIMITED to basic this Constitution and the national sovereignty as well as territorial
services requiring coordination integrity of the Republic of the Philippines.

The MMDA is a DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY Sec. 16. The President shall exercise general supervision over
- MMDA is the agency to handle the administration of metro- autonomous regions to ensure that laws are faithfully executed.
wide basic services affecting LGUs of Metro Manila
 Metro-wide services = services which have metro-wide Sec. 17. All powers, functions and responsibilities not granted by this
impact and transcend local political boundaries or Constitution or by law to the autonomous regions shall be vested in
entail huge expenditures such that it would not be the National Government.
viable for said services to be provided by the individual
LGU Sec. 18. The Congress shall enact an organic act for each autonomous
- MMDA v. Bel-Air Village Association = MMDA is not granted region with the assistance and participation of the regional
police power, let alone legislative power consultative commission composed of representatives appointed by
the President from a list of nominees from multisectoral bodies. The
organic act shall define the basic structure of government for the
region consisting of the executive department and legislative
assembly, both of which shall be elective and representative of the
 political units. The organic acts shall likewise provide for special
courts with personal, family and property law jurisdiction consistent LOCAL GOVERNMENT,
with the provisions of this Constitution and national laws.
The creation of the autonomous region shall be effective when DECENTRALIZATION, AUTONOMY
approved by majority of the votes cast by the constituent units in a
plebiscite called for the purpose, provided that only provinces, cities,
and geographic areas voting favorably in such plebiscite shall be
THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE OF
included in the autonomous region. 1991: KEY TO NATIONAL
DEVELOPMENT PIMENTEL, pp. 13-174
Sec. 19. The first Congress elected under this Constitution shall, within
eighteen months from the time of organization of both Houses, pass
Autonomy – The power of LGUs to enjoy limited self-government as
the organic acts for the autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and
defined by law. The principle of local autonomy simply means
the Cordilleras.
decentralization.
Sec. 20. Within its territorial jurisdiction and subject to the provisions - Look at:
of this Constitution and national laws, the organic act of autonomous a. Sec. 2, Art. X, 1987 Constitution = local autonomy
regions shall provide for legislative powers over: b. Sec. 2, LGC = Declaration of policy
(1) Administrative organizations; - Principle of local autonomy under the Constitution simply
(2) Creation of sources of revenues; means decentralization (Basco v. PAGCOR)
(3) Ancestral domain and natural resources;
(4) Personal, family and property relations; Decentralization – Not transfer of power and resources, but more akin
(5) Regional urban and rural planning development; to deconcentration whereby certain government offices are transferred
(6) Economic, social and tourism development; to the regions but whose officials and functions remain under the
(7) Educational policies; control of the central government
(8) Preservation and development of the cultural heritage; and - Decentralization refers to either: Decentralization of
(9) Such other matters as may be authorized by law for the Administration or Decentralization of Power
promotion of the general welfare of the people of the  LGC follows the former; latter is not allowed by law
 See table below5
Sec. 21. The preservation of peace and order within the regions shall
be the responsibility of the local police agencies which shall be DECENTRALIZATION DECENTRALIZATION
organized, maintained, supervised, and utilized in accordance with OF ADMINISTRATION OF POWER
applicable laws. The defense and security of the regions shall be the Occurs when the central Abdication of political power in
responsibility of the National Government. government delegates favor of LGUs declared to be
administrative powers to autonomous regions, making the
NOTE: Autonomous regions are governed by special laws. political subdivisions in order to latter no longer accountable to
- See separate discussion on Autonomous Regions on page 8 broaden the base of government the national government, but to
power its constituents instead
The purpose of such is to relieve
the central government of the
Not allowed under the 1987
burden of managing local affairs
Constitution
and enable to concentrate on
national concerns.

Devolution – The act by which the National Government confers power

and authority upon the various LGUs to perform specific functions and
responsibilities.

Four kinds of powers of LGUs:

1. Expressly granted
2. Implied from those granted
3. Necessary, appropriate, incidental for efficient and effective
governance
4. Essential to promotion of general welfare of inhabitants

Innovations of the LGC

- Local officials are accountable and may be recalled even in
the midst of their terms
- National agencies now need to consult with LGUs (and also
NGOs and POs) before any project or program is
implemented in their respective jurisdictions
- Implementing Rules – mandatory consultations with LGUs,
NGOs, and sectors concerned by central government agencies
and GOCCs regarding projects or programs which may
impact the environment
- Dialogues in order to avoid confrontation between
government and indigenous people

4 From D2014 Reviewer; Supplemented by B2015 Class Notes

5 Taken from the discussion in Ganzon v. CA
 DE LEON v. ESGUERRA
August 31, 1987
GANZON v. CA
August 5, 1991

Summary: De Leon was elected as Brgy Captain and others as Brgy

Summary: Ten administrative complaints were lodged against Mayor
Councilmen in the 1982 Barangay Election. However, on Feb 9, 1987,
Ganzon of Iloilo City. On the basis of three of the complaints, Secretary
which is before the end of their term, they received a Memo from the
Santos issued three preventive suspensions, each lasting sixty days
OIC Governor dated Feb 8, 1987 but admittedly antedated Dec 1, 1986,
each. The first two were carried out, but a TRO was procured to stop
designating Esguerra, et al as Brgy Captain and members of the Brgy
the third. It is petitioner’s claim that the Secretary (the Executive) does
Council. Petitioners de Leon, et al seek to declare such Memo as null and
not have the power to subject him to disciplinary action. The Supreme
void, alleging that with the ratification of the 1987 Constitution,
Court held that it still does.
respondent OIC Governor no longer has the authority to replace them
and to designate their successors. SC ruled in favor of petitioners De
Doctrine: Under the Charter, "local autonomy" is not instantly self-
Leon, et al.
executing, but subject to the passage of a local government code, among
others. In spite of autonomy, the Constitution places the local
Doctrine: The Provisional Constitution must be deemed to have been
government under the general supervision of the Executive. The
overtaken by the 1987 Constitution. The 1987 Constitution took effect
Charter also allows Congress to include in the local government code
on the day of its ratification which is the day the people cast their votes
provisions for removal of local officials, which suggest that Congress
and not the day that the results were proclaimed by the President or
may exercise removal powers, and as the existing Local Government
the Comelec. Hence, the 1987 Constitution took effect on February 2,
Code has done, delegate its exercise to the President.
1987, the date of its ratification in the plebiscite held on that same date
"Supervision" is not incompatible with disciplinary authority.
Supervision means overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to
SAN JUAN v. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
see that subordinate officers perform their duties. Control, on the other
April 19, 1991
hand, means the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set
aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his
Summary: The position of Provincial Budget Officer (PBO) for the
duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter.
province of Rizal was left vacant. Reynaldo San Juan, governor of Rizal,
But from this pronouncement it cannot be reasonably inferred that the
sent a letter to DBM recommending Ms. Dalisay Santos as PBO, and
power of supervision of the President over local government officials
submitting other nominees. Director Abella of DBM Region IV however,
does not include the power of investigation, when in his opinion the
Abella recommended Cecilia Almajose, who was not one of the people
good of the public service so requires.
nominated by San Juan. DBM appointed Almajose. Abella protested this
with the DBM, claiming that the appointed person must be one of his
Decentralization means devolution of national administration but not
nominees, but the DBM disagreed. San Juan brought it to the CSC but
power to the local levels. Autonomy is either decentralization of
the CSC agreed with DBM.
administration or decentralization of power. There is decentralization
of administration when the central government delegates
The case was brought to the SC, and the SC agreed with San Juan. The
administrative powers to political subdivisions in order to broaden the
DBM may appoint only from the list of qualified recommendees
base of government power and in the process to make local
nominated by the Governor. If none is qualified, he must return the list
governments "more responsive and accountable.” Decentralization of
of nominees to the Governor explaining why no one meets the legal
power, on the other hand, involves an abdication of political power in
requirements and ask for new recommendees who have the necessary
the favor of local governments units declared to be autonomous.
eligibilities and qualifications.The PBO is expected to synchronize his
work with DBM, but more important is the proper administration of
Class Notes: The SC laid down the following rules:
fiscal affairs at the local level. Thus, there should be a genuine interplay,
1. Local autonomy under the Constitution involves a mere
a balancing of viewpoints, and a harmonization of proposals from both
decentralization of administration, not of power, in which
the local and national officials.
local officials remain accountable to the central government
in the manner the law may provide.
Doctrine: The clear mandate and constitutional policy and principle on
2. The Constitution does not prescribe federalism.
local autonomy must be obeyed. Where a law is capable of two
3. The change in the Constitutional language was meant to deny
interpretations, one in favor of centralized power in Malacañ ang and
legislative control over local governments. However, it did
the other beneficial to local autonomy, the scales must be weighed in
not exempt the latter from legislative regulations provided
favor of autonomy.
that the regulation is consistent with the fundamental
The presidential power over local governments is not even supervision premise of autonomy.
in general, but general supervision as may be provided by law… 4. Since local governments remain accountable to the national
supervision goes no further than "overseeing or the power or authority authority, the latter may, and in the manner set forth by law,
of an officer to see that subordinate officers perform their duties. If the impose disciplinary action against local officials
5. “Supervision” and “investigation” are not inconsistent terms;
latter fail or neglect to fulfill them the former may take such action or
“investigation” does not signify “control” (which the
step as prescribed by law to make them perform their duties…
President does not have)
Control, on the other hand, "means the power of an officer to alter or
modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate had done in the
performance of their duties and to substitute the judgment of the BASCO v. PAGCOR
former for that of the latter. Our national officials should not only May 14, 1991
comply with the constitutional provisions on local autonomy but should
Summary: Atty. Basco, Balce, Maranan and Sanchez filed a petition
also appreciate the spirit of liberty upon which these provisions are
seeking to annul the PAGCOR Charter PD 1869 for being contrary to
based.
morals, public policy and order. Also, that it is 1) a waiver of a right
prejudicial to Manila City government's right to impose taxes and
Class Notes: This case laid down the rule of construction in favor of local
license fees, which is recognized by law; 2) that this, in contravention of
autonomy.
the constitutionally enshrined principle of local autonomy; 3)that it
violates the equal protection clause of the constitution in that it
legalizes PAGCOR- conducted gambling, while most other forms of
gambling are outlawed, together with prostitution, drug trafficking
and
other vices; 4) that it violates the avowed trend of the Cory government
life, without which they cannot exist. As it creates, so it may destroy. As
away from monopolistic and crony economy, and toward free
it may destroy, it may abridge and control.
enterprise and privatization. The Court ruled in favor of PAGCOR.
True, there are certain notable innovations in the Constitution, like the
Doctrine: The principle of local autonomy under the 1987 Constitution
direct conferment on the local government units of the power to tax,
simply means "decentralization". It does not make local governments
which cannot now be withdrawn by mere statute. By and large,
sovereign within the state or an "imperium in imperio."Local
however, the national legislature is still the principal of the local
Government has been described as a political subdivision of a nation or
government units, which cannot defy its will or modify or violate it.
state which is constituted by law and has substantial control of local
affairs. In a unitary system of government, such as the government
The tests of a valid ordinance are well established. An ordinance must
under the Philippine Constitution, local governments can only be an
conform to the following substantive requirements:
intra sovereign subdivision of one sovereign nation, it cannot be an
(1) It must not contravene the constitution or any statute.
imperium in imperio. Local government in such a system can only mean
(2) It must not be unfair or oppressive.
a measure of decentralization of the function of government.
(3) It must not be partial or discriminatory.
(4) It must not prohibit but may regulate trade.
The City of Manila, being a mere Municipal corporation has no inherent
(5) It must be general and consistent with public policy.
right to impose taxes. Thus, "the Charter or statute must plainly show
(6) It must not be unreasonable.
an intent to confer that power or the municipality cannot assume it". Its
power to tax therefore must always yield to a legislative act which is
superior having been passed upon by the state itself which has the
"inherent power to tax." The power of local government to "impose
taxes and fees" is always subject to "limitations" which Congress may
provide by law.

Local governments have no power to tax instrumentalities of the

National Government. This principle emanates from the "supremacy" of
the National Government over local governments. If it is otherwise,
mere creatures of the State can defeat National policies thru
extermination of what local authorities may perceive to be undesirable
activities or enterprise using the power to tax as "a tool for regulation"

Class Notes: Is this good law? NO

1. First, this was decided when BP 337 was in effect; Remember
that we now follow RA 7160 (LGC)
2. Basically Prof. Gatmaytan says that what the National
Government is saying is: “LGU, you are beneath us. Thus, you
cannot tax us!”
 Sir says that this “supremacy” of national government is
not entirely accurate
 As the law now stands, powers and authority of an LGU
depends on what the law gives the LGU (as long as the
law is constitutional)

MAGTAJAS v. PRYCE PROPERTIES CORP.

July 20, 1994

Summary: PAGCOR prepared to inaugrate a casino in Cagayan de Oro

City, on properties it leased from Pryce Corporation. The Sangguniang
Panlungsod of Cagayan de Oro City thereafter enacted Ordinance No.
3353 which prohibited the issuance of a business permit and cancelled
existing business permits for the using of the premises of an
establishment or a portion thereof for the operation of a casino.
Thereafter the Sangguniang adopted a sterner Ordinance No. 3375-93
which altogether prohibited the operation of gambling casinos in the
City of Cagayan de Oro. The Ordinances were assailed by Pryce. The CA
declared the ordinances invalid. The SC affirmed the ruling of the CA.
P.D. 1869 creating PAGCOR has not been modified by the Local
Government Code, which empowers the local government units to
prevent or suppress only those forms of gambling prohibited by law.
The SC also held that Casino gambling is authorized by P.D. 1869. This
decree has the status of a statute that cannot be amended or nullified by
a mere ordinance.

Doctrine: The rationale of the requirement that the ordinances should

not contravene a statute is obvious. Municipal governments are only
agents of the national government. Local councils exercise only
delegated legislative powers conferred on them by Congress as the
national lawmaking body. The delegate cannot be superior to the
principal or exercise powers higher than those of the latter.

Municipal corporations owe their origin to, and derive their powers and
rights wholly from the legislature. It breathes into them the breath of
 LOCAL GOVERNMENTS, Special Law cited in the Syllabus: RA 7227 (1922) – This is regarding the
Subic Special Economic Zone
ADMINISTRATIVE REGIONS, 1.
2.
Sec. 12 says that this Zone is a Special Economic Free Zone
Sec. 12 also says that the LGUs comprising the Zone retain
AUTONOMOUS REGIONS 3.
their basic autonomy and identity
Sec. 14 lays down the relationship of the Conversion
Authority and the LGU
DEFINITIONS AND CONCEPTS a. In case of conflict between the Subic Authority and the
LGU on matters affecting the Zone
Take note of the definitions and concepts: (1) The decision of the Authority prevails
(2) BUT the decision of the LGU prevails when it
1. Autonomous Region comes to defense and security
a. Consists of provinces, cities, and municipalities and
geographical areas sharing common and distinctive Class Notes:
historical and cultural heritage, economic and social - Is Diliman a barangay? NO, it is not an LGU it is merely an
structures, and other relevant characteristics within the “area”
framework of the Constitution - Prof. Gatmaytan says: Basic test to determine if it is an LGU is
(1) President exercises general supervision over it to always ask who is the local chief executive
(2) All powers not granted by law or Constitution  If there is none, then it is not an LGU
shall be vested in National Government - As of 2013, Quezon City has 6 districts
(3) Created via organic act for each autonomous
region with participation of regional consultative
commission ABBAS v. COMELEC
(a) Defines the basic structure of government for November 10, 1989
the region for both executive department and
legislative assemblies Summary: Petitioners Abbas et al. and Mama-o sought to enjoin the
(b) Provides for special courts with personal, COMELEC from conducting a plebiscite, in implementation of RA 6734 -
family, and property law jurisdiction (Sec. 15 the law providing for an Organic Act for the ARMM, and prayed that
and 16, LGC) said RA 6734 be declared unconstitutional. They argue that said law
b. The creation of the autonomous region shall take effect violates the Constitution and is in conflict with the Tripoli Agreement.
only when approved by a majority of the votes cast by In this case, the SC held that it is unnecessary to determine whether RA
the constituent units in a plebiscite, and only those 6734 is in conflict with the Tripoli Agreement because it is now the
provinces and cities where a majority vote in favor of 1987 Constitution which provides for the creation of an autonomous
the Organic Act shall be included. (Abbas v. Comelec) region. It also held that RA 6734 is NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL. The
c. It is an LGU (see Class Notes under North Cotabato) petitioners were not able to overcome the presumption of
constitutionality.
2. Administrative Region
a. Administrative regions are mere groupings of Doctrine: Under the Constitution and RA 6734, the creation of the
contiguous provinces for administrative purposes autonomous region shall take effect only when approved by a majority
(Abbas v. Comelec) of the votes cast by the constituent units in a plebiscite, and only those
(1) They are not territorial and political subdivisions provinces and cities where a majority vote in favor of the Organic Act
like the LGUs in Sec. 1, Art. X, 1987 Constitution shall be included in the autonomous region. The single plebiscite
(2) While the power to merge administrative regions contemplated will therefore be determinative of (1) whether there shall
is not expressly provided for in the Constitution, it be an autonomous region in Muslim Mindanao and (2) which provinces
is a power traditionally lodged with the President and cities, among those enumerated in RA 6734, shall compromise it.
to facilitate the exercise of the power of general
supervision over LGUs The Constitution lays down the standards by which Congress shall
b. Requirement of plebiscite is not needed in the creation determine which areas should constitute the autonomous region.
of administrative regions, only in LGUs Guided by these constitutional criteria, the ascertainment by Congress
of the areas that share common attributes is within the exclusive realm
3. Legislative District (discussed in Bagabuyo v. Comelec) of the legislature's discretion. Any review of this ascertainment would
a. Related concepts: have to go into the wisdom of the law.
(1) Legislative apportionment – the allocation of seats
in a legislative body in proportion to the What is referred to in RA 6734 is the merger of administrative regions
population (rule is in Sec. 5, Art. VI, Constitution) which are mere groupings of contiguous provinces for administrative
(2) Reapportionment – realignment or change in purposes. Administrative regions are not territorial and political
legislative districts brought about by changes in subdivisions like provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays. While
population the power to merge administrative regions is not expressly provided
b. Legislative apportionment and reapportionment relate for in the Constitution, it is a power which has traditionally been lodged
to the creation of legislative districts which is separate with the President to facilitate the exercise of the power of general
from LGUs supervision over local governments. There is no conflict between the
(1) Though the power to do both is vested in Congress power of the President to merge administrative regions with the
(2) No plebiscite requirement in legislative districts, constitutional provision requiring a plebiscite in the merger of local
only in LGUs government units because the requirement of a plebiscite in a merger
c. LGUs and Legislative districts are interrelated expressly applies only to provinces, cities, municipalities or barangays,
(1) To ensure continued adherence to the required not to administrative regions.
standards of apportionment, Sec. 5(4), Art. VI
specifically mandates reapportionment as soon as
the given standards (relating to population) are
met
 CHIONGBAN v. ORBOS with personal, family and property law jurisdiction in each of the
June 22, 1995 autonomous regions.

Summary: RA 6734 is the organic act of the ARMM which called for a Class Notes: There is no Cordillera AUTONOMOUS Region yet since the
plebiscite. Of the 13 provinces and 9 cities that voted, only 4 provinces past 2 plebiscites yielded a negative vote. However, the Cordillera
voted in favor of the Autonomous Region. President Corazon Aquino, ADMINISTRATIVE Region is still existent.
pursuant to her power under RA 6734, Art. 19, Sec. 13 “to merge
existing regions”, issued EO 429, transferring certain provinces and
cities from one region to another. A province and several cities that got ORDILLO v. COMELEC
transferred included those that did not vote in the plebiscite. Several December 4, 1990
Congressmen of the affected provinces and cities filed petitions for
certiorari arguing that EO 429 is unconstitutional and the President has Summary: Pursuant to Republic Act No. 6766 entitled “An Act Providing
no power to merge and reorganize administrative regions. The Court for an Organic Act for the Cordillera Autonomous Region”, the people of
ruled in favor of the executive power to reorganize administrative the provinces of Benguet, Mountain Province, Ifugao, Abra and Kalinga-
regions. Apayao and the city of Baguio cast their votes in a plebiscite. Results of
plebiscite: approved by majority of votes in Ifugao, rejected by the rest
Doctrine: In conferring on the President the power to merge, by of the provinces and city. COMELEC issued Resolution No. 2259 stating
administrative determination, the existing regions following the that the Organic Act for the Region has been approved and/or ratified
establishment of the ARMM, Congress merely followed the pattern set by majority of votes cast only in the province of Ifugao. Congress
in previous legislation. The SC held in the case of Abbas, "while the enacted Republic Act No. 6861 setting elections in CAR of Ifugao on first
power to merge administrative regions is not expressly provided for in Monday of March 1991.. Arguing that there can be no valid CAR in only
the Constitution, it is a power which has traditionally been lodged with one province as the Constitution and RA 6766 require that the said
the President to facilitate the exercise of the power of general Region be composed of more than one constituent unit, the petitioners
supervision over local governments (see Art. 10, Sec. 4 of the prayed that the said memoranda and Administrative Order be declared
Constitution)." The regions themselves are not territorial and political null and void, and that EO 220 constituting the Cordillera Executive
divisions like provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays but are Board and the Cordillera Regional Assembly be still in force and effect
"mere groupings of contiguous provinces for administrative purposes." until another organic law for the Autonomous Region shall have been
enacted and the same is duly ratified by the by the voters in the
The power conferred on the President is similar to the power to adjust constituent units. The SC declared that the sole province of Ifugao
municipal boundaries which has been described in Pelaez v. Auditor CANNOT validly constitute the Cordillera Autonomous Region.
General or as "administrative in nature." Art. 19, Sec. 13 of RA 6734 is
subject to the qualification that "the President may by administrative Doctrine: The keywords in Art. X, Sec. 15 of the 1987 Constitution —
determination merge the existing regions." This means that while non- provinces, cities, municipalities and geographical areas connote that
assenting provinces and cities are to remain in the regions as "region" is to be made up of more than one constituent unit. The term
designated upon the creation of the Autonomous Region, they may "region" used in its ordinary sense means two or more provinces. This
nevertheless be regrouped with contiguous provinces forming other is supported by the fact that the 13 regions into which the Philippines is
regions as the exigency of administration may require. The divided for administrative purposes are groupings of contiguous
administrative regions are mere groupings of contiguous provinces for provinces.
administrative purposes, not for political representation.
Ifugao is a province by itself. To become part of a region, it must join
The regrouping of contiguous provinces is not even analogous to a other provinces, cities, municipalities, and geographical areas. Aside
redistricting or to the division or merger of local governments, which from the 1987 Constitution, a reading of the provisions of Republic Act
all have political consequences on the right of people residing in those No. 6766 strengthens the position that the Region cannot be constituted
political units to vote and to be voted for. The administrative regions from only one province.
are mere groupings of contiguous provinces for administrative
purposes, not for political representation. The power to reorganize The Abbas case established the rule to follow on which provinces and
administrative regions also carries with it the power to determine the cities shall comprise the autonomous region in Muslim Mindanao which
regional center. is, consequently, the same rule to follow with regard to the autonomous
region in the Cordillera. However, there is nothing in the Abbas decision
Class Notes: The setting up of autonomous regions promotes political which deals with the issue on whether an autonomous region, in either
stability. Muslim Mindanao or Cordillera could exist despite the fact that only
one province or one city is to constitute it. The issue in this case is
whether the sole province of Ifugao can validly and legally constitute
CORDILLERA BOARD COALITION v. COA the Cordillera Autonomous Region. The issue is not whether the
January 29, 1990 province of Ifugao is to be included in the Cordillera Autonomous
Region. It is the first issue which the Court answers in the instant case.
Summary: Cordillera Broad Coalition and Lilia Yaranon, et al., assail EO
220, which created CAR, as unconstitutional as it pre-empts the creation Class Notes:
of an autonomous region pursuant to the 1987 Constitution. The SC - It is settled in this case that an autonomous region cannot be
ruled that what is created under EO 220 is not the autonomous region composed of only one province
contemplated in the constitution. It was merely created to coordinate - See Sec. 19, Art. X which provides for an 18 th month period
planning and implementation of programs and services in the areas  This period refers to the enactment of the organic law
covered, preparing them for autonomy. not the creation of an autonomous region
 So can we still create the autonomous region even after
Doctrine: The constitutional guarantee of local autonomy in the the 18th month period?
Constitution refers to the administrative autonomy of local government  For one, we can always amend the organic laws
units or, cast in more technical language, the decentralization of passed by Congress within the 18th month period
government authority. On the other hand, the creation of autonomous  We can also argue that Sec. 19 is NOT prohibitory;
regions contemplates the grant of political autonomy and not just it does not say that Congress cannot create the
administrative autonomy. Thus, the provision in the Constitution for an region after the 18th month period
autonomous regional government with a basic structure consisting of - Can we create OTHER autonomous regions? Meaning other
an executive department and a legislative assembly and special courts than the Cordillera and Muslim Mindanao?
  Affirmative argument = the Constitution does not
PROVINCE OF NORTH COTABATO v. GRP PEACE PANEL
prohibit
October 14, 2008
 Negative argument = the use of the word “shall” and the
fact that the Constitution explicitly enumerates
Summary: After the Tripoli Agreement of 2001, the Government of the
“Cordillera” and “Muslim Mindanao” reveals an intent to
Republic and the MILF are in the final stages of signing the final draft of
limit the regions to the 2 explicitly enumerated.
the Memorandum of Agreement on Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) aspect
of the Tripoli Agreement. Before the parties were able to sign, the
present petitions were filed seeking to enjoin the parties from signing
BAGABUYO v. COMELEC
the MOA-AD and attacked its validity. The SC ultimately held that the
December 8, 2008
MOA-AD is violative of the Constitution and present laws. It ruled that
the concept of association is not recognized under the present
Summary: RA 9371 was enacted apportioning the barangays of Cagayan
Constitution. The concept implies a recognition of the associated entity
de Oro City resulting in an increase in the legislative district from one to
as a state It requires for its validity the amendment of constitutional
two. The voters of each legislative district would have to elect their own
provisions especially Sec. 1 and Sec. 15 of Art. X of the Constitution.
representative to Congress as well as eight members of the
Given the limited nature of the President’s authority to propose
Sangguniang Panglungsod. The petitioner filed the present petition for
constitutional amendments, she cannot guarantee to any 3rd party that
certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus with a prayer for the issuance of
the required amendments will eventually be put in place, nor even be
a temporary restraining order and a writ of preliminary injunction to
submitted to plebiscite
prevent the COMELEC from implementing Res. No. 7837 on the ground
that RA 9371 is unconstitutional.
Doctrine: The MOA-AD is inconsistent with the Constitution and laws as
The petitioner argued that the resolution and the law are
presently worded. The concept of association is an international law
both unconstitutional because the COMELEC cannot implement RA
concept and is the unifying link to the MOA-AD provisions used to
9371 without providing for the rules, regulations, and guidelines for the
describe the envisioned relationship between the BJE and the Republic.
conduct of a plebiscite, which is indispensable for the division or
An association is formed when 2 states of unequal power voluntarily
conversion of a local government unit. The petitioner was of the
establish durable links; one state, the associate, delegates certain
impression that RA 9371 falls within the meaning of “creation, division,
responsibilities to the other, the principal, while maintaining its
merger, abolition, or substantial alteration of boundaries of cities”
international status as a state. In international practice, the “associated
under Sec. 10, Art. X of the Constitution, which require the conduct of a
state” arrangement has usually been used as a transitional device of
plebiscite.
former colonies on their way to full independence
The Supreme Court held that RA 9371 is constitutional.
According to the Supreme Court, RA 9371 is a legislative
The MOA-AD contains many provisions which are consistent with the
reapportionment legislation passed in accordance with the authority
international legal concept of association. These provisions indicate
granted to Congress under Art. VI, Section 5(4) of the Constitution.
that the parties aimed to vest in the BJE the status of an associated state
or, at any rate, a status closely approximating it.
Doctrine: An apportionment or reapportionment legislation does not
require a plebiscite and must only comply with Art. VI, Sec. 5(4) of the
The concept of Association is not recognized under the present
Constitution. No division of the local government unit as a political and
Constitution. This implies a recognition of the associated entity as a
corporate entity took place. In the case at bar, the local government
state but the Constitution does not contemplate any state other than the
unit, remains a single unit and its administration is not divided along
Philippine State.
territorial lines. What was involved was merely an addition of another
legislative district and the delineation of the city into two districts for
Class Notes:
purposes of representation in the House of Representatives.
- Prof. Gatmaytan does not agree with the majority
 The President can always make promises and that in
Legislative apportionment is the allocation of seats in a legislative body
itself is not unconstitutional
in proportion to the population; the drawing of voting district lines so
as to equalize population and voting power among the districts.  MOA-AD was merely a framework
Legislative reapportionment is the realignment or change in legislative - Is an Autonomous Region an LGU?
districts brought about by changes in population and mandated by the  YES! It is a sub-national government
constitutional requirement of equality of representation.  A form of local government
- The new ARMM Charter is RA 9054
Legislative reapportionment/apportionment (Art. VI, Sec. 5) and
creation, division, merger, abolition or substantial alteration of
boundaries (Art. X, Sec. 10) both require the involvement of Congress
but they are different such that the latter requires the conduct of a
plebiscite and compliance with the criteria set forth in the Local
Government Code whereas the latter does not.

A legislative district is a representative unit and is neither a political

subdivision nor a corporate unit. A district does not act for and in behalf
of the people comprising the district and the primary role of the
Congressman of the legislative district is to ensure that the voice of the
people of the district is heard and not to oversee the affairs of the
legislative district. It has no legal personality that must be created or
dissolved and has no capacity to act. On the other hand, the concern of
Art. X, Sec. 10 (creation, division, merger, abolition, or substantial
alteration of boundaries) relates to the commencement, termination,
and modification of local government units’ corporate existence and
territorial coverage. The local government units spoken of here are
political and corporate units. Its corporate existence begins upon the
election and qualification of its chief executive and a majority of the
members of its Sanggunian. It is the agency of the community in the
administration of local affairs and the representative of the people.
 EFFECTIVITY OF THE CODE
Sec. 536, LGC says that the LGC shall take effect on Jan. 1, 1992,
unless otherwise provided herein, after its complete publication in at
least 1 newspaper of general circulation
- LGC was published in Malaya on Oct. 18, 1991

EVARDONE v. COMELEC
December 2, 1991

Summary: Evardone was the elected mayor of the Municipality Sulat in

Eastern Samar. A petition for recall was filed against him. COMELEC
issued a resolution for the conduct of the signing of the petition for the
recall of Evardone on July 14, 1990. Evardone filed a petition for
prohibition. SC issued a TRO dated July 12, 1990 which was received by
the COMELEC field agent on July 15, 1990. The signing was conducted
in good faith. Evardone now assails the constitutionality of Resolution
2272 embodying the rules for the conduct of the signing of the petition
for recall of a local official. He argues that the 1987 Constitution
repealed the old Local Government Code(BP 337). Hence, there is no
law from which Resolution 2272 was based. SC ruled that the old LGC
was not repealed by the 1987 Constitution. Thus, it remains in force as
of the moment. The old LGC was repealed by the LGC of 1991 which
took effect on January 1, 1992.

Doctrine: Article XVIII, Section 3 of the 1987 Constitution provides that

all existing laws not inconsistent with the 1987 Constitution shall
remain operative, until amended, repealed or revoked. Republic Act No.
7160 providing for the Local Government Code of 1991, approved by
the President on 10 October 1991, specifically repeals B.P. Blg. 337. But
the Local Government Code of 1991 will take effect only on 1 January
1992 and therefore the old Local Government Code (B.P. Blg. 337) is
still the law applicable to the present case.

Class Notes: Remember that when jurisdiction is acquired, it continues

until the final disposition of the case

SECRETARY OF HEALTH v. CA
February 23, 1995

Summary: In the year 1991, administrative proceedings were

commenced against Fe Sibbaluca before the DOH, for grave misconduct,
dishonesty, etc. She was placed under preventive suspension on
December 17, 1991. She challenged the suspension order by motion on
January 8, 1992. Later she instituted an action in the RTC to stop the
proceedings. The action was based on the contention that the Health
Secretary lost his disciplinary power and authority over her, when the
LGC took effect on January 1, 1992. The Court held that at the time of
the commencement of the action the operative laws are the
Administrative Code of 1987 and EO 119. Under said laws, the
Secretary of Health exercises control, direction and supervision over his
subordinates, which include Sibbaluca. Since jurisdiction has been
acquired by the Secretary over the person of Sibbaluca before the
effectivity of the LGC, it continues until the final disposition of the case.

Doctrine: The Local Government Code of 1991 took effect on January 1,

1992. Jurisdiction is determined by the statute in force at the time of
the commencement of the action.
 PART 2: BOOK 1 GENERAL PROVISIONS
TITLE ONE: BASIC PRINCIPLES  If they are abusive or inept, they can be removed from
office through the initiative
 People can correct their mistakes and elect better
POLICY AND APPLICATION leaders even during midterm

Breakdown of Sec. 1, LGC: Title of RA 7160 shall be known and cited Initiative, Referendum, Recall
as the “Local Government Code of 1991” - These powers may be exercised by the registered voters
residing within the LGU territory under the circumstances
Definitions and conditions mentioned in the LGC:
A. From Sec. 2, EO 292 (Admin Code) a. Sec. 69-75 for recall
1. Government of the Republic of the Philippines – the b. Sec. 120-127 for initiative referendum
corporate Breakdown
governmental
of Sec.entity
3, LGC:through
Operativewhich theof Decentralization
Principles
functions of government are exercised through the
Philippines, including, save as the contrary appears
from the Formulation andvarious
context, the implementation of policies
arms through and measures on local autonomy shall be guided by the ff. OPERATIVE PRINCIPLES:
which
political authority is made effective in the Philippines
2. National Government - theamong
Effective allocation entiredifferent
machinery
LGUs of the respective powers, functions, responsibilities, and resources
of their
central government
Established in every LGU an accountable, efficient, and dynamic organizational structure and operating mechanism
3. Local Government
Will meet priority– theneedspolitical
and servicesubdivisions
requirements of its communities
established by or
Local in accordance
officials with the
and employees Constitution
paid wholly or mainly from local funds shall be appointed or removed:
B. LGU is defined According
in Basco v.toPAGCOR
merit and asfitness
“a political subdivision
of a nation or By state which is constituted
appropriate appointing authority by law and has
substantial control of local affairs
Vesting of duty, responsibility, and accountability in LGUs shall be accompanied with provision for reasonably adequate resources to discharge their
They shall have power to create and broaden own source of revenue
Breakdown of Sec. 2, LGC – Declaration of Policy:
Right to a just share in national taxes
(a) Policy of the State that the territorial and political
And equitable share in proceeds of the utilization and development of national wealth within their respective areas
subdivisions of the state shall enjoy genuine and meaningful
The following shall ensure that acts of their component units are within scope of their prescribed powers and functions:
local autonomy
 Provinces
To enable themwith respectfullest
to attain to component citiesasand
development municipalities
self-
reliantCities and municipalities with respect to component barangays
communities
 State LGUs
shallmayprovide
group themselves,
for moreconsolidate
responsiveor coordinate
and their efforts, services, and resources for purposes beneficial to them
Capabilities
accountable localof LGUs enhancesstructure
government by providing them with opportunities to participate actively in implementation of national programs and projects
instituted
Especially
through a systemmunicipalities and barangays
of decentralization
 LGUsContinuing mechanism
given moreto enhance
powers,localauthority,
autonomy
Not only by legislative
responsibilities, enabling acts,
and resources
 Alsoof
Process by administrative
decentralization and organizational
shall proceedreformsfrom
LGUs
national to share with national government responsibility in management and maintenance of ecological balance within territorial jurisdiction
local government
(b) To ensure Subject to provisions
accountability of LGC
of LGUs and national
through policies
institution of
(j)
effective mechanisms of recall, initiative, referendum
(c) To require all national agencies and offices to conduct
periodic consultations with LGUs, NGOs, and POs, and other
concerned sectors before any project or program is
implemented in their respective jurisdictions

Reiteration of Constitutional Policies: These are:

1. Genuine and meaningful local autonomy
2. Accountability of LGUs
3. Mandatory periodic consultations

Genuine and Meaningful Local Autonomy

- Constitution gives local autonomy, LGC emphasizes that it
must be meaningful and genuine
- Purpose:
1. To enable LGUs to become self-reliant communities and
2. To make them more effective partners in attainment of
national goals
- How? Through DECENTRALIZATION
 Implementation of this is found in Sec. 17
- De Leon v. Esguerra – Even barangays are meant to possess
genuine and meaningful local autonomy so that they may Effective mechanisms for ensuring accountability of LGUs in their respective constituents
develop fully as self-reliant communities Strengthened in order to upgrade continually the quality of local leadership
Realization of local autonomy shall be facilitated through
Accountable Local Officials
- Local autonomy >> People empowerment (k)
- Local government officials are accountable to their Improved coordination of national government policies and programs
constituencies And extension of adequate technical and material
 assistance to less developed and deserving LGUs GREATER BALANGA DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION v.
(l) Participation of private sector in local governance shall be MUNICIPALITY OF BALANGA
encouraged December 27, 1994
 Particularly in delivery of basic services
 To ensure viability of local autonomy as an Summary: GBDC applied with the office of the mayor of Balanga, Bataan
alternative strategy for sustainable development for a business permit for its property certain portions of which has
(m) National government shall ensure that decentralization been unlawfully invaded by the municipality of Balanga. The Mayor
contributes to the continuing improvement of performance issued a permit. The Sangguniang Bayan passed a resolution ordering
of LGUs and quality of community life the mayor to revoke the permit. The Mayor revoked the permit. GBDC
filed this petition claiming that the only time the mayor could revoke a
Breakdown of Sec. 4, LGC: Scope of Application license is when they had violated any law or ordinance. The
municipality of Bataan cites Section 3A-06(b) of the Balanga Revenue
LGC shall apply to all: Code alleging two things, one, GBDC did not secure permits separately
1. Provinces for its two businesses and two, that GBDC did not inform them that the
2. Cities lot was subject to an adverse claim. SC decided for GBDC. They held that
3. Municipalities Section 3A-06(b) of the Balanga Revenue Code does not expressly state
4. Barangays that GBDC should secure permits separately.
5. Other political subdivisions as may be created by law
6. To officials, offices, or agencies of the national government, Doctrine: The powers of municipal corporations are to be construed in
to the extent herein provided strictissimi juris and any doubt or ambiguity must be construed against
the municipality.

Class Notes:
RULES OF INTERPRETATION - SC said that the power of LGUs is construed strictissimi juris
 This is NOT good law
Breakdown of Sec. 5, LGC: Rules of Interpretation: - Under Sec. 5(a), LGC – liberal construction in favor of local
autonomy
(a) Any provision on a power of LGU shall be liberally  NOTE that not all laws are to be construed liberally
interpreted in its favor  Ex: Tax laws are still strictly construed:
 In case of doubt, any question thereon shall be 1. Against the LGU
resolved in favor of: 2. Against the taxpayer (in case of tax
1. Devolution of powers and exemptions)
2. Lower LGU
 Any fair and reasonable doubt as to existence of the
power shall be interpreted in favor of LGU concerned TANO v. SOCRATES
August 21, 1997
(b) In case of doubt, tax ordinance or revenue measure shall be
construed strictly against LGU enacting it and liberally in Summary: The Sangguniang Panglungsod of Puerto Prinsesa passed
favor of taxpayer Ordinance No. 15-92, banning the shipment of all live fish and lobsters
 Tax exemption, incentive or relief granted by LGU outside of its city. To implement the city ordinance, then Acting Mayor
shall be construed strictly against person claiming it Lucero issued Order No. 23, authorizing the inspection of cargoes
containing live fish and lobster being shipped out from the Puerto
(c) General welfare provisions in LGC shall be liberally Prinsesa Airport, Wharf or at any port within it to ascertain that the
interpreted to give more powers to LGUs in accelerating Mayor’s Permit required by PD 426-14-74 for any person engaged in
economic development and upgrading quality of life for business where a permit is required. The Sangguniang Panlalawigan of
people in the community Palawan enacted Resolution No. 33, Ordinance No. 2, prohibiting the
catching, gathering, possessing, buying, selling and shipment of live
(d) Rights and obligations existing on date of effectivity of LGC marine coral dwelling aquatic organisms for a period of five years. Two
and arising out of contracts or any other source of sets of petitioners filed this petition in the SC. The SC ruled that for the
prestation involving LGU: first set of petitioners, the certiorari was premature, lacking a cause of
 Shall be governed by: action. This is because there was no showing that a motion to quash
1. Original terms and conditions of said contracts, was filed in the criminal cases. For the second set, it said that the
2. Or law in force at time such rights were vested petition is for declaratory relief which the Court does not possess
original jurisdiction. Notwithstanding this, the Court resolved the case
(e) In resolution of controversies arising under LGC where no on its merits considering that the lifetime of the Ordinances was about
legal provision or jurisprudence applies: to end and having been enacted in the exercise of powers under the
 Resort may be had to customs and traditions in the new LGC relative to the protection and preservation of the
place where controversies take place environment, the case is novel and of paramount importance. The SC
did not find them Constitutionally infirm and upheld their validity.

Doctrine: Sec. 5(c) of the LGC explicitly mandates that the general
welfare provisions of the LGC shall be liberally interpreted to give more
powers to the local government units in accelerating economic
development and upgrading the quality of life for the people of the
community. The LGC vests municipalities with the power to grant
fishery privileges, to penalize certain acts be ordinances, and to
prosecute violations. Further, the sangguaniang bayan, panlungsod and
panlalawigan are directed to enact ordinances for the general welfare of
the municipality and its inhabitants, which shall include ordinances that
protect the environment and impose penalties for acts which endanger
the environment. The centerpiece of the LGC is the system of
decentralization. Devolution is indispensable to decentralization and
the LGC expressly provides that any provisions on a power of a local
government unit shall be liberally interpreted in its favor, and in case of
doubt, any question thereon shall be resolved in favor of devolution of
powers and of the local government unit. Any fair and reasonable doubt
as to the existence of the power shall be interpreted in favor of the local
government unit concerned. Devolution refers to the act by which the
National Government confers power and authority upon the various
local government units to perform specific functions and
responsibilities.

Class Notes:
- For the general welfare clause, always construe liberally in
favor of local autonomy.
- Some comments from Prof. Gatmaytan:
1. If we look at Art. Xii, Sec. 2, and Art. XIII, Sec. 2 and 7,
these provisions refer to the rights of marginal
fishermen however there was no showing that
petitioners were indeed marginal fishermen (no
discussion also by the SC)
 If we look at Sec. 149, LGC, it only gives
preferential treatment to these fishermen (but this
is not absolute)
2. This case covers the application of the GWC 6 and the
devolution of fishery laws
a. So we look at the objectives:
(1) During closed season – we invoke LGU’s
devolved power over fisheries
(2) To protect marine life – we invoke GWC

6 General welfare clause

 GENERAL POWERS AND ATTRIBUTES Breakdown of Sec. 7, LGC:
GENERAL RULE: Creation of LGU or its conversion from one level to
another shall be based on verifiable indicators of viability and
CREATION OF LGUs
projected capacity to provide services:
a. INCOME
Breakdown of Sec. 6, LGC: Authority to Create LGUs:
(1) Must be sufficient to provide for all essential
An LGU may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its government facilities and special functions
boundaries substantially altered either by: commensurate with population
1. Law enacted by Congress – for province, city, municipality (2) Based on acceptable standards
or any other political subdivision, or b. POPULATION
2. Ordinance by Sangguniang Panlalawigan or Sangguniang (1) Total number of inhabitants within territorial
Panglungsod – for barangay located within its territorial jurisdiction
jurisdiction c. LAND AREA
Subject to limitations and requirements prescribed by LGC. (1) Must be contiguous; UNLESS:
(a) Comprises 2 or more islands, OR
Creation of LGUs in General
(b) Separated by LGU independent of the others
- Sec. 6 pertains to the creation of the particular LGUs
(2) Must be properly identified by metes and bounds with
mentioned in Sec. 1, Art. X, 1987 Constitution
technical descriptions
- The power to create, divide, merge, abolish or alter the
boundaries of an LGU is lodged with CONGRESS (3) Must be sufficient to provide for basic services and
facilities
 Congress exercises this power by enacting an
appropriate law
Compliance by these indicators attested to by:
1. DOF
NOTE: CAR is NOT an LGU
2. NSO
- Remember that Congress cannot expand the LGUs mentioned
3. LMB
in Sec. 1, Art. X (the list is exclusive)
4. DENR
- In Cordillera Board Coalition v. COA the SC ruled that the CAR
was validly created, it is not an LGU
 It is not a public corporation or a territorial and Three main considerations:
political subdivision; no separate juridical personality; 1. Income - Must be sufficient to provide for all essential
not vested with powers of a public corporation government facilities and services commensurate with
 It is created primarily to coordinate the planning and population size
implementation of programs and services in the 2. Population - Total number of inhabitants within territorial
covered area jurisdiction
3. Land Area - Must be:
Power to Create LGU = LEGISLATIVE - As held in Pelaez v. Auditor a. Contiguous, unless it comprises of 2 or more islands or
General, the authority to create municipal corporations is essentially is separated by an LGU independent from others
legislative in character b. Properly identified by metes and bounds with technical
descriptions
NOTE: Take note the special treatment of barangays c. Sufficient to provide for such basic services and
- Barangays may be created, merged, abolished by the (1) facilities to meet the requirements of populace
Sangguniang Panlalawigan or (2) Sangguniang Panglungsod
by ordinance within its respective jurisdictions MANNER OF CREATION
- Sangguniang Bayan of a municipality do not have such power MANNER OF CREATION
- Neither can a barangay council create another barangay 1. May be by:
within itself, etc. a. Law, or
b. Ordinance of sangguniang
Special Laws cited in the Syllabus: panlalawigan or sangguniang
1. Art. X Constitution – Sec. 1, 7, 10, 11, 15, 16, 19 BARANGAY
panglungsod
 See Constitutional Basis section of 2. If creation is by sangguniang
reviewer 2. RA 7878 (1995) (Sec. 385 and
panlalawigan, recommendation of
 Act converting the sub-provinces of Kalinga and Apayao into regular 386 LGC)
sangguniang bayan concerned shall be
provinces: Province of Kalinga and Province of Apayao necessary
3. RA 8371 (1991) - IPRA 3. Subject to a plebiscite
 Sec. 18 on Tribal Barangays provide that the ICCs/IPs 4. No income requirement
living in continuous areas or communities where they MUNICIPALITY 1. Only by an act of Congress
form predominant population but are located in 2. Subject to a plebiscite
municipalities, provinces or cities MAY form a separate (Sec. 441 and 3. Must comply with the income, population,
barangay 442 LGC) and land area requirements
4. RA 9009 (2001) 1. Only by an act of Congress
 Increased the average annual income requirement for a CITY 2. Subject to a plebiscite
municipality or cluster of barangays to be converted 3. Must comply with:
into a component city (Sec. 449 and a. Income requirement
 Now the income requirement is P100M for the last 2 450 LGC) b. Either of the land area or population
consecutive years based on 2000 constant prices requirement
5. RA 9054 (2001), Art. IV, Sec. 19 - Organic Act of ARMM 1. Only by an Act of Congress
6. RA 10170 (2012) PROVINCE 2. Subject to a plebiscite
 An act reapportioning 2nd Legislative District of Quezon 3. Must comply with:
City thereby creating 2 additional legislative districts (Sec. 460 and a. Income requirement
and 2 sangguniang panglungsod seats 461 LGC) b. Either of the land area or population
requirement
 MINIMUM REQUIREMENTS
Breakdown of Sec. 8, LGC: Division and Merger
INCOME POPULATION LAND AREA Division and merger of existing LGUs shall comply with same
requirements as creation. Provided;
Average annual
1. Division shall NOT reduce income, population, or land area
income of not At least 250,000 At least
to less than minimum requirements
less than P20M inhabitants 2,000sqkm
PROVINCE 2. Income classification of original LGUs shall NOT fall below
As certified by As certified
its current income classification prior to such division
Based on 1991 the NSO by LMB
constant prices
Income classification of LGUs shall be updated within 6 months from
Average annual
LGC effectivity.
income of not
At least 150,000 At least
less than Creation, Conversion, Division, Merger = Same Requirements
inhabitants 100sqkm
CITY P100M
As certified by As certified
the NSO by LMB As to the 2nd par. of Sec. 8 – requires the updating of financial position of
Based on 2000 LGUs within 6 months from LGC effectivity to guide the government on
constant prices the matter of classification of LGUs and serve as basis for changes in the
P2.5M annual staffing patterns and salary scale of LGUs.
income for the
At least 25,000 As least
last 2
inhabitants 50 sqkm
MUNICIPALITY consecutive PADILLA v. COMELEC
As certified by As certified
years based on October 19, 1992
the NSO by LMB
1991 constant
prices Summary: The COMELEC promulgated a resolution providing for a
No land area plebiscite to determine if the people approves the creation of the
At least 2,000
requirement municipality of Tulay-Na-Lupa. The plebiscite was to be conducted in
inhabitants
for its the areas which will comprise the new municipality and also in the
creation remaining areas of the mother Municipality. The plebiscite resulted in
EXCEPT: in
No specific the disapproval of the municipality of Tulay na Lupa. The Governor of
municipalities
requirement. But it must the province filed a case to set aside the plebiscite on the ground that it
and cities within
Financial follow the should have only been conducted in the barangays which are to
Metro Manila,
viability of the general comprise the new municipality. The SC ruled that the COMELEC did not
and other
created guidelines abuse its discretion when it issued the resolution and included in the
BARANGAY metropolitan
barangay being: (1) as plebiscite the remaining areas of the mother municipality.
political
becomes the much as
subdivisions
obligation of possible, Doctrine: When the law states that the plebiscite shall be conducted "in
and in highly
the LGU contiguous, the political units directly affected," it means that residents of the
urbanized cities,
creating it and (2) political entity who would be economically dislocated by the separation
requirement is
properly of a portion thereof have a right to vote in said plebiscite. What is
5,0000
identified by contemplated by the phase "political units directly affected," is the
Inhabitants as
metes and plurality of political units which would participate in the plebiscite.
certified by NSO bounds
Logically, those to be included in such political areas are the inhabitants
of the 12 barangays of the proposed Municipality of Tulay-Na-Lupa as
Please note: well as those living in the parent Municipality of Labo, Camarines Norte.
1. The average annual income:
a. INCLUDES any income accruing to the general fund
b. EXCLUDES special funds, special account transfers, and
TORRALBA v. MUNICIPALITY OF SIBAGAT
non-recurring income
January 29, 1987
2. As held in Tan v. Comelec, “territory” requirement in the old
LGC refers to the mass of land area and excluded the waters Summary: BP 56, creating the Municpality of Sibagat, was assailed as
over which the political unit exercised control being violative of Sec. 3, Art. XI, of the 1973 Constitution. The
a. Thus, when the new LGC was enacted, the law uses the petitioners argue that the Local Government Code must first be enacted
word “land area” to emphasize that the area excludes in order to determine the criteria for the creation of the municipality.
water area for purposes of Sec. 7 Since the Local Government Code had not yet been enacted at the time
3. Also remember that the land area for LGUs must be BP 56 was enacted, the latter was thus null and void. The SC disagreed
contiguous as a general rule but it admits of 2 exceptions: with this, saying that the absence of the LGC at the time of the
a. When LGU created comprises 2 or more islands enactment of BP 56 does not take away the legislature from being able
b. Or when it is separated by another LGU (meaning an to create municipal corporations. While the LGC has not yet been
LGU is located in between parts of the LGU concerned) enacted, the legislative power remains plenary, except that the creation
4. IMPORTANT: of the new local government unit should be approved by the people
a. Provinces and cities must satisfy the income concerned in a plebiscite called for the purpose.
requirement, and EITHER population or territory The power to create a municipal corporation is essentially
b. Barangays have no minimum requirement for area and legislative in nature. In the absence of any constitutional limitations a
income legislative body may create any corporation it deems essential for the
more efficient administration of government.
On Conversions - Conversion means the elevation of an LGU from one
level to another Doctrine: Sec. 3, Art. XI of the 1973 Constitution does not prohibit nor
- Conversion from one LGU to a higher form (like a proscribe the creation of municipal corporations prior to the enactment
municipality being converted to a component city) of the LGC. Such enactment is not a condition sine qua non, in the same
 There is also conversion when an LGU’s class category way that the creation of a municipality does not preclude the enactment
changes (like when a province is raised from a fourth of the LGC. What the provision means is that once said Code is enacted,
class category to 3rd, 2nd, or 1st) the creation, modification or dissolution of LGUs should conform to the
- Requirements for creation also apply to their conversion criteria thus laid down
 CAWALING v. COMELEC 5, Article VI of the Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance
October 26, 2001 appended to the Constitution. The ARMM Regional Assembly cannot
create a province without a legislative district because the Constitution
Summary: RA 8806 was passed creating Sorsogon City through the mandates that every province shall have a legislative district. The
merger of 2 municipalities. Cawaling filed 2 petitions assailing the ARMM Regional Assembly cannot enact a law creating a national office
constitutionality of the law, claiming, among other things, that a like the office of a district representative of Congress because the
component city may be created only by converting "a municipality or a legislative powers of the ARMM Regional Assembly operate only within
cluster of barangays," not by merging two municipalities. The Court its territorial jurisdiction as provided in Section 20, Article X of the
held that the phrase referred to by Cawaling is just one of the modes of Constitution. Congress is a national legislature and any increase in its
creating a city. allowable membership or in its incumbent membership through the
creation of legislative districts must be embodied in a national law.
Doctrine: The phrase "A municipality or a cluster of barangays may be
converted into a component city" is not a criterion but simply one of the
modes by which a city may be created. Section 10, Article X of the LATASA v. COMELEC
Constitution allows the merger of local government units to create a December 10, 2003
province city, municipality or barangay in accordance with the criteria
established by the Code. As per Section 8 of the Code, the creation of an Summary: After Latasa served three terms as mayor of the Municipality
entirely new local government unit through a division or a merger of of Digos, Digos was converted to a City via a plebiscite. Nothing changed
existing local government units is recognized under the Constitution, as to territory, population, etc. It was just a conversion of the same area
provided that such merger or division shall comply with the to a city. Before the election of new city officials, Latasa held the
requirements prescribed by the Code. position in hold-over capacity. Now, Latasa wishes to run for mayor of
the City of Digos, claiming that the Municipality and City are two
different entities, so he is not running for the same position in
PELAEZ v. AUDITOR GENERAL contravention of the three-term limit. The Supreme Court found Latasa
December 24, 1965 ineligible to run as candidate for the position of Digos City Mayor.
Should he be allowed another three consecutive terms as mayor of the
Summary: The President issued Executive Orders creating 33 City of Digos, Latasa would then be possibly holding office as chief
municipalities claiming Sec 68 of the Revised Administrative Code of executive over the same territorial jurisdiction and inhabitants for a
1917 as basis. Petitioners question the validity of such EOs alleging that total of eighteen consecutive years. This is the very scenario sought to
Sec 68 was repealed by the Barrio Charter and the 1935 Constitution. be avoided by the Constitution
Under the Barrio Charter, the president has no power to create barrios
so the petitioners argued that it implies a negation of the bigger power Doctrine: Substantial differences do exist between a municipality and a
to create municipalities, each of which consists of several barrios. The city. For one, there is a material change in the political and economic
Auditor General insisted that municipalities can be created without rights of the local government unit when it is converted from a
creation of barrios. SC ruled that the EOs are not valid. Section 68 of the municipality to a city and undoubtedly, these changes affect the people
Revised Administrative Code of 1917 constitutes undue delegation of as well. It is precisely for this reason why Sec. 10, Art. X of the
legislative power to the President. Also, it was been repealed by the Constitution mandates a plebiscite.
1935 Constitution which only gives the president the power of general
supervision over local government units. As may be gleaned from Sec. 7 of the LGC, the creation or conversion of
a local government unit is done mainly to help assure its economic
Doctrine: Whereas the power to fix such common boundary, in order to viability.
avoid or settle conflicts of jurisdiction between adjoining
municipalities, may partake of an administrative nature — involving, as True, the new city acquired a new corporate existence separate and
it does, the adoption of means and ways to carry into effect the law distinct from that of the municipality. This does not mean, however,
creating said municipalities — the authority to create municipal that for the purpose of applying the subject Constitutional provision,
corporations is essentially legislative in nature. The power of control that the office of the municipal mayor would now be construed as a
is denied by the Constitution to the Executive, insofar as local different local government post as that of the office of the city mayor. As
governments are concerned. stated earlier, the territorial jurisdiction of the City of Digos is the same
as that of the municipality. Consequently, the inhabitants of the
municipality are the same as those in the city.
SEMA v. COMELEC
December 24, 1965 Comparison with other cases:
(1) Borja, Jr. v. COMELEC:
Summary: Cotabato City, together with 8 municipalities constituted one  A successor’s (vice-mayor) occupation of a post
legislative district under Maguindanao. The ARMM Regional Assembly, (mayor), due to the death of his predecessor, for the
exercising its power to create provinces under Section 19, Article VI of remainder of the latter’s term cannot be construed as a
RA 9054, enacted Muslim Mindanao Autonomy Act No. 201 creating the full term. Further, nature of the responsibilities and
Province of Shariff Kabunsuan composed of the aforesaid 8 duties of the vice-mayor are wholly different
municipalities (leaving out Cotabato City), separate from (2) Lonzanida v. COMELEC:
Magundanao. For purposes of elections for representatives to Congress,  When a term is involuntarily interruptedby a
the COMELEC issued a Resolution maintaining the legislative district of declaration of vacancy of such position, pursuant to a
the aforesaid 8 municipalities plus Cotabato City. Sema, a candidate for failure of election, the term cannot be counted for
legislative representative claimed that the newly created province of purposes of the three-term limit.
Shariff Kabunsuan, by virtue of its creation should automatically (3) Adormeo v. COMELEC:
constitute its own legislative district apart from Cotabato city, receiving  An assumption to office through a recall election
an additional seat in the House of Representatives. The SC ruled that should not be considered as one term in applying the
only Congress has the exclusive power to create legislative districts, three-term limit rule.
which are required in the creation of provinces and cities. (4) Socrates v. COMELEC:
 After serving three terms, and not running in the
Doctrine: Only Congress can create provinces and cities because the succeeding election, one can run in a recall election
creation of provinces and cities necessarily includes the creation of pursuant to the recall of the candidate who won in
legislative districts, a power only Congress can exercise under Section such succeeding election.
 LACEDA v. LIMENA DE FACTO CORPORATIONS
November 25, 2008
Occurs when there is a defect in the creation but the legal existence has
Summary: On October 23, Limena filed a petition for disqualification been recognized and acquiesced publicly and officially.
and/or declaration as an ineligible candidate against Laceda before the
COMELEC, asserting that he had already served as Punong Barangay for Requisites:
3 consecutive terms since 1994, and was thus prohibited from running 1. Valid law authorizing incorporation
for the 4th time under Section 2 of Republic Act No. 9164. COMELEC 2. Attempt in good faith to organize it
declared Laceda disqualified and cancelled his certificate of candidacy. 3. Colorable compliance with the law
Laceda asserted that when he was elected for his first 2 terms, Sorsogon 4. Assumption of corporate powers
was still a municipality, and that when he served his 3rd term, the
Municipality of Sorsogon had already been merged with the Municipal Corporations by Prescription - Existence is presumed where
Municipality of Bacon to form a new political unit, the City of Sorsogon, the corporation has claimed and exercised corporate functions with the
pursuant to Republic Act No. 8806. Thus, his 3rd term was actually just knowledge and acquiescence of the legislature, and without
his first in the new political unit and that he was accordingly entitled to interruption or objection for a period long enough to afford title by
run for 2 more terms. SC denied his petition with finality. prescription. [Martin, Public Corporations (1977)]

Doctrine: For the prohibition to apply, two requisites must concur: (1) Attacks against the Validity of Incorporation
that the official concerned has been elected for 3 consecutive terms in - Action is reserved to the State in a proceeding for quo
the same local government post and (2) that he or she has fully served 3 warranto or any other direct proceeding
consecutive terms. The territorial jurisdiction of Barangay Panlayaan,  Collateral attacks are not allowed
Sorsogon City, is the same as before the conversion. Consequently, the - The proceeding must be:
inhabitants of the barangay are the same. They are the same group of 1. Brought in the name of the Republic
voters who elected Laceda to be their Punong Barangay for three 2. Commenced by the Solicitor General or Fiscal when
consecutive terms and over whom Laceda held power and authority as directed by President
their Punong Barangay. Moreover, Rep. Act No. 8806 did not interrupt 3. Timely raised
Laceda's term.
NAVARRO v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
April 12, 2011

MALABANG v. BENITO
March 28, 1969

Summary: RA No. 9355 (An Act that the exemption to the land
Creating the Province of area requirement was not
Dinagat Islands) was enacted expressly provided for in Sec.
into law. The creation of the 461 of the LGC on the creation of
local government unit was provinces; hence it does not
approved by the people from apply in this case. RA 9355 is
both the mother province of therefore unconstitutional and
Surigao delNorte and the the province of Dinagat cannot
Province of Dinagat Islands. be created. The SC reversed this
Navarro, Bernal and decision.
Medina assail RA No. 9355 for
being unconstitutional. Section Doctrine: When the local
10 of Article X provides that government unit to be created is
the creation o fa local a municipality or component
government unit should be in city consisting of one or more
accordance with the criteria islands, it is EXEMPT from the
established by the local land area requirements as
government code, and the expressly provided in Section
Local Government Code of 442 and Section 450 of the LGC.
1991 provides that a province This exemption is
should have an average annual absent in the enumeration of
income of not less than P20, the requisites for the creation of
000,000, a continuous territory a province under Section 461 of
of at least 2000 sq. m, and a the LGC, although it is expressly
population of not less than stated under Article 9(2) of the
250,000. LGC-IRR.
The province of There appears neither
Dinagat did not comply with rhyme nor reason why this
land area requirement, it being exemption should apply to cities
composed of two or more and municipalities, but not to
island. The Republic argues provinces. In fact, considering
that there is an exemption to the physical configuration of the
the land area requirement if Philippine archipelago, there is a
the province is composed of greater likelihood that islands or
two or more islands, pursuant group of islands would form
to Article 9(2) of the Rules and part of the land area of a newly-
Regulations Implementing the created province than in most
LGC. cities or municipalities.
The SC first decided It is, therefore, logical to infer
 LACEDA v. LIMENA DE FACTO CORPORATIONS
that the genuine legislative its creation
Summary: The Municipality
policy decision was expressed can be
of Malabang filed an action
in Section 442 (for found in
for prohibition to nullify EO
municipalities) and Section some other
386, the EO which created
450 (for component cities) of valid law or
the municipality of
the LGC, but was in the
Balabagan. Malabang relies
INADVERTENTLY OMITTED recognition
on the cases of Pelaezand
in Section 461. of its
San Joaquin, and argues that
potential
EO 386 is invalid because
existence
the President does not have
by the
the power to create
general
municipalities, given that
laws or
Sec.68 of the Admin. Code
constitution
giving him such power is
of the state.
unconstitutional.
2. There can be no
Respondent mayor of
de facto
Balabagan claim Pelaezdoes
municipal
not apply to this case
corporation
because Balabagan is a de
unless either
facto corporation. As such,
directly or
its existence cannot be
potentially, such
collaterally attacked (as
a de jure
what is being done in this
corporation is
case). The SC held that the
authorized by
municipality of Balabagan is
some legislative
NOT a de facto corporation.
fiat.
3. There can be no
Doctrine: In the cases where
color of
a de facto municipal authority in an
corporation was recognized unconstitutiona
as such despite the fact that l statute alone,
the statute creating it was the invalidity of
later invalidated, the which is
decisions could fairly be apparent on its
made to rest on the face.
consideration that there was 4. There can be no
some other valid law giving de facto
corporate vitality to the corporation
organization. created to take
the place of an
Principles which seem to existing de jure
reconcile the apparently corporation, as
conflicting US decisions: such
1. The COLOR OF organization
AUTHORITY would clearly be
requisite to the a usurper.
organization of
a de facto
municipal
corporation
may be:
 A valid law
enacted by the
legislature.
 An
unconstitut
ional law,
valid on its
face, which
has either
(a) been
upheld for a
time by the
courts or
(b) not yet
been
declared
void;
provided
that a
warrant for
 CANDIJAY v. CA PLEBISCITE
December 28, 1995
Plebiscite is an ABSOLUTE REQUIREMENT
Summary: The Municipality of Candijay is claiming certain barrios in the - Once LGU is created, divided, merged, abolished, or its
Municipality of Alicia. One of Candijay’s arguments is that Alicia lacks a boundaries substantially altered, a plebiscite must be
juridical personality since E.O. 265 creating Alicia is null and void, conducted by the COMELEC
inasmuch as Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code, on which - When?
said Executive Order was based, constituted an undue delegation of a. On the date fixed by law or ordinance, or
legislative powers to the President and was declared unconstitutional, b. Within 120 days from its effectivity
per the SC’s ruling in Pelaez vs. Auditor General.
Breakdown of Sec. 10, LGC: Plebiscite Requirement
Doctrine: The case of Municipality of San Narciso, Quezon vs. Mendez, Sr No creation, division, merger, abolition, or substantial alteration of
is applicable. Section 442(d) of the Local Government Code to the effect boundaries of LGUs shall take effect UNLESS approved by a majority of
that municipal districts "organized pursuant to presidential issuances the votes cast in a plebiscite
or executive orders and which have their respective sets of elective 1. Plebiscite called for that purpose
municipal officials holding office at the time of the effectivity of the 2. In the political unit/s directly affected
Code shall henceforth be considered as regular municipalities." Section 3. Conducted by the COMELEC:
442 (d) of the Local Government Code was not argued to be a. Within 120 days from effectivity of law or ordinance
unconstitutional. The power to create political subdivisions is a effecting such action
function of the legislature. Congress did just that when it has b. Unless said law or ordinance fixes another date
incorporated Section 442(d) in the Code. Curative laws are validly
accepted in this jurisdiction, subject to the usual qualification against Mandatory Requirement
impairment of vested rights. Inasmuch as Alicia is similarly situated as - Mandated by the LGC and the Constitution
the municipality of San Andres, it should likewise benefit from the - Rationale: To check the power of Congress or the LGU
effects of Section 442 (d) of the Local Government Code, and should concerned to carry out such functions
henceforth be considered as a regular, de jure municipality. - In Tan v. Comelec the LGUs directly affected should
participate in the plebiscite
 This means, in that case, the new province and the
JIMENEZ v. BAZ parent province
December 2, 1996 - Also remember that plebiscite concerns LGUs, not
administrative regions (see Abbas)
Summary: Seeking to win a territorial dispute, Jimenez assailed the legal
existence of Sinacaban, arguing that, since it was created through an EO,
it cannot have legal existence. It cited Pelaez v. Auditor General, which TOBIAS v. ABALOS
ruled that creation of municipalities is essentially legislative. The RTC December 8, 1994
and the SC, however, ruled that (1) since 40 years have lapsed since its
supposed creation, (2) no quo warranto proceedings were instituted Summary: The municipalities of Mandaluyong and San Juan belonged to
against it after Pelaez was decided, (3) the Constitution, through the only one legislative district. The incumbent congressional
appended Ordinance, made it part of a legislative district, (4) it was representative sponsored the bill which eventually became R.A. No.
made part of an MCTC, and (5) by virtue of Section 442(4), LGC of 1991, 7675 known as "An Act Converting the Municipality of Mandaluyong
its previously de facto status has become de jure. into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City of Mandaluyong."
Pursuant to the Local Government Code of 1991, a plebiscite was held
Doctrine: Where a municipality created by executive order is later and the people were asked whether they approved of the conversion of
impliedly recognized and its acts are accorded legal validity, its creation the Municipality of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city. Majority
can no longer be questioned. voted yes, thus R.A. No. 7675 was deemed ratified and in effect.
Petitioners assail the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7675. They
contend that it is a violation of the three specific provisions of the
Constitution which are Article 6, Sec 26(1), Sec 5(1) and Sec 4.

Doctrine: Petitioners contend that the people of San Juan should have
been made to participate in the plebiscite on R.A. No. 7675 as the same
involved a change in their legislative district.

The contention is bereft of merit since the principal subject involved in

the plebiscite was the conversion of Mandaluyong into a highly
urbanized city. The matter of separate district representation was only
ancillary thereto. Thus, the inhabitants of San Juan were properly
excluded from the said plebiscite as they had nothing to do with the
change of status of neighboring Mandaluyong.

PASIG v. COMELEC
September 10, 1999

Summary: The City Council of Pasig passed two ordinances creating two
barangays. Two separate plebiscites for the creation of the two
barangays were scheduled on two different dates. The Municipality of
Cainta moved to suspend or cancel the respective plebiscites scheduled
by filing a petition with the COMELEC. The Municipality of Cainta called
the attention o the COMELEC to a pending case before the RTC of
Antipolo for settlement of boundary dispute. According to the
Municipality of Cainta, the proposed barangays encroached upon areas
within its own jurisdiction/territory while the City of Pasig claims these
the Constitution requires the approval of the people "in the political
areas as part of its jurisdiction/territory. The COMELEC ruled in favor
units directly affected."
of Cainta and suspended one of the plebiscites but dismissed the
petition with respect to the other barangay for being moot because the
Section 10, Article X addressed the undesirable practice in the past
plebiscite was already held. The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the
whereby local government units were created, abolished, merged or
Municipality of Cainta and upheld the validity of the suspension
divided on the basis of the vagaries of politics and not of the welfare of
ordered by the COMELEC.
the people. Thus, the consent of the people of the local government unit
directly affected was required to serve as a checking mechanism.
Doctrine: A requisite for the creation of a barangay is for its territorial
jurisdiction to be properly identified by metes and bounds or by more
Class Notes: Sir does not really agree with this case
or less permanent natural boundaries. If there is a controversy with
1. First we need to distinguish:
respect to the territorial boundaries of a local government unit, then it
a. Plebiscite is a political requirement – a check for
is a prejudicial issue that must be resolved first before the creation of
Congress
an LGU.
b. The economic aspect is to test the viability of the
proposed LGU
2. Second, “Conversion” is not in the law requiring plebiscite
a. Not really convinced on the “common” denominator
MARIANO v. COMELEC argument of the SC
March 7, 1995
Summary: The constitutionality of the provisions of RA 7854 (An Act
Converting the Municipality of Makati into a Highly Urbanized City to be
SAMSON v. AGUIRRE
known as City of Makati) were attacked in two petitions. The SC upheld
September 22, 1999
the constitutionality of the statute.
Summary: A QC Councilor challenges the validity of RA 8535 (creating
Doctrine: (On defining the territorial boundaries of LGUs) The Novaliches City) for violating the LGC and its Implementing Rules. SC:
importance of drawing with precise strokes the territorial boundaries Petitioner has failed to present clear and convincing proof to defeat the
of a LGU cannot be overemphasized. Boundaries must be clear for they presumption of constitutionality of the RA.
define the limits of the territorial jurisdiction of LGU. It can legitimately
exercise powers of government only within the limits of its jurisdiction; Doctrine: In the plebiscite under RA 8535, all persons concerned will
beyond this, its acts are ultra vires. Any uncertainty in the boundaries of obviously have the opportunity to raise issues even before they vote on
LGUs will sow costly conflicts in the exercise of governmental powers the principal question of the cityhood of Novaliches.
which will prejudice people’s welfare. This is the evil sought to be RA 8535 does not provide for a seat of government.
avoided by the LGC in requiring that the land area must be spelled out However, this omission is not as fatal to the validity as Samson makes it
in metes and bounds with technical descriptions to be. We agree with respondents that under Sec. 12 of the LGC, which
applies to the proposed City by virtue of Sec. 54 of RA 8535, the City
(On legislative districts) These issues have been addressed in Tobias v. can still establish a seat of government after its creation.
Abalos. Reapportionment of legislative districts may be made through a
special law, such as the charter of a new city. The Constitution clearly There is no need to consider the land area, since under the LGC, the
provides that Congress shall be composed of not more than 250 proposed city must comply with requirements as regards income, and
members, unless otherwise fixed by law (Art. VI, Sec. 5(1)). Constitution population OR land area.
did not preclude Congress from increasing its membership by passing a
law, other than a general reapportionment law. The statements made by officials in their official capacity could serve
the same purpose contemplated by law requiring certificates. Their
affirmation and oath in open session in the Senate/ HOR give greater
MIRANDA v. AGUIRRE solemnity than a certification given routinely.
September 16, 1999

Summary: The petitioners in this case are the Mayor and other local
officials of City of Santiago. They were assailing the constitutionality of
the RA 8528, converting the City of Santiago from an independent city
into a component city, insofar as it does not provide for a plebiscite. SC
ruled RA 8528 unconstitutional. It held that a change in the LGU which
would substantially affect the political and economic rights of its citizen
requires the approval of the people in the political units directly
affected. For one, the independence of the city as a political unit will be
diminished. The city mayor will be placed under the administrative
supervision of the provincial governor. The resolutions and ordinances
of the city council of Santiago will have to be reviewed by the Provincial
Board of Isabela. Taxes that will be collected by the city will now have
to be shared with the province.

Doctrine: The IRR of the LGC of 1991, pertaining to the requirement of

plebiscite, covers all conversions, whether upward or downward in
character, so long as they result in a material change in the local
government unit directly affected, especially a change in the political
and economic rights of its people.

In Section 10, Article X of the Constitution, the creation, division,

merger, abolition or substantial alteration of boundaries of local
government units involve a common denominator — material change in
the political and economic rights of the local government units directly
affected as well as the people therein. It is precisely for this reason that
 DOWNGRADING, DIVISION, MERGER7
subjected to a plebiscite. (Sultan Usman Sarangani vs
COMELEC)
Downgrading – Falls within the meaning of creation, division, merger,
abolition, or substantial alteration, hence, ratification in a plebiscite is
Remember: Dissolution does not occur due to:
necessary
1. Non-user or surrender of charter
- There is a material change in the political and economic
2. Failure to elect municipal officers
rights of the LGUs inhabitants as well as its budget, and thus
3. Change of sovereignty
reasonable to require consent of affected population
4. Change of name
(Miranda v. Aguirre)
- Effects of downgrading (from independent component city to
component city):
1. City mayor will be placed under administrative SULTAN USMAN SARANGANI v. COMELEC
supervision of Governor June 26, 2000
2. Resolutions and ordinances will have to be reviewed by
Summary: A petition for annulment of several precincts in Madalum,
the Provincial Board
Lanao del Sur was filed w Comelec. Comelec conducted an ocular
3. Taxes will have to be shared by the province
inspection on the alleged Brgy. Padian Torogan and they found out that
there were only two structures both uninhabitable and that the people
Division and Merger - Division and merger shall comply with the same
claimed that they were not registered voters or residents of the area.
requirements prescribed for their creation:
Comelec declared the precinct in Brgy. Padian Torogan as a ghost
- Provided: such division shall no reduce the income,
precinct. The former mayor, incumbent mayor and vice mayor of
population, or land area of the LGU concerned to less than
Madalum filed an instant petition for certiorari and mandamus. SC
the minimum requirements prescribed;
upheld the Comelec.
- Provided: the income classification of the original LGU shall
not fall below its current classification prior to the division;
Doctrine: Under the Local Government Code of 1991, the abolition of an
LGU may be done by congress in the case of a province, city,
- Effects of MERGER:
municipality or any other political subdivision. In the case of a
1. Legal existence and right of office of the annexed LGU
barangay, except in Metropolitan Manila area and in cultural
are terminated
communities, it may be done by the Sangguniang Panglalawigan or
2. Laws and ordinances of the annexing LGU shall prevail
Sangguinang panglungsod concerned subject to the mandatory
3. Title to property is acquired by the annexing LGU
requirement of a plebiscite conducted for the purpose in the political
4. Debts are assumed by the annexing LGU
units affected
- Effects of DIVISION
1. The legal existence of the original LGU is extinguished
2. The property, rights, and powers are acquired by the SALVA v. MAKALINTAL
September 18, 2000
dividing LGUs
Summary: The Sangguniang Panglalawigan of Batangas enacted
ABOLITION
Ordinance No. 5 declaring the abolition of barangay San Rafael and its
merger with barangay Dacanlao, municipality of Calaca, Batangas. The
Breakdown of Sec. 9, LGC: Abolition of Local Government Units ordinance instructed COMELEC to conduct the required plebiscite. The
An LGU may be abolished when its income, population, or land area governor of Batangas vetoed the ordinance for not having the
has been irreversibly reduced to less than the minimum standards
attestations and certifications of the DOF, NSO and DENR as required by
prescribed for its creation
the Local Government Code. The veto was overriden by Resolution No.
- Certified by national agencies in Sec. 7 to Congress or to the
345 affirming its effectivity. Pursuant to the ordinance and resolution,
sanggunian concerned, as the case may be
COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 2987 providing for the rules and
regulations governing the conduct of the plebiscte scheduled on
Law or ordinance abolishing LGU shall specify the province, city,
February 28, 1998. The petitioners, who are officials and residents of
municipality, barangay with which the LGU sought to be abolished will
barangay San Rafael, filed a class suit before the RTC for the annulment
be incorporated or merged.
of the ordinance and resolutions. They filed an ex parte motion for the
Abolition of LGUs issuance of a TRO and/or preliminary injuction. The RTC dismissed the
- When minimum requirements for its creation are not met, motion for lack of jurisdiction. It ruled that any petition or action
the LGU MAY be abolished questioning an act, resolution or decision of COMELEC must be brought
- How done? before the SC. On Feb. 27, the petitioners filed this case in the SC with
1. Through an act of Congress prayer for a TRO. The next day, the plebiscite was held. The petitioners
a. In case of a province, city, municipality, or other argued that the RTC had jurisdiction to rule on their motion because the
political subdivision conduct of a plebiscite by the COMELEC is a ministerial duty not
2. Through the Sangguniang Panlalawigan or Panglungsod exclusively within the power of the SC to review. The respondents say
concerned that the petition is already moot. The SC ruled in favor of the petitioners
a. In case of a barangay and said the question on the validity of the COMELEC resolution may
- Note that with abolition, it must be specified to which LGU well be taken in an ordinary civil action before the trial courts.
the abolished LGU will be incorporated into
- Abolition: Doctrine: The issuance of a COMELEC Resolution for the conduct of a
1. Certified by the national agencies concerned to the plebiscite is a ministerial duty that is enjoined by law and is part and
Congress or the sanggunian, as the case may be. parcel of its administrative functions. It involves no exercise of
2. Does result in an automatic cessation of the LGU; discretionary authority on the part of COMELEC.
Congress or the sanggunian concerned must pass a law
or ordinance for the abolition, and such must be

7 Not in the syllabus but this discussion is helpful

 INCOME
enact a contrary law and deem it amendatory to the
LGC
ALVAREZ v. GUINGONA - If we compare this to Torralba (see page 16):
January 31, 1996
 Note that prior to the LGC enactment, creation of LGU is
plenary
Summary: RA 7720 was passed converting the municipality of Santiago
into an independent component city. The petitioners are assailing the  Now, the LGC limits the power by specifying the
constitutionality of the RA on the ground that the income of Santiago, requirements
after deducting the IRA, does not meet the 20M minimum income - As to the whether the P100M is proper
requirement for conversion. The SC ruled that the IRA should be  Argue that it goes into the wisdom of the law!
included in the computation of the income.

Doctrine: The IRAs are items of income because they form part of the
gross accretion of the funds of the local government unit. The IRAs
regularly and automatically accrue to the local treasury without need of
any further action on the part of the local government unit. They thus
constitute income which the local government can invariably rely upon
as the source of much needed funds.

LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES v. COMELEC

June 28, 2011

Summary: 57 bills seeking the conversion of municipalities into

component cities were filed before the House of Representatives.
However, Congress acted only on 33 bills. It did not act on bills
converting 24 other municipalities into cities. During the 12th
Congress, R.A. No. 9009 became effective revising Section 450 of the
Local Government Code. It increased the income requirement to qualify
for conversion into a city from P20 million annual income to P100
million locally-generated income. In the 13th Congress, 16 of the 24
municipalities filed, through their respective sponsors, individual
cityhood bills. Each of the cityhood bills contained a common provision
exempting the particular municipality from the 100 million income
requirement imposed by R.A. No. 9009. After the Court changed its
mind several times, it finally upheld the constitutionality of the
cityhood laws. However, Justice Carpio and Justice Sereno dissented.

Doctrine: A second motion for reconsideration is not allowed.

The dissents are more important:

[Carpio, J. Dissenting]
The creation of local government units must follow the criteria
established in the Local Government Code itself and not in any other
law.

The Legislature, in enacting RA No. 9009, is not required by the

Constitution to show the courts data like inflation figures to support the
increased income requirement. As long as the increased income
requirement is not impossible to comply, such increase is a policy
determination involving the wisdom of the law, which exclusively lies
within the province of the Legislature.

The Constitution expressly requires Congress to stipulate in the Local

Government Code itself all the criteria necessary for the creation of a
city, including the conversion of a municipality into a city. To avoid
discrimination and ensure uniformity and equality, such criteria cannot
be embodied in any other law except the Local Government Code

[Sereno, J. Dissenting]
The Constitution did not preclude Congress from revising the standards
imposed under the LGC. Congress shall enjoy the freedom to reconsider
the minimum standards under the LGC, if future circumstances call for
it. However, the method of revising the criteria must be directly done
through an amendatory law of the LGC (such as RA 9009), and not
through the indirect route of creating cities and exempting their
compliance with the established and prevailing standards.

Class Notes:
- See Dissent of Carpio
 Under the majority’s ruling it seems like we need not
follow the LGC anymore since Congress can always
 POPULATION SUB-PROVINCES

AQUINO III v. COMELEC Relevant Provisions:

April 7, 2010 1. Art. XVIII, Sec. 9
 A sub-province shall continue to exist and operate until
Summary: Petitioners assail the constitutionality of RA 9716 which it is converted into a regular province or until its
reapportioned the composition of the legislative districts in the component municipalities are reverted to the mother
Province of CamSur and created a new legislative district. With the new province
grouping, the proposed first district will have a population of less than 2. Sec. 462, LGC on existing sub-provinces
250,000. The Court upheld the validity of RA 9716, ruling that only a  Existing sub-provinces are converted into regular
city needs to meet the minimum population requirement of 250,000 for provinces upon approval by majority vote in a
it to be entitled to a legislative district. A province need not meet such plebiscite to be conducted simultaneously with national
minimum population requirement. elections following LGC effectivity
 New legislative districts created as a result of
Doctrine: While a province is entitled to at least a representative, with conversion shall continue to be represented in Congress
nothing mentioned about population, a city must first meet a by the representatives of the original districts UNTIL
population minimum of 250,000 to be entitled to a representative. own representatives shall have been elected in next
In the determination of the precise district within the regular congressional elections and qualified
province, population was not the only factor considered.  Incumbent elected officials of said subprovinces
converted into regular provinces shall continue to hold
Class Notes; See Dissent of Carpio office until June 30, 1992
- Representative democracy is impaired  Vacancies in the offices occupied by incumbent
- RA 9716 is unconstitutional for being repugnant to the clear elected officials, or resulting from expiration of
and precise standards in Sec. 5, Art. VI their terms in case of a negative vote in plebiscite
 Ratio is proportional representation shall be filled by appointment by President
 Minimum population of 250,000 per Legislative District  After effectivity of conversion, President shall fill
 Progressive ratio in increase of districts as up position of governor or newly-created province
population base increases through appointment if none has not yet been
- Legislators represent PEOPLE, not cities or provinces appointed;
 He shall also appoint vice-governor and other
members of sanggunian who shall hold office until
successors are elected in next regular elections
ALDABA v. COMELEC
January 25, 2010
Summary: This is an original
GRINO v. CO
action for Prohibition to
September 4
declare unconstitutional
Republic Act No. 9591 (RA Summary: Pursuant to the
9591), creating a legislative LGC which called for the
district for the city of Malolos, conversion of sub- provinces
Bulacan, for violating the into provinces upon approval
minimum population by a majority of the votes cast
requirement for the creation of in a plebiscite to be held in
a legislative district in a city the areas directly affected, a
because the population count plebiscite was conducted by
used as basis for the addition the Comelec for the
of a legislative district was conversion of the sub-
based on the undated province of Guimaras which
demographic projected
formed part of the 2nd district
population of Malabon issued of Guimaras. The ballot did
by Dir Alberto Miranda of the not contain any space or
NSO which states that by year provision for the election of
2010 the population would be the governor, vice-governor
250,000. Court declares that and the members of the
projection requirements Sangguniang Panlalawigan
should be strictly complied representing the second
with, or should be based on district of Iloilo. It only
actual figures instead, and the contained yes or no question
legislative seat shall be granted on whether to convert the
on the following election after sub-province to a province.
its attainment. The petitioners seek to assail
this for disenfranchising them
Doctrine: Population projection to vote for provincial officials
if used as a basis for the in case the conversion is
creation of a legislative district, rejected in the plebiscite. The
should be based on credible Court ruled that the issue is
sources certified by the NCSB, moot and academic because
or on actual figures and the the conversion was approved
legislative district shall take by majority in the plebiscite
effect on the election after the and the President shall
population has been attained. appoint, as he already did,
provincial officials in the
 POPULATION SUB-PROVINCES
newly created province province of Guimaras) shall
pursuant to the LGC. continue to be represented
by the provincial officials of
Doctrine: In a plebiscite for the original province (Iloilo)
the conversion of a sub- elected at large by
province to a province registered voters the
simultaneous with the province including the sub-
elections, in case of a province.ch
negative vote, the elected
officials of the sub- Class Notes:
province only shall be - The law (LGC) is
appointed by the really silent about
President. The law did not the matter on
provide that the President what will happen
shall also appoint if the conversion
provincial officials of the was rejected in
sub-province because, by a the plebiscite
negative vote, the people of - Now, there are no
the sub-province ( sub- more sub-provinces
SELECTION AND TRANSFER OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT SITE agree with respondents that under Sec. 12 of the LGC, which applies to
the proposed City by virtue of Sec. 54 of RA 8535, the City can still
establish a seat of government after its creation. For said Code already
Breakdown of Sec. 11, LGC: Selection and Transfer of Local
provides as follows:
Government Sites, Offices and Facilities
(a) Law or ordinance creating or merging LGUs shall specify
Sec. 12. Government Centers. — Provinces, cities, and municipalities
the seat of government from where governmental and
shall endeavor to establish a government center where offices,
corporate services shall be delivered; factors to take into
agencies, or branches of the National Government, local government
account:
units, or government-owned or-controlled corporations may, as far as
(1) Geographical centrality
practicable, be located. In designating such a center, the local
(2) Accessibility
government unit concerned shall take into account the existing facilities
(3) Availability of transportation and communication
of national and local agencies and offices which may serve as the
facilities
government center as contemplated under this Section. The National
(4) Drainage and sanitation
Government, local government unit or government-owned or-
(5) Development and economic progress
controlled corporation concerned shall bear the expenses for the
(6) Other relevant considerations
construction of its buildings and facilities in the government center.
(b) When conditions and developments in LGU have
While Section 12 speaks of the site of government centers, such site can
significantly changes subsequent to establishment of seat of
very well also be the seat of government, "from where governmental
government, LGU Sanggunian may transfer the same to a
and corporate service shall be delivered."
site better suited to its needs
(1) How?
 After public hearing
 Vote of 2/3 of its members
(2) No such transfer shall be made outside its territorial
boundaries
(3) Old site and its improvements may be disposed of by
sale or lease or converted to such other uses as the
Sanggunian may deem beneficial

(c) Local government offices and facilities shall not be

transferred, relocated, or converted to other uses, UNLESS
(1) Public hearings are first conducted AND
(2) Concurrence of MAJORITY of Sanggunian members

Seats or Capitals of LGUs – Sec. 11 deals with the physical location or

situs of the seats or capitals of LGUs
- This is determined by the law creating or merging LGUs
- Art. 7 IRR
 States that seat of a provincial government shall be
located in the capital town or city
 IRR is silent for city, municipality, or barangay
 So these LGUs may locate its seat anywhere at its
sound discretion

Transfer of LGU seat of government

- This is provided for in 2nd paragraph
 Note that the transfer must be within the territorial
boundaries after public hearings and 2/3 vote of
Sanggunian members

Transferring some offices and facilities

- The 3rd paragraph refers to a situation where NOT the entire
seat of government but only SOME local government offices
are sought to be transferred, relocated, or converted to other
uses
- These shall not be done without public hearing and a
majority vote of Sanggunian members

SAMSON v. AGUIRRE
September 22, 1999

Summary: A QC Councilor challenges the validity of RA 8535 (creating

Novaliches City) for violating the LGC and its Implementing Rules.
Petitioner argues that RA 8535 failed to specify the seat of government
of the proposed City of Novaliches as required by Sec. 11 of LGC. SC:
Petitioner has failed to present clear and convincing proof to defeat the
presumption of constitutionality of the RA. Omission of the seat of
government provision is not fatal.

Doctrine: RA 8535 does not provide for a seat of government. However,

this omission is not as fatal to the validity as Samson makes it to be. We
 POLITICAL AND CORPORATE NATURE OF LGUs TORIO v. FONTANILLA
October 23, 1978
Breakdown of Sec. 14, LGC: Beginning of Corporate Existence
When a new LGU is created, corporate existence shall commence: Summary: During the staging of the zarzuela at the Malasiqui town
1. Upon election and qualification of: fiesta, Fontanilla, a performer, was pinned underneath the stage. The
a. Its chief executive, and accident caused his death. His heirs sue the Municipality and members
b. Majority of the members of its sanggunian of the Municipal Council therefor. The SC found the Municipality liable,
2. UNLESS: some other time is fixed therefor by the law or but not the Councilors.
ordinance creating it
Doctrine: The distinction of powers (governmental/ proprietary) is
Start of Corporate Life of LGU important for purposes of determining the liability of a municipality for
1. It begins on the date specified by the law or ordinance the acts of its agents which result in an injury to third persons.
creating it If the injury is caused in the course of the performance of a
2. If law or ordinance is silent: governmental function or duty, no recovery, as a rule, can be had from
a. Then it begins with the election and assumption of the municipality unless there is an existing statute on the matter, nor
office by its chief executive and majority of sanggunian from its officers, so long as they performed their duties honestly and in
members good faith or that they did not act wantonly and maliciously.
With respect to proprietary functions, the rule is that a municipal
Meaning of Elections corporation can be held liable to third persons ex contractu or ex
- Not only receiving the highest number of votes delicto.
- But also their proclamation
Class Notes:
Meaning of Qualification 1. Sec. 22 now allows LGUs to sue and be sued
- Meaning that the local officials have assumed office  So no issue when the LGU invokes immunity since LGUs
are now expressly allowed to sue and be sued
Breakdown of Sec. 15, LGC: Political and Corporate Nature of LGUs Every 2. So what can we do?
LGU created or recognized under the LGC is a body politic and  Sue the councilmen and allege bad faith
corporate
1. Endowed with powers to be exercised in conformity with la CITY OF MANILA v. IAC
2. It shall exercise powers as: November 15, 1989
a. A political subdivision of the national government, and
b. A corporate entity representing the inhabitants of its Summary: Vivencio Sto. Domingo, Sr. died on June 4,1971 and was
territory buried in lot No. 159 of the North Cemetery which was leased by the
city to Irene Sto. Domingo for the period from June 6, 1971 to June 6,
LGUs’ Dual Personality – Political AND Corporate 202. In accordance with Administrative Order No. 5 of 1975, of the City
Mayor of Manila Lot 159 in which the remains of the late Vivencio Sto.
POLITICAL CORPORATE Domingo were laid to rest, believed to have been leased to the bereaved
Political units of government family for 5 years only, was certified on January 1978 as ready for
Proprietary powers exhumation. The authorities of the North Cemetery placed the bones
Agents of national government
and skull of deceased in a bag or sack and kept the same in the
Exercised in administering the
Performed for the benefit of their depository or bodega of the cemetery. The lot was rented out to another
powers of the state and
constituents lessee so that when the plaintiffs went to said lot the resting place of
promoting public welfare
Legislative, judicial, public, and their departed did not anymore bear the stone marker.. The widow and
political Ministerial, private, and corporate children of the late Sto. Domingo, Sr. filed an action for damages against
the City of Manila and officers of the North Cemetery. Trial Court
ordered the defendants to give the family the right to make use of
another single lot for a period of 43 years 4 months and 11 days and to
LIDASAN v. COMELEC
search, for the remains and to bury the same in the substitute lot. CA
October 25, 1991
modified the decision ordering defendants to pay the family jointly and
Summary: RA 4790. entitled "An Act Creating the Municipality of severally P10,000.00 for breach of contract, P20,000.00 for moral
Dianaton in the Province of Lanao del Sur,” was enacted. It was later damages, P20,000.00 for exemplary damages, P10,000.00 as and for
learned that barrios Togaig, Madalum ,Bayanga, Langkong, Sarakan, attorney's fees. SC affirmed the IAC decision.
Kat-bo, Digakapan, Magabo, Tabangao, Tiongko, Colodan and
Kabamakawan of Dianaton are located in another province, Cotabato, Doctrine: City of Manila is a political body corporate and as such
which brought a change in the boundaries of the two provinces (Lanao endowed with the faculties of municipal corporations to be exercised by
del Sur and Cotabato). The bill was attacked by a citizen of the detached and through its city government in conformity with law, and in its
barrios on the ground of the one-title, one-bill doctrine. The SC agreed proper corporate name. It may sue and be sued, and contract and be
that this doctrine was violated, since the title was misleading and it did contracted with. Its powers are twofold in character-public,
not appraise the legislature and the citizens that the province of governmental or political on the one hand, and corporate, private and
Cotabato was affected. proprietary on the other. Governmental powers are those exercised in
administering the powers of the state and promoting the public welfare
Doctrine: Transfer of a sizeable portion of territory from one province and they include the legislative, judicial, public and political. Municipal
to another of necessity involves reduction of area, population and powers on the one hand are exercised for the special benefit and
income of the first and the corresponding increase of those of the other. advantage of the community and include those which are ministerial,
This is as important as the creation of a municipality. The title of a law private and corporate.
must express which provinces will be affected by it.
Class Notes: There is now a provision granting LGU control over private
cemeteries.
- What is the effect of this provision on the case? (hanging
question)
 MACASIANO v. DIOKNO
August 10, 1992

Summary: The Municipality of Parañ aque passed an ordinance which

authorized the closure of certain streets for the establishment of a flea
market thereon. On August 8, 1990, the Municipality and Palanyag
cooperative, entered into an agreement whereby the latter shall
operate, maintain and manage the flea market in the aforementioned
streets. Brig. Gen. Macasiano, PNP Superintendent, ordered the
destruction and confiscation of stalls belonging to Palanyag. Hence, the
Municipality and Palanyag filed with the trial court a joint petition to
enjoin Brig. Gen Macasiano from enforcing his order. The RTC ruled in
favor of the Municipality and upheld its ordinance. The SC reversed.

Doctrine: On the exercise of powers by the LGU as a body politic or

corporate entity: Verily, the powers of a local government unit are not
absolute. They are subject to limitations laid down by the Constitution
and the laws such as our Civil Code. It is only when the property is
patrimonial, that the Municipality can "use or convey them for any
purpose for which other real property belonging to the local unit
concerned might be lawfully used or conveyed." This is because
properties of the local government which are devoted to public service
are deemed PUBLIC and are under the absolute CONTROL of
CONGRESS.

On the law applicable to contracts entered into by the LGU as a corporate

entity: On August 10, 1992, the Court found it worthy to note that BP
Blg. 337, or the LGC Code, has already been repealed by RA 7160 or the
LGC of 1991 which took effect on January 1, 1992. Section 5(d) of the
new Code provides that rights and obligations existing on the date of
effectivity of the new Code and arising out of contracts or any other
source of prestation involving a local government unit shall be
governed by the original terms and conditions of the said contracts or
the law in force at the time such rights were vested.
 GENERAL WELFARE CLAUSE - Exercise of police power is subject to due process clause
 Exercise of police power must conform to the
requirements of due process
Breakdown of Sec. 16, LGC: General Welfare
- Thus, LGU is considered to have exercised its police powers
1. Every LGU shall exercise the powers:
only when (Parayno v. Mun. of Calasiao):
a. Expressly granted,
1. Interests of the public generally, as distinguished from
b. Those necessarily implied,
those of a particular class, require the interference of
c. As well as powers necessary, appropriate or incidental
State, and
for its efficient and effective governance, and
2. Means employed are reasonably necessary for the
d. Those which are essential to the promotion of the
attainment of the object sought to be accomplished and
general welfare
not unduly oppressive
2. Within their respective territorial jurisdictions, LGUs shall:
Limitations:
a. Ensure and support, among other things, preservation
1. GWC cannot be used to justify an act not authorized by law
and enrichment of culture
2. Exercise of such must be via a valid ordinance (Tatel v.
b. Promote health and safety
Municipality of Virac):
c. Enhance the right of the people to a balanced ecology
a. Not contrary to Constitution or statute
d. Encourage and support the development of
b. Not unfair or oppressive
appropriate and self-reliant scientific and
c. Not partial or discriminatory
technological capabilities,
d. Not unreasonable; must be consistent with public policy
e. Improve public morals
f. Enhance economic prosperity and social justice.
Special Laws cited in the Syllabus
g. Promote full employment among their residents
1. RA 8369 (1997) - Family Courts Act
h. Maintain peace and order, and
a. Sec. 8 – Judge of the Family Court shall have direct
i. Preserve the comfort and convenience of their
control and supervision of the youth detention home
inhabitants
which the LGU shall establish to separate youth
offenders from adult criminals
Other LGC Provisions:
b. Sec. 11 – in areas with no Family Courts, DSWD shall
1. Sec. 391 – powers, duties, functions of the sangguniang
designate and assign qualified, trained, and DSWD
barangay as the legislative body of the barangay
2. Sec. 447- powers, duties, functions, and compensation of the accredited social workers of the LGUs to handle juvenile
sangguniang bayan, as the legislative body of the and family cases
municipality
3. Sec. 458 – powers, duties, functions, and compensation of the 2. RA 8425 (1997) – Social Reform and Poverty Alleviation Act
sangguniang panglungsod, as the legislative body of the city a. Sec. 12 – LGUs, through local development councils,
4. Sec. 468 – powers, duties, functions, and compensation of the shall be responsible for formulation, implementation,
sangguniang panlalawigan, as the legislative body of the monitoring, evaluation of National Anti-Poverty Action
province Agenda
b. LGUs shall:
All-Purpose Clause Sec. 16 is the general welfare clause (1) Identify the poor in their respective areas based
- This authorizes the LGU to do just about anything that will on indicators
benefit their constituencies (2) Identify and source funding for specific social
reform and poverty alleviation projects
Nature - The police power of a municipal corporation extends to all (3) Coordinate, monitor, evaluate efforts of LGUs with
great public needs, and includes all legislation and functions of the private sector on planning and implementation of
municipal government. The drift is towards social welfare legislation local action
geared towards state policies to provide adequate social services, the (4) Coordinate and submit progress reports to
promotion of general welfare, and social justice. (Binay v. Domingo) National Anti-Poverty Commission

The two branches of general welfare clause 3. RA 8435 (1997) – Agriculture and Fisheries Modernization
1. General Legislative Power Act
a. Sec. 90 – LGUs shall be responsible for delivering
 Authorizes municipal council to enact ordinances and
agriculture and fisheries extension services
make regulations not repugnant to law, as may be
b. Sec. 99 – Replication of program shall be the
necessary to carry into effect and discharge the powers
responsibility of LGUs concerned in collaboration with
and duties conferred upon the municipal council by law
2. Police Power Proper appropriate government agencies and private sectors
c. Sec. 101 – appropriate government agencies, under the
 Authorizes the municipality to enact ordinances as may
leadership of LGUs, shall provide integrated services
be necessary and proper for the health, safety,
and information to prospective enterprises under the
prosperity, morals, peace, good order, comfort, and
one-stop-shop concept; costs carried by LGU
convenience of the municipality and its inhabitants, and
for the protection of their property
4. RA 8550 (1998) – Philippine Fisheries Code
a. Sec. 16 – Municipal/city government shall have
Police Power
jurisdiction over municipal waters; LGUs shall enforce
- NOTE that police power of LGUs is a delegated power
all fishery laws, rules, and regulations as well as valid
 It is delegated via Sec. 16, LGC
fishery ordinances
 Municipal governments exercise police power through b. Sec. 17 – duly registered fisherfolk
the general welfare clause (Binay v. Domingo) organizations/cooperative shall have preference in the
 Police power of LGUs is broad and has been said to grant of fishery rights by the municipal/city council
be commensurate with, but not to exceed, the duty pursuant to Sec. 149, LGC
to provide for the real needs of the people in their c. Sec. 18 – municipal/city government may, through local
health, safety, comfort, and convenience as chief executive pursuant to appropriate ordinance,
consistently as may be with private rights authorize or permit small and medium commercial
 fishing vessels to operate within 10.1 to 15km area
- Police power does not apply:
from shoreline in municipal waters subject to
conditions 1. Prohibition of operation of night clubs, as it is a lawful
d. Sec. 19 – LGU to maintain a registry of municipal trade or pursuit of occupation;
fisherfild, who are fishing or may desire to fish in 2. Rescinding of mayor's permits based on arbitrary
municipal waters for purpose of determining priorities grounds;
among them, of limiting entry to municipal waters, and
of monitoring fishing activities and/or other related
purposes US v. SALAVERIA
e. Sec. 22 – LGU shall grant demarcated fishery rights to November 12, 1918
fishery organization/cooperatives for mariculture
operation Summary: Salaveria, a justice of the peace in Orion, Bataan, was found
f. Sec. 23 – Whenever LGU and Department determine guilty of violating Ordinance No. 3, an ordinance enacted by Orion’s
that a municipal water is overfished and that there is a municipal council, prohibiting the playing of panguingueon days not
need to regenerate the fishery resources, LGU shall Sundays or legal holidays. Salaveria questions the validity of the
prohibit or limit fishery activities in said waters Ordinance before the SC. The SC upheld the validity of the Ordinance by
g. Sec. 24 – Department and LGUs shall provide support virtue of the general police power of the municipal corporation to
to municipal fisherfolk suppress gambling.

5. RA 8975 (2000) – Act to ensure expeditious implementation Doctrine: Like the State, the police power of a municipal corporation
and completion of government infrastructure projects extends to all matters affecting the peace, order, health, morals,
a. Sec. 3 – No court, except SC, shall issue any TRO, convenience, comfort, and safety of its citizens — the security of social
preliminary injunction or preliminary mandatory order — the best and highest interests of the municipality (Case
injunction against the government, or any of its vs. Board of Health of Manila and Heiser). Within the general police
subdivisions, officials, or any person or entity, public or powers of a municipal corporation is the suppression of gambling.
private acting under government direction, to restrain, Hence, Ordinances aimed in a reasonable way at the accomplishment of
prohibit, or compel the following acts: this purpose are undoubtedly valid. Under the general welfare clause a
(1) Acquisition, clearance and development of the city may pass an ordinance prohibiting gambling in any private house.
right-of-way and/or site or location of any
national government project;
(2) Bidding or awarding of contract/ project of the VIRAY v. CALOOCAN
national government as defined under Section 2 July 26, 1967
hereof;
(3) Commencement prosecution, execution, Summary: The Municipal Board of Caloocan City enacted Ordinance No.
implementation, operation of any such contract or 94 which imposes (1) fee for the exhumation of the remains and (2)
project; transfer permit fee or an entrance fee on cadavers coming from places
(4) Termination or rescission of any such outside Caloocan, sought to be buried in private cemeteries within
contract/project; and Caloocan. Some residents of the Manila sought to bury their relatives in
Caloocan. They were charged by the City Treasurer of Caloocan
(5) The undertaking or authorization of any other
"entrance fees" which they paid. Thereafter, they sought refund from
lawful activity necessary for such contract/project.
the City Treasurer which was refused. Hence, they filed the action in the
CFI of Caloocan against the city government, its Mayor and Treasurer,
6. RA 9275 (2004) – Clean Water Act
contesting the legality of the city ordinance. The SC ruled that the
a. Sec. 20 – LGUs shall share responsibility in management
ordinance is ultra vires and void for violation of the Equal Protection
and improvement of water quality within their
Clause. The ordinance unjustifiably discriminates against private
territorial jurisdiction
cemeteries.
 Each LGU shall prepare a compliance scheme
within 6 months after establishment of water
Doctrine: Although the ordinance which regulates the exhumation
quality management area action plan
and/or transfer of corpses from other burial grounds to those located in
the City of Caloocan is within the legislative power of the city
7. RA 10121 (2009) – Disaster Risk Reduction Management Act
government to enact, the imposition of the transfer fees on the
a. Sec. 11 –Existing Disaster Coordinating Councils (of
interment of the respective dead relatives was not justified.
LGUs) shall be known as the Risk Reduction and
Management Councils
(Own interpretation of the case) While a city may regulate certain
 Barangay Disaster Coordinating Councils shall
activities under the general welfare clause, it does not follow that they
cease to exist; functions assumed by existing
can impose taxes or fees on them. The power of taxation is limited to
Barangay Development Councils
“persons engaged in any occupation or business, or exercising
b. Sec. 12 –a Local Disaster Risk Reduction and
privileges in chartered cities or municipalities.”
Management Office is established in every province,
city, and municipality

Some Examples: BALACUIT v. CFI-AGUSAN and BUTUAN CITY

- Police power applied: June 30, 1988
1. Prescribing zoning and classification of merchandise
sold in the public market; Summary: The City of Butuan enacted an ordinance that prohibited
2. Condemnation and demolition if buildings found to be theaters from charging the full price of their tickets, intended for adults,
dangerous or ruinous condition; on children and should only charge the latter for half price. The
3. Regulation and operation of tricycles and to grant managers of theater’s argued that such ordinance is unconstitutional
franchises for the operation thereof; for being oppressive and in restraint of trade and is beyond the power
4. Zoning regulations; of the City under its regulatory power and as well as its power under
5. Providing burial assistance to the poor; the general welfare clause in its Charter.
6. Enforcement of fishery laws within LGU waters;
Doctrine: The operation of theaters, cinematographs and other places of
PATALINGHUG v.CA
public exhibition are subject to regulation by the municipal council in
the exercise of delegated police power by the local government. To January 27, 1994
invoke the exercise of police power, not only must it appear that the
Summary: Petitioner Alfredo Patalinghug was issued a Building Permit
interest of the public generally requires an interference with private
for the construction of a funeral parlor in an area classified as a
rights, but the means adopted must be reasonably necessary for the
commercial zone under Ordinance No. 363, series of 1982 enacted by
accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon
the SangguniangPanlungsod of Davao. The said ordinance allows the
individuals.
construction and establishment of funeral parlors/memorial homes but
they have to have adequate off street parking space and that they shall
BINAY v. DOMINGO
be established not less than 50 meters from any residential structures,
September 11, 1991
churches, and other institutional buildings. The private respondents
filed a complaint for the declaration of nullity of a building permit with
Summary: The Makati Council approved Resolution No. 60 affirming the
preliminary prohibitory and mandatory injunction and/or restraining
Burial Assistance Program of Mayor Binay. When the Resolution was
order with the trial court. They allege that petitioner violated the
referred to the COA, it disallowed disbursement on the ground that (1)
ordinance because the funeral parlor was constructed within 50 meters
it is not a valid exercise of police power and (2) it does not have a public
from the IglesianiKristo Chapel and several residential structures. The
purpose. The SC set aside the COA decision, ruling that (1) police power,
trial court dismissed the complaint and found that the nearest
delegated to LGUs under the general welfare clause, is broad enough to
structure, albeit declared as residential for tax purposes, is being used
cover the Resolution, and (2) the Resolution has a public purpose and
for commercial purposes. The CA reversed and said the tax declaration
the fact that only the poor are qualified is consistent with the trend
is sufficient proof that the nearest structure is a residential one. The
toward social welfare legislation.
Supreme Court reversed the CA and reinstated the ruling of the trial
court.
Doctrine: A valid delegation of police power may arise from express
delegation, or be inferred from the mere fact of the creation of the
Doctrine: In order to promote the general welfare, the state may
municipal corporation; and as a general rule, municipal corporations
interfere with personal liberty, with property, and with business and
may exercise police powers within the fair intent and purpose of their
occupations. Thus, persons may be subjected to certain kinds of
creation which are reasonably proper to give effect to the powers
restraints and burdens in order to secure the general welfare of the
expressly granted, and statutes conferring powers on public
state and to this fundamental aim of government, the rights of the
corporations have been construed as empowering them to do the things
individual may be subordinated.
essential to the enjoyment of life and desirable for the safety of people.
CITY GOVERNMENT OF QUEZON CITY v. ERICTA
June 24, 1983
RURAL BANK OF MAKATI, INC. v.
MUNICIPALITY OF MAKATI power to regulate does not include the power to confiscate.
Summary: Ordinance No. 6118, S-64, was enacted by the City
Government of Quezon City. One of the provisions (Sec. 9) of said
Ordinance requires the private cemeteries to set aside at least 6% of the
total area of the memorial park cemetery for charity burial of deceased
persons who are paupers and have been residents of QC for at least 5
years prior to death. For several years, Sec. 9 was not enforced by the
authorities but seven years after the enactment of the ordinance, the
Quezon City Council passed a Resolution which states that any further
selling of memorial park lots in QC where the owners thereof have
failed to donate the requires 6% space intended for pauper burials shall
be stopped by the City Engineer. Respondent Himlayang Pilipino
reacted by filing a petition for declaratory relief before the CFI of Rizal.
The CFI ruled in favor of Himalayang Pilipino, declaring the said Section
of the Ordinance null and void. The argument of QC is that the said
Section of the Ordinance is in line with the State’s police power and the
local government’s local police power. Himlayang Pilipino argued that
the general welfare clause is not available as a source of power for the
taking of the property. The Supreme Court ruled in favor of Himlayang
Pilipino and stated that there is no reasonable connection between the
setting aside of at least 6% of the total area of private cemeteries and
the promotion of the general welfare of the people.

Doctrine: [The City Government of QC relies solely on the general

welfare clause or on implied powers of the municipal corporation, not
on any express provision of law as statutory basis of their exercise of
power. The clause has always received broad and liberal interpretation
but we cannot stretch it to cover this particular taking. ]

There is no reasonable relation between the setting aside of at least six

(1) percent of the total area of an private cemeteries for charity burial
grounds of deceased paupers and the promotion of health, morals, good
order, safety, or the general welfare of the people. The ordinance is
actually a taking without compensation of a certain area from a private
cemetery to benefit paupers who are charges of the municipal
corporation. Instead of building or maintaining a public cemetery for
this purpose, the city passes the burden to private cemeteries. The
power to regulate does not include the power to prohibit. A fortiori, the
Summary: The Municipality of Makati filed a complaint against the
Rural Bank of Makati (RBM) for non-payment of taxes and fees and
ordered the closure of the bank. RBM paid in protest and filed a civil
case for damages and refund of the amount paid. It argued that the
ordinance was an invalid exercise of police power and its right to due
process was violated. The RTC and CA held in favor of Makati. The SC
agreed but with modifications. SC held that the municipal ordinance
calling for payment of fees and taxes was a valid exercise of police
power under the general welfare clause but it found that the closure
order violated RBM’s right to due process since it was not one of the
remedies available to Makati for payment of delinquent taxes or fees.

Doctrine: Municipal corporations are agencies of the State for the

promotion and maintenance of local government and as such are
endowed with police powers in order to effectively accomplish and
carry out the declared objects of their creation

The general welfare clause has 2 branches:

1. First, General legislative power – authorizes the municipal
council to enact ordinances and make regulations not
repugnant to law, as may be necessary to carry into effect
and discharge the powers and duties conferred upon the
municipal council by law
2. Second, Police power proper – authorizes the municipality
to enact ordinances as may be necessary and proper for
the health and safety, prosperity, morals, peace, good
order, comfort, and convenience of the municipality and
its inhabitants, and for the protection of their property.

TAYABAN v. PEOPLE
Summary: Tayaban is the Mayor of Tinoc, Ifugao. He submitted a March 6, 2007
project proposal with the provincial governor for the construction of
a public market. This project was approved and to be funded by the
CEB. The construction commenced. The Sanggunian filed a resolution
ordering the demolition of the posts and other improvements on the
ground that they were not constructed on the location given. A
complaint was filed
against them for violation of Sec. 3, RA 3019. The petitioners justified
their acts on the ground of police power and general welfare clause. ABATEMENT OF NUISANCE
Sandiganbayan found them guilty. SC affirmed the Sandiganbayan
LGC Provisions:
ruling. 1. Sec. 447 – powers, duties, and functions of sannguniang
bayan; shall enact ordinances, approve resolutions and
Doctrine: The IRR of the LGC of 1991, pertaining to the requirement of appropriate funds for the general welfare of the municipality
plebiscite, covers all conversions, whether upward or downward in and its inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of LGC and in the
character, so long as they result in a material change in the local proper exercise of the corporate powers of the municipality
government unit directly affected, especially a change in the political as provided for under Section 22 of LGC
and economic rights of its people.  Sub-section (4) - Regulate activities relative to the use
of land, buildings and structures within the
General Welfare Clause applies to nuisances per se, or those which municipality in order to promote the general welfare
affect the immediate safety of persons and property and may be and for said purpose shall:
summarily abated under the undefined law of necessity.  Letter (i) – Declare, prevent, or abate ANY
nuisance
2. Sec. 458 – powers, duties, and functions of sangguniang
BAYAN v. ERMITA panglungsod
April 25, 2006  Substantially the same as in Sec. 447 above

Summary: The constitutionality of BP 880 (The Public Assembly Act of Special Laws cited in the Syllabus
1985) as well as the policy of CPR (Calibrated Preemptive Response) 1. RA 9165 – Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act
used to implement it, is challenged. Respondent Mayor Atienza, using a. Sec. 52 – Abatement of Drug Related Public Nuisance
the general welfare clause of the LGC, argues that the Mayor has the (1) Any place/premise which have been used on 2 or
power to deny a permit independently of the assailed BP 880. SC: The more occasions as site of unlawful sale or delivery
argument of respondent Mayor is not necessary to resolve in these of dangerous drugs MAY be declared to be a public
proceedings, and was not pursued by the parties in their arguments. nuisance
(2) Such nuisance may be abated; procedure:
Doctrine: Every local government unit shall exercise the powers (a) Any city or municipality may, by ordinance,
expressly granted, those necessarily implied therefrom, as well as create administrative board to hear
powers necessary, appropriate, or incidental for its efficient and complaints regarding nuisance
effective governance, and those which are essential to the promotion of (b) Any employee, officer, or resident of city or
the general welfare. Within their respective territorial jurisdictions, municipality may bring a complaint before
local government units shall ensure and support among other things, the Board
the preservation and enrichment of culture, promote health and safety, (c) After hearing, board may declare the place as
enhance the right of the people to a balanced ecology, encourage and a nuisance
support the development of appropriate and self-reliant scientific and b. Sec. 53 – Effect of Board Declaration
technological capabilities, improve public morals, enhance economic (1) If Board declares a place to be a public nuisance, it
prosperity and social justice, promote full employment among their may declare an order immediately prohibiting the
residents, maintain peace and order, and preserve the comfort and conduct, operation, or maintenance of any
convenience of their inhabitants. business or activity which is conducive to such
ordinance
(2) Order shall expire after 1 year; Board may bring a
complaint seeking permanent injunction
(3) This does not restrict the right of any person to
proceed under CC provisions

2. RA 8749 – Comprehensive Air Pollution Control Policy

a. Sec. 7 – creation of the Integrated Air Quality
Framework; LGU is a participant
b. Sec. 8 – after creation of framework, the Department,
with public participation, shall formulate and
implement an Air Quality Control Action Plan
 LGUs to submit a procedure for carrying out the
action plan for their jurisdiction
c. Sec. 9 – designation of airsheds; LGU coordination
d. Sec. 10 – Department to designate areas where specific
pollutants have already exceeded ambient standards as
non-attainment areas
 Consultation with LGUs, NGOs, POs, and concerned
sectors
e. Sec. 11 – Air quality control techniques; Department
conducts research and consults with LGUs to revise
information on air pollution control techniques
f. Sec. 16 – Department shall have authority to issue
permits for prevention and abatement of air pollution;
permits shall serve as management tools for LGUs in
developing their action plan
g. Sec. 20 – ban on incineration; LGUs mandated to
promote and implement a comprehensive ecological
waste management
h. Sec. 24 – LGUs to implement the prohibition of smoking
inside a public building or an enclosed public place
 i. Sec. 36 – LGUs to share in the responsibility in
e. Sec. 22 – LGU shall grant demarcated fishery rights to
management and maintenance of air quality within
fishery organization/cooperatives for mariculture
their territorial jurisdiction
operation
j. Sec. 37 – There may be established an Environmental
f. Sec. 23 – Whenever LGU and Department determine
and Natural Resources Office in every province, city, or
that a municipal water is overfished and that there is a
municipality
need to regenerate the fishery resources, LGU shall
k. Sec. 39 – continuing air quality information and
prohibit or limit fishery activities in said waters
education campaign
g. Sec. 24 – Department and LGUs shall provide support
to municipal fisherfolk
3. RA 9003 (2001) – Ecological Solid Waste Management Act
a. Sec. 10 – LGUs primarily responsible for
implementation and enforcement of this Act within TATEL v. VIRAC
their respective jurisdictions March 11, 1992
b. Sec. 11 – Provincial Solid Waste Management Board
Summary: The municipal government of Virac Catanduanes issued
shall be established in every province, to be chaired by
Ordinance 13 prohibiting the construction of warehouses near a block
the governor
of houses either in poblacion or barrios without maintaining the
c. Sec. 12 – Each city or municipality shall form a City or
necessary distance of 200 meters from said block of house to avoid loss
Municipal Waste Management board that shall prepare,
of lives and properties by accidental fire. It was passed due to finding
submit, and implement a plan for the safe and sanitary
that the warehouse owned by Tatel was a public nuisance (the machine
management of solid waste generated in areas under it
emitted smoke, obnoxious odor and dust). Tatel filed a petition against
d. Sec. 13 – Multi-purpose cooperatives and associations
it. CFI and SC held that Ordinance 13 is valid.
are to be established in every LGU
e. Sec. 16 – Province, city or municipality, through its local
Doctrine: (an ordinance can be validly enacted in order to abate a
solid waste management boards, shall prepare its
nuisance) For an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the
respective 10-yr solid waste management plans
corporate powers of the municipality to enact but must also be passed
consistent with national solid waste management
according to the procedure prescribed by law and must be in
framework
consonance with certain well established and basic principles of a
f. Sec. 17 – Components of the Local Government Solid
substantive nature.
Waste Management Plan
g. Sec. 19 – Department shall be responsible for the
These principles require that a municipal ordinance:
establishment of guidelines for correct characterization
(1) must not contravene the Constitution of any statute
of wastes; LGUs to coordinate
(2) must not be unfair or oppressive
h. Sec. 20 – Each LGU plan shall include an
(3) must not be partial or discriminatory
implementation schedule which shows that within 5
(4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade
years from Act effectivity, LGU shall divert at least 25%
(5) must be general and consistent with public policy and
of all solid waste from water disposal facilities
i. Sec. 21 – LGUs shall evaluate alternative roles for the (6) must not be unreasonable. Ordinance 13 meets these criteria.
public and private sectors in providing collection
services; mandatory segregation
j. Sec. 44 – LGUs are mandated to consolidate, or ESTATE OF FRANCISCO v. CA
coordinate their efforts, services and resources for August 10, 1992
purposes of jointly assessing common solid waste
management problems Summary: Gregoria Francisco owned a quonset building in Basilan that
k. Sec. 45 – incentive schemes to encourage LGUs stood on a lot owned by the Philippine Ports Authority. When she died,
l. Sec. 46 – LGUs entitled to avail of the Solid Waste a permit to occupy the land until December 31, 1989 was issued to her
Management Fund on the basis of their approved solid surviving spouse. On May 8, 1989 Mayor Valencia notified him to
waste management plan remove and relocate the quonset building, as it was located outside the
m. Sec. 47 – LGUs shall impose fees in amounts sufficient to zone for warehouses in Ordinance No. 147 which provided for a
pay the costs of preparing, adopting, and implementing comprehensive zoning regulation for the municipality. Since the
a solid waste management plan notifications were unheeded, the mayor ordered the demolition on May
24, 1989. The writ of prohibition sought for by the Estate of Francisco
4. RA 8550 – Philipine Fisheries Code was denied. The RTC reasoned that the mayor had power to order
a. Sec. 16 – Municipal/city government shall have demolition without judicial authority. The building was demolished on
jurisdiction over municipal waters; LGUs shall enforce Sept. 6, 1989. The CA initially reversed the RTC decision, saying that
all fishery laws, rules, and regulations as well as valid since it was not a nuisance per se, the mayor had no power to order
fishery ordinances summarily its demolition. This was reversed on MR, with the CA
b. Sec. 17 – duly registered fisherfolk reasoning that the deficiency of a judicial proceeding was remedied by
organizations/cooperative shall have preference in the hearing on the petition fir prohibition and injunction. The SC reinstated
grant of fishery rights by the municipal/city council the original CA decision and said that due process requires a judicial
pursuant to Sec. 149, LGC proceeding for the declaration of a thing as nuisance. The quonset
c. Sec. 18 – municipal/city government may, through local building is not nuisance per se which can be abated summarily without
chief executive pursuant to appropriate ordinance, judicial intervention.
authorize or permit small and medium commercial
fishing vessels to operate within 10.1 to 15km area Doctrine: While the Sangguniang Bayan may provide for the abatement
from shoreline in municipal waters subject to of a nuisance under Sec. 145(ee) of the Local Government Code, it
conditions cannot declare a particular thing a nuisance per se and order its
d. Sec. 19 – LGU to maintain a registry of municipal condemnation.
fisherfild, who are fishing or may desire to fish in
municipal waters for purpose of determining priorities Class Notes: The LGC does not distinguish between nuisance per se and
among them, of limiting entry to municipal waters, and per accidens (it only says “any nuisance”)
of monitoring fishing activities and/or other related - Is this a good idea?
purposes - How will you argue that it is limited to nuisance per se?
 Argue using a due process argument
 TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPERS, INC. v. CA Doctrine: The abatement of a nuisance without judicial proceedings is
January 21, 1991 possible if it is nuisance per se. Nuisance per se is that which is
nuisance at all times and under any circumstance, regardless of location
Summary: Technology Developers, Inc. manufactures and exports and surroundings.
charcoal briquette and its plant is located in Sta. Maria, Bulacan. The
acting mayor of Bulacan shut down the plant and required the company Unlike BP 337, the present Local Government Code does not expressly
to submit certain documents before it could resume its operations. One provide for the abatement of nuisance.
of these documents was the mayor’s permit. When the company tried to
get the said permit, it was not entertained. The SC held that the mayor Before the removal of an improvement must take place, there must be a
did not abused its discretion. special order, hearing and reasonable notice to remove. Section 10(d),
Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides:
Doctrine: The mayor of a town has as much responsibility to protect its (a) Removal of improvements on property subject of execution.
inhabitants from pollution, and by virture of his police power, he may – When the property subject of execution contains
deny the application for a permit to operate a business or otherwise improvements constructed or planted by the judgment
close the same unless appropriate measures are taken to control obligor or his agent, the officer shall not destroy, demolish or
and/or avoid injury to the health of the residents of the community remove said improvements except upon special order of the
from the emissions in the operation of the business. court, issued upon motion of the judgment obligee after due
hearing and after the former has failed to remove the same
within a reasonable time fixed by the court.
TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPERS, INC. v. CA
July 31, 1991 Class Notes: This case is misleading
- SC said that unlike its predecessor law, the present LGC does
Summary: Technology Developers Inc. is engaged in manufacturing and not provide for the abatement of nuisance
exporting charcoal briquette. On February 16, 1989, they received a  But it does! The LGC expressly refers to nuisance
letter from respondent Acting Mayor Pablo Cruz, ordering the full abatement
cessation of the operation of the petitioner’s plant in Sta. Maria, - This would have been a perfect time for the SC to rule on the
Bulacan. The letter also requested the company to show to the office of effect of the jurisprudential distinction in the treatment of
the mayor some documents, including the Building permit, mayor’s nuisance per se and accidens and the effect of the LGC
permit, and Region III-Pollution of Environmental and Natural provision on this ruling
Resources Anti-Pollution Permit. Since the company failed to comply in
bringing the required documents, respondent Acting Mayor, without
notice, caused the padlock of company’s plant premises, effectively
causing stoppage of its operation. Technology Developers then
instituted an action for certiorari, prohiition, mandamus with
preliminary injuction against respondents, alleging that the closure
order was issued in grave abuse of discretion. The lower court ruled
against the company. The CA affirmed the lower court’s ruling. The SC
affirmed. Upon MR, the SC reversed, stating that the EMB had primary
jurisdiction over matters regarding air pollution.

Doctrine: It is beyond a municipal mayor’s ken and competence to

review, revise, reverse, or set aside a permit to opera [petitioner’s
charcoal briquette plant] issued by the EMB, which is the primary
authority to determine whether [there is a violation of anti-pollution
laws].

Class Notes: Sir does not agree.

- The EMB permit is not in issue; rather the issue hinges on the
mayor’s permit
 Why would the SC give credence to a permit issued in
Makati when it had its operations in Bulacan?
- Just because the national government said “it can operate” it
must still comply with the requirements imposed by the LGU
 Local autonomy!

ASILO v. PEOPLE
March 9, 2011

Summary: Visitacion’s store was demolished outright by Asilo and

Angeles pursuant to the mayor’s order based on the 2 resolutions of the
Sangguniang Bayan. However, the first resolution only authorized the
mayor to file an ejectment case with damages if the demolition was
refused. The second resolution authorized the mayor to demolish the
store through legal means. A criminal complaint was filed by the SPs.
Bombasi (Visitacion and her husband) against the mayor, Anegels and
Asilo. The Court found them guilty of violation of RA 3019. The market
stall cannot be considered as a nuisance per se because as found out by
the Court, the buildings had not been affected by the 1986 fire. The 2
resolutions did not authorize the mayor to order the demolition of the
store. They were also held civilly liable under Art 32 of the Civil Code
for not according due process to the Sps, Bombasi before the
demolition.
 BASIC SERVICES AND FACILITIES
- Devolution mainly affects 5 major departments:
Breakdown of Sec. 17, LGC: Basic Services and Facilities a. Agriculture
(a) LGUs shall endeavor to be self-reliant and shall continue b. Health
exercising powers and discharging duties and functions c. Social Welfare and Development
currently vested upon them d. Tourism
(1) They shall also discharge the functions and e. Interior and Local Government
responsibilities of national agencies and offices
devolved to them pursuant to this Code THE LGUs’ POWERS IN GENERAL
(2) They shall likewise exercise such other powers and
discharge such other functions and responsibilities as Barangay Powers in General
are necessary, appropriate, or incidental to efficient - Powers allotted are minimal compared to other LGUs
and effective provision of the basic services and - But there is ONE power which is exclusive ONLY to the
facilities enumerated herein barangay:
 Power to administer the Katarangunag Pambarangay
XXX
Municipality Powers in General
NOTE: Sec. 17(b) is a long list of devolved services. They are outlined - More extensive than the barangays’
separately in the succeeding tables of devolved services (as seen - Involve the delivery of 4 major services:
below). a. Agricultural and aquacultural
- Sec. 17(c) to (j) are details on how services are devolved  Encouraged to do through cooperatives
b. Health services
Art. 24, LGC IRR – Devolution  Connected to primary health care and access to
(a) Provision for delivery of basic services and facilities shall be secondary and tertiary health services
devolved from the National Government to provinces, cities, c. Social welfare services
municipalities, and barangay  Any pro-poor project, nutrition, family planning
 So that each LGU shall be responsible for a minimum set d. Other services including information dissemination on
of services and facilities in accordance with established investment needs and job placements
national policies, guidelines, and standards
(b) Devolution = transfer of power and authority from National Provincial Powers in General
Government to LGUs to enable them to perform specific - Provinces are granted more powers under the new LGC
functions and responsibilities - It is within their power to deliver varied services such as:
(c) Subsequent change in national policies, guidelines, and a. Agricultural and aquacultural services, including
standards shall be subject to prior consultations with LGUs organization of farmers and fishers cooperatives
b. Industrial development services
Core of Decentralization and Devolution c. Health services including hospitals and tertiary health
- Sec. 17 is the core of decentralization and devolution care
- Thrusts of LGUs: d. Social services like mass housing
a. Discharge functions and responsibilities of central e. Investment support services
agencies and offices that are now devolved to them f. Computerizing tax information and collection services
b. Strive for self-reliance g. Intra-municipal telecom services
c. Continue exercising the powers and discharging the
duties that are currently vested upon them City Powers in General
d. Exercise such other powers and discharge such other - Of all the LGUs, the city has been granted the MOST powers
functions and responsibilities as are necessary, - LGC devolved to the city ALL the services and facilities which
appropriate, or incidental to efficient and effective the barangay, municipality, and province has been
provision of the basic services and facilities enumerated empowered to deliver
therein  Except the power to administer the Kataranguang
- Note that Sec. 17 is not an exclusive list Pambarangay
 Sec. 17(b) opens with: “such basic services and facilities - In addition, there are two major functions that the city his
include, but are not limited to … “ expressly empowered to provide:
a. Adequate communication and transportation facilities
Degrees of Devolution b. Support for education, police, and fire services and
- Basic services and facilities are allocated to the barangay, facilities
municipality, city, and province in varying degrees of
devolution

HIGHLIGHTS OF DEVOLVED POWERS PER LGU 8

LGU POWERS IN AGRICULTURE

BARANGAY MUNICIPALITY PROVINCE CITY
In general, provide support services In general, provide support services In general, provide support services
for agricultural production and for agricultural production and for agricultural production and
marketing marketing marketing
Provide extension work/research ALL agricultural powers of LGUs
Distribute seeds for agriculture or combined, including control
Distribute seeds; planting materials
aquaculture prevention of plant/animal diseases
pests

8 Taken from Pimentel’s book; this table ONLY highlights the powers of each LGU
 Establish livestock markets, animal
Establish seed nurseries breeding stations, artificial
insemination centers
Provide medicinal plants Construct markets
Distribute livestock, poultry, Organize cooperatives for farmers
fingerlings and fishers
Establish communal irrigation
Establish demo farms
Operate stations to collect or buy systems
farm products Provide copra quality control
Establish marketing distribution
channels
Construct facilities for irrigation,
Transfer appropriate technology
water and soil conservation
Endorse forestry laws in municipal
waters, including conservation of
mangroves
LGU HEALTH POWERS
BARANGAY MUNICIPALITY PROVINCE CITY
In general, deliver basic health In general, deliver basic health In general, deliver basic health
services services services
Promote general hygiene Promote general hygiene
Promote sanitation Promote sanitation
Construct and maintain health Provide access to secondary and
centers tertiary health services
Construct and maintain health
Construct and maintain hospitals,
centers, clinics, other health ALL health powers of LGUs
tertiary health clinics
facilities
Provide maternal and child care
Control disease
Purchase medicines, medical
equipment, medical supplies
Provide solid waste disposal Provide solid waste disposal
systems systems
LGU ENVIRONMENTAL POWERS
BARANGAY MUNICIPALITY PROVINCE CITY
Implement community based
forestry projects including social Enforce forestry laws re-
forestry programs and similar community-based forestry projects
projects
Control of communal forest Entire pollution control laws
Establish free parks, greenbelts, ALL environmental powers of LGUs
similar forest development projects Enforce small mining law
Create environment management Enforce other laws protecting the
system environment
Establish mini-hydro-electric
projects
LGU INFRASTRUCTURE POWERS
BARANGAY MUNICIPALITY PROVINCE CITY
Maintenance of roads, bridges, In general, infra facilities funded by In general, infra facilities funded by
ALL LGU infrastructure powers
water systems municipal funds provincial funds
Construction and maintenance of
Construction and maintenance of
municipal roads, bridges, school
multi-purpose pavements, halls,
buildings, other facilities for Construction and maintenance of Telecom and transportation
sports centers, other similar
elementary and high schools, provincial roads, bridges facilities
facilities, information and
clinics, health centers, other
reading centers
facilities
Provide information services for
investments, job placements, tax
matters, market opportunities
Establish and maintain public
libraries Irrigation systems, mini hydro-
Community irrigation, small water electric projects for local purposes,
impounders, artesian wells, spring intra-municipal waterworks,
development projects, rainwater drainage, sewerage, flood control,
collectors, water supply systems, reclamation projects,
other similar projects, seawalls, intramunicipal telecom
dikes, drainage, sewerage, flood
controls, markets, slaughterhouses,
fishports other municipal
enterprises
 Construction and maintenance of
municipal buildings, cultural
centers, public parks, playgrounds, Provide investment support
sports facilities and equipment, services, access to credit,
other similar facilities, tourism modernize by computerizing tax
facilities and other tourist information and collection services
attractions, police/fire stations,
signals, road signs, jails, cemeteries
Provide facilities for industrial
research and development,
including transfer of appropriate
technology
Construction and maintenance of
provincial buildings, freedom parks,
public assembly areas, provincial
jails
LGU SOCIAL WELFARE POWERS
BARANGAY MUNICIPALITY PROVINCE CITY
Social welfare services Social welfare services Social welfare services ALL LGU social welfare powers
Day care centers Child and Youth Rebel returnees
Beautification Family and Community Evacuees
Women’s welfare Relief Operations
Elderly and disabled Population development services
Community-based rehabilitation
program for vagrants, beggars,
street children, scavengers, juvenile
delinquents, drug abuse victims
Livelihood projects, nutrition
services, pro-poor projects, family
planning
Low cost and mass housing
LGU TOURISM POWERS
BARANGAY MUNICIPALITY PROVINCE CITY
Tourism development and
Establishment of tourism facilities promotions program All LGU powers
Development of tourism attractions
Acquisition of tourism facilities and
equipment
Regulation of tourism business
concessions and security services

PLAZA II v. CASSION Class Notes: Not all kind of services are devolved
July 27, 2004 - Look at Sec. 17 with the enumeration of devolved powers
 Pimentel is saying that Sec. 17 is not an exclusive list
Summary: Mayor Plaza devolved the DSWD National Office located in and that it covers a wide range of basic services
Butuan and made it part of the City Social Services Development Office  According to our discussions in class, those related to
adding the 19 national DSWD office to the existing CSSDO replacing the the services enumerated in Sec. 17 are devolved
current head with the DSWD head, and asking them to report for work  Look at the cases of Pimentel and League of
at the DSWD Office instead. Respondent employees assert that E0 92 is Provinces below
illegal because it was a transfer without consent (puboff concept). Their - In effect, always go back to Sec. 17
continued refusal to report for work led to Mayor Plaza to “drop them
from the rolls “. CSC says this is a valid act, CA reverses, SC reverses CA
and uphold CSC. FILINVEST LAND v. FLOOD-AFFECTED HOMEOWNERS OF
MERITVILLE ALLIANCE
Doctrine: Devolution is authorized by Section 17 of the LGC. It is the act August 10, 2007
by which the national government confers power and authority upon
the various local government units to perform specific functions and Summary: Filinvest developed Meritville subdivision, which was located
responsibilites. The local chief executive, the mayor, has the authority near Naga River. After more subdivisions with higher elevation were
to reappoint devolved personnel and may designate an employee to built around it, a perennial flooding problem plagued the homeowners
take charge of a department until the appointment of a regular head. CA of Meritville whenever it rained. This was aggravated by the fact that
erred in ruling that EO 92 violated the rights of respondent to security the Naga River was heavily silted. The homeowners filed a case against
of tenure because they were transferred without their consent. Filinvest, alleging negligence. HLURB and the OP ruled in their favor,
Transfer is a movement from one position to the other which is of but SC reversed. SC ruled that the flooding problem was not the
equivalent rank, level or salary without break in service and may be responsibility of the subdivision developer, but that of the local
imposed as an administrative penalty. The change in the work of the government.
respondents was not a transfer in the legal sense but a physical transfer
that from their old office to a new one in the interest of public service. Doctrine: SEC. 17. Of the LGC obliges local governments to deliver basic
services such as: infrastructure facilities intended primarily to service
the needs of the residents of the municipality and which are funded out
direct hand in the formulation and implementation of national
of the municipal funds including but not limited to municipal roads and
development programs especially where it is implemented locally in
bridges; school buildings and other facilities for public elementary and
coordination with the LGUs concerned.
secondary schools; clinics, health centers and other health facilities
necessary to carry out health services; communal irrigation, small
Class Notes: Sec. 17 par. (c) is an exemption to devolution
water impounding projects and other similar projects, fish ports;
- This is on the reservation of power
artesian wells, spring development, rainwater collectors and water
- So not everything is devolved
supply systems; seawalls, dikes, drainage and sewerage; and flood
control, traffic signals and road signs, and similar facilities. It is the city
government, and not the subdivision developer, that has the duty to
LEAGUE OF PROVINCES OF THE PHILIPPINES v. DENR
control floods.
April 11, 2013
Class Notes:
Summary: On February 10, 2004, Mercado et al filed with the Province
- The Court is saying that since the cause of the flood is beyond
of Bulacan applications for Quarry Permit, which covered the an area
Filinvest’s control, then the LGU should be the one
subject to a prior application by a corporation, Golden Falcon. During
responsible in providing for appropriate measures (Sec.
the time that Mercado et al filed their applications, Golden Falcon's
17(b)(viii)
appeal from the Order of the DENR denying its application was pending.
- Also, since the power to maintain facilities and roads to
On July 16, 2004, the MGB Central Office denied Golden
control flooding is devolved to LGUs, Chris Lao, at least, has a
Falcon's appeal. Golden Falcon received notice of the order on July 27,
case against the LGU for the damage to his car
2004.
Then, On September 13, 2004, another corporation, AMTC,
filed with the Province an Application for Exploration Permit covering
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION v. YU the same area subject of Golden Falcon's and Mercado et al's
July 31, 2012 applications.
Eventually, AMTC appealed to the DENR Secretary against
Summary: Upon the implementation of a devolution program affecting the applications of Mercado et al on the ground that the subject area
the DOH, Gov. Salapuddin refused to accept Dr. Castillo as the was already covered by its application. AMTC's theory seems to be that
incumbent of the Provincial Health Officer II position, which was to be the subject area could only be open to mining location AFTER the
devolved to the LGU of province. So, the Regional Office of the DOH finality of the order denying application to Golden Falcon, the first
retained Dr. Castillo. Two years later, Gov. Salapuddin appointed Dr. Yu applicant for a permit. Since Mercado et al's application was filed prior
to such PHO II position. Then, a law was passed which re-nationalized to date when the order became final, it is invalid. The DENR Secretary
and reverted to the DOH the hospital positions previously devolved to ruled in its favor.
the LGU. Pursuant to such law, the position of PHO II was also re- Hence, the League of Provinces appealed to the Supreme
classified to Chief of Hospital II. However, while Dr. Yu was reverted Court, arguing that the statutes providing the DENR with executive
back to the DOH, she was made to retain the position of PHO II, instead control which infringed upon the local autonomy of provinces is
of the re-classified Chief of Hospital II. The DOH Secretary appointed unconstitutional.
another doctor to the position of Chief of Hospital II. So, Dr. Yu filed a
protest before the CSC, claiming her right to the re-classified position. Doctrine: On the power of control of the DENR: Clearly, the LGC did not
CSC ruled that the position of PHO II was never devolved to the fully devolve the enforcement of the small-scale mining law to the
Provincial Government to begin with. CA reversed. SC affirmed CA and provincial government. Under Sec. 17 (b)(3)(iii) of the LGC of 1991 the
held that the position of PHO II was devolved to the Provincial enforcement of small-scale mining law is subject to the supervision,
Government of Basilan. control and review of the DENR, which is in charge, subject to law and
higher authority, of carrying out the State's constitutional mandate to
Doctrine: In devolution, the only instance that a concerned LGU may control and supervise the exploration, development, utilization of the
choose not to absorb the national government agency personnel is country's natural resources.
when absorption is not administratively viable, meaning, it would result
to duplication of functions. However, in the absence of the recognized On whether the act of the DENR Secretary in nullifying the permits issued
exception, devolved permanent personnel shall be automatically by the Provincial Governor amounted to executive control: The Court
reappointed by the local chief executive. finds that the decision of the DENR Secretary was rendered in
accordance with the POWER OF REVIEW [and not of Executive Control]
granted to the DENR Secretary in the resolution of disputes, which is
PIMENTEL, JR. v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY provided for in Section 24 of the Small Scale Mining Act and Section 22
July 17, 2012 of its Implementing Rules and Regulations. This quasi-judicial function
of the DENR Secretary can neither be equated with "substitution of
Summary: Subject of the petition for Certiorari and Prohibition is the judgment" of the Provincial Governor in issuing Small-Scale Mining
constitutionality of certain provisions of Republic Act No. 10147 or the Permits nor "control" over the said act of the Provincial Governor as it
General Appropriations Act (GAA) of 20111 which provides a P21 is a determination of the rights of AMTC over conflicting claims based
Billion budget allocation for the Conditional Cash Transfer Program on the law.
(CCTP) headed by the Department of Social Welfare & Development
(DSWD). Petitioners seek to enjoin respondents Executive Secretary
Ochoa and DSWD Secretary Soliman from implementing the said TANO v. SOCRATES
program on the ground that it amounts to a "recentralization" of August 21, 1997
government functions that have already been devolved from the
national government to the local government units. Summary: The Sangguniang Panglungsod of Puerto Prinsesa passed
Ordinance No. 15-92, banning the shipment of all live fish and lobsters
Doctrine: The essence of this express reservation of power by the outside of its city. To implement the city ordinance, then Acting Mayor
national government in Section 17 (c) of the LFC is that, unless an LGU Amado Lucero issued Order No. 23, Series of 1993, authorizing the
is particularly designated as the implementing agency, it has no power inspection of cargoes containing live fish and lobster being shipped out
over a program for which funding has been provided by the national from the Puerto Prinsesa Airport, Wharf or at any port within it to
government under the annual general appropriations act, even if the ascertain that the Mayor’s Permit required by PD 426-14-74 for any
program involves the delivery of basic services within the jurisdiction person engaged in business where a permit is required. The
of the LGU. The national government is, not precluded from taking a Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Palawan enacted Resolution No. 33,
Ordinance No. 2, prohibiting the catching, gathering, possessing, buying,
LAND TRANSPORTATION OFFICE v. CITY OF BUTUAN
selling and shipment of live marine coral dwelling aquatic organisms
for a period of five years. Two sets of petitioners filed this petition in January 20, 2000
the SC. The SC ruled that for the first set of petitioners, the certiorari
Summary: The City of Butuan, in the exercise of its power to tax as an
was premature, lacking a cause of action. This is because there was no
LGU, claimed the exclusive power to register tricycles and to issue
showing that a motion to quash was filed in the criminal cases. For the
licenses to drivers of tricycles, excluding the LTO. The LTO on the other
second set, it said that the petition is for declaratory relief which the
hand invoked the police power of the State that grants it the authority
Court does not possess original jurisdiction. Notwithstanding this, the
to register all motor vehicles and to issue to qualified persons licenses
Court resolved the case on its merits considering that the lifetime of the
to drive such vehicles. The RTC of Butuan ruled in favor of the City of
Ordinances was about to end and having been enacted in the exercise of
Butuan and enjoined the LTO from licenses and registrations. The CA
powers under the new LGC relative to the protection and preservation
sustained this ruling. The SC reversed, saying that the power of the
of the environment, the case is novel and of paramount importance. The
LGUs pertain to the franchising and regulatory powers exercised by the
SC did not find them Constitutionally infirm and upheld their validity.
LTFRB and not the functions of the LTO relative to the registration of
motor vehicles and issuance of licenses for driving thereof. The
Doctrine: the sangguaniang bayan, panlungsod and panlalawigan are
functions of the LTO are essentially regulatory in nature exercised
directed to enact ordinances for the general welfare of the municipality
pursuant to the police power of the State. Police power and the power
and its inhabitants, which shall include ordinances that protect the
to tax are separate and distinct powers and the exclusionary clause in
environment and impose penalties for acts which endanger the
the tax provision of the LGC must not be held to have the effect of
environment.
withdrawing the express powers of the LTO.
The centerpiece of the LGC is the system of decentralization, as
Doctrine: Police power and taxation, along with eminent domain, are
expressly mandated by the Constitution. Devolution is indispensable to
inherent powers of sovereignty which the State might share with local
decentralization and the LGC expressly provides that any provisions on
government to raise revenue in order to support its existence and carry
a power of a local government unit shall be liberally interpreted in its
out its legitimate objectives. Although correlative to each other in many
favor, and in case of doubt, any question thereon shall be resolved in
respects, the grant of one does not necessarily carry with it the grant of
favor of devolution of powers and of the local government unit. Any fair
the other. The two powers are, by tradition and jurisprudence, separate
and reasonable doubt as to the existence of the power shall be
and distinct powers, varying in their respective concepts, character,
interpreted in favor of the local government unit concerned. Devolution
scopes, and limitations.
refers to the act by which the National Government confers power and
authority upon the various local government units to perform specific
functions and responsibilities.

One of the devolved powers is the enforcement of fishery laws in

municipal waters including the conservation of mangroves. This
necessarily includes the enactment of ordinances to effectively carry
out such fishery laws within the municipal waters.

LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. CA

December 7, 1995

Summary: RA 4850 created the Laguna Lake Development Authority.

Under said law, LLDA has the exclusive authority to issue new permits
for the use of the lake waters for any projects or activities in or affecting
said lake. Later, RA 7160 (the LGC) was enacted. Under the LGC,
municipalities were given the exclusive authority to grant fishery
privileges in the municipal waters and impose rental fees. Pursuant to
this, municipalities within the Laguna Lake Region assumed the
authority to issue fishing privileges and fishpen permits. As a result, the
lake area became saturated with fishpens. In view of this, LLDA issued a
notice, informing the general public that fishpens not registered with or
not given permits by the LLDA are declared illegal, and that these would
be demolished. Reacting thereto, affected fishpen owners filed
injunction cases against LLDA. RTCs issued TROs against LLDA. Hence,
LLDA filed a petition for CPI with the SC. The SC referred the matter to
the CA, which held, among others, that the LGC repealed RA 4850
(LLDA's Charter) insofar as the fishing privileges in Laguna de Bay is
concerned. The SC reversed this ruling.

Doctrine: The LLDA has exclusive jurisdiction to issue permits for the
enjoyment of fishery privileges in Laguna de Bay to the exclusion of
municipalities situated therein and the authority to exercise such
powers are by its Charter vested on it.
 EMINENT DOMAIN rendered for the property taken shall be real, substantial,
full, ample (City of Manila v. Estrada)
Breakdown of Sec. 19, LGC:
1. LGU may exercise the power of eminent domain Valid and Definite Offer
a. Through its chief executive - The burden is on the LGU to prove compliance with the
(1) And acting pursuant to an ordinance mandatory requirement of valid and definite offer
b. For public use, or purpose, or welfare for the benefit of  Failure to prove = dismissal of complaint (Jesus is Lord
the poor and the landless Christian School Foundation v. Mun. of Pasig)
c. Upon payment of just compensation - Reasonable offer in good faith, nor merely perfunctory or pro
d. Pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution and forma, must be made
pertinent laws  Single bona fide offer that is rejected is sufficient
 Mere letter of intent to acquire property or an invitation
2. Provided that the power of eminent domain may not be to a conference is not a valid and definite offer to
exercised UNLESS: purchase
a. A valid and definite offer has been previously made to
the owner, AND No Need for DAR Authority - The LGC did not intimate that the LGUs
b. Such offer was not accepted must first secure the approval of the DAR for the conversion of lands
from agricultural to non-agricultural use before they can institute
3. Provided further that LGU may immediately take expropriation (Province of Camarines Sur v. CA)
possession of the property UPON:
a. Filing of the expropriation proceedings, AND Ordinance is needed, NOT mere resolution
b. Making a deposit with the proper court of at least - LGU cannot authorize expropriation through mere resolution
15% of FMV of property - LGC expressly requires an ordinance or local law
(1) Basis: Current tax declaration of the property
Immediate Entry by LGU
4. Amount to be paid for expropriated property shall be 1. Filing of the complaint for expropriation sufficient in form
determined by the court and substance
a. Based on FMV at the time of taking of property 2. Deposit of the amount equivalent to 15% of the fair market
value of the property to be expropriated based on the
Power of Eminent Domain
current tax declaration
- Power of the State to take private property for public use,
purpose of welfare upon payment of just compensation
NOTE: Upon compliance with requisites, issuance of writ of
- Essentially lodged in Congress, delegated to LGU
possession becomes ministerial. There is no need for a
- Not absolute, scope of delegated power is narrower than that
hearing for the writ to issue (City of Iloilo v. Legaspi)
of delegating authority
 LGU may exercise the power only when authorized by Class Discussion:
Congress and subject to the constraints imposed upon
by the law conferring the power
Exercise of Eminent Domain Exercise of Eminent Domain
- Nature - The exercise of eminent domain is necessarily in
by National Government by LGU
derogation of private rights, hence the authority to exercise
Inherent power Delegated power
such must be strictly construed (Heirs of Suguitan v. City of No law is needed An ordinance is always required
Mandaluyong)
In addition to the Constitutional
- Limitations: Limitations are given by
limitations, other limitations can
1. Due process clause and equal protection clause Constitution only: (1) Public
be found in other special laws like
2. Just compensation purpose; (2) Just compensation
RA 7279 on Socialized Housing
Assessed value of property
Requisites of Eminent Domain 15% FMV required to be
required to be deposited in
1. Ordinance must be passed authorizing the local chief deposited in order to take
order to take immediate
executive to subject a certain property to LGU’s power of immediate possession
possession
expropriation
FMV at time of filing FMV at time of taking
2. Power must be exercised for public use, or purpose, or
welfare for the benefit of the poor and landless No formal and definite offer A formal and definite offer is
required required
3. Payment of just compensation
4. Valid and definite offer to buy the property must have been
previously made to the owner but the offer was not accepted Socialized Housing (RA 7279) = Under the Urban Development and
Housing Act, expropriation by an LGU for purposes of socialized
Necessity of Taking for Public Use and Welfare housing projects shall occur only as a last resort. It must be shown by
- Necessity does not mean absolute but only a reasonable or the LGU that other methods of acquisition have been exhausted:
practical necessity, such as would combine the greatest mortgage, land swapping, land consolidation, donation, joint venture
benefit to the public with the least inconvenience and agreements, and negotiated purchase.
expense to the condemning party and the property owner
consistent with such benefit (Masikip v. City of Pasig) - If all the other methods have been exhausted and
- The power is broad and has been said to be commensurate expropriation to continue, the LGU shall prioritize
with but not to exceed the duty to provide for the real needs expropriation of property of:
1. Government lands
of the people in their health, safety, comfort, and convenience
and consistently as may be with private rights (Binay v. 2. Alienable public lands
Domingo) 3. Abandoned lands
4. Areas for priority development
5. Unacquired BLISS sites
Payment of Just Compensation
- An equivalent for the value of the property taken 6. Private lands
- “just” is used to intensify the meaning of the word
“compensation” to convey the idea that the equivalent to be
 - Furthermore, small property landowners are similarly
exempt from expropriation for purposes of socialized CITY OF CEBU v. CA
housing, provided: July 5, 1996
1. Those owners of real property which consist of
Summary: Pursuant to Res. No. 404 and Ord. No. 1418 of the
residential lands within an area of not more than 300
Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cebu City authorizing the City Mayor to
sq. meters in highly urbanized cities, and 800 in other
expropriate the parcel of land subject of this case for the purpose of
urban cities; AND
providing a socialized housing project for the landless and low-income
2. They do not own real property other than the same.
residents, the City of Cebu filed a complaint for eminent domain before
RTC-Cebu City against Merlita Cardeno, the owner. RTC-Cebu City
dismissed the complaint for lack of cause of action. The RTC ruled that
BARANGAY SAN ROQUE v. HEIRS OF PASTOR
Cebu City failed to comply with one of the conditions precedent to the
June 20, 2000
exercise of power of eminent domain by LGU, for lack of a valid and
definite offer to Merlita Cardeno. The CA upheld RTC’s decision. The
Summary: Barangay San Roque filed a complaint to expropriate the
Supreme Court ruled that the complaint stated a cause of action.
property of the Heirs of Pastor. The MTC and RTC both dismissed the
Furthermore, it ruled that a closer scrutiny reveals that on the face of
complaints when filed in their sala stating that it is the other court that
the complaint alone, there is extant a cause of action.
has jurisdiction. The Barangay filed a petition to determine which court
has exclusive original jurisdiction to decide expropriation cases.
Doctrine: A local government unit may, through its chief executive and
acting pursuant to an ordinance, exercise the power of eminent domain
Doctrine: Where the basic issue is something other than the right to
for public use, or purpose, or welfare for the benefit of the poor and the
recover a sum of money, or where the money claim is purely incidental
landless, upon payment of just compensation, pursuant to the
to, or a consequence of, the principal relief sought, like in suits to have
provisions of the Constitution and pertinent laws; Provided, however,
the defendant perform his part of the contract (specific performance)
That the power of eminent domain may not be exercised unless a valid
and in actions for support, or for annulment of a judgment or to
and definite offer has been previously made to the owner, and such
foreclose a mortgage, the SC has considered such actions as cases where
offer was not accepted; Provided, further. That the local government
the subject of the litigation may not be estimated in terms of money,
unit may immediately take possession of the property upon the filing of
and are cognizable exclusively by courts of first instance.
the expropriation proceedings and upon making a deposit with the
proper court of at least fifteen percent (15%) of the fair market value of
the property to be expropriated: Provided, finally, That the amount to be
SUGUITAN v. CITY OF MANDALUYONG
paid for the expropriated property shall be determined by the proper
March 14, 2000
court, based on the fair market value at the time of the taking of the
Summary: The Sangguniang Panglungsod of Mandaluyong issued a property. (Sec. 19, RA 7160).
resolution authorizing Mayor Abalos to file the necessary complaint for
expropriating Suguitan’s property. The RTC issued the expropriation The rules of procedure are not to be applied in a very rigid, technical
order. The heirs of Suguitan disputed the RTC order, arguing that, sense; rules of procedure are used only to help secure substantial
under the LGC, an ordinance, not a mere resolution, is necessary to justice. If a technical and rigid enforcement of the rules is made their
authorize Mayor Abalos. The SC agreed with the heirs, holding that the aim would be defeated. Where the rules are merely secondary in
LGC provision controls over the inconsistent provision of the IRR of the importance are made to override the ends of justice; the technical rules
LGC requiring a mere resolution. had been misapplied to the prejudice of the substantial right of a party,
said rigid application cannot be countenanced.
Doctrine: The requisites for the exercise of LGUs of the power of
eminent domain are: Class Notes: Do not be confused. Apply Sec. 19, LGC strictly. It is the
(1) An ordinance is enacted by the local legislative council technical rules of procedure that may be relaxed.
authorizing the local chief executive, in behalf of the local
government unit, to exercise the power of eminent domain
or pursue expropriation proceedings over a particular CITY OF CEBU v. DEDAMO
private property. May 7, 2002
(2) The power of eminent domain is exercised for public use,
purpose or welfare, or for the benefit of the poor and the Summary: Petitioner City of Cebu filed a complaint for expropriation
landless. against respondent spouses Apolonio and BlasaDedamo. Spouses
(3) There is payment of just compensation, as required under Dedamo filed a motion to dismiss alleging that the expropriation would
Section 9, Article III of the Constitution, and other pertinent benefit only a particular entity, the Cebu Holdings, Inc. The parties
laws. entered into an agreement wherein they agreed that they would submit
(4) A valid and definite offer has been previously made to the the determination of the fair market value to the court and that the
owner of the property sought to be expropriated, but said spouses would no longer question the propriety of the purpose for
offer was not accepted. which the land is to be expropriated. The lower court appointed three
commissioners. The report of the commissioners was approved. The
Class Notes: Also important is the distinction between ordinance and petitioner filed an appeal alleging that just compensation should be
resolution: based on the prevailing market price of the property at the
commencement of the expropriation proceedings. The CA affirmed the
ORDINANCE RESOLUTION findings of the trial court. The SC also affirmed the CA and the trial
Declaration of sentiment or court and held that the fair market value of the property should be
It is a law decided based on the prevailing market price at the time of the taking
opinion of a lawmaking body
and not at the time of the commencement of expropriation proceedings.
Possesses a general and
permanent character Temporary in nature
Third reading necessary No such need for a resolution Doctrine: Eminent domain is a fundamental State power that is
inseparable from sovereignty. It is the Government’s right to
appropriate, in the nature of a compulsory sale to the State, private
property for public use or purpose. However, the government must pay
the owner thereof just compensation as consideration therefor. Sec. 19
of RA 7160 expressly provides that just compensation shall be
determined as of the time of actual taking.
 FILSTREAM INTERNATIONAL INC. v. CA Doctrine: Expropriation proceedings consist of two stages: first,
January 23, 1998 condemnation of the property after it is determined that its acquisition
will be for a public purpose or public use and, second, the
Summary: Filstream filed an ejectment suit against the tenants of its determination of just compensation to be paid for the taking of the
land. The MTC ordered vacation of the premises and payment of private property to be made by the court with the assistance of not
rentals. This decision became final and executory. Filstream sought the more than three commissioners.
execution of the decision and was granted a Writ of Execution and later
a Writ of Demolition. The respondents-tenants filed a Motion to Quash Class Notes: Compare with Filstream case
on the ground that supervening events rendered the enforcement of the - The difference is that both cases are at different stages in the
decision moot in that Manila City expropriated the subject lands. During expropriation process
the pendency of the ejectment suit, Manila City instituted expropriation
proceedings against Filstream’s lands.
On appeal, the CA granted the respondents’ petition and ordered CITY OF MANDALUYONG v. AGUILAR
the trial court to desist with the demolition and execution of the January 29, 2001
ejectment decision. Filstream went to the SC alleging that it is entitled
to execution. The SC agreed and reversed the CA orders. It held that Summary: The city of Mandaluyong filed a complaint for expropriation
Manila City failed to observe due process when it failed to follow the of 2 lots belonging to the Aguilars. RTC: Lots are exempt under Sec. 3 of
requirements under Ra 7279 (Urban Development and Housing Act). RA 7279, also the expropriation is not proper for not being for public
purpose. SC: RTC decision upheld. The relevant law is RA 7279. Section
Doctrine: Urban land reform has become a paramount task in view of 9 enumerates the type of lands to be acquired and the hierarchy in
the acute shortage of decent housing in urban areas particularly in acquisition. Section 10 deals with the modes of acquisition.The Aguilars
Metro Manila. are small property owners as defined in Section 3 (q). Hence their land
is exempted from expropriation under Section 10.
Nevertheless, LGUs are NOT given unbridled authority when exercising
their power of eminent domain in pursuit of solutions to these Doctrine: While there is an expanded notion of public use under present
problems: Constitutional limits: DPC, EPC, and Just Compensation; Sec. jurisprudence, the passage of RA 7279 introduced a limitation on the
19, LGC – “pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution and pertinent size of the land sought to be expropriated. The law expressly exempted
laws” "small property owners" from expropriation for urban land reform.
"Small property owners" are defined as those whose only real property
Governing law that deals with the subject expropriation for purposes of consists of residential lands not exceeding 300 sq.m. in highly
urban land reform and housing is RA 7279 (Urban Development and urbanized cities and 800 sq.m. in other urban areas.
Housing Act). There are limitations with respect to the order of priority
in acquiring private lands and in resorting to expropriation proceedings
as a means to acquire the same. Private lands rank last in the order of BARDILLON v. MASILI
priority for purposes of socialized housing. April 30, 2003

Thus, expropriation proceedings are to be resorted to only when the Summary: Brgy. Masili filed a complaint for eminent domain before
other modes of acquisition have been exhausted. Compliance with these MTC for the expropriation of Lot 4381-D. MTC dismissed the case
conditions must be deemed mandatory because these are the only because Brgy. Masili was always absent. Brgy. Masili filed again a
safeguards in securing the right of owners of private property to due complaint for eminent domain for the same lot before RTC. RTC granted
process when their property is expropriated for public use. expropriation and ordered the issuance of a writ of possession over the
lot. CA and SC upheld the RTC.
Class Notes: This case discusses the application of RA 7279
- Remember that RA 7279 (Sec. 9 and 10) applies ONLY when Doctrine: The requirements for the issuance of a writ of possession in
the purpose of expropriation is for socialized housing an expropriation case are expressly and specifically governed by
 Thus, it is only for socialized housing purposes that the Section 2 of Rule 67 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. On the part of
300/800sqm retention limit applies the local government units, expropriation is also governed by Section
 For other purposes, like construction of a road, LGU 19 of the Local Government Code.
may expropriate property even if it is as small as 5sqm
- Exemption is given to small property owners Accordingly, in expropriation proceedings, the requisites for
- Some scenarios: authorizing immediate entry are as follows
1. 300sqm – exemption; it must be in excess of 300sqm (1) the filing of a complaint for expropriation sufficient in form
2. 305sqm – yes, LGU can expropriate the ENTIRE and substance; and
property not just the excess 5sqm (2) the deposit of the amount equivalent to 15% of the fair
3. 300sqm in one lot, another 5sqm in another separate market value of the property to be expropriated based on its
lot – LGU can still expropriate the ENTIRE property current tax declaration.
 To be covered by the exemption, owner must have
at the most 300sqm of land TOTAL (aggregate, not The issue of the necessity of the expropriation is a matter properly
individual lots) addressed to the RTC in the course of the expropriation proceedings.

CITY OF MANILA v. SERRANO

June 20, 2001
FRANCIA v. MUNICIPALITY OF MEYCAUAYAN
March 24, 2008

Summary: An expropriation proceeding of the property of the Serranos SC further stated the 2 stages of an expropriation proceeding.
was initiated by the City of Manila for distribution to the homeless. TC
ordered the City to deposit the assessed amount for the land and issued
a writ of possession. CA reversed TC and ruled that the city failed to
comply with sections 9 and 10 of RA 7279. SC ruled that it was
premature for CA to rule that there was non-compliance with the rules.
Summary: The Municipality of Meycauayan sought the expropriation
of a land owned by Amos, Cecilia and the heirs of Benjamin Francia.
The municipality alleged that the land was idle, while the Francias
said that it was in fact developed and there were plans to further
develop it. The RTC ruled that the expropriation was for a public
purpose and that the municipality may take immediate possession
after payment of 15% of the fair market value of the property, upon
the issuance of a writ of possession. The Francias filed a petition for
certiorari with the CA,
saying that the RTC should have conducted a hearing to determine the
taxation, an inherent power of sovereignty and need not be clothed
existence of public purpose. The CA partially granted the petition and
with any constitutional gear to exist; instead, provisions in our
nullified the order of expropriation. It however said that a hearing was
Constitution on the subject are meant more to regulate, rather than to
not necessary because once the expropriator deposited the required
grant, the exercise of the power. It is a right to take or reassert
amount, the issuance of a writ of possession becomes ministerial. The
dominion over property within the state for public use or to meet a
SC affirmed this, citing Sec. 19 of RA 7160.
public exigency and is said to be an essential part of governance even in
its most primitive form and thus inseparable from sovereignty. In fact,
Doctrine: Before an LGU may enter into the possession of the property
“all separate interests of individuals in property are held of the
sought to be expropriated, it must (1) file a complaint for expropriation
government under this tacit agreement or implied reservation.
sufficient in form and substance in the proper court and (2) deposit
Notwithstanding the grant to individuals, the eminent domain, the
with the said court at least 15% of the property’s fair market value
highest and most exact idea of property, remains in the government, or
based on its current tax declaration. The law does not make the
in the aggregate body of people in their sovereign capacity; and they
determination of a public purpose a condition precedent to the issuance
have the right to resume the possession of the property whenever the
of a writ of possession.
public interest so requires it.”

The ubiquitous character of eminent domain is manifest in the nature of

JESUS IS LORD CHRISTIAN SCHOOL FOUNDATION INC. v.
the expropriation proceedings. Expropriation proceedings are not
MUNICIPALITY OF PASIG
adversarial in the conventional sense, for the condemning authority is
August 9, 2005
not required to assert any conflicting interest in the property. Thus, by
Summary: The municipality of Pasig wants to expropriate a part of the filing the action, the condemnor in effect merely serves notice that it is
land of the Ching Cunacos which was sold to JILCSF for the construction taking title and possession of the property, and the defendant asserts
of a road from the main road to an interior barangay. The main title or interest in the property, not to prove a right to possession, but to
contention here is the compliance with the LGC requirement of valid prove a right to compensation for the taking.
and definite offer. According to Pasig, it made such offer through a letter
sent to the owners, the said letter was not presented in court and upon The only direct constitutional qualification is thus that “private
examination, it only contained an invitation to a conference for the property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation.”
discussion of the price of the land and not an actual offer to purchase. This prescription is intended to provide a safeguard against possible
Due to the failure to comply with the requirement, and the lack of proof abuse and so to protect as well the individual against whose property
that the land was the most convenient way going to the brgy, the court the power is sought to be enforced.
reversed the lower courts’ order granting writ of possession.

Doctrine: The condemnor has the burden of proving all the essentials
necessary to show the right of condemnation. The ff. are the requisites
for the valid exercise of the power of eminent domain by a LGU… A
valid and definite offer has been previously made to the owner of the
property sought to be expropriated, but said offer was not accepted.
The purpose of the requirement of a valid and definite offer to be first
made to the owner is to encourage settlements and voluntary
acquisition of property needed for public purposes in order to avoid the
expense and delay of a court action.

Class Notes: Under this case, the valid and definite offer must be given to
ALL co-owners.

AIR TRANSPORTATION OFFICE v. GOPUCO

June 30, 2005

Summary: Gopuco owned a parcel of land close to the Lahug Airport.

The Nat’l Airport Commission, the predecessor of the Civil Aeronautics
Administration, informed them that the government was acquiring
lands for the purposes of expansion of the aforementioned airport. The
lands sought included Gopuco’s. Gopuco naturally refused. Thus, a
complaint for expropriation was filed before the CFI. The CFI ruled in
favor of the government, saying that the expropriation was valid. Such
was not appealed. However, Gopuco thereafter filed an amended
complaint with the RTC for reconveyance of the property, arguing that
since the original reason for the acquisition of the property had been
abandoned, the title to the property should revert to him. The RTC
dismissed the complaint. The CA reversed. The SC reversed the decision
of the CA, saying that aside from the fact that the judgment on the
propriety of the expropriation had long become final, the judgment
granted the title in fee simple to the government. Therefore, no rights to
Lot No. 72, either express or implied, have been retained by the herein
respondent.

Doctrine: Eminent domain is generally described as “the highest and

most exact idea of property remaining in the government” that may be
acquired for some public purpose through a method in the nature of a
forced purchase by the State. Also often referred to as expropriation
and, with less frequency, as condemnation, it is, like police power and
 RECLASSIFICATION OF LANDS 3. That land already distributed to agrarian reform
beneficiaries pursuant to CARL shall not be affected by the
reclassification
Breakdown of Sec. 20, LGC: Reclassification of Lands
4. That conversion of such land into other purposes shall be
(a) City or municipality may authorize the reclassification of
done pursuant to Sec. 65 of agrarian reform law
agricultural lands and provide for their utilization or
disposition
Areas Reclassified Expandable – the percentage limits may be increased
(1) AFTER conducting public hearings
by the President when public interest so requires upon NEDA
(2) In the following cases:
recommendation
a) When land ceases to be economically feasible
and sound for agricultural purposes as
Special Laws cited in the Syllabus
determined by DAR, OR
1. AO No. 363 (1997) – Prescribing guidelines for the
b) Where land shall have substantially greater
protection of areas non-negotiable for conversion and
economic value for residential, commercial, or
monitoring compliance with Sec. 20, LGC
industrial purposes, as determined by
a. Some areas are designated as non-negotiable for
sanggunian concerned
conversion; In all cases, applications for conversion
shall not be given due course by the DAR:
(3) Provided that such reclassification shall be limited to
(1) Protected areas under the National Integrated
the following percentage of total agricultural land
Protected Areas (NIPAS)
area at time of passage of ordinance:
(2) All irrigated lands, as delineated by the DAR
a) 15% for highly urbanized and independent
(3) All irrigable lands already covered by irrigation
component cities
projects with firm funding commitments
b) 10% for component cities and 1st to 3rd class
b. Some lands are classified as highly restricted from
municipalities
conversion which may be converted only upon
c) 5% for 4th to 6th class municipalities
compliance with existing laws; social benefit cost
analysis approved by the DA shall also be required
(4) Provided further that agricultural lands distributed to
(1) Lands classified by the NIPAS as Highly Restricted:
agrarian reform beneficiaries under CARL shall not be
(a) Irrigable lands not covered by irrigation
affected by said reclassification and conversion
projects with firm funding commitments
(b) Agro-industrial crop lands
(b) President MAY authorize a city or municipality to reclassify
(c) Highlands
lands in excess of the limits in preceding paragraph
(2) Lands issued a Notice of Acquisition/Valuation
(1) WHEN public interest so requires, and
under the agrarian reform program a
(2) UPON recommendation of NEDA
(3) Areas identified as environmentally critical as
determined by DENR
(c) LGUs shall continue to prepare respective comprehensive
land use plans enacted through zoning ordinances
2. RA 8435 (1997) – Agriculture and Fisheries Modernization
(1) This shall be the primary and dominant bases for the
a. Sec. 9 – Delineation of Strategic Agriculture and
future use of land resources
Fisheries Development Zones
(2) Provided that the following shall be taken into
(1) All irrigated lands, irrigable lands already covered
consideration:
by irrigation a projects with firm funding
a) Requirements for food production,
commitments, and lands with existing or having
b) Human settlements, and
the potential for growing high-value crops so
c) Industrial expansion
delineated and included within the SAFDZ shall
not be converted for a period of five (5) years
(d) Where approval by national agency is required for
front the effectivity for this Act
reclassification:
b. Penalty for Agricultural Inactivity and Premature
(1) Approval shall not be unreasonably withheld
Conversion
(2) Failure to act on a proper and complete application
for reclassification within 3 months from receipt shall
3. DAR AO No. 1 (1999) – Revised rules and regulations on the
be deemed approval thereof
Conversion of Agricultural Lands to Non-Agricultural Uses
(e) Nothing in Sec. 20 shall be construed as repealing,
amending, or modifying RA 6657.
CHAMBER OF REAL ESTATE AND BUILDERS ASSOC. INC.
NOTE: The power granted by Sec. 20 is not to convert land for any v. DAR SECRETARY
purpose contrary to CARL but merely to RECLASSIFY land June 18, 2010

Conditions for Reclassification: Land within the jurisdiction of an LGU Summary: Petitioner CREBA filed before the Supreme Court a Petition
may now be classified subject to several conditions: for Certiorari and Prohibition (with application for temporary
1. That land has ceased to be economically feasible and sound restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction) under Rule 65,
for agricultural purposes as determined by the DAR seeking to nullify and prohibit the Department of Agrarian Reform from
a. Or that the land has substantially greater economic enforcing several administrative issuances regulating land use
value for residential, commercial, or industrial conversion for having been issued by the Sec. of Agrarian Reform with
purposes as determined by the Sanggunian concerned grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction as
2. That the following percentages of land are at the time of the some provisions of the aforesaid administrative issuances are allegedly
passage of the reclassification ordinance are not exceeded: illegal and unconstitutional. The Court held that DAR had the authority
a. 15% - highly urbanized and independent component to issue the AOs pursuant to its express power to implement RA 6657
cities or the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law.
b. 10% - component cities and 1 st to 3rd class
municipalities Doctrine: The power of the LGUs to reclassify agricultural lands is not
c. 5% - 4th – 6th class municipalities absolute. The authority of the DAR to approve conversion of
agricultural lands covered by RA 6657 to non-agricultural uses has
been recognized by said Section 20 of RA 7160 by explicitly providing
therein that, "nothing in this section shall be construed as repealing or  DAR can overturn the LGU’s reclassification if it finds
modifying in any manner the provisions of Republic Act No. 6657." that it violates CARL
 LGUs cannot reclassify lands with the effect of
Summary of SC discussion on Conversion and Reclassification circumventing agrarian reform laws
- Are ALL reclassifications covered by the DAR?
CONVERSION RECLASSIFICATION  NO, only those provided by law (Sec. 20 of LGU and
Change in the actual use of the under CARL)
land
Classifying land in paper  What about after effectivity of CARL? Still, not all
Done with approval of DAR Done by Sanggunian reclassifications are covered by DAR since the President
may reserve land for public use
As discussed in the case: - Note that DAR has a different definition of reclassification
A. Conversion v. Reclassification and conversion (DAR AO as discussed in the case)
1. Conversion – act of changing the current use of a piece
of agricultural land into some other use as provided by
DAR
2. Reclassification – act of specifying how agricultural
lands shall be utilized for non- agricultural uses as
embodied in land use plan, subject to requirements and
procedures of land conversion
B. Mere reclassification of agricultural land does not
automatically allow landowner to change its use
1. He has to undergo process of conversion before he is
permitted to use the agricultural land for other
purposes
2. agricultural lands though reclassified to residential,
commercial, industrial or other non-agricultural uses
must still undergo conversion
C. Emphasis: DAR’s conversion authority can only be exercised
after effectivity of RA 6657 on June 15 1988

D. Immaterial if reclassification was done by LGU or by way of

Presidential Proclamation (PP) because either way they must
still undergo conversion process
1. Remember: No automatic conversion if agricultural
land was reclassified
2. For reclassified agricultural lands to be used for the
purpose to which they are intended there is still a need
to change current use through conversion process
a. Authority is with DAR
b. Notwithstanding reclassification, there is a need
for conversion
E. Even reclassification by PP needs conversion clearance from
DAR
F. Any reclassification of agricultural lands to non-agricultural
uses either by LGU or PP enacted on or after June 15, 1988
must undergo the process of conversion
1. Despite having undergone reclassification
2. Before agricultural land may be used for other purposes
G. It is different when through PP public agricultural lands have
been reserved in whole or in part for public use or purpose
because in such a case conversion is no longer necessary
1. Republic v. Estonilo – only a positive act of President is
needed to segregate or reserve a piece of land of the
public domain for a public purpose
2. Public agricultural lands already reserved for public
purpose is no longer part of the alienable lands of the
public domain and thus outside CARP

Class Notes:
- The reclassification of land by the Sanggunian depends on
compliance with Sec. 20
 LGC however, does not provide how often this can be
done; Sir thinks that this can be used to create
loopholes with respect to requirements of the law
- If the sanggunian reclassifies a lot to commercial can they
build a mall the following day?
 NO, conversion from DAR is still needed
 Conversion is an additional safeguard for the power to
reclassify
- What is DAR’s role in this? To ensure that there is no
contravention of the CARL
 CLOSURE AND OPENING OF ROADS For TEMPORARY CLOSURE:
1. Via ordinance
2. May be done due to:
Breakdown of Sec. 21, LGC: Closure and Opening of Roads
a. Actual emergency
(a) LGU may permanently or temporarily close or open any
b. Fiesta celebrations
LOCAL road, alley, park, or square falling within its
c. Public rallies
jurisdiction
d. Agricultural or industrial fairs
(1) How? Pursuant to an ordinance
e. Undertaking of public works and highways,
(2) Provided: In case of permanent closure
telecommunications, and watering projects
a) Ordinance must be approved by at least 2/3 of
3. Duration of closure must be specifically stated in the Order of
all sanggunian members
Closure
b) When necessary, and adequate substitute for the
4. If for the purpose for athletic, cultural, or civil activities;
public facility
these must be officially sponsored, recognized, or approved
by the local government
(b) No such way or place or any part thereof shall be
PERMANENTLY closed without making provisions for
For PERMANENT CLOSURE:
maintenance of public safety therein
1. Via ordinance approved by at least 2/3 of all members of the
(1) Property permanently withdrawn from public use
Sanggunian
may be used or conveyed for any purpose for which
2. Such ordinance must have provisions for the maintenance of
other real property belonging to the LGU concerned
public safety therein
may be lawfully used or conveyed
3. Such property withdrawn may be used or conveyed for any
(2) HOWEVER, no freedom park shall be closed
purpose for which other real property belonging to the local
permanently without provision for its transfer or
government may be lawfully used or conveyed
relocation to a new site
4. When necessary, an adequate substitute for the public facility
that is subject to closure should be provided
(c) Any national or local road, alley, park, or square may be
5. If a freedom park is permanently closed, there must be a
temporarily closed
provision for its transfer or relocation to a new site
(1) When? During:
a) An actual emergency
For closure by cities, municipalities, and barangays:
b) Or fiesta celebrations,
1. Via ordinance
c) Public rallies
2. May temporarily close and regulate the use of any local
d) Agricultural or industrial fairs, or
street, road, or any other public place
e) An undertaking of public works and highways
3. For shopping malls, Sunday, flea, or night markets, or
f) Telecommunications and waterworks projects
shopping areas for the sale of goods, merchandise, foodstuffs,
(2) Duration of which shall be specified by the local chief
and commodities
executive in a written order
(3) PROVIDED no national or local road, alley, park, or
Note: All LGUs may temporarily and permanently close their
square shall be temporarily closed for athletic,
local roads, but the regulation and closure of local roads for
cultural, civic activities not officially sponsored,
the above purposes are limited to cities, municipalities, and
recognized or approved by LGU concerned
barangays.
(d) Any city, municipality, or barangay may temporarily close
and regulate the use of any local street, road, thoroughfare,
CABRERA v. CA
or any other public place where shopping malls, Sunday,
March 18, 1991
flea or night markets, or shopping areas may be established
and where goods, merchandise, foodstuffs, commodities, or
Summary: The petitioner in this case assails Resolution 158 which
articles of commerce may be sold and dispensed to the
closed down the Old Road leading to the New Capitol building and was
general public
redistributed to owners of those lots whose property were
(1) By a duly enacted ordinance
expropriated for the construction of the new road in equal portions.
Ordinance is Required The lot owners then started planing vegetables and converted parts of
- Power to permanently or temporarily close or open any local the old road into a piggery. He is upset because he lost easy access to
road, alley, park, or square within LGU’s territorial his place of residence, and for such reason he demands to be
jurisdiction can be exercised ONLY through an ordinance compensated. RTC found he had an easy access way as alternative. CA
reversed, SC upheld RTC.
 EXCEPT when the closure is temporary and under the
conditions specified in Sec. 21(c)
Doctrine: Richmond v. City of Hinton - The Constitution does not
 Here, the local chief executive can unilaterally
undertake to guarantee to a property owner the public maintenance of
close it without an ordinance
the most convenient route to his door. The law will not permit him to be
cut off from the public thoroughfares, but he must content himself with
Road Closure, an LGU Power
- As held in Cabrera v. CA – closure of city streets is within such route for outlet as the regularly constituted public authority may
powers of city council while closure of provincial roads is deem most compatible with the public welfare. When he acquires city
within the powers of provincial board property, he does so in tacit recognition of these principles. If,
- Also note that Freedom Parks cannot be permanently closed subsequent to his acquisition, the city authorities abandon a portion of
without provisions for its relocation or transfer the street to which his property is not immediately adjacent, he may
suffer loss because of the inconvenience imposed, but the public
Scope of Closure – Within the JURISDICTION of the LGU: treasury cannot be required to recompense him. Such case is damnum
1. Local roads absque injuria.
2. Alleys
The construction of the new road was undertaken under the general
3. Parks
welfare clause. Whatever inconvenience the petitioner has suffered
4. Squares
"pales in significance compared to the greater convenience the new
road, which is wide and concrete, straight to the veterans fountain and
down to the pier, has been giving to the public, plus the fact that the
new road adds beauty and color not only to the town of Virac but also to
the whole province of Catanduanes." For the enjoyment of those
benefits, every individual in the province, including the petitioner, must
be prepared to give his share.

Class Notes:
- Can the LGU close all kinds or roads?
 See Sec. 21
- Can a province close a municipal road in a municipality?
Debatable:
 YES. Municipal plans must be in accordance with
provincial plans
 But then land use plans are very general so this
may not be a very strong argument
 NO because of local autonomy.
 Even if the province reviews municipal
ordinances, it can only rule on its legality
- Important lesson in this case: The closure of public roads
under police power is NOT eminent domain
 No grant of damages is awarded

DACANAY v. ASISTIO
May 6, 1992

Summary: Pursuant to Ordinance No. 79-02 enacted by the

Metropolitan Manila Commission, City Mayor of Caloocan open up 7 flea
markets in the city and issued licenses to several stall owners for the
conduct of vending activities. One of the streets affected was the
“Heroes del ‘96” where Dacanay lives. In 1987, OIC City Mayor Martinez
caused the demolition of the market stalls, The stall-owners who were
issued licenses filed an action for prohibition against the city officials.
Initially the trial court issued a writ of preliminary injunction but such
was subsequently lifted. It ruled that the streets were public dominion
and hence, outside the commerce of men. It also cited the case of
Municipality of Cavite vs. Rojas where it was held that properties for
public use may not be leased to private individuals. There was a change
of city officials and such order was never implemented. Dacanay wrote
to the city officials asking that they implement the trial court decision
but there was no response. He filed a suit before the Ombudsman which
recommended the filing of information for failing to perform a legal
obligation. Dacanay filed a petition for mandamus to compel city
officials to enforce the decision of trial court. The Supreme Court ruled
in favor of Dacanay and ordered the demolition of the market stalls in
the public streets.

Doctrine: A public street is property for public use hence outside the
commerce of man (Arts. 420, 424, Civil Code). Being outside the
commerce of man, it may not be the subject of lease or other contract.

The right of the public to use the city streets may not be bargained
away through contract. Thus, leases or licenses issued by the City
Government for the right to occupy portions of the public street are null
and void for being contrary to law.

Executive Order may not infringe upon the vested right of the public to
use city streets for the purpose they were intended to serve: i.e., as
arteries of travel for vehicles and pedestrians.

Class Notes:
- Is this good law? No, see Sec. 21(d)
- Who else may order closure of roads? The local chief
executive
 In this case, an ordinance is not necessary to effect the
closure
 But note that this refers only to temporary closure in
Sec. 21 (c)
 Note further that in case the closure was due to an
emergency, once the emergency situation ceases
the closure will no longer be valid
 CORPORATE POWERS NOTE: There can be no hard and fast rule for purposes of determining
the true nature of an undertaking or function of an LGU; the
Breakdown of Sec. 22, LGC: Corporate Powers surrounding circumstances are to be considered.
(a) Every LGU, as a corporation, shall have the following - The basic element, however beneficial to the public the
powers: undertaking may be, is that it is governmental in essence
(1) To have continuous succession in its corporate name  Otherwise, function becomes proprietary
(2) To sue and be sued - As an illustration, see Municipality of San Fernando, La Union
(3) To have and use a corporate seal v. Firme and City of Manila v. CA
(4) To acquire and convey real or personal property
(5) To enter into contracts; and Estoppel Does Not Apply
(6) To exercise such other powers as are granted to - Doctrine of estoppel cannot apply against a municipal
corporations subject to the limitations provided in this corporation to validate a contract which it has no power to
Code and other laws make, or which it is authorized to make only under
prescribed conditions, although the corporation has accepted
(b) LGUs may continue using, modify, or change their existing the benefits thereof and the other party has fully performed
corporate seals, PROVIDED: his part
(1) Newly established LGUs or those without corporate
seals may create their own which shall be registered A review on the Distinctions:
with the DILG
(2) Any change of corporate seal shall also be registered GOVERNMENTAL POWERS CORPORATE POWERS
as provided therein Exercised in administering the
Exercised for the special benefit
powers of the state and
(c) No contract may be entered into by the local chief executive promoting public welfare and advantage of the community
in behalf of the LGU without prior authorization of the Legislative, judicial, public, and
sanggunian concerned Ministerial, private, and corporate
political
(1) Unless otherwise provided in the Code Cannot be sued without consent Impliedly consents to being sued
(2) Legible copy of such contract shall be posted at a for injuries it caused9 by entering into private contracts
conspicuous place in the provincial capitol or the city, Officers or agents acting within
municipal or barangay hall Officers and agents are liable for
official duties are not liable
negligence/tort while within the
unless they acted willfully and
(d) LGUs shall enjoy full autonomy in the exercise of their scope of their employment
maliciously
proprietary functions and in the management of their Respondeat superior does not
economic enterprises apply10 Respondeat superior applies
(1) Subject to limitations provided in the Code and laws
Power to Enter into Contracts – Requisites:
Sec. 22 enumerates the powers that local governments possess as
1. Entered into by the local chief executive in behalf of the LGU
corporate entities
2. Prior authorization by Sanggunian concerned
- Also note sub-section (d) which grants full autonomy to LGUs
3. Legible copy of the contract posted at a conspicuous place in:
in the exercise of their proprietary functions
a. Provincial capitol or
b. City, municipal, barangay hall
LGUs can be sued
- General Rule: Sec. 3, Art. XVI, Constitution, “the State may not
Ultra Vires Contracts – An LGU can only legitimately exercise powers of
be sued without its consent
government only within the limits of authority granted to it, or else its
 Exception: State can be sued only with its consent
acts are ultra vires
which may be embodied in a general law or special law
- Example: Dacanay v. Asistio - A public street is property for
(implied or express consent)
public use hence outside the commerce of man. Being outside
 Consent is implied when the government enters
the commerce of man, it may not be the subject of lease or
into business contracts, as it thereby descends into
other contract. The city government, contrary to law, has
the level of the other contracting party
been leasing portions of the streets. Such lease or license is
- Under Sec. 22, it is clear that the State allows the LGU to sue
null and void for being contra to law.
and be sued (Pimentel)
- The distinction of powers (see Sec. 15) becomes important
for purposes of determining the liability of the municipality
CITY OF MANILA v. IAC
for the acts of its agents which result in an injury to third
November 15, 1989
persons (Torio v. Fontanilla)
 Torio makes a distinction: Summary: Vivencio Sto. Domingo, Sr. died on June 4,1971 and was
1. If injury is caused in the course of the performance buried in lot No. 159 of the North Cemetery which was leased by the
of a governmental function, no recovery, as a rule, city to Irene Sto. Domingo for the period from June 6, 1971 to June 6,
can be had from the municipality unless there is 202. In accordance with Administrative Order No. 5 of 1975, of the City
an existing statute on the matter Mayor of Manila Lot 159 in which the remains of the late Vivencio Sto.
a. Same goes for the officers so long as they Domingo were laid to rest, believed to have been leased to the bereaved
perform their duties honestly and in good family for 5 years only, was certified on January 1978 as ready for
faith (no malicious or wanton acts)
exhumation. The authorities of the North Cemetery placed the bones
2. If injury is caused in the exercise of proprietary and skull of deceased in a bag or sack and kept the same in the
functions, LGU can be held liable to 3rd persons ex depository or bodega of the cemetery. The lot was rented out to another
contractu or ex delicto
 Class Notes: According to our discussion in class this
may not be accurate anymore. See full discussion under 9
Does this distinction hold true in light of Sec. 24? Jurisprudence says it is but
Sec. 24 on liability (on page 49) according to our discussions in class, Sec. 24 does not distinguish between
governmental and proprietary functions
10
The SC keeps on citing respondeat superior but then it cites Art. 2180 (on
vicarious liability) and under our Torts class these 2 concepts are not the same
lessee so that when the plaintiffs went to said lot the resting place of
 For an increase in territory, go back to Sec. 10, Art.
their departed did not anymore bear the stone marker.. The widow and
X of the Constitution
children of the late Sto. Domingo, Sr. filed an action for damages against
 This just means that QC bought the property in its
the City of Manila and officers of the North Cemetery. Trial Court
proprietary character
ordered the defendants to give the family the right to make use of
another single lot for a period of 43 years 4 months and 11 days and to
search, for the remains and to bury the same in the substitute lot. CA
RABUCO v. VILLEGAS
modified the decision ordering defendants to pay the family jointly and
February 28, 1974
severally P10,000.00 for breach of contract, P20,000.00 for moral
damages, P20,000.00 for exemplary damages, P10,000.00 as and for
Summary: Petitoners Rabuco et. al filed 2 cases to enjoin the demolition
attorney's fees. SC affirmed the IAC decision.
of their lots basing their right on RA 3120 which declared that the
properties were "reserved as communal property" and ordered their
Doctrine: City of Manila is a political body corporate and as such
conversion into "disposable and alienable lands of the State" for sale in
endowed with the faculties of municipal corporations to be exercised by
small lots to the bona fide occupants thereof. Section 2 of the Act
and through its city government in conformity with law, and in its
prohibited ejectment proceedings and dismissal of demolition orders.
proper corporate name. It may sue and be sued, and contract and be
City officials countered stating that RA 3120 is invalid for being in
contracted with. Its powers are twofold in character-public,
violation of the Constitutional prohibition against the deprivation of
governmental or political on the one hand, and corporate, private and
property without due process of law and without just compensation. TC
proprietary on the other. Governmental powers are those exercised in
said that it had no jurisdiction to rule on the constitutionality but this
administering the powers of the state and promoting the public welfare
need not be passed upon as the principal question in issue is whether
and they include the legislative, judicial, public and political. Municipal
the houses of the petitioners are public nuisances, which the court
powers on the one hand are exercised for the special benefit and
resolved in the affirmative. CA certified the case to the SC stating that
advantage of the community and include those which are ministerial,
the real issue was constitutionality of RA 3120. SC upheld the validity
private and corporate.
of the Act.

Doctrine: The subdivision of communal land of the State (although titled

PROVINCE OF ZAMBOANGA v. CITY OF ZAMBOANGA
in the name of the municipal corporation) and conveyance of the
March 28, 1968
resulting subdivision lots by sale on installment basis to bona fide
Summary: CA 39 converted the Mun. of Zamboanga into Zamboanga occupants by Congressional authorization and disposition does not
City. The provinces and buildings, consisting of 50 lots and some constitute infringements of the due process clause or the eminent
buildings thereon, located in the City of Zamboanga are covered by domain provisions of the Constitution but operates simply as a
Torrens certificates in the name of Zamboanga Province. RA 3039 was manifestation of the legislature's right of control and power to deal
approved amending CA 39 by providing that all buildings, properties, with State property.
and assets belonging to the former Province of Zamboanga and located
within the City of Zamboanga are hereby transferred, free of charge, in Class Notes:
favor of the latter. - When LGUs are created, there is no transfer of land from the
Sec. of Finance ordered the CIR to stop effecting further payments to national government to the LGU
Zamboanga del Norte and to return to the City the sum taken from its - From our discussion in Zamboanga, there was no showing in
this case that Manila bought the land using its own funds
IRA as payment for the properties. Zamboanga del Norte then filed a
complaint before the CFI against the City, Sec. of Finance, and CIR. - Power of LGU to acquire and sell property:
Judgment was rendered declaring RA 3039 unconstitutional and  If the property is owned by the municipality in its
ordered the City to pay to the Province the sum for the properties. public and governmental capacity, the property is
public and Congress has absolute control over it. If the
Doctrine: The matter involved here is the extent of legislative control property is owned in its private or proprietary capacity,
over the properties of a municipal corporation. If the property is owned then it is patrimonial and Congress has no absolute
by the municipal corporation in its public and governmental capacity, control and the municipality cannot be deprived of it
the property is public and Congress has absolute control over it. But if without due process and payment of just compensation.
the property is owned in its private or proprietary capacity, then it is
patrimonial and Congress has no absolute control. The municipality
cannot be deprived of it without due process and payment of just MUNICIPAL BOARD v. CTA
compensation. The capacity in which the property is held is dependent December 26, 1964
on the use to which it is intended and devoted. The applicable law is the
law on Municipal Corporations, and not the Civil Code, in classifying Summary: The University of Southern Philippines Foundation sought to
between private and public. Under this norm, to be considered public, it have several properties it had owned exempted from the real property
is enough that the property be held and, devoted for public service and taxation imposed by the City of Cebu.
governmental purposes like local administration, public education,
public health, etc. The City Assessor exempted most of the properties on the ground that
it was being used for school purposes but did not do the same for 6 lots.
Class Notes: The Foundation appealed to the Board of Assessment Appeals of the
- The SC cited the “Law on Municipal Corporations” but what is City of Cebu and said Board granted exemption to 5 of the lots which
this law? There is no basis! were originally not considered exempt. From this decision, the
 Despite this, the SC keeps on citing this case Municipal Board, in representation of the City of Cebu, appealed to the
- When national government creates an LGU, there is no CTA.
transfer of property from the former to the latter
 If QC has title on the land, is it theirs? The CTA dismissed the appeal on the ground that the City of Cebu, as a
governmental agency, is not among those who may appeal to the CTA as
 Depends. If QC bought it using its own funds, then
enumerated in Sec. 11 of RA 1125. The SC reversed the CTA.
YES
 If QC buys property from Mandaluyong, is QC’s territory
Doctrine: Sec. 11 of RA 1125 provides: SEC 11. Who may appeal; effect
expanded?
of appeal. — Any person, association or corporation adversely affected
 NO. QC can buy but there is no increase in
by a decision or ruling of the Collector of Internal Revenue, the
territory
Collector of Customs or any provincial or city Board of Assessment
Appeals may file an appeal in the CTA within thirty days after the
receipt of such decision or ruling.

The City of Cebu constitutes a political body corporate created by a

special charter (CA No. 58), endowed with the powers which pertain to
a municipal corporation. As such, it possesses the capacity to sue and be
sued. It must be noted that the City of Cebu is authorized to levy real
estate taxes for its support. In the decision of the Board of Assessment
Appeals of Cebu City exempting the lots in question from the payment
of real property tax, no entity is more adversely affected than the City of
Ceb Cebu, for it stands to lose a yearly income equivalent to the realty
tax.
 AUTHORITY TO NEGOTIATE AND SECURE GRANTS LIABILITY FOR DAMAGES
Breakdown of Sec. 23, LGC: Authority to Negotiate and Secure Grants Breakdown of Sec. 24, LGC: Liability for Damages

Local chief executives may negotiate and secure financial grants or LGUs and their officials are NOT exempt from liability for:
donations in kind 1. Death or injury to persons, or
- For? In support of the basic services or facilities 2. Damage to property
enumerated under Sec. 17
- Where? From local and foreign assistance agencies Sec. 24 makes LGUs and their Officials liable for damages for malicious
- How? Upon authority of the Sanggunian or negligent conduct of the latter. (Pimentel)
 Without necessity of securing clearance or approval - A categorical statement that LGUs do not enjoy absolute and
therefor from any department, agency, or office of the unqualified immunity from suits
national government or from any higher LGU - What is stressed here is the right of aggrieved parties to
bring suits against the acts or omissions of LGUs and their
PROVIDED: Projects financed by such grants or assistance with officials
national security implications shall be approved by national agency
concerned Properties NOT subject to levy and execution – Properties of a
- When such national agency fails to act on the request for municipality, real or personal, which are necessary for public use
approval within 30 days from receipt, same shall be deemed CANNOT be attached and sold at an execution sale to satisfy money
approved claims against a municipality
- Revenues from taxes, licenses and market fees, and which
Local chief executive shall report the nature, amount, and terms of are intended primarily and exclusively for the purpose of
such assistance to both Houses of Congress and the President financing the governmental activities and functions of the
- Within 30 days upon signing of such grant agreement or municipality are EXEMPT from execution (Mun. of Makati v.
deed of donation CA)

LGUs are now authorized to negotiate and secure financial grants or Special Laws cited in the Syllabus
donations in kind from assistance agencies (foreign or local) to get the 1. New Civil Code
basic services in Sec. 17 a. Art. 34 - When a member of a city or municipal police
- Clearance from the national government or a higher LGU is force refuses or fails to render aid or protection to any
not necessary person in case of danger to life or property, such peace
officer shall be primarily liable for damages, and the city
When Clearance Necessary – there is one instance when approval of the or municipality shall be subsidiarily responsible
proper agency of the central government is necessary: when the grant therefor. The civil action herein recognized shall be
or assistance sought has NATIONAL SECURITY implications independent of any criminal proceedings, and a
- Ex: When grant consists of weapons or involves supervision preponderance of evidence shall suffice to support such
of foreign agents for implementation purposes action.
- Approval deemed granted if there is failure to act on the part
of the national government within 30 days upon receipt of b. Art. 2180 - The obligation imposed by article 2176 is
request for approval demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions,
but also for those of persons for whom one is
Reporting Requirement responsible.
- Once the grant or donation is signed, local chief executive has (1) The State is responsible in like manner when it
to report to Congress (both Houses) and the President acts through a special agent; but not when the
- LGC IRR also require the NEDA and DILG to assist LGUs and damage has been caused by the official to whom
the granting institutions or donors in the execution and the task done properly pertains, in which case
implementation of their agreements (Art. 52, IRR) what is provided in article 2176 shall be
applicable.
(2) The responsibility treated of in this article shall
cease when the persons herein mentioned prove
that they observed all the diligence of a good
father of a family to prevent damage.

c. Art. 2189 - Provinces, cities and municipalities shall be

liable for damages for the death of, or injuries suffered
by, any person by reason of the defective condition of
roads, streets, bridges, public buildings, and other
public works under their control or supervision.

2. RA 8749 – Act providing for a comprehensive air pollution

control policy
a. Sec. 43 - Where a suit is brought against a person who
filed an action as provided in Sec. 41, or against any
person, institution or government agency that
implements this Act, it shall be the duty of the
investigating prosecutor or the court, to immediately
make a determination not exceeding 30 days whether
said legal action has been filed to harass, vex, exert
undue pressure or stifle such legal recourses of the
person complaining of or enforcing the provisions of
this Act. Upon determination thereof the court shall
 dismiss the case and award attorney's fees and double
within the scope of their employment in precisely the same manner and
damages.
to the same extent as those of private corporations or individuals. As to
b. This provision shall also apply and benefit public
such matters the principles of respondeat superior applies.
officers who are sued for acts committed in their official
capacity, there being no grave abuse of authority, and
Class Notes: If a municipality acts in a governmental capacity, how can
done in the course of enforcing this Act.
they be liable?
1. Bad faith of a public officer – public officer is held liable
Distinguish:
2. Law provides that LGU (and its officers can be liable) under
Sec. 24
POLITICAL/GOVERNMENTAL CORPORATE/PROPRIETARY
ACTS11 ACTS
The SC made an extensive discussion on the distinction between
LGU generally not liable unless:
governmental and proprietary functions. Here is a summary:
1. Statute provides
otherwise
GOVERNMENTAL PROPRIETARY
2. Damages due to defective
As agent As a creation of law
condition of roads,
EXAMPLES
streets, buildings, and Can be held liable ex contractu or
Establishment of municipal
other public works (Art. ex delicto Adoption of regulations against
waterworks for use of
2189, CC) fire and disease, preservation of
inhabitants, construction and
3. Damages due to failure to public peace, maintenance of
maintenance of municipal
render aid or protection municipal prisons,
slaughterhouses, markets, stables,
in case of danger to life or establishment of primary
property (Art. 34, CC) bathing establishments, wharves,
schools and post-offices, etc. ferries, fisheries, etc.
Defense of due diligence in the
No valid defense for non- But there are instances when an act has a governmental and a
selection and supervision of its
performance officers corporate character (SC did not discuss more on this concept)
LIABILITIES
Officers or agents acting within
Officers and agents are liable for State immunity extended Cannot invoke immunity
official duties are not liable
negligence/torts while within In the exercise of this function, In the exercise of this function,
UNLESS they acted willfully and
scope of employment Municipality is NOT liable for municipality is liable for acts of its
maliciously
acts of its officers and agents officers and agents
When the act of the officer are for
Always remember Sec. 24 When the act of the officer come
a special benefit of the
- Sec. 24 does not distinguish between governmental or within the powers which the
corporation in its private or
proprietary functions municipality has as agent of the
corporate interest, such officer is
- So one can argue that the LGU (and its officers) are now state, it is EXEMPT from liability
deemed the agent or servant of
liable regardless if the cause of the injury was its for the acts of the officer the city
performance of governmental functions
Officer acts as agent of the
 But note that Sec. 24 specifies the grounds available: Officer acts as agent of the State
municipality
1. Damage to property
Officer will be liable in the
2. Death or injury to persons
exercise of his official acts if it is
- Read this with Sec. 22 where it provides that the LGU can sue
shown that he acted willfully
and be sued Officer will be liable
and maliciously and with the
 RA 7160 gives the consent for LGUs to be the subject of
express purpose of inflicting
suits
injury upon the plaintiff
- So what is the use of the distinction?
Respondeat superior will not
1. To determine the proper extent of control Respondeat superior applies
apply
2. For other grounds not mentioned in Sec. 24 (meaning
other than damage to property and death/injury to Municipality will be regarded as
persons) an ordinary private corporation
or individual and will be liable as
such insofar as liability to 3rd
MENDOZA v. DE LEON persons on contract or tort is
February 11, 1916 Municipality will be liable even concerned
in the exercise of its To create liability, it is
Summary: Mendoza was the lessee of a ferry owned by the municipality governmental function when it fundamentally necessary that the
of Villasis, Pangasinan. After his use of more than a year, the consents to be sued act done which is injurious must
municipality, through a Resolution, revoked such lease and awarded a be within the scope of the
franchise for the same ferry to another person. As a result, Mendoza corporate powers as prescribed
filed an action for damages against the municipal council members. The by charter; so if it is ultra vires,
Pangasinan CFI ruled in favor of Mendoza and awarded damages. SC the corporation cannot be liable
(but officers personally liable)
affirmed.

Doctrine: Municipalities have both governmental and corporate or

business functions. A municipality is not exempt from liability for the SAN FERNANDO v. FIRME
negligent performance of its corporate functions. In the administration April 8, 1991
of its patrimonial property, it is to be regarded as a private corporation
or individual so far as its liability to third persons on contract or in tort Summary: A collision occurred involving the dump truck owned by the
is concerned. Its contracts, validly entered into, may be enforced and Municipality of San Fernando and killing Baniñ a. The heirs of Baniñ a
damages may be collected from it for the torts of its officers or agents sued the owner and driver of the jeepney that the victim was riding,
who then filed a third party complaint against the municipality. The
municipality raised the defense of immunity.
11 The SC ruled that the Municipality is immune from suit. The
Taken from UP LAW 2013 Bar Reviewer driver of the municipality insists was on his way to get a load of sand
and gravel for the repair of San Fernando's municipal streets. He was
officials and the City jointly liable. Mayor Ganzon, et al., argued that the
therefore performing duties pertaining to his office. Hence, the
City should not be held liable. The SC disagreed.
municipality cannot be held liable for the torts committed in the
discharge of governmental functions.
Doctrine: Municipal corporations may be held liable for the back pay or
wages of employees or laborers illegally separated from the service,
Doctrine: A distinction should first be made between suability and
including those involving primarily governmental functions, such as
liability. "Suability depends on the consent of the state to be sued,
those of policemen.
liability on the applicable law and the established facts. The
circumstance that a state is suable does not necessarily mean that it is
Class Notes: This case teaches us to look and examine at all the facts and
liable; on the other hand, it can never be held liable if it does not first
circumstances to determine whether the act in question is
consent to be sued. Liability is not conceded by the mere fact that the
governmental or proprietary.
state has allowed itself to be sued. When the state does waive its
sovereign immunity, it is only giving the plaintiff the chance to prove, if
it can, that the defendant is liable."
PILAR v. SANGGUNIANG BAYAN NG DASOL, PANGASINAN
March 12, 1984
Anent the issue of whether or not the municipality is liable for the torts
committed by its employee, the test of liability of the municipality
Summary: The present case is an original action for mandamus to
depends on whether or not the driver, acting in behalf of the
compel the Sanguniang Bayan and the municipal treasurer to pay the
municipality, is performing governmental or proprietary functions.
salary due petitioner Vice Mayor Pilar, as provided for by Batas
Pambansa Blg 51 and as implemented by Circular 9-A of Joint
Class Notes:
Commission on Local Government and Personnel administration and to
- With this decision it becomes hard to prove that the LGU is
recover actual, moral and exemplary damages plus attorney’s fees. The
acting in a non-governmental capacity since the SC held that
Vice Mayor questioned the failure of the Sanguniang Bayan to
the presumption of regularity applies
appropriate an amount for the payment of his salary. The Executive
- Remember to distinguish between suability and liability
Secretary sent a letter to the Mayor advising the Mayor to pay the Vice
 LGUs and its officials can now be sued under Sec. 24
Mayor the salary due him equivalent to that of the Municipal Treasurer.
 But whether one can recover is another matter
Subsequently, the Sanguniang Bayan enacted a resolution
altogether
appropriating the amount of P 15, 144 as payment of the Vice Mayor’s
unpaid salaries. The resolution was vetoed by the Mayor resulting into
the filing by the Vice Mayor of the petition for mandamus. The Supreme
FERNANDO v. CA Court said that the petition was rendered moot and academic because
May 8, 1992 the Vice Mayor admitted that at the time he submitted the
memorandum, he has been fully paid of his salaries as provided for by
Summary: There was a bidding for the emptying of a septic tank in
Batas Pamabansa Blg. 51. However, the Supreme Court stated that the
Davao. One of the losing bidders with 4 others, died inside the septic
Mayor is personally liable to the Vice Mayor for damages which the
before the award of the winning bid. The heirs of the victims sued the
latter suffered due to the Mayor’s gross and evident bad faith in
City of Davao for damages. The SC held that it was the victims that were
refusing to satisfy the Vice Mayor’s valid claim.
negligent since they entered the septic tank without authorization from
Davao City and without being awarded the winning bid and the
Doctrine: A local official becomes personally liable to another person
contract.
when he acts in gross and evident bad faith in refusing to satisfy the
latter’s valid, just and demandable claim.
Doctrine: While it may be true that Davao City has been remiss in its
duty to re-empty the septic tank annually, such negligence was not a
A local official who acts in an arbitrary manner when he exercises the
continuing one. Upon learning from the report of the market master
power of veto becomes personally liable to the person injured/
about the need to clean the septic tank of the public toilet in Agdao
claimant. (In the case at bar, the Mayor’s reckless and oppressive act
Public Market, Davao immediately issuied invitations to bid for such
was shown when he vetoed the resolution despite the fact that there
service and awarded the bid to the lowest bidder, Mr. Feliciano Despite
existed sufficient municipal funds from which the Vice Mayor’s salary
Davao city’s failure to re-empty the septic tank since 1956, people in the
could be paid.
market have been using the public toilet for their personal necessities
but have remained unscathed. Article 24 of the Civil code cannot apply
TUZON v. CA
because the victims did not win the bid. Therefore, there is a total
August 21, 1992
absence of contractual relations between the victims and the City
Government of Davao City that could give rise to any contractual
Summary: The Sangguniang Bayan of Camalaniugan, Cagayan
obligation, much less, any liability on the part of Davao City.
unanimously adopted Resolution No. 9, which allowed the municipal
treasurer to enter into individual agreements with thresher operators
Class Notes:
in their municipality in order to solicit 1% of the palay threshed by the
- Sir says that this case is stupid.
said operators. The proceeds will be used for the construction of the
- SC did not discuss whether the LGU was performing
Sports and Nutrition Center, which will administer the government
governmental or proprietary functions
program on nutrition and physical development. Private respondent
 Normally this is the threshold issue which needs to be
SaturninoJurado applied for a permit but the same was denied for
addressed before ruling on liability
failure to comply with Resolution No. 9. Jurado filed a complaint for
 But maybe it was not raised in this case so the SC did mandamus with actual and moral damages. He filed another suit for
not rule on it declaratory judgment against the said resolution for being illegal either
as a donation or a tax measure. Both the CFI and the CA found that
Resolution No. 9 is valid but they disagreed with respect to the liability
GUILLERGAN v. GANZON of the Mayor and the Municipal Treasurer for damages. The CFI
May 25, 1966 dismissed the claims for damages while the CA awarded Jurado actual
damages, moral damages, and attorney’s fees after finding petitioners
Summary: The items of Guillergan, et al., after being declared by the CFI
(mayor and treasurer) guilty of bad faith and malice. The SC reversed
of Iloilo as permanent employees (market sweepers) of Iloilo City, were
the CA and held that damages cannot be awarded in this case because
not included in the budget approved by the Municipal Board. They sued
the petitioners acted in their official capacity.
Mayor Ganzon, et al., and the CFI awarded back salaries, holding the
Doctrine: One of the purposes of Art. 27, CC is to end the bribery system
MUNICIPALITY OF SAN JUAN v. CA
where the public official, for some flimsy excuse, delays or refuses the
performance of his duty until he gets some kind of pabagsak. In the August 9, 2005
present case, there was no proof that the mayor and the municipal
Summary: MWSS contracted KC to engage in diggings for pipeworks in a
treasure refused to issue the permit for purposes of soliciting bribery.
national road in San Juan. The diggings were left unfinished/ not fully
In fact, the mayor and the treasurer acted within the scope of their
refilled. The left front wheel of a passing car fell in the excavations,
authority and in consonance with their honest interpretation of the
causing a fracture of the humerus of a passenger, Prosecutor Laura.
resolution. They may have erroneously interpreted the Resolution but
RTC, CA, SC: San Juan is liable for damages.
it does not constitute nor does it amount to bad faith.
Doctrine: Ownership of the roads, streets, bridges, public buildings and
other public works, is not a controlling factor to determine if liability
BALUYOT v. CA
attaches. It is sufficient that a province, city or municipality has control
July 22, 1999
or supervision thereof. Under Section 149 of the LGC, the phrases
Summary: Petitioners, residents of Brgy. Cruz-na-Ligas, Diliman, QC, "regulate the drilling and excavation of the ground for the laying of gas,
filed a complaint for specific performance and damages against UP and water, sewer, and other pipes", and "adopt measures to ensure public
the QC Government. UP executed a Deed of Donation in favor of QC with safety against open canals, manholes, live wires and other similar
the residents of the said barangay as beneficiaries. This is in relation to hazards to life and property", are not modified by the term "municipal
an ongoing dispute where the residents asserted ownership over a lot road". And neither can it be fairly inferred from the same provision that
registered under UP’s name. However, UP revoked the Deed of San Juan’s power of regulation vis-à -vis the activities therein mentioned
Donation for alleged non-compliance by QC of the conditions stated in applies only in cases where such activities are to be performed in
the Deed. The Petitioners are seeking the enforcement of the Deed. UP municipal roads. San Juan’s liability for injuries caused by its failure to
and QC moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a cause of regulate the drilling and excavation of the ground for the laying of gas,
action. RTC denied but the CA reversed and dismissed the case. The SC water, sewer, and other pipes, attaches regardless of whether the
held that the complaint states a cause of action as the petitioners were excavation is made on a national or municipal road, as long as it is
enforcing a stipulation pour autrui. within its territorial jurisdiction. The obligation to maintain the safe
condition of the road within its territory is a continuing one which is
Doctrine: Elements of a cause of action: (1) Right in favor of plaintiff by not suspended while a street is being repaired.
whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is created; (2)
Obligation on the part of defendant to respect or not to violate such Lack of knowledge of the condition does not exempt. It is enough that
right; (3) Act or omission on the part of defendant in violation of the the authorities should have known of the circumstances in the exercise
right of plaintiff or constituting breach of obligations to plaintiff. of ordinary care. The obligation to maintain the safe condition of the
road within its territory is a continuing one which is not suspended
Requisites for stipulation pour autrui: (1) There must be a stipulation in while a street is being repaired. Knowledge of the condition of the road
favor of a third person; (2) Stipulation must be part, not the whole of and the defects/ obstructions may be actual or constructive. It is
the contract; (3) Contracting parties must have clearly and deliberately enough that the authorities should have known of the circumstances in
conferred a favor upon a third person, not a mere incidental benefit or the exercise of ordinary care.
interest; (4) Third person must have communicated his acceptance to
the obligor before its revocation; (5) Neither of the contracting parties Class Notes: A car was on its way to airport with the Mayor inside it. The
bears the legal representation or authorization of the third party. car hit a child who died due to the injuries sustained. Is the LGU liable?
- This is an actual case; the act performed was governmental
Class Notes: This case illustrates how an LGU can be sued. - In light of Sec. 24, LGU should be held liable

QUEZON CITY v. DACARA

June 15, 2005
OSMENA v. COA
May 31, 2011
Summary: Palarong Pambansa was going to be in Cebu. The city sought
Summary: Around 1am in the morning, Dacara Jr. was driving the car of the construction and renovation of the Cebu City Sports Complex. Cebu
his father at Matahimik st. in QC. While driving, he rammed into a pile of engaged the services of WTCI and DCDC for this. Mayor Osmena was
earth diggings causing the car to turn turtle. He incurred physical authorized to execute the contracts. A contract was executed. Later on,
injuries and damage to the car. The father of Dacara filed this case in there was a need for extra work orders so Osmena issued 20 extra work
behalf of his son. QC denies liability by claiming that the proximate orders. The city was not able to pay for the extra work orders. WTCI
cause of the damage was Dacara’s own negligence. TC awarded Dacara and DCDC filed 2 collection cases in RTC. RTC ordered city to pay the
compensatory, moral, and exemplary damages. CA affirmed. SC amount and damages, the decision became final. The city auditor did
affirmed with modification—deleted moral damages. not allow the payment of such, it held the Mayor and the Sanggunian
personally liable. SC reversed saying that Osmena is not personally
Doctrine: Article 2189,NCC. Provinces, cities and municipalities shall be liable. The City had to pay.
liable for damages for the death of, or injuries suffered by, any person
by reason of the defective condition of roads, streets, bridges, public Doctrine: (Implied; own words) A city mayor or the sanggunian could
buildings, and other public works under their control or supervision. not be personally liable for damage suits unless it would be proven that
they were ill-motivated or that they had personally profited or sought
The provisions of Article 2189 of the New Civil Code capsulizes the to profit from the transactions or that the disbursements have been
responsibility of the city government relative to the maintenance of made for their personal or selfish ends.
roads and bridges since it exercises the control and supervision over
the same. Failure of the defendant to comply with the statutory
provision found in the subject-article is tantamount to negligence per se
which renders the City government liable.

It must be emphasized that local governments and their employees

should be responsible not only for the maintenance of roads and
streets, but also for the safety of the public. Thus, they must secure
construction areas with adequate precautionary measures.
 INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS: - BUT this rule is NOT applicable to local government officials
NATIONAL GOVERNMENT AND LGUs  Though still part of the Executive Department, they are
only under the supervision of the Chief Executive
EXECUTIVE SUPERVISION  President has no control over LGUs
 Thus, President can only interfere in the affairs and
activities of an LGU if he or she finds that the latter as
Breakdown of Sec. 25, LGC: National Supervision over LGUs acted contrary to law (supervision)

(a) President shall exercise general supervision over LGUs LGUs are NOT attached agencies of the DILG
 To ensure that their acts are within their scope of - Radia v. Review Committee – LGUs are not attached to the
their prescribed powers and functions DILG in the same sense that bureaus and offices under the
 President shall exercise supervisory authority: DOJ, for instance
1) Directly over provinces, highly urbanized cities - LGUs are instrumentalities or units of local government,
and independent component cities vested with their own legislative and executive powers
2) Through the province with respect to component
cities and municipalities, and Relationship Among National Agencies with LGUs
3) Through the city and municipality with respect - NGAs and offices including GOCCs are directed by Sec. 25 to
to the barangays do 3 things:
1. Coordinate with one another
(b) National agencies and offices with project implementation 2. Coordinate with the LGU concerned and
functions shall coordinate with one another and with the 3. Furnish monthly reports of functions they are
LGUs concerned in the discharge of these functions discharging within the LGU to the local chief executive
 Ensure participation of LGUs both in planning and
implementation of national projects Class Discussion
- There is an EO (EO79) which bans open pit mining; Sir says
(c) President MAY direct appropriate national agency to that this EO is unconstitutional for several reasons
provide financial, technical, or other forms of assistance to  One reason is that there is no law regarding open pit
the LGU mining
 Upon request of the LGU  If the President says that your ordinance is invalid, this
 Assistance extended at no extra cost to LGU is an act of control!
 Note that the President only exercises general
(d) National agencies and offices including GOCCs with field supervision over LGUs
units or branches in a province, city, or municipality shall
furnish the local chief executive concerned monthly reports
including duly certified budgetary allocations and HEBRON v. REYES
expenditures July 28, 1958

Constitutional Provisions
1. Art. X, Sec. 2 and 4 – See section on Constitutional Basis Summary: The Municipal Mayor of Carmona, Cavite, Bernardo
2. Art. XI, Sec. 25 - The President, the Vice-President, the Hebron,was suspended by the President from office pending
Members of the Supreme Court, the Members of the investigation on the administrative charges against him. Vice-Mayor
Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman may be Eulalio Reyes assumed office as Acting Mayor. After almost a year of
removed from office on impeachment for, and conviction of, suspension while the matter has been pending in the Office of the
culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft President, Hebron’s term of office was about to expire. He instituted a
and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust. quo warranto proceeding against Reyes. The Court could not reach an
All other public officers and employees may be removed agreement on the decision so his term of office expired. The Court
from office as provided by law, but not by impeachment. decided the case nonetheless because the question of law is vital to
local governments. The Court held that the suspension of Hebron is null
Presidential Power over LGUs: SUPERVISION only and void for non-compliance with the provisions of law.
- Supervision – to ensure that the acts of the subordinate are
within their powers and functions and properly exercised Doctrine: The procedure described in sections 2188 to 2191 of the
- Presidential power of supervision may be done either: Revised Administrative Code for suspension and removal of the
1. DIRECTLY – over provinces, highly urbanized cities, and municipal officials therein referred to is mandatory and exclusive. The
independent component cities provincial governor and provincial board may not be deprived by the
Executive of the power to exercise the authority conferred upon them
2. INDIRECTLY – over component cities, municipalities,
in sections 2188 to 2190 of the Revised Administrative Code.
and barangays

Doctrine of Qualified Political Agency Class Notes:

- This is not good law
- Carpio v. Executive Sec. – All executive and administrative
- Look at Ganzon, where the SC said that authority to discipline
organizations are adjuncts of the Executive Department, the
is not inconsistent with supervision
heads of the various executive departments are assistants
and agents of the Chief Executive; the functions are
performed by and through the executive departments, and
the acts of the Secretaries, performed and promulgated in the GANZON v. CA
regular course of business are, unless disapproved or August 5, 1991
reprobated by the Chief Executive, presumptively the acts of
the Chief Executive Summary: Ten administrative complaints were lodged against Mayor
Ganzon of Iloilo City. On the basis of three of the complaints, Secretary
 EXCEPT:
Santos issued three preventive suspensions, each lasting sixty days
1. Where the Constitution or law requires the
each. The first two were carried out, but a TRO was procured to stop
President to act in person, or
the third. It is petitioner’s claim that the Secretary (the Executive) does
2. Where the exigencies of the situation demand that
he act personally not have the power to subject him to disciplinary action. The Supreme
Court held that it still does.
Doctrine: [implied] that the president, as part of his supervisory power,
has the power to investigate (disciplinary authority) over local
government officials. Note though that there are cases where such
power is deprived from the president, “in those case that this Court
denied the President the power (to suspend/remove) it was not
because we did not think that the President can not exercise it on
account of his limited power, but because the law lodged the power
elsewhere. But in those cases in which the law gave him the power, the
Court, as in Ganzon v. Kayanan, found little difficulty in sustaining him.”

DRILON v. LIM
August 14, 1994

Summary: The principal issue in this case is the constitutionality of

Section 187 of the Local Government Code. The Secretary of Justice (on
appeal to him of four oil companies and a taxpayer) declared Ordinance
No. 7794 (Manila Revenue Code) null and void for non-compliance with
the procedure in the enactment of tax ordinances and for containing
certain provisions contrary to law and public policy. The RTC declared
Sec. 187 of the LGC unconstitutional. The SC reversed insofar as the
lower court declared Sec. 187 unconstitutional, but affirmed the lower
court’s decision regarding the Manila Revenue Code’s compliance with
the procedure in the enactment of tax ordinances.

Doctrine: An officer in control lays down the rules in the doing of an act.
If they are not followed, he may, in his discretion, order the act undone
or re-done by his subordinate or he may even decide to do it himself.
Supervision does not cover such authority. The supervisor or
superintendent merely sees to it that the rules are followed, but he
himself does not lay down such rules, nor does he have the discretion to
modify or replace them. If the rules are not observed, he may order the
work done or re-done but only to conform to the prescribed rules. He
may not prescribe his own manner for the doing of the act. He has no
judgment on this matter except to see to it that the rules are followed.

Class Notes:
- Sir does not agree with this case
- Sec. 187 gives the Executive judicial power
 CONSULTATIONS Environmental Concerns
- Sec. 26 emphasizes the need to maintain a sound ecology and
See also Sec. 2(c), LGC - It is likewise the policy of the State to require all clean environment
national agencies and offices to conduct periodic consultations with - Sec. 26 must be read in conjunction with Sec. 2(c) and Sec. 27
appropriate local government units, nongovernmental and people's which require prior consultations with the LGUs, NGOs, and
organizations, and other concerned sectors of the community before People’s Organizations (POs), before programs and projects
any project or program is implemented in their respective jurisdictions. of national agencies may be implemented

Breakdown of Sec. 26, LGC: Duty of National Government Agencies in

the Maintenance of Ecological Balance BANGUS FRY FISHERFOLK v. LANZANAS
July 10, 2003
It shall be the duty of every NGA or GOCC authorizing or involved in
the planning and implementation: Summary: NAPOCOR was issued an Environmental Clearance Certificate
(ECC) by DENR for the construction of a mooring facility for its power
- Of any project or program that may: barge in Minolo Code which was declared a mangrove area and a
1. Cause pollution, breeding ground for bangus fry, an eco-tourist zone. Petitioners
2. Climatic change, assailed the legality of the ECC on the ground that no prior consultation
3. Depletion of nonrenewable resources with the local government unit was held. The Court held that Sections
4. Loss of cropland, rangeland, or forest cover, 26 and 27 do not apply to this case because as petitioners admit, the
5. And extinction of animal or plant species mooring facility itself is not environmentally critical and hence does not
belong to any of the six types of projects mentioned in the law. There is
- To CONSULT with the LGUs, NGOs and other sectors no statutory requirement for the concerned sanggunian to approve the
concerned and explain: construction of the mooring facility. It is another matter if the operation
1. The goals and objectives of the project or program of the power barge is at issue. As an environmentally critical project
2. Its impact upon people and community in terms of that causes pollution, the operation of the power barge needs the prior
environmental or ecological balance approval of the concerned sanggunian. However, what is before this
3. Measures that will be undertaken to prevent or Court is only the construction of the mooring facility, not the operation
minimize the adverse effects thereof of the power barge. Thus, the issuance of the ECC does not violate
Sections 26 and 27 of RA 7160.
Breakdown of Sec. 27, LGC: Prior Consultations Required
Doctrine: Sections 26 and 27 should be read together. Thus, the projects
and programs mentioned in Section 27 should be interpreted to mean
NO project or program shall be implemented by government
projects and programs whose effects are among those enumerated in
authorities
Sections 26 and 27, to wit, those that: (1) may cause pollution; (2) may
- UNLESS
bring about climatic change; (3)may cause the depletion of non-
1. Consultation mentioned in Sec. 2(c) and 26 are
renewable resources; (4) may result in loss of crop land, rangeland, or
complied with, and
forest cover; (5) may eradicate certain animal or plant species; and
2. Prior approval of the sanggunian concerned is
(6)other projects or programs that may call for the eviction of a
obtained
particular group of people residing in the locality where these will be
- PROVIDED – occupants in areas where such projects are
implemented.
being implemented shall NOT be evicted
 UNLESS appropriate relocation sites have been
Class Notes: Why are we upset with this decision?
provided in accordance with Constitution
1. What happened to Sec. 2(c)?
Special Laws cited in the Syllabus  Consultation is not limited to environmental projects
1. Memo Circ. No. 52 – Enjoining strict compliance with LGC  The law also cites Sec. 2(c) on projects of the national
provisions requiring mandatory coordination and government
consultation with LGUs  THUS, mandatory consultation is required under:
2. RA 8975 – Act to ensure expeditious implementation and a. Sec. 2(c) – periodic consultations before
completion of government infrastructure projects by implementation of any project or program
prohibiting lower courts from issuing TROs or Preliminary b. Sec. 26 – on projects with environmental impacts
Mandatory Injunctions 2. The pronouncement about PD 1605 is wrong
a. Governor or mayor of a highly-urbanized city shall 3. On “absence of documents” which the SC justified
immediately issue necessary permit to extract sand,  The SC cited Mangubat v. Osmena which was cited out of
gravel and other quarry resources needed in context; if one reads this unreported case the decision
government projects; issuance of permit shall consider actually supports the petitioners in Bangus Fry
environmental laws, land use ordinances and the  On “patent illegality”
pertinent provisions of the LGC relating to environment.  Flawed logic since the SC went on to say that the
RED had the power to issue it
Mandatory Consultation
- Sec. 26 makes it an obligation for NGAs or GOCCs to conduct
consultations with LGUs and NGOs and other concerned PROVINCE OF RIZAL v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
sectors December 13, 2005
- Absent such consultation, the said project may be declared
illegal and the officials concerned made liable Summary: Seven hectares of the 18 hectare watershed preserve was
 As was held in Province of Rizal v. Executive Secretary; delineated to be used as a dumpsite starting 1989 ignoring all the
SC said that absent either the (1) prior consultation protests of the people, the recommendation of the CENRO, the letter of
with affected local communities or the (2) prior the Laguna Lake Development Authority, the local government
approval by appropriate sanggunian, a national composed of 6 mayors, the letters of Senator Salonga to the MMA (later
project’s implementation is illegal turned MMDA) because the problem of waste management was so big
that this dumpsite is needed because it services 38% of Metro Manila’s
garbage nevermind that it already polluted water resources, cut down
all the mature fruit bearing trees and is totally contrary to law. Despite
the petitioners asking for a TRO, the court a quo at one point even had
likewise have a stake in the resources in the area, and deserve to be
the gall to say that this petition was right to be dismissed! Good thing
adequately compensated when these resources are exploited.
they were relentless to pursue closure of this dumpsite.

Doctrine: LGC Section 16 allows every local government unit to

“exercise the powers expressly granted, those necessarily implied BORACAY FOUNDATION INC v. PROVINCE OF AKLAN
therefrom, as well aspowers necessary, appropriate, or incidental for its June 26, 2012
efficient and effective governance, and those which are essential to the
promotion of the general welfare,” which involve, among other things, Summary: The Province of Aklan, secured permits from Philippine
“promot(ing) health and safety, enhance(ing) the right of the people to a Reclamation Authority (PRA), and Department of Environment and
balanced ecology, and preserv(ing) the comfort and convenience of their Natural Resources – Environmental Management Bureau, Regional
inhabitants.” Office VI (DENR-EMB RVI) for the implementation of the project which
sought to reclaim land in Caticlan and Malay, and to develop buildingd
Moreover, Section 447, which enumerates the powers, duties and and commercial sites there. It signed a MOA with PRA, and secured an
functions of the municipality, grants the sangguniang bayan the power Environmental Compliance Certificate from DENR before consulting
to, among other things, “enact ordinances, approve resolutions and with the LGU’s. Subsequently, it talked to the local governments
appropriate funds for the general welfare of the municipality and its involved to tell them about the project, but the local governments
inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of th(e) Code.” affected refused to give their support. Aklan still commenced with the
project. Boracay Foundation filed a suit questioning the propriety of
Under the Local Government Code, therefore, two requisites must be Aklan’s actions. The SC ruled that the LGC requirements for prior
met before a national project that affects the environmental and consultation and approval by the LGU’s before implementation of the
ecological balance of local communities can be implemented: prior project were not complied with, and remanded the case.
consultation with the affected local communities, and prior approval of
the project by the appropriate sanggunian. Absent either of these Doctrine: The Local Government Code establishes the duties of national
mandatory requirements, the project’s implementation is illegal. government agencies in the maintenance of ecological balance, and
requires them to secure prior public consultation and approval of local
government units for the projects described therein. Section 27 of the
Local Government Code applies only to “national programs and/or
ALVAREZ v. PICOP RESOURCES INC.
projects which are to be implemented in a particular local community”
December 3, 2009
and that it should be read in conjunction with Section 26. Under the
Summary: In 1952, TLA 43 was issued to PICOP. It was valid for 25 Local Government Code, two requisites must be met before a national
years and renewable for another 25 years and with a condition that project that affects the environmental and ecological balance of local
DENR can amend the boundaries covered by the license. Upon request communities can be implemented: prior consultation with the affected
of the board of investors if PICOP, President Marcos signed 1969 local communities, and prior approval of the project by the appropriate
Document purportedly a Presidential Warrranty assuring PICOP of the sanggunian. Absent either of these mandatory requirements, the
boundaries convered by the TLA. However, PICOP claimed that such project’s implementation is illegal. The lack of prior public consultation
warranty is a contract which guarantees perpetual renewal of its and approval is not corrected by the subsequent endorsement of the
license. In 1999, DAO 99-53 was issued providing for the conversion of project.
TLA to IFMA. PICOP applied for the conversion of its TLA which was
already subsisting since 1952 and was already renewed once in 1977. Class Notes:
Without negotiating further with the DENR, PICOP filed a mandamus - The SC held that subsequent approval does NOT cure lack of
with RTC of Manila to compel DENR Sec Alvarez to issue the IFMA they prior approval
are applying for insisting that there should be automatic conversion, - The SC also held that the approval has to come before the
the 1969 Document is a contract and that it has complied with all the issuance of ECC
legal requirements for the conversion of its TLA to IFMA. RTC granted  This is not entirely accurate
the mandamus. CA affirmed. SC reversed. Hence, this motion for  The issuance of ECC does not depend on compliance of
reconsideration. LGC requirements; specifically it refers to DENR laws
 The LGC only said that the approval must be secured
It was held that there is no law enjoining the DENR to issue the IFMA PRIOR to the implementation of the program
applied for because it is discretionary upon the Secretary after proper  So it could be said that as long as the project has
evaluation. The 1969 Document is also not a contract but a mere not been implemented, even if the ECC has already
reassurance of the boundaries of TLA 43. It cannot be construed to been issued, and LGU approval was secured, then
grant perpetual renewal of license because that would contravene Sec there is compliance with the law
2, Article 12 of the Constitution. Regarding the adminsitrative
requirements, the Court held that PICOP submitted the forest
protection and reforestation plans and paid forest charges. PICOP is
required to submit the NCIP certification mandated by RA 8371. Also,
the approval of the Sangunians of ALL local government units (Surigao
del Sur, Agusan del Sur, Compostela Valley and Davao Oriental)
concerned. The approval of Surigao del Sur cannot be deemed as
sufficient compliance.

Doctrine: The approval of the Sanggunian concerned is required by law,

not because the local government has control over such project, but
because the local government has the duty to protect its constituents
and their stake in the implementation of the project. Again, Section 26
states that it applies to projects that "may cause pollution, climatic
change, depletion of non-renewable resources, loss of crop land,
rangeland, or forest cover, and extinction of animal or plant species."
The local government should thus represent the communities in such
area, the very people who will be affected by flooding, landslides or
even climatic change if the project is not properly regulated, and who
 RELATIONS WITH PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE In Carpio v. Executive Secretary, the deputization of the local executives
was challenged
- SC upheld the deputization and held that the local executives
Breakdown of Sec. 28, LGC: Powers of Local Chief Executives over the Units
are only acting as representatives of the NAPOLCOM
of the PNP
 Unless countermanded by the NAPOLCOM, their acts
are valid and binding
RA 6975 (DILG Act) shall govern the extent of OPERATIONAL
- Besides, local officials, as NAPOLCOM representatives, will
SUPERVISION and CONTROL of local chief executive over:
choose the officers concerned from a list of eligibles to be
1. Police force
recommended by PNP officials
2. Fire protection unit and
3. Jail management personnel

Special Laws cited in the Syllabus CARPIO v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

1. RA 6975 – Act establishing the PNP under a reorganized February 14, 1992
department under the DILG
Summary: RA 6975 was passed, reorganizing the PNP under the DILG.
a. Sec. 13 – creation of the NAPOLCOM for the purpose of
Carpio assails its constitutionality. One of Caprio’s arguments was that
effectively discharging the functions; collegial body
the law derogated the power of control of the NAPOLCOM over the PNP
within the DILG
by vesting different powers in the local officials. The SC upheld the
b. Sec. 14 – powers and functions of the NAPOLCOM
constitutionality of the law.
(1) It exercises administrative control over the PNP
among others
Doctrine: Under RA 6975, there is no usurpation of the power of control
c. Sec. 23 – Composition of the PNP; its powers and
of the NAPOLCOM because the local executives only act as
functions are in Sec. 24
representatives of the NAPOLCOM. As such deputies, they are
d. Sec. 51 – Governors and mayors shall be deputized as
answerable to the NAPOLCOM for their actions in the exercise of their
representatives of the NAPOLCOM in their respective
functions.
territorial jurisdiction
(1) Power of operational supervision and control
e. Sec. 52 – President may, upon consultation with Class Notes:
provincial governor and congressman concerned, - Is this good law? As to the PNP structure, no. Now, PNP is
suspend the power operational supervision and control attached to DILG under RA 8551
of any local executive over police units assigned or - “Operational supervision and control”
stationed in his jurisdiction for any of the following  Day to day operations only
grounds:  So it does not have to go to the NAPOLCOM all the time
(1) Frequent unauthorized absences;
(2) Abuse of authority;
(3) Providing material support to criminal elements; ANDAYA v. RTC
(4) Engaging in acts inimical to national security or December 3, 1999
which negate the effectiveness of the peace and
order campaign. Summary: Mayor appointed Sarmiento as chief of police of Cebu. The
latter was not part of the list of 5 eligibles submitted by Andaya
2. RA 8551 (1998) – PNP reform and reorganization because was not qualified for the position under NAPOLCOM
a. Sec. 62 defines operational supervision Memorandum Circular No. 95-04 prescribing minimum qualifications
(1) Power to direct, superintend, and oversee the day- for Directors of Provincial/City Police commands. Cebu City filed a
to-day functions of police investigation of crime, complaint for declaratory relief with preliminary prohibitory and
crime prevention activities, and traffic control in mandatory injunction against Andaya and Inciong, Regional Director of
accordance with the rules and regulations the NAPOLCOM.TC ruled in favor of the City stating that Sarmiento was
promulgated by the Commission. qualified. MR was denied. SC reversed the decision.
(2) Includes the power to direct the employment and
deployment of units or elements of the PNP, Doctrine: As deputy of the Commission, the authority of the mayor is
through the station commander, to ensure public very limited. In reality, he has no power of appointment; he has only the
safety and effective maintenance of peace and limited power of selecting one from among the list of five eligibles to be
order within the locality named the chief of police. Actually, the power to appoint the chief of
b. Sec. 64 - Governors and mayors are automatically police of Cebu City is vested in the Regional Director, Regional Police
deputized as representatives of the NAPOLCOM in their Command No. 7. Much less may the mayor require the Regional
respective jurisdiction. As deputized agents, local Director, Regional Police Command, to include the name of any officer,
government executives can inspect police forces and no matter how qualified, in the list of five to be submitted to the mayor.
units, conduct audit, and exercise other functions as The purpose is to enhance police professionalism and to isolate the
may be duly authorized by the Commission. police service from political domination.

DILG/PNP Law Governs Police CANONIZADO v. AGUIRRE

- Pimentel notes that the LGC did not settle the question as to January 25, 2000
who has primacy in the running of the local police in a
definitive manner Summary: The Commissioners of the NAPOLCOM were Edgar Dula
 All it did was to reiterate the principle that the Torres, Alexis C. Canonizado, Rogelio A. Pureza and Jose Percival L.
relationship between LGU and PNP is defined in RA Adiong. RA 8551 was passed declaring that the terms of the current
6975 and rules implementing it Commissioners were deemed as expired upon its effectivity. None of
- BUT remember that the Constitution mandates the creation terms of Canonizado et al had expired at the time RA 8551, took effect.
of ONE national police Thus, Except for Adiong,all of the incumbent commissioners just before
 So if there be one national police, LGUs cannot have full the passage of RA 8551 lost their positions. Canonizado et al argue that
control and supervision of the police in their locality their removal from office by virtue of section 8 of RA 8551 violates their
since this would make them LOCAL police forces security of tenure. The SC ruled in their favor, and ordered their
 Under the DILG reorganization act, mayors and reinstatement.
governors are DEPUTIES of NAPOLCOM
Doctrine: On when an abolition of an office does not result in a violation
RODRIGUEZ v. CA
of the security of tenure of civil service employees: The creation and
abolition of public offices is primarily a legislative function. However, in August 7, 2002
order for the abolition to be valid, it must be made in GOOD FAITH, not
Summary: Pursuant to PNP’s OPLAN AJAX, PFC Rodriguez (together
for political or personal reasons, or in order to CIRCUMVENT the
with PFC Silangan and PFC Pilandi) of the Metropolitan Traffic
CONSTIUTIONAL SECURITY OF TENURE of civil service employees.
Command in Makati was caught in an entrapment operation for
Substantial identity in the functions between the abolished office and
extortion activities in Guadalupe Bridge. An administrative case was
the new office was indicia of bad faith in the removal of a civil service
filed with NAPOLCOM against Rodriguez and the 2 other police officers
employee pursuant to a reorganization.
for their summary dismissal. PNP Chief Nazareno issued a Special Order
summarily dismissing them from the police force. Rodriguez appealed
On the meaning of administrative control and operational
to the NAPOLCOM National Appellate Board but the latter affirmed
supervision: The power of control necessarily encompasses the power
their summary dismissal. Instead of appealing to the DILG Secretary or
of supervision.
the CSC, Rodriguez elevated his case to the CA by way of certiorari and
mandamus. The CA dismissed his petition for lack of merit and held that
On the meaning of reorganization: Reorganization takes place
certiorari and mandamus cannot be resorted to as substitute for appeal.
when there is an alteration of the existing structure of government
The SC agreed with the CA and held that PFC Rodriguez should have
offices or units therein, including the lines of control, authority and
followed the procedure under the Administrative Code for appeals
responsibility between them. It involves a reduction of personnel,
relating to dismissal from the Civil Service.
consolidation of offices, or abolition thereof by reason of economy or
redundancy of functions. Naturally, it may result in the loss of one's
Doctrine: The civilian character of the PNP is unqualified, unconditional,
position through removal or abolition of an office. However, for a
and all embracing. Members of the PNP are deemed civilian personnel
reorganization to be valid, it must also pass the test of good faith.
of the government. Hence, police officers and personnel are part of the
civil service. This is expressly recognized by RA 6975 when it provided
for the applicability of civil service laws to all its personnel, as stated in
Section 91.
CANONIZADO v. AGUIRRE
February 15, 2001
PEOPLE v. VELARDE
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
July 18, 2002
Summary: The Executive Secretary seeks a reconsideration of the
Court's 2000 decision on the ground that since Canonizado, one of the
reinstated commissioners, accepted a position as Inspector General in Summary: Velarde was tagged as a suspect for rape with homide. He
the PNP during the pendency of the 2000 case, he is deemed have was allegedly informed of his constitutional rights. Thereafter, he was
abandoned his NAPOLCOM position as commissioner. This was because brought to the Mayor who agreed to act as his counsel. Before the
the offices of the NAPOLOCOM and the Inspector General in the PNP Mayor, he executed an extrajudicial confession, admitting the crime. He
were held to be incompatible. was convicted by the lower courts and sentenced to death. On
The SC held that Canonizado is not deemed to have automatic review to the SC, the admissibility of his extrajudicial
abandoned her office in the NAPOLCOM by her acceptance of a position confession is in question, as well as the suifficiency of evidence to prove
in the PNP, since she had no intention to abandon such office; she was guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
compelled to do so because of Section 9 of RA 8551. The SC ruled that his extrajudicial confession was
inadmissible because it was not made in the presence of an
Doctrine: On where there is abandonment of office: Where, while INDEPENDENT counsel. As mayor of Malolos, his duties were
desiring and intending to hold the office, and with no willful desire or inconsistent with those of his responsibilities to the accused. Hence, the
intention to abandon it, the public officer vacates it in deference to the accused is acquitted on reasonable doubt.
requirements of a statute which is afterwards declared
unconstitutional, such a surrender will not be deemed an abandonment Doctrine: The Mayor exercises "operational supervision and control"
and the officer may recover the office. over the PNP unit in that municipality. His powers included the
utilization of the elements thereof for the maintenance of peace and
On the rationale for how incompatibility of two offices results order, the prevention of crimes, the arrest of criminal offenders and the
in a vacation of the first office held: Public policy considerations dictate bringing of offenders to justice. As mayor of Malolos, his duties were
against allowing the same individual to perform inconsistent and inconsistent with those of his responsibilities of a counsel to an
incompatible duties. The incompatibility contemplated is not the mere accused.
physical impossibility of one person’s performing the duties of the two
offices due to a lack of time or the inability to be in two places at the
same moment, but that which proceeds from the nature and relations of
the two positions to each other as to give rise to contrariety and
antagonism should one person attempt to faithfully and impartially
discharge the duties of one toward the incumbent of the other.

On the incompatibility of the NAPOLCOM Commissioner

position and the Inspector General positon in the PNP: There is no
question that the positions of NAPOLCOM Commissioner and Inspector
General of the IAS are incompatible with each other. As pointed out by
Executive Secretary et al, RA 8551 prohibits any personnel of the IAS
from sitting in a committee charged with the task of deliberating on the
appointment, promotion, or assignment of any PNP personnel, whereas
the NAPOLCOM has the power of control and supervision over the PNP.
However, the rule on incompatibility of duties will not apply to the case
at bar because at no point did Canonizado discharge the functions of the
two offices simultaneously.
 INTER-LOCAL GOVERNMENT RELATIONS 2. City/municipality mayor also has the power to review the
EOs of the punong barangay in his jurisdiction
Breakdown of Sec. 29, LGC: Provincial Relations with Component
Cities and Municipalities Purpose of Review
- To ensure that such EOs are within the powers granted by
The province, through governor, shall ensure that every component law and in conformity with ordinances
city and municipality within its territorial jurisdiction acts within the - Casino v. CA – power of review is exercised to determine
scope of its prescribed powers and functions whether it is necessary to correct the acts of the subordinate
- The following shall be independent from the province: and to see to it that he performs his duties in accordance
1. Highly urbanized cities with law
2. Independent component cities
When EOs are deemed Valid – when the governor or mayor fails to act
Governor’s Supervisory Powers on said EO within 30 days from its submission
- Province (through governor) only has supervisory powers
over: (within its territorial jurisdiction) Other Powers of Supervision – additional powers granted to governor
1. Component cities and or mayor to supervise acts of lower LGU; these can be found in:
2. Municipalities 1. Sec. 29, LGC
- Highly urbanized cities and independent component cities: 2. Sec. 31, LGC
 Independent of the province 3. Sec. 32, LGC
 Under the supervisory powers of the President
Breakdown of Sec. 31, LGC: Submission of Municipal Questions to the
Governor’s Coordinative Powers Provincial Legal Officer or Prosecutor
- Governor also has the power to coordinate plans and
developmental activities of component cities and Municipal government may secure the opinion of any legal question
municipalities with the province and with NGAs concerned affecting the municipality:
- Such coordinated activities may cover (Art. 59, IRR): 1. The municipal legal officer
1. Law and order plans which may be coordinated with 2. The provincial legal officer, in the absence of (1)
PNP and NAPOLCOM 3. The provincial prosecutor, in the absence of (2)
2. Measures to safeguard and conserve natural resources
which may be coordinated with the mayors Legal Adviser
3. Efforts to host sports contests or promote sports - Note that a legal adviser is different from a legal counsel
development activities  Sec. 30 refers to the legal adviser
4. Convening of meetings or calling of conventions of  Sec. 481 refers to the legal counsel
elective and appointive officials of the province and its
component cities and municipalities Absence of Legal Officer
5. Review executive orders of mayors - Provinces and cities are now mandated to create the office of
- ALWAYS NOTE: the Legal Officer
 This only covers component cities and municipalities  Municipalities are permitted subject to availability of
 And only within its territorial jurisdiction funds
- In the absence of a legal officer, the LGUs can resort to the
Sanggunian’s Power of Review lawyers enumerated in Sec. 30
- Provincial sanggunian has the power to review:
1. Component city or municipal ordinances Legal Representation
a. Even resolutions approving development plans - Sec. 30 does NOT cover the situation wherein the LGU is a
and public investment programs party litigant
2. Annual or supplemental appropriations - GENERAL RULE: LGUs may NOT resort to hiring private
counsel when they are faced with legal problems
Breakdown of Sec. 30, LGC: Review of Executive Orders  EXCEPTION: Province of Cebu v. IAC
 In that case the SC held that the municipality’s
(a) Governor shall review ALL executive orders promulgated by authority to employ a private lawyer is expressly
the component city or municipal mayor within its limited only to situations where the provincial
jurisdiction fiscal is disqualified to represent it
 EXCEPT as otherwise provided under Constitution and
special laws Breakdown of Sec. 32, LGC: City and Municipal Supervision over
 City/municipal mayor shall review all executive Their Representative Barangays
orders promulgated by the punong barangay within
his jurisdiction City or municipality shall exercise general supervision over component
 Copies of such orders shall be forwarded to governor barangays
or city/municipal mayor within 3 days from issuance - Through city/municipal mayor concerned
 Local chief executive concerned shall ensure that such - To ensure that said barangays act within the scope of their
EOs are within the powers granted by law and in prescribed powers and functions
conformity with provincial, city, or municipal
General supervision exercised by mayor over acts of barangay is an
ordinances
extension of supervisory power of the Presidents over LGUs
(b) If governor or mayor fails to act on said EO within 30 days
after submission:
Breakdown of Sec. 33, LGC: Cooperative Undertakings Among LGUs
 Deemed consistent with the law and therefore valid
LGUs may, through appropriate ordinances, group themselves,
Power of Review consolidate, or coordinate their efforts, services, and resources for
1. Governor has power to review all EOs promulgated by purposes commonly beneficial to them
component city or municipal mayor within the province - LGUs involved may:
 1. Contribute funds, real estate, equipment, and other
kinds of property and
2. Assign or appoint personnel

 Under such terms and conditions as may be agreed

upon by the participating LGUs through MOA
 AND UPON:
a. Approval by sanggunian concerned
b. After public hearing conducted for the purpose

Sec. 33 expressly grants to LGUs the power to cooperate with one

another, consolidate their efforts, and coordinate their activities for any
legal purpose that s beneficial to them.
 RELATIONS WITH PEOPLE’S AND NON-GOVERNMENTAL THE LOCAL PREQUALIFICATION, BIDS, AND AWARDS
ORGANIZATIONS COMMITTEE

Breakdown of Sec. 34, LGC: Role of People’s and Non-Governmental Breakdown of Sec. 37, LGC: Local PBAC
Organizations
(a) A local PBAC is created in every province, city and
LGUs shall promote the establishment and operation of POs and NGOs municipality13
- To become active partners in the pursuit of local autonomy  Primarily responsible for the conduct of
prequalification of contractors, bidding, evaluation of
NOTE: Sec. 34 has to be read together with Sec. 35 and 36 bids and recommendation of awards concerning local
infrastructure projects
POs = People’s Organizations are groups of people outside of  Members:
government, who are organized for the attainment of some legitimate 1. Governor or City/Municipal Mayor as Chairman
aspirations such as labor unions and cooperatives which may also be 2. Members:
profit-oriented a. Chairman of appropriations committee of
sanggunian concerned
NGOs = Non-Government Organizations are groups of people who are b. Representative of the minority party in
involved in a more or less systematic pursuit of some particularized sanggunian concerned, if any
sectoral activity (1) If none, then 1 chosen by said
sanggunian from among its members
Breakdown of Sec. 35, LGC: Linkages with POs and NGOs c. Local treasurer
d. 2 representatives of NGOs that are
LGUs may enter into JVAs12 and other such cooperative arrangements represented in the local development
with POs and NGOs to: council concerned
1. Engage in the delivery of certain basic services, capability- (1) To be chosen by the organizations
building and livelihood projects, and themselves
2. Develop local enterprises designed to improve productivity e. Any practicing CPA from the private sector
and income, diversify agriculture, spur rural (1) Designated by the local chapter of the
industrialization, promote ecological balance, and Phil. Institute of CPAs, if any
3. Enhance the economic and social well-being of the people  COA representatives shall:
1. Observe the proceedings of PBAC, and
The provision is so broadly worded that it may encompass any activity 2. Certify that the rules and procedures for
that promotes the development of a locality prequalification, bids, and awards are complied
- Area of PO/NGO-LGU joint activities is virtually limitless
- Cooperatives are suggested forms of private organizations (b) Agenda and other information relevant to meeting of PBAC
through which JVAs with LGUs may be established shall be deliberated upon by the committee at least 1 week
before holding of meeting
Breakdown of Sec. 36, LGC: Assistance to POs and NGOs
(c) All meetings shall be held in the provincial capitol or
An LGU may provide assistance to such POs and NGOs for economic, city/municipality hall
socially oriented, environmental or cultural projects to be  Minutes and any decision made therein shall be:
implemented within its territorial jurisdiction 1. Duly recorded
- Done through its local chief executive 2. Posted at a prominent place in the
 With the concurrence of the sanggunian concerned provincial capitol or city/municipality hall,
- Assistance may be financial or otherwise and
3. Delivered by the most expedient means
This provision allows LGUs to support POs and NGOs

Specific Examples: Breakdown of Sec. 38, LGC: Local Technical Committee (LTC)
1. POs/NGOs engaged in local ceramics industries or
development of tourist spots can earn some money and LGUs (a) A local LTC is hereby created in every province, city, and
may fund the same as economic projects municipality
2. Reforestation projects and marine rehabilitation projects  To provide technical assistance to the local PBAC
may be assisted by LGUs as part of their environmental  Composed of:
activities 1. Provincial, city, or municipal engineer
3. Local drama and choir groups may be assisted by LGUs 2. Local planning and development coordinator
3. Such other officials designated by the local PBAC

(b) Chairman of LTC shall be designated by local PBAC

 He shall attend PBAC meeting in order to present the
reports and recommendations of the LTC

12 13
Joint-Venture Agreements Note: no mention of barangays
 TITLE TWO: ELECTIVE OFFICIALS
QUALIFICATIONS AND ELECTIONS (1) For provinces with 2 or more legislative districts,
elective members of Sangguniang Panlalawigan
shall be elected by legislative districts
MEMBERS OF THE SANGGUNIAN (2) For provinces with 1 legislative district, COMELEC
shall divide them into 2 districts for purposes of
Breakdown of Sec. 41, LGC: electing members of the Sangguniang
This section provides for the ways of electing local officials: Panlalawigan
(3) Number of election of elective members of
For: Sangguniang Panlungsod and Bayan of any city
At large or
1. Governor and vice-governor to be with 2 or more legislative districts shall continue
throughout the
elected by entire province to be governed by Sec. 2 and 3 of RA 6636
territorial
2. Mayor and vice-mayor to be elected by
jurisdiction of
the entire city or municipality
LGU concerned 3. Punong barangay by the entire barangay 2. Section 2. Metro Manila Area. - For purposes
By district
For regular members of the various sanggunians, of the Local Elections on January 18, 1988, the
- Provincial, city, or municipal
City of Manila, Quezon City and the City of
In case of members of the Sangguniang barangay
- In case of the Sangguniang barangay Caloocan shall have six (6) councilors for each
chairman, Art. XXVII of the IRR requires of their representative districts who shall be
By barangay
that he be elected by the registered residents thereof to be elected by the qualified
voters of the Katipunan ng mga
Barangay
voters therein. The City of Pasay and the
In case of the presidents of: Municipalities of Makati, Parañaque, Pasig,
1. League of Sanggunian of Component Marikina, and Valenzuela, each of which
Cities and Municipalities comprises a representative district, shall have
By league
2. Sanggunian ng mga Barangay and
3. Pederasyon ng mga Sangguniang twelve (12) councilors each to be elected at
Kabataan large by the qualified voters of the said city or
In case of the representatives of: municipality. All the other municipalities within
1. Women
2. Workers
the Metropolitan Manila area shall have ten
3. One or other of the following sectors: (10) councilors each, with the exception of the
a. Urban poor Municipality of Pateros which shall have eight
By sector b. Indigenous cultural communities (8) councilors, to be elected at large by their
c. Disabled persons
d. Any other sector as determined by respective qualified voters.
the sanggunian concerned within
90 days prior to holding of next 3. Section 3. Other Cities. - The provision of any
local elections
law to the contrary notwithstanding the City of
FOR THE SANGGUNIAN Cebu, City of Davao, and any other city with
more than one representative district shall have
- Elected BY district
Sangguniang eight (8) councilors for each district who shall
- Presidents of the league of sanggunian
Panlalawigan,
members of component cities and be residents thereof to be elected by the
Panglungsod,
and Bayan
municipalities shall serve as ex officio qualified voters therein, provided that the cities
members of Cagayan de Oro, Zamboanga, Bacolod,
Rules on the number of regular members:
1. 1st and 2nd class provinces shall have 10 Iloilo and other cities comprising a
2. 3rd and 4th class provinces shall have 8 representative district shall have twelve (12)
Specifically for
the
3. 5th and 6th class provinces shall have 6 councilors each and all other cities shall have
PROVIDED that in provinces with more than 5
Sangguniang ten (10) councilors each to be elected at large
legislative districts:
Panglungsod
- Each district shall have 2 sangguniang by the qualified voters of the said cities:
panlalawigan memebrs Provided, That in no case shall the present
- Without prejudice to Sec. 2, RA 6637 number of councilors according to their
Sangguniang
Barangay
Elected at large (meaning by the whole barangay) charters be reduced.

Special Laws cited in the Syllabus

1. RA 6636 (1987) – Act resetting the local elections from Nov.
9, 1987 to Jan. 18, 1988 3. RA 7887 (1995) – Act instituting electoral reforms for the
purpose of amending Sec. 3 (c) and (d) of RA 7166
2. RA 7166 (1991) a. Number of elective members of the sangguniang
a. Sec. 3 provides that members of Sangguniang panlungsod and sangguniang bayan in the Metro Manila
Panlalawigan, Panlungsod and Bayan shall be elected as area, City of Cebu, City of Davao and any other city with
follows: 2 or more legislative districts shall be elected by
districts and in accordance with the provisions of
Sections 2 and 3 of RA. 6636
 b. Provided, that, all cities with 1legislative district and
all municipalities in the Metro Manila area shall have
12 councilors each
c. Provided, further, that, the Commission shall divide all
cities with one legislative district and each of the
municipalities in Metro Manila area into 2 districts by
barangay for purposes of representation in the
sangguniang bayan as nearly as practicable according
to the number of inhabitants, each district comprising
a compact, contiguous and adjacent territory

4. RA 8553 (1998) – An act amending Sec. 41(B) of LGC

 This is already incorporated in the “Breakdown of Sec.
41, LGC”

5. RA 19156 (2011) – An act conferring upon members of the

sangguniang bayan, panlungsod, and panlalawigan the
appropriate civil service eligibility under certain
circumstances

HERRERA v. COMELEC
Summary: The Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Guimaras requested the November 17, 1999
Comelec to divide such Province, composed only of 1 legislative
district, to 2 provincial districts pursuant to the mandate of RA 7166.
Guimaras was also reclassified from 5 th to 4th class province entitling it
to 8 Sanggunian Seats. Comelec issued Resolution 2950 which divided
the Province into 2 provincial districts with the 1 st district getting 3
seats and the 2nd district getting 5 seats. Petitioners argue that based
on the number of registered voters, the municipalities composing such
districts should be rearranged to almost equalize the number of voters
for each district so that each would get 4 seats.

Doctrine: Under R.A. 7166 and Comelec Resolution No. 2313, the basis
for division into districts shall be the number of inhabitants of the
province concerned and not the number of listed or registered voters
as theorized by petitioners. Comelec did not act with grave abuse of
discretion in issuing the assailed Resolution because the basis for the
districting is the number of inhabitants of the Province of Guimaras by
municipality based on the official 1995 Census of Population as
certified by Tomas P. Africa, Administrator of the NSO.
 REMEDIES14
QUALIFICATIONS
Petition to Deny or Cancel COC
1. Sec. 78, OEC Breakdown of Sec. 39, LGC: An elective local official must be:
2. WHO may file: Any person
3. WHEN to file: Any time not later than 25 days from the time GENERAL QUALIFICATIONS
of filing of COC Citizenship A Citizen of the Philippines
4. NATURE: Summary proceeding A registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city, or
5. Exclusive Ground: Any material misrepresentation contained province
Voter
in the COC In case of a member of the Sanggunian, in the district
a. Provided that: where he intends to be elected
(1) False representation pertains to a material matter A resident therein for at least 1 year immediately
Residency
affecting substantive rights of a candidate; and preceding the day of election
(2) False representation must consist of deliberate Must be able to read and write Filipino or any other
Literacy local language or dialect
attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact
which would otherwise render a candidate
ineligible (Salcedo II v. COMELEC) AGE QUALIFICATIONS
 Meaning, material fact that refers to a candidate’s Reckoned on election day
eligibility or qualification for office like citizenship, For governor, vice-governor, or member of the
residence, or status as registered voter 23 years Sangguniang Panlalawigan
6. Decision: Shall be decided, after due notice and hearing, not old For mayor, vice-mayor or member of the Sangguniang
later than 15 days before election Panglungsod of highly urbanized cities
 Not mandatory For mayor or vice-mayor of:
21 years 1. Independent component cities,
Quo Warranto Proceedings old 2. Component cities, or
1. WHO may file: Any voter 3. Municipalities
2. WHEN: Within 10 days after the proclamation of the results For position of member of the Sangguniang
of the election. 18 years Panglungsod or Sangguniang Bayan
3. JURISDICTION: old For position of Punong Barangay or member of the
a. COMELEC – petitions involving regional, provincial and Sangguniang Barangay
city officials 15 years For candidates of the Sangguniang Kabataan
b. RTC – petitions involving municipal officials old - BUT must be less than 18 years old
c. MeTC or MTC – petitions involving barangay officials
4. GROUNDS: Special Laws cited in the Syllabus
a. Ineligibility 1. RA 9164 (2002) – Synchronized barangay and SK elections
b. Disloyalty to the Republic a. Sec. 424 of LGC is amended – Katipunan ng Kabataan
5. NATURE: (1) Composed of Filipino citizens
a. A petition for quo warranto under the Omnibus Election (2) Actually residing in barangay for at least 6 months
Code raises in issue the disloyalty or ineligibility of the (3) 15 but less than 18 years old on day of election
winning candidate. It is a proceeding to unseat the (4) Duly registered in the list of SK or in the official
respondent from office but not necessarily to install the barangay
petitioner in his place. b. Sec. 428 of LGC is amended – Elective official of SK
b. Different from an Election Protest (1) Must be a Filipino citizen
(1) In election protest, it is the losing candidate which (2) Qualified voter of the katipunan ng kabataan
files and seeks declaration as winner (3) Resident of barangay at least 1 year prior to
(2) Quo warranto can be filed by any voter since election
question is only on eligibility and loyalty (4) 15 but less than 18 years old on day of election
(5) Read and write Filipino, English, or local dialect
EFFECT OF DISQUALIFICATION (6) Must not have been convicted of any crime
involving moral turpitude
Effect: Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to
be disqualified 2. RA 8171 (1995) – Repatriation of Filipino Women who by
1. Shall not be voted for and virtue of their marriage to alien nationals, and of natural-
2. Votes cast for him shall not be counted born Filipinos
3. If a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an
election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives Citizenship Requirement
the winning number of votes in such election: - Need not be by birth
a. Court or COMELEC shall continue with the trial and - Naturalized Filipinos may qualify
hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest and
b. Upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may Residency Requirement
during the pendency thereof, order the suspension of - Take note:
the proclamation of such candidate whenever the 1. For governor, vice-governor, mayor, vice-mayor and
evidence of his guilt is strong barangay officials
 They must be residents of the province, city,
GENERAL RULE:2nd placer does not assume office as winning candidate. municipality, or barangay where they are seeking
election for at least 1 year immediately preceding
EXCEPTIONS: (See cases) election day
1. Labo doctrine 2. For candidates of the various sanggunian districts
2. When COC is invalid  EXCEPT the barangay
 They have to be residents of the district where
they are seeking election for at least 1 year
14 immediately preceding the election
For a complete and exhaustive discussion on electoral remedies, see page 82
 - Some Jurisprudence:
SALCEDO II v. COMELEC
 Abella v. COMELEC – no loss of residence due to transfer
for professional, business, or educational reasons August 16, 1999
 The determination of a person’s legal residence or Summary: Victorino Salcedo II sought to cancel the certificate of
domicile largely depends upon intention which candidacy of Ermelita Cacao Salcedo, on the ground that by stating that
may be inferred from his acts, activities, and her surname was “Salcedo” therein, she committed a material
utterances misrepresentation, since she was not entitled to use that surname. The
 Co v. HRET – residence synonymous to domicile (for Comelec Second Division initially granted the petition. The Comelec en
election purposes) banc and the SC reversed. The latter ruled that, since surname does not
 Dumpit-Michelena v. Boado – domicile of origin is not refer to a qualification for office, there was not material
easily lost; to successfully effect a change in domicile misrepresentation.
there must be clear and positive proof of:
1. An actual removal or an actual change of domicile Doctrine: The material misrepresentation contemplated by Section 78,
2. A bona fide intention of abandoning the former Omnibus Election Code, refers to qualifications for elective office, not
place of residence and establishing a new one innocuous mistakes
3. Acts which correspond with the purpose
Candidates must file a sworn certificate of candidacy. It states, among
Literacy Requirement – candidate must be able to read and write: others, that the candidate is eligible for the office. In case of material
1. Filipino, OR misrepresentation, the Comelec is authorized, under Section 78, to deny
2. Any other local language or dialect due course to or cancel such certificate. If the petition is duly filed:
(1) And the candidate is disqualified before the election, he shall
No Property Requirement – as held in Co v. HRET - To require the not be voted for or he votes cast for him shall not be counted;
candidate to own property in order to be eligible to run would be (2) And the candidate is not disqualified before the election and
tantamount to a property qualification not found in the Constitution receives the winning number of votes, the Court or the
Comelec shall continue with the trial and hearing and, upon
NOTE: Take note of the qualifications between District Representatives motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may order the
vis-à -vis other local elective officials: suspension of the proclamation whenever the evidence of his
guilt is strong.
Gov./Vice-Gov./
Mayor/Vice Mayor/ To justify cancellation, the false representation must pertain to a
DISTRICT REPRESENTATIVES
Punong Brgy,/ “material matter” since what is involved is the substantive right of a
Sanggunian members
candidate to run for the elective post. The law does not specify what
CITIZENSHIP constitutes “material representation,” but the Court has considered the
Natural-born Citizen Citizen of the Philippines following, if proven to be false, as material misrepresentation under
VOTER REGISTRATION Section 78: (a) residence, (b) citizenship (natural-born; reacquisition),
Registered voter in the and (c) citizenship (reacquisition).
barangay, municipality, city, or
province, or, in the case of a A Section 78 proceeding has been likened to a quo warranto proceeding
Registered voter in the district in
member of the sangguniang (Section 253), since they both deal with qualifications of a candidate.
which he shall be elected
panlalawigan, panlungsod, or However, under Section 78, the petition is filed before the election,
bayan, the district where he while for quo warranto, it is filed within 10 days after proclamation. If a
intends to be petition cannot be filed within the period provided in Section 73, quo
elected warranto may still be availed of. The grounds are also different. For the
RESIDENCY
former, there must be a material representation in the certificate of
Resident of the same district for candidacy. The latter may be brought on two grounds: (1) ineligibility
Resident therein for at least 1
a period of not less than 1 year (lacks qualifications) or (2) disloyalty to the RP. As in quo warranto
year immediately preceding the
immediately preceding the day election proceedings, therefore, the material misrepresentation under Section
of election 78 refers to qualifications for elective office.
LITERACY
Able to read and write Filipino Class Notes:
Able to read and write or any other local language or - The SC mentioned 2 tests: Test of Materiality and Test of
dialect
Deliberate Attempt
AGE
 To be disqualified, BOTH tests must be satisfied
23 years old on election day for - Sir thinks that we should apply both tests to the effect that
governor, vice-governor, fulfillment of EITHER test is sufficient to disqualify
member of the sangguniang  Eg: A name may be immaterial (since it does not refer to
panlalawigan, mayor, vice- disqualification) but it may be patently deceiving
mayor, or member of the  Only Test of Deliberate Attempt is satisfied
sangguniang panlungsod of  But the candidate must still be disqualified
highly urbanized cities
21 years old on day of election
for mayor or vice-mayor of
At least 25 years old on the day CIPRIANO v. COMELEC
independent component and
of election August 10, 2004
component city
18 years old on day of election Summary: Petitioner Elena Cipriano filed her Certificate of Candidacy
for member of sangguniang (COC) for the 2002 SK elections. However she and several others were
panlungsod or bayan or punong disqualified because the COMELEC adopted a resolution recommended
barangay or member of by the Commission’s law department to this effect because it is said that
sangguniang barangay
she together with several others were not registered voters of the
15 years old but not more than
barangay were they intended to run. Elena was proclaimed the SK
18 years old on day of election
Chairperson. She filed with the COMELEC a Motion for Reconsideration
for SK officials
of the COMELEC Resolution, cancelling her COC. She argued that the
cancellation of her COC may only be done via proper petition under Sec.
Doctrine: Basic in the law of evidence is that one who alleges a fact has
78 of the Omnibus Election Code and that the cancellation of her COC
the burden of proving it. In administrative cases, the quantum of proof
was done with grave abuse of discretion because it was done without
required is substantial evidence.
notice and hearing. The Supreme Court resolved the issue of the validity
(I think what’s important here is that a petition to disqualify must
of COMELEC Resolution (cancelling Cipriano’s COC), in the negative.
be supported by evidence and the onus probandi of proving the ground
The SC stated that it was beyond COMELEC’s administrative power to
relied upon for disqualification rests with the petitioner. The court also
cancel Cipriano’s COC and that the cancellation was done in violation of
says, in effect, that substantial evidence is required in disqualification
Cipriano’s right to due process.
cases.)
Doctrine: The Commission has no discretion to give or not to give due
course to petitioner’s certificate of candidacy. The duty of the COMELEC
JAPZON v. COMELEC
to give due course to certificates of candidacy filed in due form is
January 19, 2009
ministerial in character. While the Commission may look into patent
defects in the certificates, it may not go into matters not appearing on
Summary: Japzon and Ty were Mayoralty candidates of the Municipality
their face. The question of eligibility or ineligibility of a candidate is
of General Macarthur in Eastern Samar. Japzon assails the candidacy of
thus beyond the usual and proper cognizance of said body.
Ty and prays for the cancellation of his certificate of candidacy alleging
that Ty was not able to comply with the residency requirements as
To deny due course to or cancel COC, the proper petition is that which
provided in the LGC of 1991. COMELEC First Division found for Ty. This
must be filed under Sec. 78 of the Omnibus Election Code Contrary to
was affirmed by the COMELEC en banc. SC gave credence to the factual
the submission of the COMELEC, the denial of due course or
findings of the COMELEC there being substantial evidence to support it.
cancellation of one’s certificate of candidacy is not within the
administrative powers of the Commission, but rather calls for the
Doctrine: The term "residence" is to be understood not in its common
exercise of its quasi-judicial functions. The determination whether a
acceptation as referring to "dwelling" or "habitation," but rather to
material representation in the certificate of candidacy is false or not, or
"domicile" or legal residence, that is, "the place where a party actually
the determination whether a candidate is eligible for the position he is
or constructively has his permanent home, where he, no matter where
seeking involves a determination of fact where both parties must be
he may be found at any given time, eventually intends to return
allowed to adduce evidence in support of their contentions. Because the
(animus revertiendi) and remain (animus manendi)." A domicile of
resolution of such fact may result to a deprivation of one’s right to run
origin is acquired by every person at birth. It is usually the place where
for public office, or, as in this case, one’s right to hold public office, it is
the child’s parents reside and continues until the same is abandoned by
only proper and fair that the candidate concerned be notified of the
acquisition of new domicile (domicile of choice). The principle of
proceedings against him and that he be given the opportunity to refute
animus revertendi has been used to determine whether a candidate has
the allegations against him.
an "intention to return" to the place where he seeks to be elected.
Corollary to this is a determination whether there has been an
"abandonment" of his former residence which signifies an intention to
BAUTISTA v. COMELEC
depart therefrom.
October 23, 2003
Absence from residence to pursue studies or practice a profession or
Summary: Petitioner Bautista filed his certificate of candidacy for
registration as a voter other than in the place where one is elected, does
Punong Barangay in Lumbangan, Nasugbu, Batangas. At first, election
not constitute loss of residence. The length of actual stay in a place is
officer Jareñ o refused to accept Bautista’s certificate of candidacy
not necessarily determinative of the fact of residence.
because he was not a registered voter in Lumbangan. The latter filed a
petition for mandamus with the RTC, which ordered Jareñ o to accept
When the evidence of the alleged lack of residence qualification of a
the certificate of candidacy. Jareñ o referred the matter to the Law
candidate for an elective position is weak or inconclusive and it clearly
Department of the COMELEC, which recommended the deletion of
appears that the purpose of the law would not be thwarted by
Bautista’s name in the list of candidates. However, the same was not
upholding the victor’s right to the office, the will of the electorate
acted upon by the COMELEC and it was only after Bautista’s
should be respected.
proclamation that the COMELEC en banc issued Resolutions no. 5404
and 5584. Bautista wrote the COMELEC for reconsideration and while
Class Notes: The SC discussed the nature of RA 9225
the letter of reconsideration was still pending he filed the petition for
- RA 9225 governs the manner in which a natural bon Filipino
certiorari and prohibition with a prayer for the issuance of TRO with
may reacquire or retain his Filipino citizenship despite
the SC. The SC held that Bautista is not a registered voter in the
acquiring foreign citizenship
barangay where he intends to run. Therefore, he is not qualified to run
- RA 9225 treats citizenship INDEPENDENTLY of residence
and assume the position of Punong Barangay.
- Philippine residency only becomes relevant when a natural
born Filipino decides to run for public office.
Doctrine: Sec. 39, LGC specifically requires an elective official to be a
REGISTERED VOTER and not merely a qualified voter The Local
Government Code clearly requires a candidate for Punong Barangay to
be a registered voter of the barangay where he intends to run for office. CORDORA v. COMELEC
February 19, 2009
Summary: Cordora accused Tambunting of making false claims in his
MATUGAS v. COMELEC certificate of candidacy as to citizenship and residency. Cordora asserts
January 20, 2004 that Tambunting is a naturalized American. COMELEC/ SC: Tambunting
is a dual Filipino American citizen. He did not undergo naturalization.
Summary: Matugas filed a petition to disqualify his opponent Barbers Dual citizenship is not a ground for disqualification. There were no false
from the Surigao del Norte Gubernatorial Race on the ground that the claims in the certificate of citizenship.
latter is not a Filipino Citizen. Matugas presented documents to support
his allegation but both the Comelec and SC found that these are not Doctrine: Dual citizenship is not a ground for disqualification. The
sufficient evidence to support a conclusion that Barbers is not a Filipino phrase "dual citizenship" in RA 7160, §40(d) and in RA 7854, §20 refers
Citizen. The documents presented were mere photocopies and did not to "dual allegiance." Persons with mere dual citizenship do not fall
comply with the Rules on Evidence, specifically on proving public under this disqualification. It should suffice if, upon the filing of their
documents. certificates of candidacy, they elect Philippine citizenship to terminate
their status as persons with dual citizenship considering that their
condition is the unavoidable consequence of conflicting laws of
his repatriation. Ortega as second placer is not entitled to proclamation.
different states. By electing Philippine citizenship, such candidates at
The vice-mayor shall assume office as mayor because of the permanent
the same time forswear allegiance to the other country of which they
vacancy, based on Sec. 44 of the LGC.
are also citizens and thereby terminate their status as dual citizens.
Under RA 9225, a Filipino who becomes a naturalized citizen of another
Doctrine: The election of an alien does not automatically restore his
country is allowed to retain his Filipino citizenship by swearing to the
Philippine citizenship, the possession of which is an indispensable
supreme authority of the Republic of the Philippines. The act of taking
requirement for holding office (Sec. 39, LGC). The ineligibility of a
an oath of allegiance is an implicit renunciation of a naturalized citizen’s
candidate receiving majority votes does not entitle the eligible
foreign citizenship.
candidate receiving the next highest number of votes to be declared
elected.
Dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The former arises
when, as a result of the concurrent application of the different laws of 2
Ineligibility of a candidate receiving majority votes does NOT entitle the
or more states, a person is simultaneously considered a national by the
eligible candidate receiving the next highest number of votes to be
said states. Such a person, ipso facto and without any voluntary act on
declared elected
his part, is concurrently considered a citizen of both states.
The rule would have been different if the electorate fully aware in fact
Dual allegiance refers to a situation in which a person simultaneously
and in law of a candidate’s disqualification so as to bring such
owes, by some positive act, loyalty to 2 or more states. While dual
awareness within the realm of notoriety, would nonetheless cast their
citizenship is involuntary, dual allegiance is the result of an individual’s
votes in favor of eh ineligible candidate. Then the candidate with the
volition.
next highest number of votes deemed elected
Class Notes:
Class Notes: So can a 2nd placer ever assume office? Only in 2 instances:
- Citizenship IS different from residence; do not confuse both
1. The Labo doctrine
requirements
2. When COC is invalid since in this case there is really only just
- Sir does not agree with the Dual Allegiance – Dual Citizenship
one candidate
discussion; the law is clear when it disqualifies DUAL
 See succeeding cases
CITIZENS
 Sir said that the SC is divided on this issue but they are
leaning towards this doctrine

MARUHOM v. COMELEC
July 27, 2009 JALOSJOS v. COMELEC
October 9, 2012
Summary: Maruhom filed a certificate of candidacy (coc) for the
mayoralty position in the Municipality of Marantao. Her opponent filed
Summary: Cardino filed for the cancellation of Jalosjos’ COC on the
a petition to cancel the coc alleging that Maruhom was a double
ground of material misrepresentation. He alleged that Jalosjos
registrant (she is registered in Marawi and in Marantao) and that she
misrepresented in his COC that he was eligible to run for mayor when in
did not allege the same in her coc amounting to false material
fact he was not because he was previously convicted with robbery.
representations. COMELEC cancelled Maruhom’s coc. SC affirmed.
Under the RPC, robbery has an accessory penalty of perpetual special
disqualification which makes a person perpetually disqualified from
Doctrine: COMELEC had jurisdiction to cancel cocs if a false
running for a public office. The SC ruled in favor of Cardino and further
representation of a material fact in the COC is a ground for the denial or
enunciated that Cardino, having the second highest number of votes
cancellation of the COC. Two things must be present. One, a material
should be proclaimed as mayor.
fact which refers to a candidate’s eligibility or qualification for elective
office like citizenship, residence or status as a registered voter. And
Doctrine: Decisions of this Court holding that the second-placer cannot
two, the false representation must consist of a deliberate attempt to
be proclaimed winner if the first-placer is disqualified or declared
mislead, misinform or hide a fact that would otherwise render a
ineligible should be limited to situations where the certificate of
candidate ineligible.
candidacy of the first-placer was valid at the time of filing but
subsequently had to be cancelled because of a violation of law that took
Maruhom’s voter registration constitutes a material fact because it
place, or a legal impediment that took effect, after the filing of the
affects her eligibility to be elected as a municipal mayor of Marantao.
certificate of candidacy. If the certificate of candidacy is void ab initio,
Section 39(a) of RA 7160 (LGC) requires that an elective local official
then legally the person who filed such void certificate of candidacy was
must be, among other things, a registered voter in the barangay,
never a candidate in the elections at any time. All votes for such non-
municipality, city or province where he intends to be elected.
candidate are stray votes and should not be counted. Thus, such non-
candidate can never be a first-placer in the elections.
LABO v. COMELEC
A false statement in a certificate of candidacy that a candidate is eligible
July 3, 1992
to run for public office is a false material representation which is a
ground for a petition under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code.
Summary: Ramon Labo Jr. filed is certificate of candidacy for Mayor of
Baguio City. The other candidate, Roberto Ortega, filed disqualification
Section 74 requires the candidate to state under oath in his certificate
proceedings against Labo, invoking the ruling in Labo v. COMELEC
of candidacy "that he is eligible for said office." A candidate is eligible if
where the Court ruled that Labo was not a Filipino citizen but an
he has a right to run for the public office. If a candidate is not actually
Australian. COMELEC issued a resolution cancelling the COC of Labo
eligible because he is barred by final judgment in a criminal case from
two days before the elections. In Labo’s petition for review in the SC, he
running for public office, and he still states under oath in his certificate
argued that supervening events preclude the application of Labo v.
of candidacy that he is eligible to run for public office, then the
COMELEC and that he can be proclaimed as the winner because the
candidate clearly makes a false material representation that is a ground
COMELEC resolution attained finality only after five days. He also
for a petition under Section 78.
pointed to his application for reacquisition of Philippine citizenship
filed with the OSG. Ortega argued that the COMELEC resolution has
Perpetual special disqualification is a ground for a petition under Sec.
become final and executory and as a result, the candidate with the
78, OEC because this accessory penalty is an ineligibility, which means
second highest number of votes should be declared Mayor. The Court
that the convict is not eligible to run for public office, contrary to the
ruled that Labo is not a Filipino citizen absent any proof of approval of
statement that Section 74 requires him to state under oath.
 Philippine citizenship is an indispensable requirement for holding an
A sentence of prisió n mayor by final judgment is a ground for elective public office, and the purpose of the citizenship qualification is
disqualification under Section 40 of the Local Government Code and none other than to ensure that no alien, i.e., no person owing allegiance
under Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code. It is also a material fact to another nation, shall govern our people and our country or a unit of
involving the eligibility of a candidate under Sections 74 and 78 of the territory thereof. Now, an official begins to govern or to discharge his
Omnibus Election Code. Thus, a person can file a petition under Section functions only upon his proclamation and on the day the law mandates
40 of the Local Government Code or under either Section 12 or Section his term of office to begin.
78 of the Omnibus Election Code.
Section 39 of the Local Government Code speaks of "Qualifications" of
Art. 30, RPC, temporary absolute disqualification - produces the effect "ELECTIVE OFFICIALS," not of candidates. Literally, such qualifications
of "deprivation of the right to vote in any election for any popular — unless otherwise expressly conditioned, as in the case of age and
elective office or to be elected to such office." The duration of the residence — should thus be possessed when the "elective [or elected]
temporary absolute disqualification is same as that of principal penalty. official" begins to govern, i.e., at the time he is proclaimed and at the start
of his term
Art. 32, RPC, perpetual special disqualification - "the offender shall not
be permitted to hold any public office during the period of his Class Notes:
disqualification," which is perpetually. - Sir does not agree with this case at all
 Dissent of Davide is correct
Class Notes - So can Katy Perry run?
- COC was void ab initio  According to Frivaldo, yes, as long as she acquires
 Can we apply this to Labo? Philippine citizenship before she is proclaimed
- Can COMELEC motu proprio institute a disqualification
proceeding?
 Note that in Cipriano, there must be a complaint MAQUILING v. COMELEC
 Here, there was none April 16, 2013
 The SC said that the final judgment against Jalosjos
was sufficient notice; COMELEC can act on its own Summary: Rommel Arnado is a natural born Fil citizen who lost his Fil
- On Sec. 40(a) citizenship when he became a naturalized US citizen. He applied for
 If there is an accessory penalty of perpetual repatriation under RA 9225 and met the twin requirements of taking
disqualification, then forever disqualified the oath of allegiance and renouncing his US citizenship. However, he
 Sir also mentioned RA 10368 (Human Rights Victims still continued to use his US passport in his travel abroad. Subsequently,
Repatriation and Recognition Act of 2013) which he filed his COC. His qualification to run is now being assailed on the
modified Sec. 40(a) ground that he was a foreigner. The Court ruled that his act of using a
 Sec. 25 on penalties says: If convicted, he shall foreign passport did not divest Arnado of his Filipino citizenship, which
suffer the imprisonment of eight (8) to ten (10) he acquired by repatriation. However, by representing himself as an
years, shall be disqualified from public office and American citizen, Arnado voluntarily and effectively reverted to his
employment and shall be deprived of the right to earlier status as a dual citizen. Such reversion was not retroactive; it
vote and be voted for in any national or local took place the instant Arnado represented himself as an American
election, even after the service of sentence unless citizen by using his US passport. When he filed his COC, Arnado was a
granted absolute pardon. dual citizen which disqualifies him from running for any local elective
position.

FRIVALDO v. COMELEC Doctrine: Arnado’s category of dual citizenship is that by which foreign
June 28, 1996 citizenship is acquired through a positive act of applying for
naturalization. This is distinct from those considered dual citizens by
Summary: Juan G. Frivaldo ran for Governor of Sorsogon again and won. virtue of birth, who are not required by law to take the oath of
Raul R. Lee questioned his citizenship. He then petitioned for renunciation as the mere filing of the certificate of candidacy already
repatriation under Presidential Decree No. 725 and was able to take his carries with it an implied renunciation of foreign citizenship. Dual
oath of allegiance as a Philippine citizen. citizens by naturalization, on the other hand, are required to take not
only the Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines but also to
However, on the day that he got his citizenship, the Court had already personally renounce foreign citizenship in order to qualify as a
ruled based on his previous attempts to run as governor and acquire candidate for public office.
citizenship, and had proclaimed Lee, who got the second highest
number of votes, as the newly elect Governor of Sorsogon. The renunciation of foreign citizenship also requires an absolute and
perpetual renunciation of the foreign citizenship and a full divestment
The Supreme Court ruled that his repatriation was valid and legal and of all civil and political rights granted by the foreign country which
because of the curative nature of Presidential Decree No. 725, his granted the citizenship.
repatriation retroacted to the date of the filing of his application to run
for governor. The steps to reacquire Philippine Citizenship by While the act of using a foreign passport is not one of the acts
repatriation under Presidential Decree No. 725 are: (1) filing the enumerated in Commonwealth Act 63 constituting renunciation and
application; (2) action by the committee; and (3) taking of the oath of loss of Philippine citizenship, it is nevertheless an act which repudiates
allegiance if the application is approved. It is only upon taking the oath the very oath of renunciation required for a former Filipino citizen who
of allegiance that the applicant is deemed ipso jure to have reacquired is also a citizen of another country to be qualified to run for a local
Philippine citizenship. If the decree had intended the oath taking to elective position.
retroact to the date of the filing of the application, then it should not
have explicitly provided otherwise. He is therefore qualified to be Class Notes:
proclaimed governor of Sorsogon. - Holding of SC has no leg to stand on
 We should just wait for Congress to enact a law
Doctrine: The Local Government Code of 1991 expressly requires regarding the use of foreign passports
Philippine citizenship as a qualification for elective local officials, - Note the pronouncement in Maquiling on the inapplicability
including that of provincial governor, of Labo in the instant case:
  The electorate’s awareness of the candidate’s
change, there must be animus manendi coupled with animus non
disqualification is not a prerequisite for the
revertendi. The intent to remain in the new domicile of choice must be
disqualification to attach to the candidate. The very
for an indefinite period of time, the change of residence must be
existence of a disqualifying circumstance makes the
voluntary, and the residence at the place chosen for the new domicile
candidate ineligible. Knowledge of the electorate of a
must be actual.
candidate’s disqualifications is not necessary before a
qualified candidate who placed 2 nd to a disqualified one
can be proclaimed as the winner. The 2 nd placer in the
TORAYNO v. COMELEC
vote count is actually the 1st placer among the qualified
April 19, 1991
candidates
Summary: Vicente Emano ran for, was elected, and proclaimed
provincial governor of Misamis Oriental, his third consecutive term as
ALTAREJOS v. COMELEC
governor. In his March 12, 1995 Certificate of Candidacy, his residence
November 10, 2004
was declared to be in Tagoloan, MO. While still governor, Emano
executed a Voter Registration Record in Cagayan de Oro City, a highly
Summary: Altarejo was running for mayor but his certificate of
urbanized city, in which he claimed 20 years of residence. Emano filed
candidacy was attacked on the ground that he was not a citizen during
his COC for mayor of the city. Torayno, Eligan, and Seriñ o, residents of
the time he filed it. Due to his failure to submit the documentation to
CDO, sought the disqualification of Emano, alleging he failed to meet the
prove that he is a citizen (because citizenship is a requirement for
one-year residence requirement. Prior to the resolution of their
candidacy under Section 39 of the LGC of 1991) COMELEC found for the
Petition, Commission on Elections proclaimed Emano as duly-elected
assailants of his candidacy. COMELEC En Banc upheld the COMELEC
city mayor. They filed a quo warranto petition, which was also denied.
first division findings. The Supreme Court here discussed that
The SC also sided with Emano, ruling that he had fulfilled the residency
Frivaldo’s doctrine could apply to this case, stating that he is really a
requirement.
citizen and such citizenship retroacts to the date he filed his petition,
and that the citizenship requirement is only necessary until upon the
day of oath taking and proclamation. HOWEVER, since he failed to Doctrine: The Constitution and the law requires residence as a
adduce documentary evidence of his citizenship in his main petition qualification for seeking and holding elective public office, in order to
and only on his motion for reconsideration when such evidence can no give candidates the opportunity to be familiar with the needs,
longer be adduced, the court upheld COMELEC and denied his petition difficulties, aspirations, potentials for growth and all matters vital to the
to nullify COMELEC’s rulings. welfare of their constituencies; likewise, it enables the electorate to
evaluate the office seekers' qualifications and fitness for the job they
Doctrine: The requirement in RA 7160 Section 39 as to citizenship, the aspire for. "SEC. 39 of the LGC provides: Qualifications. - (a) An elective
law does not specify any date or time when the candidate must possess local official must be a citizen of the Philippines; a registered voter in
it unlike residence which is at the immediately preceding the election. the barangay, municipality, city, or province x x x where he intends to
Since an official only begins to discharge the duties of his office on the be elected; a resident therein for at least one (1) year immediately
day of his proclamation when his term begins, his qualification becomes preceding the day of the election; and able to read and write Filipino or
required on such date. Hence the citizenship requirement can be any other local language or dialect."
construed as applying to the time of proclamation of the elected official
Class Notes:
at the start of his term. The Court further cites that in Frivaldo, the
- Is residency requirement a continuing requirement?
court pronounced that his repatriation by virtue of PD 725, retroacted
to the date of filing his application, based on the intent of legislative  This was not in issue in Torayno but the SC said no
authority which is to enable the largest number of Filipinos to enhoy  All other requirements are continuing
the fullest effect and expression of the rights accorded to citizenship; it - Can we argue that it IS a continuing requirement?
also prevents prejudice to applicants.  We can invoke the rational of the residency
requirement and argue that it the same will be best
fulfilled if it be a continuing requirement
- Sir noted that the law is silent on this matter
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR DISQUALIFICATION OF
TESS DUMPIT-MICHELENA
November 17, 2005 COQUILLA v. COMELEC
July 31, 2002
Summary: Tess Dumpit-Michelena was a candidate for the position of
mayor in the municipality of Agoo, La Union. Boado, et al filed a petition
Summary: Coquilla was born a Filipino. He served with the US Navy,
for the disqualification and the denial or cancellation of her certificate
was naturalized an American, and became a resident of the US.
of candidacy on the ground of material misrepresentation. It was
Nevertheless, he made frequent visits to the Philippines. After
alleged that she was not a resident of Agoo one year prior to the
retirement, he came back to the Philippines and repatriated. He gained
upcoming May 10, 2004 election as required by the LGC because she
his Filipino citizenship back and ran for mayor in his hometown of Oras,
only transferred to Agoo from Naguilian in October 2003. Dumpit-
Eastern Samar. In his COC, he stated that he had been a resident of the
Michelena countered that she already acquired a new domicile in San
Philippines for two years prior to such filing (including the time of his
Julian West when she purchased a residential lot on April 19, 2003.
visits before he repatriated). The incumbent mayor Alvarez, who was
Comelec Second division cancelled her COC. Comelec en bac denied her
running for reelection filed a petition for Coquilla’s disqualification on
MR. SC affirmed and ruled that Tess did not meet the one-year
the ground that the latter had misrepresented.
residence requirement.
Doctrine: A person loses his domicile in the Philippines by
Doctrine: For election purposes, residence is used synonymously with
naturalization to a different citizenship. After such naturalization and
domicile. Property ownership is not indicia of the right to vote or to be
until repatriation, such person, when in the Philippines, is considered
voted for an office.
an alien without any right to reside in the country, save as our
immigration laws may have allowed him to stay as a visitor. Thus, his
Domicile of origin is not easily lost. To successfully effect a change of
stay here as a visitor cannot count to satisfy the residence requirement
domicile, there must be concurrence of the following requirements: (1)
to qualify him to run for local office.
an actual removal or an actual change of domicile; (2) a bona fide
intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing
a new one; and (3) acts which correspond with the purpose. To effect
Class Notes: Why are we confused with this case?
This Court would be, in effect, imposing a property requirement to the
- The SC seemed to combine the residency and citizenship
right to hold public office, which property requirement would be
requirement
unconstitutional.
 We must always treat them separately since they are
independent requirements
 One can be a resident but not a citizen
- Residence is a matter of evidence

JALOSJOS v. COMELEC
April 24, 2012

Summary: In Nov 2009 Jalosjos filed his Certificate of Candidacy COC for
Governor of Zamboanga Sibugay Province for the 2010 elections.
Erasmo promptly filed a petition to deny due course or to cancel
Jalosjos’ COC because he made material misrepresentation in the same
since he failed to comply with the requirements of R.A. 9225 and the
one-year residency requirement of the LGC. COMELEC ruled that he
failed to prove the residency requirement for a gubernatorial candidate
and his bona fide intention to establish his domicile in Ipil, Zamboanga
Sibugay. SC reversed the COMELEC resolutions.

Doctrine: There is no hard and fast rule to determine a candidate’s

compliance with residency requirement since the question of residence
is a question of intention. Still, jurisprudence has laid down the
following guidelines: (a) every person has a domicile or residence
somewhere; (b) where once established, that domicile remains until he
acquires a new one; and (c) a person can have but one domicile at a
time.

JALOSJOS v. COMELEC
February 26, 2013

Summary: Svetlana Jalosjos filed her Certificate of Candidacy (CoC) for

mayor of Baliangao, Misamis Occidental for the 10 May 2010 elections.
She indicated therein her place of birth AND residence as Barangay
Tugas, Municipality of Baliangao, Misamis Occidental.

Edwin Tumpag and Rodolfo Estrellada filed against Jalosjos a Petition to

Deny Due Course to or Cancel the Certificate of Candidacy, in which
they argued that she had falsely represented her place of birth and
residence, because she was in fact born in San Juan, Metro Manila, and
had not totally abandoned her previous domicile, Dapitan City.

The Comelec 2nd Division and the Comelec En Banc found Jalosjos
disqualified from the office of Mayor.

Doctrine: On COMELEC's failure to give an advance notice of its

promulgation: The additional rule requiring notice to the parties prior
to promulgation of a decision is not part of the process of promulgation.
Since lack of such notice does not prejudice the rights of the parties,
noncompliance with this rule is a procedural lapse that does not vitiate
the validity of the decision.

On establishment of new domicile: There are three requisites for a

person to acquire a new domicile by choice. First, residence or bodily
presence in the new locality. Second, an intention to remain there.
Third, an intention to abandon the old domicile.

Moreover, EVEN IF these requisites are established by clear and

positive proof, the date of acquisition of the domicile of choice, or the
critical date, must also be established to be within at least one year
prior to the elections using the same standard of evidence.
Assuming that the claim of property ownership of Jalosjos is true, it has
established that the ownership of a house or some other property does
not establish domicile.

To use ownership of property in the district as the determinative

indicium of permanence of domicile or residence implies that the
landed can establish compliance with the residency requirement.
 DISQUALIFICATIONS Class Notes: Are these the only grounds to disqualify a candidate?
- No, some special laws provide for the disqualification of
Breakdown of Sec. 40, LGC: The following persons are disqualified candidates; see special laws below
from running for ANY elective local position: THOSE
(a) Sentenced by final judgment Special Laws cited in the Syllabus
 For an offense: 1. RA 8295 (1997) – In addition to the disqualifications
1. Involving moral turpitude, OR mentioned in Sec. 12 and 68 of OEC and Sec. 40, LGC,
2. Punishable by 1 year or more of imprisonment WHENEVER THE EVIDENCE OF GUILT IS STRONG, the
 Within 2 years after serving sentence following persons are disqualified to run in a SPECIAL
ELECTION called to fill the vacancy in an elective office:
(b) Removed from office as a result of an administrative case a. Any elective official who has resigned from his office by
accepting an appointive office or for whatever reason
(c) Convicted by final judgment for violating oath of allegiance which he previously occupied but has caused to become
to the Republic vacant due to his resignation
b. Any person who, directly or indirectly, coerces, bribes,
(d) With dual citizenship threatens, harasses, intimidates or actually causes,
inflicts or produces any violence, injury, punishment,
(e) Fugitives from justice in criminal or nonpolitical cases here torture, damage, loss or disadvantage to any person or
or abroad persons aspiring to become a candidate or that of the
immediate member of his family, his honor or property
that is meant to eliminate all other potential candidate
(f) Permanent resident in a foreign country
 OR those who have acquired the right to reside
2. RA 9165 (2002) – Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs
abroad and continue to avail of the same right after
effectivity of LGC a. Sec. 27 – Criminal liability of a public officer or
employee:
(g) Insane or feebleminded (1) If public officer/employee misappropriates or
misapplies or fails to account for confiscated,
NOTE: Any one ground is enough to disqualify a candidate seized, or surrendered dangerous drugs, etc:
(a) Penalties:
Grounds for Disqualification under Election Laws: 1) Life imprisonment to death, and
2) Fine of P500,000 to P10M, plus
1. Under the OEC (Sec. 12)
3) ABSOLUTE PERPETUAL
a. Declared as incompetent or insane by competent
DISQUALIFICATION from public office
authority before said insanity or incompetence is
(2) Any elective local or national office found to have
declared removed
benefited from proceeds of trafficking of
b. Convicted by final judgment for subversion,
dangerous drugs or have received any financial or
insurrection, rebellion, or any offense for which he has
material contributions or donations from persons
been sentenced to a penalty of more than 18 months
found guilty of trafficking:
imprisonment, before expiration of a period of 5 years
(a) Removal from office
from his service of sentence
(b) And PERPETUAL DISQUALIFICATION from
c. Convicted by final judgment of a crime involving moral
holding any elective or appointive office
turpitude
d. Any person who is a permanent resident of or
b. Sec. 28 – Criminal Liability of Government Officials and
immigrant to a foreign country
Employees
(1) UNLESS said person has waived his status as
(1) Maximum penalties for the unlawful acts
permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign
(2) Plus ABSOLUTE PERPETUAL DISQUALIFICATION
country in accordance with the residence
from any public office
requirement provided for in the election laws
3. RA 9225 (2003) – Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition
2. Under the LGC (Sec. 40) – These grounds are applicable only
(see separate compilation for the full law)
to candidates for local elective office
a. 7 grounds (see above)
Sec. 40(a) – Conviction
3. Additional grounds under OEC (Sec. 68)
- Moral turpitude = everything which is done contrary to
a. One who has violated provisions on:
justice, honesty, modesty or good morals
(1) Campaign period
(2) Removal, destruction of lawful election  Any act of baseness, vileness or depravity in the private
propaganda and social duties which a man owes his fellow men, to
(3) Prohibited forms of propaganda society in general, contrary to the accepted and
customary rule of the right and duty between man and
(4) Regulation of propaganda through mass media
woman or conduct contrary to justice, honesty,
b. One who has given money or other material
modesty, or good morals
consideration to influence voters or public officials
- Within 2 years after serving sentence
performing electoral functions
 Note that this applies whether the candidate was
c. One who committed acts of terrorism to enhance
convicted of an offense (1) involving moral turpitude, or
candidacy
d. One who spent in his election campaign an amount in (2) punishable by 1 year or more of imprisonment
excess of that allowed by law  Moreno v. COMELEC defined “service of sentence”:
e. One who solicited or received or made any contribution  Applies only to a convict who has been confined in
prohibited by law a penal facility for some time
 Does not apply to a probationer, whose principal
and accessory penalties were suspended upon the
grant of probation
Sec. 40(b) – Removal from Office
office because the 2-year period of ineligibility under Sec. 40(a) of the
- This section applies only to those removed from office on or
Local Government Code does not even begin to run.
after Jan. 1, 1992
 There is no provision in the LGC which would clearly
The period within which a person is under probation CANNOT be
indicate that the same operates retroactively (Grego v.
equated with service of the sentence adjudged.
COMELEC)
Sec. 4 of the Probation Law: the grant of probation suspends the
Sec/ 40(d) – Dual Citizenship
execution of the sentence. During the period of probation, the
- Here the SC qualifies dual citizenship in Sec. 40 with the dual
probationer does not serve the penalty imposed upon him by the court
allegiance provision of Art. IV, Sec. 5
but is merely required to comply with all the conditions prescribed in
- Mercado v. Manzano – dual citizenship is different from dual
the probation order, The Probation Law should be construed as an
allegiance
exception to the Local Government Code.
 Thus, dual citizenship in Sec. 40 must be understood as
referring to dual allegiance; so persons with mere dual
Class Notes:
citizenship do not fall under the disqualification
- If one is convicted and sentenced but is later on granted
 Class Notes: Sir does not agree with this interpretation
probation, can he run?
 The provision is clear when it says “DUAL
 It seems so since probation suspends the execution of
CITIZENSHIP”
the sentence
- What if he violates the conditions of his probation?
Sec. 40 (e) – Fugitives
- Sir thinks that there is something wrong with this doctrine
- Persons fleeing from local or foreign justice or non-political
 The fact that he has NOT yet served sentence makes it
cases are likewise disqualified
all the more reason to disqualify a convicted person
- Rodriguez v. COMELEC – “fugitive from justice” defined:
 Includes not only those who flee after conviction to
avoid punishment
MAGNO v. COMELEC
 But likewise those who, after being charged, flee to
October 4, 2002
avoid prosecution
 Intent to evade on the part of the candidate must
Summary: Magno is a mayoralty candidate for 2001 elections of San
therefore be established by proof that there has already
Isidro, Nueva Ecija sought to be disqualified on the ground that of his
been a conviction or at least, a charge has been filed, at
previous conviction by the Sandiganbayan of four counts of direct
the time of flight
bribery. After being sentenced to imprisonment, he applied for
probation and was discharged. However, the COMELEC disqualified him
Sec. 40(f) – Green Card Holders
from running as mayor because his 5-year disqualification under the
- This sub-section is directed against the green-card holders
Omnibus Election Code ends on 2003. However, Magno insisted that he
 Filipino citizens who have acquired permanent
is qualified to run because direct bribery is not a crime involving moral
residency in a foreign country and have continued to
turpitude and the Omnibus Election Code providing for five years of
use it even after Jan. 1, 1992
disqualification is modified by the LGC providing for only 2 years.
- Caasi v. CA
 To be qualified to run for elective office, the candidate The SC ruled that direct bribery is a crime involving moral turpitude as
who is a green card holder must have waived his status inferred from its third element: such offer or promise be accepted or
as permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign gift or present be received by the public officer with a view to
country committing some crime. However, it also ruled that the LGC prevails
 The act of filing a COC did not in itself constitute a over the Omnibus Election Code being a later enactment, having a
waiver of his status as permanent residency in a foreign general repealing clause and being more specific in providing for
country disqualifications of elective LOCAL officials, unlike the Omnibus
 Waiver of green card should be manifested by Election Code providing for disqualification of ANY public official.
some act/s independent of and done prior to COC Hence, Magno is not disqualified from running as mayor. However, the
filing SC said that it is not the proper forum to assail the proclamation of the
new mayor, the proper remedy being an election protest.
MORENO v. COMELEC Doctrine: A candidate for an elective local position, when convicted of a
August 10, 2006 crime involving moral turpitude (such as direct bribery) or having a
penalty of more than 1 year of imprisonment, is disqualified from
Summary: Moreno, the incumbent Punong Barangay in Brgy. Cabugao,
running within 2 years after serving sentence, as provided under Sec
Daram, Samar, sought re-election. Mejes filed a petition to disqualify
40, LGC.
him on the ground that he was convicted by final judgment of Arbitrary
Detention and was sentenced to imprisonment (of more than 1 year) in
The 5-year disqualification under the Omnibus Election Code is deemed
1998. Moreno claims that he was already granted probation by the RTC
repealed insofar as elective public officers are concerned. As to them,
in December 2000 and hence, he was restored to all the civil rights
the disqualification is only for 2 years.
suspended by his conviction. The COMELEC 1st Div. and En Banc,
applying Sec. 40(a) of the LGC, disqualified Moreno from running for
Punong Barangay. They held that the grant of probation in 2000 merely
KARE v. COMELEC
suspended the execution of his sentence and it did not affect his
August 28, 2004
disqualification. Moreno argues that the disqualification under the LGC
Sec. 40(a) applies only to those who have served their sentence and not
Summary: Ceriola, the 2nd placer, sought the disqualification of Moll, 1st
to probationers, who did not serve their sentence. The SC agreed with
placer for the Mayoral Elections in 2001, from holding the position of
Moreno.
Mayor since Moll was convicted of a crime in 1999 which disqualified
him from being a candidate for Mayor. Moll argues that the decision has
Doctrine: Those who have not served their sentence by reason of the
not yet become final since he filed a motion for reconsideration before
grant of probation, which should not be equated with service of
the lapse of the reglementary period for filing an appeal.
sentence, should not be disqualified from running for a local elective
Doctrine: Section 40(a) of the Local Government Code provides:
which was signed only by him (presiding chair). This constituted the
"Disqualifications. – The following persons are disqualified from running
first “Decision”. On September 5, the Sanggunian, voting 7 to 2,
for any elective local position:(a) Those sentenced by final judgment for
acquitted Red of the charges against him. This vote was embodied in a
an offense involving moral turpitude or for an offense punishable by one
Decision which was signed by all the members. Virginia Malinao argued
(1) year or more of imprisonment, within two (2) years after serving
that the First Sanggunian decision had already become final and
sentence. Moll was sentenced to suffer the penalty of six (6) months
executory for failure of Mayor Red to appeal. Filing a petition for
of arresto mayor to one (1) year and nine (9) months of prision
mandamus, Virginia Malinao asked the Court to compel the Governor to
correccional, a penalty that clearly disqualified him from running for
implement the first “Decision” (suspending Mayor Red for one month).
any elective local position. The period for appeal is interrupted by the
The Supreme Court denied the petition for mandamus.
filing of either a motion for reconsideration or a motion for a new trial.
But what Moll filed was a "Motion to Quash the Information"; and when
Doctrine: In order to render a decision in administrative cases involving
it was denied, he filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the denial. The
elective local officials, the decision of the Sanggunian must be "in
period is interrupted only by the filing of a motion for reconsideration
writing stating clearly and distinctly the facts and the reasons for such
of the judgment or of the final order being appealed. Neither Moll’s
decision." Like the procedure in the Supreme Court, the voting
Motion to Quash Information nor his Motion for Reconsideration was
following the deliberation of the members of the Sanggunian did not
directed at the judgment of conviction but attacked a matter extraneous
necessarily constitute their decision unless this was embodied in an
to the judgment.
opinion prepared by one of them and concurred in by the others, in the
same way that the voting following the deliberation on a case in the
Supreme Court becomes its decision only after the opinion prepared by
JALOSJOS v. COMELEC
a Justice is concurred in by others composing the majority. Until they
October 9, 2012
have signed the opinion and the decision is promulgated, the Justices
are free to change their votes.
Summary: Cardino filed for the cancellation of Jalosjos’ COC on the
ground of material misrepresentation. He alleged that Jalosjos
misrepresented in his COC that he was eligible to run for mayor when in At all events, this case is now moot and academic as a result of the
fact he was not because he was previously convicted with robbery. expiration of Mayor Red's term during which the act complained of was
Under the RPC, robbery has an accessory penalty of perpetual special allegedly committed, and further proceedings against respondent
disqualification which makes a person perpetually disqualified from Mayor are barred by his reelection on May 8, 1995.
running for a public office. The SC ruled in favor of Cardino and further
enunciated that Cardino, having the second highest number of votes Pursuant to §66(b) of the Code, the penalty of suspension cannot
should be proclaimed as mayor. exceed the unexpired term of the respondent or a period of six (6)
months for every administrative offense. On the other hand, any
Doctrine: (On Disqualifications) The perpetual special disqualification administrative disciplinary proceeding against respondent is abated if
against Jalosjos arising from his criminal conviction by final judgment is in the meantime he is reelected, because his reelection results in a
a material fact involving eligibility which is a proper ground for a condonation of whatever misconduct he might have committed during
petition under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code. Jalosjos’ his previous term.
certificate of candidacy was void from the start since he was not eligible
to run for any public office at the time he filed his certificate of
candidacy. Jalosjos was never a candidate at any time, and all votes for REYES v. COMELEC
Jalosjos were stray votes. As a result of Jalosjos’ certificate of candidacy March 7, 1996
being void ab initio, Cardino, as the only qualified candidate, actually
garnered the highest number of votes for the position of Mayor. Summary: An administrative complaint was filed against the incumbent
mayor of Bongabong, Oriental Mindor and the petitioner in this case,
Renato Reyes. The Sangguniang Panlalawigan, after hearing the case,
The penalty of prisió n mayor automatically carries with it, by operation rendered a decision finding him guilty and ordering petitioner to vacate
of law, the accessory penalties of temporary absolute disqualification the position. A TRO was issued by the RTC and the service of the order
and perpetual special disqualification. Under Article 30 of the Revised was delayed until the expiration of the TRO. Several attempts were
Penal Code, temporary absolute disqualification produces the effect of made to serve the order but petitioner refused to receive the same. In
"deprivation of the right to vote in any election for any popular elective the meantime, petitioner Reyes filed his certificate of candidacy for the
office or to be elected to such office." The duration of the temporary 1995 election. Private respondent Rogelio de Castro sought the
absolute disqualification is the same as that of the principal penalty. disqualification of petitioner as candidate for Mayor but it was not
acted upon by the COMELEC. Petitioner Reyes won the elections on May
On the other hand, under Article 32 of the Revised Penal Code perpetual 8, 1995 but COMELEC issued an order on May 9, 1995 disqualifying
special disqualification means that "the offender shall not be permitted Reyes. He filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied by the
to hold any public office during the period of his disqualification," COMELEC en banc. The Supreme Court also denied the petition for
which is perpetually. certiorari filed by Reyes ruling that he is disqualified from running in
the 1995 elections due to his removal from office resulting from the
Both temporary absolute disqualification and perpetual special complaint filed before the Sangguniang Panlalawigan. Considering that
disqualification constitute ineligibilities to hold elective public office. A the decision of the Sangguaniang Panlalawigan has become final and
person suffering from these ineligibilities is ineligible to run for elective executory, Reyes is disqualified from running for any elective position.
public office, and commits a false material representation if he states in
his certificate of candidacy that he is eligible to so run. Doctrine: Sec. 40 (b) of the Local Government Code provides that those
removed from office as a result of an administrative case are
disqualified from running for any elective local positions. The decision
must be rendered within the term of office during which the alleged
MALINAO v. REYES
misconduct was committed. If a public official is not removed before his
March 29, 1996
term of office expires, he can no longer be removed if he is thereafter
Doctrine: Virgnia Malinao, Human Resource Manager III, filed an reelected for another term.
administrative case against Mayor Red for abuse of authority and denial
of due process with the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Marinduque. On Petitioner invokes the ruling in Aguinaldo v. COMELEC, in which it was
August 12, 1994, members of the Sanggunian, by a vote of 5 to 3, found held that a public official could not be removed for misconduct
Mayor Red guilty. The Presiding Chairperson wrote a draft “Decision” committed during a prior term and that his reelection operated as a
condonation of the officer's previous misconduct to the extent of cutting
off the right to remove him therefor. But that was because in that case,
disqualification to “reinstatement” and under Civil Service Decree,
before the petition questioning the validity of the administrative
reinstatement refers only to appointive office. Hence, there was no legal
decision removing petitioner could be decided, the term of office during
impediment for Basco to run for a local elective office.
which the alleged misconduct was committed expired. Removal cannot
extend beyond the term during which the alleged misconduct was
Doctrine: Aguinaldo v. Comelec – statutes are not to be construed as
committed. If a public official is not removed before his term of office
intended to have a retroactive effect, unless such intent is expressly
expires, he can no longer be removed if he is thereafter reelected for
declared or clearly and necessarily implied from the language of the
another term. This is the rationale for the ruling in the two Aguinaldo
enactment. There is no provision in the statute (the LGC) which would
cases.
clearly indicate that the same operates retroactively.
The case at bar is the very opposite of those cases. Here, although
petitioner Reyes brought an action to question the decision in the
MORENO v. COMELEC
administrative case, the temporary restraining order issued in the
August 10, 2006
action he brought lapsed, with the result that the decision was served
on petitioner and it thereafter became final on April 3, 1995, because
Summary: Mejes filed a petition to disqualify Moreno on the ground that
petitioner failed to appeal to the Office of the President. He was thus
he was convicted by final judgment of Arbitrary Detention and was
validly removed from office and, pursuant to § 40(b) of the Local
sentenced to imprisonment (of more than 1 year) in 1998. Moreno
Government Code, he was disqualified from running for reelection.
claims that he was already granted probation by the RTC. The
COMELEC 1st Div. and En Banc, applying Sec. 40(a) of the LGC,
It is noteworthy that at the time the Aguinaldo cases were decided
disqualified Moreno from running for Punong Barangay. They held that
there was no provision similar to § 40(b) which disqualifies any person
the grant of probation in 2000 merely suspended the execution of his
from running for any elective position on the ground that he has been
sentence and it did not affect his disqualification. Moreno argues that
removed as a result of an administrative case. The Local Government
the disqualification under the LGC Sec. 40(a) applies only to those who
Code of 1991 (R.A. No. 7160) could not be given retroactive effect.
have served their sentence and not to probationers, who did not serve
their sentence. The SC agreed with Moreno.
LINGATING v. COMELEC
Doctrine: The period within which a person is under probation CANNOT
November 13, 2002
be equated with service of the sentence adjudged. Sec. 4 of the
Summary: Lingating filed a petition to disqualify Lingating as a Probation Law states that the grant of probation suspends the
candidate for Mayor of Lapuyan, Zamboanga del Sur, in the May 14, execution of the sentence. During the period of probation, the
2001 elections, on the ground that, in 1991, the Sangguniang probationer does not serve the penalty imposed upon him by the court
Panlalawigan of Zamboanga del Sur ordered his removal from office. but is merely required to comply with all the conditions prescribed in
Sulong, however, argued that the decision never became final since he the probation order. Sec. 40(a) does not specifically disqualify
filed an MR, which was never resolved by the Sanggunian. The probationers from running for a local elective office. The Probation Law
COMELEC en banc ruled that Sulong’s re-election twice after his term in should be construed as an exception to the Local Government Code.
1991, and his election in 2001 operated as condonation of his
misconduct. The SC, however, merely ruled that the decision of the
Sanggunian never became final because of the MR. As such, there was, MERCADO v. MANZANO
in effect, no decision to remove him. May 26, 1999

Doctrine: The doctrine in Reyes v. COMELEC, to the effect that the Summary: Manzano won as vice mayor of Makati in the May 1998
disqualification under Section 40(b) applies when the candidate was elections. Second placer Mercado sought the disqualification of
removed from office before the expiration of his term, does not apply Manzano under Sec. 40 (d) of the LGC because Manzano is allegedly a
when the decision ordering such removal never became final and dual US-Filipino citizen. SC: Mercado has standing, but petition has no
executory due to an unresolved MR. merit. Manzano is qualified to run.

Class Notes: Doctrine: Dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The former
- Sec. 40(b) is a PERPETUAL disqualification arises when, as a result of the concurrent application of the different
laws of 2 or more states, a person is simultaneously considered a
 But the cause of removal may be petty (petty crimes)
national by the said states. Dual allegiance refers to the situation in
- Sec. 40(a) on moral turpitude is NOT a perpetual
which a person simultaneously owes, by some positive act, loyalty to 2
disqualification
or more states. While dual citizenship is involuntary, dual allegiance is
- RATIO?
the result of an individual's volition. The phrase "dual citizenship" in
 Sec. 40(b) goes into the competency of carrying out the
Sec. 40 (d) of the LGC and in Sec. 20 of RA 7854 refers to "dual
functions of local office
allegiance."
 Sec. 40(a) – you can be competent but immoral
The rule in Labo v. COMELEC only applies to cases in which the election
of the respondent is contested, and the question is whether one who
GREGO v. COMELEC placed 2nd to the disqualified candidate may be declared the winner.
June 19, 1997
Class Notes: We should be very unhappy with this case
Summary: Basco was removed from office as Deputy Sheriff in 1981
1. Sec. 40(d) is very clear when it refers to DUAL CITIZENSHIP,
pursuant to an administrative case. The SC held that his dismissal is
not allegiance
with prejudice to reinstatement to any position in the national or local
2. Assuming that the law is vague, is the interpretation of the SC
government. On 1988, 1992, and 1995 Basco ran, was elected, and
correct? NO
assumed office as councilman for the 2 nd District of Manila City. Grego
 It cited ConCom proceedings instead of LGC
filed a petition for disqualification against Basco invoking the
deliberations
administrative penalty imposed against Basco on 1981 thus making
 Sec. 40(c) is the one which refers to dual allegiance!
him ineligible under Sec. 40(b), LGC. Comelec dismissed the petition. SC
3. SC decision made Sec. 40(d) inexistent
affirmed the dismissal. SC held that Basco was under no disqualification
since his dismissal (1981) was before the effectivity of LGC which has  This disqualification will never exist because once a
no retroactive effect. The SC also emphasized that the SC limited the candidate files his COC he is deemed to have renounced
foreign citizenship
 DE GUZMAN v. COMELEC
June 19, 2009

Summary: Roseller ran for vice mayor of Guimba, Nueva Ecija. His
opponent filed a petition for disqualification against him alleging that
he was not a Filipino Citizen. Roseller claims that he was a naturalized
Filipino citizen under RA 9225 hence he was qualified to run. SC held
that though he was a naturalized Filipino citizen, he was disqualified to
run for office. RA 9225 provides for another requirement for
naturalized Filipinos under the act who wish to run for office.

Doctrine: Section 5(a) of RA 9225 lays down two requirements for a

natural born Filipino who reacquired or retained his Philippine
citizenship under the RA. He must 1) meet the qualifications for holding
such public office as required by the Constitution and existing laws and
2) make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign
citizenships before any public officer authorized to administer an oath.

RODRIGUEZ v. COMELEC
July 24, 1996

Summary: Rodriguez and Marquez Jr. were candidates for governor of

Quezon in 1992 and 1995. In the 1992 elections, Marquez challenged
Rodriguez’ victory in a quo warranto petition, saying that he is a fugitive
from justice disqualified under Sec. 40(e) of the LGC. There is a pending
charge against Rodriguez in LA for fraudulent insurance claims, grand
theft and attempted grand theft of personal property. He left the US
roughly five months prior to the institution of the criminal case against
him. The Court defined a “fugitive from justice” in the Marquez decision
as including not only those who flee after conviction to avoid
punishment but likewise those who, after being charged, flee to avoid
prosecution. The case was then remanded to the COMELEC. During its
pendency, Marquez challenged Rodriguez’ candidacy in the 1995
election in a petition for disqualification on the same allegation. The
COMELEC consolidated the two and rendered a resolution disqualifying
Rodriguez based on an authenticated copy of warrant of warrant and
felony complaint against Rodriguez. It nullified Rodriguez’
proclamation. After being directed by the SC to receive and evaluate
evidence, the COMELEC declared that Rodriguez is not a fugitive from
justice as defined in the Marquez decision because intent to evade is a
material element. The SC affirmed and held that the intent to evade is
the compelling factor that animates one’s flight from a particular
jurisdiction and since Rodriguez’ arrival in the Philippines preceded the
filing of the felony complaint and the issuance of warrant of arrest, it
was impossible for him to have known of such.

Doctrine: A ‘fugitive from justice’ includes not only those who flee after
conviction to avoid punishment but likewise those who, after being
charged, flee to avoid prosecution. Intent to evade on the part of a
candidate must therefore be established by proof that there has already
been a conviction or at least, a charge has already been filed, at the time
of flight.

When, in good faith, a person leaves a territory of a state not his own,
homeward bound, and learns subsequently of charges filed against him
while in the relative peace and service of his own country, the fact that
he does no subject himself to the jurisdiction of the former does not
qualify him outright as a fugitive from justice.
 TERM OF OFFICE Term Shortened – Term of local elective officials has been shortened
from 4 to 3 years;
- voluntary renunciation not considered an interruption
Breakdown of Sec. 43, LGC: Term of Office What Constitutes Term of Office - the term limit for elective officials
must be taken to refer to the right to be elected as well as the right to
(a) Term of office of all local elective officials after LGC
serve in the same elective position
effectivity shall be 3 years
- It is not enough that an individual has served three
 Starting from noon of June 30, 1992 or such date as consecutive terms in an elective local office,
may be provided by law - He must also have been elected to the same position for the
 Except that of local elective barangay officials same number of times before the disqualification can apply.
(b) No local elective official shall serve for more than 3 Elected for 3 Terms – For the 3-term limit to apply, 2 conditions must
consecutive terms in the same position be met:
 Voluntary renunciation of office for any length of time 1. That the official concerned has been elected for 3 consecutive
NOT considered as an interruption in the continuity of terms to the same local government post
service for the full term 2. That he has fully served 3 consecutive terms
(c) Term of office of barangay officials and members of SK shall What does “Fully Served Term” mean?
be for 3 years 1. There is no FULL service of term when there is an
 Which shall begin after regular election of barangay INVOLUNTARY interruption or break in continuity of service
officials on 2nd Monday of May 1994  Such as when there is involuntary severance because of
legal process
Special Laws cited in the Syllabus
 Such as an order to vacate office before expiration
1. Art. X, Sec. 8, Constitution
of the term (Dizon v. COMELEC)
a. Term of office of elective local officials shall be 3 years
 But there is a full service of term where a duly
(1) Except barangay officials which shall be
proclaimed Mayor has assumed office but was later
determined by law
declared as the loser in an electoral protest after the
b. Three-term limit (consecutive terms)
term of contested office had expired (Ong v. Alegre)
(1) Voluntary renunciation not considered
2. Voluntary renunciation of office for any length of time shall
interruption in continuity of service
not be considered as interruption in continuity of service.
3. The conversion of a municipality to a city without
2. RA 6679 (1988) – Act postponing barangay elections to
interruption of the term of an elective official is not
March 28, 1989; prescribing additional rules governing the
considered an interruption in the continuity of service.
conduct of barangay elections
(Latasa vs COMELEC)
a. Barangay officials shall serve a term of 5 years which
4. Election via a recall election does not satisfy a “fully-served”
shall begin on June 1 following the election and until
term. (Lonzanida vs COMELEC)
their successors shall have been elected and qualified
5. The imposition of preventive suspension should not be
b. No barangay official shall serve for more than 3
considered an interruption that allows an elective official to
consecutive terms
stay in office for more than 3 terms. (Aldovino vs COMELEC)
c. Barangay elections shall be non-partisan
Effect of Specific Cases
NOTE: See case of David v. COMELEC which held that the
1. Effect of judicial declaration that official’s proclamation is
term limit for barangay officials has also been reduced to
void
3 years
 Assumption of office cannot be deemed to have been by
reason of a valid election thus he should not be
3. RA 8524 (1998) – Act changing the term of office of barangay
considered disqualified because he did not serve three
officials and members of SK from 3 years to 5 years
a. Amending Sec. 43 of LGC FULL consecutive terms (Lonzanida v. COMELEC)
2. Effect of recall elections
NOTE: See RA 9164 which amended Sec. 43 again and  Constitution does not require that the interruption be a
reduced the term limit of barangay officials and SK full term of 3 years. The clear intent of the framers of
officials to 3 years. So as the law stands now, term limit the law is that interruption for any length of time is
for these officials is THREE YEARS sufficient to break an elective local official’s continuity
of service. (Socrates v. COMELEC)
4. RA 9006 (2001) – Fair Elections Act 3. Effect of LGU Conversion
a. Sec. 14 – Elective official running for any office other  Disqualified; He should not be allowed to run again; if
than the one which he is holding in a permanent he would have served the same people for a term more
capacity, is NO LONGER considered ipso facto resigned than what is allowed by law (Latasa v. COMELEC)
from his office upon filing of his COC 4. Effect of Preventive Suspension
 NOTE: Sec. 14 expressly repealed Sec. 67 of  Disqualified; Strict adherence to the intent of the three-
Omnibus Election Code term limit rule demands that preventive suspension
 This does not apply to APPOINTIVE officials should not be considered an interruption that allows an
elective official’s stay in office beyond three terms. A
5. RA 9164 (2002) – Synchronized barangay and sangguniang preventive suspension cannot simply be a term
kabataan elections interruption because the suspended official continues
a. Term of office of barangay and SK officials = 3 years to stay in office although he is barred from exercising
b. No barangay elective official shall serve for more than 3 the functions and prerogatives of the office within the
consecutive terms in the same position: suspension period. The best indicator of the suspended
(1) Reckoned from 1994 barangay elections official’s continuity in office is the absence of a
(2) Voluntary renunciation of office for any length of permanent replacement and the lack of the authority to
time shall not be considered as an interruption appoint one since no vacancy exists. (Aldovino v.
COMELEC)
 BORJA v. COMELEC three-term limit rule, or conviction by final judgment of the crime of
September 3, 1998 falsification under the Revised Penal Code, as one of the grounds or
offenses covered under Section 68.
Summary: Capco was the vice mayor of Pateros, he succeeded as mayor
by operation of law when the incumbent mayor died. After which, he Perpetual special disqualification is a ground for a petition under
ran and won as mayor for 2 consecutive terms. He then again filed a Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code because this accessory penalty
COC for mayor for the upcoming elections. Borja sought his is an ineligibility, which means that the convict is not eligible to run for
disqualification on the ground of Sec. 43(b) of the LGC. The Court ruled public office, contrary to the statement that Section 74 requires him to
that the 3 consecutive term limit refers to terms served as elected state under oath in his certificate of candidacy.
officials and not those served by operation of law as in the case at bar.
Since this is an important case, here is an outline of the SC Decision:
Doctrine: The term limit for elective local officials must be taken to refer
to the right to be elected as well as the right to serve in the same SC’s Ruling: Antipolo, the alleged 2 nd placer, should be proclaimed
elective position. Consequently, it is not enough that an individual has Mayor because Lonzanida’s COC was void ab initio.
served three consecutive terms in an elective local office, he must also
have been elected to the same position for the same number of times I. Qualifications and Disqualifications
before the disqualification can apply. A. Sec. 65 OEC point to the LGC for qualifications of
elective local officials (Sec. 40 and 39)
B. Sec. 12 OEC provides for grounds for disqualification
LATASA v. COMELEC (see page 70 for the list)
December 10, 2003 C. Grounds for petition for disqualification are specifically
enumerated in Sec. 68 OEC (see page 70 for the list)
Summary: After Latasa served three terms as mayor of the Municipality 1. A petition for disqualification under Sec. 68 clearly
of Digos, Digos was converted to a City via a plebiscite. Nothing changed refers to:
as to territory, population, etc. It was just a conversion of the same area a. Commission of prohibited acts AND
to a city. Before the election of new city officials, Latasa held the b. Possession of a permanent resident status in
position in hold-over capacity. Now, Latasa wishes to run for mayor of a foreign country
the City of Digos, claiming that the Municipality and City are two 2. All other offenses mentioned in Sec. 68 refer to
different entities, so he is not running for the same position in election offenses under the OEC
contravention of the three-term limit. The Supreme Court found Latasa a. NOT to violations of other penal laws
ineligible to run as candidate for the position of Digos City Mayor. 3. There is absolutely nothing in Sec. 68 that would
justify including violation of the 3-term limit rule,
Doctrine: True, the new city acquired a new corporate existence or conviction by final judgment of a crime under
separate and distinct from that of the municipality. This does not mean, RPC, as one of the grounds covered by Sec. 68
however, that for the purpose of applying the subject Constitutional D. THUS, Lonzanida’s case is NOT covered by Sec. 68
provision, that the office of the municipal mayor would now be
construed as a different local government post as that of the office of II. False Material Representation
the city mayor. A. Sec. 78 OEC – Cancellation of COC if there is a false
material representation of the COC contents
1. Sec. 74 OEC details the contents of the COC
ARATEA v. COMELEC B. A candidate for mayor in the 2010 local elections was
October 9, 2012 thus required to provide 12 items of information in the
COC:
NOTE: 1. Name
Master the cases of Aratea and Talaga as they will come out in the exam. 2. Nickname/stage name
3. Gender
Summary: Romeo Lonzanida was a candidate for Mayor of San Antonio, 4. Age
Zambales. A petition under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code 5. Place of birth
was filed to disqualify him on the ground that he already served as 6. Political party that nominated the candidate
mayor for 4 consecutive terms. The Court held that such an ineligibility 7. Civil status
falls under Section 78. Lonzanida misrepresented his eligibility because 8. Residence/address
he knew full well that he had been elected, and had served, as mayor of 9. Profession/occupation
San Antonio, Zambales for more than three consecutive terms yet he 10. Post office address for election purposes
still certified that he was eligible to run for mayor for the next 11. Locality of which candidate is a registered voter
succeeding term. 12. Period of residence in Philippines before May 10
C. A candidate also certifies 4 statements:
Doctrine: In a certificate of candidacy, the candidate is asked to certify 1. That he is a natural born or naturalized Filipino
under oath his eligibility, and thus qualification, to the office he seeks citizen
election. Even though the certificate of candidacy does not specifically 2. That he is not a permanent resident of, or
ask the candidate for the number of terms elected and served in an immigrant to, a foreign country
elective position, such fact is material in determining a candidate’s 3. That he is eligible for office he seeks election
eligibility, and thus qualification for the office. Election to and service of 4. An oath of allegiance to the Constitution
the same local elective position for three consecutive terms renders a D. In Lonzanida’s case:
candidate ineligible from running for the same position in the 1. His conviction by final judgment, with penalty of
succeeding elections. L prision mayor, disqualifies him perpetually from
holding any public office, or from being elected to
A petition for disqualification under Section 68 clearly refers to “the any public office
commission of prohibited acts and possession of a permanent resident a. Perpetual disqualification took effect upon
status in a foreign country.” All the offenses mentioned in Section 68 finality of conviction
refer to election offenses under the Omnibus Election Code, not to b. It took effect BEFORE he filed his COC
violations of other penal laws. There is absolutely nothing in the 2. The penalty of prision mayor automatically carries
language of Section 68 that would justify including violation of the with it the accessory penalties of temporary
 absolute disqualification and perpetual special
2. Fermin v. Comelec – issue on residency
disqualification
requirement was raised in a Sec. 68 petition
a. A person suffering from these ineligibilities is
instead of a Sec. 78 petition
ineligible to run for elective public office
a. A petition for disqualification can ONLY be
b. He commits a false material representation if
premised on a ground specified in:
he states in his COC that he is eligible to run
(1) Sec. 12 OEC
E. Perpetual special disqualification is a ground for a
(2) Sec. 68 OEC
petition under Sec. 78 OEC because this accessory
(3) Sec 40 LGC
penalty is an INELIGIBILITY
b. Thus, a petition questioning a candidate’s
1. Note that Sec. 74 requires him to state that he is
possession of the required 1-yr residency
eligible to run
requirement (as distinguished from
2. Fermin v. Comelec – false material representation
permanent residency or immigrant status in
may refer to “qualifications or eligibility”
a foreign country) should be filed under Sec.
a. Denial of due course to or cancellation of OC
78, not Sec. 6815
is not based on lack of qualifications but on a
3. Munder v. Comelec – Comelec 2nd Division
finding that candidate made a material
dismissed the petition and declared that the
representation that is false
grounds relied on are not grounds for
disqualification under Sec. 68 but for denial or
III. Latasa, Rivera, and Ong: The 3-term limit rule as a ground for
cancellation of COC under Sec. 78
ineligibility (not as disqualification)
a. The ground raised in the petition was lack of
A. Three-term limit rule
registration as voter in the locality where he
1. After 3 consecutive terms, an elective local official
was running
cannot seek immediate reelection for the same
b. SC agreed and held that the ground was an
office in the next regular election because he is
inappropriate Sec. 68 petition (remember
INELIGIBLE
Footnote 15 of this Reviewer)
2. In Sec. 74, “eligible” means having the right to run
for elective public office
V. The Majority cannot accept the Dissents’ view that the three-
a. Meaning having all the qualification and none
term limit rule as a disqualification under Sec. 68
of the ineligibilities to run for public office
A. Majority says that the Dissents write in the law what is
B. In Latasa v. Comelec (see page 17)
not found in the law
1. NOTE: The petition filed was under Sec. 78
B. Sec. 68 is explicit as to the proper grounds for
2. Comelec cancelled Latasa’s COC for violation of the
disqualification
3-term limit rule but NOT for false material
C. Lonzanida misrepresented his eligibility because he
representation
knew full well that he had been elected, and had served,
a. SC agreed with Comelec
as mayor for more than 3 consecutive terms yet he still
C. In Rivera III v. Comelec
certified that he was eligible to run
1. Morales’ COC was cancelled and the SC declared
him ineligible for having served 3 consecutive
VI. Legal Duty of COMELEC to enforce perpetual special
terms
disqualification
2. Although the SC did NOT explicitly rule that
A. Even without a petition under Sec. 78 OEC, Comelec is
Morales’ violation of the 3-term limit rule
under legal duty to cancel the COC of anyone suffering
constituted false material representation,
from perpetual special disqualification to run
a. SC still granted the petition to cancel COC
1. Final judgment of conviction is judicial notice to
under Sec. 78
Comelec of the disqualification of the convict
D. In Ong v. Alegre
1. The SC affirmed COC cancellation via petition
under Sec. 78 which was predicated on the
violation of the three term limit rule
15
IV. Loong, Fermin, and Munder: When possession of a (CAVEAT: Personal reflection!!) I think that by this point it becomes clear
disqualifying condition is not a ground for a petition for that the nature of the petition to be filed would depend on what one is
disqualification alleging:
A. From the laws and cases it is clear that there is an 1. If petitioner alleges that candidate is DISQUALIFIED to run by
overlap in the grounds for eligibility and ineligibility pointing out SPECIFIC grounds for disqualification under Sec. 12,
vis-à -vis qualifications and disqualifications 68 OEC or Sec. 40 LGC, the petition to be filed should be under
1. E.g. A candidate may represent that he is a Sec. 68 (Petition for Disqualification)
resident of a particular locality (eligibility) when a. Always remember that the grounds for disqualification
he is actually a permanent resident of another are SPECIFICALLY provided for in the laws (limited to
(disqualification) these only; and he must point to a specific ground)
2. In such overlap, petitioner should not be 2. If petitioner alleges that candidate is NOT eligible to run by
constrained in his choice of remedy since the OEC
pointing out non-compliance with general qualification
makes available multiple remedies
requirements (like Constitution and Sec. 39 LGC), the petition to
B. HOWEVER, one should not be confuse a petition for
be filed is under Sec. 78 (Petition to Deny Due Course or
disqualification using the grounds in Sec. 68 with a
Cancellation of COC)
petition to deny due course or cancel COC in Sec. 78
1. Loong v. Comelec on the applicable prescriptive a. WHY? Remember that in the COC the candidate makes a
period – SC held that the petition was one based statement that he is “eligible” to run for the position he
on false representation under Sec. 78 and not for seeks election. But when he, in fact, does not possess the
disqualification under Sec. 68 qualification requirements he makes a material
a. Hence, the 25-day prescriptive period should misrepresentation in his COC (thus, Sec. 78)
be strictly applied Why is it important to properly characterize the petition? Because they
have different periods for filing, different effects, different grounds (See
discussion on page 82 Supplementary Notes)
 VII. Effect of a VOID COC
valid COC that render the person making the
A. A cancelled COC is VOID AB INITIO and cannot give rise
declaration valid or official candidate
to valid candidacy, much less to valid votes
B. Lonzanida’s COC was cancelled because he was
D. TWO REMEDIES available to prevent candidate from
INELIGIBLE or not qualified to run for mayor
running in an electoral race:
1. Whether his COC was cancelled before or after
1. Petition for Disqualification
elections is immaterial because cancellation on
2. Petition to Deny Due Course or to Cancel COC
such ground means that he was never a candidate
E. The difference between the two remedies are discussed
from the very beginning
in Fermin v. Comelec:
2. Void Ab Initio
C. Thus, there was only one qualified candidate for Mayor
in the May 2010 elections – Antipolo PETITION FOR PETITION TO DENY DUE
DISQUALFICATION COURSE OR CANCEL COC
Grounds
VIII. Petition dismissed. Antipolo to be proclaimed Mayor. Aratea
ordered to desist from discharging functions of Mayor. Only be grounded on a
Premised on Sec. 12 or statement of a false
68 OEC or Sec. 40 LGC material representation in
COC
TALAGA v. COMELEC
Effects
October 9, 2012
Person whose COC is
Person disqualified is
NOTE: cancelled or denied is not
merely prohibited to
Master the cases of Aratea and Talaga as they will come out in the exam. treated as a candidate at
continue as candidate
all
Summary: Ramon Talaga filed his COC declaring himself to be eligible to
run as mayor in the May 2010 election at Lucena, his opponent Castillo F. The grounds for disqualification under Sec. 68 OEC are
petitioned that his COC be cancelled on the ground that his material separate and distinct from the grounds for COC
representation of eligibility is false for he has won 3 terms as a mayor cancellation or denial in Sec. 78 OEC; In Miranda v.
already but Ramon’s defense was that he was subsequently suspended Abaya, the following circumstances may result from the
by the Sandiganbayan hence he wasn’t able to serve his 2 nd and third granting of the petition:
term. COMELEC rules that he is disqualified. Appeals ensue. Ramon 1. A candidate may not be qualified to run for
doesn’t try to substitute until the last day of filing of the petition. Issue election but may have filed a valid COC
of WON or not substitution is valid. Court discussed the difference of a 2. A candidate may not be qualified and at the same
Section 68 which refer to a valid candidate subsequently disqualified time may not have filed a valid COC; and
versus Section 74 petition, the latter based on material representation 3. A candidate may be qualified but his COC may be
being false. The Court ruled the COC of Ramon was invalid, taken as denied due course or cancelled
there being no COC, none can actually be substituted. Castillo as the
second placer cannot assume office because of the rule’s second G. In the event that a candidate is disqualified to run for a
requirement that the voters be aware that the person they voted for is public office, or dies, or withdraws his COC before
ineligible and they threw away their votes – here the voters were elections, Sec. 77 OEC provides for the option of
unaware that Ramon or Barbara was disqualified. There is now a substitution
permanent vacancy and the vice mayor should assume office. 1. Note that Sec. 77 unequivocally states that only an
official candidate of a registered or accredited
Doctrine: A cancelled CoC does not give rise to a valid candidacy, there party may be substituted
can be no valid substitution of the candidate under Section 77 of the 2. Considering that a cancelled COC does NOT give
Omnibus Election Code. It should be clear, too, that a candidate who rise to a valid candidacy, there can be no valid
does not file a valid CoC may not be validly substituted, because a substitution of the candidate under Sec. 77 OEC
person without a valid CoC is not considered a candidate in much the a. It is also clear that a candidate who does not
same way as any person who has not filed a CoC is not at all a candidate. file a valid COC may not be validly
substituted
The concept of a substitute presupposes the existence of the person to
be substituted, for how can a person take the place of somebody who II. Declaration of Ramon’s disqualification rendered his COC
does not exist or who never was. The existence of a valid certificate of invalid; hence, he was not a valid candidate to be properly
candidacy seasonably filed is a requisite sine qua non. substituted
A. SC agrees that the petition of Castillo was in the nature
Since this is an important case, here is an outline of the SC Decision: of a petition to deny due course to or cancel COC under
Sec. 78 OEC;
I. Existence of a valid COC is a condition sine qua non for a 1. The following allegations are enlightening:
valid substitution a. Ramon made a false representation in his
A. Filing of COC within the period provided for by law is a COC
mandatory requirement for any person to be b. False representation referred to a material
considered a candidate matter that would affect the substantive right
B. Evident purpose of requirement for filing of COCs and of Ramon as candidate
in fixing the time limit for filing them are: c. Ramon made the false representation with
1. To enable the voters to know, at least 60 days the intention to deceive the electorate as to
prior to the regular election, the candidates from his qualification for public office
among whom they are to make the choice 2. The petition challenged Ramon’s eligibility for
2. To avoid confusion and inconvenience in public office based on the 3-term limit rule
tabulation of the votes cast B. The denial of due course to or the cancellation of COC
C. A person’s declaration of his intention to run for public under Sec. 78 involves a finding not only that a person
office and his affirmation that he possesses the lacks a qualification but also that he made a material
eligibility for the position he seeks to assume, followed representation that is false
by the timely filing of such declaration, constitute a 1. Mitra v. Comelec – there must be a deliberate
attempt to mislead!
 C. Understand that Sec. 78 petition should not be confused
2. Sec. 8, Rule 20, Comelec Res. 8804 – decision of En
or interchanged with a Sec. 68 petition
Banc becomes final and executory 5 days after its
1. Remedies are different as they are based on
promulgation and receipt of notice by parties
different grounds and can result in different
eventualities
C. SC did not agree with Castillo’s assertion that Cayat is
D. NOTE: The cause of Ramon’s ineligibility is his violation
applicable
of the 3-term limit rule
1. Facts are different because there was no
1. He was absolutely precluded from asserting an
substitution in Cayat; thus, the rival remained the
eligibility to run as mayor for a 4 th consecutive
ONLY candidate for the mayoralty post
term
2. In this case, SC said that the Division Resolution
2. As a result, his COC was invalid and ineffective ab
became final around April 24 (before May
initio for containing the incurable defect
elections) HOWEVER, Ruby substituted Ramon
consisting in his false declaration of eligibility
a. SO, the May elections proceeded with Ruby
3. SC noted that Ramon himself specifically admitted
being regarded by the electorate as a bona
his ineligibility
fide candidate
E. Ramon, a non-candidate, had no right to pass on to his
b. To the electorate, she became a contender for
substitute
the same position vied for by Castillo
1. The concept of a substitute presupposes the
3. SINCE Ruby was considered a candidate, such
existence of the person to be substituted
standing negated Castillo’s claim of being the
F. SC ruled that in ALL instances enumerated in Sec. 77
candidate who obtained the highest number of
OEC (provision on substitution) existence of a VALID
votes
COC seasonably filed is a condition sine qua non
a. So he cannot assume office!
III. That COMELEC made no express finding that Ramon
D. Labo should be applied
committed any deliberate misrepresentation of his COC was
1. The 2nd placer was not the choice of the sovereign
of little consequence in the determination of whether his COC
will
should be deemed cancelled or not
2. The only time a 2 nd placer is allowed to take the
A. Miranda v. Abaya applies
place of a disqualified winning candidate is when
1. Here, the specific relief sought was for the
two requisites concur:
cancellation or denial of the COC
a. Candidate who obtained the highest number
2. COMELEC cancelled the COC and then – in
of votes is disqualified; and
apparent contradiction – held that Miranda was
b. The electorate was fully aware in fact and in
“disqualified”
law of that candidate’s disqualification as to
3. SC held that the COMELEC, by granting the petition
bring such awareness within the realm of
WITHOUT ANY QUALIFICATION, disqualified
notoriety but the electorate still cast plurality
Miranda AND, at the same time, cancelled his COC
of votes in favor of the ineligible candidate
B. In this case:
3. In this case, 2nd element was absent
1. Castillo’s petition specifically sought BOTH the
a. The voters were not the least aware of the
disqualification AND denial/cancellation of
fact of Ruby’s illegibility as the substitute
Ramon’s COC
b. En Banc issued a resolution finding Ruby
2. COMELEC categorically stated in its Resolution
ineligible A YEAR after the elections
that it was granting the petition
3. THUS, despite the COMELEC making no finding of
V. COMELEC En Banc properly disqualified Ruby from
material misrepresentation, its granting of the
assuming the position of Mayor
petition WITHOUT ANY QUALIFICATION
A. There was no valid candidate for her to substitute due
manifested that the COMELEC cancelled Ramon’s
to Ramon’s ineligibility
COC based on his apparent ineligibility
B. Ramon did not voluntarily withdraw his COC before the
elections in accordance with Sec. 73 OEC
IV. Elected Vice Mayor must succeed and assume the position of
C. She was not an additional candidate for the position of
Mayor due to a permanent vacancy in the office
Mayor because her filing of COC was beyond the period
A. Castillo argues:
fixed by law
1. Labo doctrine (rejection of 2nd placer) should not
apply to him because Ramon’s disqualification
VI. Since there is a permanent vacancy in the office of Mayor,
became final prior to the elections
such vacancy should be filled pursuant to the law on
2. Cayat v. Comelec – he was entitled to assume office
succession in Sec. 44 LGC
of Mayor for having obtained the highest number
A. Vice Mayor assumes office
of votes among the remaining qualified candidates
a. Petitioner in this case was disqualified and
Class Notes: Sir did not express his opinion regarding this case. So
the decision became final BEFORE the
please study carefully.
elections
- (Personal observation) So far Talaga has been consistent with
(1) So SC said that Cayat was no longer a
Aratea regarding the characterization of the petition and the
legal candidate on the day of election
effect of a successful Sec. 78 petition
(2) In Labo, candidate was disqualified
 Note that if a COC is cancelled or denied there is no
AFTER the elections
candidate so the 2nd placer assumes office because he is
b. No substitution in this case
the only qualified candidate left
B. It would seem that the date of finality of the COMELEC
resolution declaring Ramon’s disqualification is  HOWEVER, In Talaga, petition was under Sec. 78, BUT
decisive Court ruled that there is a permanent vacancy so the
1. Sec. 10, Rule 19, Comelec Res. 8804 – a decision or Vice Mayor assumes office (which is also the effect of a
resolution of Division becomes final and executory successful Disqualification petition under Sec. 68)
after a lapse of 5 days following it promulgation  HOWEVER, What is unique in Talaga is that there was a
a. UNLESS MR is seasonably filed Substitute so MAYBE the case hinges on the effect of the
substitute and SC’s discussion on it
 ABUNDO, SR. v. COMELEC ousted from office, thus disenabling him from serving
January 8, 2013 what would otherwise be the unexpired portion of his
term of office had the protest been dismissed
Summary: Abundo vied for the position of mayor of Viga, Catanduanes (Lonzanida vs Comelec, 1999 and Dizon vs Comelec
for 4 consecutive elections ( 2001, 2004, 2007, 2010). In both 2001 and 2009). The break or interruption need not be for a full
2007, he was proclaimed the winner and served his terms. However, in term of three years or for the major part of the 3-year
the 2004 elections, Torres was proclaimed as the winner in the election. term; an interruption for any length of time, provided
Abundo unseated Tores after a successful election protest. Abundo the cause is involuntary, is sufficient to break the
served the remaining 1 year and 1 month of the term. In the 2010 continuity of service (Socrates, citing Lonzanida).
elections, Abundo and Torres again opposed each other. Torres filed a
petition to disqualify Abundo based on the three-term limit rule. When an official is defeated in an election protest and said decision
Meanwhile, Vega filed a quo warranto proceeding against Abundo becomes final after said official had served the full term for said office,
before the RTC which ruled that Abundo was ineligible to serve as then his loss in the election contest does not constitute an interruption
Mayor. On appeal, Comelec Second Division and en banc affirmed RTC since he has managed to serve the term from start to finish. His full
ruling. SC reversed and ruled that the two-year period during which his service, despite the defeat, should be counted in the application of term
opponent, Torres, was serving as mayor should be considered as an limits because the nullification of his proclamation came after the
interruption, which effectively removed Abundo’s case from the ambit expiration of the term (Ong vs Alegre, 2006 and Rivera III vs Comelec,
of the three-term limit rule. 2007).

Doctrine: To constitute a disqualification to run for an elective local

office pursuant to the constitutional and statutory provisions on the DAVID v. COMELEC
three-term limit, the following requisites must concur: (1) that the April 8, 1997
official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms in the
same local government post; and (2) that he has fully served three Summary: Barangay chairman David is contending that his term of
consecutive terms. office is 5 years, under Sec. 2 of RA 6653, as reiterated in RA 6679. And
so he sought prohibition to stop the elections on his third year of office.
The prevailing jurisprudence on issues affecting consecutiveness of The Solicitor General agreed with David, arguing that RA 6679 was not
terms and/or involuntary interruption are the following: repealed by RA 7160. COMELEC disagreed, citing Sec. 43 of RA 7160
which reduced the term of office of all local elective officials to 3 years.
A. Re: Assumption of Office by Operation of Law Amicus curiae, former Senator Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr. agreed with
1. When a permanent vacancy occurs in an elective COMELEC. The SC agreed with COMELEC and Pimentel, and ruled that
position and the official merely assumed the position RA 7160 repealed the previous laws and reduced the term of office of
pursuant to the rules on succession under the LGC, then baranggay officials to 3 years.
his service for the unexpired portion of the term of the
replaced official cannot be treated as one full term as Doctrine: RA 7160 is a set of laws that specifically applies to local
contemplated under the subject constitutional and government units. It specifically and definitively provides in Sec. 43-c
statutory provision that service cannot be counted in that “the term of office of barangay officials… shall be for three
the application of any term limit (Borja, Jr.vs Comelec, years.” It is a special provision, and RA 7160 is a special law insofar as
1998). If the official runs again for the same position he it governs the term of office of barangay officials. In its repealing
held prior to his assumption of the higher office, then clause, RA 7160 states that “all general and special laws x x x which are
his succession to said position is by operation of law inconsistent with any of the provisions of this Code are hereby repealed
and is considered an involuntary severance or or modified accordingly.”
interruption (Montebon vs Comelec, 2008).

B. Re: Recall election COMELEC v. CRUZ

1. An elective official, who has served for three November 20, 2009
consecutive terms and who did not seek the elective
position for what could be his fourth term, but later Summary: Barangay officials challenge the constitutionality of Sec. 2,
won in a recall election, had an interruption in the 9164. Their argument is that the term limit provided therein is made to
continuity of the official’s service. For, he had become in apply retroactively, contrary to the principle of prospective application
the interim, i.e., from the end of the 3rd term up to the of statutes. The RTC declared the proviso unconstitutional. So,
recall election, a private citizen (Adormeo vs Comelec, COMELEC appealed to the SC. SC upheld the constitutionality of the law.
2002 and Socrates vs Comelec, 2002). There was no retroactive application.

C. Re: Conversion of a Municipality into a City Doctrine: Looking into historical considerations, it may be gleaned that
1. The abolition of an elective local office due to the no retroactive application was made because the three-term limit has
conversion of a municipality to a city does not, by itself, been there all along. Sec. 43, LGC did provide for a term limit. Title II of
work to interrupt the incumbent official’s continuity of the LGC, as a general rule, applies to all local elective officials. No
service (Latasavs Comelec,2003). exception was made in Sec. 43 (b). Also, retroactivity of laws is a matter
of civil law, not of constitutional law. As such, no constitutional
D. Re: Period of Preventive Suspension standard is violated.
1. Preventive suspension is not a term-interrupting event
as the elective officer’s continued stay and entitlement
to the office remain unaffected during the period of MONREAL v. COMELEC
suspension, although he is barred from exercising the December 21, 2009
functions of his office during this period (Aldovino, Jr.vs
Comelec, 2009) Summary: These are 2 separate petitions for certiorari filed by Monreal
and Foronda questiong the COMELEC resolutions disqualifying them
E. Re: Election Protest from seeking election to a fourth term and canceling their certificate of
1. When a candidate is proclaimed as winner for an candidacy after they have been declared as duly elected punong
elective position and assumes office, his term is barangay in District I and District II of Caloocan. They point out that
interrupted when he loses in an election protest and is COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it refused to suspend
further proceedings in the disqualification cases filed against them even
if the issue of constitutionality of Section 2 of RA 9164 is pending before
the RTC of Caloocan.

Doctrine: A prejudicial question is that which arises in a case, the

resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved in that
case. Because the jurisdiction to try and resolve the prejudicial question
has been lodged in another tribunal, the rule is that proceedings in the
1st case may be suspended to await the resolution of the prejudicial
question in the 2nd case. Laws are presumptively constitutional until
they are found otherwise in an appropriate case. To suspend
disqualification proceedings would amount to a preliminary injuction
against the implementation of that provision of the law. RTC decision
has not attained finality and the RTC has issued no order making the
same executory pending appeal. Consequently, such provision of law
remains in full force.

MONROY v. CA
July 1, 1967

Summary: On Sept. 15, Mayor Monroy filed his CoC for the position of
Rial 1st district representative. 3 days later, he withdrew his CoC.
COMELEC approved such withdrawal. However, 3 days after the
withdrawal, then vice-mayor Del Rosario took his oath of office as
Navotas Mayor, on the theory that Monroy forfeited said office upon his
filing of CoC for another position. Monroy filed an injunction suit
against Del Rosario, arguing, among other things, that the COMELEC’s
approval of his CoC’s withdrawal restored him to his former position as
Navotas Mayor. The RTC, CA and SC all disagreed with him and held
that upon the filing of his CoC for the position of Congressman of Rizal
1st district, he was considered resigned from his position a municipal
mayor of Navotas.

Doctrine: Under Sec. 27 of the Rev. Election Code, “any elective

provincial, municipal of city official running for an office, other than the
one which he is actually holding, shall be considered resigned from his
office from the moment of the filing of his CoC”. Once the CoC is filed,
seat is forfeited forever and nothing save a new election or
appointment can restore the ousted official.

Class Notes: Is this good law? No. See Fair Elections Act
- Sec. 14 – Elective official running for any office other than the
one which he is holding in a permanent capacity, is NO
LONGER considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon
filing of his COC
 NOTE: Sec. 14 expressly repealed Sec. 67 of Omnibus
Election Code
 This does not apply to APPOINTIVE officials
-
 Supplementary Notes: a. Suspended during the pendency of a pre-
16 proclamation controversy
THE ELECTORAL REMEDIES b. Should be declared within 15 days from
filing in case of barangay officials
A. Petition to Deny Due Course or to Cancel COC
1. The COMELEC, upon proper petition, may cancel a 2. Quo Warranto (Sec. 253, Art. XXI, OEC)
COC on the ground that any material a. Filed by any registered voter in the
misrepresentation contained therein as required constituency
under Sec. 74, OEC is false b. Grounds:
2. Sec. 78, OEC provides: (1) Ineligibility
a. Petition may be filed not later than 25 days (2) Disloyalty to the Republic
from time of filing COC c. Time to file: Within 10 days after proclamation
b. It shall be decided, after due notice and hearing, of results of election
not later than 15 days before election
3. Jurisdiction over this petition lies with the COMELEC PLEASE TAKE NOTE OF THESE DISTINCTIONS:
Division and not with the COMELEC En Banc
(Garvida v. Sales) Petition to Deny Due Course v. Petition for Disqualification (as
discussed in Jalosjos, Aratea, Talaga, and the cases cited in these cases)
B. Petition for Disqualification
1. Grounds: PETITION TO DENY DUE PETITION FOR
COURSE OR CANCEL COC DISQUALIFICATION
a. Any candidate who, in an action or protest in
Sec. 78 OEC Sec. 68 OEC
which he is a party, is declared by final decision
Period of Filing
of a competent court, guilty of, or found by the
Within 5 days from last day of Any day after the last day of the
COMELEC to be suffering from any filing of COC filing of COC
disqualification provided by law or BUT not later than 25 days from
Constitution may be disqualified (Sec. 1, Rule BUT not later than the date of
time of filing of the COC subject
25, COMELEC Res. No. 9523) to the petition proclamation
b. Disqualification is premised on Sec. 12 or 68 of GROUNDS
the OEC or Sec. 40 of the LGC Material Misrepresentation in Sec. 12, 68, OEC
(1) See page 70 for a list of the COC Sec. 40, LGC
disqualifications under each provision SUBSTITUTION
2. Who may file A person whose COC has been
Candidate disqualified can be
a. Any registered voter or any duly registered denied due course or cancelled
validly substituted because he
political party, organization, or coalition of cannot be substituted because
remains a candidate until
political parties may file this petition he is not considered a candidate
disqualified (Miranda v. Abaya)
3. Period of filing (Miranda v. Abaya)
a. Any day after the last day for filing of COC, but EFFECT
not later than the date of proclamation (Sec. 2 Person whose COC is denied or
Disqualified candidate is merely
and 3, Rule 25, COMELEC Res. No. 9523) cancelled is not treated as a
prohibited to continue as a
candidate at all, as if COC was
never filed (Fermin v. Comelec) candidate (Fermin v. Comelec)
C. Postponement and Failure of Elections (irrelevant for
Candidate with the 2nd highest
our class) Rule on succession shall be
number of votes shall assume
observed
office
D. Pre-proclamation Controversy (irrelevant for our
class) Election Protest v. Quo Warranto

E. Election Contests (2 kinds)

1. Election Protest (Sec. 2, Rule 6, COMELEC Res. No.

8804)
a. May be filed by any candidate who has filed a
COC and has been voted upon for the same
office
b. Grounds:
(1) Fraud
(2) Terrorism
(3) Irregularities
(4) Illegal acts committed before, during, or
after the casting and counting of votes
c. Time to file: Within 10 days from proclamation
of results of election

16
We added a separate discussion on this point since it can create a bit of
 ELECTION PROTEST QUO WARRANTO
Issue
Refers to questions of disloyalty
Based on grounds of election
or ineligibility of the winning
fraud or irregularities
candidate
 Strictly a contest between the
defeated and winning A proceeding to unseat the
candidates as to who actually ineligible person from office, but
obtained the majority of the NOT to install the protestant in
legal votes and therefore is his place
entitled to the office
Who May File
Can be filed by any voter
Can only be filed by a candidate
It is for this reason that it is not
who has duly filed a COC and has
considered a contest where the
been voted for
parties strive for supremacy
Effect on the Protestee
A protestee may be ousted and While respondent may be
the protestant seated in the unseated, the petitioner will not
office vacated be seated
confusion. This is a consolidation of remedies available in election law. This
framework will hopefully place everything in perspective. Review this part
together with Aratea and Talaga.
END OF MIDTERM EXAM COVERAGE