Laygo Vs Municipal Mayor of Solano

Rodolfo and Willie Laygo vs. Municipal Mayor of Solano of Nueva Vizcaya, G.R. No.
188448, January
11, 2017
FACTS:
 July 2005: Aniza Bandrang sent 2 letter-complaints to then Municipal Mayor Santiago Dickson
and the Sangguniang Bayan of Solano, Nueva Vizcaya, informing them of the illegal sublease she
entered with petitioners Rodolfo and Willie Laygo over Public Market Stalls 77-A, 77-B, 78-A,
and 78-B. The Laygos leased these stalls from the government
 Bandrang claimed that the petitioners told her to vacate the stalls which they then subleased to
another. She expressed her willingness to testify against them
 Aug 2005: Sangguniang Bayan endorsed Bandrang’s letter and copy of Resolution 183-2004 to
Mayor Dickson for appropriate action. Sanggunian informed Mayor Dickson that the matter is
under his jurisdiction by virtue of Resolution 183-2004 which authorized the mayor to enforce
the provision against subleasing of stalls in the public market
 In response, the mayor informed the Sanggunian that the stalls were constructed under the
Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) scheme, which meant that the Laygos had the right to keep their
stalls until the BOT agreement was satisfied. He also asked the body if there are provisions that
sanctioned lessees under the BOT scheme
 Bandrang wrote another letter to the Sangguniang, praying for the cancellation of the lease
contract between the Laygos and Municipality as it violates the provision on subleasing.
 Sanggunian once again sent the letter and copy of Resolution to Mayor Dickson. However,
mayor still didn’t act on it, prompting Bandrang to file a petition for mandamus against him with
RTC Bayombong
 Mayor defended that Bandrang had no right to seek remedy as she was also guilty in leasing the
market stalls. Moreover, she had no cause of action since the stalls were on a BOT scheme.
 Laygos denined that they were the lessees of the stalls, but instead their mother. When they
entered into their contract, parties agreed that the contract was subject to their mother’s other
heirs. Since no consent was given, there was no subleasing to speak of. Even if there was,
prohibition wouldn’t apply since it was under a BOT agreement
 Incumbent mayor Philip Dacayao became respondent in the place of Mayor Dickson
RTC ruled in favor of Bandrang, stating that the contract between Laygos and Municipality was a lease
contract. Thus, Resolution applies
CA affirmed
Petitioners’ Arguments
 Resolution 183-2004 cannot be enforced against them since there was no lease contract
between them and the Municipality
 Resolution can only be enforced by Mayor Dickson since it specified him. As Mayor Dickson was
no longer in office, he cannot anymore enforce the Resolution
ISSUE: W/N mandamus will lie - NO
RULING:
Contract is one of lease
 Municipal government was able to prove, through secondary evidence, that its contract with
petitioners was one of lease
 The certifications of former Mayor Galima and the Municipal Planning and Development Office
(MPDO) show that the contract was converted into a BOT agreement for a time in 1992 due to a
fire that razed the public market.
 This proves that Clarita was allowed to construct her stalls which were destroyed in the fire, and
the payment of the lease rentals being suspended until she recovers the construction costs.
MPDO even supervised the construction for 3 months
 After the stalls were built, Clarita occupied them under a lease contract with the municipality
 Municipal Treasurer even sent a Notice dated Aug 21, 2007 reminding Laygos to pay their
delinquent stall rentals from May 2006-July 2007. If the stalls were under a BOT scheme,
treasurer couldn’t have assessed Laygos of any delinquency
 Resolution 183-2004 was also presumed to have been regularly issued absent any contrary
evidence
Mandamus however is not proper
 Mandamus is a command directed to some inferior court, tribunal, or board, or to some

corporation or person requiring the performance of a particular duty therein specified, which
duty results from the official station of the party to whom the writ is directed or from operation
of law
 As a rule, mandamus will not lie in the absence of any of the following grounds:
o [a] that the court, officer, board, or person against whom the action is taken unlawfully
neglected the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty
resulting from office, trust, or station; or
o [b] that such court, officer, board, or person bas unlawfully excluded petitioner/relator
from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which he is entitled
 Mandamus will also not lie to compel performance of duties that are discretionary in nature
 SC described difference between ministerial and discretionary powers in Roble Arrastre Inc v
Villaflor:
o Discretion- means a power or right conferred upon them by law or acting officially,
under certain circumstances, uncontrolled by the judgment or conscience of others.
o Ministerial- where officer or tribunal performs in a given state of facts, in a prescribed
manner, in obedience to the mandate of a legal authority, without regard to or the
exercise of his own judgment upon the propriety or impropriety of the act done
o If the law imposes a duty upon a public officer and gives him the right to decide how or
when the duty shall be performed, such duty is discretionary and not ministerial.
o The duty is ministerial only when the discharge of the same requires neither the
exercise of official discretion or judgment
 IN THIS CASE, mandamus must fail since the acts sought to be done are discretionary in nature
 Bandrang’s petition sought an order to direct Mayor to cancel lease contracts between Laygos
and the municipality and to lease the vacated stalls to interested persons
 In Aprueba v Ganzon, SC ruled that the privilege of operating a marketing stall under license is
always subject to LGU’s police power and may be refused or granted for reasons of public
policy and sound public administration. Being a delegated police power falling under thee
general welfare clause, the grant or revocation of the privilege is therefore, discretionary
 Resolution 183-2004 or even its subsequent equivalent merely authorizes the mayor to enforce
the No. 11 provision of the contract of lease of market stalls between the municipality and the
stallholders at the public market who violated the No 9 provision of the contract
o No.11 provision provides “if any back rental remains unpaid for more than 15 days or if
any violation be made of any of the stipulations of this lease by the LESSEE, the
LESSOR may declare this lease terminated and, thereafter, reenter the leased premises
and repossess the same, and expel the LESSEE or others claiming under him/her from
the leased premises
 No.11 does not give mayor a mandate to automatically terminate or cancel the lease with a
delinquent lessee. This is apparent from the permissive word “may” used in the provision. It
doesn’t specifically enjoin mayor to cancel the lease as a matter of duty
 While the GR is that mandamus will only lie to compel a ministerial duty, there are exceptions.
Mandamus will apply against discretionary duties when it has been proven that there has been
gross abuse of discretion, manifest injustice, or palpable excess of authority. These, however, do
not exist in this case
 While Mayor Dickson may be compelled to act by virtue of Resolution 135-2007 (subsequent
resolution), he may not be compelled to do so in a certain way.
 It was enough that he was reminded of his authority to cancel the contract under No 11, but
whether or not his decision would be for or against Bandrang would be for Mayor Dickson alone
to decide. Not even the Court can substitute its own judgment over what he had chosen
 Mayor Dickson did exercise his discretion by choosing not to cancel the contract, explaining that
Bandrang was also in violation of the same policy. There was no proof that Mayor committed
grave abuse of discretion, manifest injustice, or palpable excess of authority
 SC also reasoned that mandamus should be filed by a person who has a clear legal right to the
claim that is sought. In other words, it should be instituted by an aggrieved party
 IN THIS CASE, Bandrang does not have such right as she was not an applicant for any stall in the
public market nor is she a representative of one
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is GRANTED.

Laygo Vs Municipal Mayor of Solano

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Rodolfo and Willie Laygo vs. Municipal Mayor of Solano of Nueva Vizcaya, G.R. No.

ISSUE: W/N mandamus will lie - NO

Mandamus however is not proper

 Mandamus is a command directed to some inferior court, tribunal, or board, or to some

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is GRANTED.

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