Bautista, Rio Krisel 1D Constitutional Law II

OSCAR B. PIMENTEL, ERROL B. COMAFAY, JR., RENE B. GOROSPE, EDWIN R.

SANDOVAL, VICTORIA B. LOANZON, ELGIN MICHAEL C. PEREZ, ARNOLD E.
CACHO, AL CONRAD B. ESPALDON, ED VINCENT S. ALBANO, LEIGHTON R.
SIAZON, ARIANNE C. ARTUGUE, CLARABEL ANNE R. LACSINA, KRISTINE JANE
R. LIU, ALYANNA MARI C. BUENVIAJE, IANA PATRICIA DULA T. NICOLAS, IRENE
A. TOLENTINO and AUREA I. GRUYAL, petitioners, vs. LEGAL EDUCATION BOARD,
as represented by its Chairperson, HON. EMERSON B. AQUENDE, and LEB
Member HON. ZENAIDA N. ELEPAÑO, respondents.
G.R. No. 230642 September 10, 2019

Facts:

Consolidated Petitions for Prohibition (GR 230642) and Certiorari and Prohibition (GR 242954)
were filed before the Court to assail the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7662, or the Legal
Education Reform Act of 1993, on the principal grounds of encroachment upon the rule-making power
of the Court concerning the practice of law, violation of institutional academic freedom and violation of
a law school aspirant’s right to education, these petitions also seek to declare as unconstitutional the
Legal Education Board Issuances establishing and implementing the Philippine Law School Admission
Test or the PhiLSAT.

RA 7662 created the Legal Education Board (LEB) for the improvement of the system of legal
education in the Philippines due to diminishing performance of law students and law schools in the bar
examinations. It is an executive agency separate from the Department of Education, Culture and Sports
but attached solely for budgetary and administrative purposes, consisting of presidential appointees.

In July 2001, The Court’s Committee on Legal Education and Bar Matters (CLEBM) through its
Chairperson, Justice Jose Vitug, noted that the following objectionable provisions of the law must be
removed: First, Section 2 of [R.A. No. 7662], the State "shall xxx require apprenticeship and continuing
legal education." The concept of continuing legal education encompasses education not only of law
students but also of members of the legal profession. [This] implies that the [LEB] shall have jurisdiction
over the education of persons who have finished the law course and are already licensed to practice law,
in violation of the Supreme Court's power over the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.

Next is Section 3 which provides that one of the objectives of legal education is increasing
"awareness among members of the legal profession of the needs of the poor, deprived and oppressed
sectors of the society." Such objective should not find a place in the law that primarily aims to upgrade
the standard of schools of law as they perform the task of educating aspiring lawyers. Section 5,
paragraph 5 of Article VIII of the Constitution also provides that the Supreme Court shall have the power
to promulgate rules on "legal assistance to the “underprivileged" and hence, implementation of [R.A.
No. 7662] might give rise to infringement of a constitutionally mandated power.

Lastly, Section 7(e) giving the LEB the power to prescribe minimum standards for law admission
and Section 7(h) giving the LEB the power to adopt a system of continuing legal education and for this
purpose, the LEB may provide for the mandatory attendance of practicing lawyers in such courses and
for such duration as the LEB may deem necessary encroach upon the Supreme Court's powers under
Section 5, paragraph 5 of Article VIII of the Constitution. Aside from its power over the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines, the Supreme Court is constitutionally mandated to promulgate rules concerning
admission to the practice of law.

Moreover, in resolution dated September 4, 2001, the Court approved the CLEBM’s explanatory
note and draft amendments to RA 7662, to which a copy was formally furnished to the Congress.
However, the said act remained unaltered.

In 2003, LEB members were appointed with the Retired Court of Appeals Justice Hilarion Aquino
was appointed as their first chairperson. LEB became fully operational only in June 2010. Since then, it
has issued several orders, circulars, resolutions and other issuances to prescribe the minimum standards
for law schools pursuant to Sec 7 of RA 7662. One of these orders includes Memorandum Order No. 7,
Series of 2016 which seeks to improve the quality of legal education by requiring those seeking
admission to the basic law course to take and pass a nationwide uniform law school admission test,
known as the PhilSAT.

The PhilSAT is an aptitude test measuring the examinee’s communication and language
proficiency, critical thinking, verbal and quantitative reasoning. It was designed to measure the
academic potential of the examinee to pursue the study of law. Such examination was effective for the
academic year 2017-2018, wherein no applicant to law school was allowed admission without having
taken and passed the PhilSAT. The first PhilSAT was held on April 16, 2017. However, under LEBMO No.
11-2017, a conditional admission and enrollment was given to those who failed to take the PhilSAT for
justifiable and meritorious reasons, as part of the transition adjustments in the initial year of the PhilSAT
implementation, as clarified by the issuance of LEBMO No. 11-2018. Nevertheless, on July 25, 2018, the
LEB issued LEBMC No. 19-2018 allowing limited conditional admission/enrollment in the first semester
of academic year 2018 to 2019 for those applicants who have never previously taken the PhiLSAT. Those
who have taken the PhiLSAT and scored below the cut-off score (55%) were disqualified. In addition,
only those law schools with a passing rate of not less than 25%, are updated in the reportorial
requirement and signified its intention to conditionally admit applicants were allowed to do so.

The Petition

The petitioners prayed for the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) to prevent the
LEB from conducting the PhiLSAT days before the first aptitude test was held. They argue that R.A. No.
7662 and the PhiLSAT are offensive to the Court's power to regulate and supervise the legal profession
pursuant to Section 5 (5), Article VIII of the Constitution and that the Congress cannot create an
administrative office that exercises the Court's power over the practice of law. They also argue that R.A.
No. 7662 gives the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) additional functions to vet nominees for the LEB in
violation of Section 8 (5), Article VIII of the Constitution. They also question the constitutionality of the
LEB's powers under Section 7 (c)and 7 (e)to prescribe the qualifications and compensation of faculty
members and Section 7 (h)on the LEB's power to adopt a system of continuing legal education as being
repugnant to the Court's rule-making power concerning the practice of law. They also argue that the
PhiLSAT violates the academic freedom of law schools and the right to education.

The Court issued the TRO allowing conditional enrollment to incoming freshmen law students
for the academic year 2019 to2020.

The Office of the Solicitor General OSG in its comment contends that the Court's power to
regulate admission to the practice of law does not include regulation of legal education. OSG points out
that the Court had actually authorized the JBC to process the applications for membership to the LEB
making this a non-issue. In defending the validity of the PhiLSAT, the OSG advances the argument that
the PhiLSAT is the minimum standard for entrance to law schools prescribed by the LEB pursuant to the
State's power to regulate education. The OSG urges that the PhiLSAT is no different from the National
Medical Admission Test (NMAT) which the Court already upheld as a valid exercise of police power in
the seminal case of Tablarin v. Gutierrez.

Issues:

1. Whether or not the case is subject to judicial review

2. Whether or not the Court has jurisdiction over legal education
3. Whether or not the reasonable supervision and regulation of legal education is a valid exercise of
police power

Ruling:

1. Whether or not the case is subject to judicial review- YES

For a proper exercise of its power of review in constitutional litigation, certain requisites
must be satisfied:
(1) an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power;
(2) the person challenging the act must have "standing" to challenge;
(3) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and
(4) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.

ACTUAL CASE/CONTROVERSY
In the unanimous en banc case Tañada v. Angara, this Court held that when an act of the
legislative department is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, settling the
controversy becomes the duty of this Court. By the mere enactment of the questioned law
or the approval of the challenged action, the dispute is said to have ripened into a judicial
controversy even without any other overt act. Indeed, even a singular violation of the
Constitution and/or the law is enough to awaken judicial duty.
Said the Court: In seeking to nullify an act of the Philippine Senate on the ground that it
contravenes the Constitution, the petition no doubt raises a justiciable controversy. Where
an action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it
becomes not only the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute. The
question thus posed is judicial rather than political.
The petitions therefore raise an actual controversy insofar as they allege that R.A. No.
7662,specically Section 2, paragraph 2, Section 3 (a) (2), Section 7 (c), (e), (g), and (h) of R.A.
No. 7662infringe upon the Court's power to promulgate rules concerning the practice of law
and upon institutional academic freedom and the right to quality education. Necessarily, a
review of the LEB issuances when pertinent to these assailed provisions of R.A. No. 7662
shall also be undertaken.
LEGAL STANDING

The rule on standing admits of recognized exceptions: the over breadth doctrine,
taxpayer suits, third-party standing and the doctrine of transcendental importance.

Petitioners who are law students possess the requisite standing to challenge the
constitutionality of Section 7(e) of R.A. No. 7662 and the implementing LEB issuances, as
they were, in fact, required to take the PhiLSAT, or to comply with the terms of the
conditional enrollment and failing which, were denied admission as regular students to law
school.

Meanwhile, petitioners Pimentel, Comafay, Gorospe, Sandoval, Loanzon, Perez,

Cacho,Espaldon, Albano, Siazon, Artugue, Lacsina, Liu, Buenviaje, Nicolas, Tolentino, and
Gruyal; and petitioners-in intervention Rapista, Rapista-Tan, Tan, Enterina and Villarico
commonly anchor their standing to challenge R.A. No. 7662 and the PhiLSAT as citizens.
Standing as a citizen has been upheld by this Court in cases where a petitioner is able to
craft an issue of transcendental importance or when paramount public interest is involved.

Legal standing may be extended to petitioners for having raised a "constitutional issue
of critical significance. "Without a doubt, the delineation of the Court's rule-making power
vis-à-vis the supervision and regulation of legal education and the determination of the
reach of the State's supervisory and regulatory power in the context of the guarantees of
academic freedom and the right to education are novel issues with far-reaching
implications that deserve the Court's immediate attention. In taking cognizance of the
instant petitions, the Court is merely exercising its power to promulgate rules towards the
end that constitutional rights are protected and enforced.

2. Whether or not the Court has jurisdiction over legal education - NO

Petitioners in G.R. No. 230642 argue that the Court's power to promulgate rules
concerning the admission to the practice of law necessarily includes the power to do things
related to the practice of law, including the power to prescribe the requirements for
admission to the study of law. In support, they point to Sections 6 and 16, Rule 138 of the
Rules of Court. They contend that the Congress cannot create an administrative body, like
the LEB, that exercises this rule-making power of the Court. They emphasize that the LEB
belongs to the Executive department, and, is not linked to the Court nor placed under the
Court's regulation and supervision.
Petitioners in G.R. No. 242954 maintain that the Court exercises authority over the legal
profession which includes the admission to the practice of law, to the continuing
requirements for and discipline of lawyers. They further contend that part of the rule-
making power of the Court which includes the power to admit members to the practice of
law extends to the admission to the legal education since it is a preparatory process to the
admission to the legal profession.
Contrary to petitioner's claims, the Court has no primary and direct jurisdiction over
legal education for the following reasons:
First, it had been historically and consistently exercised by the political departments. In
fact, it was recommended that legislation be enacted to prohibit the opening of any school
without the permission of the Secretary of Public Instruction. Moreover, the Constitution
expressed in no uncertain terms that "all educational institutions shall be under the
supervision and subject to regulation by the State." The Administrative Code also states that
it shall be the State that shall protect and promote the right of all citizens to quality
education at all levels, and shall take appropriate steps to make such education accessible to
all; and that the DECS shall be primarily responsible for the formulation, planning,
implementation, and coordination of the policies, plans, programs and projects in the areas
of formal and non-formal education. The Administrative Code also empowered the Board of
Higher Education to create technical panels of experts in the various disciplines including
law, to undertake curricula development.
Second, DECS Order No. 27-1989, the precursor of R.A. No. 7662, defined legal
education as an educational program including a clinical program appropriate and essential
in the understanding and application of law and the administration of justice. It is
professional education after completion of a required pre-legal education at the college
level. For state colleges and universities, the operation of their law schools was to depend
on their respective charters, and for private colleges and universities, by the rules and
regulations issued by the DECS. Nevertheless, it was made clear under DECS Order No. 27-
1989 that the administration of a law school shall be governed primarily by the law school's
own policies and the provisions thereof apply only suppletorily.
Third, legal education is a mere composite of the entire Philippine education system.
Being a specialized area of study, however, is not reason in itself to demarcate legal
education and withdraw it from the regulatory and supervisory powers of the political
branches.
Fourth, the Court's exclusive rule-making power covers the practice of law and not the
study of law. Accordingly, the Court's exclusive power of admission to the Bar has been
interpreted as vesting upon the Court the authority to define the practice of law, to
determine who will be admitted to the practice of law, to hold in contempt any person
found to be engaged in unauthorized practice of law, and to exercise corollary disciplinary
authority over members of the Bar. The act of admitting, suspending, disbarring and
reinstating lawyers in the practice of law is a judicial function because it requires "(1)
previously established rules and principles; (2) concrete facts, whether past or present,
affecting determinate individuals; and (3) decision as to whether these facts are governed
by the rules and principles.”
The definition of the practice of law cannot be further enlarged as to cover the study of
law.
Fifth, the Court exercises judicial power only and should not assume any duty not
connected to its judicial functions, the basic postulate being the separation of powers.
Neither may the regulation and supervision of legal education be justified as an exercise of
the Court's "residual" power. A power is residual if it does not belong to either of the two
co-equal branches and which the remaining branch can, thus, exercise consistent with its
functions. Regulation and supervision of legal education is primarily exercised by the
Legislative and implemented by the Executive, thus, it cannot be claimed by the judiciary.
Sixth, while the power of the Court to promulgate rules concerning admission to the
practice of law exists under the 1935 Constitution and reiterated under the 1973 and 1987
Constitutions, the Court has not promulgated any rule that directly and actually regulates
 legal education. In allowing the law student and in governing the conduct of the law student
practitioner under the Revised Law Student Practice Rule, what the Court regulates and
supervises is not legal education, but the appearance and conduct of a law student before
any trial court, tribunal, board, or officer, to represent indigent clients of the legal clinic —
an activity rightfully falling under the definition of practice of law. Inasmuch as the law
student is permitted to act for the legal clinic and thereby to practice law, it is but proper
that the Court exercise regulation and supervision over the law student practitioner.
Necessarily, the Court has the power to allow their appearance and plead their case, and
thereafter, to regulate their actions.

3. Whether or not the reasonable supervision and regulation of legal education is a valid
exercise of police power - YES

REASONABLE SUPERVISION AND REGULATION

Police power is "the power vested in legislature by the Constitution, to make, ordain,
and establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes, and ordinances,
either with penalties or without, not repugnant to the Constitution, as they shall judge to be
for the good and welfare of the Commonwealth, and of the subjects of the same."
The enactment of education laws, implementing rules and regulations and issuances of
government agencies is an exercise of the State's police power. Such exercise, however, is
NOT ABSOLUTE. When the Constitution gives the State supervisory power, it is understood
that what it enjoys is a supportive power, that is, the power of oversight over all educational
institutions. It includes the authority to check, but not to interfere. In addition to
supervision, educational institutions are likewise made subject to State regulation. In this
regard, the political departments are vested with ample authority to set minimum standards
to be met by all educational institutions. To be valid, the supervision and regulation of legal
education as an exercise of police power must be reasonable and not repugnant to the
Constitution, which means that when the Constitution speaks of State supervision and
regulation, it does not in any way amount to control.

Accordingly, the Court's exclusive power of admission to the Bar has been interpreted as vesting
upon the Court the authority to define the practice of law, to determine who will be admitted to the
practice of law, to hold in contempt any person found to be engaged in unauthorized practice of law,
and to exercise corollary disciplinary authority over members of the Bar.

The act of admitting, suspending, disbarring and reinstating lawyers in the practice of law is a
judicial function because it requires "(1) previously established rules and principles; (2) concrete facts,
whether past or present, affecting determinate individuals; and (3) decision as to whether these facts
are governed by the rules and principles

ACADEMIC FREEDOM
 Accordingly, the reasonable supervision and regulation clause must be read in
conjunction with the other Constitutional provisions relating to education which include, in
particular, the clause on academic freedom. The internal conditions for institutional
academic freedom, means that the academic staff should have de facto control over: (a) the
admission and examination of students; (b)the curricula for courses of study; (c) the
appointment and tenure of office of academic staff; and(d) the allocation of income among
the different categories of expenditure.

The rule is that institutions of higher learning enjoy ample discretion to decide for itself
who may teach, what may be taught, how it shall be taught and who to admit, being part of
their academic freedom. The State, in the exercise of its reasonable supervision and
regulation over education, can only impose minimum regulations.

RIGHT TO EDUCATION

The normative elements of the general right to education under Section 1, Article XIV,
are (1)to protect and promote quality education; and (2) to take appropriate steps towards
making such quality education accessible. "Quality" education is defined as the appropriateness,
relevance and excellence of the education given to meet the needs and aspirations of the
individual and society. In order to protect and promote quality education, the political
departments are vested with the ample authority to set minimum standards to be met by all
educational institutions. However, the right to education is subject to fair, reasonable and
equitable admission and academic requirements.

The element of accessibility under the Constitution, thus, pertains to both the elimination of
discrimination especially against disadvantaged groups and to the financial duty of the State for,
after all, the right to education is part and parcel of social justice. The objective is to make
quality education accessible by appropriate means.

In conclusion, jurisdiction over legal education belongs primarily and directly to the
political departments, and that the exercise of such police power must be in the context of
reasonable supervision and regulation, and must be consistent with academic freedom and the
right to education.

LEB's Powers under R.A. No. 7662 vis-à-vis the Court's Jurisdiction under Article VIII, Section 5 (5)
of the Constitution

1. Sections 3(a)(2) and 7(2) on increasing awareness among members of the legal profession of
the needs of the poor, deprived and oppressed sectors of society goes beyond the scope of
R.A. No.7662, which involves the improvement of the quality of legal education, and,
instead delves into the training of those who are already members of the bar. Likewise, this
objective is a direct encroachment on the power of the Court to promulgate rules
concerning the practice of law and legal assistance to the underprivileged and should, thus,
be voided on this ground.
2. Section 2, par. 2 of R.A. No.7662 mandates the State to legal apprenticeship and continuing
legal education. Pursuant to this policy, Section 7 (g) of R.A. No. 7662 grants LEB the power
to establish a law practice internship as a requirement for taking the bar examinations. The
jurisdiction to determine whether an applicant may be allowed to take the bar examinations
belongs to the Court. This requirement unduly interferes with the exclusive jurisdiction of
the Court to promulgate rules concerning the practice of law and admissions thereto.
3. By its plain language, the clause "continuing legal education" under Section 2, par. 2, and
Section 7 (h) of R.A. No. 7662 unduly give the LEB the power to supervise the legal
education of those who are already members of the bar. Inasmuch as the LEB is authorized
to compel mandatory attendance of practicing lawyers in such courses and for such duration
as the LEB deems necessary the same encroaches upon the Court's power to promulgate
rules concerning the Integrated Bar which includes the education of "lawyer-professors" as
teaching of law is practice of law.
4. The Court finds no constitutional conflict between its rule-making power and the power of
the LEB to prescribe the minimum standards for law admission under Section 7 (e) of R.A.
No. 7662.Consequently, the PhiLSAT, which intends to regulate admission to law schools,
cannot be voided on this ground. This provision of the law embodies reasonable supervision
and regulation. Emphatically, the law allows the LEB to prescribe only the minimum
standards and it did not, in any way, impose that the minimum standard for law admission
should be by way of an exclusionary and qualifying exam nor did it prevent law schools from
imposing their respective admission requirements.

The issue on whether the exercise of such power, through the PhiLSAT, was
reasonable based on grounds presented by the petitioners are not only conclusions of fact
which beg the presentation of competent evidence, but also necessarily go into the wisdom
of the PhiLSAT which the Court cannot inquire into. These grounds include the following:
that it is not a conclusive proof of the student's aptitude; it entails unreasonable
examination and travel expenses and burdensome documentary requirements; applying for
PhiLSAT exemption is inconvenient; it is redundant to existing law school entrance exams;
and it is not supported by scientific study.

The avowed purpose of the PhiLSAT is to improve the quality of legal education by
evaluating and screening applicants to law school. As elucidated, the State has an interest in
improving the quality of legal education for the protection of the community at-large, and
requiring an entrance test is reasonably related to that interest. In other words, the State
has the power and the prerogative to impose a standardized test prior to entering law
school, in the same manner and extent that the State can do so in medical school when it
prescribed the NMAT (as in the case of Tablarin).In all, the Court finds no constitutional
conflict between the Court's rule-making power concerning admissions to the practice of
law and on the LEB's power to prescribe minimum standards for law admission under
Section 7 (e) of R.A. No. 7662.Further, pursuant to its power under Section 7 (e), the Court
arms the LEB's authority to initiate and administer an aptitude test, such as the PhiLSAT, as
a minimum standard for law admission. Thus, the PhiLSAT, insofar as it functions as an
aptitude exam that measures the academic potential of the examinee to pursue the study
of law to the end that the quality of legal education is improved is not per se
unconstitutional.
LEB's Powers vis-à-vis Institutional Academic Freedom and the Right to Education
1. PhilSAT
In mandating the passing score of 55% in the PhilSAT, it actually usurps the right of the
school to determine for itself the criteria for the admission of the students. The law schools
are left with absolutely no discretion to choose its students at the first instance and in
accordance with its own policies, but are dictated to surrender such discretion in favor of a
State-determined pool of applicants, under pain of administrative sanctions and/or
payment of fines. Mandating law schools to reject applicants who failed to reach the
prescribed PhiLSAT passing score or those with expired PhiLSAT eligibility transfers
complete control over admission policies from the law schools to the LEB.
With the conclusion that the PhiLSAT, when administered as an aptitude test, passes
the test of reasonableness, there is no reason to strike down the PhiLSAT in its entirety.
Instead, the Court takes a calibrated approach and partially nullifies LEBMO No. 7-2016
insofar as it absolutely prescribes the passing of the PhiLSAT and the taking thereof within
two years as a prerequisite for admission to any law school which, on its face, run directly
counter to institutional academic freedom. Unlike the PhiLSAT score, the NMAT score is not
the sole determining factor on whether or not an examinee may be admitted to medical
school. The NMAT score is only meant to be one of the bases for evaluating applicants for
admission to the college of medicine. In contrast, the PhiLSAT score itself determines
whether an applicant may be admitted to law school or not, the PhiLSAT being strictly a
pass or fail exam. It excludes those who failed to reach the prescribed cut-off score from
being admitted to any law school. It qualifies admission to law school not otherwise
imposed by the schools themselves. The PhiLSAT, as presently crafted, employs a
totalitarian scheme in terms of student admissions. This leaves the consequent actions of
the applicant-student and the school solely dependent upon the results of the PhiLSAT.
The constitutionality of the PhiLSAT, moreover, cannot be voided on the ground that it
violates the right to education as stated under Section 1, Article XIV of the Constitution
because the PhiLSAT is a minimum admission standard that is rationally related to the
interest of the State to improve the quality of legal education and, accordingly, to protect
the general community.
The rest of LEBMO No. 7-2016, being free from any taint of unconstitutionality, should
remain in force and effect, especially in view of the separability clause therein contained.

2. Other LEB Issuances

LEB Issuances relating to pre-requisites to admission to law school, Ll. B or JD Program
and Graduate Programs of Law similarly encroach upon the law school's freedom to
determine for itself its admission policies. It affects a law school's admission policies leaving
the latter totally without the full discretion to admit applicants who do not comply with
these requirements.
3. Minimum qualification on faculty members
The masters degree required of law faculty members and dean, and the doctoral degree
required of a dean of a graduate school of law are, in fact, minimum reasonable requirements.
However, it is the manner by which the LEB had exercised this power through its various
issuances that prove to be unreasonable. In this regard, the LEB is actually assessing the
teaching performance of faculty members and when such is determined by the LEB as
 constituting gross incompetence, the LEB may mete out penalties, thus, usurping the law
school's right to determine for itself the competence of its faculty members.
4. Section 2, par. 2 and Section7 (g) on legal apprenticeship and legal internship
The manner by which LEB exercised the power to require apprenticeship through several of its
issuances undoubtedly show that the LEB controls and dictates upon law schools on
how such apprenticeship and internship programs should be undertaken.

CONCLUSION

WHEREFORE, the petitions are PARTLY GRANTED. The jurisdiction of the Legal Education Board over legal
education is UPHELD.

The Court further declared:

As CONSTITUTIONAL:

1. Section 7 (c) of R.A. No. 7662 insofar as it gives the Legal Education Board the power to set the
standards of accreditation for law schools taking into account, among others, the qualifications of the
members of the faculty without encroaching upon the academic freedom of institutions of higher
learning; and

2. Section 7 (e) of R.A. No. 7662 insofar as it gives the Legal Education Board the power to prescribe the
minimum requirements for admission to legal education and minimum qualifications of faculty members
without encroaching upon the academic freedom of institutions of higher learning.

As UNCONSTITUTIONAL for encroaching upon the power of the Court:

1. Section 2, par. 2 of R.A. No. 7662 insofar as it unduly includes "continuing legal education" as an
aspect of legal education which is made subject to Executive supervision and control;

2. Section 3 (a) (2) of R.A. No. 7662 and Section 7 (2) of LEBMO No. 1-2011 on the objective of legal
education to increase awareness among members of the legal profession of the needs of the poor,
deprived and oppressed sectors of society;

3. Section 7 (g) of R.A. No. 7662 and Section 11 (g) of LEBMO No. 1-2011 insofar as it gives the Legal
Education Board the power to establish a law practice internship as a requirement for taking the Bar;
and

4. Section 7 (h) of R.A. No. 7662 and Section 11 (h) of LEBMO No. 1-2011 insofar as it gives the Legal
Education Board the power to adopt a system of mandatory continuing legal education and to provide
for the mandatory attendance of practicing lawyers in such courses and for such duration as it may
deem necessary.

As UNCONSTITUTIONAL for being ultra vires:

1. The act and practice of the Legal Education Board of excluding, restricting, and qualifying admissions
to law schools in violation of the institutional academic freedom on who to admit, particularly:
a. Paragraph 9 of LEBMO No. 7-2016 which provides that all college graduates or graduating students
applying for admission to the basic law course shall be required to pass the PhiLSAT as a requirement for
admission to any law school in the Philippines and that no applicant shall be admitted for enrollment as
a first year student in the basic law courses leading to a degree of either Bachelor of Laws or Juris Doctor
unless he/she has passed the PhiLSAT taken within two years before the start of studies for the basic law
course;

b. LEBMC No. 18-2018 which prescribes the passing of the PhiLSAT as a prerequisite for admission to law
schools; Accordingly, the temporary restraining order issued on March 12, 2019 enjoining the Legal
Education Board from implementing LEBMC No. 18-2018 is made PERMANENT. The regular admission of
students who were conditionally admitted and enrolled is left to the discretion of the law schools in the
exercise of their academic freedom; and

c. Sections 15, 16, and 17 of LEBMO No. 1-2011.

2. The act and practice of the Legal Education Board of dictating the qualifications and classification of
faculty members, dean, and dean of graduate schools of law in violation of institutional academic
freedom on who may teach, particularly:

a. Sections 41.2 (d), 50, 51, and 52 of LEBMO No. 1-2011;

b. Resolution No. 2014-02;

c. Sections 31 (2), 33, 34, and 35 of LEBMO No. 2;

d. LEBMO No. 17-2018; and

3. The act and practice of the Legal Education Board of dictating the policies on the establishment of
legal apprenticeship and legal internship programs in violation of institutional academic freedom on
what to teach, particularly:

a. Resolution No. 2015-08;

b. Section 24 (c) of LEBMO No. 2; and
c. Section 59 (d) of LEBMO No. 1-2011.