Bailon Casilao V Ca

9/5/2020 CentralBooks:Reader
738 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Bailon-Casilao vs. Court of Appeals
*
No. L-78178. April 15, 1988.
DELIA BAILON-CASILAO, LUZ PAULINO-ANG, EMMA PAULINO-

YBANEZ, NILDA PAULINO-TOLENTINO, and SABINA BAILON,
petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and CELESTINO
AFABLE, respondents.
Civil Law; Property; Sale; Co-ownership; Even if a co-owner sells the whole property

as his, the sale will affect only his own share but not those of the other co-owners who did
not consent to the sale; Reason.— As early as 1923, this Court has ruled that even if a co-
owner sells the whole property as his, the sale will affect only his own share but not
those of the other co-owners who did not consent to the sale [Punsalan v. Boon Liat, 44
Phil. 320 (1923)]. This is because under the aforementioned codal provision, the sale or
other disposition affects only his undivided share and the transferee gets only what
would correspond to his grantor in the partition of the things owned in common
[Ramirez v. Bautista, 14 Phil. 528 (1909)]. Consequently, by virtue of the sales made by
Rosalia and Gaudencio Bailon which are valid with respect to their proportionate
shares, and the subsequent transfers which culminated in the sale to private respondent
Celestino Afable, the said Afable thereby became a co-owner of the disputed parcel of
land as correctly held by the lower court since the sales produced the effect of
substituting the buyers in the enjoyment thereof [Mainit v. Bandoy, 14 Phil. 730 (1910)].
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Sale of the entire property by one co-owner without
the consent of the other co-owners is not null and void; Proper action is the division of the
common property.—From the foregoing, it may be deduced that since a co-owner is
entitled to sell his undivided share, a sale of the entire property by one co-owner without
the consent of the other co-owners is not null and void. However, only the rights of the
co-owner-seller are transferred, thereby making the buyer a co-owner of the property.
The proper action in cases like this is not for the nullification of the sale or for the
recovery of possession of the thing owned in common from the third person who
substituted the co-owner or co-owners who alienated their shares, but the DIVISION of
the common property as if it continued to remain in the possession of the co-owners who
possessed and administered it [Mainit v. Bandoy, supra.].
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Partition; The appropriate recourse of the co-
owners who did not consent to the sale of the entire
________________
* THlRD DIVISION.
739
www.central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/000001745c61c423fc617fe3003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False 1/12
VOL. 160, APRIL 15, 1988 739
property and the sale of the undivided shares of some of the co-owners is partition.—
Thus, it is now settled that the appropriate recourse of coowners in cases where their
consent were not secured in a sale of the entire property as well as in a sale merely of
the undivided shares of some of the co-owners is an action for PARTITION under Rule
69 of the Revised Rules of Court. Neither recovery of possession nor restitution can be
granted since the defendant buyers are legitimate proprietors and possessors in joint
ownership of the common property claimed [Ramirez V. Bautista, supra].
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Prescription; Interpretation; Article 494 of the
Civil Code on co-ownership, means that the action for partition is imprescriptible and
cannot be barred by prescription.—In the light of the attendant circumstances,
defendant-appellee’s defense of prescription is a vain proposition. Pursuant to Article
494 of the Civil Code, "(n)o co-owner shall be obliged to remain in the co-ownership.
Such co-owner may demand at anytime the partition of the thing owned in common,
insofar as his share is concerned.” In Budlong v. Bondoc [G.R. No. L-27702, September
9, 1977, 79 SCRA 24], this Court has interpreted said provision of law to mean that the
action for partition is imprescriptible or cannot be barred by prescription. For Article
494 of the Civil Code explicitly declares: “No prescription shall lie in favor of a co-owner
or co-heir so long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership.”
Same; Same; Same; Land Registration; Prescription will not lie in favor of the
respondent as against the petitioners who remain the registered owners of the disputed
parcel of fancL—Furthermore, the disputed parcel of land being registered under the
Torrena System, the express provision of Act No. 496 that "(n)o title to registered land
in derogation to that of the registered owner shall be acquired by prescription or adverse
possession” is squarely applicable. Consequently, prescription will not lie in favor of
Afable as against the petitioners who remain the registered owners of the disputed
parcel of land.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Prescription is unavailing not only against the registered
owner but also equally against the latter’s hereditary successors; Reason: Pasion vs.
Pasion case, not applicable.— Reliance on the aforesaid Pasion case is futile. The ruling
therein applies only against transferees other than direct issues or heirs or to complete
strangers. The rationale is dear: If prescription is unavailing against the registered
owner, it must be equally unavailing against the latter’s hereditary successors, because
they merely step into the shoes of the decedent by operation of law (New Civil Code,
740
740 SUPREME COURT REPORTS

ANNOTATED
Article 777; Old Civil Code, Article 657), the title or right undergoing no change by
its transmission mortis causa. [Atus, et al., v. Nuñez, et al., 97 Phil. 762, 764].
Same; Same; Same; Same; Laches; Basic requirements oflaches.— Well-settled in
this jurisdiction are the four basic elements of laches, namely: (1) conduct on the part of
the defendant or of one under whom he claims, giving rise to the situation of which
complaint is made and for which the complainant seeks a remedy; (2) delay in asserting
the complainant’s rights, the complainant having had knowledge or notice of the
defendant’s conduct and having been afforded an opportunity to institute suit; (3) lack of
knowledge or notice on the part of the defendant that the complainant would assert the
right on which he bases his suit; and (4) injury or prejudice to the defendant in the event
relief is accorded to the complainant, or the suit is not held to be barred [Go Chi Gun, et
al. v. Co Cho, et al., 96 Phil. 622 (1955)].
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Mere fact of delay in asserting a right is
insufficient to constitute laches; Requirement to constitute laches; Laches is not concerned
with mere lapse of time.—The second element speaks of delay in asserting the
complainant’s rights. However, the mere fact of delay is insufficient to constitute laches.
It is required that (1) complainant must have had knowledge of the conduct of defendant
or of one under whom he claims and (2) he muBt have been afforded an opportunity to
institute suit. This court has pointed out that laches is not concerned with the mere
lapse of time.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Concept of laches.—Laches has been defined as the
failure or neglect, for an unreasonable length of time to do that which by exercising due
diligence could or should have been done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a
right within a reasonsable time warranting a presumption that the party entitled to
assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it. [Tijam, et al., v. Sibonghanoy,
G.R, No. L-21450, April 25,1968, 23 SCRA 29, 35; Tejido v. Zamacoma, G.R. No. L-
63048, August 7,1985,138 SCRA 78, 901.
Same; Same; Same; Same; While there was delay of petitioners in asserting their
rights, such delay was not attended with any knowledge of the sale nor with any
opportunity to bring suit.—It must be noted that while there was delay in asserting
petitioners’ rights, such delay was not attended with any knowledge of the sale nor with
any opportunity to bring suit. In the first place, petitioners had no notice of the sale
made by their eldest sister. It is undisputed that the petitioner coowners had entrusted
the care and management of the parcel of land to Rosalia Bailon who was the oldest
among them [TSN, July 27,1983,
741
VOL. 160, APRIL 15, 1988 741
p. 14]. In fact, Nicanor Lee, a son of Rosalia, who was presented as a witness by the
plaintiffs-petitioners, testified on cross-examination that his mother was only the
administrator of the land as she is the eldest and her brothers and sisters were away
[TSN, October 5,1983, p. 15]. Indeed, when Delia Bailon-Casilao left Sorsogon in 1942
after she got married, it was only in 1981 that she returned. Sabina, on the other hand,
is said to be living in Zamboanga while Bernabe who left for China in 1931 has not been
heard from since then. Consequently, when Rosalia, from whom the private respondent
derived his title, made the disputed sales covering the entire property, the herein
petitioners were unaware thereof
Same; Same; Same; Same; Laches may not be asserted against the petitioners due to
lack of knowledge by petitioners of the conduct of the vendor co-owner in selling the land
and the absence of opportunity to institute the proper action.—In view of the lack of
knowledge by the petitioners of the conduct of Rosalia in selling the land without their
consent in 1975 and the absence of any opportunity to institute the proper action until
1981, laches may not be asserted against the petitioners.
Same; Same;Same; Same; Private respondent is guilty of bad faith in purchasing the
property as there are only two signatories to the deed out of six co-owners and the absence
of special authorization to sell was granted to the two sellers by the other co-owners.—
The third element of laches is likewise absent. There was no lack of knowledge or notice
on the part of the defendant that the complainants would assert the right on which they
base the suit. On the contrary, private respondent is guilty of bad faith in purchasing
the property as he knew that the property was co-owned by six persons and yet, there
were only two signatories to the deeds of sale and no special authorization to sell was
granted to the two sellers by the other co-owners.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Private respondent already had notice that the land was
titled in the name of the six persons by virtue of the certificate of title in his possession.—
Even as the land here was misrepresented in the deeds of sale as “unregistered”, the
truth was that Afable already had notice that the land was titled in the name of six
persons by virtue of the Certificate of Title which was already in his possession even
before the sale. Such fact is apparent from his testimony before the court a quo.
Same; Same; Same; Same; A person dealing with registered land has the right to
rely upon the face of the Torrens certificate of title and to dispense with the need of
inquiring further; Exeeption.—Such actual
742
742 SUPREME COURT REPORTS

ANNOTATED
knowledge of the existence of other co-owners in whose names the lot subject of the
sale was registered should have prompted a searching inquiry by Afable considering the
well-known rule in this jurisdiction that: . . . a person dealing with a registered land has
a right to rely upon the face of the Torrens certificate of title and to dispense with the
need of inquiring further, except when the party concerned has actual knowledge of
facts and circumstances that would impel a reasonably cautious man to make such
inquiry. [Gonzales v. IAC and Rural Bank of Pavia, Inc., G.R. No. 69622 January
29,1988].
Same; Same; Same; Same; For failure of private respondent to exercise even a
minimum degree of ordinary prudence, he is deemed to have bought the lot at his own
risk.—Moreover, the undisputed fact is that petitioners are relatives of his wife. As a
genuine gesture of good faith, he should have contacted the petitioners who were still
listed as co-owners in the certificate of title which was already in his possession even
before the sale. In failing to exercise even a minimum degree of ordinary prudence
required by the situation, he is deemed to have bought the lot at his own risk. Hence
any prejudice or injury that may be occasioned to him by such sale must be borne by
him.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Private respondent is not a buyer in good faith; Laches,
being an equitable defense, he who invokes it must come to court with clean hands.—It
may be gleaned from the foregoing examination of the facts that Celestino Afable is not
a buyer in good faith. Laches being an equitable defense, he who invokes it must come to
court with clean hands.
PETITION for certiorari to review the decision of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

Veronico E. Rubio for petitioners.
Mario G. Fortes for private-respondent.
CORTES, J.:
The fate of petitioners’ claim over a parcel of land rests ultimately on a

determination of whether or not said petitioners are chargeable with such
laches as may effectively bar their present action.
The petitioners herein filed a case for recovery of property and damages with
notice of lis pendens on March 13, 1981 against the defendant and herein
private respondent, Celestino Afable. The parcel of land involved in this case,
with an area of
743
VOL. 160, APRIL 15, 1988 743

48,849 square meters, is covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 1771

issued on June 12, 1931, in the names of Rosalia, Gaudencio, Sabina, Bernabe,
Nenita and Delia, all surnamed Bailon, as co-owners, each with a 1/6 share.
Gaudencio and Nenita are now dead, the latter being represented in this case
by her children. Luz, Emma and Nilda. Bernabe went to China in 1931 and had
not been heard from since then [Decision of the Court of Appeals, Rollo, p. 39],
It appears that on August 23, 1948, Rosalia Bailon and Gaudencio Bailon
sold a portion of the said land consisting of 16,283 square meters to Donato
Delgado. On May 13, 1949, Rosalia Bailon alone sold the remainder of the land
consisting of 32,566 square meters to Ponciana V. Aresgado de Lanuza. On the
same date, Lanuza acquired from Delgado the 16,283 square meters of land
which the latter had earlier acquired from Rosalia and Gaudencio. On
December 3, 1975, John Lanuza, acting under a special power of attorney given
by his wife, Ponciana V. Aresgado de Lanuza, sold the two parcels of land to
Celestino Afable, Sr.
In all these transfers, it was stated in the deeds of sale that the land was not
registered under the provisions of Act No. 496 when the fact is that it is, It
appears that said land had been successively declared for taxation first, in the
name of Ciriaca Dellamas, mother of the registered co-owners, then in the
name of Rosalia Bailon in 1924, then in that of Donato Delgado in 1936, then in
Ponciana de Lanuza’s name in 1962 and finally in the name of Celestino
Afable, Sr. in 1983.
In his answer to the complaint filed by the herein petitioners, Afable claimed
that he had acquired the land in question through prescription and contended
that the petitioners were guilty of laches. He later filed a third-party complaint
against Rosalia Bailon for damages allegedly suffered as a result of the sale to
him of the land.
After trial, the lower court rendered a decision:
1. Finding and declaring Celestino Afable, a co-owner of the land

described in paragraph III of the complaint having validly bought the
two-sixth (2/6) respective undivided shares of Rosalia Bailon and
Gaudencio Bailon;
2. Finding and declaring the following as pro-indiviso co-owners, having
1/6 share each, of the property described in paragraph III of the
complaint. to wit:
744

a. Sabina Bailon
b. Bernabe Bailon
c. Heirs of Nenita Bailon-Paulino
d. Delia Bailon-Casilao;
3. Ordering the segregation of the undivided interests in the property in

order to terminate co-ownership to be conducted by any Geodetic
Engineer selected by the parties to delineate the specific part of each of
the co-owners.
4. Ordering the defendant to restore the possession of the plaintiff ‘s
respective shares as well as all attributes of absolute dominion;
5. Ordering the defendant to pay the following:
a. P5,000.00 as damages;
b. P2,000.00 as attorney’s fees and;
c. to pay the costs.
[Decision of the Trial Court, Rollo, p. 37–38].
On appeal, the respondent Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the lower
court insofar as it held that prescription does not lie against plaintiffs-appellees
because they are co-owners of the original vendors. However, the appellate
court declared that, although registered property cannot be lost by prescription,
nevertheless, an action to recover it may be barred by laches, citing the ruling
in Mejia de Lucaz v, Gamponia[100 Phil. 277 (1956)]. Accordingly, it held the
petitioners guilty of laches and dismissed their complaint. Hence, this petition
for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals.
The principal issue to be resolved in this case concerns the applicability of
the equitable doctrine of laches. Initially though, a determination of the effect
of a sale by one or more coowners of the entire property held in common
without the consent of all the co-owners and of the appropriate remedy of the
aggrieved co-owners is required.
The rights of a co-owner of a certain property are clearly specified in Article
493 of the Civil Code. Thus:
Art 493, Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his partand of the fruits and
benefits pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it and
even substitute another person in its enjoyment, except when personal rights are
involved. But the effect of the alienation or mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall
be limited to the portion which may be allotted to him in the division upon the
termination of the co-ownership. [Italics supplied.]
745
VOL. 160, APRIL 15, 1988 745

As early as 1923, this Court has ruled that even if a co-owner sells the whole
property as his, the sale will affect only his own share but not those of the other
co-owners who did not consent to the sale [Punsalan v. Boon Liat, 44 PhU. 320
(1923)]. This is because under the aforementioned codal provision, the sale or
other disposition affects only his undivided share and the transferee gets only
what would correspond to his grantor in the partition of the thing owned in
common. [Ramirez v. Bautista, 14 Phil. 528 (1909)]. Consequently, by virtue of
the sales made by Rosalia and Gaudencio Bailon which are valid with respect
to their proportionate shares, and the subsequent transfers which culminated
in the sale to private respondent Celestino Afable, the said Afable thereby
became a co-owner of the disputed parcel of land as correctly held by the lower
court since the sales produced the effect of substituting the buyers in the
enjoyment thereof [Mainit v. Bandoy, 14 Phil. 730 (1910)].
From the foregoing, it may be deduced that since a co-owner is entitled to
sell his undivided share, a sale of the entire property by one co-owner without
the consent of the other coowners is not null and void. However, only the rights
of the coowner-seller are transferred, thereby making the buyer a coowner of
the property.
The proper action in cases like this is not for the nullification of the sale or for
the recovery of possession of the thing owned in common from the third person
who substituted the co-owner or co-owners who alienated their shares, but the
DIVISION of the common property as if it continued to remain in the possession
of the co-owners who possessed and administered it [Mainit v. Bandoy, supra.]
Tkus, it is now settled that the appropriate recourse of coowners in cases
where their consent were not secured in a sale of the entire property as well as
in a sale merely of the undivided shares of some of the co-owners is an action
for PARTITION under Rule 69 of the Revised Rules of Court. Neither recovery
of possession nor restitution can be granted since the defendant buyers are
legitimate proprietors and possessors in joint ownership of the common
property claimed [Ramirez v. Bautista, supra].
As to the action for petition, neither prescription nor laches can be invoked.
746

In the light of the attendant circumstances, defendantappellee’s defense of

prescription is a vain proposition. Pursuant to Article 494 of the Civil Code, "
(n)o co-owner shall be obliged to remain in the co-ownership. Such co-
owner may demand at anytime the partition of the thing owned in
common, insofar as his share is concerned.” [Italics supplied.] In Budlong v.
Bondoc [G.R. No. L-27702, September 9,1977, 79 SCRA 24], this Court has
interpreted said provision of law to mean that the action for partition is
imprescriptible or cannot be barred by prescription. For Article 494 of the Civil
Code explicitly declares: “No prescription shall lie in favor of a co-owner or co-
heir so long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership.”
Furthermore, the disputed parcel of land being registered under the Torrens
System, the express provision of Act No. 496 that "(n)o title to registered land
in derogation to that of the registered owner shall be acquired by prescription
or adverse possession” is squarely applicable. Consequently, prescription will
not lie in favor of Afable as against the petitioners who remain the registered
owners of the disputed parcel of land.
It is argued however, that as to the petitioners Emma, Luz and Nelda who
are not the registered co-owners but merely represented their deceased mother,
the late Nenita Bailon, prescription lies. Respondents bolster their argument
by citing a decision of this Court in Pasion v. Pasion [G.R. No. L-15757, May
31,1961, 2 SCRA 486, 489] holding that “the imprescriptibility of a Torrens title
can only be invoked by the person in whose name the title is registered” and
that “one who is not the registered owner of a parcel of land cannot invoke
imprescriptibility of action to claim the same.”
Reliance on the aforesaid Pasion case is futile. The ruling therein applies
only against transferees other than direct issues or heirs or to complete
strangers. The rational is clear:
If prescription is unavailing against the registered owner, it must be equally unavailing
against the latter’s hereditary successors, because they merely step into the shoes of the
decedent by operation of law (New Civil Code, Article 777; Old Civil Code, Article 657),
the title or right undergoing no change by its transmission mortis causa. [Atus, et al., v.
Nuñez, et al., 97 Phil. 762, 764].
747
VOL. 160, APRIL 15, 1988 747

The latest pronouncement of this Court in Umbay v. Alecha[G.R. No. 67284,
March 18, 1985, 135 SCRA 427, 429], which was promulgated subsequent to
the Pasion case reiterated the Atus doctrine. Thus:
Prescription is unavailing not only against the registered owner but also against his
hereditary successors, because they merely step ino the shoes of the decedent by
operation of law and are merely the continuation of the personality of their predecessor-
in-interest. [Barcelona v. Barcelona, 100 Phil. 251, 257].
Laches is likewise unavailing as a shield against the action of herein

petitioners.
Well-stated in this jurisdiction are the four basic elements of laches, namely:
(1) conduct on the part of the defendant or of one under whom he claims, giving
rise to the situation of which complaint is made and for which the complainant
seeks a remedy; (2) delay in asserting the complainant’s rights, the
complainant having had knowledge or notice of the defendant’s conduct and
having been afforded an opportunity to institute suit; (3) lack of knowledge or
notice on the part of the defendant that the complainant would assert the right
on which he bases his suit; and, (4) injury or prejudice to the defendant in the
event relief is accorded to the complainant, or the suit is not held to be barred
[Go Chi Gun, et al. v. Co Cho, et aL,96 Phil. 622 (1955)].
While the first and last elements are present in this case, the second and
third elements are missing.
The second element speaks of delay in asserting the complainant’s rights.
However, the mere fact of delay is insufficient to constitute. laches. It is
required that (1) complainant must have had knowledge of the conduct of
defendant or of one under whom he claims and (2) he must have been afforded
an opportunity to institute suit. This court has pointed out that laches is not
concerned with the mere lapse of time. Thus:
Laches has been defined as the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable length of time to
do that which by exercising due diligence could or should have been done earlier; it is
negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time warranting a
presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to
assert it. [Tijam, et al., v. Sibonghanoy, G.R. No. L-21450, April 25,1968, 23
748

SCRA 29, 35; Tejido v. Zamacoma, G.R. No. L-63048, August 7, 1985, 138 SCRA 78, 90].
The doctrine of ‘laches’ or of ‘stale demands’ is based upon grounds of public policy
which requires for the peace of society, the discouragement of stale claims and unlike
the statute of limitations, is not a mere question of time but is principally a question of
inequity or unfairness of permitting a right or claim to be enforced or asserted,” [Tijam
v. Sibonghanoy, supra, p. 35]. [Italics supplied.]
It must be noted that while there was delay in asserting petitioners’ rights,
such delay was not attended with any knowledge of the sale nor with any
opportunity to bring suit. In the first place, petitioners had no notice of the sale
made by their eldest sister. It is undisputed that the petitioner co-owners had
entrusted the care and management of the parcel of land to Rosalia Bailon who
was the oldest among them [TSN, July 27, 1983, p. 14]. In fact, Nicanor Lee, a
son of Rosalia, who was presented as a witness by the plaintiffs-petitioners,
testified on cross-examination that his mother was only the administrator of
the land as she is the eldest and her brothers and sisters were away [TSN,
October 5, 1983, p. 15]. Indeed, when Delia Bailon-Casilao left Sorsogon in
1942 after she got married, it was only in 1983 that she returned. Sabina, on
the other hand, is said to be living in Zamboanga while Bernabe who left for
China in 1931 has not been heard from since then. Consequently, when
Rosalia, from whom the private respondent derived his title, made the disputed
sales covering the entire property, the herein petitioners were unaware thereof.
In the second place, they were not afforded an opportunity to bring suit
inasmuch as until 1981, they were kept in the dark about the transactions
entered into by their sister. It was only when Delia Bailon-Casilao returned to
Sorsogon in 1981 that she found out about the sales and immediately, she and
her copetitioners filed the present action for recovery of property. The appellate
court thus erred in holding that “the petitioners did nothing to show interest in
the land.” For the administration of the parcel of land was entrusted to the
oldest co-owner who was then in possession thereof precisely because the other
co-owners cannot attend to such a task as they reside outside of Sorsogon
where the land is situated. Her co-owners also allowed her to appropriate the
entire produce for herself because
749
VOL. 160, APRIL 15, 1988 749

it was not even enough for her daily consumption [TSN, October 5,1983, pp.
17–18]. And since petitioner was the one receiving the produce, it is but natural
that she was the one to take charge of paying the real estate taxes. Now, if
knowledge of the sale by Rosalia was conveyed to the petitioners only later,
they cannot be faulted for the acts of their co-owner who failed to live up to the
trust and confidence expected of her. In view of the lack of knowledge by the
petitioners of the conduct of Rosalia in selling the land without their consent in
1975 and the absence of any opportunity to institute the proper action until
1981, laches may not be asserted against the petitioners.
The third element of laches is likewise absent. There was no lack of
knowledge or notice on the part of the defendant that the complainants would
assert the right on which they base the suit. On the contrary, private
respondent is guilty of bad faith in purchasing the property as he knew that the
property was co-owned by six persons and yet, there were only two signatories
to the deeds of sale and no special authorization to sell was granted to the two
sellers by the other co-owners.
Even as the land here was misrepresented in the deeds of sale as
“unregistered,” the truth was that Afable already had notice that the land was
titled in the name of six persons by virtue of the Certificate of Title which was
already in his possession even before the sale. Such fact is apparent from his
testimony before the court a quo:
COURT:
Q: From whom did you get the certificate ofTitle?
A: When it was mortgaged by Ponciana Aresgado.
Q: It was mortgaged to you before you bought it?
A: Yes, Your Honor. (TSN, March 5,1984, p. 12)
When crossexamined, he stated:
Q: Mr. Witness, the original Certificate of Title was

given to you in the year 1974, was it not?
A: 1975.
Q: In 1975, you already discovered that the title was
in the name of several persons, is it not?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: When you discovered that it is in the name of
several persons, you filed a case in court for
authority to cancel the title to be transferred in
your name, is it not?
A: Yes, sir.
750

Bailon-Casilao vs..Court of Appeals
Q: And that was denied by the Court of First

Instance of Sorsogon because there was only one
signatory to the deed of sale instead of six, was it
not?
A: Not one but two signatories.
[Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Sorsogon,
Rollo, p. 35]
Such actual knowledge of the existence of other co-owners in whose names the
lot subject of the sale was registered should have prompted a searching inquiry
by Afable considering the well-known rule in this jurisdiction that:
... a person dealing with a registered land has a right to rely upon the face of the
Torrena certificate of title and to dispenBe with the need of inquiring further, except
when the party concerned has actual knowledge of facts and circumstances that would
impel a reasonably cautious man to make such inquiry. [Gonzales v. IAC and Rural
Bank of Pavia, Inc., G.R. No. 69622, January 29,1988].
Moreover, the undisputed fact is that petitioners are relatives of his wife. As a
genuine gesture of good faith, he should have contacted the petitioners who
were still listed as coowners in the certificate of title which was already in his
possession even before the sale. In failing to exercise even a minimum degree of
ordinary prudence required by the situation, he is deemed to have bought the
lot at his own risk. Hence any prejudice or injury that may be occasioned to
him by such sale must be borne by him.
Indeed, aware of the flaws impairing his title, Afable went to the herein
petitioner Delia Bailon-Casilao, asking the latter to sign a document obviously
to cure the flaw [TSN, July 27,1983, p. 6]. Later, he even filed a petition in the
Court of First Instance to register the title in his name which was denied as
aforesaid.
It may be gleaned from the foregoing examination of the facts that Celestino
Afable is not a buyer in good faith. Laches being an equitable defense, he who
invokes it must come to the court with clean hands.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is hereby GRANTED, the
challenged decision of the Court of Appeals is SET ASIDE, and the decision of
the trial court is REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
751
VOL. 160, APRIL 15, 1988 751

Palma-Fernandez vs. De la Paz
Fernan, Gutierrez, Jr.. Feliciano and Bidin, JJ., concur.
Petition granted. Decision set aside.
——o0o——
© Copyright 2020 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved.

Bailon Casilao V Ca

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Bailon Casilao V Ca

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Bailon Casilao V Ca

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

9/5/2020 CentralBooks:Reader

738 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

DELIA BAILON-CASILAO, LUZ PAULINO-ANG, EMMA PAULINO-

Civil Law; Property; Sale; Co-ownership; Even if a co-owner sells the whole property

VOL. 160, APRIL 15, 1988 739

Bailon-Casilao vs. Court of Appeals

740 SUPREME COURT REPORTS

Bailon-Casilao vs. Court of Appeals

VOL. 160, APRIL 15, 1988 741

Bailon-Casilao vs. Court of Appeals

742 SUPREME COURT REPORTS

Bailon-Casilao vs. Court of Appeals

PETITION for certiorari to review the decision of the Court of Appeals.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

The fate of petitioners’ claim over a parcel of land rests ultimately on a

VOL. 160, APRIL 15, 1988 743

48,849 square meters, is covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 1771

1. Finding and declaring Celestino Afable, a co-owner of the land

744 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

3. Ordering the segregation of the undivided interests in the property in

[Decision of the Trial Court, Rollo, p. 37–38].

VOL. 160, APRIL 15, 1988 745

746 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

In the light of the attendant circumstances, defendantappellee’s defense of

VOL. 160, APRIL 15, 1988 747

Laches is likewise unavailing as a shield against the action of herein

748 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

VOL. 160, APRIL 15, 1988 749

Q: Mr. Witness, the original Certificate of Title was

750 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Q: And that was denied by the Court of First

VOL. 160, APRIL 15, 1988 751

Fernan, Gutierrez, Jr.. Feliciano and Bidin, JJ., concur.

Petition granted. Decision set aside.

© Copyright 2020 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved.

You might also like