2 George Wise Science and Technology
2 George Wise Science and Technology
2 George Wise Science and Technology
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Science and Technology
By George Wise*
have rejected it, but not yet replaced it. They have created some of the pieces
for a new model. But ratherthan buildingthat new model, they have put forward
metaphors depicting science and technology as mirror-imagetwins, a married
couple, a lemon and lemonade, opposing armies, opposing meteorologicalfronts,
or sovereign states. The key idea behind all the metaphorsis autonomy. Science
and technology are viewed as autonomous with regard to one another, though
far from autonomous with regardto economics, politics, and ideologies. But no
new model for the way these two autonomousenterprisesact on each other has
yet emerged.
"Science" will be used in this review primarilyto mean knowledge about na-
ture, acquired for its own sake, and secondarily to mean the institutions and
people who generate that knowledge. "Technology"will be used primarilyto
mean knowledge about the man-madeworld, generatedfor use, and secondarily
the community of people (including engineers, inventors, scientists, and
craftsmen)who contributeto this knowledge base. This second definition,if gen-
erally accepted, would make the assertion that science provides the knowledge
base for technology meaningless. But the definition is not generally accepted.
More often, technology is used as a synonym for "tools" or as a synonym for
"engineering"and science is used as synonymous with knowledge. This review
will regard the knowledge behind the tools, not the tools, as the essence of
technology.
Instead of examining the alleged dependence of technology on science, a re-
view of the relation between science and technology might have emphasizedthe
communities where technology and science have been generated, such as nine-
teenth-centuryManchester, or twentieth-centuryPalo Alto; the interplayof sci-
ence, technology, and ideology; or the view that distinctions between science
and technology are mere reflections of struggles between people or between
groups for status or supremacy.2The approachpresented here, however, avoids
diffusingthe issue into those more general questions of geography,politics, eco-
nomics, and ideology. The focus is on a relatively narrow and unintendeddia-
logue that has occurred over the past forty years between the championsof the
assembly-line model and the champions of the various autonomy metaphors.
That narrow dialogue discloses a major difference in the way two concerned
groups of Americans, policymakers and historians, have viewed the relation of
science and technology in modern America.
Looking back from the vantage point of 1960, historian John Beer recollected
what everybody had known in 1945. It used to be commonlyaccepted, he wrote,
2 On the study of communities and their role in science and
technology, see, e.g., Arnold
Thackray, "Natural Knowledge in Cultural Context: the Manchester Model," American Historical
Review, 1974, 79:672-710; and Robert Kargon, Science in Victorian Manchester: Enterprise and
Expertise (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 1977). On science as the tool of a business elite,
see David F. Noble, America by Design: Science, Technology, and the Rise of Corporate Capitalism
(New York: Knopf, 1977). On the history of science as a story of groups competing for status and
resources, see Robert E. Kohler, "Foreword: the Interaction of Science and Technology in the
Industrial Age, "Technology and Culture, 1976, 17:621-623; and the development of the ideas in
that brief article in Kohler, From Medical Chemistry to Biochemistry: The Making of a Biomedical
Discipline (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1982).
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 231
that technology was only applied science; that the rate of conversion of science
and technology went in direct proportion to the money spent; and that, because
the way to set up science-invention assembly lines, as exemplified by giant re-
search laboratories, was now understood, the time between discovery and in-
novation was rapidly diminishing.3
But who had commonly accepted these views? Not Beer himself, who pre-
sented them in order to refute them. Not the general public: it largely ignored
differences between science and technology. The "everyone" was a small elite
of leaders, mainly drawn from academic science departments or deans' offices,
who made national science policy. In 1945, that small group wrote a report en-
titled Science, the Endless Frontier, which proclaimed: "New products, new
industries, and more jobs require continuous additions to knowledge of the laws
of nature .... This essential new knowledge can be obtained only through basic
scientific research." "Only" is the key word.4
Vannevar Bush, the report's principal author, was an MIT engineer with
broad experience: he had invented a computer, participated in the creation of
the electronics company Raytheon, and headed the major United States military
research and development organization during World War II, the Office of Sci-
entific Research and Development. He is sometimes saddled with responsibility
for the report's more drastic oversimplifications. But a recent history of the Na-
tional Science Foundation (NSF) suggests that he permitted them reluctantly.
He had hoped that the report would include under the title of research "pi-
oneering efforts of a technical sort," as exemplified by the Wright Brothers. But
he found to his annoyance that the panels drawing up the report did not think
that "a couple of bicycle mechanics working on a flying machine would . . . be
doing research." He hoped briefly that the panels might be enlarged to include
members representing "the rugged type of thing that the Wright brothers ex-
emplified," but he did not push his views, and no endorsement of that type of
research appeared in the report.5
Most members of the science policy elite sided instead with a view expressed
by such academic science leaders as James B. Conant. A student of the history
of science, Conant was willing to concede that "the cut and try empiricism of
practical men" had been important back around 1850. But today, in the mid-
twentieth century, "from the labors of those who were interested only in ad-
vancing science have come the ideas, the discoveries, the new instruments
which have created new industries and transformed old ones." The applied sci-
entist, in Conant's view, inevitably runs into a dead end. "Nine times out of
ten," it is the pure scientist who provides the needed knowledge.6
Bush's dream of a National Research Foundation supporting the work of
modern-day counterparts of everyone from Einstein to the Wright brothers gave
way to a National Science Foundation aimed at supporting Einsteins only
7 Bush, Science, the Endless Frontier (1960), p. xxvi; England, A Patron for Pure Science, p. 152.
8 I. Bernard Cohen, Science, Servant
of Man: A Layman's Primer for the Age of Science (Boston:
Little, Brown, 1948).
9 Kendall Birr, Pioneering in Inditstrial Research: The Story
of the General Electric Research
Laboratory, (Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs Press, 1957).
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 233
only out of, advance in pure science does not provide a full and faithful story
of modern invention."10
These examples show that the historians of the period 1945-1960 by no means
naively accepted the views of the policymakers of their time. Careful reading
by policymakers of this historical literature might have caused them to question
the assembly-line model. There is no evidence, however, that those making sci-
ence policy read that literature, carefully or otherwise.
sponsored by the Materials Advisory Board, set out deliberately to fit case
studies to the assembly line sequence, but found this to be impossible.13 With
their widely varying conclusions, the exercises tended to deepen the suspicion
that the relation between science and technology was more complicated than
any simple model such as the assembly line would suggest. Historians of science
and technology already doubted that technology was merely applied science. As
that view came under increasing attack (though not necessarily because of the
attacks), some historians began to explore alternatives. The essence of those
alternatives can be summed up in the phrase "technology is knowledge."
In part, this argument emerged from detailed studies of specific relationships
between areas of science and technology. Cyril Stanley Smith, a metallurgist
turned historian, found that in the history of materials, science lagged rather
than led technology, well into the twentieth century. Art, rather than science or
economics, drove materials technology: "Almost all inorganic materials and
treatments to modify their structure and properties appear first in decorative
objects rather than in tools or weapons." Only in very recent times, since about
1950, has science begun answering some simple questions about materials: for
example, why you can see through a pane of glass, and why it shatters when
dropped, while you can see your reflection in a sheet of metal, and it stays whole
and rings when dropped. Even answering these questions has rarely led to new
technology. Instead it usually confirms the wisdom of cut-and-try predecessors.
That wisdom was not written down, but it was nevertheless a form of knowl-
edge.14
Other fields showed similar characteristics. As Lynwood Bryant showed,
when inventors tried to apply science to the internal combustion engine, they
found surprises. For example, Rudolf Diesel's engine was intended to be science
based: an embodiment of the Carnot cycle, an ideal sequence of heating, ex-
panding, cooling and contracting a gas aimed at maximizing efficiency. But the
actual invention was shaped by technical realities, rather than a scientific ideal
(specifically, Diesel found it necessary for technical reasons to add heat not at
constant temperature, as in a Carnot cycle, but at a temperature that first rose,
then fell). Again, technology created its own knowledge base, rather than merely
applying scientific knowledge.15
Similarly, late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century electrical technology
proved far more than a simple application of the ideas of Faraday and Maxwell.
Thomas P. Hughes and James Brittain have depicted an engineering community
sophisticated in its theory as well as daring in its experimentation, epitomized
by such figures as Charles P. Steinmetz and Ernst F. W. Alexanderson, who
operated parallel to, and in important ways independently of, the scientific com-
munity.16
13Chalmers W. Sherwin, and Raymond S. Isenson, "Project Hindsight," Science, 1967, 156:1571-
1577; Illinois Institute of Technology Research Institute, Technology in Retrospect and Critical
Events in Science (National Science Foundation contract NSF-C535), 2 vols. (Chicago: IIT Research
Institute, 1968); Materials Advisory Board, Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Principles of the
Research-Engineering Interaction (Washington, D.C.: National Academy of Sciences, 1966).
14 Cyril Stanley Smith, A Search for Structure: Selected Essays on Science, Art, and History
(Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1981).
15Lynwood Bryant "The Role of Thermodynamics in the Evolution of Heat
Engines," Technol.
Cult. 1973, 14:152-165.
16
James E. Brittain, "C. P. Steinmetz and E. F. Alexanderson: Creative Engineering in a Cor-
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 235
porate Setting," Proceedings of the IEEE, 1976, 64:1413-1417; Thomas P. Hughes, Networks of
Power: Electrification in Western Society (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 1983).
17 Jacob
Schmookler, Invention and Economic Growth (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press,
1966).
18
Melvin Kranzberg, "The Disunity of Science-Technology," American Scientist, 1968, 56:21-34;
and Kranzberg, "The Unity of Science-Technology," ibid., 55:48-66.
19Edwin Layton, "Mirror Image Twins: The Communities of Science and Technology in 19th
Century America," Technol. Cult. 1971, 12:562-580; and Layton, "Technology as Knowledge,"
Technol. Cult., 1974, 15:31-41.
236 GEORGE WISE
One reason that the battle against the assembly line has not been completely
won is that its rivals remain metaphors rather than models, and metaphorsare
good stimulantsto thinkingbut unreliabletools for answeringquestions. So far,
historians such as Layton, Kranzberg, and Hughes who have put forward the
view that technology is more than a stepchild of science have not provided an
alternative model that is just as clear as the assembly line and gives a more
realistic depiction of the way science and technology influence each other and
the society that supports them. They and many other historians have shaped
some of the pieces out of which such a model might be made. Those pieces
operate on different levels, and are sometimes far more opaque than the ones
that go to make up the transparent,if incorrect, assembly-linemodel. But they
seem to point the way toward a future synthesis.
The pieces include one that was well defined by 1972, the concept of tech-
nology-as-knowledge,and three others that have emergedsince: the presumptive
anomaly; the balance of momentumand external pressure; and the role of the
research entrepreneur.
Science, Technology, and the Origins of Innovation: The Presumptive Anomaly.
In the assembly-line tradition,linear models explain the origins of innovationby
a pull from society at one end of the line, or a push from science at the other.
But the concept of technology as autonomous suggests that both of these ap-
proaches are inadequate.
Edward Constant's study of the invention of the jet engine provides a new
ington, D.C.: NSF, 1980), p. xii; Leon M. Lederman, "The Value of Fundamental Science," Sci-
entific American (Nov. 1984), 251(11):40-47.
23George Keyworth, "Four Years of Reagan Science Policy," Science, 1984, 224:9-13.
24 Lewis M.
Branscomb, "Engineering and the National Science Foundation," Science, 1984,
224:10.
238 GEORGE WISE
of electric power systems in terms of first technological and then business com-
munities solving their immediate problems. Inventors with a vision of systems
get the jump on inventors who see only components. Those inventors and their
business partners transfer technology across oceans; the modern light bulb
moves east, the transformer moves west. The systems grow unevenly, until the
bypassed areas (or reverse salients, as Hughes calls them)-the difficulty of
sending direct current over long distances, or the difficulty of running a large
motor on alternating current-become critical problems that help shape the re-
search efforts of engineers. The systems' growth has now attained a momentum
that enables them to overcome or compromise with outside political or economic
pressures. Finally, with technological maturity, the technological problem of
creating systems gives way to the mainly economic problem of creating regional
networks.32
The scientist is little in evidence. Maxwell's laws may make a system possible,
but they have less to do with its growth and form than does a more modest
conceptual invention, load factor (a measure of how much of the electricity gen-
erating capacity of a system is actually used). The role of science in the growth
phase is a supporting one. The main influence of science on electrical technology
was a transient one, in education, for physicists, not engineers, were the first
to perceive the possibilities of educating electrical engineers. The first generation
of true electrical engineers came out of the physics laboratories. Then they re-
warded the profession that spawned them by creating a discipline of their own
independent of physics.33
Other studies of the growth and form of innovations and systems echo these
conclusions. Martha Trescott's study of electrochemistry has shown how that
industry also developed its own internal knowledge base and technical institu-
tions, rather than relying on direct imports from science. No doubt the work of
chemical researchers provided the basic ideas for the electrochemical industry.
But the influence of science was, again, supporting and transient rather than
central. Similarly, John Servos has traced the way the growth in demand for
physical chemists was not a direct but an indirect result of industrial growth.
That is, the industries did not at first hire physical chemists with Ph.D.s.; they
hired engineering graduates who had taken chemistry courses, and the colleges
hired the Ph.D. physical chemists to teach those courses.34
More recently, in the evolution of computers, the pacemaker of technology
has been not science but practical needs, especially national defense. Scientific
needs may have inspired such pioneers as John Atasanoff and John Mauchly,
but the most successful innovators were the ones who coped most successfully
with nonscientific issues: engineering design, patents, funding, project targets,
and marketing. Only when computers became established did a discipline of
computer science-a branch of engineering research-begin to emerge.35
32 Hughes, Networks of Power (cit. n. 16), pp. 140-174.
33Robert Rosenberg, "American Physics and the Origins of Electrical Engineering," Physics
Today, 1983, 36:48-53.
34 Martha M. Trescott, The Rise
of the American Electrochemical Industry, 1880-1910: Studies
in the American Technological Environment (Contributions in Economics and Economic History,
38) (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood, 1981); John W. Servos, "The Industrial Relations of Science:
Chemical Engineering at MIT, 1900-1939," Isis, 1980, 71:531-549.
35 Kent C. Redmond and Thomas M. Smith, Project Whirlwind: The History of a Pioneer Com-
puter, (Bedford, Mass.: Digital, 1980); Nancy Stern, From Eniac to Univac: An Appraisal of the
Eckert-Mauchly Computers (Bedford, Mass.: Digital, 1981).
242 GEORGE WISE
Reconciling Technological and Scientific Goals with the Immediate Needs of Pa-
trons: The Role of the Research Entrepreneur. In rejecting science as the pace-
maker of technology, historians have begun to suggest that the particular balance
of scientific and technological efforts undertaken by an institution may depend
more on the needs of patrons than on the direct influence of science and tech-
nology on each other. This interpretation puts emphasis on a new role, the "re-
search entrepreneur": an individual dedicated to creating new science or new
technology, but realistic enough to recognize that he must strike bargains with
people who have very different interests if he hopes to accomplish his goals.
The role is not new. Joseph Henry provides a nineteenth-century example.
The publication of the Henry papers, edited by Nathan Reingold and colleagues,
and studies based on those papers have as one theme Henry's attempts to rec-
oncile science and technology by viewing science as making technology pos-
sible, though by no means as the head of an assembly line. Social conditions
call invention forth. The inventive genius is needed as well as the scientific.
Henry's role in developing the telegraph and discouraging the electric motor was
consistent with what he saw as the scientist's proper social and intellectual role
in the creation of new technology. Other nineteenth-century figures made
uneasier adjustments. Robert Post depicts the physicist-inventor Charles Page
as seeking to vindicate his position as a true scientist, even as he got more
deeply enmeshed in questionable government-funded schemes to develop a prac-
tical electric motor. And David Hounshell has described how even Thomas
Edison identified himself as a "scientific man" when he needed scientists' ap-
proval of his electric lighting system, then broke with them when their pure-
science ideal (and their occasional kind words about rivals' lighting systems)
proved incompatible with his further needs for allegiance and support.36
Looking at a later part of the nineteenth century, Charles Rosenberg and Mar-
garet Rossiter have shown how the directors of the federal government's agri-
cultural experiment stations exemplified the research entrepreneur role. The
burden of requests for advice and technology from farmers dampened the ide-
alism of station scientists. But successful laboratory directors found a way to
compromise their ideals in a way that looked a lot like surrender, but did even-
tually make possible important research (for example, on hybrid corn).37
Research entrepreneurs also created major twentieth-century industrial re-
search laboratories. The successful laboratory directors were team players, not
rugged individualists. Stuart Leslie has shown how even as individualistic a
leader as General Motors' research director Charles Kettering learned the need
to make institutional compromises-especially after an innovative air-cooled au-
tomobile engine his team developed failed commercially, as much because of
organizational problems within GM as because of technical flaws in the engine.
36 Arthur P. Mollella, "The Electric
Motor, the Telegraph, and Joseph Henry's Theory of Tech-
nological Progress," Proc. IEEE (1976), 64:1273-1278; Joseph Henry, The Papers of Joseph Henry,
ed. Nathan Reingold (Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1972-present), 4 vols. to
date; Robert Post, Physics, Patents, and Politics: A Biography of Charles Grafton Page (New York:
Science History, 1976); David Hounshell, "Edison and the Pure Science Ideal in 19th Century
America," Science, 1980, 207:612-617.
37 Charles E. Rosenberg, No Other Gods: On Science and American Social Thought (Baltimore:
Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 1976) Chs. 8-12; Margaret Rossiter, "The Organization of the Agri-
cultural Sciences," in The Organization of Knowledge in Modern America, 1860-1920, ed. Alex-
andra Oleson and John Voss (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 1979), pp. 211-248.
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 243
Leonard Reich's studies of Bell Laboratories provide major new insights into
the business pressures shaping industrial research, and his work and other
studies of General Electric's laboratory show how that organization's director,
Willis R. Whitney, extended the role of research entrepreneur. By first proving
the laboratory's value as a defender of established company businesses, he
earned for a few of his researchers the right to wander into more remote fields
of science and technology.38
Clayton Koppes's history of the Jet Propulsion Laboratory shows that in the
absence of such a research entrepreneur, scientists and technologists can allow
external patrons to set priorities. The laboratory's two patrons, California In-
stitute of Technology and the federal government (the Department of Defense
and NASA) agreed, Koppes argues, that the laboratory's primary purpose would
be service to the "warfare state," not science or technology. "Lacking a strong
institutional ethic, the science and research-engineering communities allowed the
organization and agenda of research to be determined disproportionately by mil-
itary funding."39 But the laboratory's federal patrons also sponsored a remark-
able series of planetary explorations. The JPL's history must be seen as a com-
promise of scientific and nonscientific goals, not merely a surrender. People
interested in space exploration as technology, and space scientists interested in
knowledge about the solar system, achieved many of their own goals in the
process of supporting the government in achieving its goals.
Two studies of twentieth-century science and technology suggest that the me-
diating role of research entrepreneurs has been eliminated by capitalist managers
who dictate the roles of both science and engineering. David Noble's study of
the behavior of important science and engineering educators and organizers ar-
gues that any idealistic rhetoric from them is only a smoke screen masking their
total surrender to capitalist managerial hierarchies. David Dickson, in a survey
of science policy since World War II, gives essentially the same message.40
Others have found more impressive the amount of autonomy scientists at-
tained, and how well they have insulated themselves from their patrons. John
Servos has described how an apparent victory at MIT of applied, industry-allied
chemical engineering over "purer" forms of that discipline and of chemistry
proved in fact only temporary. After 1930, the verdict was reversed; science
38 Hoddeson, "The
Discovery of the Point Contact Transistor" (cit. n. 28); Lillian Hoddeson, "The
Emergence of Basic Research in the Bell Telephone System, 1875-1915," Technol. Cult., 1981,
22:512-544; John J. Beer and W. David Lewis, "Aspects of the Professionalization of Science," in
The Professions in America, ed. Kenneth S. Lynn (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1965); Beer, "Coal
Tar Dye Manufacture and the Origins of the Modern Industrial Research Laboratory," Isis, 1958,
49:123-131; Birr, Pioneering in Industrial Research (cit. n. 9); Kendall Birr, "Industrial Research
Laboratories," in The Sciences in the American Context: New Perspectives, ed. Nathan Reingold
(Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1979); Stuart Leslie, "Charles A. Kettering and
the Copper Cooled Engine," Technol. Cult., 1979 20:752-778, Leslie, Boss Kettering (New York:
Columbia Univ. Press, 1983),; Leonard Reich, "Industrial Research and the Pursuit of Corporate
Security: The Early Years of Bell Labs," Business History Review, 1980, 54:504-529; Reich, "Irving
Langmuir: Engineer and Scientist," Technol. Cult., 1983, 24:199-221; George Wise, "A New Role
for Professional Scientists in Industry: Industrial Research at General Electric, 1900-1916," Technol.
Cult., 1980, 21:408-429; and Wise "Ionists in Industry: Physical Chemistry at General Electric,
1900-1915," Isis, 1983, 74:7-21.
39 Clayton R. Koppes, JPL and the American Space Program: A History of the Jet Propulsion
Laboratory, (New Haven: Yale, 1982), p. 247.
40 Noble, America by Design (cit. n. 2); David Dickson, The New Politics of Science (New York:
Pantheon, 1984).
244 GEORGE WISE
and engineering research goals set by faculty members, rather than by external
patrons, got priority. In The Physicists Daniel Kevles studies a discipline par-
ticularly susceptible to clashes between its pure and applied wings. But Kevles
denies that business or technology shaped physics. Indeed, he downplays the
role technology played in the growth and organization of the discipline. Such
technological episodes as the invention of the transistor are left out of the ac-
count altogether. Technology is principally mentioned as something people who
lacked understanding confused with science. The major treatment of the inter-
action of science and technology, the discussion of how the modern interdis-
ciplinary research lab was created, appears in a chapter entitled "The Search
for New Patrons." In the twentieth century, Kevles concludes, the physicists
did not suffer domination by the capitalists. Instead, during and after World War
II, the physicists, the capitalists and the politicians sat down around the table
and came up with a compromise that satisfied all of them. They institutionalized
the role played by research entrepreneurs within a science policy system under
which the government would allow scientists to dictate their own government-
supported research programs, and the scientists would help meet the technology
needs of the government, particularly in the area of national defense. Under that
compromise, the physicists enjoyed, until the 1970s, a remarkable degree of au-
tonomy. A major idea that both reflected this privileged position and provided
a justification for it is the rationale for pure research with which we began: the
science-technology assembly line.41
CONCLUSION
41 Servos, "Industrial Relations" (cit. n. 34); Daniel J. Kevles, The Physicists: The
Histor? of a
Scientific Community in Modern America (New York: Knopf, 1978).
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 245
Pennsylvania; and the Charles Babbage Institute for the History of Information
Processing, directed by Arthur Norberg, sponsored by the American Federation
of Information Processing Societies and various corporations and individuals in-
volved with information processing, and located at the University of Minnesota.
Each of the directors mentioned is a professional historian of science or tech-
nology.
The challenge these initiatives present to historians mirrors the major theme
of this review. Historical studies have shown that the relations between science
and technology need not be those of domination and subordination. Each has
maintained its distinctive knowledge base and methods while contributing to the
other and to its patrons as well. History must now show that it too can be an
autonomous discipline capable of contributing value to other disciplines and to
corporate, public, or technical-society patrons without becoming their creature
or mouthpiece. In pursuing that goal, the study of the historical relations of
science and technology can provide both a theme for investigation and a source
of guidance.