Team-9 - Harley-Davidson - Rejuvenating An Iconic Brand

KE115
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April 24,
2020
NEAL J. ROESE AND ALEXANDER CHERNEV
Harley-Davidson:
Rejuvenating an Iconic
Brand
On a bright summer day in Milwaukee in July 2007, Mark-Hans Richer stepped off his black
motorcycle at the corporate headquarters of Harley-Davidson, creator of one of the world’s
best known brands and the only major American motorcycle manufacturer. As he walked to
the landmark red-brick building, Richer passed packs of gleaming Harleys and a number of
Buells, Harley-Davidson’s smaller and sportier brand.
Today was not only Richer’s frst day as chief marketing ofcer, it also was the frst day Harley-
Davidson had ever employed a CMO. Why did such a strong brand suddenly decide it needed
a CMO? As Richer strode into his ofce, he had no illusions about the motive behind his
hiring: Harley-Davidson riders were aging, and the company saw this as a threat to its
existence. Although Harley-Davidson had a record sales year in 2006 and had maintained a
commanding share of the heavyweight motorcycle market during the previous decade, it
needed to take new action to sustain its growth—action like investing in the kind of
marketing it had not needed in its glory days.
As he sat in his new ofce studying the stacks of information-packed binders, Richer knew
exactly what Harley-Davidson wanted from its investment in him—a new generation of
riders and a more diverse customer base, all without losing its current customers. He also
knew he could not relax even for a moment: the average tenure of a CMO was only 27
months, and a complete new product development cycle would take about fve years.
©2019, 2020 by the Kellogg School of Management at Northwestern University. Tis case was prepared by
Professors Neal J. Roese and Alexander Chernev. Cases are developed solely as the basis for class discussion.
Cases are not intended to serve as endorsements, sources of primary data, or illustrations of effective or
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This document is authorized for use only in Prof (Dr.) Neha Gupta's MBA-IMC 1st Trimester 10.09.2020 at Somaiya Vidyavihar from Sep 2020 to Mar
2021.
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Company History
William Harley and the Davidson brothers—Arthur, Walter, and William—founded the Harley-
Davidson Motor Company in 1903. Te company initially competed against dozens of start-up
motorcycle manufacturers and expanded rapidly, building motorcycles aimed at leisure, sport racing,
police forces, delivery services, and the military. Time and economic stresses eliminated all but the
Harley-Davidson and Indian brands, which competed with ever more powerful and stylish designs.
In the years following World War II, cheap Harley-Davidson surplus military motorcycles became a
platform for “bobbers,” uniquely customized bikes cut down from the stock model. In the 1950s,
rebellious motorcycle clubs with names like Te Boozefghters and Te Galloping Goose Motorcycle
Club formed, and many adopted Harley-Davidson as their dominant symbol.
Later, some clubs morphed into criminal gangs such as the Hell’s Angels, projecting a ferce image of
violent machismo while dealing in guns, narcotics, and prostitution. Te outlaw bikers (as portrayed in
this 1960s-era description) were “tense for action, long hair in the wind, beards and bandanas
flapping, earrings, armpits, chain whips, swastikas and stripped-down Harleys flashing chrome as
trafc on 101 moves over, nervous, to let the formation pass like a burst of dirty thunder.” 1 Although
lawlessness was in fact rare among motorcycle owners, the image of the loner outlaw astride a
rumbling bike became inextricably tied to Harley-Davidson’s brand image.
Also in the 1960s, Harley-Davidson faced new competition in the form of a shrewdly marketed
influx of lighter and cheaper Japanese bikes. From 1959 to 1965, Harley-Davidson sales grew from
$16 million to nearly $30 million, but Honda motorcycle sales increased from $500,000 to $77
million, shattering Harley-Davidson’s market share.
In 1969, AMF—one of the largest American recreational equipment companies, whose product line
included snow skis, golf clubs, lawn and garden equipment, yachts, bicycles, mopeds, and bowling
equipment—bought Harley-Davidson, ushering in a new era of corporate stewardship that ultimately
threatened the survival of the company. After AMF cut the work force, quality problems
compounded to the point that the company’s motorcycles were referred to as “Hardly Drivable.”
Following a decade of contracting market share and deteriorating brand image, in 1981 a group of 13
investors (including Harley-Davidson executives and one of the Davidson grandsons, Willie G.
Davidson) purchased the Harley-Davidson motorcycle business from AMF in a management buyout.
In 1986, Harley-Davidson became publicly held.
During the 1980s and 1990s, American Baby Boomers* had sufcient disposable income to buy
hundreds of thousands of Harley-Davidson motorcycles to fulfll dreams fed by flms like Easy Rider
and Terminator 2 and legendary bike rallies in Sturgis and Daytona. Demand for Harley- Davidson
motorcycles often exceeded the capacity of Harley’s manufacturing plants, and many customers
ended up paying over the list price and had to wait more than a year for a new bike.
* Americans born during the “Baby Boom” following World War II (1946–1964).
K ELLOGGS CHOOLOFM ANAGEMENT
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Tis success continued into the early 21st century, capped by Harley-Davidson’s raucous 100th
anniversary celebration in 2003, when a quarter of a million Harley owners from around the world
descended on the company’s Milwaukee headquarters (Exhibit 1).
The Motorcycle Market
Motorcycles could be broadly grouped into two categories based on the size of their engines:
heavyweight bikes and sport bikes. A heavyweight bike typically had an engine displacement larger
than 601cc (cubic centimeters).* Te larger engine meant not only greater power and faster
acceleration but also the opportunity for customers to load up on custom add-ons. Harley-
Davidson’s heavyweights were ideal for touring (taking long, leisurely pleasure rides) and cruising
(showing off and being seen by others). By contrast, sport bikes were designed for speed and racing
and were manufactured from lighter materials so that even with smaller engines they delivered fast
acceleration and quick handling.
Te motorcycle market in 2007 comprised the following four segments: (1) standard (emphasizing
simplicity and cost), (2) performance (emphasizing handling and acceleration), (3) custom
(emphasizing styling and individual owner customization), and (4) touring (emphasizing comfort and
amenities for long-distance travel).
In the United States, Harley-Davidson competed most heavily in the touring and custom segments of
the heavyweight motorcycle market. According to the Motorcycle Industry Council, these segments
accounted for about 80% of total heavyweight retail motorcycle registrations in the United States. 2 Te
larger engine-displacement custom and touring motorcycles were generally the most expensive
vehicles in the market and the most proftable for Harley-Davidson. During 2007, heavyweight
motorcycles represented about 54% of the total U.S. motorcycle market (on- and off- highway
motorcycles and scooters) in terms of new motorcycles registered.
Te heavyweight motorcycle market was highly competitive. Harley-Davidson’s major competitors
were based outside the United States and generally had substantially greater fnancial and marketing
resources. Tey also had larger worldwide revenue, were more diversifed than Harley-Davidson, and
competed in all four segments of the market. Harley-Davidson’s U.S. competitors had signifcantly
lower production volume and market share. Tey generally offered heavyweight motorcycles with
traditional styling that competed directly with many of Harley- Davidson’s products.
Competition in the heavyweight motorcycle market was based on a number of factors, including
price, quality, reliability, styling, product features, customer preference, and warranties. Harley-
Davidson emphasized quality, reliability, and styling in its products and generally offered a two-year
warranty for its motorcycles. In addition, Harley-Davidson supported the motorcycling lifestyle by
sponsoring events, rides, rallies, and membership in H.O.G. (the Harley Owners Group), and by
offering fnancing through Harley-Davidson Financial Services.
* Prior to 2013, Harley-Davidson classifed heavyweight motorcycles as those having an engine displacement of 651cc-
plus. In 2013, Harley-Davidson adjusted its defnition of heavyweight motorcycles to 601cc-plus from the prior defnition
of 651cc-plus, to better align with the current U.S. industry defnition.
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For the past two decades, Harley-Davidson had led the industry in the United States for retail unit
registrations of new heavyweight motorcycles. Harley-Davidson’s share of the U.S. heavyweight
market was 49% in 2007—signifcantly greater than that of its largest competitor, which had a 14%
market share (Exhibit 2). Harley-Davidson was also the market leader for heavyweight bikes in
Japan, where the brand was nearly as popular as in the United States. Te European heavyweight
motorcycle market was more fragmented among European and Japanese companies, with Harley-
Davidson having only an 8.2% share.
Harley-Davidson’s Product Line
Harley-Davidson-branded motorcycle products emphasized traditional styling, design simplicity,
durability, and quality. Te company manufactured fve families of motorcycles: Touring, DynaTM,
Softail®, Sportster®, and VRSCTM. Te frst four of these motorcycle families were powered by an
air-cooled, twin-cylinder engine with a 45-degree “V” confguration. Te VRSC family used a liquid-
cooled, twin-cylinder engine with a 60-degree “V” confguration. Harley-Davidson engines ranged in
size from 883cc to 1803cc. Te 2007 model year included 31 domestic models of Harley-Davidson
heavyweight motorcycles, with domestic manufacturer’s suggested retail prices ranging from $6,695
to $23,270.
Harley-Davidson’s 2007 product line included touring bikes like the Road Glide and Road King
(Exhibit 3); softail bikes like the Softail Heritage Classic, Night Train, Fat Boy, and Cross Bones
(Exhibits 4 and 5); dyna-frame bikes like the FXDB Street Bob and Fat Bob (Exhibit 6); sportster
bikes like the Sportster and Nightster (Exhibit 7); and the recently introduced VRSC bikes like the V-
Rod and Night Rod, which had been co-developed with Porsche and were considered to be Harley’s
biggest break from tradition (Exhibit 8). A forthcoming model—Iron 883—had been developed for a
comparatively modest investment of under $1 million and was scheduled for a January 2009 debut at
a price of $7,499 (Exhibit 9).
Harley-Davidson pioneered the touring segment of the heavyweight market with its Touring family
of motorcycles, which were equipped with fairings, windshields, saddlebags, and/or Tour Pak
luggage carriers. Te company’s offerings for the custom segment of the market included motorcycles
featuring the distinctive styling associated with classic Harley-Davidson models and encompassed
the Dyna, Softail, and VRSC motorcycle families as well as a portion of the motorcycles in the
Sportster family. Te Sportster family also served the standard segment of the market.
In the United States, suggested retail prices for Harley-Davidson motorcycles ranged from being
comparable to moderately higher than suggested retail prices for similar motorcycles offered by
competitors. Although there were some differences in accessories between Harley-Davidson’s top-
of-the-line touring motorcycles and those of its competitors, suggested retail prices for these
motorcycles were generally comparable. Harley-Davidson’s larger-displacement custom motorcycles
(Dyna, Softail, and VRSC) represented its highest unit volumes. Tese motorcycles commanded a
premium price because of the features, styling, and strong resale value associated
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with Harley-Davidson custom products. Harley’s smallest-displacement custom motorcycle (the
883cc Sportster) was price-competitive with comparable motorcycles available in the market.
Harley-Davidson’s market surveys indicated that three-quarters of the retail purchasers of its
Sportster models in the United States either had previously owned competitive-brand motorcycles or
were completely new to motorcycling. Market research also showed that for the past 20 years retail
purchasers of new Harley-Davidson motorcycles in the United States had repurchase intent at or in
excess of 80%. Furthermore, approximately 52% of all retail purchasers of new Harley- Davidson
motorcycles in the United States in 2007 had previously owned a Harley-Davidson motorcycle.
Although Harley-Davidson enjoyed continued growth in the 2000s, its core customer base of Baby
Boomers was aging. In 1987, the median age of a Harley-Davidson customer was 35; by 2007, it was
47.3 Without an inflow of new customers, Harley’s market share was destined to shrink, with
competitors catering to younger customers taking over the motorcycle market.
Te 2007 worldwide retail sales of Harley-Davidson motorcycles decreased 1.8% compared to 2006.
Te decrease was driven primarily by a 6.2% drop in Harley-Davidson dealer retail sales in the United
States. International retail sales of Harley-Davidson motorcycles in 2007 were up 14% over 2006. 4
On an industry-wide basis in 2007, the heavyweight portion of the market was down 5% in the
United States but grew 5.4% in Europe compared to 2006.
Distribution
In the United States, Harley-Davidson distributed its motorcycles to a network of independently
owned, full-service Harley-Davidson dealerships and the Overseas Military Sales Corporation, an
entity that retailed the company’s products to members of the U.S. military. Harley-Davidson
distributed its motorcycles to its U.S. dealers based on dealer orders but subject to an allocation
system. Tere were approximately 684 U.S. Harley-Davidson dealerships. With respect to sales of new
motorcycles, approximately 80% of the U.S. dealerships sold Harley-Davidson motorcycles
exclusively. All of these independent dealerships stocked and sold parts and accessories, general
merchandise and licensed products, and serviced Harley-Davidson motorcycles. Dealers also sold
parts and accessories, general merchandise, and licensed products through “non-traditional” retail
outlets, including secondary retail locations, alternative retail outlets, and seasonal retail outlets.
Secondary retail locations were satellites of the main dealership and were developed to meet
additional retail and service needs of Harley-Davidson-riding customers. In addition to selling
merchandise, secondary retail locations were authorized to sell and service new motorcycles.
Alternative retail outlets were located primarily in high trafc locations such as malls, airports, or
popular vacation destinations and focused on selling Harley-Davidson general merchandise and
licensed products. Seasonal retail outlets were located in similar high trafc areas, but operated on a
seasonal basis out of temporary locations such as vendor kiosks. Alternative retail outlets and
seasonal retail outlets were not authorized to sell new motorcycles. Tere were approximately 104
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secondary retail locations, 68 alternative retail outlets, and 12 seasonal retail outlets located in the
United States.
To strengthen its competitive position, Harley-Davidson had recently improved the availability of its
motorcycles at its independent dealers. Te increased availability had resulted in independent dealers
providing wider selections of motorcycles at or near manufacturer’s suggested retail prices, which
put downward pressure on Harley-Davidson’s used motorcycle prices (which were discounted at a
set percentage off the manufacturer’s suggested retail price when new). In addition, Harley-Davidson
introduced a new engine on many of its motorcycles beginning with the 2007 model year, which took
a toll on the prices of its used motorcycles.
Harley-Davidson’s Core Customers
Outlaw bikers once defned Harley-Davidson’s brand image, but they were not necessarily the
company’s main customers. Te average U.S. retail purchaser of a new Harley-Davidson motorcycle
was a married male in his mid to late forties with a median household income of approximately
$84,300 (compared to the U.S. median of $52,700). Nearly three-quarters of the U.S. retail sales of
new Harley-Davidson motorcycles were to buyers with at least one year of education beyond high
school, and 30% of these buyers had college degrees. Approximately 12% of U.S. retail motorcycle
sales of new Harley-Davidson motorcycles were to female buyers. 5
Harley-Davidson customers not only bought the branded product but also bought into the lifestyle
embedded within a unique subculture. Teir loyalty embraced not just repurchase but also
commitment, a psychological state in which the individual has a large stake in continued afliation
with the brand and its community. According to a scholarly study, “visible indicators of commitment
include tattoos, motorcycle customization, club-specifc clothing, and sew-on patches and pins
proclaiming various honors, accomplishments, and participation in rallies and other rider events.” 6
Membership was a “sanctuary in which to experience temporary self-transformation,” and riding
itself became a spiritual experience that involved “the increased closeness to nature, the heightened
sensory awareness, the mantric throbbing of the engine, the constant awareness of risk and the
concomitant mental focus and, in group riding, the consciousness of oneself as an integral part of a
larger group or purpose.”7
Te Harley-Davidson subculture encompassed not only the entire universe of Harley motorcycle
owners, but also independent clubs (and sometimes gangs) with their own unique identities. Tese
groups rarely recruited new members; rather, prospective members had to overcome barriers to entry
and survive “new prospect” status by surmounting various hurdles before being accepted as full
members. Recognizing the importance of building a brand community, in 1983 Harley- Davidson
formed the Harley Owners Group in an effort to encourage Harley owners to become more actively
involved in the sport of motorcycling. H.O.G. also sponsored many motorcycle events, including
rallies and rides for Harley-Davidson motorcycle enthusiasts throughout the world. By 2007, H.O.G.
had over one million members worldwide and was the industry’s largest company-sponsored
motorcycle enthusiast organization.
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The Young Adult Market

Young adults expressed several preferences that distinguished them from Harley-Davidson’s core
customer (nearly two-thirds of whom were between the ages of 35 and 54), notably an aversion to
chrome and a preference for black. Young adults also preferred stripped-down bikes over the heavily
adorned cruisers sold to Harley’s core customers. Te Harley bikes that sold proportionally more to
young adults (such as the Nightster, Street Bob, and Night Train) shared this minimalistic
appearance. Harley-Davidson had a 22% share of young adult buyers (18‒34) in 2007 across all on-
road motorcycles, second only to Suzuki, the market leader in this segment.
Te preferences of young adults were elaborated further in an internal study of metaphors for the
riding experience, which revealed the following brand image aspects as important: (1) a
transformational journey, in which riders become who they truly want to be; (2) a means of escape
from a monotonous, constraining life; and (3) a way to connect with other like-minded souls. Tese
same young adults characterized sport bikes as constricting and physically uncomfortable, mass
produced and lacking in durability, and having an unappealing sound (“like sewing machines”). 8 Te
key fnding for the future of the brand was that agreement with the statement “You can relate to
Harley-Davidson” was only 16% for respondents under age 35, compared to 32% for respondents
over the age of 35. Even though the younger generation was comfortable with key aspects of the
Harley-Davidson brand image, like tattoos and piercings, it was not evident that they wanted to
follow the Boomers’ motorcycle passions.
In 2007, the company conducted a study of young adults that identifed barriers to buying a Harley-
Davidson, including “haven’t seen the right bike,” “may not belong” (i.e., may not ft into the Harley
brand culture), and “dealership aversion.” 9 Of these, dealership aversion represented the biggest
barrier to conversion. Younger adults found the experience of visiting the dealership daunting and
intimidating. Further research found that this group overestimated by a considerable amount the cost
of an entry-level Harley-Davidson motorcycle: It was not unusual for them to assume that “every
Harley costs $20 grand” when in fact the price of the least expensive Harley- Davidson in 2007 (the
Sportster 883 Low) started at $6,699.
The Opportunity with Buell
Te company also produced a secondary brand, Buell, which competed in the sport bike category.
Buell was founded by ex-Harley engineer Erik Buell in 1983 and was partially acquired by Harley-
Davidson in 1993 and fully in 1998. Light sport bikes with correspondingly lower prices, the Buell
models were aimed at younger customers and the European market segments not typically interested
in heavy motorcycles. Te Buell brand and logo were distinct from and did not share any design
elements with the Harley-Davidson brand. Of the approximately 684 Harley-Davidson dealerships,
307 sold both the Harley-Davidson and Buell brands. Although sold through the Harley-Davidson
dealer network, Buell bikes did not carry any Harley-Davidson visual branding and were promoted
on technological innovation and superior handling.
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Te company’s Buell motorcycle products emphasized innovative design, responsive handling, and
overall performance. In 2007 Buell’s product line included ten models. Serving the performance
segment of the market were eight heavyweight models in its XB family as well as the new 1125R, a
motorcycle with a liquid-cooled engine developed at a cost of $30 million and launched in the market
earlier in 2007. Te Buell Blast® served the standard segment of the market (Exhibit 10). Te Buell
XB motorcycles focused on superior handling and were powered by either a 984cc or a 1203cc air-
cooled, twin-cylinder engine with a 45-degree “V” confguration. Te Buell XB motorcycle models
had suggested retail prices ranging from $8,895 to $12,995. Te 1125R was a high-performance sport
bike that retained Buell styling and character; it sold at a suggested retail price of $11,995. Te Buell
Blast was smaller and less expensive than the Buell XB models, was powered by a 492cc single-
cylinder engine, and had a suggested retail price of $4,695. Te majority of new Buell owners were
between 25 and 55 years old and had a median household income of approximately $80,900.
Approximately 7% of all new Buell XB U.S. retail motorcycle sales were to females.
Buell competed with BMW (Germany) and Ducati (Italy), which also positioned themselves on
engineering precision and racing performance. Te “big four” Japanese manufacturers— Honda,
Kawasaki, Suzuki, and Yamaha—had a very strong presence in the sport bike category in the United
States because of their lower price points, faster speeds, and, for some, perceived higher quality. In
Europe there was a general preference for smaller and sportier bikes, which gave the Buell brand a
larger share (1%) than it had in the United States (0.7%). Similar to Harley- Davidson, Buell did not
have a signifcant presence in large, emerging markets such as China, India, Brazil, or Russia.
Unlike Harley-Davidson bikes, which had a gross proft margin of 35%—the highest in the industry
—Buell bikes had only a 5% gross margin, expected to increase to 10% in the near future.
Historically, Buell rarely showed a proft because of its higher level of R&D investment.
Because Buell bikes were lighter, faster, sportier, and cheaper than Harley-Davidson’s heavyweight
bikes, Harley management believed the Buell brand was more attractive to younger customers. Te
expectation was that younger customers would enter the Harley-Davidson dealer universe via Buell
and then trade up to Harley-Davidson heavyweight bikes as they grew older. Te challenge here was
that even though 87% of young adults were aware of the Harley brand, only 5% were aware of Buell.
The Decision
Faced with the grim reality of declining market share, Richer and his team had to come up with a
plan to grow Harley’s customer base by attracting younger customers while preserving the loyalty of
Harley’s core customers. Several options were on the table.
Te frst option was to stay the course with the current dual-brand strategy, with Harley- Davidson as
the leading brand targeting Harley’s core customers and commanding a greater investment of
company resources (at the time 83% of the total marketing expenditures) and
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Buell as the offering targeting young adults and requiring a smaller company investment (17% of
marketing expenditures).
Te second option was to double down on Buell, allocating additional resources with the goal of
building up the Buell brand while preserving the strength of the Harley brand. Tis option would
involve shifting some of the resources from Harley’s core customers to young adults in order to
strengthen the Buell brand.
Te third option was to endorse Buell using the Harley-Davidson brand. Tis option would involve
leveraging certain aspects of the Harley brand (such as its image of rebellion) to strengthen the Buell
brand and make it more relevant to young adults. Under this option, there were two endorsement
formats: a stronger endorsement in the form of co-branding, Harley-Davidson Buell, and a relatively
weaker endorsement in the form of sub-branding: Buell by Harley-Davidson.
Another option was to divest Buell by selling it to another company. Under this option, Harley-
Davidson would focus all of its efforts on its namesake brand, which would be used to target both
Harley’s core customers and young adults. Te revenues from the sale of Buell would be used to
enhance the Harley-Davidson brand as well as to invest in new product development.
Finally, there was the option to discontinue the Buell product line. Richer knew that even if the brand
were to be discontinued, Harley-Davidson would still be obligated to service the Buell bikes already
in circulation and carry spare parts for ten years after the last Buell bike was sold. Richer was also
concerned about how the Buell team, including its founder Eric Buell, might react to the decision to
discontinue Buell motorcycles.
Richer knew that time was his enemy. Every passing year not only brought Baby Boomers closer to
the time when they would no longer be interested in upgrading their Harleys, but also brought him
closer to the average 27-month tenure for CMOs. A decision had to be made soon.
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All photos © 2003 Alexander Chernev.
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Exhibit 1: Harley-Davidson centennial celebration (2003)

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Exhibit 2: U.S. Heavyweight Motorcycle Registration Data (in thousands)

Source: Harley-Davidson 2007 Annual Report.
Exhibit 3: Road Glide and Road King

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Exhibit 4: Softail Heritage Classic and Night Train

Exhibit 5: Fat Boy and Cross Bones
Exhibit 6: FXDB Street Bob and Fat Bob
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Exhibit 7: Sportster 883 and Nightster
Exhibit 8: VRSC V-ROD and VRSC Night Rod
Exhibit 9: Iron 883
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Exhibit 10: Buell Blast and Buell 1125R

Endnotes
1 Hunter Tompson, Hell’s Angels: A Strange and Terrible Saga (New York: Ballantine Books, 1996), 3. 2 Harley-
Davidson, Inc., Form 10-K, December 31, 2008. 3 Karen Richardson, “Living High on the Hog,” Wall Street Journal,
February 5, 2007. 4 Harley-Davidson 2007 Annual Report. 5 Ibid. 6 John W. Schouten and James H. McAlexander,
“Subcultures of Consumption: An Ethnography of the New
Bikers,” Journal of Consumer Research 22, no. 1 (1995): 43‒61. 7 Ibid. 8 Harley-Davidson internal documents. 9 Ibid.
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KE115

NEAL J. ROESE AND ALEXANDER CHERNEV

The Young Adult Market

Exhibit 1: Harley-Davidson centennial celebration (2003)

Exhibit 2: U.S. Heavyweight Motorcycle Registration Data (in thousands)

Exhibit 3: Road Glide and Road King

Exhibit 4: Softail Heritage Classic and Night Train

Exhibit 10: Buell Blast and Buell 1125R

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