Logic Dictionary

Keith Burgess-Jackson
12 August 2017

addition (Add). In propositional logic, a rule of inference (i.e., an elementary

valid argument form) in which (1) the conclusion is a disjunction and (2) the premise
is the first disjunct of the conclusion. Formally, ‘p’; therefore, ‘p Ú q’. See (1) disjunc-
tion, (2) elementary valid argument form, (3) inference, rules of, and (4) proposi-
tional logic.

affirmative proposition. In categorical logic, a proposition that asserts that one

class is included (i.e., contained) in another, either totally or partially. A proposition
that affirms class membership. If the claim is one of totality, the proposition is
universal (‘All S are P’). If the claim is one of partiality, the proposition is particular
(‘Some S are P’). See (1) “A” proposition, (2) “I” proposition, and (3) negative propo-
sition.

affirming the consequent (AC), fallacy of (a.k.a. asserting the conse-

quent). In propositional logic, an invalid syllogism (i.e., a formal fallacy) in which
the first premise is a conditional, the second premise the consequent of that con-
ditional, and the conclusion the antecedent of that conditional. The name derives
from the fact that the second premise affirms the consequent of the first premise.
Formally, ‘p ‫ ﬤ‬q’; ‘q’; therefore, ‘p’. See (1) denying the antecedent (DA), fallacy of
and (2) Modus Ponens.

affirmo. Latin for “I affirm.” In categorical logic, the letter names “A” and “I”
come from the first two vowels of the word “affirmo.” The “A” proposition is uni-
versal affirmative; the “I” proposition is particular affirmative. See (1) “A” proposi-
tion, (2) nego, and (3) “I” proposition.

“all.” The universal affirmative quantifier, as in ‘All S are P’. See (1) “no” and (2)
“some.”

ambiguity (a.k.a. equivocation). A property of (some) linguistic entities, such

as words and sentences. A term (word or sentence) is ambiguous in a given context
when it has two or more distinct meanings and the context does not make clear
which meaning is intended by the utterer. Examples: “bank,” “right,” “duty,” “ma-
terial implication.” See (1) sentence, (2) synonymy, and (3) vagueness.

antecedent (a.k.a. protasis). In propositional logic, the part of a conditional

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that follows the word “if,” or, in the case of a symbolized expression, precedes the
horseshoe. Example: In the conditional “If this is an even-numbered year, then
there are Congressional elections this year,” the antecedent is “this is an even-num-
bered year.” In the symbolized expression ‘q ‫ ﬤ‬p,’ the antecedent is ‘q’. See (1) con-
ditional and (2) consequent.

antilogism. An inconsistent triad of propositions. A triad of propositions such

that the truth of any two of them logically implies the falsity of the third. A valid
syllogism is a syllogism whose premises, taken with the contradictory of the conclu-
sion, constitute an antilogism. Example:

Valid Syllogism Antilogism

All men are mortal. All men are mortal.
Socrates is a man. Socrates is a man.
\ Socrates is mortal. Socrates is not mortal.

“A” proposition. In categorical logic, a universal affirmative standard-form cat-

egorical proposition: ‘All S are P’. See (1) “E” proposition, (2) “I” proposition, (3) “O”
proposition, and (4) standard-form categorical proposition (SFCP).

“all.” The universal affirmative quantifier, as in ‘All S are P’. See (1) “no” and (2)
“some.”

argument. The expression of an inference. Any group of (two or more) proposi-

tions of which one, the conclusion, is claimed (by the arguer) to follow from the
other or others, the premise(s). The premise or premises are regarded as providing
support, grounds, reasons, or evidence for the truth of the conclusion. Every argu-
ment has at least one premise and exactly one conclusion, though there are chain
arguments that consist of two or more arguments linked together, with the con-
clusion of one serving as a premise of another. See (1) argument form, (2) conclusion,
(3) chain argument, (4) inference, and (5) premise.

argument form. Any array of symbols containing propositional variables (‘p’, ‘q’,
‘r’, ‘s’, and so forth) but no propositions, such that when propositions are substi-
tuted for the propositional variables—the same proposition being substituted for
the same propositional variable throughout—the result is an argument. See (1) ar-
gument and (2) substitution instance.

argumentation. The act, process, practice, or institution of arguing, or produc-

ing an argument. The aim of argumentation is to persuade or convince someone to
believe or do something. See argument.

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Aristotelian interpretation of standard-form categorical propositions.
See (1) Aristotle and (2) square of opposition.

Aristotle, Greek Aristoteles (born 384 BCE, Stagira, Chalcidice,

Greece—died 322, Chalcis, Euboea). Ancient Greek philosopher and scien-
tist, one of the greatest intellectual figures of Western history. He was the author
of a philosophical and scientific system that became the framework and vehicle for
both Christian Scholasticism and medieval Islamic philosophy. Even after the in-
tellectual revolutions of the Renaissance, the Reformation, and the Enlighten-
ment, Aristotelian concepts remained embedded in Western thinking (from Ency-
clopædia Britannica online). See categorical logic.

artificial symbolic language. A language created by logicians to avoid some of

the problems that inhere in natural language, such as vagueness, ambiguity (sub-
stantive or structural), misleading idioms, emotive meaning, and confusing meta-
phorical style. The special symbols of modern logic (propositional and predicate)
help us to exhibit with greater clarity the logical structures of propositions and
arguments. See natural language.

association (Assoc). In propositional logic, two replacement rules. The first says
that three disjuncts may be reassociated with one another (i.e., that parentheses
may be relocated). Formally, ‘p Ú (q Ú r)’ :: ‘(p Ú q) Ú r’. The second says that three
conjuncts may be reassociated with one another. Formally, ‘p • (q • r)’ :: ‘(p • q) • r’.

asyllogistic inference. In predicate logic, an inference (argument) that involves

propositions with more complicated internal structures than either standard-form
categorical propositions (“A,” “E,” “I,” or “O”) or singular propositions. For exam-
ple, “Hotels are both expensive and depressing; some hotels are shabby; therefore,
some expensive things are shabby.” This inference (argument) may be symbolized
as:

1. (x)[Hx ‫( ﬤ‬Ex • Dx)] (“For all x, if x is a hotel, then x is expensive and x is

depressing”)
2. (Ǝx)(Hx • Sx)
Therefore,
3. (Ǝx)(Ex • Sx)

The four quantification rules (EG, EI, UG, and UI) that apply to syllogisms are
applicable here as well. The finite-universe method of proving invalidity that ap-
plies to syllogisms is applicable here as well. See syllogism.

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asymmetry. A relation such that if one thing has that relation to a second, then
the second cannot have that relation to the first. Symbolically: (x)(y)(Rxy ‫~ ﬤ‬Ryx).
Examples: “is the father of,” “is north of,” “is older than,” “weighs more than,” “is a
child of.” See (1) nonsymmetry, (2) relation, and (3) symmetry.

attribute (a.k.a. predicate). In predicate logic, a property, feature, quality, or

characteristic of an individual. Examples: “is human,” “is mortal,” “is beautiful.” At-
tributes are denoted by upper-case letters “A” through “Z.” Attribute variables are
denoted by upper-case Greek letters “Ø” and “Ψ.” See (1) Greek letters “Ø” (phi)
and “Ψ” (psi) and (2) individual.

axiom of replacement. See replacement, axiom of.

Barbara. In categorical logic, a standard-form categorical syllogism with mood

and figure AAA-1. All three of its propositions are “A” propositions, and it is in the
first figure because the middle term is the subject of the major premise and the
predicate of the minor premise. The syllogism may be reconstructed as follows:

1. All M are P.
2. All S are M.
Therefore,
3. All S are P.

The syllogism is unconditionally valid—one of 15 standard-form categorical syllo-

gisms with that characteristic. See (1) figure, (2) mnemonic terms, (3) mood, and (4)
standard-form categorical syllogism (SFCS).

biconditional. In propositional logic, a truth-functional compound proposition

formed by putting “if and only if” between two propositions. The symbol for a
biconditional is the triple bar (tribar) (“º”). A biconditional is true just in case either
(1) its two component propositions are true or (2) its two component propositions
are false. The relation expressed by a biconditional is material equivalence. See (1)
conditional, (2) material equivalence, and (3) truth-functional compound proposi-
tion.

binary (dyadic) relation. A relation that holds (obtains) between two individu-
als, i.e., a two-place relation. For example, “Ron is married to Nancy,” “Dallas is
north of Houston,” and “Cain was brother to Abel.” See relation.

bivalence, law (principle) of. The law of classical logic that every proposition
is either true or false. That is, there are just two values a proposition may take: ‘true’

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and ‘false’. Another way to put this is that the truth values ‘true’ and ‘false’ are
jointly exhaustive; i.e., there is no third or middle possibility. The law of bivalence
is not to be confused with the law of excluded middle, which asserts that every
proposition is either true or not true.

Law of excluded middle Every proposition is either true or not true

(this is an instance of the more general law
that every object either has or lacks a given
property)
Law of bivalence Every proposition is either true or false

See excluded middle, law (principle) of.

Boole, George (born 2 November 1815, Lincoln, Lincolnshire, Eng-

land—died 8 December 1864, Ballintemple, County Cork, Ireland). Eng-
lish mathematician who helped establish modern symbolic logic and whose algebra
of logic, now called Boolean algebra, is basic to the design of digital computer cir-
cuits (from Encyclopædia Britannica online). See Boolean symbolism.

Boolean equations. See Boolean symbolism.

Boolean interpretation of standard-form categorical propositions. See

(1) Boole, George and (2) square of opposition.

Boolean symbolism. A way of representing standard-form categorical syllogisms

(“A,” “E,” “I,” and “O”) as equalities and inequalities, to wit:

• The “A” proposition, ‘All S are P’, is symbolized as SP = 0.

• The “E” proposition, ‘No S are P’, is symbolized as SP = 0.
• The “I” proposition, ‘Some S are P’, is symbolized as SP ≠ 0.
• The “O” proposition, ‘Some S are not P’, is symbolized as SP ≠ 0.

See Boole, George.

bound variable. In predicate logic, a variable that is bound by a quantifier. See (1)
free variable and (2) quantifier.

categorical logic (a.k.a. classical logic, syllogistic logic, and Aristotelian

logic). The logic of categories or classes. This type of logic concerns relations of
class inclusion (either total or partial) and class exclusion (either total or partial).
Various means (such as the Square of Opposition and Venn diagrams) have been

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devised to determine whether particular categorical syllogisms are valid. See (1) Ar-
istotle, (2) predicate logic, and (3) propositional logic.

categorical proposition. A proposition about classes (categories), affirming or

denying that a class S is included in a class P, either in whole or in part. See (1)
proposition and (2) standard-form categorical proposition (SFCP).

categorical syllogism. A syllogism consisting of three categorical propositions

that together contain three terms, each of which occurs in exactly two of the con-
stituent propositions. See (1) categorical proposition, (2) standard-form categorical
syllogism (SFCS), and (3) syllogism.

category. See class.

chain argument. A series of two or more arguments, with the conclusion of the
first argument serving as a premise of a second argument, the conclusion of the
second argument serving as a premise of a third argument, and so on, for as many
arguments as there are. Like a physical chain, a chain argument is no stronger than
its weakest link. See argument.

change-of-quantifier rule (CQ). In predicate logic, a set of four logical equiv-

alences that allow for the replacement of (1) a universal quantifier with an existen-
tial quantifier or (2) an existential quantifier with a universal quantifier. The rule is
that one quantifier may be replaced with the other, provided that tildes are placed
before and after the quantifier. Here are the four logical equivalences:

• ‘(x)Øx’ :: ‘~(Ǝx)~Øx’
• ‘(Ǝx)Øx’ :: ‘~(x)~Øx’
• ‘(x)~Øx’ :: ‘~(Ǝx)Øx’
• ‘(Ǝx)~Øx’ :: ‘~(x)Øx’

Note that double negation is silently employed. See (1) double negation and (2)
quantifier.

Chrysippus (born c. 280 BCE—died c. 206). Greek philosopher from Soli

(Soloi) who was the principal systematizer of Stoic philosophy. He is considered to
have been, with Zeno, cofounder of the academy at Athens Stoa (Greek: “Porch”).
Credited with about 750 writings, he was among the first to organize propositional
logic as an intellectual discipline (from Encyclopædia Britannica online). See proposi-
tional logic.

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class. A collection (group, aggregate) of individuals (objects) that have some spec-
ified characteristic (property) in common, the characteristic being known as the
class-defining characteristic.

class complement. See complement.

cogency. A property of (some) inductive arguments. An inductive argument is

cogent if and only if (1) it is strong and (2) it has true premises. Cogency is the
inductive analogue of deductive soundness. Cogency, like strength, is a matter of
degree; it is not, like validity or soundness, all or nothing. See (1) induction, (2)
strength, and (3) uncogency.

commutation (Com). In propositional logic, two replacement rules. The first

rule says that the disjuncts of a disjunction may be switched (i.e., rearranged). For-
mally, ‘(p Ú q)’ :: ‘(q Ú p)’. The second rule says that the conjuncts of a conjunction
may be switched. Formally, ‘(p • q)’ :: ‘(q • p)’.

compactness. A property of (some) deductive systems. A deductive system is

compact if and only if (1) it is complete and (2) if even one of its rules of inference
is eliminated, it becomes incomplete. See (1) completeness, (2) consistency 2, and (3)
deduction.

complement (a.k.a. complementary class, negative, and contradictory).

In categorical logic, the collection of all things that do not belong to a given class.
Example: the complement of the class of people is the class of all things that are
not people. The complement of a term (as opposed to a class) is formed by prefixing
“non” to it. Thus, “nonpeople,” however odd it may be as a linguistic item, is the
complement of “people.” The complement of “nonpeople,” however, is “people,”
not “nonnonpeople.” (Double negation is silently employed.) See class.

completeness. A property of (some) deductive systems. A deductive system is

complete if and only if all valid arguments are provable in it. See (1) compactness,
(2) consistency 2, and (3) deduction.

component. In propositional logic, x is a component of a proposition if and only

if (1) x is a proposition in its own right and (2) if x is replaced in the larger proposi-
tion with any other proposition, the result of that replacement is meaningful. For
example, in the proposition “The man who shot Lincoln was an actor,” the final
four words (“Lincoln was an actor”) satisfy the first requirement, but not the se-
cond; therefore, “Lincoln was an actor” is not a component of the larger proposi-
tion. See (1) compound proposition and (2) simple proposition.

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compound proposition. In propositional logic, a proposition that (1) contains
another proposition as a component and (2) remains meaningful when the compo-
nent is replaced with any other proposition. The components themselves may be
compound propositions. See (1) component and (2) simple proposition.

conclusion. In an argument, the proposition that is affirmed on the basis of the

other propositions (the premises) of the argument. That which is inferred from the
premises of a given argument. See (1) argument, (2) premise, and (3) proposition.

conclusion indicator. A word or phrase that indicates (but does not guarantee)
that what follows it is the conclusion of an argument. Examples: “therefore,”
“hence,” “thus,” “so,” “it follows that,” “consequently.” See (1) argument, (2) conclu-
sion, and (3) premise indicator.

condition. See (1) necessary condition, (2) necessary and sufficient condition, and
(3) sufficient condition.

conditional (a.k.a. hypothetical proposition and implicative proposi-

tion). In propositional logic, a truth-functional compound proposition formed by
putting “only if” between two propositions. Stated differently, a truth-functional
compound proposition expressed by an “if-then” sentence. A conditional contains
two component propositions, each of which has a name. The component following
the word “if” is the antecedent; the component following the word “then” is the
consequent. The symbol for a conditional is the horseshoe (“‫)”ﬤ‬. A conditional is
true unless both (1) its antecedent is true and (2) its consequent is false. Thus, ‘p ‫ﬤ‬
q’ is an abbreviation for (and is logically equivalent to) ‘~(p • ~q)’. In other words, a
conditional is true if either (1) its antecedent is false or (2) its consequent is true.
Thus, ‘p ‫ ﬤ‬q’ is an abbreviation for (and is logically equivalent to) ‘~p Ú q’. The
relation expressed by a conditional is material implication. See (1) antecedent, (2)
biconditional, (3) consequent, (4) material implication, and (5) truth-functional
compound proposition.

conditional proof. A method of proof that consists of (1) assuming the anteced-
ent of a required conditional on the first line of an indented sequence, (2) deriving
the consequent of the required conditional on a subsequent line, using only valid
rules of inference, and (3) discharging the indented sequence in a conditional that
exactly replicates the one to be obtained. See (1) conditional and (2) proof.

conditional validity. A property of (some) standard-form categorical syllogisms

(SFCSs). A conditionally valid argument is an argument that is valid on the condition

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that (i.e., if and only if) at least one member of a given class exists. See (1) uncondi-
tional validity and (2) validity.

conjuncts. The propositions (simple or compound) that make up a conjunction.

In the conjunction “Baseball is a sport and chess is not a sport,” the conjuncts are
“Baseball is a sport” (a simple proposition) and “Chess is not a sport” (a compound
proposition). Conjuncts can be referred to as “left” and “right” or as “first” and
“second.” Thus, “Baseball is a sport” is the first or left conjunct of the aforemen-
tioned conjunction, while “Chess is not a sport” is the second or right conjunct. See
(1) conjunction and (2) proposition.

conjunction.

1. (a.k.a. conjunctive proposition) A truth-functional propositional form. A

truth-functional compound proposition formed by putting “and” between
two propositions, which are called conjuncts. The symbol for conjunction
is the dot (“•”). A conjunction is true just in case both of its conjuncts are
true. See (1) conjuncts and (2) truth-functional compound proposition.
2. In propositional logic, a rule of inference (i.e., an elementary valid argu-
ment form, abbreviated as Conj) in which the conclusion is the conjunc-
tion of the argument’s two premises. Formally, ‘p’; ‘q’; therefore, ‘p • q’. See
(1) elementary valid argument form and (2) inference, rules of.

connective, logical. See operator, logical.

connective, truth-functional. In propositional logic, a symbol that either pre-

cedes a proposition or joins two propositions so as to produce a truth-functional
compound proposition. There are five truth-functional connectives: the tilde (“~”);
the dot (“•”); the wedge (“Ú”); the horseshoe (“‫ ;)”ﬤ‬and the triple bar (tribar) (“º”).
See truth-functional compound proposition.

consequent (a.k.a. apodosis). In propositional logic, the part of a conditional

that follows the word “then,” or, in the case of a symbolized expression, follows the
horseshoe. Example: In the conditional “If this is an even-numbered year, then
there are Congressional elections this year,” the consequent is “there are Congres-
sional elections this year.” In the symbolized expression ‘q ‫ ﬤ‬p’, the consequent is
‘p’. See (1) antecedent and (2) conditional.

consistency.

1. (a.k.a. joint satisfiability) A logical relation between (among) propositional

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 forms (or propositions). Propositional form X is consistent with proposi-
tional form Y (i.e., X and Y are consistent [with one another]) if and only
if it is logically possible for both X and Y to be true. Colloquially, X and Y
can both be true. Example: ‘p • q’ is consistent with ‘p Ú q’, since, in the
case in which both ‘p’ and ‘q’ are true, both compound propositions are
true. One may also speak of a set of propositional forms (or propositions)
being consistent or inconsistent. See inconsistency.
2. A property of (some) deductive systems. A deductive system is consistent
if and only if only valid arguments are provable in it. See (1) compactness
and (2) completeness.

constant. In predicate logic, a symbol (lowercase “a” through “w”) that names (de-
notes, refers to, picks out) an individual. Examples: “a” denotes Alice; “b” denotes
Boston; “c” denotes Colorado. See (1) individual and (2) variable.

constructive dilemma (CD). In propositional logic, a rule of inference (i.e., an

elementary valid argument form) in which the first premise is a conjunction of con-
ditionals, the second premise a disjunction of the antecedents of those condition-
als, and the conclusion a disjunction of the consequents of those conditionals. For-
mally, ‘(p ‫ ﬤ‬q) • (r ‫ ﬤ‬s)’; ‘p Ú r’; therefore, ‘q Ú s’. See (1) destructive dilemma (DD),
(2) elementary valid argument form, and (3) inference, rules of.

contingency (a.k.a. syntheticity). A logical property of propositional forms (or

propositions). Propositional form X is contingent (i.e., X is a contingent proposi-
tional form) if and only if (1) it is logically possible for X to be true and (2) it is
logically possible for X to be false. In other words, X is neither necessarily false nor
necessarily true. Example: ‘p • q’ is contingent. See (1) contingent proposition and
(2) contingent propositional form.

contingent proposition. Any proposition whose specific form is contingent.

For example, “If it’s raining, then the game is canceled” is a contingent proposition,
since its specific form, ‘p ‫ ﬤ‬q’, is contingent. See (1) contingency, (2) contingent
propositional form, and (3) specific form 2.

contingent propositional form. A propositional form that has both true and
false substitution instances. A propositional form that is neither necessarily true
nor necessarily false. In other words, a propositional form that is both possibly false
and possibly true. Example: ‘p • q’. See (1) contingency, (2) contingent proposition,
(3) propositional form, (4) self-consistent propositional form, (5) self-contradictory
propositional form, and (6) tautologous propositional form.

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contingent truth. A proposition that is true, but not necessarily so. Examples:
“Abraham Lincoln was the 16th president”; “the Boston Red Sox won the 2013
World Series”; “some bachelors are bald.” See necessary truth.

contradictoriness (a.k.a. denial). A logical relation between two propositional

forms (or propositions). Propositional form X is the contradictory of propositional
form Y (i.e., X and Y are contradictories [of one another]) if and only if (1) it is
logically impossible for both X and Y to be true and (2) it is logically impossible for
both X and Y to be false. In other words, X and Y necessarily have different truth
values. Colloquially, X and Y can’t both be true; X and Y can’t both be false. Ex-
ample: ‘p • q’ is the contradictory of ‘~p Ú ~q’. See contradictories.

contradictories. Two propositional forms (or propositions) are contradictories

(of one another) if and only if they stand in the logical relation of contradictoriness
to one another. In categorical logic, “A” and “O” propositions are contradictories,
as are “E” and “I” propositions. See contradictoriness.

contraposition. In categorical logic, an immediate inference that proceeds by (1)

replacing the proposition’s subject term with the complement of its predicate term
and (2) replacing the proposition’s predicate term with the complement of its sub-
ject term. The initial proposition is known as the premise; the resulting proposi-
tion is known as the contrapositive. Contraposition is logically equivalent to ob-
version, conversion, and obversion, in that order (use the acronym “OCO”). Thus,
‘All S are P’ becomes, successively, ‘No S are nonP’ (by obversion), ‘No nonP are S’
(by conversion), and ‘All nonP are nonS’ (by obversion). ‘Some S are not P’ becomes,
successively, ‘Some S are nonP’ (by obversion), ‘Some nonP are S’ (by conversion),
and ‘Some nonP are not nonS’ (by obversion).

Premise Contrapositive
All S are P All nonP are nonS
No S are P No nonP are nonS
Some S are P Some nonP are nonS
Some S are not P Some nonP are not nonS

See immediate inference.

contraposition per accidens (a.k.a. contraposition by limitation). In cate-

gorical logic, an immediate inference in which one contraposes an “E” proposition.
From ‘No S are P’, one infers ‘Some nonP are not nonS’. The inference is valid only
on the traditional (Aristotelian) interpretation of categorical propositions. The in-
ference is logically equivalent to subalternation and contraposition, in that order.
Thus, ‘No S are P’ becomes ‘Some S are not P’ (by subalternation), which becomes

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‘Some nonP are not nonS’ (by contraposition). See (1) contraposition, (2) conversion
per accidens, and (3) immediate inference.

contrapositive. The conclusion of an immediate inference by contraposition. See

(1) contraposition, (2) immediate inference, and (3) premise.

contraries. Two propositional forms (or propositions) are contraries (of one an-
other) if and only if they stand in the logical relation of contrariety to one another.
In categorical logic, “A” and “E” propositions are contraries on the traditional (Ar-
istotelian) interpretation but not on the modern (Boolean) interpretation. See (1)
contrariety and (2) subcontraries.

contrariety. A logical relation between two propositional forms (or proposi-

tions). Propositional form X is the contrary of propositional form Y (i.e., X and Y
are contraries [of one another]) if and only if (1) it is logically impossible for both
X and Y to be true and (2) it is logically possible for both X and Y to be false.
Colloquially, X and Y can’t both be true; X and Y can both be false. Example: ‘p •
q’ is the contrary of ‘~p • ~q’. See contraries.

converse.

1. In categorical logic, the conclusion of an immediate inference by conver-

sion. See (1) conversion, (2) convertend, and (3) immediate inference.
2. In predicate logic, the converse of a relation R is the relation that holds
between the objects b and a (in that order) whenever the relation R holds
between a and b (in that order). Examples: “less than” is the converse (i.e.,
flip side) of “greater than”; “parent of” is the converse of “child of”; “is loved
by” is the converse of “loves.” Note that “father of” is not the converse of
“son of,” because the child in question may be a daughter rather than a son.

conversion. In categorical logic, an immediate inference that proceeds by inter-

changing the subject and predicate terms of the proposition. The initial proposi-
tion is known as the convertend; the resulting proposition is known as the con-
verse.

Convertend Converse
All S are P All P are S
No S are P No P are S
Some S are P Some P are S
Some S are not P Some P are not S

See immediate inference.

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conversion per accidens (a.k.a. conversion by limitation). In categorical
logic, an immediate inference in which one converts an “A” proposition. From ‘All
S are P’, one infers ‘Some P are S’. The inference is valid only on the traditional
(Aristotelian) interpretation of categorical propositions. The inference is logically
equivalent to subalternation and conversion, in that order. Thus, ‘All S are P’ be-
comes ‘Some S are P’ (by subalternation), which becomes ‘Some P are S’ (by con-
version). See (1) contraposition per accidens, (2) conversion, and (3) immediate infer-
ence.

convertend. The premise of an immediate inference by conversion. See (1) con-

verse, (2) conversion, and (3) immediate inference.

copula. Some form of the verb “to be.” The copula connects (joins) the subject
and predicate terms of a standard-form categorical proposition. (Note: In this
course, for the sake of uniformity, we use “are” and “are not” as copulas, rather
than, say, “is” and “is not.”) See standard-form categorical proposition (SFCP).

correlation. A principle by which relations are classified. Some relations, such as

“A is a creditor of B,” are many-many, since many individuals can be a creditor of B
and many individuals can have A as a creditor. Some relations, such as “A is the son
of B,” are many-one, since many individuals can be the son of B, but only one indi-
vidual can have A as a son. Some relations, such as “A is the father of B,” are one-
many, since only one individual can be the father of B, but many individuals can
have A as their father. Some relations, such as “A is greater by one than B,” are one-
one, since only one individual can be greater by one than B, and only one individual
can be such that A is greater by one than it is. Here is a summary:

Many One
Many “is a creditor of” “is the son of”
One “is the father of” “is greater by one than”

corresponding conditional. To every argument form (or argument) there cor-

responds a conditional whose antecedent is the conjunction of the argument
form’s premises and whose consequent is the argument form’s conclusion. For ex-
ample, the corresponding conditional of the argument form ‘p ‫ ﬤ‬q’; ‘p’; therefore,
‘q’ (Modus Ponens) is ‘[(p ‫ ﬤ‬q) • p] ‫ ﬤ‬q’. An argument form is valid if and only if its
corresponding conditional is a tautologous propositional form. See (1) argument
form, (2) conditional, (3) Modus Ponens, and (4) tautologous propositional form.

counterdilemma. A way of rebutting (though not necessarily defeating or refut-

ing) a constructive dilemma (CD). It consists of constructing a second constructive

13

dilemma whose conclusion is opposed (either as contrary or as contradictory) to
the conclusion of the original. If the premises of the second (counter) dilemma are
true, then the original dilemma has at least one false premise. See constructive di-
lemma (CD).

counterexample. An example that counters, or goes against, a proposition or an

argument. For example, a black swan is a counterexample to the proposition that
all swans are white. See refutation by logical analogy, method of.

counterexample method of refutation. See refutation by logical analogy,

method of.

counterfactual. A counterfactual (usually indicated by the subjunctive mood) is

a conditional of the form “if p were to happen q would,” or “if p were to have hap-
pened q would have happened,” where the supposition of p is contrary (counter)
to the known fact that not-p. In truth-functional analysis, all counterfactuals are
true, since their antecedents are, by definition, false. But some counterfactuals
seem to be true, such as “If Joe Biden were a horse, then Joe Biden would have four
legs,” and some false, such as “If Joe Biden were a horse, then Joe Biden would have
five legs.” It follows that counterfactuals cannot (or should not) be interpreted as
material conditionals of the sort dealt with in propositional logic. See conditional.

deduction. See deductive argument.

deductive argument (a.k.a. deduction). A type of argument in which the ar-

guer claims that the conclusion follows necessarily (rather than probably) from the
premise(s). The claim, in other words, is that, given the truth of the premises, it is
logically impossible for the conclusion to be false. The claim, in other words, is that
the premises logically imply the conclusion. Deductive arguments are either valid
or invalid, depending on whether the claim made by the arguer is correct or incor-
rect. See (1) argument, (2) inductive argument, and (3) logical implication.

definiendum (Latin for “to be defined”). In a definition, the word or phrase

to be defined. See (1) definiens and (2) definition.

definiens (Latin for “defining thing”). In a definition, the defining phrase or

sentence. See (1) definiendum and (2) definition.

definition. A procedure for giving the meaning of a word or phrase. See (1) defin-
iendum and (2) definiens.

14

definition symbol (“=df”). An abbreviation for “equals (i.e., means) by defini-
tion.” Example: “puppy” =df “young dog.” This may be read as “The word ‘puppy’
means, by definition, ‘young dog.’ ” See definition.

De Morgan, Augustus (born 27 June 1806, Madura, India—died 18

March 1871, London, England). English mathematician and logician whose
major contributions to the study of logic include the formulation of De Morgan’s
laws and work leading to the development of the theory of relations and the rise of
modern symbolic, or mathematical, logic (from Encyclopædia Britannica online). See
De Morgan’s theorems (DM).

De Morgan’s theorems (DM). In propositional logic, two replacement rules.

The first rule says that the negation of the disjunction of two propositions is logi-
cally equivalent to the conjunction of the negations of the two propositions. For-
mally, ‘~(p Ú q)’ :: ‘~p • ~q’. The second rule says that the negation of the conjunc-
tion of two propositions is logically equivalent to the disjunction of the negations
of the two propositions. Formally, ‘~(p • q)’ :: ‘~p Ú ~q’. See De Morgan, Augustus.

denying the antecedent (DA), fallacy of. In propositional logic, an invalid syl-
logism (i.e., a formal fallacy) in which the first premise is a conditional, the second
premise the denial of the antecedent of that conditional, and the conclusion the
denial of the consequent of that conditional. The name derives from the fact that
the second premise denies the antecedent of the first premise. Formally, ‘p ‫ ﬤ‬q’; ‘~p’;
therefore, ‘~q’. See (1) affirming the consequent (AC), fallacy of and (2) Modus Tol-
lens.

destructive dilemma (DD). In propositional logic, a valid syllogism in which

the first premise is a conjunction of conditionals, the second premise a disjunction
of the denials of the consequents of those conditionals, and the conclusion a dis-
junction of the denials of the antecedents of those conditionals. Formally, ‘(p ‫ ﬤ‬q)
• (r ‫ ﬤ‬s)’; ‘~q Ú ~s’; therefore, ‘~p Ú ~r’. While valid, DD is not one of the eight rules
of inference (i.e., elementary valid argument forms), for it can be reduced to two
other rules: constructive dilemma (CD) and transposition (Trans). See (1) construc-
tive dilemma (CD) and (2) transposition (Trans).

direct proof. See (1) indirect proof and (2) proof.

direct truth table. Another name for a full (as opposed to a partial) truth table.
See (1) partial truth table and (2) truth table.

15

disjuncts (a.k.a. alternatives, alternants, and alternates). The proposi-
tions (simple or compound) that make up a disjunction. In “Joe is tired or Phil ate
Wheaties,” the disjuncts are “Joe is tired” and “Phil ate Wheaties.” Disjuncts can
be referred to as “left” and “right” or as “first” and “second.” Thus, “Joe is tired” is
the first or left disjunct of the disjunction, while “Phil ate Wheaties” is the second
or right disjunct. See disjunction.

disjunction (a.k.a. alternation and alternative proposition). A truth-func-

tional propositional form. A truth-functional compound proposition formed by
putting “or,” “unless,” or “if not” between two propositions, which are called dis-
juncts (or alternatives). The symbol for disjunction is the wedge (“Ú”). A disjunction
is true just in case at least one of its disjuncts is true. See (1) disjuncts and (2) truth-
functional compound proposition.

disjunctive syllogism (DS) (a.k.a. modus tollendo ponens). In propositional

logic, a rule of inference (i.e., an elementary valid argument form) in which the first
premise is a disjunction, the second premise the negation of the first disjunct of
the disjunction, and the conclusion the second disjunct of the disjunction. For-
mally, ‘p Ú q’; ‘~p’; therefore, ‘q’. See (1) elementary valid argument form and (2) in-
ference, rules of.

distribution.

1. In categorical logic, a proposition distributes a term if and only if it (the

proposition) refers to, or makes a claim about, all members of the class
designated (denoted) by the term. Universal propositions distribute their
subject term; negative propositions distribute their predicate term. Thus,
an “A” proposition (universal affirmative) distributes only its subject term;
an “E” proposition (universal negative) distributes both its subject term
and its predicate term; an “I” proposition (particular affirmative) distrib-
utes neither its subject term nor its predicate term; an “O” proposition
(particular negative) distributes only its predicate term.

Predicate Term Predicate Term

Distributed Not Distributed
Subject Term Dis- E A
tributed
Subject Term Not O I
Distributed

2. In propositional logic, two replacement rules (abbreviated as Dist). The

16

 first rule says that a proposition and a dot may be either distributed to or
collected from each disjunct of a disjunction. Formally, ‘p • (q Ú r)’ :: ‘(p • q)
Ú (p • r)’. The second rule says that a proposition and a wedge may be either
distributed to or collected from each conjunct of a conjunction. Formally,
‘p Ú (q • r)’ :: ‘(p Ú q) • (p Ú r)’. See replacement rules.

dot. In propositional logic, the symbol (“•”) for conjunction. See conjunction 1.

double colon (“::”). The symbol for logical equivalence. For example, ‘p’ :: ‘~~p’
means that the propositional form ‘p’ is logically equivalent to the propositional
form ‘~~p’. The double colon has a different logical status from symbols such as
“~,” “•,” “Ú,” “‫ﬤ‬,” and “º.” The latter are logical (i.e., truth-functional) operators on
propositions (or propositional forms); the double colon, by contrast, is a metalogi-
cal symbol about propositions (or propositional forms). See logical equivalence.

double negation (DN). In propositional logic, a replacement rule. It says that

tildes may be added or subtracted in pairs. Formally, ‘p’ :: ‘~~p’. See replacement
rules.

elementary valid argument. Any argument that is a substitution instance of an

elementary valid argument form (such as Modus Ponens). In other words, any argu-
ment that has a valid form is a valid argument. See elementary valid argument form.

elementary valid argument form. In propositional logic, any of eight argu-

ment forms (such as Modus Ponens) the conclusions of which follow logically from
(i.e., are logically implied by) the premises. When propositions are substituted for
the propositional variables—the same proposition being substituted for the same
propositional variable throughout—the result is a valid argument. In general, an
elementary valid argument form is an argument form the conclusion of which fol-
lows logically from the premise or premises. See (1) elementary valid argument and
(2) rules of implication.

end term. In categorical logic, a term that appears in the conclusion of a syllogism
but not in either of its premises. Contrasted with “middle term.” The major term
and the minor term are end terms.

Terms
End Middle
Major Minor
1 2 3

17

See (1) major term, (2) middle term, and (3) minor term.

entailment. See logical implication.

enthymeme. An argument that is stated incompletely, part of it being “under-

stood” and only “in the mind.” Example: All men are mortal; therefore, Socrates is
mortal. (The part being understood is “Socrates is a man.”) In categorical logic, if
the major premise is unstated (suppressed), the enthymeme is said to be of the first
order. If the minor premise is unstated (suppressed), the enthymeme is said to be
of the second order. If the conclusion is unstated (suppressed), the enthymeme is
said to be of the third order. See argument.

“E” proposition. In categorical logic, a universal negative standard-form cate-

gorical proposition: ‘No S are P’. See (1) “A” proposition, (2) “I” proposition, (3) “O”
proposition, and (4) standard-form categorical proposition (SFCP).

equivalence. Let “X” and “Y” be propositional forms. The following diagram dis-
plays (among other things) the difference between material equivalence and logical
equivalence:

Implication Equivalence
As a matter of fact, the follow- As a matter of fact, neither of
ing state of affairs does not ob- the following states of affairs
tain: X is true and Y is false. obtains: X is true and Y is
Material false; Y is true and X is
X materially implies Y. false.1

‘X ‫ ﬤ‬Y’ is true. X is materially equivalent to

Y.

‘X º Y’ is true.
Logically, the following state of Logically, neither of the fol-
affairs cannot obtain: X is true lowing states of affairs can ob-
and Y is false. tain: X is true and Y is false;
Logical Y is true and X is false.2

X logically implies Y. X is logically equivalent to Y.

1

Put differently, “As a matter of fact, X and Y have the same truth value.”
2
Put differently, “Logically, X and Y have the same truth value.”

18

 ‘X ‫ ﬤ‬Y’ is a tautology. ‘X º Y’ is a tautology.

See (1) logical equivalence, (2) material equivalence, and (3) tautology.

equivalence relation. A relation that is transitive, symmetrical, and reflexive.

Examples: “is congruent to”; “has the same number of members as”; “has the same
weight as”; “is identical to.” See (1) reflexivity, (2) relation, (3) symmetry, and (4) tran-
sitivity.

equivocation, fallacy of. An informal fallacy that occurs when a term is used in
different senses (equivocally, rather than univocally) in the same argument. Exam-
ple:

1. Knowledge is power.
2. All power corrupts.
Therefore,
3. Knowledge corrupts.

The word “power” is being used in different senses. In premise 1, it means “power
to (do something).” In premise 2, it means “power over (others).” In the first sense,
premise 1 is true but premise 2 is false. In the second sense, premise 2 is true but
premise 1 is false. Therefore, whichever sense is chosen, the argument is unsound.
See (1) fallacy, (2) informal fallacy, and (3) unsoundness.

escaping (going) between the horns of a dilemma. A way of defeating or re-

futing a constructive dilemma (CD). It consists of rejecting the disjunctive prem-
ise. Obviously, this is impossible if the disjunctive premise is a tautology (‘p Ú ~p’).
See (1) constructive dilemma (CD), (2) grasping (taking) the dilemma (bull) by the
horn(s), and (3) tautology.

exceptive proposition. A proposition (such as “All except employees are eligi-

ble”) that is a conjunction of categorical propositions rather than a single categor-
ical proposition. The proposition mentioned is analyzed as (1) “All nonemployees
are eligible” and (2) “No employees are eligible.” Together, these two propositions
assert that the classes in question (employees and eligible persons) are complemen-
tary. Other phrases that are analyzed as exceptive propositions, besides ‘All except
S are P’, are ‘Almost all S are P’, ‘Not quite all S are P’, and ‘All but a few S are P’.
See conjunction.

excluded middle, law (principle) of (a.k.a. tertium non datur). One of the
three laws (principles) of thought. It asserts that every object either has or lacks a

19

given property. Formally, (x)(Øx Ú ~Øx). It follows from this law that every propo-
sition either has or lacks the property of truth, i.e., that every proposition is either
true or not true, i.e., that every proposition of the form ‘p Ú ~p’ is true. The law of
excluded middle is not to be confused with the law of bivalence, which asserts that
every proposition is either true or false.

Law of excluded middle Every proposition is either true or not true (this
is an instance of the more general law that every
object either has or lacks a given property).
Law of bivalence Every proposition is either true or false.

See (1) bivalence, law (principle) of, (2) identity, law (principle) of, (3) laws (princi-
ples) of thought, and (4) noncontradiction, law (principle) of.

exclusive (strong) disjunction. In propositional logic, a disjunction that is true

whenever exactly one of its disjuncts is true. If both disjuncts are true or both false,
the disjunction is false. See (1) disjunction and (2) inclusive (weak) disjunction.

exclusive “or.” See exclusive (strong) disjunction.

existential assumption, fallacy of. The fallacy of assuming that a class has
members if it is not asserted explicitly that it does. See fallacy.

existential fallacy. See existential assumption, fallacy of.

existential generalization (EG). In predicate logic, an operation (i.e., an ele-

mentary valid argument form) that consists of (1) introducing an existential quan-
tifier immediately prior to a proposition, a propositional function, or another
quantifier; and (2) replacing at least one occurrence of the constant or variable that
appears in the proposition or propositional function with the variable that appears
in the quantifier. Formally, ‘Øa-z’; therefore, ‘(Ǝx)Øx’. In English, this says either
(1) “Individual a-w is Ø; therefore, something is Ø” or (2) “Anything (i.e., any arbi-
trarily selected individual) is Ø; therefore, something is Ø.” See (1) elementary valid
argument form and (2) existential quantifier.

existential import. A proposition is said to have existential import if it is typi-

cally uttered to assert the existence of objects of some specified kind. On the tra-
ditional (Aristotelian) interpretation of categorical propositions, all four standard-
form categorical propositions (“A,” “E,” “I,” and “O”) have existential import. On
the modern (Boolean) interpretation, only particular propositions (“I” and “O”)

20

have existential import. See (1) square of opposition and (2) standard-form categor-
ical proposition (SFCP).

existential instantiation (EI). In predicate logic, an operation (i.e., an elemen-

tary valid argument form) that consists of removing an existential quantifier and
replacing every variable bound by that quantifier with the same constant. The con-
stant must be a new name that does not appear in any previous line of the proof
(including the line that contains the final premise, a slash mark, and the conclu-
sion). Formally, ‘(Ǝx)Øx’; therefore, ‘Øa-w’. In English, this says “Something is Ø;
therefore, (let) individual a-w (be the individual that) is Ø.” See (1) elementary valid
argument form and (2) existential quantifier.

existential name. The name given to the individual that is claimed to exist by an
existentially quantified proposition. Existential instantiation (EI) consists of infer-
ring ‘Øa’ from ‘(Ǝx)Øx’ (read as “Something is Ø, so let ‘a’ be its name”). The exis-
tential name in this case is “a.” See (1) existential instantiation (EI) and (2) instantial
letter.

existential quantifier. In predicate logic, the symbol ‘(Ǝx)’, as in ‘(Ǝx)Øx’ (read

as “There is at least one x such that x is Ø,” or, in better English, “Something is
Ø”). The quantifier used to translate particular (“I” and “O”) propositions. See (1)
quantifier and (2) universal quantifier.

exportation (Exp). In propositional logic, a replacement rule. It says that a con-

ditional with a conjunction as its antecedent is logically equivalent to a conditional
the antecedent of which is the first conjunct of the antecedent of the original prop-
osition and the consequent of which is a conditional the antecedent of which is
the second conjunct of the antecedent of the original proposition and the conse-
quent of which is the consequent of the original proposition. Formally, ‘(p • q) ‫ ﬤ‬r’
:: ‘p ‫( ﬤ‬q ‫ ﬤ‬r)’. See replacement rules.

fallacy. An argument (or argument form) that appears to be correct but is not. An
argument (or argument form) that is psychologically attractive (plausible, alluring),
and therefore commonly made, but which is logically infirm. An error or mistake
in reasoning other than the employment of false premises. Fallacy is not the same
as sophistry, which is the deliberate use of unsound reasoning for some ulterior
purpose, such as deception, “winning” an argument, or undermining proper discus-
sion. Every fallacy is either formal or informal, depending on whether it can be
detected merely through an examination of the form or structure of the argument.
If it can be so detected, then it is a formal fallacy; if it cannot be so detected, but
requires attention to content or context, then it is an informal fallacy. See (1) formal

21

fallacy, (2) informal fallacy, and (3) paralogism.

fallacy of affirming the consequent (AC). See affirming the consequent (AC),
fallacy of.

fallacy of denying the antecedent (DA). See denying the antecedent (DA), fal-
lacy of.

fallacy of equivocation. See equivocation, fallacy of.

fallacy of existential assumption. See existential assumption, fallacy of.

fallacy of illicit process of the major term (a.k.a. illicit major). See illicit
process of the major term, fallacy of.

fallacy of illicit process of the minor term (a.k.a. illicit minor). See illicit
process of the minor term, fallacy of.

fallacy of undistributed middle. See undistributed middle, fallacy of.

falsity (falsehood). A property of (some) propositions. A proposition is false

when it incorrectly describes how things are, and true otherwise. See (1) proposition
and (2) truth.

figure. In categorical logic, the figure of a standard-form categorical syllogism in-

dicates the position of the middle term in the premises—and therefore the “logical
shape” of the syllogism. There are four figures:

1. The middle term is the subject term of the major premise and the predi-
cate term of the minor premise.
2. The middle term is the predicate term of both premises.
3. The middle term is the subject term of both premises.
4. The middle term is the predicate term of the major premise and the sub-
ject term of the minor premise.

Figure
1 2 3 4
----- M ----- P ----- P ----- M ----- M ----- P ----- P ----- M
----- S ----- M ----- S ----- M ----- M ----- S ----- M ----- S
----- S ----- P ----- S ----- P ----- S ----- P ----- S ----- P

Each of the 64 moods (AAA through OOO) can occur with each of the four figures

22

(1 through 4), which gives a total of 256 distinct standard-form categorical syllo-
gisms. Example: AIO-3:

1. All M are P.
2. Some M are S.
Therefore,
3. Some S are not P.

Only 24 of the 256 standard-form categorical syllogisms (9.3%) are valid: 15 of them
unconditionally and nine conditionally (the condition being the existence of mem-
bers of one of the three classes). See (1) mood and (2) standard-form categorical syl-
logism (SFCS).

finite-universe method of proving invalidity. In predicate logic, a method of

proving the invalidity of an argument in which one shows that there is a possible
universe or model containing at least one individual such that the argument’s prem-
ises are true and its conclusion false of that model. One begins with a one-member
universe or model. If this model does not produce the desired result, then one
moves to a two-member universe or model. If this model does not produce the
desired result, then one moves to a three-member universe or model—and so on,
until one either produces the desired result or gives up. Failing to prove invalidity
is not equivalent to proving validity. The most one can say, having tried unsuccess-
fully to prove invalidity, is that the argument is probably valid, the degree of proba-
bility being a function of (1) how long and how hard one tried to prove invalidity
and (2) one’s intelligence and ingenuity. See validity.

formal fallacy. A fallacy that can be detected merely by examination of the form
or structure of the argument. See (1) fallacy and (2) informal fallacy.

formal logic. The type of logic in which the reasoning being studied is expressed
in artificial (as opposed to natural) language. See (1) artificial symbolic language, (2)
informal logic, (3) logic, and (4) natural language.

formal proof (of validity). A formal proof that a given argument (or argument
form) is valid is a sequence of propositions each of which is either a premise of that
argument or follows from preceding propositions of the sequence by an elementary
valid argument, and the last proposition in the sequence is the conclusion of the
argument whose validity is being proved. A formal proof of validity is effective in
the sense that it can be mechanically decided of any given sequence whether it is a
proof. Constructing a formal proof, by contrast, is not an effective procedure, for
there is no guarantee that one will be able to “figure out” how to derive the con-
clusion from the premise(s), given the rules of inference. In this respect, formal

23

proof is unlike truth tables, which are completely mechanical. See (1) proof, (2) truth
table, and (3) validity.

free variable. In predicate logic, a variable that is not bound by a quantifier. See
(1) bound variable and (2) quantifier.

Frege, Gottlob (born 8 November 1848, Wismar, Mecklenburg-Schwe-

rin—died 26 July 1925, Bad Kleinen, Germany). German mathematician
and logician, who founded modern mathematical logic. Working on the borderline
between philosophy and mathematics—viz., in the philosophy of mathematics and
mathematical logic (in which no intellectual precedents existed)—Frege discov-
ered, on his own, the fundamental ideas that have made possible the whole modern
development of logic and thereby invented an entire discipline (from Encyclopædia
Britannica online). See predicate logic.

full truth table. Another name for a truth table (contrasted with a partial truth
table). See (1) partial truth table and (2) truth table.

generalization (a.k.a. quantification). In predicate logic, the formation of a

proposition from a propositional function by placing a universal or existential
quantifier before it. For example, the propositional function ‘Jx’ (“x is a jaywalker”)
is generalized as the proposition ‘(x)Jx’ (“Everything is a jaywalker”) or the propo-
sition ‘(Ǝx)Jx’ (“Something is a jaywalker”). See (1) existential quantifier, (2) proposi-
tional function, (3) quantifier, and (4) universal quantifier.

general proposition. A quantified proposition, such as ‘All S are P’, ‘No S are P’,
‘Some S are P’, and ‘Some S are not P’. See singular proposition.

grasping (taking) the dilemma (bull) by the horn(s). A way of defeating or

refuting a constructive dilemma (CD). It consists of rejecting the conjunctive
premise, the two conjuncts of which are conditionals. To reject the first condi-
tional (and therefore the conjunction as a whole) is to grasp the bull by the left
horn; to reject the second conditional (and therefore the conjunction as a whole)
is to grasp the bull by the right horn. One can, of course, grasp the bull by both
horns. See (1) constructive dilemma (CD) and (2) escaping (going) between the horns
of a dilemma.

Greek letters “Ø” (phi) and “Ψ” (psi). In predicate logic, symbols that repre-
sent predicates or attributes. Just as “x,” “y,” and “z” are variables for objects, “Ø”
and “Ψ” are variables for attributes. The propositional function ‘Øx’ may be read
as “x is Ø.” If “x” is replaced with “a,” the name for, say, Allen Buchanan, and “Ø”

24

is replaced with “P,” for the attribute “is a philosopher,” then we have the propo-
sition ‘Pa,’ which says that Allen Buchanan is a philosopher (i.e., has the property
of being a philosopher). Propositions, unlike propositional functions, are either
true or false. (Propositional functions are neither true nor false; they lack truth
value.) It is true that Allen Buchanan (one of my teachers at the University of Ari-
zona during the 1980s) is a philosopher. See (1) attribute and (2) variable.

horseshoe. In propositional logic, the symbol (“‫ )”ﬤ‬for material implication. See
material implication 1.

hypothetical. See conditional.

hypothetical syllogism (HS) (a.k.a. pure hypothetical syllogism). In

propositional logic, a rule of inference (i.e., an elementary valid argument form) in
which (1) both premises and the conclusion are conditionals, (2) the antecedent of
the first premise is identical to the antecedent of the conclusion, (3) the consequent
of the first premise is identical to the antecedent of the second premise, and (4)
the consequent of the second premise is identical to the consequent of the conclu-
sion. Formally, ‘p ‫ ﬤ‬q’; ‘q ‫ ﬤ‬r’; therefore, ‘p ‫ ﬤ‬r’. See (1) elementary valid argument
form and (2) inference, rules of.

identity. A relation that holds (obtains) only between an object and itself. To say
that x and y are identical is to say that they are the same thing. Everything is iden-
tical with itself and with nothing else. Examples: Cicero is identical with (i.e., is the
same thing as) Tully (symbolized as “Cicero = Tully”); the longest river in South
America = the Amazon; Whitman = the author of Leaves of Grass; 13 = the sixth
prime number. The relation of identity is transitive, symmetrical, and reflexive:

• Transitive: (x)(y)(z){[(x = y) • (y = z)] ‫( ﬤ‬x = z)}

• Symmetrical: (x)(y)[(x = y) ‫( ﬤ‬y = x)]
• Reflexive: (x)(x = x)

See (1) reflexivity, (2) relation, (3) symmetry, and (4) transitivity.

identity, law (principle) of. One of the three laws (principles) of thought. It
asserts that every object that has a given property has that property. Formally,
(x)(Øx ‫ ﬤ‬Øx). It follows from this law that every proposition that has the property
of truth has the property of truth, i.e., that every proposition that is true is true,
i.e., that every proposition of the form ‘p ‫ ﬤ‬p’ is true, i.e., that every proposition
materially implies itself. See (1) excluded middle, law (principle) of, (2) laws (princi-

25

ples) of thought, (3), material implication 1, and (4) noncontradiction, law (princi-
ple) of.

iff. An abbreviation for “if and only if.” See biconditional.

illicit contraposition. A formal fallacy that occurs when the conclusion of an

argument depends on the contraposition of an “E” or an “I” proposition:

• No S are P; therefore, no nonP are nonS.

• Some S are P; therefore, some nonP are nonS.

Here are counterexamples (i.e., refutations by logical analogy):

• No gorillas are lions (true); therefore, no nonlions are nongorillas (false).

• Some animals are nondogs (true); therefore, some dogs are nonanimals
(false).

See (1) contraposition, (2) fallacy, and (3) formal fallacy.

illicit contrariety. A fallacy that occurs when the conclusion of an argument de-
pends on an incorrect application of the contrary relation.

• Suppose S’s exist. Then “A” and “E” propositions are contraries, for, while
it is possible for both propositions to be false, it is not possible for both
propositions to be true. It follows that (1) if the “A” proposition is true,
then the corresponding “E” proposition is false; and (2) if the “E” proposi-
tion is true, then the corresponding “A” proposition is false. This is a cor-
rect (i.e., nonfallacious) application of the contrary relation.
• Suppose S’s do not exist. Then “A” and “E” propositions are not contraries,
for it is possible for both propositions to be true (indeed, both are true).
To infer the falsity of one from the truth of the other is to commit the
fallacy of illicit contrariety.

See (1) contrariety and (2) fallacy.

illicit conversion. A formal fallacy that occurs when the conclusion of an argu-
ment depends on the conversion of an “A” or an “O” proposition:

• All S are P; therefore, all P are S.

• Some S are not P; therefore, some P are not S.

26

Here are counterexamples (i.e., refutations by logical analogy):

• All dogs are animals (true); therefore, all animals are dogs (false).
• Some vegetables are not carrots (true); therefore, some carrots are not veg-
etables (false).

See (1) conversion, (2) fallacy, and (3) formal fallacy.

illicit major. See illicit process of the major term, fallacy of.

illicit minor. See illicit process of the minor term, fallacy of.

illicit process of the major term, fallacy of. In a valid standard-form categor-
ical syllogism, if an end term is distributed in the conclusion, then it must be dis-
tributed in the premises. Any syllogism in which the major term is distributed in
the conclusion but not in the major premise commits the (formal) fallacy of illicit
process of the major term (or, more briefly, illicit major). See (1) end term, (2) fallacy,
(3) formal fallacy, (4) major term, and (5) standard-form categorical syllogism
(SFCS).

illicit process of the minor term, fallacy of. In a valid standard-form categor-
ical syllogism, if an end term is distributed in the conclusion, then it must be dis-
tributed in the premises. Any syllogism in which the minor term is distributed in
the conclusion but not in the minor premise commits the (formal) fallacy of illicit
process of the minor term (or, more briefly, illicit minor). See (1) end term, (2) fal-
lacy, (3) formal fallacy, (4) minor term, and (5) standard-form categorical syllogism
(SFCS).

illicit subalternation. A fallacy that occurs when the conclusion of an argument

depends on an incorrect application of the subalternation relation.

• Suppose S’s exist. Then (1) the “A” proposition is the superaltern of the
corresponding “I” proposition, for (a) it is not possible for the “A” propo-
sition to be true while the corresponding “I” proposition is false and (b) it
is possible for the “I” proposition to be true while the corresponding “A”
proposition is false; and (2) the “E” proposition is the superaltern of the
corresponding “O” proposition, for (a) it is not possible for the “E” propo-
sition to be true while the corresponding “O” proposition is false and (b) it
is possible for the “O” proposition to be true while the corresponding “E”
proposition is false. It follows that (1) if the “I” proposition is false, then

27

 the corresponding “A” proposition is false and (2) if the “O” proposition is
false, then the corresponding “E” proposition is false. This is a correct (i.e.,
nonfallacious) application of the subalternation relation.
• Suppose S’s do not exist. Then (1) the “A” proposition is not the superal-
tern of the corresponding “I” proposition, for it is possible for the “A”
proposition to be true while the corresponding “I” proposition is false (in-
deed, the “A” proposition is true and the corresponding “I” proposition is
false); and (2) the “E” proposition is not the superaltern of the correspond-
ing “O” proposition, for it is possible for the “E” proposition to be true
while the corresponding “O” proposition is false (indeed, the “E” proposi-
tion is true and the corresponding “O” proposition is false). To infer the
truth of the “I” proposition from the truth of the corresponding “A” prop-
osition, or the truth of the “O” proposition from the truth of the corre-
sponding “E” proposition, is to commit the fallacy of illicit subalternation.

See (1) fallacy and (2) subalternation.

illicit subcontrariety. A fallacy that occurs when the conclusion of an argument

depends on an incorrect application of the subcontrary relation.

• Suppose S’s exist. Then “I” and “O” propositions are subcontraries, for,
while it is possible for both propositions to be true, it is not possible for
both propositions to be false. It follows that (1) if the “I” proposition is
false, then the corresponding “O” proposition is true; and (2) if the “O”
proposition is false, then the corresponding “I” proposition is true. This is
a correct (i.e., nonfallacious) application of the subcontrary relation.
• Suppose S’s do not exist. Then “I” and “O” propositions are not subcon-
traries, for it is possible for both propositions to be false (indeed, both are
false). To infer the truth of one from the falsity of the other is to commit
the fallacy of illicit subcontrariety.

See (1) fallacy and (2) subcontrariety.

immediate inference. An inference in which a conclusion is drawn from a single

premise, without the mediation of a second premise. Examples include conversion,
obversion, contraposition, simplification (Simp), and tautology (Taut). See (1) infer-
ence and (2) mediate inference.

implication. Let “X” and “Y” be propositional forms. The following diagram dis-
plays (among other things) the difference between material implication and logical
implication:

28

 Implication Equivalence
As a matter of fact, the follow- As a matter of fact, neither of
ing state of affairs does not ob- the following states of affairs
tain: X is true and Y is false. obtains: X is true and Y is
Material false; Y is true and X is
X materially implies Y. false.3

‘X ‫ ﬤ‬Y’ is true. X is materially equivalent to

Y.

‘X º Y’ is true.
Logically, the following state of Logically, neither of the fol-
affairs cannot obtain: X is true lowing states of affairs can ob-
and Y is false. tain: X is true and Y is false;
Logical Y is true and X is false.4

X logically implies Y. X is logically equivalent to Y.

‘X ‫ ﬤ‬Y’ is a tautology. ‘X º Y’ is a tautology.

See (1) logical implication, (2) material implication, and (3) tautology.

implication rules. In propositional logic, eight rules (Modus Ponens, Modus Tol-
lens, Hypothetical Syllogism, Disjunctive Syllogism, Constructive Dilemma, Sim-
plification, Conjunction, and Addition) that allow a particular propositional form
to be inferred from one or more other specified propositional forms. In each case,
the conjunction of the premises logically implies the conclusion (but not con-
versely). The rules (i.e., elementary valid argument forms) are applicable only to
whole lines of a proof. See (1) elementary valid argument form, (2) inference, rules
of, (3) logical implication, and (4) replacement rules.

inclusive (weak) disjunction. In propositional logic, a disjunction that is true

whenever at least one of its disjuncts is true. The only time an inclusive (weak)
disjunction is false is when both disjuncts are false. See (1) disjunction and (2) exclu-
sive (strong) disjunction.

inclusive “or.” See inclusive (weak) disjunction.

3

Put differently, “As a matter of fact, X and Y have the same truth value.”
4
Put differently, “Logically, X and Y have the same truth value.”

29

inconsistency (a.k.a. joint unsatisfiability). A logical relation between
(among) propositional forms (or propositions). Propositional form X is incon-
sistent with propositional form Y (i.e., X and Y are inconsistent [with one an-
other]) if and only if it is logically impossible for both X and Y to be true, i.e., if
and only if at least one of the propositional forms (X or Y) is false. Colloquially, X
and Y can’t both be true. Example: ‘p ‫ ﬤ‬q’ is inconsistent with ‘p • ~q’. One may
also speak of a set of propositional forms (or propositions) being consistent or in-
consistent. See consistency.

independence (a.k.a. irrelevance). A logical relation between two proposi-

tional forms (or propositions). Propositional form X is independent of proposi-
tional form Y (i.e., X and Y are independent [of one another]) if and only if (1) it is
logically possible for X to be true while Y is false; (2) it is logically possible for Y to
be true while X is false; (3) it is logically possible for both X and Y to be true; and
(4) it is logically possible for both X and Y to be false. Colloquially, X can be true
while Y is false; Y can be true while X is false; X and Y can both be true; X and Y
can both be false. Example: ‘p’ and ‘p º q’ are independent of one another. See log-
ical implication.

indicator. See (1) conclusion indicator and (2) premise indicator.

indirect proof (a.k.a. reductio ad absurdum). A method of proof that consists

of (1) assuming the negation of a required proposition on the first line of an in-
dented sequence, (2) deriving a self-contradiction on a subsequent line, and then
(3) discharging the indented sequence by asserting the negation of the assumed
proposition (i.e., by affirming the required proposition). Example: to prove ‘p’, as-
sume ‘~p’ and derive ‘r • ~r’; then conclude ‘~~p’, which is logically equivalent to ‘p’.
See (1) negation, (2) proof, and (3) self-contradiction.

indirect truth table. Another name for a partial truth table. The contrast is with
a direct (full) truth table. See (1) partial truth table and (2) truth table.

individual. In predicate logic, any thing—such as a country, a city, or a person—

of which an attribute can be meaningfully predicated. Examples: Argentina, Chi-
cago, Barack Obama. Individuals are denoted by constants (as opposed to varia-
bles). See (1) attribute and (2) constant.

individual constant. See constant.

individual variable. See variable.

30

induction. See inductive argument.

inductive argument (a.k.a. induction). A type of argument in which the ar-

guer claims that the conclusion follows probably (rather than necessarily) from the
premise(s). The claim, in other words, is that, given the truth of the premises, it is
improbable for the conclusion to be false. Inductive arguments are either strong
or weak, depending on whether the claim made by the arguer is correct or incor-
rect. Strictly speaking, all inductive arguments are invalid, since, in an inductive
argument, the truth of the premises is consistent with the falsity of the conclusion.
See (1) argument, (2) consistency 1, (3) deductive argument, and (4) validity.

inference. A psychological (mental), and hence temporal, process by which one

proposition is arrived at and affirmed on the basis of one or more other proposi-
tions, which are accepted as the starting point of the process. An inference may be
expressed as an argument if the objective is to persuade someone. (One typically
does not argue with oneself.) Do not confuse inference with logical implication.
We make inferences; we do not make, but discover, logical implications. See (1) ar-
gument and (2) proposition.

inference, rules of. In propositional logic, a set of rules consisting of eight im-
plication rules (i.e., elementary valid argument forms) and 10 replacement rules, for
a total of 18 rules. The rules provide the means by which the conclusion of an ar-
gument may be derived from its premises. See (1) implication rules and (2) replace-
ment rules.

informal fallacy. A fallacy that cannot be detected merely by examination of the

form or structure of the argument. The content or context must also be examined.
See (1) fallacy and (2) formal fallacy.

informal logic. The type of logic in which the reasoning being studied is ex-
pressed in natural (as opposed to artificial) language. See (1) artificial symbolic lan-
guage, (2) formal logic, (3) logic, and (4) natural language.

instantial letter. The letter (a variable or a constant) that is introduced by uni-

versal instantiation (UI) or by existential instantiation (EI). See (1) constant, (2) ex-
istential instantiation (EI), (3) existential name, (4) universal instantiation (UI), and
(5) variable.

instantiation. In predicate logic, the formation of a proposition from a proposi-

tional function by substituting an individual constant for its individual variable. For
example, the propositional function ‘Jx’ (“x is a jaywalker”) is instantiated as the

31

propositions ‘Ja’ (“Allen is a jaywalker”), ‘Jb’ (“Billy Bob is a jaywalker”), and ‘Jc’
(“Carl is a jaywalker”). See (1) constant, (2) propositional function, and (3) variable.

intransitivity. A relation in which, if one thing has that relation to a second and
the second has that relation to a third, then the first cannot have that relation to
the third. Symbolically: (x)(y)(z)[(Rxy • Ryz) ‫~ ﬤ‬Rxz]. Examples: “is the mother of,”
“is the father of,” “is a child of,” “weighs exactly two pounds more than.” See (1)
nontransitivity, (2) relation, and (3) transitivity.

invalidity. See validity.

“I” proposition. In categorical logic, a particular affirmative standard-form cat-

egorical proposition: ‘Some S are P’. See (1) “A” proposition, (2) “E” proposition, (3)
“O” proposition, and (4) standard-form categorical proposition (SFCP).

irreflexivity. A relation that a thing cannot have to itself. Symbolically: (x)~Rxx.

Examples: “is the parent of,” “is greater than,” “is north of,” “is married to,” “is not
a member of the same family as.” See (1) nonreflexivity, (2) reflexivity, and (3) rela-
tion.

irrelevance. See independence.

justification. In a proof, the justification of a given line (proposition) consists of

one or more numerals, which refer to the preceding propositions from which the
given line is inferred, together with the abbreviation for the rule(s) of inference by
which the given line follows from the preceding propositions. Strictly speaking, the
justification is not part of the proof, but a supplement to it; it is a help and should
always be included. See (1) inference, rules of and (2) proof.

large scope. See scope.

law (principle) of excluded middle. See excluded middle, law (principle) of.

law (principle) of identity. See identity, law (principle) of.

law (principle) of noncontradiction (a.k.a. law [principle] of contradic-

tion). See noncontradiction, law (principle) of.

laws of distribution. In predicate logic, two replacement rules:

• ‘(x)(Øx • Ψx)’ :: ‘(x)Øx • (x)Ψx’. (Translation: “Everything is both Ø and Ψ”

32

 is logically equivalent to “Everything is Ø and everything is Ψ.”)
• ‘(Ǝx)(Øx v Ψx)’ :: ‘(Ǝx)Øx v (Ǝx)Ψx’. (Translation: “Something is either Ø or
Ψ” is logically equivalent to “Either something is Ø or something is Ψ.”)

The first rule says (in effect) that a universal quantifier may be either distributed
to or collected from each of two conjuncts. The second rule says that an existential
quantifier may be either distributed to or collected from each of two disjuncts. See
replacement rules.

laws (principles) of thought. Three fundamental laws (principles) that are be-
lieved to be necessary and sufficient for “correct” or rational thinking. These laws
(principles) are the Law of Identity, the Law of Noncontradiction, and the Law of
Excluded Middle. See (1) excluded middle, law (principle) of, (2) identity, law (prin-
ciple) of, and (3) noncontradiction, law (principle) of.

lens. In categorical logic, the part of a Venn diagram that is shaded by an “E”
proposition. The term comes from geometry. See (1) “E” proposition, (2) lune, and
(3) Venn diagram.

logic. From the Greek word “logos,” which could mean any of the following, de-
pending on the context: statement, principle, law, reason, proportion, speech,
thought, word, meaning, or explanation. “Logic” is defined variously as (1) the sci-
ence (study) of logical implication, or valid inference; (2) the science (study) of the
methods and principles used to distinguish good (correct) from bad (incorrect) rea-
soning; (3) the science (study) that evaluates arguments or argument forms; and (4)
the normative study of reasoning. Based on this final definition, logic is concerned
with categories 3 and 4 in the following diagram:

Types of Reasoning
Theoretical Practical
(Issues in (Issues in
Belief) Action)
Empirical (Descriptive/Explana-
Types of tory) (The Real) (What Is) 1 2
Study of Normative (Prescriptive/Justifica-
Reasoning tory) (The Ideal) (What Ought to 3 4
Be)

logical connective. See operator, logical.

logical consequence. See logical implication.

33

logical equivalence (a.k.a. equivalence, mutual logical implication, mu-
tual strict implication, mutual entailment, and mutual logical conse-
quence). A logical relation between two propositional forms (or propositions).
Propositional form X is logically equivalent to propositional form Y (i.e., X and Y
are logically equivalent [to one another]) if and only if (1) it is logically impossible
for X to be true while Y is false and (2) it is logically impossible for Y to be true
while X is false. In other words, (1) X logically implies Y and (2) Y logically implies
X. In other words, X and Y necessarily have the same truth value. Colloquially, X
can’t be true while Y is false; Y can’t be true while X is false. Example: ‘p ‫ ﬤ‬q’ is
logically equivalent to ‘~p Ú q’. See (1) logical implication, (2) replacement rules, and
(3) material equivalence.

logical implication (a.k.a. implication, strict implication, entailment,

formal implication, tautologous implication, logical consequence, and
deducibility). A logical relation between two propositional forms (or proposi-
tions). Propositional form X logically implies propositional form Y if and only if it
is logically impossible for X to be true while Y is false. Colloquially, X can’t be true
while Y is false. Example: ‘p’ logically implies ‘p Ú q’. See (1) implication rules, (2)
material implication, and (3) validity.

logically undetermined truth value. A condition that exists or obtains when

the truth value of a given propositional form cannot be determined solely by the
truth value of some other propositional form. For example, if all one knows is that
‘p’ is true, then the truth value of ‘p • q’ is logically undetermined. See (1) truth value
and (2) propositional form.

logical operator. See operator, logical.

lune. In categorical logic, the part of a Venn diagram that is shaded by an “A”
proposition. The term comes from geometry. See (1) “A” proposition, (2) lens, and
(3) Venn diagram.

main operator. In propositional logic, the operator (connective) in a compound

proposition that has as its scope everything else in the proposition. For example,
in ‘[(p Ú ~q) • (r • s)] • ~(m ‫ ﬤ‬n)’, the main operator is the third dot from the left.
The proposition is a conjunction, the left conjunct of which is itself a conjunction
and the right conjunct of which is a negated conditional. The left conjunct is a
conjunction of a disjunction and a conjunction. The right disjunct of the disjunc-
tion is a negation. See (1) compound proposition and (2) operator, logical.

34

major premise. In categorical logic, the premise that contains the major term.
See (1) major term and (2) minor premise.

major term. In categorical logic, the term that occurs as the predicate of the
conclusion. See (1) end term, (2) major premise, (3) middle term, and (4) minor term.

material equivalence.

1. A truth-functional propositional form. The relation expressed by a truth-

functional biconditional. A truth-functional compound proposition
formed by putting “if and only if” or “just in case” between two proposi-
tions. The symbol for material equivalence is the triple bar (tribar) (“º”).
Propositional form X is materially equivalent to propositional form Y if
and only if (a) both X and Y are true or (b) both X and Y are false. Alter-
natively, propositional form X is materially equivalent to propositional
form Y if and only if X and Y materially imply each other. See (1) bicondi-
tional, (2) logical equivalence, (3) material implication, and (4) truth-func-
tional compound proposition.
2. In propositional logic, two replacement rules (abbreviated as ME). The
first rule says that a biconditional may be replaced with a conjunction of
the two conditionals (or vice versa). Formally, ‘p º q’ :: ‘(p ‫ ﬤ‬q) • (q ‫ ﬤ‬p)’.
The second rule says that a biconditional may be replaced with a disjunc-
tion, the first disjunct of which is a conjunction of the two propositions
making up the biconditional and the second disjunct of which is a conjunc-
tion of the negations of the two propositions making up the biconditional
(or vice versa). Formally, ‘p º q’ :: ‘(p • q) Ú (~p • ~q)’. See replacement rules.

material implication.

1. A truth-functional propositional form. The relation expressed by a truth-

functional conditional. A truth-functional compound proposition formed
by putting “only if” between two propositions or by using the expression
“if-then.” The symbol for material implication is the horseshoe (“‫)”ﬤ‬. Prop-
ositional form X materially implies propositional form Y if and only if it is
not the case that X is true while Y is false, i.e., if and only if either X is
false or Y is true. See (1) conditional, (2) logical implication, (3) material
equivalence, and (4) truth-functional compound proposition.
2. In propositional logic, a replacement rule (abbreviated as MI). It says two
things: (1) that a conditional may be turned into a disjunction, provided
that its antecedent is negated; and (2) that a disjunction may be turned into
a conditional, provided that its first disjunct is negated. Formally, ‘p ‫ ﬤ‬q’ ::

35

 ‘~p Ú q’. See replacement rules.

material implication, paradoxes of. The horseshoe symbol (“‫ )”ﬤ‬is defined as
a material conditional, so ‘p ‫ ﬤ‬q’ means nothing more (or less) than ‘~(p • ~q)’. All
this says is that, as a matter of fact, it is not the case that the antecedent is true while
the consequent is false. There are two paradoxical implications of this definition:

• If a given proposition is true, then it is materially implied by any proposi-

tion whatever. Formally, ‘p ‫( ﬤ‬q ‫ ﬤ‬p)’.
• If a given proposition is false, then it materially implies any proposition
whatever. Formally, ‘~p ‫( ﬤ‬p ‫ ﬤ‬q).’

(Both of these are tautologous propositional forms.) The following proposition,

therefore, is true: “If the moon is made of green cheese (F), then the earth is round
(T).” The paradox is resolved when one realizes that material implication states no
meaning relation between the antecedent and the consequent. Hence, the fact that
the antecedent and the consequent have unrelated subject matter has no bearing
on the truth of the conditional of which they are parts. See (1) material implication
and (2) tautologous propositional form.

mediate inference. An inference in which a conclusion is drawn from two or

more premises. In the case of a syllogism, the conclusion is supposed to be drawn
from the first premise through the mediation of the second. Examples include cat-
egorical syllogisms (from categorical logic) and Modus Ponens (from propositional
logic). See (1) immediate inference, (2) inference, and (3) syllogism.

method of refutation by logical analogy. See refutation by logical analogy,

method of.

middle term. In categorical logic, the term that appears in both premises but not
in the conclusion. Contrasted with “end term.” See (1) end term, (2) major term, and
(3) minor term.

minor premise. In categorical logic, the premise that contains the minor term.
See (1) major premise and (2) minor term.

minor term. In categorical logic, the term that occurs as the subject of the con-
clusion. See (1) end term, (2) major term, (3) middle term, and (4) minor premise.

mnemonic terms. Names—such as “Barbara,” “Celarent,” and “Ferison”—that

36

medieval logicians introduced for the valid syllogisms. See Barbara.

modern (Boolean) square of opposition. See square of opposition.

modus ponens (MP) (a.k.a. modus ponendo ponens, affirming the anteced-
ent, and mixed hypothetical syllogism). In propositional logic, a rule of infer-
ence (i.e., an elementary valid argument form) in which the first premise is a con-
ditional, the second premise the antecedent of that conditional, and the conclusion
the consequent of that conditional. Formally, ‘p ‫ ﬤ‬q’; ‘p’; therefore, ‘q’. Modus Ponens
can be thought of as asserting the following: “Anything materially implied by a
truth is true.” See (1) elementary valid argument form and (2) inference, rules of.

modus tollens (MT) (a.k.a. modus tollendo Tollens, denying the conse-
quent, and mixed hypothetical syllogism). In propositional logic, a rule of
inference (i.e., an elementary valid argument form) in which the first premise is a
conditional, the second premise the denial of the consequent of that conditional,
and the conclusion the denial of the antecedent of that conditional. Formally, ‘p ‫ﬤ‬
q’; ‘~q’; therefore, ‘~p’. Modus Tollens can be thought of as asserting the following:
“Anything that materially implies a falsehood is false.” See (1) elementary valid ar-
gument form and (2) inference, rules of.

monadic predicate. A predicate used to assign an attribute to individual things.

See (1) attribute and (2) relational (polyadic) predicate.

mood. In categorical logic, the mood of a standard-form categorical syllogism is

represented by three capital letters, the first of which names the form of the syllo-
gism’s major premise, the second of which names the form of the syllogism’s minor
premise, and the third of which names the form of the syllogism’s conclusion. Ex-
ample: AEO. There are 64 moods, ranging from AAA to OOO. See (1) figure, (2)
major premise, (3) minor premise, and (4) standard-form categorical syllogism
(SFCS).

mutual entailment. See logical equivalence.

mutual logical consequence. See logical equivalence.

mutual logical implication. See logical equivalence.

mutual strict implication. See logical equivalence.

n-ary (n-adic, polyadic) relation. A relation that holds (obtains) between or

37

among n individuals, i.e., an n-place relation. See relation.

natural deduction. A proof procedure by which the conclusion of a deductive

argument is derived from the argument’s premises through the use of rules of in-
ference. See (1) deductive argument, (2) inference, rules of, and (3) proof.

natural language. A language, such as English, French, modern Greek, ancient

Greek, Latin, or Chinese, that arose gradually, typically over a long period of time,
with contributions made by many people, as opposed to being created by a partic-
ular person or persons at a particular time for a particular purpose. See artificial
symbolic language.

necessary and sufficient condition. A condition that is both necessary (essen-

tial) and sufficient (adequate) for something (else) to be the case. Examples: Being
a young dog is both necessary and sufficient for being a puppy; receiving a final
score of 90 or higher in this course is both necessary and sufficient for receiving an
A in this course. Two propositions that are materially equivalent to one another
are necessary and sufficient for one another, since they materially imply each other.
The symbol for material equivalence is the triple bar (tribar) (“º”), which is read as
“if and only if.” Hence, “p º q” may be read as “p if and only if q” or as “p is necessary
and sufficient for q.” See (1) material equivalence, (2) necessary condition, and (3)
sufficient condition.

necessary condition. The condition represented by the consequent in a condi-

tional. Example: In the conditional “If 4 > 3, then 4 > 2,” four’s being greater than
two is a necessary condition of four’s being greater than three. In the conditional
‘p É q’, ‘q’ is a necessary condition of ‘p’. See (1) conditional and (2) sufficient condi-
tion.

necessary truth. A proposition that cannot (logically) be false. Examples: “All

green books in the room are green objects”; “two plus two equals four”; “no bach-
elor is married.” See contingent truth.

negation (a.k.a. contradictory and denial). A truth-functional propositional

form. A truth-functional compound proposition formed by putting “not,” “it is
false that,” or “it is not the case that” in front of a proposition. The symbol for
negation is the tilde (“~”). A negation is true just in case the negated proposition is
false. See truth-functional compound proposition.

negative proposition. In categorical logic, a proposition that asserts that one

class is excluded from another, either totally or partially. A proposition that denies

38

class membership. If the claim is one of totality, then the proposition is universal
(‘No S are P’). If the claim is one of partiality, then the proposition is particular
(‘Some S are not P’). See (1) affirmative proposition, (2) “E” proposition, and (3) “O”
proposition.

nego. Latin for “I deny.” In categorical logic, the letter names “E” and “O” come
from the two vowels of the word “nego.” The “E” proposition is universal negative;
the “O” proposition is particular negative. See (1) affirmo, (2) “E” proposition, and
(3) “O” proposition.

“no.” The universal negative quantifier, as in ‘No S are P’. See (1) “all” and (2)
“some.”

noncontradiction, law (principle) of (a.k.a. law [principle] of contradic-

tion). One of the three laws (principles) of thought. It asserts that no proposition
both has and lacks a given property. Formally, (x)~(Øx • ~Øx). It follows from this
law that no proposition both has and lacks the property of truth, i.e., that no propo-
sition is both true and not true, i.e., that every proposition of the form ‘~(p • ~p)’
is true, or, equivalently, that every proposition of the form ‘p • ~p’ is false. See (1)
excluded middle, law (principle) of, (2) identity, law (principle) of, and (3) laws (prin-
ciples) of thought.

nonreflexivity. A relation that is neither reflexive nor irreflexive. Examples:

“loves,” “hates,” “criticizes.” See (1) irreflexivity, (2) reflexivity, and (3) relation.

nonsymmetry. A relation that is neither symmetrical nor asymmetrical. Exam-

ples: “is a brother of,” “weighs no more than,” “loves.” See (1) asymmetry, (2) rela-
tion, and (3) symmetry.

nontransitivity. A relation that is neither transitive nor intransitive. Examples:

“is a friend of,” “is a brother of,” “is not a brother of,” “loves,” “is discriminably
different from,” “has a different weight than.” See (1) intransitivity, (2) relation, and
(3) transitivity.

normal-form formula (NFF). In predicate logic, a formula in which negation

signs (if there are any) apply only to simple predicates. Examples:

NFF Not a NFF

(x)(~Fx v Gx) ~(Ǝx)(Fx • ~Gx)
(x)(Fx ‫~ ﬤ‬Gx) (x)~(Fx • ~Gx)

39

 (Ǝx)(Fx • Gx) (x)(~Fx Ú ~~Gx)

See simple predicate.

obverse. The conclusion of an immediate inference by obversion. See (1) immedi-

ate inference, (2) obversion, and (3) obvertend.

obversion. In categorical logic, an immediate inference that proceeds by (1)

changing the quality of the proposition and (2) replacing the predicate term with
its complement. The initial proposition is known as the obvertend; the resulting
proposition is known as the obverse.

Obvertend Obverse
All S are P No S are nonP
No S are P All S are nonP
Some S are P Some S are not nonP
Some S are not P Some S are nonP

See (1) complement, (2) immediate inference, (3) predicate term, and (4) quality.

obvertend. The premise of an immediate inference by obversion. See (1) imme-

diate inference, (2) obverse, and (3) obversion.

Ockham’s Razor (a.k.a. the principle of parsimony). The principle, origi-

nally expressed in Latin as entia non sunt multiplicanda praeter necessitatem, that enti-
ties are not to be multiplied beyond necessity. Modern version: “Keep it simple,
stupid.” See Ockham, William of.

Ockham, William of (also called William Ockham, Ockham also spelled

Occam, by name Venerabilis Inceptor [Latin: “Venerable Enter-
priser”], or Doctor Invincibilis [“Invincible Doctor”]) (born c. 1285,
Ockham, Surrey?, England—died 1347/49, Munich, Bavaria [now in
Germany]). Franciscan philosopher, theologian, and political writer, a late scho-
lastic thinker regarded as the founder of a form of nominalism—the school of
thought that denies that universal concepts such as “father” have any reality apart
from the individual things signified by the universal or general term (from Ency-
clopædia Britannica online). See Ockham’s Razor.

operator, logical (a.k.a. logical connective). In propositional logic, a special

symbol used to translate ordinary-language propositions. The five truth-functional
logical operators/connectives are the tilde, the dot, the wedge, the horseshoe, and

40

the triple bar (tribar). See connective, truth-functional.

“O” proposition. In categorical logic, a particular negative standard-form cate-

gorical proposition: ‘Some S are not P’. See (1) “A” proposition, (2) “E” proposition,
(3) “I” proposition, and (4) standard-form categorical proposition (SFCP).

opposition. In categorical logic, two standard-form categorical propositions hav-

ing the same subject and predicate terms are opposed to one another when they
differ in quality or quantity or both. The square of opposition depicts (displays) the
various types of opposition between “A,” “E,” “I,” and “O” propositions. “A” and
“E” propositions are opposed in quality, with “A” being affirmative and “E” nega-
tive. “A” and “I” propositions are opposed in quantity, with “A” being universal and
“I” particular. “A” and “O” propositions are opposed in both quantity and quality,
with “A” being universal affirmative and “O” being particular negative. See (1)
square of opposition and (2) standard-form categorical proposition (SFCP).

ordering relation. A relation that is transitive, asymmetrical, and irreflexive. Ex-

amples: “is greater than”; “is earlier than”; “is more intelligent than”; “is heavier
than”; “is north of.” See (1) asymmetry, (2) irreflexivity, (3) relation, and (4) transitiv-
ity.

overlapping quantifiers. Quantifiers that lie within the scope of one another.
Examples:

• (x)(y)Dxy (“Everything is different from everything”)

• (Ǝx)(Ǝy)Dxy (“Something is different from something”)
• (x)(Ǝy)Dxy (“Everything is different from something [or other]”)
• (Ǝx)(y)Dxy (“Something is different from everything”)

See (1) quantifier and (2) scope.

paradox of strict implication. See technical validity.

paradoxes of material implication. See material implication, paradoxes of.

paralogism. Any fallacious reasoning. See (1) fallacy and (2) reasoning.

partial truth table (a.k.a. indirect truth table). In propositional logic, a

method of proving—without having to construct a full truth table (which might be
unwieldy)—either (1) the validity or invalidity of an argument or (2) the consistency
or inconsistency of a set of two or more propositions.

41

 • For validity/invalidity, the method consists of assuming that the argument
is invalid by assigning the truth value true to each premise and the truth
value false to the conclusion. If this necessarily leads to a contradiction,
then the assumption (of invalidity) is false, which means that the argument
is valid. If it does not necessarily lead to a contradiction, then the argument
is invalid (for it will have been shown that it is possible for the premises to
be true while the conclusion is false).
• For consistency/inconsistency, the method consists of assuming that the
set of propositions is consistent by assigning the truth value true to each
proposition in the set. If this necessarily leads to a contradiction, then the
assumption (of consistency) is false, which means that the set of proposi-
tions is inconsistent. If it does not necessarily lead to a contradiction, then
the set of propositions is consistent (for it will have been shown that it is
possible for all the propositions to be true).

See (1) indirect proof and (2) truth table.

particular affirmative proposition. In categorical logic, the “I” proposition,

‘Some S are P’. It asserts that one class is partially included (contained) in another.
See “I” proposition.

particular negative proposition. In categorical logic, the “O” proposition,

‘Some S are not P’. It asserts that one class is partially excluded from another. See
“O” proposition.

particular proposition. In categorical logic, a proposition that asserts that one

class is partially included (contained) in or partially excluded from another class. If
the claim is one of inclusion, then the proposition is affirmative (‘Some S are P’). If
the claim is one of exclusion, then the proposition is negative (‘Some S are not P’).
See universal proposition.

Peirce, Charles Sanders (born 10 September 1839, Cambridge, Massa-

chusetts—died 19 April 1914, near Milford, Pennsylvania). American sci-
entist, logician, and philosopher who is noted for his work on the logic of relations
and on pragmatism as a method of research (from Encyclopædia Britannica online).
See Peirce’s Law.

Peirce’s Law. The tautologous propositional form ‘[(p ‫ ﬤ‬q) ‫ ﬤ‬p] ‫ ﬤ‬p’. See (1)
Peirce, Charles Sanders and (2) tautologous propositional form.

42

practical reasoning. Reasoning that culminates in action (as opposed to belief).
The reasoning is designed to help the reasoner decide what to do. See (1) reasoning
and (2) theoretical reasoning.

predicate. See attribute.

predicate calculus (a.k.a. predicative calculus and functional calculus).

The logical theory of inferences involving quantifiers. See (1) predicate logic and (2)
quantification.

predicate logic (a.k.a. quantification theory). The logic of predicates, or

quantification. A type of logic that combines the distinctive features of categorical
logic and propositional logic. Predicate logic facilitates analysis of arguments about
individuals (e.g., Socrates), about properties of individuals (e.g., being a Greek phi-
losopher), and about relations between individuals (e.g., Socrates being the teacher
of Plato). See (1) categorical logic, (2) Frege, Gottlob, and (3) propositional logic.

predicate term. In a standard-form categorical proposition, the term that comes

immediately after the copula. See (1) copula, (2) standard-form categorical proposi-
tion (SFCP), and (3) subject term.

premise.

1. In an argument, a proposition (there may be more than one) that is af-

firmed (or assumed) as providing support or reasons for accepting the con-
clusion. A member of the set of propositions, assumed for the course of an
argument, from which a conclusion is inferred. See (1) argument, (2) conclu-
sion, and (3) proposition.
2. In categorical logic, the premise of an immediate inference by contraposi-
tion. See (1) contraposition, (2) contrapositive, and (3) immediate inference.

premise indicator. A word or phrase that indicates (but does not guarantee) that
what follows it is the premise of an argument. Examples: “since,” “because,” “for,”
“as,” “for the reason that,” “inasmuch as.” See (1) conclusion indicator and (2) prem-
ise.

proof. Demonstration of validity (in the case of arguments) or truth (in the case
of propositions). With regard to validity, a proof that a given argument is valid is a
sequence of propositions each of which is either a premise of that argument or
follows from preceding propositions of the sequence by an elementary valid argu-
ment form, and the final proposition in the sequence is the conclusion of the argu-
ment whose validity is being proved. See (1) indirect proof and (2) validity.

43

proposition. That which is asserted or denied by a declarative sentence. An ob-
ject of belief (“I believe that aliens exist”), nonbelief (“I do not believe that aliens
exist”), or disbelief (“I believe that aliens do not exist”). The meaning of a declarative
sentence. The bearer of truth value. Every proposition is either true or false, and
no proposition is both true and false. We may not know, in a particular case, which
truth value a proposition has; for example, it is unknown whether Abraham Lin-
coln thought about his son Tad just moments before he (Lincoln) was shot, though
it is either true or false that he did so. Synonym: statement. See sentence.

propositional calculus. The logical calculus (i.e., calculating machine) whose ex-
pressions are letters representing propositions, and special symbols representing
operations on those propositions, to produce propositions of greater complexity.
The operations are negation (symbolized by “~”), conjunction (“•”), disjunction
(“Ú”), material implication (“‫)”ﬤ‬, and material equivalence (“º”). See propositional
logic.

propositional form. Any sequence of symbols containing propositional varia-

bles and logical operators but no propositions, such that when propositions are
substituted for the propositional variables—the same proposition being substi-
tuted for the same propositional variable throughout—the result is a proposition.
See (1) operator, logical and (2) proposition.

propositional function. In predicate logic, an expression that (1) contains an

individual variable and (2) becomes a proposition when either (a) an individual con-
stant is substituted for the individual variable (this is known as instantiation) or (b)
a universal or existential quantifier is placed before the expression (this is known
as generalization). The expression that remains when a quantifier is removed from
a proposition. An expression which contains one or more variables and which ex-
presses a proposition when values are given to the variables. See (1) generalization
and (2) instantiation.

propositional logic. The logic of propositions. Unlike categorical logic, which is

concerned with relations between categories or classes of objects, propositional
logic is concerned with propositions, which are either true or false. Propositions
are represented by letters, which are combined by means of logical operators to
form more complex symbolic representations. See (1) categorical logic, (2) Chrysip-
pus, (3) predicate logic, and (4) proposition.

propositional variable. In propositional logic, a letter for which, or in place of

which, a proposition may be substituted. For example, in the expression ‘p ‫ ﬤ‬q’, ‘p’

44

and ‘q’ are propositional variables. To avoid confusion, we use lowercase letters
from the middle part of the alphabet: ‘p’, ‘q’, ‘r’, ‘s’, and so forth. See proposition.

punctuation. In propositional logic, parentheses (“(. . .)”), brackets (“[. . .]”), and
braces (“{. . .}”) are used to disambiguate (i.e., eliminate the ambiguity of) ambiguous
expressions. For example, ‘p • q Ú r’ is ambiguous; it might mean a conjunction
whose right conjunct is a disjunction (i.e., ‘p • (q Ú r))’, or it might mean a disjunc-
tion whose left disjunct is a conjunction (i.e., ‘(p • q) Ú r)’). See (1) conjunction and
(2) disjunction.

quality. A property of categorical propositions. The quality of a categorical prop-

osition is either affirmative or negative, depending on whether class inclusion
(complete or partial) is affirmed or denied by the proposition. If class inclusion is
affirmed, the proposition is affirmative. If class inclusion is denied, the proposition
is negative. See (1) categorical proposition and (2) quantity.

quantification. See generalization.

quantification rules. In predicate logic, a set of four elementary valid argument

forms: existential generalization (EG), existential instantiation (EI), universal gen-
eralization (UG), and universal instantiation (UI). These argument forms permit
the construction of proofs of validity for arguments (such as “All men are mortal;
Socrates is a man; therefore, Socrates is mortal”) whose validity turns on the inner
structures of noncompound propositions occurring in them. See (1) elementary
valid argument form, (2) existential generalization (EG), (3) existential instantiation
(EI), (4) universal generalization (UG), and (5) universal instantiation (UI).

quantifier. In categorical logic, the words “all, “no,” and “some.” In predicate
logic, the symbols “(x)” (universal quantifier) and “(Ǝx)” (existential quantifier). See
(1) “all,” (2) existential quantifier, (3) “no,” (4) “some,” and (5) universal quantifier.

quantifier convention. In predicate logic, the convention (stipulation, agree-

ment) that in any quantified proposition, the quantifier applies to the smallest par-
ticle that the punctuation permits. Thus, the following is a disjunction (a com-
pound proposition), the first disjunct of which is a universally quantified proposi-
tion and the second disjunct of which is an existentially quantified proposition:
(x)Øx Ú (Ǝx)~Øx. The following is a universally quantified proposition (a simple
proposition): (x)(Øx ‫~ ﬤ‬Ψx). The first is read as “Either everything is Ø or some-
thing is not Ø.” The second is read as “No Ø are Ψ.” See quantifier.

45

quantity. A property of categorical propositions. The quantity of a categorical
proposition is either universal or particular, depending on whether the proposition
refers to all members or only some members of the class designated by its subject
term. If the proposition refers to all members, it is universal. If the proposition
refers to only some members, it is particular. See quality.

quaternary (tetradic) relation. A relation that holds (obtains) between or

among four individuals, i.e., a four-place relation. For example, “Dave, Tom, Bill,
and Margaret played bridge together,” “America bought Alaska from Russia for
seven million dollars,” and “The Texas Rangers traded Ian Kinsler to the Detroit
Tigers for Prince Fielder.” See relation.

reasoning. A special kind of thinking in which problems are solved or in which

inference takes place, that is, in which conclusions are drawn from premises. All
reasoning is thinking, but not all thinking is reasoning. Some reasoning culminates
in action; this is known as practical reasoning. Some reasoning culminates in belief;
this is known as theoretical reasoning. See (1) inference, (2) practical reasoning, and
(3) theoretical reasoning.

reductio ad absurdum (a.k.a. reductio ad impossibile). The method of prov-

ing a proposition true by showing that its denial, together with other propositions
assumed to be true, leads to (i.e., logically implies) a contradiction. See indirect
proof.

reflexivity. A relation that a thing must have to itself. Symbolically: (x)Rxx. Ex-
amples: “is the same age as,” “is equal to,” “is congruent to,” “is as intelligent as,”
“has the same color hair as,” “is a contemporary of,” “is a member of the same fam-
ily as,” “is identical with.” See (1) irreflexivity, (2) nonreflexivity, and (3) relation.

refutation. Proof of the invalidity of an argument (or, in the case of a proposition,

of its falsehood). Do not confuse refutation with rebuttal. A rebuttal is an attempt
to refute. A refutation is a successful rebuttal. See validity.

refutation by logical analogy, method of. Any fallacious deductive argument

can, in principle, be proved invalid by finding a second argument that has exactly
the same form as the first and is known to be invalid by the fact that its premises
are known to be true while its conclusion is known to be false. Failure to think of
a refuting analogy does not prove the argument to be valid; it may simply reflect
the limitations of one’s thinking, attention, or creativity. See (1) counterexample
and (2) fallacy.

refute. See refutation.

46

relation. A way in which two or more things (objects) stand to one another. (The
contrast is with objects having properties.) Here are nine important properties
(characteristics) of binary (dyadic) relations:

Relational Symbolic Example How to Pithy For-

Property Expression Read It (Let mulation
(Let “R” Be the Domain
the Rela- Be Persons)
tion in
Question)
Symmetry (x)(y)(Rxy ‫ﬤ‬ x is a sibling For any two Siblinghood
Ryx) of y persons x and is symmet-
y, if x is a sib- rical.
ling of y, then
y is a sibling
of x.
Asymmetry (x)(y)(Rxy ‫ﬤ‬ x is the fa- For any two Fatherhood
~Ryx) ther of y persons x and is asymmet-
y, if x is the fa- rical.
ther of y, then
y is not the fa-
ther of x.
Nonsymmetry ----- x is a ----- Brotherhood
brother of y is nonsym-
metrical.
(Suppose x is
a brother of
y; y may or
may not be a
brother of
x.)
Transitivity (x)(y)(z)[(Rxy x is older For any three Age is transi-
• Ryz) ‫ ﬤ‬Rxz] than y persons x, y, tive.
and z, if x is
older than y
and y is older
than z, then x
is older than
z.
Intransitivity (x)(y)(z)[(Rxy x is the For any three Motherhood
mother of y persons x, y,

47

 • Ryz) ‫ﬤ‬ and z, if x is is intransi-
~Rxz] the mother of tive.
y and y is the
mother of z,
then x is not
the mother of
z.
Nontransitivity ----- x is a friend ----- Friendship is
of y nontransi-
tive. (Sup-
pose x is a
friend of y
and y is a
friend of z; x
may or may
not be a
friend of z.)
Reflexivity (x)Rxx x is the Everybody is Sameness of
same age as the same age age is reflex-
y as himself or ive.
herself.
Irreflexivity (x)~Rxx x is the par- Nobody is the Parenthood
ent of y parent of him- is irreflexive.
self or herself.
Nonreflexivity ----- x loves y ----- Love is non-
reflexive.
(Some peo-
ple love
themselves
and some do
not.)

See the entry for each listed term (e.g., symmetry) for elaboration and additional
examples. See binary (dyadic) relation.

relational (polyadic) predicate. A predicate that expresses a connection be-

tween (or among) two or more individuals. See monadic predicate.

replacement, axiom of. An axiom (first principle) to the effect that logically
equivalent expressions may replace (be substituted for) one another wherever they
occur in a proof sequence. See (1) logical equivalence, (2) proof, and (3) replacement
rules.

48

replacement rules. In propositional logic, 10 rules (De Morgan’s theorems,
Commutation, Association, Distribution, Double Negation, Transposition, Mate-
rial Implication, Material Equivalence, Exportation, and Tautology) that allow re-
placement of one propositional form with another form that is logically equivalent
to it. The replacement may occur on a whole line or on any part of a line. See (1)
implication rules, (2) inference, rules of, (3) logical equivalence, and (4) replacement,
axiom of.

rhetorical question. A sentence that has the form of an interrogative (typically

with a question mark) but which functions as an informative. Example: “Do you
really believe that the Dallas Cowboys will win the 2018 Super Bowl?” (Meaning:
The Dallas Cowboys will not win the 2018 Super Bowl.) See sentence.

rules and fallacies for syllogisms. See syllogistic rules and fallacies.

rules of inference. See inference, rules of.

rules of replacement. See replacement rules.

schema of a standard-form categorical proposition. A schema or skeleton

has four parts: quantifier, subject term, copula, and predicate term. See (1) copula,
(2) predicate term, (3) quantifier, (4) standard-form categorical proposition (SFCP),
and (5) subject term.

scope. That to which a quantifier applies (or ranges over). For example, in “(x)Øx
• (Ǝx)Ψx,” the scope of the universal quantifier is “Øx.” In “(x)(Øx ‫ ﬤ‬Ψx),” the scope
of the universal quantifier is “(Øx ‫ ﬤ‬Ψx).” The universal quantifier has small scope
in the first example and large scope in the second example. See (1) existential quan-
tifier and (2) universal quantifier.

self-consistency (a.k.a. satisfiability and consistency). A logical property

of propositional forms (or propositions). Propositional form X is self-consistent
(i.e., X is a self-consistent propositional form) if and only if it is logically possible
for X to be true. In other words, X is not necessarily false. Example: ‘~p’ is self-
consistent. See (1) self-consistent proposition and (2) self-consistent propositional
form.

self-consistent proposition. Any proposition whose specific form is self-con-

sistent. For example, “If it’s raining, then the game is canceled” is a self-consistent
proposition, since its specific form, ‘p ‫ ﬤ‬q’, is a self-consistent propositional form.

49

See (1) self-consistency and (2) self-consistent propositional form.

self-consistent propositional form. A propositional form that has at least one

true substitution instance. A propositional form that is not necessarily false. In
other words, a propositional form that is possibly true. Example: ‘p ‫~ ﬤ‬p’. See (1)
contingent propositional form, (2) propositional form, (3) self-consistency, (4) self-
consistent proposition, (5) self-contradictory propositional form, and (6) tautolo-
gous propositional form.

self-contradiction (a.k.a. self-contradictory proposition). Any proposi-

tion whose specific form is self-contradictory. For example, “It’s raining and it’s
not raining” is a self-contradiction, since its specific form, ‘p • ~p’, is a self-contra-
dictory propositional form. A proposition that both asserts and denies some other
proposition. See (1) self-contradictoriness and (2) self-contradictory propositional
form.

self-contradictoriness (a.k.a. unsatisfiability, inconsistency, and logical

falsehood). A logical property of propositional forms (or propositions). Proposi-
tional form X is self-contradictory (i.e., X is a self-contradiction) if and only if it is
logically impossible for X to be true. In other words, X is necessarily false. Exam-
ple: ‘p • ~p’ is self-contradictory. See (1) self-contradiction and (2) self-contradictory
propositional form.

self-contradictory propositional form. A propositional form that has only

false substitution instances. A propositional form that is necessarily false, logically
false, formally false, or false by virtue of its form alone. In other words, a proposi-
tional form that cannot be true. Example: ‘p • ~p’. See (1) contingent propositional
form, (2) propositional form, (3) self-consistent propositional form, (4) self-contra-
diction, (5) self-contradictoriness, and (6) tautologous propositional form.

sentence. A unit of language (i.e., a linguistic entity) that expresses a complete

thought. Every sentence is in a particular language, such as English. Two sentences
that have the same meaning are said to be synonymous (i.e., to bear the relation of
synonymy). A sentence that has more than one meaning is said to be ambiguous
(i.e., to have the property of ambiguity). Sentences can be declarative (e.g., “The
Boston Red Sox won the 2013 World Series”), imperative (“Please close the door”),
interrogative (“Where is the library?”), or exclamatory (“Hooray!”). See (1) ambigu-
ity, (2) proposition, and (3) synonymy.

simple predicate. In predicate logic, a propositional function having some true

50

and some false substitution instances, each of which is an affirmative singular prop-
osition. See (1) predicate and (2) propositional function.

simple proposition. In propositional logic, a proposition that does not contain

any other proposition as a component. See (1) component and (2) compound prop-
osition.

simplification (Simp). In propositional logic, a rule of inference (i.e., an elemen-

tary valid argument form) in which the premise is a conjunction and the conclusion
is the first conjunct of that conjunction. Formally, ‘p • q’; therefore, ‘p’. See (1) ele-
mentary valid argument form and (2) inference, rules of.

singular proposition. A proposition that affirms or denies that a specified indi-

vidual (object) has a specified attribute. Examples: “Socrates is a philosopher” (an
affirmative singular proposition); “This table is not an antique” (a negative singular
proposition). See (1) general proposition and (2) proposition.

small scope. See scope.

“some.” The particular affirmative and particular negative quantifier, as in (re-

spectively) ‘Some S are P’ and ‘Some S are not P’. In logic, the word “some” means
“at least one.” Thus, it does not follow from the fact that ‘Some S are P’ that ‘Some
S are not P’; nor does it follow from the fact that ‘Some S are not P’ that ‘Some S
are P’. See (1) “all,” (2) “no,” and (3) quantifier.

sorites. A chain of syllogisms in which the conclusion of one is a premise in an-

other, in which all the conclusions except the last one are unexpressed, and in
which the premises are so arranged that any two successive ones contain a common
term. More generally, a chain argument in which only the premises and the final
conclusion are stated, the intermediate conclusions being hidden or suppressed.
See (1) chain argument and (2) syllogism.

soundness. A property of (some) deductive arguments. A deductive argument is

sound if and only if (1) it is valid and (2) it has true premises. It follows from this
definition—though it is not part of the definition—that all sound arguments have true
conclusions. If the conclusion of a particular deductive argument is false, therefore,
then the argument is unsound—either because it is invalid or because it has at least
one false premise, or both. Soundness is the deductive analogue of inductive co-
gency. Soundness, like validity, is all or nothing; it is not a matter of degree. See (1)
truth, (2) unsoundness, and (3) validity.

specific form.

51

 1. The specific form of a given argument is the argument form that results
when each different proposition of the argument is replaced with a differ-
ent propositional variable. For example, the specific form of the argument
‘B ‫ ﬤ‬G’; ‘G’; therefore, ‘B’ is ‘p ‫ ﬤ‬q’; ‘q’; therefore, ‘p’, not ‘p’; ‘q’; therefore,
‘r’. For any given argument, there is a unique argument form that is the
specific form of that argument. An argument is valid if and only if the spe-
cific form of that argument is a valid argument form. To prove that a given
argument is invalid, therefore, one must prove that the specific form of
that argument is invalid. See (1) validity and (2) variable.
2. The specific form of a given proposition is the propositional form that re-
sults when each different component of the proposition is replaced with a
different propositional variable. For example, the specific form of the
proposition “The blind prisoner has a red hat or the blind prisoner has a
white hat” is ‘p Ú q’. See (1) component and (2) variable.

square of opposition. A diagram in the form of a square that represents various

kinds of opposition (logical relations) that hold (obtain) between the four standard-
form categorical propositions (“A,” “E,” “I,” and “O”). There are two squares of
opposition:

• In the traditional (Aristotelian) square of opposition, all four standard-

form categorical propositions have existential import. On this interpreta-
tion, the “A” proposition and its corresponding “E” proposition are con-
traries; the “I” proposition and its corresponding “O” proposition are sub-
contraries; the “A” proposition is the superaltern of its corresponding “I”
proposition; the “E” proposition is the superaltern of its corresponding
“O” proposition; the “A” proposition and its corresponding “O” proposi-
tion are contradictories; the “E” proposition and its corresponding “I”
proposition are contradictories.
• In the modern (Boolean) square of opposition, only the “I” proposition
and the “O” proposition have existential import. On this interpretation,
the “A” proposition and its corresponding “O” proposition are contradic-
tories; the “E” proposition and its corresponding “I” proposition are con-
tradictories.

See (1) Aristotle, (2) Boole, George, (3) opposition, and (4) standard-form categorical
proposition (SFCP).

standard-form categorical proposition (SFCP). There are four standard-

form categorical propositions: ‘All S are P’ (known as an “A” proposition); ‘No S

52

are P’ (known as an “E” proposition); ‘Some S are P’ (known as an “I” proposition);
and ‘Some S are not P’ (known as an “O” proposition). See (1) “A” proposition, (2)
categorical proposition, (3) “E” proposition, (4) “I” proposition, and (5) “O” propo-
sition.

standard-form categorical syllogism (SFCS). A categorical syllogism in

which (1) both of its premises and its conclusion are standard-form categorical
propositions and (2) the premises and the conclusion are arranged in a specified
standard order. That order is: (1) major premise; (2) minor premise; (3) conclusion.
Only 24 of the 256 SFCSs are valid, 15 of them unconditionally and nine condition-
ally. Here is a breakdown of the 24 valid SFCSs, by mood and figure, with super-
scripts indicating which class—subject, predicate, or middle—must have members
in order for the SFCS to be valid:

Figure
1 2 3 4
AAA AEE AAIM AAIP

Barbara Camestres Darapti Bramantip

Canada Manchester
AAIS AEOS AII AEE

Darapti Falepton Datisi Camenes

Pacific Valverde
AII AOO EAOM AEOS

Darii Baroco Fesapo Falepton

Tahiti Rangoon
EAE EAE EIO EAOM

Celarent Cesare Ferison Fesapo

New Haven Seattle Wellington
EAOS EAOS IAI EIO

Fesapo Fesapo Disamis Fresison

Britain Levittown
EIO EIO OAO IAI

Ferio Festino Bocardo Dimaris

Mexico Leighton Monaco Miami

See (1) categorical syllogism, (2) figure, (3) mood, and (4) standard-form categorical

53

proposition (SFCP).

statement. See proposition.

strength. A property of (some) inductive arguments. Whether a particular induc-

tive argument is strong (as opposed to weak) depends solely on its form or struc-
ture; it has nothing to do with the content or subject matter of the argument (i.e.,
what it is about). The following chart provides a number of different definitions of
the term “strength” (together with its opposite, “weakness”):

Inductive Arguments
Strong Weak
It is improbable that the premises are It is probable that the premises are
true and the conclusion false (or: It is true and the conclusion false (or: It is
improbable that the conclusion is probable that the conclusion is false,
false, given that the premises are true). given that the premises are true).
The conclusion follows probably from The conclusion does not follow prob-
the premises. ably from the premises.

Strength is the inductive analogue of deductive validity (and weakness the induc-
tive analogue of deductive invalidity). With respect to inductive arguments, the
terms “strong” and “weak” are (1) jointly exhaustive (meaning that every inductive
argument is either strong or weak); and (2) mutually exclusive (meaning that no
inductive argument is both strong and weak). Strength is a matter of degree; unlike
deductive validity, it is not all or nothing. Therefore, it makes sense to say, of an
inductive argument, that it is “almost strong” (implying that it is not strong), “very
strong” (implying that it is strong), or “somewhat strong” (implying that it is
strong). It also makes sense to say that one inductive argument is “stronger” than
another inductive argument (implying that both are strong). Strength is not a sub-
jective matter, in the sense of being dependent on what some or many people be-
lieve; it is an objective feature of an inductive argument, independent of what any-
one believes. It is about how the premises are related (objectively) to the conclu-
sion. See (1) cogency and (2) validity.

strict implication. See logical implication.

strict implication, paradox of. See technical validity.

subaltern (a.k.a. subimplicant). See subalternation.

subalternation (a.k.a. superimplication). A logical relation between two

propositional forms (or propositions). Propositional form X is the superaltern of

54

propositional form Y if and only if (1) it is logically impossible for X to be true
while Y is false and (2) it is logically possible for Y to be true while X is false. In
other words, (1) X logically implies Y and (2) Y does not logically imply X. Collo-
quially, X can’t be true while Y is false; Y can be true while X is false. Example: ‘p
• q’ is the superaltern of ‘p Ú q’. On the traditional (Aristotelian) interpretation of
standard-form categorical propositions, but not on the modern (Boolean) interpre-
tation, (1) the “A” proposition is the superaltern and the corresponding “I” propo-
sition its subaltern, and (2) the “E” proposition is the superaltern and the corre-
sponding “O” proposition its subaltern. See (1) logical implication and (2) standard-
form categorical proposition (SFCP).

subcontraries. Two propositional forms (or propositions) are subcontraries (of

one another) if and only if they stand in the logical relation of subcontrariety to
one another. In categorical logic, “I” and “O” propositions are subcontraries on the
traditional (Aristotelian) interpretation but not on the modern (Boolean) interpre-
tation. See (1) contraries and (2) subcontrariety.

subcontrariety. A logical relation between two propositional forms (or proposi-

tions). Propositional form X is the subcontrary of propositional form Y (i.e., X and
Y are subcontraries [of one another]) if and only if (1) it is logically possible for both
X and Y to be true and (2) it is logically impossible for both X and Y to be false.
Colloquially, X and Y can both be true; X and Y can’t both be false. Example: ‘p Ú
q’ is the subcontrary of ‘~p Ú ~q’. See subcontraries.

subject term. In a standard-form categorical proposition, the term that comes

immediately after the quantifier. See (1) predicate term and (2) standard-form cate-
gorical proposition (SFCP).

substitution instance.

1. Any argument that results from the substitution of propositions for prop-
ositional variables in an argument form. See argument form.
2. Any proposition that results from the substitution of propositions for
propositional variables in a propositional form. See propositional form.

sufficient condition. The condition represented by the antecedent in a condi-

tional. Example: In the conditional “If 4 > 3, then 4 > 2,” four’s being greater than
three is a sufficient condition of four’s being greater than two. In the conditional
‘p É q’, ‘p’ is a sufficient condition of ‘q’. See (1) conditional and (2) necessary condi-
tion.

55

superaltern (a.k.a. principal and superimplicant). See subalternation.

superimplication. See subalternation.

syllogism. A deductive argument consisting of two premises and a conclusion. See

asyllogistic inference.

syllogistic rules and fallacies (a.k.a. the rules of the syllogism). In categor-
ical logic, a set of three rules that enable the reasoner/arguer to avoid (formal) fal-
lacies. A set of higher-order statements laying down the conditions to which a
given syllogistic inference-pattern must conform if it is to be valid. What follows
are the rules for the modern (Boolean) interpretation of standard-form categorical
propositions (according to which only “I” and “O” propositions have existential
import):

Rule Statement of Rule Associated Fallacy

Number
I The middle term must be distributed Undistributed middle
exactly once.
II No end term may be distributed only Illicit major; illicit minor
once.
III The number of negative premises (Unnamed)
must equal the number of negative
conclusions.

If a standard-form categorical syllogism violates any of these rules, it is invalid (i.e.,

fallacious), whereas if it conforms to all three rules, it is valid (i.e., not fallacious).
Some syllogisms violate more than one rule. At least one syllogism (OOI-3) violates
all three rules. See (1) illicit process of the major term, fallacy of, (2) illicit process of
the minor term, fallacy of, (3) square of opposition, and (4) undistributed middle,
fallacy of.

symmetry. A relation such that if one thing has that relation to a second, then
the second must have that relation to the first. Symbolically: (x)(y)(Rxy ‫ ﬤ‬Ryx). Ex-
amples: “is a sibling of,” “exists at the same time as,” “equals,” “is next to,” “is mar-
ried to,” “has the same weight as,” “is a member of the same family as.” See (1) asym-
metry, (2) nonsymmetry, and (3) relation.

synonymy. A property of linguistic entities, such as words and sentences. Two

words or sentences are synonymous when they have the same meaning. Example
(words): “water” and “H2O.” Example (sentences): “John loves Mary” and “Mary is
loved by John.” See (1) ambiguity and (2) sentence.

56

tautologousness (a.k.a. validity, logical truth, and analyticity). A logical
property of propositional forms (or propositions). Propositional form X is tautol-
ogous (i.e., X is a tautology) if and only if it is logically impossible for X to be false.
In other words, X is necessarily true. Example: ‘p Ú ~p’ is tautologous. See (1) tau-
tologous propositional form and (2) tautology 1.

tautologous propositional form. A propositional form that has only true sub-
stitution instances. A propositional form that is necessarily true, logically true, for-
mally true, or true by virtue of its form alone. In other words, a propositional form
that cannot be false. Example: ‘p ‫ ﬤ‬p’. See (1) contingent propositional form, (2)
propositional form, (3) self-consistent propositional form, (4) self-contradictory
propositional form, (5) tautologousness, and (6) tautology 1.

tautology.

1. (a.k.a. tautologous proposition) Any proposition whose specific form is

tautologous. For example, “Either it’s raining or it’s not raining” is a tau-
tology, since its specific form, ‘p Ú ~p’, is a tautologous propositional form.
See (1) tautologousness and (2) tautologous propositional form.
2. In propositional logic, two replacement rules (abbreviated as Taut). The
first rule says that a proposition is logically equivalent to a disjunction, both
disjuncts of which are that very proposition. Formally, ‘p’ :: ‘p Ú p’. The
second rule says that a proposition is logically equivalent to a conjunction,
both conjuncts of which are that very proposition. Formally, ‘p’ :: ‘p • p’.
The rule allows for the elimination (or introduction) of redundancy in dis-
junctions and conjunctions. See replacement rules.

technical validity (a.k.a. paradox of strict implication). A property of

(some) deductive arguments. An argument is technically valid (and therefore valid
in the generic sense of the term) if and only if either (1) its premises are inconsistent
or (2) its conclusion is a tautology. There are three ways for a set of premises to be
inconsistent:

1. At least one of its members is self-contradictory.

2. Two of its members are contradictories (of one another).
3. Two of its members are contraries (of one another).

Any argument with inconsistent premises, while valid, is unsound, for sound argu-
ments, by definition, have true premises, and inconsistent premises, by definition,

57

cannot all be true. Any argument with a tautologous conclusion, while valid, is un-
informative, for the conclusion, being a tautology, is trivially true (e.g., “Either it’s
raining here and now or it’s not raining here and now”). See (1) contradictoriness,
(2) contrariety, (3) inconsistency, (4) self-contradictoriness, (5) soundness, (6) tau-
tologousness, and (7) trivial truth.

term. See (1) predicate term and (2) subject term.

term complement. See complement.

ternary (triadic) relation. A relation that holds (obtains) between or among

three individuals, i.e., a three-place relation. For example, “Texas is between New
Mexico and Louisiana,” “Laban gave Zilpah to Leah,” and “The Texas Rangers
traded Ian Kinsler to the Detroit Tigers.” See relation.

theoretical reasoning. Reasoning that culminates in belief (as opposed to ac-

tion). The reasoning is designed to help the reasoner decide what to believe. See (1)
practical reasoning and (2) reasoning.

three-dot symbol (“\”). An abbreviation for “therefore”; a conclusion indica-

tor. See conclusion.

tilde. In propositional logic, the symbol (“~”) for negation. It appears immediately
before that which is being denied. See negation.

tilde convention. In propositional logic, the convention (stipulation, agreement)

that in any formula, the negation symbol will be understood to apply to the smallest
proposition that the punctuation permits. Thus, the following is a disjunction with
a negated first disjunct: ‘~p Ú q’. The following is a negated disjunction: ‘~(p Ú q)’.
See negation.

traditional (Aristotelian) square of opposition. See square of opposition.

transitivity. A relation such that if one thing has that relation to a second and
the second has that relation to a third, then the first must have that relation to the
third. Symbolically: (x)(y)(z)[(Rxy • Ryz) ‫ ﬤ‬Rxz]. Examples: “is older than,” “is north
of, “is an ancestor of,” “is a descendant of,” “weighs the same as.” See (1) intransitiv-
ity, (2) nontransitivity, and (3) relation.

transposition (Trans). In propositional logic, a replacement rule. It says that

the antecedent and consequent of a conditional may be switched, provided that (1)

58

a tilde is added to each or (2) a tilde is subtracted from each. Formally, ‘p ‫ ﬤ‬q’ :: ‘~q
‫~ ﬤ‬p’. See (1) conditional and (2) replacement rules.

triple bar (a.k.a. tribar). In propositional logic, the symbol (“º”) for material
equivalence. See material equivalence 1.

trivial truth (a.k.a. vacuous truth). A proposition that is true by virtue of its
form (e.g., “All dogs are dogs”) rather than by virtue of its content, matter, or sub-
stance (e.g., “All dogs are animals”). See truth.

truth. A property of (some) propositions. A proposition is true if and only if it

correctly describes how things are. See (1) falsity and (2) proposition.

truth condition. In propositional logic, the truth condition of a compound prop-

osition is the set of circumstances in which the proposition is true. For example,
the truth condition of a conjunction is that both conjuncts be true; otherwise, the
conjunction is false. The truth condition of a negation is that the proposition being
negated is false; otherwise, the negation is false. See truth.

truth-functional component. In propositional logic, a component is truth-

functional provided that, if it is replaced in the compound with different proposi-
tions having the same truth value as each other, the different compound proposi-
tions produced by those replacements will also have the same truth values as each
other. See (1) component and (2) truth-functionality.

truth-functional compound proposition. In propositional logic, a compound

proposition, all of whose components are truth-functional components of it. There
are five truth-functional compound propositions:

Sym- Ex- How Name Name Used to Truth

bol am- Read of First of Trans- Condition
(We ple Symbol Form late
Will Listed
Use
the
First
Sym-
bol
Listed)
~, ¬, - ~p not-p Tilde, Nega- not; it is A negation is
Curl, tion not the true iff its

59

 Squiggly (Contra- case that; constituent
Line dictory, it is false proposition
Denial) that is false.
•, &, Ù p•q p and q Dot Con- and; also; A conjunc-
junction moreover; tion is true
but iff both its
constituent
propositions
are true.
(The constit-
uent propo-
sitions are
known as
conjuncts.)
Ú pÚq p or q Wedge, Disjunc- or; either- A disjunc-
Vee tion (Al- or; unless; tion is true
terna- if not iff at least
tion) one of its
constituent
propositions
is true. (The
constituent
propositions
are known as
disjuncts.)
‫ﬤ‬, ® p‫ﬤ‬q if p Horse- Material if-then; A material
then q shoe, Implica- only if; conditional
Hook tion necessary is true iff it
(Condi- condition is not the
tional) (reading case both
from right that the first
to left); of its con-
sufficient stituent
condition propositions
(reading is true and
from left the second
to right); false. (The
not p un- first constit-
less q; ei- uent propo-
ther not p sition is
or q; mate- known as

60

 rially im- the anteced-
plies ent; the se-
cond con-
stituent
proposition
is known as
the conse-
quent.)
º, « pºq p if and Triple Material if and only A material
only if q Bar, Tri- Equiva- if (iff); nec- bicondi-
bar lence essary and tional is true
(Bicon- sufficient iff its con-
ditional) condition; stituent
just in propositions
case; is are either
materially both true or
equivalent both false.
to

See (1) compound proposition and (2) truth-functional component.

truth-functional connective. See connective, truth-functional.

truth-functionality. A property of (some) compound propositions. A com-

pound proposition is truth-functional if and only if its truth value is determined by
(1) the truth values of its components and (2) the logical operators involved. Exam-
ples: The compound proposition “Abraham Lincoln was the 16th president and
Andrew Johnson was the 18th president” is truth-functional. The compound prop-
osition “Frank believes that Abraham Lincoln was the 16th president” is not truth-
functional. See (1) truth-functional compound proposition and (2) truth value.

truth-functional propositional form. A propositional form characterized by

truth-functionality. The form ‘p’ is not truth-functional. The forms ‘~p’ and ‘p Ú q’
are truth-functional. See (1) propositional form and (2) truth-functionality.

truth table (a.k.a. full truth table and direct truth table). An array (arrange-
ment) of truth values that shows in every possible case how the truth value of a
compound proposition is determined by the truth values of its simple components.
Truth tables have multiple uses:

• To define truth-functional connectives, such as “~” and “º”.

61

 • To classify propositions as tautologous, self-contradictory, &c.
• To compare two or more propositions as logically equivalent, contradic-
tory, &c.
• To test certain deductive arguments for validity.

See (1) compound proposition, (2) partial truth table, and (3) truth value.

truth value. The attribute by which a proposition is either true or false. Every
proposition, by definition, has a truth value. The truth value of a true proposition
is true and the truth value of a false proposition is false. See (1) proposition and (2)
truth.

uncogency. A property of (some) inductive arguments. An inductive argument is

uncogent if and only if (1) it is weak, (2) it has a false premise, or (3) it is weak and
has a false premise. Uncogency is the inductive analogue of deductive unsoundness.
See (1) cogency and (2) inductive argument.

unconditional validity. A property of (some) deductive arguments. An uncon-

ditionally valid argument is an argument that is valid even if members of one or
more classes do not exist. See (1) conditional validity, (2) deductive argument, and
(3) validity.

undistributed middle, fallacy of. In order for a standard-form categorical syl-

logism to be valid, the middle term must be distributed at least once. Any syllogism
that violates this rule commits the (formal) fallacy of undistributed middle. See (1)
fallacy, (2) formal fallacy, and (3) standard-form categorical syllogism (SFCS).

unit class. A class with exactly one member. To every individual object there cor-
responds a unique unit class whose only member is that object itself. Socrates, for
example, is the sole member of the class “things identical to Socrates.” See class.

universal affirmative proposition. In categorical logic, the “A” proposition,

‘All S are P’. It asserts that one class is totally included (contained) in another. See
“A” proposition.

universal generalization (UG). In predicate logic, an operation (i.e., an elemen-

tary valid argument form) that consists of (1) introducing a universal quantifier im-
mediately prior to a proposition, a propositional function, or another quantifier;
and (2) replacing all occurrences of the constant or variable that appears in the
proposition or propositional function with the variable that appears in the quanti-
fier. Formally, ‘Øx-z’; therefore, ‘(x)Øx’. In English, this says “Anything (i.e., any

62

arbitrarily selected individual) is Ø; therefore, everything is Ø.” This may seem
sneaky, but think of it this way. If it were true that anything one reached out and
grabbed (with eyes closed) were a Ø, then it has to be the case that everything is
Ø. In other words, the only way the premise could be true is if the conclusion were
true as well. See (1) elementary valid argument form and (2) universal quantifier.

universal instantiation (UI). In predicate logic, an operation (i.e., an elemen-

tary valid argument form) that consists of removing a universal quantifier and re-
placing every variable bound by that quantifier with the same constant or variable.
Formally, ‘(x)Øx’; therefore, ‘Øa-z’. In English, this says either (1) “Everything is Ø;
therefore, individual a-w is Ø” or (2) “Everything is Ø; therefore, anything (i.e., any
arbitrarily selected individual) is Ø.” See (1) elementary valid argument form and (2)
universal quantifier.

universal negative proposition. In categorical logic, the “E” proposition, ‘No

S are P’. It asserts that one class is totally excluded from another. See “E” proposi-
tion.

universal proposition. In categorical logic, a proposition that asserts that one

class is totally included (contained) in or excluded from another class. If the claim
is one of inclusion, then the proposition is affirmative (‘All S are P’). If the claim is
one of exclusion, then the proposition is negative (‘No S are P’). See particular prop-
osition.

universal quantifier. In predicate logic, the symbol “(x),” as in “(x)Øx” (read as

“Given any x, x is Ø,” or, in better English, “Everything is Ø”). The quantifier used
to translate universal propositions. See (1) existential quantifier and (2) quantifier.

universe of discourse. The domain of reference. The things (objects) across

which the quantifiers of a formal theory may range. Those objects with which a
discussion is concerned. If the universe of discourse is persons, for example, then
the proposition “Everything is sensitive” means “All persons are sensitive.” A uni-
verse of discourse is either restricted (to persons, sets, or lines, for example) or
unrestricted. An unrestricted universe of discourse is the whole universe. To see
how the universe of discourse matters in predicate logic, consider the following
example. If the universe of discourse is unrestricted, then the proposition “There
are people in the garden” is symbolized as (Ǝx)(Px • Gx), which is read as “There is
at least one thing that is a person and is in the garden.” If the universe of discourse
is restricted to persons, then the same proposition is symbolized as (Ǝx)Gx, which
is read as “There is at least one person who is in the garden.” See quantifier.

unsoundness. A property of (some) deductive arguments. A deductive argument

63

is unsound if and only if (1) it is invalid, (2) it has a false premise, or (3) it is invalid
and has a false premise. See (1) deductive argument and (2) soundness.

vagueness. A property of (some) terms. A term is vague when there exist “bor-
derline cases” such that it cannot be determined whether the term applies to them.
Examples: “democracy,” “obscenity,” “death.” It may be that most terms in a nat-
ural language (such as English) are vague. One motive for creating an artificial sym-
bolic language is to avoid the vagueness of terms in natural language. See (1) ambi-
guity, (2) artificial symbolic language, and (3) natural language.

validity. A property of (some) deductive arguments. Whether a particular deduc-

tive argument is valid (as opposed to invalid) depends solely on its form or struc-
ture; it has nothing to do with the content or subject matter of the argument (i.e.,
what it is about). The following chart provides a number of different definitions of
the term “validity” (together with its opposite, “invalidity”):

Deductive Arguments
Valid Invalid
It is logically impossible for the prem- It is logically possible for the premises
ises to be true while the conclusion is to be true while the conclusion is false
false (or: It is logically impossible for (or: It is logically possible for the con-
the conclusion to be false given that clusion to be false given that the
the premises are true). premises are true).
The truth of the premises is incon- The truth of the premises is con-
sistent with the falsity of the conclu- sistent with the falsity of the conclu-
sion. sion.
The conclusion follows necessarily The conclusion does not follow neces-
(logically) from the premises. sarily (logically) from the premises.
The premises, if true, provide conclu- The premises, even if true, do not
sive grounds for the truth of the con- provide conclusive grounds for the
clusion. conclusion.
The premises are related to the con- The premises are not related to the
clusion in such a way that the conclu- conclusion in such a way that the con-
sion must be true if the premises are clusion must be true if the premises
true. are true.
The premises logically imply the con- The premises do not logically imply
clusion (i.e., the conclusion is logically the conclusion (i.e., the conclusion is
implied by the premises). not logically implied by the premises).
The argument preserves truth. The argument does not preserve
truth.

64

 The conditional consisting of the con- The conditional consisting of the con-
junction of the premises as its ante- junction of the premises as its ante-
cedent and the conclusion as its con- cedent and the conclusion as its con-
sequent is a tautology. sequent is either a self-contradiction
or a contingent proposition.
The conclusion is implicit in the The conclusion is not implicit in the
premises. premises.

Validity is the deductive analogue of inductive strength. With respect to deductive

arguments, the terms “valid” and “invalid” are (1) jointly exhaustive (meaning that
every deductive argument is either valid or invalid); and (2) mutually exclusive
(meaning that no deductive argument is both valid and invalid). Validity is all or
nothing; unlike inductive strength, it is not a matter of degree. Therefore, it makes
no sense to say, of a deductive argument, that it is “almost valid,” “very valid,” or
“somewhat valid.” Nor does it make sense to say that one deductive argument is
“more valid” (or “valider”) than another deductive argument. Validity is not a sub-
jective matter, in the sense of being dependent on what some or many people be-
lieve (or even what everyone believes); it is an objective feature of a deductive ar-
gument, independent of what anyone believes. It is about how the premises are
related (objectively) to the conclusion. See (1) deductive argument and (2) logical
implication.

variable. In predicate logic, a symbol (lowercase “x” through “z”) that serves as a
place marker, serving to indicate where the various letters “a” through “w” (con-
stants) may be written for singular propositions to result. See (1) constant and (2)
singular proposition.

Venn, John (born 4 August 1834 , Kingston upon Hull, England—died 4

April 1923, Cambridge, England). English logician and philosopher best
known as the inventor of diagrams—known as Venn diagrams—for representing
categorical propositions and testing the validity of categorical syllogisms. He also
made important contributions to symbolic logic (also called mathematical logic),
probability theory, and the philosophy of science (from Encyclopædia Britannica
online). See Venn diagram.

Venn diagram. An iconic (graphic) representation of a standard-form categorical

proposition, in which spatial inclusions and exclusions correspond to the nonspa-
tial inclusions and exclusions of classes. Venn diagrams can be used not merely to
depict standard-form categorical propositions (“A,” “E,” “I,” and “O”), but to test
the validity of standard-form categorical syllogisms. See (1) standard-form categor-
ical proposition (SFCP), (2) standard-form categorical syllogism (SFCS), and (3)
Venn, John.

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weakness. See strength.

wedge. In propositional logic, the symbol (“Ú”) for disjunction. See disjunction.

well-formed formula (WFF). In propositional logic, a compound proposition

(arrangement of symbols) that is grammatically (syntactically) correct. Every for-
mula is either well-formed or ill-formed. A given formula must obey three rules in
order to be well-formed:

Rule Examples of non-WFFs Examples of WFFs

1. A dot, wedge, horse- 1. p ~ Ú q 1. p • q
shoe, or triple bar (tri- 2. p Ú (q ‫ ﬤ‬r)
2. p ‫(~ ﬤ‬q Ú ‫ ﬤ‬r)
bar) must go between
3. p • (‫ ﬤ‬q Ú r) 3. (p º q) Ú (p Ú q)
two propositions (ei-
ther simple or com- 4. ~p (q Ú r)
pound). 5. p • Ú q
6. p q
7. • p • (q Ú ~r)
2. A tilde must be at- 1. p ~ Ú q 1. ~p
tached to the proposi-
2. p • (q ~ r) 2. ~(p Ú q)
tion (either simple or
compound) it is meant 3. p Ú q ~ 3. p • ~q
to negate. 4. p ‫( ﬤ‬q • ~r)
5. ~{[p Ú (q º r)] ‫ ﬤ‬t}
3. Parentheses, brack- 1. p Ú q • r 1. (p Ú q) • r
ets, and braces are re-
2. p Ú q Ú r5 2. p Ú (q • r)
quired in order to elim-
inate ambiguity in a 3. p Ú (q Ú r)
complex proposition.

See compound proposition.

5

Strictly speaking, this proposition is ambiguous (and therefore in need of punctuation). On
one interpretation, it is a disjunction, the left disjunct of which is ‘p Ú q’ and the right disjunct of
which is ‘r’. On another interpretation, it is a disjunction, the left disjunct of which is ‘p’ and the right
disjunct of which is ‘q Ú r’. That the two interpretations have the same truth conditions does not mean
that there is no ambiguity. In any event, we will treat this proposition as a non-WFF.

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