Polarized Politics: The Challenge of Democracy in Pakistan: January 2009

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POLARIZED POLITICS: THE CHALLENGE OF DEMOCRACY IN PAKISTAN
Article · January 2009

DOI: 10.2307/20752885
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Source: International Journal on World Peace, Vol. 26, No. 2 (JUNE 2009), pp. 31-63
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POLARIZED POLITICS: THE
CHALLENGE OF DEMOCRACY IN
PAKISTAN
Nasreen Akhtar Lecturer of Political Science
International Islamic University
Women Campus. Office No: C-016
Sector H-10, Islamabad
Pakistan
Nasreen Akhtar is a Lecturer of Political Science and International Relations in the Depart
ment of Politics and International Relations, International Islamic University, Islamabad,
Pakistan. She earned an M.A. in Political Science, and an M.Phil, in U.S. history and
international relations.
In Pakistan, state elites have been INTRODUCTION

affiliating with the different ethnic
groups for their own political Polarized politics is having an immense
interests. This diminishes the sense
impact on the Pakistani nation and
of equal justice and state legitimacy.
The creation of a nation-state is it has been posing security threats to
a historical process that may take a a state founded on the principles of
long time to complete. This is not peace, prosperity, and democracy. But
to suggest that Pakistan or other
Third World countries have to pass internal factors are leading the Paki
through the same sequences of state stani nation toward war, conflicts, and
making as the Europeans did. We clashes against the Army.1 Over 60
need to highlight the complex issues
and the constraints that Pakistan years have been passed since Pakistan
has faced since its inception in was founded. Is polarization a serious
1947. While the internal obstacles problem in Pakistan? I elaborate on
to national integration are well
how it has materialized during the civil
known, one must also consider the
geopolitical pressures that emanate military regimes.
from the regional and international The dominant elites in Pakistan,
environments. The central theme
and elsewhere in the Third World,
of this paper is that nations and
identities are evolutionary processes
have uncritically accepted the Western
that cannot be artificially and
notions of nation-state and central
externally imposed, but only aided ization in structuring the state and
by policies that are sensitive to needs
promoting national integration. This
of the constituent groups.
idealization is predicated on two
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL ON WORLD PEACE

VOL. XXVI NO. 2 JUNE 2009 31
interrelated postulates: (a) the nation-state is the form of a modern state,

and that (b) centralization is the sign of modernization.2 However, the
European pattern of the nation-state or even fashioning a uniform model
of nation-building for all developing countries is dangerous, and might
lead to self-destruction. There is much evidence and many reasons for this
cautionary note, but one will suffice to explain the pitfalls of pursuing the
policies of nation-building through a strong central government.
It is an historical accident that most of the post-colonial states like
Pakistan have inherited a mosaic of ethnic, religious and linguistic groups
that have a proud past, a strong sense of ethnic or communal identity and
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ rich cultural traditions. Needless to say,
these groups had a semi-autonomous
The European pattern of existence5 if not a self.rule5 for centuries
the nation-state or even before western colonization. The con
fashioning a uniform struction of a cohesive national identity
model of nation-building by the central state, primarily through
for all developing "primitive accumulation of power,"3 and
countries is dangerous, without political legitimacy would rather
and might lead to self- provoke resistance, alienate important
destruction. sectors of the society, and might under
hh^hi^hhh^^h mine the legitimacy of the state itself.
In Pakistan, state elites have been
affiliating with the different ethnic groups for their own political interests.
This diminishes the sense of equal justice and state legitimacy.
In my view, the creation of a nation-state is a historical process that may
take a long time to complete. This is not to suggest that Pakistan or other
Third World countries have to pass through the same sequences of state
making as the Europeans did. We need to highlight the complex issues and
the constraints that Pakistan has faced since its inception in 1947. While
the internal obstacles to national integration are well-known, one must
also consider the geopolitical pressures that emanate from the regional and
international environments.4
The central theme of this paper is that nations and identities are evo
lutionary processes that cannot be artificially and externally imposed, but
only aided by policies that are sensitive to needs of the constituent groups.
What are the policies that various Pakistani civil-military regimes have

32 VOL. XXVI NO. 2 JUNE 2009
attempted to strengthen the idea of Pakistan's security, and nationhood?

How have political culture and religion affected the state policies? How
have ethnic, linguistic and religious groups responded and have adverse
impacts on democratic process? What have been issues and challenges on
the path to nation-building in Pakistan and why has democracy not taken
root? In answering these questions, we will focus on the following two
propositions:
a) Promotion of economic or cultural interests of ethnic groups alone
does not guarantee their integration until they are allowed to par
ticipate in the political process, share power, and develop stakes in
the state.
b) Devolution of power, regional autonomy and recognition of multiple

linguistic and cultural identities within a pluralistic, democratic frame
work would contribute to national solidarity and lay the foundations
for the development of a nation-state.5
ISLAM AND PAKISTAN

Islam could be a complete code of life, if it would be practiced with a true
spirit. Although Islam stresses the Muslim Umhha (Muslim unity), in our
fragmented world this has been a mirage. Moreover, Muslims in different
regions have different cultures, and have divided in different subgroups;
Sunni, Shite, Wahabi, Deobandi, etc. In the united India, Muslims ignored
differences and were united for the same cause of "an independent state."
Islam had taken deep roots in the sub-continent. Its strong pillars tremen
dously influenced its followers in United India. The formation of Islamic
identity in British India was also influenced by a variety of cultural and
political factors. Islam gave people coherence, direction, and meaning.
However, the role of Islam in promoting a sense of Muslim political
community in pre-independence era and its mobilizing appeal during the
Pakistan independence period has produced conflicting interpretations of
its relevance to the construction of a Pakistani nation. This controversy
stems from the fact that the leaders of the movement, including Quaid
i-Azam Mohammed Ali Jinnah rested the claim for Pakistan on the idea
of a "Muslim nation." He argued that Islam was not just a religion, but

VOL. XXVT NO. 2 JUNE 2009 33
represented a separate social order, culture, and a civilization that gave

the Muslims a distinctive character as a political community.6 Different
strata of Muslims in the subcontinent supported the concept of Muslim
nationalism for a variety of reasons, not all of them religious.7 Most of
the supporters of Pakistan rejected the notion of territorial nationalism,
claiming that Islam transcended narrow ethnic and lingual differences.
Dr.Allama Mohammad Iqbal, the poet and philosopher who proposed the
idea of Pakistan in 1930s, said "It is not the unity of language or country
or the identity of economic interests that constitutes the basic principle of
our nationality. We are members of the society founded by the Prophet."8
However, Jinnah did not conceive Pakistan in purely pan-Islamic terms. His
conceptualization of Muslim nationalism was special, based on protection
of minority rights, and defined in relation
to the Hindu majority.9
The question Pakistanis
After Pakistan's independence, Islam
have confronted is became the source of confrontation
whether Islam could
between secular and religious leaders;
serve as effectively a even religion could not unite the people
unifying force the same in East Pakistan (Bangladesh) and West
way as it did during the Pakistan. The question Pakistanis have
struggle for the creation confronted is whether Islam could serve as
of Pakistan. effectively a unifying force the same way as
it did during the struggle for the creation
of Pakistan. There are three different per
spectives on this question that contend for shaping the national identity and
nationhood. Let us characterize these roughly as Islamist, modernist, and
sub-nationalist. The Islamist position on nation needs a little explanation.
The Islamists believe that Islam is a complete code of life, has answers to all
modern problems, and it must be relied upon as a source of personal con
duct and public affairs. They define Islam essentially as a political ideology,
and set the mission of the faithful, at least in areas where they have formed
an independent state, to create an Islamic state, establishing supremacy of
the Shariah (Islamic law or way of life).10 The Islamists doctrinally refuse
to consider territorial definition of a nation as relevant to the Muslims.
Their conception of an Islamic Millat (nation) would embrace all believers
irrespective of their race, language or domicile. Faith in Allah, Quran and

the Prophet gives them a far greater sense of togetherness than any other
factor.11 Using this phraseology, or, if you wish, symbolism, the Islamists
stress the role of religion in achieving national unity.
The second and more vital aspect of the Islamist perspective is conception
of an Islamic state. By deconstructing the history of the Pakistan movement,
they claim that the country's independence was won in the name of Islam,
and that the driving force behind the idea of Pakistan was the creation of
an Islamic state.12 This seems to be a total reversal of the position that they
took during the political struggle for Pakistan. The Ulema (Islamic scholars)
from Ahmr, Jumiut-i-Ulema-i-Hind, and even Jumut-i-Islumihzd refused
to support the creation of Pakistan because they believed that a national
ist movement could not be Islamic. Even Jamat-e-Islami (Islamic Party)
opposed the idea of Pakistan. They believed Muslim Ummahi. and did not
trust the leadership of Westernized Muslims like Jinnah.13 The Jamiat-i
Ulema-i-Hind and the famous Deoband Islamic seminary rather associated
themselves with the Indian nationalism.14 The position of Maulana Abul
Ala Maudoodi, the most articulate and celebrated exponent of the Islamic
state, on the creation of Pakistan had the same reservation and was not dif
ferent from the orthodox ulema.is The only difference is that he was equally
opposed to the Indian nationalism.16 But their opposition to Pakistan in no
way could exclude them from participating in the political process, or pre
vent them from migrating to the new country, as many of them did. After
the creation of Pakistan, the Islamists have contended that Pakistan is an
ideological state, meaning that the sole purpose of making Pakistan was to
create conditions for the Islamic values and way of life. Maulana Maudoodi
goes one step further in characterizing any failure to implement Islam in
state affairs as "a form of national apostasy."17 The scholars from various
religious groups had failed to convince the people of East Pakistan, those
who had fought against their own people and army.
A more complex construction is the "ideology of Pakistan" that was
thrown into public debate for the first time in the 1970,18 and got official
support during the dictatorship of Zia-ul-Haq (1977-88). None of its
advocates has yet clearly defined what it exactly means, but by implication
"ideology of Pakistan" refers to two things: Islam is the basis of nationhood
in Pakistan; Islam must be accepted as the supreme guiding principle of the
state.19 Even the most professed secular leaders have frequently brought

the "ideology of Pakistan" into political debate, not realizing that it would
strengthen the politics of Islamization. It is partly this ambivalence and
political use of Islam by the secular elites that has allowed the Islamists to
set the agenda of Islamic politics.20 Presently, a few people have hijacked
Islam to pursue and implement it according to their own understanding and
purposes. The Militants in Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) do
not understand or support the meaning of "ideology of Pakistan." Their
unconventional interpretation of Sbaria21 has tremendously affected the
security of the state and nation. In my view, nation-building needs con
struction, development, democracy and rule of law. Deconstruction, denial
of development, and lawlessness by the militants in FATA has destabilized
the process of nation-building in the twenty-first century.22
^^ i It is common perception in Pakistan
There is a vast difference that Pakistan was achieved in the name
between claiming a state of Islam Let us examine some of the
for Muslims, which was contradictions of the Islamist position
the case when Pakistan on cation-building. First, it is historically
was founded, and incorrect that ^ demand for Pakistan
,Islamizinq
, . . A A rested on T.
a state. the. ,promise
run of creating an
Islamic state in the vision or the fun
damentalists. There is a vast difference
between claiming a state for Muslims, which was the case when Pakistan
was founded, and Islamizing a state.
It was the consistent failure to reach an acceptable agreement on the
constitutional guarantees to the rights of the Muslims in British India that
strengthened the demand for Pakistan. The Muslims in the United India
were being denied their fundamental rights. A sense of deprivation insti
gated the Muslims to be separated. The objective was to preserve cultural
identity and protect economic and political interests of Muslims by creating
a state in the Muslim majority areas. As mentioned earlier, Islamic symbol
ism was regarded necessary for the political mobilization of the Muslim
masses and it served that purpose very well. Even today in Pakistan, Islam
is being regarded as an effective tool to serve political purposes by both
state and non-state actors.23
Second, the founders of Pakistan, particularly Iqbal and Jinnah, have
been grossly misinterpreted by the Islamists in support of their views on

the relation between Islam and the state. None of them was even remotely
associated with the idea of an authoritarian, hegemonic, or a theocratic
state, which the Islamists today pursue with so much dedication. There is no
doubt that, on occasions, Jinnah made brief references to Islam in seeking
support for Pakistan, but dragging him closer to the Islamist position is a
very recent phenomena. An objective reading of history would reveal that
the creator of Pakistan was a constitutional democrat to the core, and a
secular Muslim.24 Jinnah's presidential address to the Constituent Assembly
of Pakistan, on August 11, 1947 bears testimony to this: "You are free,
you are free to go to your temples, you are free to go to your mosques or
to any other places of worship in this state of Pakistan. You may belong to
any religion or caste or creed?that has nothing to do with the business
of the state."25 Unfortunately, Jinnah's real personality and ideological
outlook fell victim to the political exigencies of the authoritarian state and
obscurantist ulema.26
Third, once Pakistan was achieved, Islam alone could not foster soli
darity. Islam emphasizes Shum (consultation) which is the core element
of democracy and without consultancy democracy cannot take root. As
we know, the concept of consultancy was lacking in Pakistan's political
institutions since 1947. As the political environment changed due to the
state elites, the central dynamics of politics and the true spirit also changed,
requiring an authoritarian approach to strengthen the bonds of political
community. The Muslim leaders faced challenges in the newly Muslim
state. The post-separation from the Hindu majority, ethnic groups in East
Pakistan (present Bangladesh) and West Pakistan emerged as a political
force and new polarization along center province lines emerged. The main
issue was rights and a fair share of power in the new state. The separation
of former East Pakistan amply demonstrated the fact that faith (religion)
and political interests are two different matters. This episode must have
put an end to the wishful thinking that the material interests of diverse
regional groups and state elites are insignificant or can be superseded by
the holy politics of Islam.
The empirical fact is that the economic disparity, denial of political
power, injustice and superimposition of new forms of cultural or ideological
identity foment the ethnic nationalism seen in Pakistan. Power politics and
ethnic rivalry have taken root in society. This should have ended reliance

on Islam as the sole basis of nation formation. But it cannot be. The reli
gious leaders have continued their rhetoric, paying littie or no attention to
pragmatic issues that might involve the genuine and concrete interests of
the peoples of different regions. Rather, they serve to promote their own
communities instead of the nation or state. In my view, religious leaders
have been promoting the sense of community, not of a larger humanity.
People do not have much trust in religious leaders' ability as political lead
ers, thus for more than sixty years a single religious political party has not
had heavy control in central government. Rather, religious political parties
have had political influence in the parliament as an "alliance."27 Basing
nation-building on religious matters obscures very real issues pertaining
to the distribution of political power and participation in government and
erodes trust and confidence in the politi
cal union.
Basing nation-building
on religious matters A nation, as opposed to a state, is a
obscures very real cultural identity. It is a politically con
scious and mobilized collectivity of people
issues pertaining to the
which possesses, or may aspire to, self
distribution of political
government or independent statehood. A
power and participation
nation is not necessarily the same as the
in government and citizenry of a state, nor is it restricted to
erodes trust and
those who possess a common language,
confidence in the
ancestry, or cultural heritage, although
political union. these components are usually involved. It
is "essentially subjective, a sense of social
belonging and ultimate loyalty.28 This is an era of nation-building. Since the
end of the Cold War many newly independent states have emerged on the
world map and nearly a billion are deprived citizens of old states striving
to become modern nations.29 The challenge of nation-building, operating
in a highly complex nexus of society, economy, and polity, hinges on the
issues of access to and the stakes in structures of power.30
The creation of a nation-state is a historical process that may take a
long time to complete. This is not to suggest that Pakistan or other Third
World countries have to pass through the same sequences of state-making
as the Europeans did, but to highlight the complexity of the issue as well as
the constraints that Pakistan faces. While the internal obstacles to national

integration are well-known, one must also consider the geopolitical pres
sures that emanate from the regional and international environments.31
Nation-building is an evolutionary process; it cannot simply be imposed
by external powers or by the ruling elite but depends on the development
of society.
Another dilemma which the Pakistani nation faces after Quaid-e-Azam
is the lack of charismatic and sincere leadership. The central concern of this
paper is to examine why Pakistani regimes have failed to strengthen the
ideology of Pakistan. How have Pakistani multi-ethnic groups responded
to the question of ideology? This paper will explore how ethnic and reli
gious groups have been politicized and promoted by the state and military
elites.
CONFLICT BETWEEN IDENTITY AND IDEOLOGY

It is a grave problem that the new generation hardly understands the
meaning of "ideology of Pakistan." They are striving to understand what
Pakistan is. It is hard to blame them; our political socialization process is
not strong enough. Even political leaders32 have denied the "two nation
theory."33 The two nation theory became mirage when the people from
East Pakistan demanded their separate state "Bangladesh" because they
spoke a different language "Bangla." The post-independence era could not
unite the two units (East Pakistan and West Pakistan). Geographical gaps
divided the state elite politically, economically and ethnically; the Muslims
of India struggled to preserve their Islamic ideology. Yet the question of
ideology was less relevant in East Pakistan. The sense of political depriva
tion increased the sense of a separate identity and Bengali nationalism. As
a result of such questions of ethnic identity, Pakistan has created enormous
difficulties in developing a coherent sense of nationhood. The fact of a
common religion was rendered irrelevant during the secessionist move
ment in East Pakistan.
Religion has polarized more societies than it has unified. Even within
a single religious denomination one may find numerous strands. Doctrinal
differences, political contestation for power, material gains and territorial
space can make the particular religion and the question of its authenticity
one of great dispute.34

Complex historical and social factors have shaped the interaction

between religion and ethnicity in Pakistan, a state which came into being
with the support of ethnic groups.
Pre-Independence, the perception that Muslim identity was threatened
by Hindu dominance was a more important factor than ethnicity for Muslim
groups and political parties. Of course, Islam has remained at the center of
post-Independence political discourse; nevertheless, it is today less impor
tant when the central issue has become the demand of constitutional rights
(provincial autonomy) by various ethnic groups. The troubling question
of what type of state Pakistan should be?liberal democratic or Islamic?
evokes distinct responses from each social
Ethnic identity and sector and political interest.
language became more Military leaders, mainstream political
important once Pakistan parties, and Islamicists have all attempted
was created. The fact to define this relationship according to
of a common religion their own vision of a just society and
was rendered irrelevant the role of religion in society and state
affairs. Thus civil-military rule as well as
during the secessionist
movement in East their policy preferences provided a space
for community groups to emerge as an
Pakistan. effective force in the state.
Among the three main forces in the
country, the quest for shaping the Pakistani state has added yet another
dimension to the ethnic and political polarization of Pakistan. As a conse
quence of these conflicts of interest and the strange alliances they produce,
the autonomy of the civil political sphere and civil liberties and minority
rights has been severely compromised.
During the military regime of General Zia-ul-Haq, the promotion of
ethnic politics and Islamization35 was inevitable because military rulers
needed the support of the minority ethnic political parties to balance and
offset the mainstream parliamentary parties. In 2006, General Musharraf
dealt with the Baluch nationalists with an iron hand.36 The military opera
tions in Baluchistan have posed a great security threat to the process of
nation-building.

NATION BETWEEN RELIGION AND STATE

Since Pakistan began fighting the war against terrorism within Pakistan in
Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and supporting the U.S policy
in Afghanistan, the nation has been divided into different sections. The
fundamentalist interpretations of Islam and Sharia by the local Taliban has
increased strong resentment against Talibanization. Another group feels
that Taliban are fighting against an imperial force (U.S.) or for justice so
the state must support their demands for speedy justice and peace.37 Thus
society has been divided into moderate-religious and extreme-religious sec
tions. Intra- and inter-state religion clash ^^^mh^m
has been a major obstacle in promoting As a conseqUence
nation-building in Pakistan. Qf these conf|icts Qf
i jInJther twenty-first century religion . A A . A.
t r ? . i interest and the strange
has emerged as a powerful force which 0
has both divided and united the world.38 alliances theY Produce,
Non-state actors (religious groups) used the autonomy of the Civil
India's soil to destablize Pakistan.39 But Political sphere and civil
the significance of religion was never liberties and minority
denied in the past. In British India the for- rights has been severely
mation of Islamic identity gave direction compromised,
and meaning to its followers, promoting mmmmmmammmm^^^^^mmmmm
a sense of political community to economically-deprived Muslims during
the Pakistan movement. In fact, Islamic ideology has produced conflicting
interpretations of its relevance to the construction of a Pakistani nation.
This controversy stems from the fact that the leaders of the movement,
including Quaid-i-Azam Mohammed Ali Jinnah rested the claim for Paki
stan on the idea of a "Muslim nation." He argued that Islam was not just a
religion, but represented a separate social order, culture, and a civilization
that gave the Muslims a distinctive character as a political community.40
Different strata of Muslims in the subcontinent supported the concept
of Muslim nationalism, although for different reasons.41 Jinnah did not
conceive Pakistan in purely pan-Islamic terms. His conceptualization of
Muslim nationalism accommodated the protection of minority rights, yet
was defined in relation to the Hindu majority of the subcontinent.42

NATION AND CONTROLLED DEMOCRACY

Democracy is not simply defined as the rule of majority or elections to form
a government. Modern democracy includes the rule of law, accountability,
and justice in all the state institutions. This has never been fully realized
in Pakistan. What prevailed is power politics, personalities, injustice, and
inequity. Pakistan suffered due to an excess of centralism and the lack of
democratic values. The nation has always sacrificed for the promotion of
democracy and the supremacy of law43 but has never tasted its fruit. As I
mentioned earlier, the nation-building process requires the true develop
ment of democracy. What happened in Pakistan was that rulers assumed
power through dubious means, and then employed more dubious means to
sustain their power. And there are others
Modern democracy who come to power through legal and
includes the rule of constitutional means but perpetuate their
law, accountability, rule by subverting all routes for orderly
and legitimate political change.44
and justice in all the
state institutions. This Democracy has been under the con
trol of both civil and military rulers. State
has never been fully
realized in Pakistan. elites created the impression that the
people are not capable of democracy, and
What prevailed is power they need to implement their own politi
politics, personalities, cal vision to run the institutions.45
injustice, and inequity. Since Pakistan's independence in
1947 until the fall of East Pakistan in
1971, ethno-centrism prevailed, and this acted as encouragement to Bengali
nationalism. Tariq Ali has discussed this:
"Inequity and inequitable distribution of resources by the central govern

ment had isolated the Bengali from the state, especially after 1954, when
the overall economic situation deteriorated. Out of the total development
fund, East Pakistan's share was only 22.1% and non-Bengali businessmen,
financed by capital from West Pakistan had set up most manufacturing
enterprises."46

42 VOL. XXVT NO. 2 JUNE 2009
In fact, the limited Bengali representation in the central government

had increased the sense of deprivation, suppression and exploitation. The
fragile economic situation in East Pakistan made the Bengali people anti
West Pakistan and also enhanced their ethnic distinctness in the unequal
federal structure of Pakistan. The Bengali move for provincial autonomy
encouraged other ethnic communities in West Pakistan.
Unfortunately the same ideology and the same religion could not defuse
the sentiment of separate nationalism between Bengalis and Punjabis.47
Ethnic identities were strengthened in East Pakistan and, to a lesser extent,
in the smaller provinces of West Pakistan, especially in Sindh. Ethnic hostil
ity between East Pakistan and West Pakistan increased after the elections
of 1954 when all the opposition parties united and emerged as a force,
the United Front, and they defeated the Muslim League. Their victory
gave greater impetus to Bengali ethno-nationalism. Increasing violence
between Bengali and non-Bengali workers gave the central government
a pretext for dismissing the United Front government, establishing the
governor's rule in East Pakistan and banning the Communist Party. This
dismissal caused further resentment amongst the Bengali population and
Communist Party.48
The close association of the governor General Ghulam Muhammad
with the Punjabi elite and the neglect of the Bengalis increased popular
resentment. The Governor's reliance on the Punjabi community widened
the gulf of mistrust between East and West Pakistan. Parity was an issue
of great concern. Weak and limited Bengali representation in the central
government increased the sense of exploitation. The Bengali demand for
an autonomous province encouraged other ethnic communities in West
Pakistan.
The separation of East Pakistan amply demonstrated that faith and
political interests were two different matters. National solidarity on religion
obscures real issues pertaining to the distribution of political power and
participation, eroding trust and confidence in the political union, effecting
fragmentation rather than cohesion.49

OBSTACLES AND RESTRAINTS IN THE WAY OF NATION

BUILDING
Is building of a nation inevitable? This process cannot be achieved without
a state's "legal" functions. If a state has become dysfunctional or is not
functioning under the Constitution, then the nation cannot be promoted.
This is not just a theoretical statement but a practical requirement. Societies
and states are interlocked. The institutional and political capacities of the
state of Pakistan have declined very sharply over the past quarter century.50
The role of the state in nation-building is inevitable, yet takes on a dif
ferent character when hijacked by undemocratic forces. Since the 1950s,
the military has dominated in Pakistani politics. It has conducted foreign
policy directly or indirectiy.51
Political forces in Pakistan have a consensus on the parliamentary form
of democracy, which the two constitutions of the country, 1956 and 1973,
drafted by the two respective constituent assemblies, amply reflect. Paki
stan's colonial political heritage and its post-independence development
of institutions are responsible for this consensus. The British introduced
political institutions and practices in the subcontinent that they knew
best, rooted in their own history. Our founding fathers fighting the case
for Pakistan could not think of any other political system, since their own
political experience had included training in British constitutional law, and
they were grounded in the history of its institutions.52
Military leaders have thrice tried to reorient the Pakistani political system
toward some sort of presidential form of government. Ayub Khan who was
the first to try so many things was the first leader to change the parliamen
tary system, replacing the 1956 Constitution with his own in 1962. He was
elected indirectly by an electoral college of councilors comprising eighty
thousand, later increased to one hundred and twenty thousand. The second
military ruler, Yahya Khan, wanted to give the country his own version of a
presidential system after stabilizing the situation in East Pakistan, which had
deteriorated to a complete collapse of authority. But, with mass rebellion
and Indian intervention, the country broke apart. Yahya Khan's dream of
creating a stable presidential system died with his exit from power.
Since 1985 we have seen attempts by two other military rulers, General
Zia-ul-Haq and General Pervez Musharraf, to alter the parliamentary struc

ture of the constitution, purportedly to balance the executive power of the

prime minister. With the provision of "58-2(b) powers"53 in the hands of
the President, the political system of Pakistan is closer to an executive presi
dency in its functioning than a parliamentary democracy. Article 58-2(b)
has been used as a political weapon to destabilize democratically elected
governments. The political parties, both mainstream as well as religious
and regional, have made their preference known by promulgating the two
parliamentary constitutions and by removing 58-2(b)?when they had an
opportunity to do so in 1997, through the Thirteenth Amendment to the
Constitution of Pakistan.
In 2002, the military establishment under Musharraf's leadership
abandoned its agreement with demo
cratic forces on establishing the National With the provision of
Security Council, and by re-inserting "58-2(b) powers" in the
the 58-2(b) provision through the Sev- hands of the President,
enteenth Amendment. Surprisingly, the the political system of
same parliamentarians who supported pakistan is c|oser to an
the
the deletion of 58-2b
Seventeenth in 1997 voted
Amendment for. .A
that has executiye
, A. pudency
ii ii i i i m its functioning
brought that power back to the hands ^ arliamentar
of the President. This is a great weakness an a ^ar iamen arY
in the Pakistani political system. When democracy._
legislators are permanently on sale for
political benefits and corrupt patronage, parliamentary democracy cannot
take root.54
We might speculate elsewhere why India, where politics is perhaps
equally corrupt, has had some working democracy for much of the same
post-Independence period. Is it the multiplicity of ethnic and caste and
religious identities that has made it too difficult for any class, military or
political, to impose hegemony?
Vested interests and the establishment that wanted to create artifi
cial groupings and parties have countered efforts against floor-crossing
by rescinding laws and even constitutional amendments. The case of the
Fourteenth Amendment is an example. But floor-crossing for corrupt
inducement is just one of the factors destabilizing parliamentary democracy.
There are other, perhaps more significant, reasons for the derailment of the

parliamentary system in Pakistan. Chief among them is military rule and its
so-called "guided democracy." The takeover by the military four times in
Pakistani history, and the determination of leaders to stay in power as long
as possible by manipulating political institutions, has caused an institutional
decay that has included the political parties.55
Military rule could not have been effective nor lasted long had it not
politically co-opted the same elites who held public office in the civilian
governments. This was enabled by the political fragmentation engineered
by the military regime and intelligence agencies under its control. It was
a conscious and well-designed effort of military rulers to divide political
forces by rewarding those who joined their rule and oppressing those who
refused to render the political services they desired.56
^^^^^^^^^^^^B^^^? In Pakistan's political history, the
Although the Pakistani centralization of state power did not take
leaders both military into consideration the ethnic> cultural,
and
, . .civilian
one, theaccepted Kn8uific
state elites md re?ional
regarded reaJjtjf VFromday
the voicing
federalism, they worked c . ,. /c i
. . . - or regional interests (tor provincial auton
against its spirit.
73 . . omy) In fact,their
as anti-state; f _.demands
_ . . A Awere
they turned Pakistan into suppressed through coercion. Although
an authoritarian state. the Pakistani leaders both military and
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^mmmm civilian accepted federalism, they worked
against its spirit. In fact, they turned Pakistan into an authoritarian state.
The frequent dissolution of the elected government by the power
ful Governor/President and provincial assemblies and enforcement of
governor's rule has adversely affected the nation-building approach in
Pakistan. Over-centralization and the frequent intervention by the central
government has been the norm. The Pakistan People Party's (PPP) leader
Zulfqar Ali Bhutto was the first elected Prime Minister who removed the
Bluchistan government of National Awami Party (NAP) in February 1973.
The practice of removing unwanted governments continued. Nawaz Sharif,
who formed his government in the Center in 1996, dismissed the Sindh
Assembly in August 1999. This was because the Pakistan Muslim League
(PML) government in Sindh lost its majority in the House after Mohajir
Qomi Movement (MQM) and PML broke up their alliance.
If we look into Pakistan's political history during the transitional

democratic process from 1985 to October 1999, all elected parliaments

failed to play a proper legislative role; they rubber-stamped all ordinances
and passed bills presented by the executive without much debate or scrutiny,
perhaps under some pressure from the military.
In the 1950s, politicians (in West Pakistan) and military elites remained
dominant. They used their institutional power to topple governments, and
established new political parties and groups, playing one against the other.
There were frequent allegations of inefficiency, nepotism and corruption
against politicians.
General Zia-ul-Haq was the first president who exercised institutional
and constitutional power (Eighth Amendment 58-2 b) and dissolved the
Prime Minister Jonejo's elected government in 1988. President Ghulam
Ishaq Khan continued the same practice. He also used the same amendment
to dismiss Benazir Bhutto's government in 1990. The same president dis
missed the elected government of Nawaz Sharif in 1993.57 Benazir Bhutto
in power nominated Farooq Khan Laghari for President. President Laghari
dismissed Benazir's government in 1996. After Bhutto's dismissal, Nawaz
Sharif was elected the prime minister. His party had a two-thirds majority
in the Parliament. He eliminated the Eighth Amendment 58-2 (b) from
the Constitution. Nawaz Sharif became the most powerful prime minister
Pakistan had seen. The elimination of 58-2 (b) diminished the powers of
the president and Farooq Khan Laghari resigned. Nawaz Sharif nominated
his trustworthy man as the next President of Pakistan?ensuring he had no
power to dismiss the government.
This imbalance of power made the prime minister near-absolute. His
conflict with General Pervez Musharraf over the Kargil War of 199958
resulted in his removing him as Chief of the Army Staff and increas
ing resentment among Army officers. They refused to accept the newly
appointed Chief (General Zia-u-Din). Musharraf seized power and dis
missed the elected Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, the federal and provincial
governments and suspended the national assembly, senate and the provin
cial assemblies, declaring that the Constitution would stay in abeyance in
October 12, 1999.
Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif had dismissed the Chief of Army Staff a
few hours before the military action when the General was still flying back
to Pakistan from Sri Lanka.59 Musharraf dismissed Nawaz's government,

put him jail and filed case against Nawaz to disqualify him and, as men
tioned earlier, the Supreme Court's verdict was not acceptable to the Sharif
brothers and their party.
Interestingly, Mr. Nawaz was not disqualified during Musharraf's
regime. It was the PPP-led government that was not comfortable in Pun
jab where PML-N was ruling as the majority party. General Musharraf,
who toppled the Nawaz's government, became the "Chief Executive" in
October 12,1999. He announced his seven point agenda for his govern
ment that centered on economic revival, law and order, good governance,
accountability and the eradication of corruption, with no time frame for
the restoration of democracy.60
General Musharraf As with earlier dismissals of govern
became the "Chief ments in office, the removal of the gov
Executive" in October ernment of Nawaz Sharif and the military
12,1999. He announced takeover were challenged in the Supreme
his seven point agenda Court of Pakistan. The Supreme Court
in 2000 declared that General Mushar
for his government that
centered on economic raf's extra-constitutional coup d'etat of
12 October 1999 was validated on the
revival, law and order,
basis of doctrine of State necessity 61 When
good governance, elected officials fail to control the situation
accountability and the politically, the army is justified in taking
eradication of corruption, control to restore order.62
with no time frame The October coup demonstrated
for the restoration of once again that the state elites consider
democracy. the free play of political forces a danger
to national security. It had been their
consistent policy to control the political process, restrict participation and
guide the political process from the top. In their elitist view of politics, the
popular will of the poor and illiterate masses cannot be trusted; the people
are vulnerable to the manipulations of the socially-influential landed aristoc
racy.63 The Army comes forward to protect the solidarity of Pakistan.64
By abrogating or suspending the constitutions, the military acquired
vast powers to remove, and if necessary, eradicate all sources of societal
opposition. Political parties that have been dominated by the landlord class
or single dominant individuals and institutions of the civil society, have

proved too weak to offer any resistance to unconstitutional rule. So frag

mented is political life in Pakistan that those in the opposition have hailed
the removal of elected governments. Such celebrations over the downfall
of the governments of other parties have anticipated the removal of these
very parties on the same grounds. The feudal political culture has strength
ened the view that democracy has only legitimized the power of the most
influential classes. The political crisis is deepened and the development of
institutions necessary to support democratic governance is delayed.65
The generals took away whatever autonomy the provincial elites had
acquired under the Constitution of 1973. The Musharraf regime used
coercion against Akbar Bugti who demanded provincial autonomy.66 Con
sequently, authoritarian rule has strengthened ethnic identities more than
building the intended unified nation.67
FRAGMENTATION AND NATION-BUILDING

Pakistan is a fragmented nation-state. It is a society composed of a mix of
ethnic groups in all provinces; all ethnic groups share their culture with
different provinces. Baluchis migrate to Sindh, there are Pashtuns living in
Sindh, and Punjabis have been assimilated in Karachi.
Due to their movements, ethnic groups have emerged in all provinces
of Pakistan. Today ethnic groups can sometimes even pose a security threat
when they have access to high quality weaponry. External forces also play a
major role in promoting ethnic identity in multi-ethnic states. Specifically,
India played a role in fomenting Baluch nationalism, as Pakistan has played
a role in promoting the Kashmiri.
The collective nationhood experience of many post-colonial states
provides mixed evidence of the success of creating national solidarity and
a sense of common national identity. Not all states have really succeeded
in nation-building based on the equitable distribution of power or repre
sentation of all groups; nor have they all fallen apart.
Ethnic movements have at times shifted from seeking advantage within
the state to moving beyond to the realm of ethno-nationalism, and then
reverting to earlier positions. These shifts have correlated primarily with
international influences, such as the case of the "greater Baluchistan" and
Pashtun movements. We have seen in the elections of2002 and 2008 the

re-emergence of ethnic-coalition partnerships in the centre.

The political factors in ethnic politics have been highlighted by Hamza
Alvi, who has stressed the over-developed state structure, weak political
institutions, and the perception of "Punjabi hostility" as major causes of
regional-ethnic conflicts.68
Pakistan is comprised of heterogeneous ethnic orders; in fact, the people
of Pakistan form a complex "polygot" as Tahir Amin puts it, with migration
from Central Asia, and Iran, plus the indigenous residents.69 If we look at
history before the secessionist movement of 1971, there were six major
ethnic groups: Baluch, Bengalis, Mohajirs, (Urdu speakers in Sindh who
migrated from Northern India), Punjabis, Pashtuns, and Sindhis.
b^^^b^^i^^ But, with the exception of the Benga
Although ethnic groups lis in what was East Pakistan until 1971>
claim a home province, thcrc have has ^s been a of ethnic
the
. . same
. iL ,territory is groups
. A . Pakistan has in dl altered
not ?c Provinces-Unlike India>
the territorial
claimed as the historic c , 11^
status or the provinces it inherited from
homeland by at least BrMsh India in 1947 So ethnic
one other, and in some groups claim a ?home province^ accord.
instances, more than one ing to Bakhsh ^ same terri.
Other ethnic identity. tory is claimed as the historic homeland by
^^ "B^^"^^"^? IIB1^" at least one other, and in some instances,
more than one other ethnic identity."70
In Sindh and Baluchistan, waves of migration have altered the demo
graphic balance; first with the inflow of refugees from other parts of India
in 1947, and next from Afghanistan in 1979, when the Soviet Union
invaded the country. Since then, only the ANP (Awami National Party) has
demanded Pakhtunkhawa, complaining about Punjabi domination.71 But
their demand is fulfilled by the present government of the PPP. Unequal
distribution of economic resources has led to migratory movements and
finally separatist movements in the case of Bangladesh and now Baluchistan.
Punjabi and Pashtun migration in Sindh have led to Sindhi and Mohajir
movements. They use language and history to authenticate separateness,
as Hindu and Muslim parties did in pre-Partition India.72 In Punjab the
Siraiki community also claims to be a separate group in South Punjab, an
agrarian region and a major source of revenue.

The relationship between democracy and the multi-ethnic polarized

society is interactive. The ethnic character of society influences the politi
cal ordering of the community, determines the rules of politics and shapes
the general patterns of political behavior; democratic maturity mitigates
ethnic tensions.73
The British Raj supported Punjabis and Pashtuns more than other eth
nic groups. As a part of their divide-and-rule strategy they termed ethnic
groups who supported the British during the uprising of 1857 "martial
races" while groups that had been instrumental in the uprising were dubbed
"non-martial races."74 The biggest colonial legacy of the British has been
the highly centralized and authoritarian state apparatus that came under the
domination of Punjabis and Pashtuns over time. Consequently, the state
elites of Pakistan have tried to create a single nation-state by using Islam
and Urdu as a smokescreen for their nation-building policies.
In West Pakistan, ethnic groups raised their voices against prejudice and
discrimination by the Punjabi dominating class, and the Baluch clashed with
the center in the late 1950s on the issue of land allotments to Punjabi settlers
along the border with Sindh. Since 1999, land has become a political issue
at Gwadar, where non-Baluchs have been allotted lands, increasing local
resentment.75 Baluchistan's Governor has said that Gwadar port belongs
to the Baluch people.76 This port can play a vital role in the development
of Baluchistan. But the confrontation between the Center and Province
will hurt development, peace, and stability in Baluchistan.
The central government needs to rethink its present nation-building
strategy in terms of political reconciliation and provincial autonomy. Strong
and authoritative central governments have always weakened the Pakistani
state. The state elite has accommodated ethnic groups, promoted ethnicity
for its own personal political interest. It has also instigated a sense of strong
nationalism among them which eventually has turned anti-Pakistan.
CHALLENGES AND THREATS FROM WITHIN

Unfortunately the state structure has been weak and the political system
has remained unstable in Pakistan. Unified social structures are weakening.
As we know, no nation and society can progress without a strong state and
strength relates to a state's institutional and political capacity to perform

its primary functions, i.e. deliver services to society and provide justice.
Military and civilian regimes have been equally unaccountable.77
The judiciary has with rare exceptions been facilitating the military
regime. The acceptance of the doctrine of necessity on critical occasions has
undermined the judiciary from working as the guardian of the constitution
and protector of the sovereignty of the parliament. The judiciary is identi
fied as power broker, a facilitator under the cover of the Law of Necessity.78
Whenever the judiciary refused to obey the ruler, whether civilian or mili
tary, it has been suppressed. Judges have been forced on leave; they were
retired before tenure or detained and dismissed as General Musharraf did
in 2007.79 The deposed Chief Justice (CJP)of Pakistan, Iftkhar Muham
mad, took oath as CJP under Musharraf's Provisional Constitutional Order
(PCO), and legitimized the military coup.
Since Pakistan has been Chief Justice himself fought with the State
supporting the U.S. war for himself and his colleague's reinstate
on against terrorism in ment and has come back to his previous
position on November 2,2007.80 But the
Afghanistan, religious
extremism and terrorism question comes whether he would be able
to work as an independent Chief Justice
both have been posing
under the present government or whether
a grave threat to nation
the judiciary will get its independence and
building process. the people will benefit without discrimi
nation? In the long run, in my view, it
cannot work. The appointment of the judges is a big question mark; they
are appointed by the president under the Constitution of 1973. In the past
both the prime minister and the president have been confronting over the
appointments of judges.81
Since Pakistan has been supporting the U.S. war against terrorism in
Afghanistan, religious extremism and terrorism both have been posing a
grave threat to the nation-building process. Religious extremists have chal
lenged the writ of government and the local Taliban have imposed Sharia82
in some areas of NWFP (North West Frontier Province).83Both provincial
and federal governments have lost their control over the Swat District of
the NWFP.84 The Post-Bugti scenario poses a great threat in Baluchistan.
The current government has not ended the military operation against
Baluch militants. If it is continued and Baluch demands are not met under

the constitution of 1973, then civil war may well break out.
The grandson of the late Akbar Bugti, Brahamdagh has founded "Bal
uchistan Republican Army" in 2007. He threatened the present government
of PPP: "if the government would not stop military operation in Baluchistan
it should wait how we repay" he demands "independent Bluchistan."85 As
we know, subversive activities, kidnappings and targeted murders86 have
increased manifold, especially in Baluchistan where a section of Baluch
nationalists have taken up arms. On the other hand, the Taliban are chal
lenging the State's security and have stretched the security apparatus.
POLITICS BETWEEN REALISTS AND IDEALISTS

The major factors that prevented democracy from flourishing:
a) the role of the higher judiciary in condoning the sacking of civilian
government and solution of parliament, providing a cover to the
perpetuation of self-interest by dictators. November 3,2009 makes
Pakistan's history, over sixty years passed, the first time the Supreme
Court resisted the executive and the military both.87 If the judiciary
would not protect the dictator's and elites' interests, Pakistan would
be a different country;
b) the other factor which has been the major obstacle in the way of
democracy and nation-building is the lack of democratic values in
the state institutions and democratic approach in our leadership;
c) the last factor that is also significant which has divided our society in
ethnic groups has been an undemocratic, and authoritative nature
of our top leadership of mainstream political parties as we have seen
after elections 2008.
The present government of the PPP was not comfortable with the Paki
stan Muslim League Nawaz (PML-N) government in the largest province
Punjab after the PML-N decision to quite its alliance with PPP.88 Political
rivalry increased between the two major parties (PPP-PML-N) when the
PML-N decided to support lawyers movement and "long march." When
the two parties could not reach a compromise, the Supreme Court's deci
sion to disqualify the former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and the Chief
Minister of Punjab on 25 February 2009 strengthened Nawaz's image

nationally and internationally. The Court decision was seen as political,

not legal or constitutional, because the judges were appointed by Mush
rraf. The decision destabilized the entire political structure in the country.
Under the Court's verdict, the Sharif brothers were declared ineligible in
contesting elections.89President Asif Ali Zardari, who has been denounced
by the Sharif brothers, dismissed the PML-N government in Punjab that
imposed Governor Rule after the court verdict. The decision to impose
governor rule, I think, was the wrong one at the wrong time. The PPP
lost its popularity and PML-N gained public sympathy which united the
nation against the PPP-led government. From February 25 to March 16
(the twenty days "politics for power"), the political history of Pakistan
polarized the society and party leadership between realists and idealists.
The demand for a national agenda by the idealists dominated with the
Army's and international community's intervention. We saw a military
intervention on the eve of a political deadlock and a serious confrontation
between political parties has always been crucial90 and will be continued in
the future if the politicians fail to act wisely and pragmatically. The Chief
of the Army Staff (CAOS), General Ashfaq Kayani, has frequently been
meeting with the president and prime minister to resolve the political cri
sis. This time the Army has restored its image which was lost by General
Musharraf during his regime.
The restoration of the deposed Chief Justice would not be possible
without CAOS's intervention. The government's decision at the last
moment to restore the Chief Justice is an admission that over-centralism is
not a political solution. It is a denial of the people's power and a grave risk
to state sovereignty. This political dimension will not be reversed by the
realists. This is not the first PPP government that was uncomfortable with
the Punjab government. Prime minister Benazir Bhutto, during her first
tenure, also confronted the then-Chief Minister of Punjab, Nawaz Sharif.
Thus political intervention from the center during the entire history of
Pakistan has been rampant. In my view the denial of provincial autonomy
and political mandate has weakened the process of nation and state build
ing. Concentration of power in the center has weakened the philosophy
of Federation. Today Balouchistan has become a security challenge for the
central government due to its denial of autonomy to Baluchistan.

THE POLITICS OF NATIONAL RECONCILIATION

OR POLITICAL INTERESTS
The politics of national reconciliation has been applied in Pakistan's his
tory, but it never been applied for the national interest or nation-building.
State elites always used the term "reconciliation" either to stay in power or
to facilitate a specific ethnic, political group. General Mushrraf also took
initiative about national reconciliation (NR).91 In fact, it made a secretive
political deal as NR because Mushrraf and Benazir Bhutto had bitter politi
cal relations. Mushrraf wanted to be elected the president for the next five
years and Benazir Bhutto wanted to be a prime minister for the third time,
but Mushrraf's 17th92 amendment was the major hurdle in her way. Both
promised to facilitate each other and the National Reconciliation Order
(NRO)93 issued by Mushrraf in 2007. In May 2006, Benazir Bhutto and
Nawaz Sharif both had signed the "Charter of Democracy"94 (CoD). Both
condemned dictatorship and pledged that they would continue democratic
struggle against MushrraPs regime. Benazir Bhutto ignored CoD and
compromised on a deal for sharing power with Mushrraf.
The present government is also using the tactic of "political recon
ciliation" to retain and maintain its power and has filed a petition in the
Supreme Court to review the Sharif brother's case against their disquali
fication. President Zardari also has announced the intention to lift the
Governor rule from Punjab and accepts PML-N's majority to form the
provincial government. It happened after the PPP failed to get its majority
in the Punjab provincial assembly.95At the time when this piece is being
discussed the Supreme Court has commenced a hearing to seek reversal
of the Supreme Court's decision on 25the February 2009. Will the Court
nullify the previous verdict and on what ground? Will the Sharif brothers
be declared eligible to contest elections? Will the Court will play its role
independently and fairly? These questions determine the political relations
between PPP and PML-N and the independence of judiciary in Pakistan
after the reinstatement of the deposed Chief Justice. It is, however, too
early to judge given the fact that deposed Judges were restored shortly
before this article was written.

CONCLUSION
The consequences of polarized politics in Pakistan are that the nation has
not developed democratically, economically, and politically. State elites, both
civilian and military, have failed to promote a democratic state structure
and political system. The spirit of the Constitution has never been imple
mented. Most of the problems of nation-building arise from idealizing the
nation-state model. What is needed is constitutional politics and power
arrangements in which the state guarantees economic, cultural and political
rights and, in return, a new social contract exercised and constituent groups
accept the institutional and territorial legitimacy of the state.
Democratic norms and values are not a measure of political ideology.
What matters to the political parties and political leaders is "political conve
nience to justify one's misrule or the party boss orders." Currendy, Pakistan
is passing through the gravest period of its history. Religious extremists,
terrorists, nationalists, and ethnic groups are the greatest security threat
to Pakistan. If we look at the current political system, the Army has the
upper hand in political affairs as we saw, for example, during the first two
weeks of March 2009.
Another factor which has promoted undemocratic political culture
and undermined the nation as a "united nation" is that political parties
have been dominated by the landlord class or single dominant individuals.
Institutions of the civil society have proved too weak to offer any resis
tance to unconstitutional rule. Since Pakistan has suffered from political
confrontation among the politicians, those in the opposition have not only
hailed removal of elected governments but have also demanded such an
unconstitutional act on the ground that the government was not functioning
according to the Constitution. There cannot be greater political absurdity
than such demands and celebrations over the downfall of government of
other parties. This also shows absolute political immaturity, lust of power,
selfishness and lack of self-esteem among the political class of Pakistan.
A strong feudal political culture has strengthened a view that democracy
should not be the most preferred way of political and economic develop
ment of Pakistan and that democracy has only legitimized the power of
the most influential classes.
If we look at Pakistan's political structure and history we can see that

over-centralism cannot overcome the forces of nationalism, ideology, and

identity, and the state elites must accept and respect the Constitutional
rights to disengage the undemocratic political forces and regain legitimacy.
We have to recognize that the politics and ideology of identity is primar
ily about self-preservation as a cultural entity, and about economic, and
political rights.
Since the world has been changed by the presence of global media,
information about nations, states, and the movements for self-preservation
cannot be suppressed. The state can no longer hide truth from citizens.
Thus, the state needs to respect the Constitution and Constitutionalism
must be seen in all state institutions in order to be seen as promoting a fair
and legitimate government.
Notes
1. In 1971, people in East Pakistan, now Bangladesh, fought with Pakistani

Army.
2. Author's discussion with Prof. Dr. Rasul Bakhs Rais, 26 January 2009.
3. Youssef Cohen, Brian R. Brown, and A.F. K. Organski, "The Paradoxi
cal Nature of State-Making: The Violent Creation of Order," American Political
Science Review, Vol. 75, No. 4 (1981), pp. 901-10.
4. Ken Booth, ed., New Thinking About Strategy and International Security
(London: Harper Collins Academic, 1991), p. 270.
5. Rasul Bakhsh Rais, op. cit.
6. Jamil-ud-Din Ahmad, Speeches and Writings ofMr.Jinnah, Vol. 1 (Lahore:
Sh. Mohammad Ashraf & Sons, 1960) p. 160.
7. K.K. Aziz, A History of the Idea of Pakistan (Lahore: Vanguard, 1987), 4
volumes.
8. S.A. Vahid, Thoughts and Reflections of Iqbal (Lahore: Sh. Ashraf & Sons,
1964), p. 396.
9. Stanley Wolpcrt,Jinnah of Pakistan (New York: Oxford University Press,
1984).
10. Abu-Al Maudoodi, IslamiRiyasat(Islamic State) in Urdu (Lahore: Islamic
Publications Ltd., 1969).
11. Abu- Al Maudoodi, Nationalism and India, (Pathankot: Maktaba-i
Jammat-i-Islami, 1967). Maudoodi was a religious scholar in Pakistan. He is
considered a most respected person and an authority on religious issues.

12. Abdul Hameed Nayyar, "Rewriting the History of Pakistan," in Asghar

Khan, ed., The Pakistan Experience: State & Religion, (Lahore: Vanguard, 1985),
pp. 164-177.
13. Afzal Iqbal, Select Writings and Speeches of Maulana Mohammed Ali,
(Lahore, 1944), p. 452.
14. Hafeez Malik, Moslem Nationalism in India and Pakistan, (Washington,
D.C.: Public Affairs Press, 1963), p. 240.
15. Freeland Abbott, "The Jam'at-i-Islami of Pakistan." The Middle East
Journal, Vol. 11 (Winter, 1957), p. 40.
16. Maudoodi, Tehrikh-i-Ajzadi-i-Hind aur Musalmans (The Indian indcpcn
dence movement and Muslims) in Urdu (Lahore: Islamic Publications, 1974).
17. Maudoodi, Islamic Law and Constitution, trans, and ed., Khurshid Ahmad
(Lahore: Islamic Publications, 1960), pp. 5-6.
18. The reason: the separatist movement in Bangladesh was at its climax.
19. Sayeduddin Ahmad, Ideology of Pakistan (Islamabad: National Institute
of Historical and Cultural Research, 1998).
20. Charles H. Kennedy, Islamization in Pakistan (Islamabad: Institute of
Policy Research).
21. Islamic laws according to Qurannic princples.
22. In FATA, militants challenged the writ of the government and even the Army
failed to restore the Government's writ in Swat and some Agencies in FATA.
23. Pakistan got independence on August 15,1947 but the first constitution
was delayed due to the religious factor (1956). General Zial-ul-Haq used Islam
to gain political support from the various sections in the country. The bloody
incident occurred during MushrraPs era when some clergy were going to impose
Sharia within the Capital and challenged MushrraPs powers. Currendy, Molvi
Fazlullha has challenged the writ of the government in FATA and is striving to
impose misinterpreted Sharia. Girl's schools are being burnt or closed. Women
cannot move. Thus, Talibanization is being imposed in the name of Islam.
24. Sharif-u-al Mujahid, Quaid-i-Azam Jinnah: Studies in Interpretation
(Karachi: Quaid-i-Azam Academy, 1981).
25. Quaid-e-Azam Mahomed Ali Jinnah: Speeches as Governor-General of
Pakistan 1947-1948 (Karachi: Pakistan Publications, n.d.), p. 65.
26. Rasul Bakhsh Rais. Op. cit.
27. In 2002, six religious parties, in the form of the MMA (Muthida-Mujles
Amal) United Front, emerged because people in Pakistan were opposing General
MushrraPs policy "war against terrorism." Unfortunady, the MMA also supported
Mushrraf for political gain and established their government in NWF, FATA

(currently the government) has signed an agreement with the local Taliban in Sawat
district, where they have established their own courts and have imposed Sharia.
28. Robert J. Jackson and Doreen Jackson. A Comparative Introduction of
Political Science. (New Jersey: Simon & Schuster, 1997), p. 35.
29. Lucian W. Pye. Politics, Personality and Nation Building: Burma's Search
for Security. (U.S.A: MIT, 1962.) p. 3.
30. Urmila Phadnis, Rajat Ganguly. Ethnicity and Nation Building in South
Asia, (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 1989), p. 59.
31. Mohammed Ayub, "The Security Problematic of the Third World," World
Politics, Vol. 43 (January 1991), pp.265-266.
32. Altaf Hessian, leader of MQM (Muthida Qomi Movement) visited India
in November 2004, where his anti-Pakistan statement increased resentment in
civil society. See details in Dawn and Daily Times, 8-10 November 2009.
33. Sir Syed Ahmad Khan, the great educationist was convinced that Muslims
and Hindus could not live together.
34. Rasul Bakhsh Rais, Recovering the Frontier State: War, Ethnicity and State
in Afghanistan, (USA: Lexington Books, 2008).
35. See detail in Khalid Hassan, Rearview Mirror, (Islamabad: Alhamr,
2002).
36. "Akbar Bugti killed in an Army operation," Daily Times, 27 August
2006.
37. In the Swat deal of March 16, 2009, the government accepted the Tali
ban's demands to exercise Sharia. Under this deal the judges were barred from
the courts. Seven Qazi (religious scholars) were appointed to Swat High Court.
See detail in "NWFP gov't asks Swat judges not to attend courts over Security
Concerns," Daily Times, The News, March 19, 2009.
38. This post-9/11 incident makes religion a source of conflict between and
within the states. This incident adversely affected Pakistan because religious forces
have united against the state. Suicide bombers are being used as a weapon which
has killed civilians, security personnel, and political personalities, including the
former prime minister Benazir Bhutto (27 December 2007) and foreigners.
39. On November 26, 2008, terrorists attacked Mumbai. India accused
Pakistani-banned religious groups, e.g. Laskar-e-Taiba which is a Kashmir based
organization, banned by Mushrraf regime after 9/11.
40. Jamil-ud-Din Ahmad, Speechesand Writings of Mr. Jinnah,Vo\. 1 (Lahore:
Sh. Mohammad Ashraf & Sons, 1960) p. 160.
41. K.K. Aziz, A History of the Idea of Pakistan (Lahore: Vanguard, 1987), 4
volumes.

42. Stanley Yfolpzvt, Jinnah of Pakistan (New York: Oxford University Press,
1984).
43. The long March, March 2009 (Lawyers movement) supported by the
political parties, and civil society against the government succeeded after lawyers,
and common people were scared. Some lawyers were burned alive in Karachi
during Mushrraf era in 2007, some of them were targeted by suicide bombers.
Most importantly, judges were put under house arrest when they refused to obey
MushrraPs order in November 2007. See details in Daily Times, May 13, 2007.
44. Nasreen Akhtar, "Ethnic Politics and Political Process in Pakistan" paper
was presented in the conference on 15-16 October, Organized by Malaya Uni
versity, Kula Lumpur, Malaysia.
45. Lawrence Ziring, Pakistan in the Twentieth Century: A Political History,
Karachi Oxford University Press,1997.
46. Tariq Ali, Pakistan: Military Rule on People's Power, (New York: William
Morrow, 1970).
47. Nasreen Akhtar, "Ethnicity and Political Process in Pakistan," op. cit.
48. Khalid bin Sayeed, The Political System of Pakistan (Pakistan: by arrange
ments with Houghton Mifflin 1966), p.62
49. Rasul Bakhsh Rais.Professor of Political Science at LUMS, (personal
interview), December 28, 2008.
50. Rasul Bakhsh Rais. "A Dysfunctional State." Daily Times, 18 November
2008.
51. Author's interview with Islamabad-based (Ret) Col. (who requested
anonymity), on 11 February 2009.
52. Nasreen Akhtar. "Pakistan's Undemocratic Political Culture" http://arts.
monash.edu.au/mai/asaa/proceedings.php. Accessed on 28 December 2008.
53. General Zia amended the constitution 1973 and inserted 58-2 (b).The
president shall dissolve the National Assembly if a situation has arisen in which
the Government of the Federation cannot be carried on in accordance with the
provisions of the Constitution and an appeal to the electorate is necessary, see,
The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, (Islamabad: Ministry of Law,
Justice and Human Rights, 2004), p. 32.
54. Nasreen Akhtar, "Pakistan's Undemocratic Political Culture," op. cit.
55. Ibid.
56. Ibid.
57. Nawaz Sharif challenged the Presidential Order in the Supreme Court.
Presidential Order was declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court and the
Nawaz Sharif government was restored. Ghulam Ishaq Khan and Nawaz Sharif

could not work together. The then-Chief of the Army Staff, General Abdul Hamid
Kakar forced them to resign. See text in Dawn, May 26,1993.
58. Limited war was fought between India-Pakistan. Both Prime Minister and
Chief of the Army Staff blamed each other.
59. Dawn, October 13,1999.
60. Mushrraf was forced to resign on August 18, 2008.
61. Shuja Nawaz, Crossed Swords: Pakistan its Army, and the Wars Within
(Karachi: Oxford University Press 2008), p. xxxi.
62. "Army asked to be ready if security worsens," Daily Times, March 15,
2009. In early 1977, the same proposal was given by Prime Minister Zulfqar Ali
Bhutto's aide to ask the then-Chief of the Army Staff, General Zia-ul-Haq to control
the situation and he would leave his office until the situation was controlled but
General Zia rejected that proposal. See detail in Kahlid Hassan, Rearview Mirror,
(Islamabad: Alhamr, 2002).
63. Rasul Bakhsh Rais. op. cit.
64. Mushrraf's interview with the Indian press on March 9,2009. He legiti
mized the Army's intervention in politics.
65. Ibid.
66. Akbar Bugti was killed in a military operation on August 26, 2006.
67. Tahir Amin, Ethno-Nationalist Movements of Pakistan: Domestic and
International Factors, Institute of Policy Studies, (Islamabad: 1988). p. 77.
68. Hamza AM, "Authoritarianism and Legitimating of State Power in Paki
stan? in Subtrata Mitra (ed), The Post-Colonial State in South Asia, (London:
1990).
69. Tahir Amin, op. cit.
70. Rasul Bakhsh Rais, "Politics of Ethnicity and Democratic Process in Paki
stan" Ethno-Nationalism and the Emerging World Disorder, Gurnam Singh, ed.,
(New Delhi: Kanishka Publishers, 2002).
71. Author's interview with Islamabad-based retired bureaucrat (who
requested anonymity).
72. Tariq Rehman, Language and Politics in Pakistan, (Krachi: Oxford Uni
versity Press, 1996.
73. Rasul Bakhsh Rais, Recovering the Frontier State: War, Ethnicity, and State
in Afghanistan, op. cit.
74. Craig Baxter, Yogendra Malik, Charles Kennedy, & Robert Oberst. Gov
ernments and Politics in South Asia. (Colorado: West view Press, 1998.) pp 8-9.
75. Rasul Bakhsh Rais, talk in seminar on "Dialogue on Provincial Autonomy,"

organized by aid action organization in Ambassador Hotel Lahore, 6 August

2008.
76. See detail in, Malik Siraj Akbar. "Raisani says Gawadar Belongs to Baluch, *
Daily Times, December 22, 2008.
77. Rasul Bakhsh Rais. "A dysfunctional State," Daily Times, November 28,
2008.
78. Shuja Nawaz, op. cit.
79. General Musharraf removed the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of
Pakistan in March 2007.
80. General Musharraf imposed a state of emergency in the country on

November 3, 2007.
81. Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto and President Farooq Khan Laghari had
conflict over the judiciary in 1996.
82. Islamic laws are being implemented according to their own understanding,
and they have set up their own courts.
83. Abdul Saboor Khan. "Taliban Impose Sharia in Hangu," Daily Times,
December 3, 2009.
84. Daud Khattak. "ANP's leader says Swat is out of Govt's control," Daily
Times, December 7, 2008.
85. Malik Siraj Akbar. "Barahamdagh threats to 'repay' PPP," Daily Times,
February 10, 2009.
86. See details in Dawn, January 27, 2009 and Daily Times and Dawn, 3
February, 2009. John Solecki, UNHCR official kidnapped by Baluchistan Libera
tion United Front.
87. Haris Khalique, "No democracy no tolerance," The News, May 9, 2008.
88. The Party leader Asif Ali Zardari, (President of Pakistan) broke all promises
he made with PML-N on the issues of judiciary and repeal of 17th amendment;
includes 5 8-2b. See detail in Daily Times, August 26, 2008.
89. See detail, "The Supreme Court released judgment on the Sharif brothers
disqualification case,*Dawn, March 21, 2009.
90. Talat Masood. "The Crisis and the Army," The News, March 16, 2009.
91. South Africa's model 2002 earned global respect. See "Ghana's National
Reconciliation Commission: A Comparative Assessment" on www.ictj.org/static/
Africa/Subsahara/GhanaCommission.pdf.
92. Under the 17th amendment the person who has served as Prime Minister
twice cannot avail a third term, so both Benazir and Nawaz Sharif were declared

ineligible. These days, the removal of the 17th amendment has become PML-N's
agenda.
93. See detail in Dawn, The News, October 6, 2007. Under this Ordinance,
all corruption cases against Benazir Bhutto and her husband Asif Ali Zardari (
President of Pakistan) were given amnesty.
94. Text of Charter of Democracy, see in Dawn May 16, 2006.
95. "Zardari signs summary to lift Governor's rule,^ The News, March 30,
2009, Daily Times, March 29, 2009

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POLARIZED POLITICS: THE CHALLENGE OF DEMOCRACY IN PAKISTAN

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POLARIZED POLITICS: THE CHALLENGE OF DEMOCRACY IN PAKISTAN

In Pakistan, state elites have been INTRODUCTION

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interrelated postulates: (a) the nation-state is the form of a modern state,

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attempted to strengthen the idea of Pakistan's security, and nationhood?

b) Devolution of power, regional autonomy and recognition of multiple

ISLAM AND PAKISTAN

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represented a separate social order, culture, and a civilization that gave

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CONFLICT BETWEEN IDENTITY AND IDEOLOGY

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Complex historical and social factors have shaped the interaction

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NATION BETWEEN RELIGION AND STATE

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NATION AND CONTROLLED DEMOCRACY

"Inequity and inequitable distribution of resources by the central govern

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In fact, the limited Bengali representation in the central government

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OBSTACLES AND RESTRAINTS IN THE WAY OF NATION

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ture of the constitution, purportedly to balance the executive power of the

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democratic process from 1985 to October 1999, all elected parliaments

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proved too weak to offer any resistance to unconstitutional rule. So frag

FRAGMENTATION AND NATION-BUILDING

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re-emergence of ethnic-coalition partnerships in the centre.

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The relationship between democracy and the multi-ethnic polarized

CHALLENGES AND THREATS FROM WITHIN

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POLITICS BETWEEN REALISTS AND IDEALISTS

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nationally and internationally. The Court decision was seen as political,

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THE POLITICS OF NATIONAL RECONCILIATION

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over-centralism cannot overcome the forces of nationalism, ideology, and

1. In 1971, people in East Pakistan, now Bangladesh, fought with Pakistani

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12. Abdul Hameed Nayyar, "Rewriting the History of Pakistan," in Asghar