Network Paper: Housing Reconstruction in Post-Earthquake Gujarat A Comparative Analysis
Network Paper: Housing Reconstruction in Post-Earthquake Gujarat A Comparative Analysis
Network Paper: Housing Reconstruction in Post-Earthquake Gujarat A Comparative Analysis
Number 54
March 2006
Humanitarian Practice Network
HPN
Managed by
About HPN
The Humanitarian Practice Network at the
Overseas Development Institute is an
independent forum where field workers,
managers and policymakers in the humanitarian
sector share information, analysis and experience.
The views and opinions expressed in HPN’s
publications do not necessarily state or reflect
those of the Humanitarian Policy Group or the
Overseas Development Institute.
Dr. Jennifer Duyne Barenstein is a senior lecturer and researcher at the Department of Social Anthropology of
the University of Zurich and at the Department for Environment, Construction and Design at the University
of Applied Sciences of Southern Switzerland.
The research team comprised Dr. Vijay Joshi, Swati Shrinivas Shinde, Dr. Yogesh Jadeja and Shailesh Vyas.
Dr. Vijay Joshi is an environmental engineer and head of environmental consulting operations at IL&FS
Ecosmart India (Mumbai). Swati Shrinivas Shinde is an architect and planner specialising in mass housing
projects. She works with IL&FS Ecosmart India. Dr. Yogesh Jadeja is a geo-hydrologist, specialising in water
resource management in arid and semi-arid areas. Shailesh Vyas is an agricultural scientist specialising in
agriculture and livestock-based livelihoods in arid and semi-arid areas. With Dr. Yogesh Jadeja, he is
co-founder of the Bhuj-based NGO Arid Communities and Technologies.
Acknowledgements
This report presents the findings of a research partnership between the Department of Environment,
Construction and Design of the University of Applied Sciences of Southern Switzerland, the Department of
Social Anthropology of the University of Zurich, IL&FS Ecosmart India (Mumbai) and Arid Communities and
Technologies (Bhuj). Funding by the Swiss Agency for Development Cooperation and Swiss Solidarity is
gratefully acknowledged. We would also like to thank the numerous agencies which gave us access to their
project documents, and the hundreds of people in rural Gujarat who gave us their confidence, hospitality
and time in the course of our fieldwork.
Photocopies of all or part of this publication may be made providing that the source is acknowledged. Requests
for the commercial reproduction of HPN material should be directed to the ODI as copyright holders. The Network
Coordinator would appreciate receiving details of the use of any of this material in training, research or
programme design, implementation or evaluation.
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Contents
Chapter 1 Introduction 1
Reconstruction approaches 1
Research methodology 2
Bibliography 36
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46 Humanitarian futures: practical policy perspectives by
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Ntububa, J MacAskill, S LeJeune, Y Guluma, J Acidri and A
27 Between Relief and Development: targeting food aid for
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disaster prevention in Ethiopia by K. Sharp (1998)
48 Community-based therapeutic care: a new paradigm for
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selective feeding in nutritional crises by Steve Collins
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of the IKAFE Refugee Settlement Programme, Uganda by
K. Neefjes (1999) fit analysis by Courtenay Cabot Venton and Paul Venton
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Civilians from Deliberate Harm by D. Paul (1999) 50 Cash relief in a contested area: lessons from Somalia by
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A full list of HPN publications is available at the HPN website: www.odihpn.org. To order HPN publications,
contact hpn@odi.org.uk.
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Currency
100 Indian Rupees (Rs) = UK£1.20 = US$2.30 (January 2005)
ii
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The dwelling is more than the materials from which it is reconstruction, but the community is also involved in the
made, the labour that has gone into its construction, or process. In particular, the so-called ‘owner-driven’ or ‘cash-
the time and money that may have been expanded on it; based’ model is attracting increasing attention, including
the dwelling is the theatre of our lives, where the major from leading international agencies like the World Bank. In
drama of birth and death, of procreation and recreation, this approach, people reconstruct their houses themselves;
of labour and of being in labour are played out and in the role of external agencies is limited to the provision of
which a succession of scenes of daily lives is perpetually financial and technical assistance. Owner-driven reconstruc-
enacted.1 tion has a number of advantages over contractor-led
approaches: it is more cost-effective, building may be
Besides human casualties, one of the most visible and incremental, allowing occupancy before the house is fully
striking effects of any major disaster is the destruction of finished, and occupancy rates tend to be significantly higher.
houses. Loss of housing destroys livelihoods, protection
and privacy. Effective housing reconstruction is essential to There is a growing body of literature concerned with the
restore affected communities’ dignity, society, economy advantages and risks of different approaches to post-
and cultural identity. disaster housing reconstruction.2 This paper aims to
contribute to this discussion through an exploration of
Humanitarian agencies engaging in post-disaster housing local perceptions of housing reconstruction in the
reconstruction confront a number of key questions. Should aftermath of the earthquake that hit Gujarat in India on 26
they provide temporary, semi-permanent or permanent January 2001. The earthquake was India’s most severe
housing? Should they offer financial, material and/or natural disaster for almost 300 years. At least 20,000
technical support? Should they bring in ready-made people were killed and over 167,000 severely injured. An
shelters, or should they involve disaster-affected people in estimated 344,000 houses were destroyed, and over a
construction? What housing technologies should be million damaged. More than 7,600 villages and towns were
promoted or adopted? Should new materials and building damaged, and over 300 villages flattened; hospitals,
techniques be introduced, or should projects build upon health centres, schools and water and irrigation systems
locally available knowledge and resources? Should collapsed. Although 21 of Gujarat’s 25 districts sustained
agencies support self-help housing reconstruction, recruit some level of damage, over 90% of deaths and an
local labour, encourage homeowners’ participation or estimated 85% of assets lost were in Kachch, the state’s
engage a professional construction company? largest, and also one of its poorest, districts.
Ideally, these questions are answered according to a Gujarat was selected for three main reasons. First, in terms of
thorough contextual analysis, based on what is most the number of damaged houses and the area affected, the
appropriate in the specific economic, socio-cultural, earthquake constituted an extremely severe and widespread
technological, political and institutional context. In practice, disaster. Second, it marked the first time that owner-driven
however, approaches may also be determined by factors approaches to housing reconstruction were implemented on
such as the agency’s available resources, overall mandate, a truly large scale, with the government of Gujarat supporting
experience, capacity and preferences. As a result, within the the own-build reconstruction or repair of over a million
same disaster context different agencies may adopt very homes. Third, the presence of a large number of national and
different reconstruction approaches. international non-governmental agencies and private
corporations, and the application of a range of approaches,
Many humanitarian organisations assume that the quickest from the contractor-driven reconstruction of entire villages to
and most effective way to rebuild houses after a disaster is to targeted material assistance to specific communities,
employ professional construction companies. At the same provided an opportunity for a comparative analysis of the
time, however, there is growing awareness of the limitations merits and drawbacks of different techniques and strategies.
and risks of the contractor-led approach. Contractor-built
reconstruction may lead to housing that does not respond to While this paper covers Gujarat specifically, its findings will
the cultural or social needs of disaster-affected communities. be relevant for agencies engaged in post-disaster housing
An emphasis on safety – increasing earthquake resilience, for reconstruction in other contexts, for instance in areas
instance – may see the introduction of modern technologies affected by the Indian Ocean tsunami and in post-
and construction materials that may be inappropriate to the earthquake Kashmir.
local environment, and may make subsequent repairs and
maintenance difficult or impossible. Reconstruction approaches
These difficulties are encouraging other, more participatory The bulk of the reconstruction work after the earthquake
strategies, whereby agencies retain a leading role in was carried out by the Gujarat government under the Gujarat
1
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2
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Chapter 1 Introduction
Figure 1
Map of Gujarat by earthquake zones
Banas Kantha
Kachchh
Patan Mahesana Sabar
Kantha
Gandhinagar
Panch
Ahmedabad
Surendranagar Kheda Mahals
Dohad
Anand
Jamngar Vadodara
Rajkot
Narmada
Bharuch
Porbandar Amreli Bhavnagar
Earthquake zone area Junagadh
Surat
II
III Navsari The
Dangs
IV
Valsad
V
In-depth study villages
PRA villages
The research was undertaken in two phases between involved a household survey in six villages, covering a
October 2004 and March 2005, by which time the bulk of random sample of 15% of households (totalling 434 face-
the reconstruction work had been completed. Phase 1 to-face interviews). A research checklist and research
sought to capture individual and collective views about the questionnaire are in Annexes 1 and 2.
impact of the earthquake via semi-structured interviews
with key informants and stratified samples of men and Whereas many project evaluations tend to give more space
women, focus groups, village walk-throughs, observation, to agencies’ experiences and perspectives, we deliberately
participatory mapping of village and community focused on citizens’ perspectives. Our aim was to find out
infrastructures before and after the earthquake and the how different categories of people articulated their views
detailed participatory assessment of housing designs, and experiences, and to avoid mediation or filtering of
construction materials and construction quality. Phase 2 these views by project staff.
3
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4
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Chapter 2
The owner-driven approach
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Table 2: Positive and negative housing features mentioned by self-built house owners (%; N=136)
Village 1 Village 2 Village 3 Village 4 Village 5
Positive features
Plastering is provided 8
Negative features
No negative features 56 52 40 57
No compound wall 50
No colour-wash provided 17 14
Another problem with the government’s compensation People were familiar with the main reconstruction materials,
policy was that households that were not formally and the use of vernacular designs and spatial arrangements
registered with the Panchayat were not entitled to any ensured that villages reconstructed with government
compensation. We could not find any statistical data to financial assistance maintained their traditional character.
quantify this problem, but in each village a certain number
of households were affected, particularly in poor Targeting vulnerable groups
communities in remote areas, semi-nomadic groups and
newly migrated people. From the government’s point of The government’s housing programme did not take
view, not providing compensation for houses that officially account of the special needs of particularly vulnerable
did not exist may have been logical, but in practice it meant individuals or groups who may not have had the capacity
that vulnerable people in particular were left without any to undertake building work themselves, or to manage and
financial or technical help. supervise the building process. The inhabitants of one of
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the villages in which we conducted a PRA had never had described in the next chapter may be one way to overcome
the resources to construct high-quality dwellings, and these limitations.
hence lacked construction experience. Out of 19 house-
holds in the village, nine turned to a local contractor, who Repairing and retrofitting damaged houses
did very poor-quality work. As the first instalment of
government assistance was not enough to allow them to The government’s housing restoration effort mainly
progress work to the point where the next instalment could concentrated on the reconstruction of destroyed homes.
be released, they received no more money. As a Much less attention was given to the repair and retrofitting
consequence, their present housing situation is still very of damaged buildings. This bias towards the reconstruction
poor. Although our research supports these observations of new houses marked not only the government’s housing
in only one village, they suggest one potentially serious programme, but also – even more so – the programmes
risk of owner-driven approaches; the subsidiary approach implemented by most NGOs.
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Chapter 3
The subsidiary housing approach
House location 20 95 5 83 89
House size 20 95 4 67 81
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The communities in which SHA worked were very poor The quality of construction in these villages was comparable
and remote: 96% of the inhabitants of the two hamlets with the quality of construction under the owner-driven
covered by our research belong to the Koli community, housing reconstruction approach. Most people were
one of the most deprived groups in Gujarat. Most are satisfied with the quality of construction.
engaged in seasonal migration, finding employment in
the production of coal or salt. Their housing conditions Overcompensation
prior to the earthquake were very poor; nearly 22% of
households in these hamlets would not have been SHA assumed that people belonging to minorities and
entitled to any compensation because their houses were underprivileged groups would be neglected by the
not registered. SHA directly engaged in housing government. This turned out to be less of a problem than
reconstruction for these households, adopting a expected. In fact, with the financial compensation they
participatory housing approach by involving house received from the government plus NGO support, many
owners in construction. However, people had no major families managed to construct two houses, with the result
say in the design and size of the house. Our research that, in the hamlets covered by SHA, there were almost
(shown in Table 4) indicates that SHA performed better in double the number of houses than before the earthquake.
supporting self-built housing than when it assumed a Nevertheless, it was found that 100% of the houses were
leading role in construction, reconfirming people’s occupied, which indicates that improving the housing
preference for owner-driven reconstruction. situation in these communities was a necessity.
Table 4: Positive and negative features mentioned by house owners in SHA villages (%)
Positive features Material support only (N=21) Provision of full house (N=6)
Earthquake-resistant 90 67
Flat roof 17
Negative features
No negative features 52 50
Not earthquake-resistant 17
Source: Household survey, December 2004–February 2005
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Chapter 4
The participatory housing approach
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House size 46 85 24 96
Quality of materials 50 93 24 96
Construction quality 50 93 24 96
Table 6: Positive and negative features mentioned by house owners in the PHA village (%; N=65)
Positive features Negative features
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Chapter 5
Contractor-driven reconstruction in situ
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Issues, achievements
and constraints
Beneficiary satisfaction
Our research showed that the An upgraded CODIS house
majority of beneficiaries were
satisfied with the housing they
received under the CODIS programme: 74% of households stemmed from a lack of water for adequate curing of the
considered that their housing situation was better than RCC constructions, leading walls to crack. However, our
before the earthquake, and 71.6% expressed overall respondents believed that the contractor produced poor-
satisfaction with their housing situation. Most people were quality work in an effort to maximise profits.
satisfied with the location and size of the house. The flat
roof was an innovative feature, and was used by CODIS set up a village committee to supervise the
beneficiaries to store or dry items. Several house owners building work, and encouraged house owners to monitor
liked the fact that their homes had the potential for up- the contractor. However, this turned out to be a difficult
grading. Some reported that they planned to add a second task, and villagers could do little to influence the
floor, indicating that the basic CODIS units lent themselves company. Almost a third of beneficiaries complained of
well to people’s incremental approach to housing. leaking roofs, and a quarter were unhappy with the quality
of their doors and windows. Latrines were particularly
Construction quality problematic, and 36% of households did not consider
them useful at all. This low acceptance stemmed partly
A significant proportion (36%) of house owners were not from the small size of the septic tank. The waterproof
satisfied with the quality of the materials used, and 31% paint that was supposed to be applied to walls and
were unhappy about the quality of construction. These ceilings, and for which CODIS had obtained the necessary
figures compare poorly with the 100% satisfaction rating funds, had in most cases not been applied. Most of the
among people in the same village who had opted for additional 264 houses built in the second round of
owner-driven reconstruction. In part, poor construction construction were unoccupied and of significantly inferior
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quality; many were not completed. This additional particularly low in the neighbourhoods belonging to the Ahir
construction also led to some families owning as many as (farming) community, which constitutes 45% of the village
six houses. In all, there were 67% more houses in the population. Furthermore, as people had given up govern-
village after the CODIS programme than there had been ment compensation in favour of CODIS housing, they had to
prior to the earthquake. reconstruct their wadi houses without external financial and
technical assistance.
Bias towards accessible and better-off
communities Village layout and communal spaces
Contractors are reluctant to work in small remote com- The fact that CODIS intended to reconstruct houses in situ
munities, which are generally poorer than more accessible led the agency to neglect the need for a settlement plan.
sites. One of CODIS’ selection criteria was that the village The design effort focused on the houses, and little
should not be too far from Bhuj, and that it should have at attention was paid to the village as a whole. This was
least 100 households. In Gujarat, villages with these particularly noticeable in relation to the NGO-constructed
characteristics are generally not among the poorest. The community hall, which was built on the village’s former
village reconstructed by CODIS was better-off than the chowraha (plaza). The chowraha used to be the social,
average, and significantly wealthier than the villages assisted cultural and economic heart of the village. At its centre was
by SHA and PHA. a simple structure consisting of a tiled roof supported by
wooden pillars placed on an elevated concrete base. On
Housing location one side, there was a small house that served as a storage
room, and a place where pilgrims, business people or
Prior to the earthquake, the bulk of the inhabitants of the other travellers could stay overnight, and at the centre of
CODIS village had spent most of the year in scattered wadis the chowraha was a chabutera (a bird house). However,
(farms), and only came to the village itself for religious instead of rebuilding the chowraha (as requested by the
festivals, private ceremonies and trading purposes. Many villagers), CODIS built the community hall, which is hardly
villagers would have preferred their new homes to be built in ever used, and what used to be a lively village centre is
their wadis, but this was not accepted by the NGO and moribund. People meet under a tree in the yard of the
villagers thus ended up reconstructing their wadi houses village’s principal temple or under temporary structures.
themselves. This is one of the reasons why about 20% of the People remember the chowraha with nostalgia, and feel
CODIS houses were unoccupied. Occupancy rates are that their village no longer has a centre.
Table 8: Positive and negative features mentioned by house owners in the CODIS village (%; N=176)
Positive features % Negative features %
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Chapter 6
Contractor-driven reconstruction ex nihilo
Contractor-driven construction ex
nihilo differs from in situ recon-
struction in that, instead of
rebuilding the village on the same
site, the new houses are relocated
to a new site. The advantage of this
approach is that it does not require
the removal of rubble to clear the
site, and the reconstruction plan is
not constrained by any buildings
CODEN is a large NGO. In association with a large con- Houses were distributed randomly among the villagers
struction company, CODEN had rebuilt five villages once construction was completed. Owners did not
comprising 2,000 houses after the 1993 earthquake in participate in the construction process, and the fact that
Maharashtra. Although the reconstruction approach pursued they did not know which house was theirs until building
in Maharashtra has a number of problems and weaknesses, was finished meant that houseowners could not monitor
CODEN used the same strategy in Gujarat.14 progress informally.
CODEN reconstructed its villages on land that was either Issues, achievements and constraints
provided by the government, or which the community had
Beneficiary satisfaction
purchased itself. Where land was provided by the
government, people had to renounce their land rights in In CODEN villages, dissatisfaction with the quality of
the old village. Full village reconstruction included materials and construction was very high, as shown in
infrastructure such as roads, schools, a community hall, a Table 9.* Frustration with the quality of construction was
water supply system and drainage canals. CODEN’s particularly evident among members of the Kadiya caste.
reconstruction plans in the three villages covered by this
*The survey could be carried out in only two of the three villages. In
research envisaged three type of plots and houses: one village the Sarpanch, under the influence of CODEN staff, did not
allow the research team to carry out the survey with a random
• 100–150m2 plots and 30m2 houses, at a cost of sample of households. He only allowed the team to speak with
Rs97,500, for 294 landless and marginal landholders; people of his choice and in his presence. Given these conditions, we
• 250m2 plots and 40m2 houses, at a cost of Rs127,500, decided against carrying out a survey in that village.
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Skilled masons, Kadiyas accounted for the majority of the consultation about relocation, and no alternatives to
beneficiaries. Beneficiaries also complained that the new resettlement were presented to them.
houses and settlements did not conform to their rural
lifestyle, there was no privacy for women, and there was no Relocation made some sense in only one of the three
space for cattle, fodder, agricultural implements and villages we looked at. However, relocation stemmed not
people’s furniture. Uniquely among the villages we looked from the earthquake, but because the old village was at
at, a significant number of people were unable to mention risk of flooding due to the construction of a dam. Prior to
any positive feature of their new house, and a high the earthquake, the Irrigation Department, which provided
percentage of households explicitly said that their new land for the new site, had been trying to persuade villagers
home had no positive features at all. to relocate, but lack of support and financing for relocation
had encouraged it to look into alternative solutions, such
Poor-quality housing in contractor-driven reconstruction as building a dyke. After the earthquake, relocation
projects is sometimes the result of an NGO’s inexperience in became a more viable option, but there was no consensus
handling contractors; firms may be keen to save time and around where the new site should be located. About 30
resources at the cost of construction quality. In this case, households in the village demanded houses in another
problems were exacerbated by a lack of accountability: the location nearer to their agricultural land, but they were told
construction company had a close association with the NGO, that, if they wanted assistance, they had to move to the
and was given the contract without going through any reconstruction site proposed by CODEN. Eventually, the 30
regular tendering procedure. households built their own hamlet in a location better
suited to their livelihood activities.
Resettlement
In the second village, it was argued that resettlement was
As discussed above, there was significant opposition to necessary because the old village was on seismically
resettlement in Gujarat, and only 23 villages in Kachch (9% unsafe ground (a claim that does not seem to have been
of the total) were reconstructed via resettlement. People in supported by any scientific assessment). The village was
CODEN villages told us that there had been no community very old, and well-known for its wealth and beauty. In the
Table 10: Positive and negative features mentioned by house owners in CODEN villages (%)
Positive features V1 V2 Negative features V1 V2
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houses in the name of two brothers living in Ahmedabad. Project documents indicate that CODEN was aware of the
In the same neighbourhood, we met two women who told importance of castes in rural India. The NGO appeared to
us that their husbands had used the same device to obtain attribute to the caste system all the evils of Indian society,
four houses and homestead plots of 10,500 square feet. thereby underestimating the importance of economic
Another woman proudly told us that, in the name of inequality. By reorganising the village territory according to
different family members, her family had managed to socio-economic categories, it attempted to replace a caste-
acquire three houses in their own village and an additional based spatial organisation with a class-based one. It is
three houses in another CODEN village, where none of beyond the scope of this study to assess whether a class
them was living. Unsurprisingly, the less fortunate society is more legitimate than a caste society. However,
resented the way the more powerful members of the any attempt to introduce such dramatic social change is
villages seemed to exploit the system. unlikely to succeed; in this case, it made people unhappy
and made no contribution to reducing socio-economic
Interference in local social organisation vulnerability. On the contrary, in fact: families who were
isolated from their communities expressed a sense of
Although the caste system is a classic example of a highly solitude and insecurity. This problem was felt in particular
stratified society, social injustice and inequality are not among women, whose life is often confined by the
inherent to it. Castes are first and foremost groups of boundaries of their neighbourhood.
people connected to each other through kinship and
common ancestry. Each caste has its unique customs and The fact that the new settlement does not allow people to
beliefs, which find expression partly in different housing live near their relatives and community members is one of
styles and settlement patterns. Castes do not consist of the factors contributing to low occupancy rates and to the
socially or economically homogeneous groups of people. sale and exchange of houses. In one village, occupancy rates
Within a group belonging to the same caste, some were around 20%, and many people preferred to repair their
families are endowed with more social and economic old homes rather than live in the new ones. Occupancy was
capital than others, which gives them an obligation to higher in the other two villages, where people were able to
provide patronage to weaker caste members. Therefore, buy land from the government on which to build the new
families belonging to the same caste prefer to live close settlement. However, purchases were conditional on people
together.16 surrendering their old property rights to the state.
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Chapter 7
Overall findings and conclusions
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Housing
Worse 2 0 6 10 25 8.6
No response 1 0 0 1 3 1
Economic situation
No response 1 0 0 2 1 0.8
Village environment
Better 61 81 86 58 51 67.4
Same 30 19 9 18 10 17.2
Worse 7 0 3 22 34 13.2
No response 1 0 0 1 1 0.6
Health
Worse 20 7 5 16 15 12.6
No response 1 0 0 2 1 0.8
Education
Better 84 85 94 68 65 79.2
Same 13 11 2 13 20 11.8
Worse 0 0 0 9 2 2.2
Table 12: Satisfaction with different reconstruction approaches: overall findings (%; N=434)
ODA SHA PHA CODIS CODEN
Financial support per housing unit (Rs) 40,000–90,000 40,000 from the 47,000 85,000 124,000
government + (average)
25,000 from
the NGO
Overall satisfaction with quality of housing 93.3 100 90.8 71.6 22.8
Satisfaction with:
House size 90 95 85 89 51
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Table 13: Number of dwellings before and after the earthquake by housing reconstruction approach (N=434)
Number of No. of Dwellings/ No. of Dwellings/ Increase Increase
households dwellings household dwellings after household (No.) (%)
before the before the the earth- after the
earthquake earthquake quake earthquake
Total/Average 434 (Total) 602 (Total) 1.38 (Average) 955 (Total) 2.20 (Average) 168 (Total) 60.7 (Average)
Among the two contractor-driven approaches reviewed by earthquake, this was not the case in the CODEN villages,
this study, 71.8% of households expressed overall satis- where levels of housing before the earthquake were
faction with their housing situation under the CODIS satisfactory.
approach. However, while people were generally happy with
the location and size of their homes, they were less pleased This study provides empirical evidence that the growing
with the quality of materials and construction, which are the trend towards financial support to owner-driven post-
main factors used by humanitarian agencies to justify disaster housing reconstruction is socially, financially and
employing professional construction companies. Contractors technically viable. It shows that, in a context where people
prefer industrial construction materials and technologies, are traditionally involved in building their own dwellings,
which may not be suited to the local climate. The profit given adequate financial and technical support they have
imperative may also compromise the quality of the work. the capacity to construct houses that are more likely to
respond to their needs and preferences than houses
Finally, CODEN. This was by far the least popular approach. provided by outside agencies. The study confirms many of
In these villages, only 22.8% of people were satisfied with the drawbacks and risks associated with a contractor-
their housing. Since the main difference between CODIS driven approach: inflexibility, cultural insensitivity, failure
and CODEN reconstruction concerned resettlement, we to adapt to local conditions, and a tendency to introduce
might expect location to be the key issue. In fact, however, external construction materials ill-suited to the local
this was not the case. Dissatisfaction and frustration in the climate, and which are difficult to maintain and upgrade.
CODEN villages was linked to a wide range of issues. The
majority of households reported problems, such as cracks These conclusions are not based on project evaluations by
in walls and ceilings, leaks and poor-quality doors and ‘experts’, but on what affected people themselves thought
windows. Only 3.5% of households said they were about different post-disaster housing reconstruction
satisfied with the construction. People also complained approaches. The clear conclusion is that the cheapest
about lack of participation, the elite capture of decision- approach to post-disaster housing reconstruction was the
making and project benefits, bald discrimination in favour most effective in reaching the most neglected com-
of the local elite and the disruption of family networks. munities, and addressing their housing requirements.
Where people had the option of staying in their old houses, Conversely, the most expensive approach may have made
they refused en masse to move to the new village. the rich richer, and the poor more vulnerable. Funding
agencies and NGOs should reconsider their role in post-
It is perhaps ironic that the project that enjoyed the least disaster housing reconstruction and support people’s own
appreciation among its beneficiaries was on average by far initiative, rather than providing them with what outside
the most expensive, costing around three times more than agencies believe is good for them. Cash-based approaches
the non-contractor projects. In addition, while in each case are viable in emergencies, are more empowering and more
there was a significant increase in the number of post- dignifying. These goals are fully in line with most NGOs’
earthquake houses compared to pre-earthquake levels, objectives, but need to be translated into operational
the most striking disparities are in the CODEN villages. strategies. We hope that this study, by allowing hundreds
Whereas in the villages which were assisted through a of people to tell us what they needed to restore their
subsidiary approach the increased housing may to some livelihoods, will encourage agencies to look again at how
extent be attributed to poor housing conditions prior to the they respond to housing needs after disaster.
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Annex 1
Checklist for village profiles
1. General situation before and after the 4. Emergency aid: local initiatives
earthquake
• What were the immediate needs and problems?
• Human population by community and occupation • How did the community respond to those needs?
• Migration • Who took initiative and leadership in organising
• Animal population emergency aid?
• Total amount of agricultural land • What difficulties and constraints did they face in
• Dry land providing emergency aid?
• Irrigated land • What among the items and skills needed to provide
• Type and number of irrigation systems emergency aid were available, and what was missing?
• Crops cultivated on dry land
• Crops cultivated on irrigated land 5. External emergency aid
• Type and number of irrigation schemes
• How many farmers own irrigation schemes? • When did the first external relief arrive?
• For how long have they practiced irrigation? • What type of government relief did you receive? When?
• Original village layout, with hamlets and related • What other agencies provided relief to this village?
population What (e.g. food, temporary shelters, clothing, water)?
• Domestic water sources and supply systems When? How long?
• Communal infrastructure (schools, temples, chowraha, • Did some volunteers from outside come and stay in
etc) your village for some time? What did they do? How long
did they stay?
2. Domestic water supply situation • Was there a FFW programme?
• Did some agencies provide cash relief?
• What was the drinking water situation before the • Who did what and when?
earthquake? Quality? Quantity? Seasonal problems? • How/by whom was external relief coordinated?
• Where did people of different communities and • Was relief adequate? What was good, what was not so
hamlets get drinking water? good?
• Where did they get water for washing clothes, bathing
and for their animals? 6. Disruption of daily life
• How far did they have to walk to fetch drinking water?
• How was the domestic water situation 10 years ago? • How long was communication with the outside world
• What changes occurred in the water supply situation, disrupted?
and how did it affect their lives? • How long were water, electricity supplies, etc disrupted?
• What problems are they facing due to water problems? • How long were schools closed?
• How long were health centres disrupted?
3. Earthquake • How long were markets disrupted? Why?
• How did the earthquake affect agricultural activities?
• What happened? • How did the earthquake affect animal husbandry?
• Number of casualties and wounded people • What other activities and occupations were disrupted?
• Did animals die? For how long?
• Damage to public infrastructure and services: • When did life return to normal? What remains the same?
• temples What changes in your daily life have occurred since the
– mosques earthquake and why?
– markets
– water supplies 7. General questions about govt. compensa-
– electricity tion, NGO adoption and relocation
– public telephones
– post offices • What government compensation were you granted for
– roads the reconstruction of your houses?
– health centres • What government compensation did you receive for the
– schools reconstruction of your houses?
• Damage to houses by neighbourhood • How many agencies came to offer their assistance for
the reconstruction of your village?
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Annex 2
Household questionnaire survey
I. GENERAL INFORMATION:
1.3 Relation with the H/H head : 1.4 Name of the community:
2.2 Ownership of land and other assets before and after the earthquake:
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2.3 Give details about the houses you owned BEFORE the quake
Property Owner’s Name House Type* Construction Plot House No. of Dist. from Damage
No. Year Area Area Rooms from Category**
Village
Centre
1
2
3
2.4 Give details about the houses you owned AFTER the quake
Property Owner’s Name Repair/ If Reconst: If Ex-situ: Type of const. No. of Rooms Size
Reconst/ In situ/ Dist. from
Abandon Ex situ Village Centre
1
3
4
2.5 Where did your family primarily live BEFORE THE earthquake?
a) Village b) Wadi c) Other Places (give details)
2.6 Where did your family primarily live AFTER the earthquake?
a) Old Village b) New Village c) Wadi d) Other Places (give details)
2.7 Before the earthquake, did you have any outstanding loans? YES/NO
Loan 2
Loan 3
Loan 4
2.8 As a consequence of the earthquake did you take any loans? YES/NO
If yes, give details:
Loan 1
Loan 2
Loan 3
Loan 4
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3.1 Did any of your household members die during the earthquake? YES/NO
If yes, give details:
a) Age:
b) Relation to h/h head:
c) Occupation:
d) Expenses related to the death:
3.2 Were any of your household members injured during the earthquake? YES/NO
2. Buffaloes
3. Goats/Sheep
4. Seeds
6. a) Well
b) Bore well
c) Pump room
7. Tractors
8. Motorcycle
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3.4 Did the quake disrupt any of your household members’ regular activities? If so, for how long? With what consequences/ losses?
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
1. Land Acre
2. House Nos.
3. Cow Nos.
4. Buffalo Nos.
5. Goat/sheep Nos.
6. Seeds Y/N
9. Tractor Y/N
12. Others
4.2 As a consequence of the earthquake did you and your family members migrate? YES/NO
4.3 As a consequence of the earthquake did you and any of your family members return from outside? YES/NO
4.4 Did your family spend own money to restore your properties? YES/NO
If yes, How much money did your family spend to restore your properties?
1. House
2. Shop
3. Agricultural assets
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4.5 Did you receive any financial or material help from the relatives/friends? YES/NO
If yes, give details
1. Financial
2. Material
5.1 Did government made an assessment of the damage to 5.4 If resurvey is done were you satisfied with the
your properties? YES/NO reevaluation? YES/NO
If NO, state why If NO state why
5.2 Were you satisfied with the assigned damage category 5.5 Are you satisfied with the overall compensation?
and estimated value for your property? YES/NO YES/NO
If YES, go to q. 5.5. If NO, state why If NO state why
5.3 If you were not satisfied with the initial evaluation did 5.6 Did you receive full government compensation?
you go for reevaluation? YES/NO YES/NO
If NO state why If NO state why
1.
2.
3.
7.1 Please give the details about your satisfaction in relation to the following (Please tick):
4. Quality of materials
5. Quality of construction
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7.2 Are you satisfied with the house(s) you have reconstructed with government compensation? YES/NO
7.3 What are the POSITIVE FEATURES of your present house when compared to your original house before the earthquake?
7.4 What are the NEGATIVE FEATURES of your present house when compared to your original house before the earthquake?
Sr. No. Feature Addition Y/N Type of const. Was the feature present in
earlier housing? Y/N
1. Chali
3. External kitchen
4. Compound Wall/Veranda
7.6 Did you undertake any repair work due to poor quality of construction? YES/NO
If yes, give the details:
1.
2.
3.
4.
7.7 Is there any amenity in the house that is provided and not used by you?
1. Toilet
2. Bathroom
4. Tank
5. Hand pump
6. Others
7.8 How good was the technical advice provided by the government?
a) Insufficient b) sufficient
7.9 How good was the quality of the materials supplied by the government?
a) Good b) poor
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8.1 Please give the details about your satisfaction in relation to the following (Please tick):
8.2 Are you satisfied with the house(s) you have received from NGO or reconstructed with NGO support? YES/NO
8.3 What are the POSITIVE FEATURES of your present house when compared to your original house before the earthquake?
8.4 What are the NEGATIVE FEATURES of your present house when compared to your original house before the earthquake?
Sr. No. Feature Addition Y/N Type of const. Was the feature present in
earlier housing? Y/N
1. Chali
2. Shelter for livestock
3. External kitchen
4. Compound Wall/Varanda
6. Others
8.6 Did you undertake any repair work due to poor quality of construction? YES/NO
If yes, give the details:
8.7 Is there any amenity in the house that is provided by the NGO that was not there in your old house?
If so give details:
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8.8 How good was the technical advice provided by the NGO? a) Insufficient b) sufficient
8.9 How good was the quality of the materials supplied by the NGO? a) good b) poor
9.1 If you received a house from an NGO, did you have to renounce to government compensation? YES/NO
9.2 If you had known the type of house you would receive from the NGO, would you still go for this option or would you have
preferred government compensation?
a) I am satisfied with the NGO house b) I would have preferred Government compensation
9.3 Do you know the financial value of the house you received? YES/NO If NO go to 9.5
9.3.1. If you had a choice, would you have preferred to get the money instead of the house? YES/NO
9.3.2. If you had received the equivalent money would you have been able to:
a) Construct a better quality house.
b) Construct the same quality house.
c) Would not have been able to match the quality of the given house.
9.4 If you reconstructed a house with government compensation as well as got one from NGO, which of the two do you like more?
9.5 Are you satisfied with the overall quality of housing of YOUR OWN house? YES/NO
9.8 Are you satisfied with over all effectiveness of rehabilitation of social infrastructure? YES/NO
If NO, please suggest measures that could have made it more effective?
10.1 At present what is your household’s overall situation compared with before the
earthquake?
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Notes
1 P. Oliver, Dwellings: The House Across the World (Oxford: Phaedon of Post-Earthquake Rehabilitation Process on Cultural Heritage in
Press, 1987), p. 15. Marathwada Region, India’, Paper presented at the International
2 See, for example, Sultan Barakat, Housing Reconstruction after Conference on Seismic Performance of Traditional Buildings,
Conflict and Disaster, HPN Network Paper 43, 2003; John Twigg, Istanbul, 2001, www.anglia.ac.uk/geography/radix/resources/jigya-
‘Technology, Post-Disaster Housing Reconstruction and Livelihood su.doc; R. Jigyasu, ‘From Marathwada to Gujarat: Emerging
Security’, in Technology for Sustainable Development, DFID Challenges in Post-earthquake Rehabilitation for Sustainable Eco-
Infrastructure and Urban Development Department, 2002, development in South Asia’, http://www.grif.umontreal.ca/pages/i-
http://livelihoodtechnology.org; David Peppiatt et al., Cash rec%20papers/rohit.PDF; R. Jigyasu, Post-earthquake Rehabilitation
Transfers in Emergencies: Evaluating Benefits and Assessing Risks, in Gujarat: Nine Months After, A Field Assessment (Trondheim:
HPN Network Paper 35, 2002; and Paul Harvey, Cash and Vouchers Norwegian University of Science and Technology, 2002); Alex Salazar,
in Emergencies, HPG Discussion Paper, February 2005. ‘Disasters, the World Bank and Participation: Relocation Housing
3 Barakat, Housing Reconstruction after Conflict and Disaster. after the 1993 Earthquake in Maharashtra, India’, Third World
4 Oliver, Dwellings. Planning Review, February 1999, http://groups.yahoo.com/group/
5 Barakat, Housing Reconstruction after Conflict and Disaster; GUJARATDEVELOPMENT/message/64; Alex Salazar, ‘The Crisis and
Twigg, ‘Technology, Post-Disaster Housing Reconstruction’. Modernity of Housing Disasters in Developing Countries:
6 See Gujarat State Disaster Management Agency (GSDMA), www. Participatory Housing and Technology after the Marathwada (1993)
gsdma.org. Earthquake’, 2002, http://www1.worldbank.org/finance/html/hous-
7 GSDMA, Gujarat Emergency Earthquake Reconstruction Project After ingfinance/pdf/HousingDisasters.pdf; Alex Salazar, ‘Normal Life
700 Days, Ahmedabad, 2002, www.gsdma.org/pdf/700days.pdf. after Disaster? 8 Years of Housing Lessons, from Marathwada to
8 Abhiyan, Coming Together, vol. 5 (Bhuj: UNDP/Abhiyan, 2003), Gujarat’, 2002, http://groups.yahoo.com/group/gujaratdevelop-
p. 29. ment/message/64.
9 Sushma Iyengar, personal communication, 16 October 2004. 15 Anthony Oliver-Smith, ‘Post-disaster Housing Reconstruction and
10 See Sarah Collinson, Politically Informed Humanitarian Social Inequality: A Challenge to Policy and Practice’, Disasters, 14,
Programming: Using a Political Economy Approach, HPN Network 1990.
Paper 41, 2004; E. Skoufias, ‘Economic Crisis and Natural 16 Luis Dumont, Homo Hierarchicus: The Caste System and Its
Disasters: Coping Strategies and Policy Implications’, World Implications (Delhi: OUP, 1980; André Béteille (ed.), Equality and
Development, 31/7, 2003, pp. 1,087–1,102. Inequality: Theory and Practice (Delhi: OUP, 1983).
11 Twigg, ‘Technology, Post-Disaster Housing Reconstruction’. 17 Oliver, Dwellings, p. 11.
12 Barakat, Housing Reconstruction after Conflict and Disaster, p. 31. 18 Gujarat State Disaster Management Authority (GSDMA), Grit and
13 See T. E. Downing, Mitigating Social Impoverishment When Grace: The Story of Reconstruction, 2005, p. 48.
People Are Involuntarily Displaced, 2003. 19 Abhiyan, Coming Together.
14 See R. Jigyasu, ‘From “Natural” to “Cultural” Disaster: Consequences 20 Ibid., p. 50.
37
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38
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The Humanitarian Practice Network (HPN) is an independent forum where field workers, managers
and policymakers in the humanitarian sector share information, analysis and experience.
HPN’s aim is to improve the performance of humanitarian action by contributing to individual and
institutional learning.
• A series of specialist publications: Good Practice Reviews, Network Papers and Humanitarian
Exchange magazine.
• A resource website at www.odihpn.org.
• Occasional seminars and workshops to bring together practitioners, policymakers and analysts.
HPN’s members and audience comprise individuals and organisations engaged in humanitarian
action. They are in 80 countries worldwide, working in northern and southern NGOs, the UN and
other multilateral agencies, governments and donors, academic institutions and consultancies.
HPN’s publications are written by a similarly wide range of contributors.
HPN’s institutional location is the Humanitarian Policy Group (HPG) at the Overseas Development
Institute (ODI), an independent think tank on humanitarian and development policy. HPN’s publications
are researched and written by a wide range of individuals and organisations, and are published by HPN
in order to encourage and facilitate knowledge-sharing within the sector. The views and opinions
expressed in HPN’s publications do not necessarily state or reflect those of the Humanitarian Policy
Group or the Overseas Development Institute.
Funding support is provided by institutional donors (AusAID, CIDA, DANIDA, DFID, Development
Cooperation Ireland, MFA Netherlands, SIDA, USAID), non-governmental organisations (British Red
Cross, CAFOD, Christian Aid, Concern, International Rescue Committee, MSF, Oxfam, Save the Children
(UK), World Vision) and UN agencies (WFP).
To join HPN, complete and submit the form at www.odihpn.org or contact the
Membership Administrator at: