LAND TITLES AND DEEDS

Torrens system; general principles

Macario bought a titled lot from Ramon, got the title and took possession of the lot.
Since Macario did not have the money to pay the taxes, fees and registration expenses,
he was not able to register the Deed of Absolute Sale. Upon advice, he merely
executed an Affidavit of Adverse Claim and had it annotated at the back of the title. A
few years after, he received a Notice of Levy on Attachment and Writ of Execution in
favor of Alex. The notice, writ and certificate of sale were annotated at the back of the
title still in Ramon's name. Alex contends that since the Affidavit of Adverse Claim is
effective only for 30 days from the date of its registration, then its validity has expired.
Macario posits that the annotation of his adverse claim is notice to the whole world of
his purchase of the lot in question. Who has the superior right over the disputed
property - Macario or Alex? Explain.
Macario is preferred since the registration of his adverse claim was made ahead
of the notice of levy and writ of execution in favor of Alex. Macario’s adverse claim,
coupled with the fact that he was in possession of the disputed property, are
circumstances which should have put Alex on constructive notice that the property
being offered to him had already been sold to another. The contention that the adverse
claim is effective only for 30 years is puerile. The Supreme Court held that the adverse
claim does not ipso facto lose its validity since an independent action is still necessary
to render it ineffective. Until then, the adverse claim shall continue as a prior lien on the
property.

Section 70 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, concerning adverse claims on registered

land, provides a 30-day period of effectivity of an adverse claim, counted from the date
of its registration. Suppose a notice of adverse claim based upon a contract to sell was
registered on March 1, 1997 at the instance of the BUYER, but on June 1, 1997, or after
the lapse of the 30- day period, a notice of levy on execution in favor of a JUDGMENT
CREDITOR was also registered to enforce a final judgment for money against the
registered owner. Then, on June 15, 1997 there having been no formal cancellation of
his notice of adverse claim, the BUYER pays to the seller-owner the agreed purchase
price in full and registers the corresponding deed of sale. Because the annotation of the
notice of levy is carried over to the new title in his name, the BUYER brings an action
against the JUDGMENT CREDITOR to cancel such annotation, but the latter claims
that his lien is superior because it was annotated after the adverse claim of the BUYER
had ipso facto ceased to be effective. Will the suit prosper?
The suit will prosper. While an adverse claim duly annotated at the back of a title
under Sec. 70 of P.D. 1529 is good only for 30 days, cancellation thereof is still
necessary to render it ineffective, otherwise, the inscription thereof will remain
annotated as a lien on the property. While the life of adverse claim is 30 days under
P.D. 1529, it continuous to be effective until it is cancelled by formal petition filed with
the Register of Deeds. The cancellation of the notice of levy is justified under Sec. 108
of P.D. 1529 considering that the levy on execution cannot be enforced against the
buyer whose adverse claim against the registered owner was recorded ahead of the
notice of levy on execution.
Mario sold his house and lot to Carmen for P1 million payable in five equal annual
installments. The sale was registered and title was issued in Carmen's name. Carmen
failed to pay the last three installments and Mario filed an action for collection, damages
and attorney’s fees against her. Upon filing of the complaint, he caused a notice of lis
pendens to be annotated on Carmen's title. Is the notice of lis pendens proper or not?
Why?
The notice of lis pendens is not proper for the reason that the case filed by Mario
against Carmen is only for collection, damages, and attorney's fees. Annotation of a lis
pendens can only be done in cases involving recovery of possession of real property, or
to quiet title or to remove cloud thereon, or for partition or any other proceeding affecting
title to the land or the use or occupation thereof. The action filed by Mario does not fall
on anyone of these.

Regina has been leasing foreshore land from the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic
Resources for the past 15 years. Recently, she learned that Jorge was able to obtain a
free patent from the Bureau of Agriculture, covering the same land, on the basis of a
certification by the District Forester that the same is already "alienable and disposable".
Moreover, Jorge had already registered the patent with the Register of Deeds of the
province, and he was issued an Original Certificate of Title for the same. Regina filed an
action for annulment of Jorge's title on the ground that it was obtained fraudulently. Will
the action prosper?
An action for the annulment of Jorge's Original Certificate of Title will prosper on
the following grounds:
1. Under Chapter IX of C .A, No. 141, otherwise known as the Public Land Act,
foreshore lands are disposable for residential, commercial, industrial, or similar
productive purposes, and only by lease when not needed by the government for public
service.
2. If the land is suited or actually used for fishpond or aquaculture purposes, it comes
under the Jurisdiction of the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources (BFAR) and
can only be acquired by lease. (P.D. 705)
3. Free Patent is a mode of concession under Section 41, Chapter VII of the Public
Land Act, which is applicable only for agricultural lands.
4. The certificate of the district forester that the land is already "alienable and
disposable" simply means that the land is no longer needed for forest purposes, but the
Bureau of Lands could no longer dispose of it by free patent because it is already
covered by a lease contract between BFAR and Regina. That contract must be
respected.
5. The free patent of Jorge is highly irregular and void ab initio, not only because the
Bureau has no statutory authority to issue a free patent over a foreshore area, but also
because of the false statements made in his sworn application that he has occupied and
cultivated the land since July 4, 1945, as required by the free patent law. Under Section
91 of the Public Land Act, any patent concession or title obtained thru false
representation is void ab initio. In cases of this nature, it is the government that shall
institute annulment proceedings considering that the suit carries with it a prayer for the
reversion of the land to the estate. However, Regina is a party in interest and the case
will prosper because she has a lease contract for the same land with the government.
In 1979, Nestor applied for and was granted a Free Patent over a parcel of agricultural
land with an area of 30 hectares, located in General Santos City. He presented the Free
Patent to the Register of Deeds, and he was issued a corresponding Original Certificate
of Title (OCT) No. 375, Subsequently, Nestor sold the land to Eddie. The deed of sale
was submitted to the Register of Deeds and on the basis thereof, OCT No. 375 was
cancelled and Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 4576 was issued in the name of
Eddie. In 1986, the Director of Lands filed a complaint for annulment of OCT No, 375
and TCT No. 4576 on the ground that Nestor obtained the Free Patent through fraud.
Eddie filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that he was an innocent purchaser for
value and in good faith and as such, he has acquired a title to the property which is
valid, unassailable and indefeasible. Decide the motion.
The motion of Nestor to dismiss the complaint for annulment of O.C.T. No. 375
and T.C.T. No. 4576 should be denied for the following reasons:
1. Eddie cannot claim protection as an innocent purchaser for value nor can he
interpose the defense of indefeasibility of his title, because his TCT is rooted on a void
title. Under Section 91 of CA No. 141, as amended, otherwise known as the Public Land
Act, statements of material facts in the applications for public land must be under oath.
Section 91 of the same act provides that such statements shall be considered as
essential conditions and parts of the concession, title, or permit issued any false
statement therein, or omission of facts shall ipso facto produce the cancellation of the
concession. The patent issued to Nestor in this case is void ab initio not only because it
was obtained by fraud but also because it covers 30 hectares which is far beyond the
maximum of 24 hectares provided by the free patent law.
2. The government can seek annulment of the original and transfer certificates of title
and the reversion of the land to the state. Eddie's defense is untenable. The protection
afforded by the Torrens System to an innocent purchaser for value can be availed of
only if the land has been titled thru judicial proceedings where the issue of fraud
becomes academic after the lapse of one year from the issuance of the decree of
registration. In public land grants, the action of the government to annul a title
fraudulently obtained does not prescribe such action and will not be barred by the
transfer of the title to an innocent purchaser for value.

Rod, the owner of an FX taxi, found in his vehicle an envelope containing TCT No.
65432 over a lot registered in Cesar's name. Posing as Cesar, Rod forged Cesar's
signature on a Deed of Sale in Rod's favor. Rod registered the said document with the
Register of Deeds, and obtained a new title in his name. After a year, he sold the lot to
Don, a buyer in good faith and for value, who also registered the lot in his name. Did
Rod acquire title to the land? Explain.
No, Rod did not acquire title to the land. The inscription in the registry, to be
effective, must be made in good faith. The defense of indefeasibility of a Torrens Title
does not extend to a transferee who takes the certificate of title with notice of a flaw. A
holder in bad faith of a certificate of title is not entitled to the protection of the law, for the
law cannot be used as a shield for frauds. In the case at bar, Rod only forged Cesar's
signature on the Deed of Sale. It is very apparent that there was bad faith on the part of
Rod from the very beginning. As such, he is not entitled to the protection of the Land
Registration Act.

Discuss the rights of Don, if any, over the property.

It is a well-known rule in this jurisdiction that persons dealing with registered land
have the legal right to rely on the face of the Torrens Certificate of Title and to dispense
with the need to inquire further, except when the party concerned has actual knowledge
of facts and circumstances that would impel a reasonably cautious man to make such
inquiry. In the given problem, the property was already registered in the name of Rod
when he bought the same from the latter. Thus, Don could be considered as a buyer in
good faith and for value. However, since Rod did not actually sell any property to him,
Don has no right to retain ownership over the property. He has only the right to recover
the purchase price plus damages.

In 1950, the Bureau of Lands issued a Homestead patent to A. Three years later, A sold
the homestead to B. A died in 1990, and his heirs filed an action to recover the
homestead from B on the ground that its sale by their father to the latter is void under
Section 118 of the Public Land Law. B contends, however, that the heirs of A cannot
recover the homestead from him anymore because their action has prescribed and that
furthermore, A was in pari delicto. Decide.
The sale of the land by A to B 3 years after issuance of the homestead patent,
being in violation of Sec. 118 of the Public Land Act, is void from its inception The action
filed by the heirs of B to declare the nullity or inexistence of the contract and to recover
the land should be given due course. B's defense of prescription is untenable because
an action which seeks to declare the nullity or inexistence of A contract does not
prescribe. On the other hand, B's defense of pari delicto is equally untenable. While as
a rule, parties who are in pari delicto have no recourse against each other on the
principle that a transgressor cannot profit from his own wrongdoing, such rule does not
apply to violations of Sec. 118 of the Public Land Act because of the underlying public
policy in the said Act "to conserve the land which a homesteader has acquired by
gratuitous grant from the government for himself and his family". In keeping with this
policy, it has been held that one who purchases a homestead within the five-year
prohibitory period can only recover the price which he has paid by filing a claim against
the estate of the deceased seller under the principle that no one shall enrich himself at
the expense of another. Applying the pari delicto rule to violation of Section 118 of the
Public Land Act, the Court of Appeals has ruled that "the homesteader suffers the loss
of the fruits realized by the vendee who in turn forfeits the improvement that he has
introduced into the land."

Cesar bought a residential condominium unit from High Rise Co. and paid the price in
full. He moved into the unit, but somehow he was not given the Condominium
Certificate of Title covering the property. Unknown to him, High Rise Co. subsequently
mortgaged the entire condominium building to Metrobank as security for a loan of 500
million. High Rise Co. failed to pay the loan and the bank foreclosed the mortgage. At
the foreclosure sale, the bank acquired the building, being the highest bidder. When
Cesar learned about this, he filed an action to annul the foreclosure sale insofar as his
unit was concerned. The bank put up the defense that it relied on the condominium
certificates of title presented by High Rise Co., which were clean. Hence, it was a
mortgagee and buyer in good faith. Is this defense tenable or not? Why?
Metrobank's defense is untenable. As a rule, an innocent purchaser for value
acquires a good and a clean title to the property. However, it is settled that one who
closes his eyes to facts that should put a reasonable man on guard is not an innocent
purchaser for value. In the present problem the bank is expected, as a matter of
standard operating procedure, to have conducted an ocular inspection, of the promises
before granting any loan. Apparently, Metrobank did not follow this procedure.
Otherwise, it should have discovered that the condominium unit in question was
occupied by Cesar and that fact should have led it to make further inquiry. Under the
circumstances, Metrobank cannot be considered a mortgagee and buyer in good faith.

In 1950's, the Government acquired a big landed estate in Central Luzon from the
registered owner for subdivision into small farms and redistribution of bonafide
occupants, F was a former lessee of a parcel of land, five hectares in area. After
completion of the resurvey and subdivision, F applied to buy the said land in
accordance with the guidelines of the implementing agency. Upon full payment of the
price in 1957, the corresponding deed of absolute sale was executed in his favor and
was registered, and in 1961, a new title was issued in his name. In 1963, F sold the said
land to X; and in 1965 X sold it to Y, new titles were successively issued in the names of
the said purchasers. In 1977, C filed an action to annul the deeds of sale to F, X and Y
and their titles, on the ground that he (C) had been in actual physical possession of the
land, and that the sale to F and the subsequent sales should be set aside on the ground
of fraud. Upon motion of defendants, the trial court dismissed the complaint, upholding
their defenses of their being innocent purchasers for value, prescription and laches.
Plaintiff appealed. Is the said appeal meritorious? Explain your answer.
No, the appeal is not meritorious. The trial court ruled correctly in granting
defendant's motion to dismiss for the following reasons:
a) While there is the possibility that F, a former lessee of the land was aware of the fact
that C was the bonafide occupant thereof and for this reason his transfer certificate of
title may be vulnerable, the transfer of the same land and the issuance of new TCTs to
X and Y who are innocent purchasers for value render the latter's titles indefeasible. A
person dealing with registered land may safely rely on the correctness of the certificate
of title and the law will not in any way oblige him to go behind the certificate to
determine the condition of the property in search for any hidden defect or inchoate right
which may later invalidate or diminish the right to the land. This is the mirror principle of
the Torrens System of land registration.
b) The action to annul the sale was instituted in 1977 or more than (10) years from the
date of execution thereof in 1957, hence, it has long prescribed.
c) Under Sec 45 of Act 496, “the entry of a certificate of title shall be regarded as an
agreement running with the land, and binding upon the applicant and all his successors
in title that the land shall be and always remain registered land. A title under Act 496 is
indefeasible and to preserve that character, the title is cleansed anew with every
transfer for value.

Suppose the government agency concerned joined C in filing the said action against the
defendants, would that change the result of the litigation?
Even if the government joins C, this will not alter the outcome of the case so
much because of estoppel as an express provision in Sec. 45 of Act 496 and Sec. 31 of
PD 1529 that a decree of registration and the certificate of title issued in pursuance
thereof “shall be conclusive upon and against all persons, including the national
government and all branches thereof, whether mentioned by name in the application or
not.”
The spouses X and Y mortgaged a piece of registered land to A, delivering as well the
OCT to the latter, but they continued to possess and cultivate the land, giving 1/2 of
each harvest to A in partial payment of their loan to the latter, A, however, without the
knowledge of X and Y, forged a deed of sale of the aforesaid land in favor of himself,
got a TCT in his name, and then sold the land to B, who bought the land relying on A's
title, and who thereafter also got a TCT in his name. It was only then that the spouses X
and Y learned that their land had been titled in B's name. May said spouses file an
action for reconveyance of the land in question against b? Reason.
The action of X and Y against B for reconveyance of the land will not prosper
because B has acquired a clean title to the property being an innocent purchaser for
value. A forged deed is an absolute nullity and conveys no title. The fact that the forged
deed was registered and a certificate of title was issued in his name, did not operate to
vest upon an ownership over the property of X and Y. The registration of the forged
deed will not cure the infirmity. However, once the title to the land is registered in the
name of the forger and title to the land thereafter falls into the hands of an innocent
purchaser for value, the latter acquires a clean title thereto. A buyer of a registered land
is not required to explore beyond what the record in the registry indicates on its face
inquest for any hidden defector inchoate right which may subsequently defeat his right
thereto. This is the "mirror principle” of the Torrens system which makes it possible for a
forged deed to be the root of a good title. Besides, it appears that spouses X and Y are
guilty of contributory negligence when they delivered this OCT to the mortgagee without
annotating the mortgage thereon. Between them and the innocent purchaser for value,
they should bear the loss.

Rommel was issued a certificate of title over a parcel of land in Quezon City. One year
later Rachelle, the legitimate owner of the land, discovered the fraudulent registration
obtained by Rommel. She filed a complaint against Rommel for reconveyance and
caused the annotation of a notice of lis pendens on the certificate of title issued to
Rommel. Rommel now invokes the indefeasibility of his title considering that one year
has already elapsed from its issuance. He also seeks the cancellation of the notice of
Lis pendens. May the court cancel the notice of lis pendens even before final judgment
is rendered? Explain.
A Notice of Lis Pendens may be cancelled even before final Judgment upon
proper showing that the notice is for the purpose of molesting or harassing the adverse
party or that the notice of lis pendens is not necessary to protect the right of the party
who caused it to be registered. (Sec. 77, P.D. No. 1529) In this case, it is given that
Rachelle is the legitimate owner of the land in question. It can be said, therefore, that
when she filed her notice of lis pendens her purpose was to protect her interest in the
land and not just to molest Rommel. It is necessary to record the lis pendens to protect
her interest because if she did not do it, there is a possibility that the land will fall into
the hands of an innocent purchaser for value and in that event, the court loses control
over the land making any favorable judgment thereon moot and academic. For these
reasons, the notice of lis pendens may not be cancelled.

Will Rachelle's suit for reconveyance prosper? Explain.

Yes, Rachelle's suit will prosper because all elements for an action for
reconveyance are present, namely:
a. Rachelle is claiming dominical rights over the same land.
b. Rommel procured his title to the land by fraud.
c. The action was brought within the statutory period
of four years from discovery of the fraud and not later than ten years from the date of
registration of Rommel's title.
d. Title to the land has not passed into the hands of an innocent purchaser for value.
Rommel can invoke the indefeasibility of his title if Rachelle had filed a petition to
reopen or review the decree of registration. But Rachelle instead filed an ordinary action
in personam for reconveyance. In the latter action, indefeasibility is not a valid defense
because, in filing such action, Rachelle is not seeking to nullify nor to impugn the
indefeasibility of Rommel's title. She is only asking the court to compel Rommel to
reconvey the title to her as the legitimate owner of the land.

Sancho and Pacifico are co-owners of a parcel of land. Sancho sold the property to
Bart. Pacifico sued Sancho and Bart for annulment of the sale and reconveyance of the
property based on the fact that the sale included his ½ pro- indiviso share. Pacifico had
a notice of lis pendens annotated on the title covering the property and ordered the
cancellation of the notice of lis pendens. The notice of lis pendens could not be
cancelled immediately because the title over the property was with a bank to which the
property had been mortgaged by Bart. Pacifico appealed the case. While the appeal
was pending and with the notice of lis pendens still uncancelled, Bart sold the property
to Carlos, who immediately caused the cancellation of the notice of lis pendens, as well
as the issuance of a new title in his name. Is Carlos (a) a purchaser in good faith, or (b)
a transferee pendente lite?
Carlos is a buyer in bad faith. The notice of lis pendens was still annotated at the
back of the title at the time he bought the land from Bart. The uncancelled notice of lis
pendens operates as constructive notice of its contents as well as interests, legal or
equitable, included therein. All persons are charged with the knowledge of what it
contains. In an earlier case, it was held that a notice of an adverse claim remains
effective and binding notwithstanding the lapse of the 30 days from its inscription in the
registry. This ruling is even more applicable in a lis pendens. Carlos is a transferee
pendente lite insofar as Sancho’s share in the co-ownership in the land is concerned
because the land was transferred to him during the pendency of the appeal.
If your answer is (a), how can the right of Pacifico as co-owner be protected? Explain.
Pacifico can protect his right as a co-owner by pursuing his appeal; asking the
Court of Appeals to order the re-annotation of the lis pendens on the title of Carlos; and
by invoking his right of redemption of Bart’s share under Art. 1620.

Juliet offered to sell her house and lot, together with all the furniture and appliances
therein to Dehlma. Before agreeing to purchase the property, Dehlma went to the
Register of Deeds to verify Juliet's title. She discovered that while the property was
registered in Juliet's name under the Land Registration Act, as amended by the
Property Registration Decree, it property, Dehlma told Juliet to redeem the property
from Elaine, and gave her an advance payment to be used for purposes of releasing the
mortgage on the property. When the mortgage was released, Juliet executed a Deed of
Absolute Sale over the property which was duly registered with the Registry of Deeds,
and a new TCT was issued in Dehlma's name. Dehlma immediately took possession
over the house and lot and the movables therein. Thereafter, Dehlma went to the
Assessor's Office to get a new tax declaration under her name. She was surprised to
find out that the property was already declared for tax purposes in the name of XYZ
Bank which had foreclosed the mortgage on the property before it was sold to her. XYZ
Bank was also the purchaser in the foreclosure sale of the property. At that time, the
property was still unregistered but XYZ Bank registered the Sheriff's Deed of
Conveyance in the day book of the Register of Deeds under Act. 3344 and obtained a
tax declaration in its name. Was Dehlma a purchaser in good faith?
Yes, Dehlma is a purchaser in good faith. She learned about the XYZ tax
declaration and foreclosure sale only after the sale to her was registered. She relied on
the certificate of title of her predecessor-in-interest. Under the Torrens system, a buyer
of registered lands is not required by law to inquire further than what the Torrens
certificate indicates on its face. If a person proceeds to buy it relying on the title, that
person is considered as buyer in good faith. The “priority in time” rule could not be
invoked by XYZ Bank because the foreclosure sale of the land in favour of the bank was
recorded under Act No. 3344, the law governing transaction affecting unregistered land,
and thus, does not bind the land.
Who as between Dehlma and XYZ Bank has a better right to the house and lot?
Between Dehlma and the bank, the former has a better right to the house and lot.

In an action brought to collect a sum of money based on a surety agreement, the

defense of laches was raised as the claim was filed more than seven years from the
maturity of the obligation. However, the action was brought within the ten-year
prescriptive period provided by law wherein actions based on written contracts can be
instituted. Will the defense prosper? Reason.
No, the defense will not prosper. The problem did not give facts from which
laches may be inferred. Mere delay in filing an action, standing alone, does not
constitute laches.

Way back in 1948, Winda’s husband sold in favor of Verde Sports Center Corp. (Verde)
a 10-hectare property belonging to their conjugal partnership. The sale was made
without Winda’s knowledge, much less consent. In 1950, Winda learned of the sale,
when she discovered the deed of sale among the documents in her husband’s vault
after his demise. Soon after, she noticed that the construction of the sports complex had
started. Upon completion of the construction in 1952, she tried but failed to get free
membership privileges in Verde. Winda now files a suit against Verde for the annulment
of the sale on the ground that she did not consent to the sale. In answer, Verde
contends that, in accordance with the Spanish Civil Code which was then in force, the
sale in 1948 of the property did not need her concurrence. Verde contends that in any
case the action has prescribed or is barred by laches. Winda rejoins that her Torrens
title covering the property is indefeasible, and imprescriptible. Define or explain the term
―laches.
Laches means failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of
time, to do what, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier. It
is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time.

Decide the case, stating your reasons for your decision.

While Art. 1413 of the Spanish Civil Code did not require the consent of the wife
for the validity of the sale, an alienation by the husband in fraud of the wife is void as
held in decided case. Assuming that the alienation in 1948 was in fraud of Winda and,
therefore, makes the sale to Verde void, the action to set aside the sale, nonetheless, is
already barred by prescription and laches. More than 52 years have already elapsed
from her discovery of the sale in 1950.

In 1965, Renren bought from Robyn a parcel of registered land evidenced by a duly
executed deed of sale. The owner presented the deed of sale and the owner's
certificate of title to the Register of Deeds. The entry was made in the daybook and
corresponding fees were paid as evidenced by official receipt. However, no transfer of
certificate of title was issued to Renren because the original certificate of title in Robyn's
name was temporarily misplaced after fire partly gutted the Office of the Register of
Deeds. Meanwhile, the land had been possessed by Robyn's distant cousin, Mikaelo,
openly, adversely and continuously in the concept of owner since 1960. It was only in
April 1998 that Renren sued Mikaelo to recover possession. Mikaelo invoked acquisitive
prescription
Renren's action to recover possession of the land will prosper. In 1965, after
buying the land from Robyn, he submitted the Deed of Sale to the Registry of Deeds for
registration together with the owner's duplicate copy of the title, and paid the
corresponding registration fees. Under Sec. 56 of PD No. 1529, the Deed of Sale to
Renren is considered registered from the time the sale was entered in the Day Book
(now called the Primary Entry Book). For all legal intents and purposes, Renren is
considered the registered owner of the land. After all, it was not his fault that the
Registry of Deeds could not issue the corresponding transfer certificate of title.
Mikaelo's defense of prescription cannot be sustained. A Torrens title is imprescriptible.
No title to registered land in derogation of the title of the registered owner shall be
acquired by prescription or adverse possession (Sec. 47, P.D. No. 1529). The right to
recover possession of registered land likewise does not prescribe because possession
is just a necessary incident of ownership.
Laches, asking that he be declared owner of the land.
Mikaelo's defense of laches, however, appears to be more sustainable. Renren
bought the land and had the sale registered way back in 1965. From the facts, it
appears that it was only in 1998 or after an inexplicable delay of 33 years that he took
the first step asserting his right to the land. It was not even an action to recover
ownership but only possession of the land. By ordinary standards, 33 years of neglect
or inaction is too long and maybe considered unreasonable. As often held by the
Supreme Court, the principle of imprescriptibly sometimes has to yield to the equitable
principle of laches which can convert even a registered land owner's claim into a stale
demand. Mikaelo's claim of laches, however, is weak insofar as the element of equity is
concerned, there being no showing in the facts how he entered into the ownership and
possession of the land.
A owned a parcel of unregistered land located on the Tarlac side of the boundary
between Tarlac and Pangasinan. His brother B owned the adjoining parcel of
unregistered land on the Pangasinan side. A sold the Tarlac parcel to X in a deed of
sale executed as a public instrument by A and X. After X paid in full the price of the
sale, X took possession of the Pangasinan parcel in the belief that it was the Tarlac
parcel covered by the deed of sale executed by A and X. After twelve years, a
controversy arose between B and X on the issue of the ownership of the Pangasinan
parcel, B claims a vested right of ownership over the Pangasinan parcel because B
never sold that parcel to X or to anyone else. On the other hand, X claims a vested right
of ownership over the Pangasinan parcel by acquisitive prescription, because X
possessed this parcel for over ten years under claim of ownership. Decide on these
claims, giving your reasons.
At this point in time, X cannot claim the right of vested ownership over the
Pangasinan parcel by acquisitive prescription. In addition to the requisites common to
ordinary and extraordinary acquisitive prescription consisting of uninterrupted, peaceful,
public, adverse and actual possession in the concept of owner, ordinary acquisitive
prescription for ten years requires (1) possession in good faith and (2) just title. "Just
title" means that the adverse claimant came into possession of the property through one
of the modes recognized by law for the acquisition of ownership but the grantor was not
the owner or could not transmit any right (Art.1129). In this case, there is no "just title"
and no "mode" that can be invoked by X for the acquisition of the Pangasinan parcel.
There was no constructive delivery of the Pangasinan parcel because it was not the
subject-matter of the deed of sale. Hence, B retains ownership of the Pangasinan parcel
of land.

Original registration
Who may apply
Decree of registration
Review of decree of registration; innocent purchaser for value
Louie, before leaving the country to train as a chef in a five-star hotel in New York,
U.S.A., entrusted to his first- degree cousin Dewey an application for registration, under
the Land Registration Act, of a parcel of land located in Bacolod City. A year later, Louie
returned to the Philippines and discovered that Dewey registered the land and obtained
an Original Certificate of Title over the property in his Dewey’s name. Compounding the
matter, Dewey sold the land to Huey, an innocent purchaser for value. Louie promptly
filed an action for reconveyance of the parcel of land against Huey. Is the action
pursued by Louie the proper remedy?
An action for reconveyance against Huey is not the proper remedy, because
Huey is an innocent purchaser for value. The proper recourse is for Louie to go after
Dewey for damages by reason of the fraudulent registration and subsequent sale of the
land. If Dewey is insolvent, Louie may file a claim against the Assurance Fund.

Assuming that reconveyance is the proper remedy, will the action prosper if the case
was filed beyond one year, but within ten years, from the entry of the decree of
registration?
Yes, the remedy will prosper because the action prescribes in ten years, not
within one year when a petition for the reopening of the registration decree may be filed.
The action for reconveyance is distinct from the petition to reopen the decree of
registration registration proceedings, but the property should just be reconveyed to the
real owner. The action for reconveyance is based on implied or constructive trust, which
prescribes in ten years from the date of issuance of the original certificate of title. This
rule assumes that the defendant is in possession of the land. Where it is the plaintiff
who is in possession of the land, the action for reconveyance would be in the nature of
a suit for quieting for the title which action is imprescriptible.

What are the essential requisites or elements for the allowance of the reopening or
review of a decree of registration?
The essential elements are: (1) that the petitioner has a real or dominical right;
(2) that he has been deprived thereof through fraud; (3) that the petition is filed within
one (1) year from the issuance of the decree; and (4) that the property has not yet been
transferred to an innocent purchaser.

Distinguish the Torrens system of land registration from the system of recording of
evidence of title.
The torrens system of land registration is a system for the registration of title to
the land. Thus, under this system what is entered in the Registry of Deeds, is a record
of the owner's estate or interest in the land, unlike the system under the Spanish
Mortgage Law or the system under Sec. 194 of the Revised Administrative Code as
amended by Act 3344 where only the evidence of such title is recorded. In the latter
system, what is recorded is the deed of conveyance from hence the owner's title
emanated—and not the title itself.
Torrens system of land registration is that which is prescribed in Act 496 (now PD
1529), which is either Judicial or quasi-judicial. System or recording of evidence of title
is merely the registration of evidence of acquisitions of land with the Register of Deeds,
who annotates the same on the existing title, cancels the old one and issues a new title
based on the document presented for registration.

On March 27, 1980, Cornelio filed an application for land registration involving a parcel
of agricultural land that he had bought from Isaac identified as Lot No. 2716 with an
area of one (1) hectare. During the trial, Cornelio claimed that he and his predecessors-
in- interest had been in open, continuous, uninterrupted, public and adverse possession
and occupation of the land for more than thirty (30) years. He likewise introduced in
evidence a certification dated February 12, 1981 citing a presidential declaration to the
effect that on June 14, 1980, agricultural lands of the public domain, including the
subject matter of the application, were declared alienable and disposable agricultural
land. If you are the judge, will you grant the application for land registration of Cornelio?
No, I will not grant the application. To be entitled to registration of the parcel of
land, the applicant must show that the land being applied for is alienable land. At the
time of the filing of the application, the land has not yet been declared alienable by the
state

Can Cornelio acquire said agricultural land through acquisitive prescription, whether
ordinary or extraordinary?
Cornelio can acquire the land by acquisitive prescription only after it was
declared part of alienable land by the state by possession for the required number of
years for ordinary prescription, ten years possession in good faith with just title or
extraordinary prescription by possession for thirty years without need of any other
condition (Art. 1134).
Manuel was born on 12 March 1940 in a 1000-square meter property where he grew up
helping his father, Michael, cultivate the land. Michael has lived on the property since
the land was opened for settlement at about the time of the Commonwealth government
in 193 5, but for some reason never secured any title to the property other than a tax
declaration in his name. He has held the property through the years in the concept of an
owner and his stay was uncontested by others. He has also conscientiously and
continuously paid the realty taxes on the land. Michael died in 2000 and Manuel - as
Michael’s only son and heir -now wants to secure and register title to the land in his own
name. He consults you for legal advice as he wants to perfect his title to the land and
secure its registration in his name. What are the laws that you need to consider in
advising Manuel on how he can perfect his title and register the land in his name?
Explain the relevance of these laws to your projected course of action. I would advise
Manuel to file an application for registration under Sec. 14 of Pres. Decree No. 1529, or
the Property Registration Decree (PRD), specifically Sec. 14 (1)which requires (a) that
the land applied for forms part of the alienable and disposable (A & D) portion of the
public domain, and (b) that the applicant has been in open, continuous and notorious
possession and occupation thereof under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12,
1945, or earlier. However, it is only necessary that the land is already declared A & D
land “at the time the application for registration is filed" Manuel could also invoke Sec.
14 (2) of the same Decree, which allows registration through ordinary acquisitive
prescription for thirty years, provided, however, that the land is “patrimonial” in
character, i.e., already declared by the government (a) as A & D land, and (b) no longer
needed for public use or public service (Id). Manuel could also file an application for
“confirmation of imperfect or incomplete title" through "judicial legalization under Sec. 48
(b) of CA No. 141 or the Public Land Act (PLA). But, as held in Malabanan, there is no
substantial difference between this provision and Sec. 14 (1), PRD. Both refer to
agricultural lands already classified us alienable and disposable at the time the
application is filed, and require possession and occupation since June 12, 1945. The
only difference is that under the PRD, there already exists a title which is to he
confirmed, whereas under the PLA, the presumption is that land is still public land
(Republic v. Aquino, G.R. No. L-33983, January 27, 1983). Manuel may also invoke
“vested rights" acquired under R.A. No. 1942 dated June 2, 1957, which amended Sec.
48 (b), PLA by providing for a prescriptive period of thirty years or judicial confirmation
of imperfect title. It must only be demonstrated that possession and occupation
commenced on January 24, 1947 and the 30-year period was completed prior to the
effectivity of PD No. 1073 on January 25, 1977. PD No. 1073 now requires possession
and occupation since June 12, 1945. Another alternative is for Manuel to secure title
through administrative proceedings under the homestead or free patent provisions of
the PLA. The title issued has the same efficacy and validity as a title issued through
judicial proceedings, but with the limitation that the land cannot be sold or disposed of
within five years from the issuance of patent (Sec. 118, CA No. 141, as amended).

What do you have to prove to secure Manuel's objectives and what documentation is
necessary?
Manuel has the burden to overcome the presumption of State ownership by
“well-nigh incontrovertible” evidence. Accordingly, he must show that the land is already
classified as A & D “at the time the application for registration is filed" and that he has
been in “possession and occupation thereof" in the manner required by law since June
12, 1945, or earlier. Manuel may tack his possession to that of his predecessor-in-
interest (Michael) by the testimony of disinterested and knowledgeable eyewitnesses.
Overt acts of possession may consist in introducing valuable improvements like fencing
the land, constructing a residential house thereon, cultivating the land and planting fruit
hearing trees, declaring the land for taxation purposes and paying realty taxes, all of
which are corroborative proof of possession. To identify the land, he must submit the
tracing cloth plan or a duly-certified blueprint or whiteprint copy thereof. To show the
classification of the land as A & D, the application must be accompanied by (1) a
CENRO or PENRO certification; and (2) a certified true copy of the original classification
approved by the DENR Secretary. A presidential or legislative act may also be
considered.

Certificate of title
Subsequent registration
Mr. and Mrs. Roman and Mr. and Mrs. Cruz filed an application for registration of a
parcel of land which after due proceedings was granted by the RTC acting registration
as land court. However, before the decree of registration could be issued, the spouses
Roman and the spouses Cruz sold the lot to Juan. In the notarized deed of sale, the
sellers expressly undertook to submit the deed of sale to the land registration court so
that the title to the property would be directly issued in Juan's name. Is such a
stipulation valid?
Yes, because when one who is not the owner of the property sells or alienates it
and later the seller or grantor acquires title, such title passes by operation of law to the
buyer or grantee (Art. 1434).

Distinguish a direct attack from a collateral attack on a title.

 A direct attack on a title is one where the action filed is precisely for the purpose
of pointing out the defects in the title with a prayer that it be declared void. A collateral
attack is one where the action is not instituted for the purpose of attacking the title but
the nullity of the title is raised as a defense in a different action.

If the title in Item XX. A is issued in the names of the original sellers, would a motion
filed by Juan in the same case to correct or amend the title in order to reflect his name
as owner considered be collateral attack?
No, because Juan is not attacking the title but merely invoking his right as
transferee. Hence, it does not involve a collateral attack on the title.

Voluntary dealings; general provisions

Involuntary dealings
Bedrock Land & Property Development Corp. is a development company engaged in
developing and selling subdivisions, condominium units and industrial estates. In order
to replenish its inventories, it embarked on an aggressive land banking program. It
employed "scouts" who roam all over the Philippines to look for and conduct
investigations on prospective sites for acquisition and development, whether developed,
semi-developed or raw land. The management of Bedrock asks you as the company
counsel to prepare a manual containing a summary of the pertinent laws and
regulations relating to land registration and acquisition of title to land. The manual
should include the following items: What is the governing law?
The governing law is the Land Registration Act as amended by Property
Registration Decree (Act 496 as amended by PD 1529).

What properties are not registrable?

The following properties are not registrable: PPIMA
a. Properties of the Public Dominion;
b. Properties for public use or public service;
c. Inalienable lands of the public domain;
d. Military installations, civil and quasi-public lands; and
e. All lands not classified as alienable and disposable.

Republic Act 1899 authorizes municipalities and chartered cities to reclaim foreshore
lands bordering them and to construct thereon adequate docking and harbor facilities.
Pursuant thereto, the City of Cavite entered into an agreement with the Fil-Estate Realty
Company, authorizing the latter to reclaim 300 hectares of land from the sea bordering
the city, with 30% of the land to be reclaimed to be owned by Fil-Estate as
compensation for its services. The Solicitor General questioned the validity of the
agreement on the ground that it will mean reclaiming land under the sea which is
beyond the commerce of man. The City replies that this is authorized by RA. 1899
because it authorizes the construction of docks and harbors. Who is correct?
The Solicitor General is correct. The authority of the City of Cavite under RA
1899 to reclaim land is limited to foreshore lands. The Act did not authorize it to reclaim
land from the sea. "The reclamation being unauthorized, the City of Cavite did not
acquire ownership over the reclaimed land. Not being the owner, it could not have
conveyed any portion thereof to the contractor.

Adverse claim
Notice of lis pendens
Assurance Fund
Action of compensation from funds
Limitation of action