Ji 2001 1 44 PDF
Ji 2001 1 44 PDF
Ji 2001 1 44 PDF
The sacred principle of the classical law of obligations was the idea of pacta sunt servanda (sanctity
of contracts), which means that contracts are binding on any conditions. According to the classical
theory of contracts, each reasonable person has the freedom to enter into a contract upon terms
determined by that person and to be certain that a contract concluded voluntarily will be subject to
judicial enforcement and binding on the parties. It is primarily in the public interest to hold contractual
agreements binding under any circumstances. Everyone’s freedom to decide whether to conclude a
contract (Abschlussfreiheit) and to decide about the content of the contract (Inhaltsfreiheit), in
addition to honesty in the process of entering into a contract, were to preclude unfairness in
contractual relationships. Disputing of contracts was allowable if the contract had been concluded
by fraud, mistake or duress. In the absence of those circumstances, the parties were bound to their
contract. Unilateral denunciation of a contract was, therefore, in general, excluded.*1
The very same principles, characteristic of the classical contract law, also served as a basis for drafting
the Estonian Civil Code (ECC) *2 , applicable from 1 January 1965. Hence, in accordance with ECC
section 174, unilateral refusal to perform an obligation or unilateral modification of contractual terms
are not permitted, except in the cases prescribed by law.
The Riigikogu (Estonian parliament) is presently reading the draft Law of Obligations Act (LOA)*3,
which will replace the obligations part of the 1965 Civil Code. The applicable Estonian civil law
contains no provisions to regulate the general grounds and procedure for unilateral withdrawal from
a contract or for claiming specific performance from a party in breach or for exemption from
1R. Zimmermann. The Law of Obligations. Roman Foundations of the Civilian Tradition. Deventer, Boston: Kluwer Law and Taxation
Publishers, 1992, pp. 576–577.
2 Eesti NSV Tsiviilkoodeks. III osa. Kohustisõigus (The Civil Code of the Estonian SSR. Part III. Law of Obligations), adopted on 12.06.1964;
entered into force 1 January 1965 (in Estonian)
3 Võlaõigusseaduse eelnõu (The draft Law of Obligations Act) (116 SE II-2 of 10 January 2001). Available at: http://www.riigikogu.ee/ems/in-
dex.html, 20.06.2001 (in Estonian).
performance. Changes to accompany the adoption of the Law of Obligations Act in contract law are,
therefore, of fundamental importance, as principles substantially different from those of the applica-
ble law will be provided in respect of the consequences of breach of the duty to perform and with
regard to the permissibility of claiming specific performance. While the applicable law, as well as
judicial practice, observes, quite strictly, the principles of pacta sunt servanda, the draft Law of
Obligations Act contains provisions, which are rather based on the principle of clausula rebus sic
stantibus. It is yet difficult to predict the consequences of this new and considerably more flexible
regulation for Estonian legal practice and economy. However, it can be stated with certainty that the
new regulation will require a different approach to the binding nature of contracts both from judges
as well as advocates, who will be protecting the interests of their clients on the basis of the new Act.
law while in private law, its position was not the strongest. The 19th century, in contrast, was not most
favourable for the recognition of the clausula principle. The theory of intention, whereunder a
person’s intention concerns only certain circumstances and develops on the basis of knowledge and
consideration of those circumstances, permitted breach of promises if those circumstances proved to
be wrong. On the other hand, it was realised that the society’s interest in ensuring legal certainty,
guaranteed by ensuring a balance of interests between the contracting parties, was also worth
protection. In particular, Windscheid’s doctrine of tacit presupposition (Voraussetzungslehre)*8 was
one of the attempts to ensure balance in contractual relationships, especially as that theory was based
on the presumption that contracting parties plan the realisation of legal consequences under certain
specific circumstances. Usually, the presumption that certain circumstances will remain unchanged
is not a direct condition of a contract. If the presumption of unchanged circumstances, as considered
at the time of concluding the contract, proves to be wrong, requirement of performance may be unfair
and unreasonable, taking, however, into account that the promisee must have understood that the
other party had been influenced by certain circumstances. In such event, the promisor should have
the right to demand termination of the contract. For that reason, Windscheid’s theory has been
regarded to be close to the theory of conditional contracts, which is based on the condition that the
circumstances remain unchanged during the entire life of the contract. *9
Windscheid’s theory could not be made acceptable to the drafters of the German Civil Code (BGB),
and therefore, BGB does not contain a general rule about changes in the circumstances. However,
modern versions of the clausula principle have been developed extra legem by courts and jurists.*10
An example of this is the frustration theory, the formulation of which became necessary in connection
with the economic and political problems caused by the First World War, and, in particular, with
regard to performance of long-term contracts influenced by those problems. By now, the clausula
principle has become a part and parcel of modern German contract law.*11
In common-law countries, the clausula doctrine has not exerted any substantial influence on the
development of contract law. It was already stated in the case of Paradine v. Jane (1647)*12 that
contractual obligations were absolute and no dissolution thereof was permitted. That principle
prevailed in English law until the 19th century, when the case of Taylor v. Caldwell (1863)*13 laid a
foundation for the modern clausula doctrine.*14 Under the traditional common-law rules, parties to
a contract were not excused from performance even by such circumstances, following the conclusion
of the contract, that made performance impossible, and it was found that the effect of such
circumstances on contractual obligations must be foreseen by the parties. That position is also in
accordance with the principle of strict liability, which is recognised in common law in respect of
contractual relationships. *15
8 Windscheid’s main work was the monography “Die Lehre des römischen Rechts von der Voraussetzung” (1850). The name of this theory
can be translated into English as “the doctrine of contractual assumption”, which has been used in T. Weir’s translation of the book: An
Introduction to Comparative Law (2nd ed., 1992, p. 557) by K. Zweigert and H. Kötz.
9 W. Lorenz. Contract Modification as a Result of Change of Circumstances. Good Faith and Fault in Contract Law. Ed. by J. Beatson, D.
Friedman. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997, p. 361.
10 R. Zimmermann (Note 1), p. 581.
11 Ibid., p. 582.
12 Paradine v. Jane (1647) Aleyn 26; 82 ER 579, 897.
13 Taylor v. Caldwell (1863) 3 B&S 826, 835; 122 ER 309, 313, per Blackburn J.
14However, the case of Taylor v. Caldwell was of decisive importance with regard to reducing differences between civil law and common
law. An equitable result was achieved by supplementing the contract with the tacit presupposition that the circumstances would remain the
same. The decision adopted in that case was of historical import, paving the way for the later famous cases of coronation festivities.
15 U. Draetta, R. B. Lake, V. P. Nanda. Breach and Adaption of International Contracts. An Introduction to Lex Mercatoria. New Hampshire:
Butterworth Legal Publishers, 1992, p. 87.
are, then, those unforeseen circumstances whereupon a party may be discharged from its duties or
render a performance which is substantially different from the initial agreement? *16
In modern legal systems, the theory of frustration (Wegfall der Geschäftsgrundlage) is recognised
as a basis for exemption from contractual duties. Frustration may arise upon delay in performance
or extinguishment of the causa of the contract (death of a person, destruction of a thing, etc.), or if
performance becomes illegal, or upon a material change in the circumstances, whereby the initial
contract transforms into another contract, i.e. it becomes substantially different from what was agreed
initially, or upon a bilateral mistake or for the reason of economic unreasonableness.*17 Regardless
of the dissimilarities in the classification of circumstances, all of those circumstances have the
common consequence of duties becoming excessively onerous. Excessive onerosity itself may be
constituted by an increase in the cost of performance or decrease in the value of what is receivable
under the contract. Impossibility of performance, dispute against the transaction or recourse to its
voidness, impermissibility of claims for performance or excusability of breach may also serve as
grounds for exemption, besides substantial difficulties in performance. Hence a distinction must be
made between situations in which a party is discharged from performance without the maintenance
of any other duties of conduct and situations in which a party’s obligation to perform is extinguished
but another duty, e.g. a duty to pay penalties, is maintained or the initially agreed obligation is reduced
or modified.*18
In addition to the above-mentioned cases, each legal system usually provides legal measures for
discharge of contracts by unilateral termination. Performance of a contract may become impossible
in connection with a change in factual circumstances, establishment of statutory prohibitions or for
the reason of economic unreasonableness.*19
According to Windscheid’s theory of tacit presupposition, a contract is regarded to be concluded on
the inchoate condition that the assumed state of affairs remains unaltered for the period of the contract.
This implies a danger that one party may avail itself of the chance to transfer contractual risks to the
other party, which would considerably reduce legal certainty and the reliability of economic
transactions.*20 If Windscheid’s theory is applied side by side with Oertmann’s theory, whereunder
a contract is based on the presumption of the existence or realisation of certain substantial circum-
stances that have been notified to, or been acquiesced in by, the other party at the time of concluding
the contract, it will be possible to move from the hopes of the parties to the obvious effects which
the changed circumstances have had on the transaction.*21 However, in respect of determining the
parties’ positions and the permissibility of claims, importance is borne by the changes, arising out
of the changed circumstances, in the balance between the duties and rights.
Regardless of the dissimilarity of theoretical conceptions and arguments regarding exemption from
contractual duties in different legal systems, possible solutions to the problems are nonetheless
related particularly to the question of a reasonable division of risks between the parties.*22
Impossibility
Impossibility of performance is the most typical case of breach of contract. In old European civil
codes, the consequences of impossibility of performance depend on whether or not the party in breach
was at fault with regard to the breach. The Continental and Anglo-American legal systems are,
however, remarkably different in their positions towards the question of the fault of the party in
breach in respect of allowing recourse to remedies. While in Continental civil codes, liability is based
16D. Tallon. Hardship. – A. Hartkamp, M. Hesselink, E. Hondius, C. Joustra, E. du Perron (Ed.). Towards European Civil Code. Nijmegen:
Ars Aequi Libri, 1998, p. 327.
17 W. F. Ebke, B. M. Steinhauer. The Doctrine of Good Faith in German Contract Law. Good Faith and Fault in Contract Law. Ed. by J.
Beatson, D. Friedman. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997, p. 180.
18 B. Markesinis. The German Law of Obligations. Vol. I. The Law of Contracts and Restitution: A Comparative Introduction. Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1997, p. 519.
19G. H. Jones, P. Schlechtriem. Breach of Contract. International Encyclopedia of Comparative Law. Vol. VII. Contracts in General. Chief
ed. A. von Mehren. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1999, pp. 99–100.
20 B. Markesinis (Note 18), p. 518.
21 Ibid., pp. 518–519.
22 G. H. Treitel. Law of Contract. 9th ed. London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1995, p. 781.
on fault, the so-called strict liability is applied in Anglo-American systems.*23 Nor is the conception
of impossibility of performance used as a basis for exemption from contractual obligations in the UN
Vienna Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods of 1980 (CISG). Cases in which
a party cannot perform an obligation due to impossibility of performance are, nevertheless, regarded
as breach of contract. The aggrieved party may still claim damages and, if the breach can be regarded
as substantial (CISG art. 25), even termination of the contract. Upon breach of contract, the aggrieved
or if requirement of performance is permitted (CISG art. 28).*24
The Principles of European Contract Law (PECL) and the Principles of International Commercial
Contracts (PICC)*25 provide for liability regardless of the fault of the party in breach and regulate
the cases in which specific performance cannot be obtained. Thus, according to PICC article 7.2.2
(a) and PECL article 9:102 (2) (a), specific performance cannot be obtained if performance is
unlawful or impossible. If the impossibility of performance was not excusable, the aggrieved party
is also entitled to damages (PECL art. 9:501 (1); art. 8:108; PICC art. 7.1.7).
The applicable Estonian law is based on the principle that duties are automatically extinguished in
the event of impossibility of due performance thereof. In accordance with section 240 of the Estonian
Civil Code (ECC), an obligation is extinguished if the impossibility of its performance has been
elicited by circumstances beyond the debtor’s responsibility. However, if the debtor is responsible
for the impossibility of performance, the obligation does not terminate but, instead, only its content
changes. If a duty cannot be performed any more, the party in breach must compensate for the damage
caused by non-performance. Thus, impossibility of performance through the debtor’s fault entitles
the creditor to claim recovery of the damage thereby caused. In accordance with ECC section 227,
a party in breach of an obligation is liable only upon the existence of culpability (intent or negligence),
unless otherwise provided for by the law or stipulated in the contract. The absence of culpability
must be proved by the person in breach. Hence, in the applicable law, an obligation is automatically
extinguished in the event of impossibility of its performance, and recourse to any remedies is
excluded. Claims arising out of the liquidation of an obligation must be filed on the basis of the
provisions concerning unjust enrichment, which are, however, patently imperfect under the ECC for
the achievement of the desired objective.
The Estonian Law of Obligations Act was drafted on the basis of the general principle that contracts
are binding. Thus, in accordance with LOA subsection 8 (2), the performance of a contract is
mandatory and, in accordance with subsection 11 (1), the applicability of a contract is not influenced
by the fact that performance of the contract was impossible or that the thing or right serving as the
object of the contract was not at a party’s disposal at the time of concluding the contract.
However, in the draft Estonian Law of Obligations Act, the permissibility of applicable remedies
depends on whether the non-performance is excusable or not. Still, recourse to remedies is not
absolutely precluded, but only limited by the criterion of excusability.
In accordance with LOA subsection 96 (1), breach of obligation is excusable if the debtor is in breach
due to an impediment beyond its control (force majeure circumstances). Force majeure is constituted
by an impediment beyond the control of the debtor, who could not be reasonably expected to consider
or prevent such impediment, or overcome the consequence thereof, at the time of concluding the
contract or upon the inception of the obligation from tort.*26 If the effect of force majeure is temporary,
the breach is excusable only during the period when performance is impeded by force majeure
circumstances. In accordance with LOA section 98, the creditor may, regardless of the debtor’s
liability, withhold the performance of its own duties, unilaterally dissolve or terminate the contract
as well as reduce the price. If both parties are engaged in economic or professional activities, the
creditor may claim interest, regardless of the debtor’s liability for the breach.*27 Despite the fact that
impossibility of performance is not excusable, the creditor may not require specific performance if
performance of the obligation is impossible (LOA subsection 101 (2) 1)). Differently from PECL
article 9:102, unlawfulness, unlike impossibility, is not provided as a basis for not permitting claims
for specific performance in the draft Estonian Law of Obligations Act. Thus, according to the
circumstances, even those cases in which specific performance is prevented by statutory prohibitions
have to be qualified as impossibility.
23 D. Tallon. Breach of Contract and Reparation of Damage. – A. Hartkamp, M. Hesserlink, E. Hondius, C. Joustra, E. du Perron (Ed.). Towards
European Civil Code. Nijmegen: Ars Aequi Libri, 1994, pp. 223–224.
24 G. H. Jones, P. Schlechtriem (Note 19), p. 98.
25 UNIDROIT Principles of Inetrnational Commercial Contracts (1994). The Principles of European Contract Law (1998).
26 The conception of excusability is analysed on the basis of CISG article 79.
27 The draft Law of Obligations Act (Note 3).
In accordance with LOA subsection 101 (1), claims for specific performance with regard to monetary
obligations are always permitted. Nevertheless, introduction of a general regulation similar to PECL
article 9:101 (“Monetary Obligations”) should be considered with a view to those cases in which
there is a need to justify the impermissibility of claims for specific performance of monetary
obligations and to protect the other party against forced performance.
Frustration
Frustration is regarded to include situations in which performance is possible but the creditor has
lost its interest therein. Such loss of interest may arise from different circumstances. For example,
performance may become excessively onerous or the value of what is receivable under the contract
may become insignificant. Frustration is not deemed to mean a failure to receive the expected benefits
from a transaction, since that risk is presumed to be borne by the parties themselves.*28
It has been demonstrated by German judicial practice that even nowadays, intervention in contracts
is considered possible by courts, who are ready to make contracts equitable. German practice has
also shown that in the case of intervention in contracts, courts prefer frustration to the institutions of
impossibility or mistake, as this leaves more room for manoeuvring and finding correct solutions.
Whether courts should do this or not is yet another question. Arguments justifying intervention in
contractual relationships have emphasised the need to ensure an equitable division of risks between
the parties (except in the event of simply a bad transaction) or for the reason that the aggrieved party
cannot bear the unfavourable consequence because of its economic situation.*29
In economic activities, the parties themselves must be able to evaluate the circumstances, take
account thereof and foresee measures to liquidate or prevent unpleasant consequences. In any event,
one should agree with the view that economically unfavourable situations should not be too easily
ascertainable and not every economic change should bring about an option to dissolve the binding
nature of the contract. *30
One of the most frequent types of frustration involves export restrictions and quotas or the require-
ment to obtain a licence necessary for the activities. Such contracts often give rise to the question
whether the parties have, at the time of concluding the contract, already taken account of the risk that
a licence would not be obtained or that the quota would be too small or that export or import
prohibitions would be established. In the event of contracts between professional traders, considera-
tion of such circumstances at the time of entering into the contract should be regarded as an inchoate
contractual condition and part of the due care.
The applicable Estonian law contains no general provisions to regulate frustration as a legal basis
for exemption from contractual obligations or for demanding modification thereof. In accordance
with ECC subsection 230 (2), the creditor may refuse to accept performance if it has lost its interest
in performance because of a delay. Thus, the debtor may be discharged from its duty to perform if it
delays the performance of its absolute obligations. However, the Civil Code contains no provisions
that would permit an obligee to refuse to perform its duties if, after the conclusion of the contract, it
becomes evident that the other party’s economic situation has deteriorated in comparison with that
of the time of concluding the contract and this would jeopardise the reception of counter-performance.
Nevertheless, subsection 85 (1) 3) of the General Part of the Civil Code Act*31 entitles the creditor
to demand security from the debtor if there is reason to believe that the debtor is not capable of
performing the obligation arising from the transaction. In addition, ECC sections 248 and 249 entitle
the seller and the buyer, respectively, to unilaterally refuse to perform the contract if the counter-party
fails to perform its contractual obligations, which serves as a basis for frustration. A lawful right to
demand review or modification of contractual terms also arises out of subsection 6 (2) of the
Commercial Lease Act, whereunder the lessor may demand review of the rent in the event of change
in such prices, depreciation rates, tariffs or payments that are determined on the national level. As
yet, no claims filed on that basis have been satisfied in Estonian judicial practice.
Frustration is, first of all, a question of whether exemption from an obligation should be based on
the frustration of a subjective or objective basis. The subjective basis of a transaction includes the
circumstances that have been referred to by the parties during the negotiations and that have
influenced the parties to enter into the contract. The objective basis means those circumstances that
should logically exist in order that the objective of the contract be achieved. In modern times,
distinction between the objective and subjective bases is no longer made, and exemption from the
duty to perform is possible in either event.*32
In accordance with LOA subsection 101 (2) 2), specific performance may not be claimed if the
performance would be excessively onerous or costly for the debtor. If the excessive onerosity results
from objective circumstances (non-performance by the debtor would be excusable), such situation
may be qualified as an excusable breach of the duty to perform and the creditor may have recourse
to remedies provided for excusable breaches on the part of the debtor. Even in such event, claims for
specific performance are excluded. Hence LOA subsection 101 (2) 2) is applicable only if perform-
ance is yet possible but claims for such performance have become unreasonable due to certain
subjective circumstances.
The special part of LOA provides, like section 610 of the German BGB, that a person who has
promised to give a loan, may withdraw that promise if the economic situation of the borrower has
deteriorated to such extent as to cast doubt on the borrower’s ability to repay the loan. In Estonian
courts, classical examples from German judicial practice can be used to illustrate provisions of law*33,
but in respect of specific decisions, consideration of Estonian economic and social climate and
consequences will, however, be of conclusive importance.
Frustration may also be constituted by the so-called economic frustration. Thus, for example,
hyperinflation substantially influenced German judicial practice in deciding whether or not the
parties were bound to their contractual duties. It was found by German courts that in the event of sale
contracts, the risk of price changes must be borne by both of the parties. Nevertheless, if this led to
economic ruination, contracts should not be binding. In a normal economic situation, however,
inflation should naturally not be a sufficient argument for exemption from contractual duties.*34 Until
now, in Estonian courts, no claims for reduction of or increase in agreed payments on the basis of
inflation have been found to be justified.
The German theory of frustration is not so similar to the English-law theory of frustration as, rather,
to the doctrine of equitableness recognised in English law, which allows adjustment of contracts in
the case of a mistake that has occurred upon the conclusion of the contract. In the event of frustration,
the contract terminates automatically and the court has no right to adjust the contract to the changed
situation or to make the parties’ duties more equitable, except in certain situations of restitution.*35
Delay
A delay may result in a change in the balance between the parties’ duties, in consequence of which
the duties become substantially more onerous for one party or the value of what is receivable under
the contract diminishes substantially. In the applicable law, ECC subsection 230 (2) provides that if
the creditor has lost its interest in performance due to a delay, it may waive performance and claim
damages. In accordance with LOA subsection 106 (1), a party may unilaterally dissolve the contract
if the other party is in fundamental breach of a contractual duty. Fundamental breach means, inter
alia, a breach of such duty, strict compliance with which is of the essence of the contract. Fundamental
breach with regard to a part of the performance may entitle the party to unilaterally terminate the
entire contract if the breach with regard to the part in question was fundamental in respect of the
entire contract or if the creditor is uninterested in partial performance. Thus, a delay elicits the right
to either refuse to accept performance or to unilaterally dissolve the contract and, hence, to discharge
the debtor from the duty to perform.
36 Ibid., p. 523.
37 Ibid., p. 532.
In German law, the requirement that transactions must be interpreted on the basis of good faith, taking
into consideration the general practice, is also contained in BGB section 157, which regulates
interpretation. In addition, BGB section 242 provides for the debtor’s obligation to perform its duties
in accordance with the principle of good faith, taking into consideration the general practice. Thus,
similar results can be achieved in German judicial practice on the basis of either section 157 or section
242. Nevertheless, BGB section 242 provides grounds for interpretation with a greater potential for
law-creation.*38
Pursuant to LOA subsection 90 (2), modification of contractual terms may be demanded if the
aggrieved party did not have reasonable grounds to believe, at the time of concluding the contract,
that the circumstances could change and the change in the circumstances was beyond the control of
the aggrieved party, and provided that on the basis of law or the contract, the aggrieved party does
not bear the risk of a change in the circumstances, and if the aggrieved party had been aware of the
change in the circumstances, it would not have concluded the contract or would have concluded the
contract on substantially different conditions. Modification of the contract may also be claimed in
the event that the circumstances underlying the contract had changed before the conclusion of the
contract but the aggrieved party became aware of such change only after entering into the contract.
The aggrieved party may also demand modification of the contract with retroactive effect, but not to
an earlier date than that of the change in the balance between the duties. In addition to the option of
claiming modification of contractual terms, the aggrieved party may also fix an additional period for
performance (LOA section 106), withhold performance (LOA sections 102 and 103) or claim
damages (LOA section 107). The choice of claims must be based on the fact that courts cannot rewrite
contracts. They can only modify the terms insofar as this does not result in an entirely new contract.
If modification of contractual terms is impossible or unreasonable in respect of the other party, the
party aggrieved by the change in the circumstances may unilaterally terminate the long-term contract
in accordance with the special procedure laid down in section 185. Thus the aggrieved party is
provided with an option to unilaterally terminate the contract even without fixing an additional period
for performance if the change in the balance between the contractual duties can be demonstrated to
serve as grounds for dissolving the contract in accordance with the provisions of law.
Hence the new draft Law of Obligations Act provides several options for withholding performance,
either absolutely or for a certain period. How those provisions will be used by persons participating
in Estonian economic activities and by judges, i.e. the appliers of law, will be seen after the
implementation of the Act. The new Act will certainly provide parties in breach with more options
to avoid performance of their duties and to postpone the moment of beginning to do what was
promised at the time of concluding the contract. Yet there is a danger that courts will come to
underestimate the economic practice, the transaction itself and the parties’ relations in the transaction.
In the case of contracts concluded within the areas of economic and professional activities, there will
certainly also be a need to evaluate how the parties have secured themselves against the risks in the
contract and which division of risks would be equitable. In any event, the provision of courts with
such rights will require the development of certain new techniques in order to reach satisfactory
solutions.*39
38 G. Chievely. The Future of Common Law. The Wilberforce Lecture, 1997. – The International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 1997, No.
46, p. 752.
39 L. E. Trakman. Frustrated Contracts and Legal Fictions. – The Modern Law Review, 1983, No. 46, pp. 39–54.