United States District Court

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
BACKWARD DISTRICT OF ANYWHERE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
V. NO. RX-010YC
IVE B. PERSECUTED
MOTION TO DISMISS CHARGES
(Lack of Essential Element)
COMES NOW the Accused, by special appearance in challenge of jurisdiction,
pursuant Rule 12(b)(2), to state:
A. The charging instrument, an Information, presents five counts of failure type of offenses
punishable under §7203.
B. In order to comply with constitutional safeguards concerning due process of law and the
right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation rules of procedure have been
promulgated to regulate and simplify as well as to “standardize” the process which is due.
C. FRCrP Rule 7 specifies the content of an Indictment, or an Information, and portions
relevant here are:
“The indictment or the information shall be a plain, concise and definite written
statement of the essential facts constituting the offense charged.”

“The indictment or information shall state for each count the official or
customary citation of the statute, rule, regulation or other provision of law which the
defendant Is alleged therein to have violated.”
D. The Information fails to state in each count the official citation to a statute or code section
which allegedly has been violated, as expressly required by the Rule. Additionally, the
Information fails to specify in a written form in plain, concise and definite statement all of the
essential facts in substantial allegations so as to inform the defendant and the court exactly of
the nature of the offense intended to be charged.
1) At two places within each count the wording of, “to make an income tax return”
appears. And from that one can glean that the nature of the complaint has something to do
with income tax returns, that is, not a return in regard to some other tax, such as a distiller’s
tax. That the Information specified INCOME TAX returns helped to narrow the field to that
particular species of return.
2) Because of the allegations about making an INCOME TAX return in each count one can
determine that the missing citation of the provision supposedly violated must be located within
Sub-Title A of the tax code. In order to be sufficient within the context of this Information one
can discern that the nature of the text, if any there be, as relates to the or those missing statute
section(s) would impose a requirement or duty to make (and file?) a return; an income tax
return. The non-cited and missing statute section(s), if any, would be the one or more
section(s) that supposedly were violated, not section 7203!
3) In addition to the omission of citation of statute section(s) supposedly violated, there is no
written statement of the essential facts concerning a duty or requirement to make an income
tax return. In lieu of any substantial allegation(s) the Pleader substitutes the phrase, “he was
required by law”, which is merely a conclusion of law, if such law actually exists. And if there is
no portion of the income tax law which expressly and clearly imposes a duty and requirement
to make an INCOME TAX return then the above quoted pleader’s conclusion is not a conclusion
concerning something that a statute supposedly says. Instead, the quoted phrase represents a
blatant fraud in pleading.
This Accused challenges, and this court should insist that the government attorney(s) shall
cite and produce copies of the section(s) of the income tax statute which imposes a duty to
make an income tax return.
4) A duty and requirement to make a return is an essential element to constitute an offense
under section 7203, and must be plainly, concisely and definitely alleged in an Indictment or an
Information as required by Rule 7(c) FRCrP. And then, later, must be proved at trial. It is
suggested that the only means of evidencing such a proof is to produce copies of the statute
section(s) which impose the duty to make the particular type of tax return at issue.
5) In the instance of this Information, the duty and requirement to make a return is not
alleged conformably with the Rule 7(c). Indeed, not at all because a Pleader’s conclusion is not
a substantial allegation of fact and emphatically not of an essential fact. Such a conclusion
should be treated as not being an allegation at all.
6) The failure to allege an essential fact, as required by the Rule, yields a defective and
insufficient charge, one which, in this instance, is fatally defective and cannot be resurrected.
THEREFORE: The effort at the charges in the Information, all five counts, must be
dismissed. Be it so ordered.
Dated this ______of April, 2009.
____________________
___ ; IVE B.
PERSECUTED, Accused

{Add Certificate of Service – directed to U.S. Attorney by way of U.S. Mail. Get address from
Clerk of court }
NOTE - - - [NOT to be appended to the above paper! This is info for you.
“It is now a well established fact that Congress never enacted any Statute(s) at Large
creating a specific liability for taxes imposed by Subtitle A of the Internal Revenue Code. By
comparison, Congress has enacted Statute(s) at Large creating specific liabilities for taxes
imposed by Subtitles B and C of the
Internal Revenue Code. On this key point, see 26 CFR 1.1-1(b) and Commissioner v. Acker, 361
U.S. 87,
4 L. Ed.2d 127, 80 S. Ct. 144 (1959), quoting in pertinent part:

But the section contains nothing to that effect, and, therefore, to uphold this addition
to the tax would be to hold that it may be imposed by regulation, which, of course,the law
does not permit. United States v. Calamaro, 354 U.S. 351, 359; Koshland v. Helvering, 298 U.S.
441, 446-447; Manhattan Co. v. Commissioner, 297 U.S. 129, 134. [Bold emphasis added]

BACKWARD DISTRICT COURT OF ANYWHERE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA )
v. ) Case No. RX-010YC
IVE B. PERSECUTED )
MOTION TO DISMISS INFORMATION
Comes now the Accused, by special appearance, in challenge of jurisdiction, and

without waiver of improper plaintiff, to state:
1.) It has long been recognized that the federal United States has not been granted any
common law authorities or jurisdictions. This was emphatically confirmed in 1938 when
the U.S. Supreme Court overturned the Tyson doctrine in Erie Railroad v. Tompkins, 304
US 64.
2.) That the federal United States lacked any common law jurisdiction was early-on
recognized in U.S. v. Worrall, (1798) 2 US 384 Fed. Case. 2 Dall. 384, and also ruled in
the U. S. Supreme court in U. S. v. Hudson and Goodwin (1812) 7 Cranch 32.

3.) In U.S v. Cruikshank (1875) 93 US 542, the U.S. Supreme Court explained, “The
government of the United States is one of delegated powers alone. Its authority is
defined and limited by the Constitution. All powers not granted to it by the instrument
are reserved to the States or the people. No rights can be acquired under the
constitution or laws of the United States, except such as the government of the United
States has the authority to grant or secure. All that cannot be so granted or secured are
left under the protection of the States.” (Emphasis added) 92 US, at 551. Obviously the
U.S. Congress has not been granted or delegated any power to adopt a common law and
therefore cannot lawfully authorize a criminal mode of procedure by way of
a Information in the U.S. District Courts.
4.) This Accused is aware of the ruling in DUKE v. UNITED STATES, 301 US 492 which
was decided in May of 1937, almost one year prior the Erie Railroad decision above
cited and wherein the court ruled in these words, “There is no federal general common
law. Congress has no power to declare substantive rules of common law applicable in a
state whether they be local in their nature or ‘general,’ be they commercial law or a part
of the law of torts. And no clause in the Constitution purports to confer such a power
upon the federal courts.” 304 US 78.

5.) From the above, this Accused contends that the Erie decision necessarily overturned
the Duke ruling and in effect postulates that the statute of December, 1930 which led to
the questions in Duke is also unconstitutional.
6.) A re-view of history shows that the origin of a criminal procedure by way of an
Information was a device concockted in the infamous Star Chamber by the excessively
ambitious Empson and Dudley after the statute of 1495, 11 Henry VII, Chap. 3 (Offenses
against Statutes) had further extended the jurisdiction of the Star Chamber so as to
include a criminal jurisdiction.
When the Star Chamber as a court was abolished by statute in 1640, 16 Car. I,
Chap. 10 (Star Chamber), the procedural device which originated there was also
abolished. But its use was revived in the King’s Bench despite its unlawfulness. And it
continues - - - -.
7.) Criminal procedure by way of an Information is of British origin and has not and
cannot be adopted by the Congress, despite that the language of some statutes seem to
suggest otherwise.
8.) The procedural method being pursued here in this alleged case is that of an
Information, a method which is absolutely unlawful.

ACCORDINGLY: This Information must be dismissed. Be it so ordered.
______________________
Ive B. Persecuted, Accused
v. No. RX-010YC
IVE B. PERSECUTED
4th MOTION TO DISMISS
(No Charge)
COMES NOW the Accused, by special appearance in challenge of

jurisdiction, pursuant Rule 12(b) (2), to state,
This Accused contends:

1) The government attorney has used a typical “pattern” charge in each count in the
Information.
2) In each count all of the wordage up to the words, “he did willfully fail ---“ is
unnecessary to any charge intended, is only preliminary data that goes to describe a
WHO that may be charged with an offense made penal by section
7203. Such unnecessary data may be struck and disregarded because it is not pertinent
to the charge.
3) The actual charge intended in each count begins with the words, “he did willfully
fail ---“, and thereafter the government attorney musty allege all the essential elements
to constitute the offense.
4) In the instance of an offense under §7203, which is a generic penalty section,
there are only five distinct acts of failure that have been made penal, and they are:
(a) Failure to pay an estimated tax;
(b) Failure to pay a tax;
(c) Failure to make a return;
(d) Failure to keep records;
(e) Failure to supply information.
And a so-called “failure to file” (a return) is not within the express provisions of the
section.

5.) In this Information the only charge element which has been alleged is failure to make
a return.
Whether the allegedly not made return is an income tax return is not a core
element of a charge here.
6.) But, for all that the paragraph of each count does excessively say, it nevertheless
remains that an essential element has not been alleged. Namely, the “charge” portion of
§7203 requires that for each count of the five failure acts, as specified above, there must be
an accompanying allegation asserting that they were not done at a time (or times) as
required by law (or
regulation).
7.) The failures of allegation in this Information is that the Accused has not been
charged in the charging portion of each count with having failed to make a return at the
time (or times) as required in an unspecified statute, or regulation.
THEREFORE: No charge has been presented before this court and the case or cases must be
Dated this ___ April, 2009

_____________________
______

Add certificate of Service
V. No. RX-010YC
IVE B. PERSECUTED
FIRST MOTION TO DISMISS
Improper Plaintiff
COMES NOW the Accused, by special appearance in challenge of
jurisdiction, to show the court a lack of authority, as follows:
1) The Information names “UNITED STATES OF AMERICA” as being the

Plaintiff without explaining or more particularly describing who or what that
“UNITED STATES OF AMERICA” is.
2) The nature of the Information as presented seems to deliberately utilize an
implication to the end that the unaware will assume that the “UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA” is or refers to the federal government; and the gullible won’t question
the subterfuge.
3) The facts are that as generally used the United States of America is an
abstraction which refers to the fifty states which collectively comprise the union of
States known by that name. The United States of America has not been constituted
by law as a government in a sense of federal government; there is no government
entity by that name. That which is referred to sub-nominee “United States of
America” is not an entity competent to sue, or be sued, and it cannot be a real party
in interest.
4) Because there is no government entity by the name of United States of

America or UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, there is no Plaintiff before the court which
this court can recognize as an entity competent to proceed.
THEREFORE: Because of the lack of a legally cognizable plaintiff
this Information must be dismissed. Be it so ordered.
Dated _____ of April, 2009.
___________
_________
Ive B.
Persecuted, Accused
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigned certifies that the above document was served on all
parties in the above cause by depositing one copy each in the U.S. mail postage
prepaid, in an envelope addressed to _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ on this _____ day of April 2009.
___________
___________
Ive B.
Persecuted
NOTE - - - - GET, Read, and STUDY NORTON v. SHELBY COUNTY (1886) 118 US 425
V. NO. RX-010YC
IVE B. PERSECUTED
MOTION TO STRIKE
COMES NOW the Accused, by special appearance in challenge of jurisdiction, pursuant
Rule 12(b)(2) and Rule 7(d), to state:
A. The portions of Rule 7 FRCrP which are relevant to this motion are:
(c) Nature and Contents.

The indictment or the information shall be a plain, concise and
definite written statement of the essential facts constituting the offense charged.
The indictment or information shall state for each count the official

or Customary citation of the statute, rule, regulation or other provision of law which the
defendant is alleged therein to have violated.
(d) Surplusage. The court on motion of the defendant may strike

surplusage from the indictment or information.
B. Under the Rule the Pleader is required to state for each count the official or customary
citation of the statute, rule, regulation or other provision of law which the defendant allegedly
violated. Immediately below each count in the Information it is expressly alleged in these
words, “In violation of Title 26, United States Code, Section 7203”. This statement is the only
citation to any statute or rule etc. in the Information, and this motion is based on that fact.
Treating the content of section 7203 as being the only substantive portion of a statute
which was violated as expressly alleged, all wording or language as used in the Information
which is not contained within section 7203, or is not fairly inferable from the context thereof is
herein contended to be surplusage and should be struck and deleted from the Information, as
follows in specific detail:
1. The words, “During the calendar year”, and the year date as in each count should
be struck from each count because there is no equal wordage or dates within section
7203.
2. The words, “had and received gross income in excess of”, and the amount, (of
56,400.) as inserted into the Information should be struck from each count because
there is no equivalency of wordage or relevancy of amounts in section 7203.
3. The words, “that by reason of such gross income he was required by law”, as
inserted into the Information should be struck from each count because there is no
equivalency of wordage in section 7203, and further, because this entire phrase
constitutes a pleader’s conclusion about something which supposedly exists somewhere
in some unspecified law or statute, and at best this phrase expresses only what the
pleader might believe some law supposedly requires. It is not, emphatically not a
substantial allegation of fact as clearly required by the pleading rule, Rule 7(c).
4. The words, ”following the close of the calendar year” and the date as inserted into
the Information should be struck from each count because there is no equivalency of
wordage, or relevancy of dates within section 7203.
5. The words, ”and on or before April 15, 2003” and the date as inserted into the
Information should be struck from each count because there is no equivalency of
wordage, or relevancy of dates contained within section 7203.
6. The words, “to make an income tax return”, include wordage which is not
contained within section 7203, and because those extra words, specifically the words,
“income tax”, are not contained within section 7203, the words “income tax” should be
struck from each count in the Information, An additional aspect applicable to this point
of contention is that the Pleader apparently has inferred and concluded that the
Accused is one upon which some undisclosed and/or unspecified statute has imposed a
duty of making a thing called a “return” in regard to some tax concerning some
undefined thing called “income”. To the extent that the Pleader had inferred and/or
merely concluded that the Accused is one who is burdened with a statutorialy imposed
duty in regard to making “an income tax” return without specifying the statute which
imposes such a so-called duty, the Pleader has failed to present a substantial allegation
of fact as required by the rule of pleading, Rule 7(c) and for that reason the words of,
“an income tax” where they appear at two places in each count in the Information
should be struck from each count in the Information.
7. The words, “to the District Director of the Internal Revenue Service for the Internal
Revenue District of Louisville, at Louisville, Kentucky, in the Western District of
Kentucky, or to the Director, Internal Revenue Service Center, at Covington, Kentucky,
or other proper officer of the United States” as inserted into the Information should be
struck from each count because there is no equivalency of wordage or relevancy for
them in section 7203.
8. The words, “stating specifically the items of his gross income and any deductions
and credits to which he was entitled,” as inserted into the Information should be struck
from each count because there is no equivalency of wordage or relevancy for them in
section 7203.
9. The words, “that well-knowing and believing all of the foregoing,” as inserted into
wordage or relevancy for them in section 7203.
10. The words, “to said District Director of the Internal Revenue Service, to said
Director of the Internal Revenue Service Center, or to any other proper officer of the
United States.” As inserted into the Information should be struck from each count
because there is no equivalency of wordage or relevancy for them in section 7203.
The final line under each count in the Information asserts that the foregoing is “In violation
of Title 26, United States Code, Section 7203”, which is simply not true!
THEREFORE: Because all of the wordage as detailed above is surplusage and
impertinent all of the above specified wordage should be struck form each count in the
Information. Be it so ordered.
Dated _______ April, 2009.
______________________
_______
IVE B. PERSECUTED,
Accused
Add Certificate of Service

&nb
sp;
V. NO. RX-010YC
IVE B. PERSECUTED
MOTION TO STRIKE
COMES NOW the Accused, by special appearance in challenge of jurisdiction, pursuant
Rule 12(b)(2) and Rule 7(d), to state:
A. The portions of Rule 7 FRCrP which are relevant to this motion are:
(c) Nature and Contents.
The indictment or the information shall be a plain, concise and

definite written statement of the essential facts constituting the offense charged.
The indictment or information shall state for each count the official

or Customary citation of the statute, rule, regulation or other provision of law which the
defendant is alleged therein to have violated.
(d) Surplusage. The court on motion of the defendant may strike surplusage

from the indictment or information.
B. Under the Rule the Pleader is required to state for each count the official or customary
citation of the statute, rule, regulation or other provision of law which the defendant allegedly
violated. Immediately below each count in the Information it is expressly alleged in these
words, “In violation of Title 26, United States Code, Section 7203”. This statement is the only
citation to any statute or rule etc. in the Information, and this motion is based on that fact.
Treating the content of section 7203 as being the only substantive portion of a statute
which was violated as expressly alleged, all wording or language as used in the Information
which is not contained within section 7203, or is not fairly inferable from the context thereof is
herein contended to be surplusage and should be struck and deleted from the Information, as
follows in specific detail:
1. The words, “During the calendar year”, and the year date as in each count should
be struck from each count because there is no equal wordage or dates within section
7203.
2. The words, “had and received gross income in excess of”, and the amount, (of
56,400.) as inserted into the Information should be struck from each count because
there is no equivalency of wordage or relevancy of amounts in section 7203.
3. The words, “that by reason of such gross income he was required by law”, as
inserted into the Information should be struck from each count because there is no
equivalency of wordage in section 7203, and further, because this entire phrase
constitutes a pleader’s conclusion about something which supposedly exists somewhere
in some unspecified law or statute, and at best this phrase expresses only what the
pleader might believe some law supposedly requires. It is not, emphatically not a
substantial allegation of fact as clearly required by the pleading rule, Rule 7(c).
4. The words, ”following the close of the calendar year” and the date as inserted into
wordage, or relevancy of dates within section 7203.
5. The words, ”and on or before April 15, 2003” and the date as inserted into the
Information should be struck from each count because there is no equivalency of
wordage, or relevancy of dates contained within section 7203.
6. The words, “to make an income tax return”, include wordage which is not
contained within section 7203, and because those extra words, specifically the words,
“income tax”, are not contained within section 7203, the words “income tax” should be
struck from each count in the Information, An additional aspect applicable to this point
of contention is that the Pleader apparently has inferred and concluded that the
Accused is one upon which some undisclosed and/or unspecified statute has imposed a
duty of making a thing called a “return” in regard to some tax concerning some
undefined thing called “income”. To the extent that the Pleader had inferred and/or
merely concluded that the Accused is one who is burdened with a statutorialy imposed
duty in regard to making “an income tax” return without specifying the statute which
imposes such a so-called duty, the Pleader has failed to present a substantial allegation
of fact as required by the rule of pleading, Rule 7(c) and for that reason the words of,
“an income tax” where they appear at two places in each count in the Information
should be struck from each count in the Information.
7. The words, “to the District Director of the Internal Revenue Service for the Internal
Revenue District of Louisville, at Louisville, Kentucky, in the Western District of
Kentucky, or to the Director, Internal Revenue Service Center, at Covington, Kentucky,
or other proper officer of the United States” as inserted into the Information should be
struck from each count because there is no equivalency of wordage or relevancy for
them in section 7203.
8. The words, “stating specifically the items of his gross income and any deductions
and credits to which he was entitled,” as inserted into the Information should be struck
from each count because there is no equivalency of wordage or relevancy for them in
section 7203.
9. The words, “that well-knowing and believing all of the foregoing,” as inserted into
wordage or relevancy for them in section 7203.
10. The words, “to said District Director of the Internal Revenue Service, to said
Director of the Internal Revenue Service Center, or to any other proper officer of the
United States.” As inserted into the Information should be struck from each count
because there is no equivalency of wordage or relevancy for them in section 7203.

The final line under each count in the Information asserts that the foregoing is “In violation
of Title 26, United States Code, Section 7203”, which is simply not true!
THEREFORE: Because all of the wordage as detailed above is surplusage and
impertinent all of the above specified wordage should be struck form each count in the
Information. Be it so ordered.
Dated _______ April, 2009.
______________________
_______
IVE B. PERSECUTED,
Accused
BACKWARD DISTRICT COURT OF ANYWHERE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA )
v. ) Case No. RX-010YC
IVE B. PERSECUTED )
MOTION TO DISMISS INFORMATION

Comes now the Accused, by special appearance, in challenge of jurisdiction, and without
waiver of improper plaintiff, to state:
1.) It has long been recognized that the federal United States has not been granted any
common law authorities or jurisdictions. This was emphatically confirmed in 1938 when
the U.S. Supreme Court overturned the Tyson doctrine in Erie Railroad v. Tompkins, 304
US 64.
2.) That the federal United States lacked any common law jurisdiction was early-on
recognized in U.S. v. Worrall, (1798) 2 US 384 Fed. Case. 2 Dall. 384, and also ruled in
the U. S. Supreme court in U. S. v. Hudson and Goodwin (1812) 7 Cranch 32.
3.) In U.S v. Cruikshank (1875) 93 US 542, the U.S. Supreme Court explained,
“The government of the United States is one of delegated powers alone. Its authority is
defined and limited by the Constitution. All powers not granted to it by the instrument
are reserved to the States or the people. No rights can be acquired under the
constitution or laws of the United States, except such as the government of the United
States has the authority to grant or secure. All that cannot be so granted or secured are
left under the protection of the States.” (Emphasis added) 92 US, at 551.
Obviously the U.S. Congress has not been granted or delegated any power to adopt a
common law and therefore cannot lawfully authorize a criminal mode of procedure by
way of a Information in the U.S. District Courts.
4.) This Accused is aware of the ruling in DUKE v. UNITED STATES, 301 US 492 which
was decided in May of 1937, almost one year prior the Erie Railroad decision above
cited and wherein the court ruled in these words, “There is no federal general common
law. Congress has no power to declare substantive rules of common law applicable in a
state whether they be local in their nature or ‘general,’ be they commercial law or a part
of the law of torts. And no clause in the Constitution purports to confer such a power
upon the federal courts.” 304 US 78.
5.) From the above, this Accused contends that the Erie decision necessarily overturned
the Duke ruling and in effect postulates that the statute of December, 1930 which led to
the questions in Duke is also unconstitutional.
6.) A re-view of history shows that the origin of a criminal procedure by way of an
Information was a device concockted in the infamous Star Chamber by the excessively
ambitious Empson and Dudley after the statute of 1495, 11 Henry VII, Chap. 3 (Offenses
against Statutes) had further extended the jurisdiction of the Star Chamber so as to
include a criminal jurisdiction.
When the Star Chamber as a court was abolished by statute in 1640, 16 Car. I,
Chap. 10 (Star Chamber), the procedural device which originated there was also
abolished. But its use was revived in the King’s Bench despite its unlawfulness. And it
continues - - - -.
7.) Criminal procedure by way of an Information is of British origin and has not and
cannot be adopted by the Congress, despite that the language of some statutes seem to
suggest otherwise.
8.) The procedural method being pursued here in this alleged case is that of an
Information, a method which is absolutely unlawful.
ACCORDINGLY: This Information must be dismissed. Be it so ordered.
______________________

V. NO. RX-010YC
IVE B. PERSECUTED
MOTION for BILL of PARTICULARS
COMES NOW the Accused, by special appearance only and without waiver of
challenges to jurisdiction, pursuant Rule 7(f) FRCrP, to state:
1) This Accused comprehends that a Bill of Particulars cannot “cure” a
defective or insufficient indictment or information, nevertheless because
the Information here does not properly comply with Rule 7(c) FRCrP in
that the Information does not cite or otherwise specify the particular
statute, or section thereof, allegedly violated, nor cite or identify a
particular administrative regulation (if any) supposedly violated, this
Accused is extremely handicapped and cannot understand how or even if
an unspecified statute or regulation might have been violated.

2) In particular, this Accused needs to know the following specific things:
(a) What statute, or section thereof, imposes a duty or requirement “to
make an income tax return”?
(b) IF a duty or requirement “to make an income tax return” was or has
been imposed by an administrative rule or regulation, this Accused
needs a copy of the applicable rule or regulation.
(c) What statute, or section thereof, imposes a duty or requirement “to
make an income tax return TO said District Director of the Internal
Revenue Service”? (emphasis added to clarify this point)
(d) IF a duty or requirement “to make an income tax return TO said

District Director of the Internal Revenue Service” was or has been imposed
by an administrative rule or regulation, this Accused needs a copy of
the applicable rule or regulation.
(e) What statute, or section thereof, imposes a duty or requirement

“to make an income tax return TO said Director of the Internal
Revenue Service Center” ? (emphasis added for clarification)
(f) IF a duty or requirement “to make an income tax return TO said

Director of the Internal Revenue Service Center” was or has been imposed
by an administrative rule or regulation, this Accused needs a copy of
(g) What statute, or section thereof, imposes a duty or requirement
“to make an income tax return TO any other proper officer of the
UnitedStates.”? (emphasis added to clarify this point).
(h) IF a duty or requirement “to make an income tax return TO any

other proper officer of the United States” was or has been imposed by
an administrative rule or regulation, this Accused needs a copy of
(i) Please define the phrase “any other proper officer of the United
States” as used in the Information. Does this phrase refer to a de jure
officer of the United States as appointed by the President of the U.S.
pursuant Article II, §2 of the Constitution? Or does it refer to some other
claimed to be “officer of the United States”? Specify the WHO that
“other proper officer” is!
(j) Is the language of “fail to make an income tax return” a

cryptic euphemism used in lieu of a direct and positive statement of “fail to
file an income tax return”?
This Accused cannot understand a so-called “charge” not made nor can
a defense be effective.
THEREFORE: The government attorney(s) should be required to reply and

respond to all of the above. Be it so ordered.
Dated ______ April

________________________
IVE B. PERSECUTED, Accused


V. NO. RX-010YC
IVE B. PERSECUTED
MOTION TO DISMISS CHARGES
(Lack of Essential Element)
COMES NOW the Accused, by special appearance in challenge of jurisdiction,
pursuant Rule 12(b)(2), to state:
A. The charging instrument, an Information, presents five counts of failure type of offenses
punishable under §7203.
B. In order to comply with constitutional safeguards concerning due process of law and the
right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation rules of procedure have been
promulgated to regulate and simplify as well as to “standardize” the process which is due.
C. FRCrP Rule 7 specifies the content of an Indictment, or an Information, and portions
relevant here are:

“The indictment or the information shall be a plain, concise and definite written
statement of the essential facts constituting the offense charged.”
“The indictment or information shall state for each count the official or customary

citation of the statute, rule, regulation or other provision of law which the defendant is alleged
therein to have violated.”
D. The Information fails to state in each count the official citation to a statute or code section
which allegedly has been violated, as expressly required by the Rule. Additionally, the
Information fails to specify in a written form in plain, concise and definite statement all of the
essential facts in substantial allegations so as to inform the defendant and the court exactly of
the nature of the offense intended to be charged.
1) At two places within each count the wording of, “to make an income tax return”
appears. And from that one can glean that the nature of the complaint has something to do
with income tax returns, that is, not a return in regard to some other tax, such as a distiller’s
tax. That the Information specified INCOME TAX returns helped to narrow the field to that
particular species of return.
2) Because of the allegations about making an INCOME TAX return in each count one can
determine that the missing citation of the provision supposedly violated must be located within
Sub-Title A of the tax code. In order to be sufficient within the context of this Information one
can discern that the nature of the text, if any there be, as relates to the or those missing statute
section(s) would impose a requirement or duty to make (and file?) a return; an income tax
return. The non-cited and missing statute section(s), if any, would be the one or more
section(s) that supposedly were violated, not section 7203!

3) In addition to the omission of citation of statute section(s) supposedly violated, there is no
written statement of the essential facts concerning a duty or requirement to make an income
tax return. In lieu of any substantial allegation(s) the Pleader substitutes the phrase, “he was
required by law”, which is merely a conclusion of law, if such law actually exists. And if there is
no portion of the income tax law which expressly and clearly imposes a duty and requirement
to make an INCOME TAX return then the above quoted pleader’s conclusion is not a conclusion
concerning something that a statute supposedly says. Instead, the quoted phrase represents a
blatant fraud in pleading.
This Accused challenges, and this court should insist that the government attorney(s) shall
cite and produce copies of the section(s) of the income tax statute which imposes a duty to
make an income tax return.
4) A duty and requirement to make a return is an essential element to constitute an offense
under section 7203, and must be plainly, concisely and definitely alleged in an Indictment or an
Information as required by Rule 7(c) FRCrP. And then, later, must be proved at trial. It is
suggested that the only means of evidencing such a proof is to produce copies of the statute
section(s) which impose the duty to make the particular type of tax return at issue.
5) In the instance of this Information, the duty and requirement to make a return is not
alleged conformably with the Rule 7(c). Indeed, not at all because a Pleader’s conclusion is not
a substantial allegation of fact and emphatically not of an essential fact. Such a conclusion
should be treated as not being an allegation at all.

6) The failure to allege an essential fact, as required by the Rule, yields a defective and
insufficient charge, one which, in this instance, is fatally defective and cannot be resurrected.
THEREFORE: The effort at the charges in the Information, all five counts, must be
Dated this ______of April, 2009.
____________________
___ ; IVE B.
PERSECUTED, Accused

{Add Certificate of Service – directed to U.S. Attorney by way of U.S. Mail. Get address from
Clerk of court }
NOTE - - - [NOT to be appended to the above paper! This is info for you.
“It is now a well established fact that Congress never enacted any Statute(s) at Large
creating a specific liability for taxes imposed by Subtitle A of the Internal Revenue Code. By
comparison, Congress has enacted Statute(s) at Large creating specific liabilities for taxes
imposed by Subtitles B and C of the
Internal Revenue Code. On this key point, see 26 CFR 1.1-1(b) and Commissioner v. Acker, 361
U.S. 87, 4 L. Ed.2d 127, 80 S. Ct. 144 (1959), quoting in pertinent part:

But the section contains nothing to that effect, and, therefore, to uphold this addition
to the tax would be to hold that it may be imposed by regulation, which, of course,the law
does not permit. United States v. Calamaro, 354 U.S. 351, 359; Koshland v. Helvering, 298 U.S.
441, 446-447; Manhattan Co. v. Commissioner, 297 U.S. 129, 134. [Bold emphasis added]

v. No. RX-010YC
IVE B. PERSECUTED
MOTION FOR ACQUITTAL
COMES NOW the Accused, after the government has rested from its
presentation, to remind the court of lack of evidence(s) or proof(s) of the
government’s claims as alleged, as follows:
1) This Accused renews the previously filed “MOTION TO DISMISS
CHARGES”, especially at point 3 & 4, and herein contends that the government has
not adduced evidence such as to show and prove that this Accused is a “person”
who is “required under this title” - - to make a return; an income tax return. This
applies to all counts.
2) Additionally, the Information asserts that this Accused failed “to make an
income tax return”. The Information does not allege in any plain, concise and
definite language that this Accused failed to FILE any return document so
made. Perhaps the lack of such an allegation can be explained by the fact that a
failure to FILE an income tax return has not been made an offense within section
7203.
3) Beyond doubt the government has not adduced any evidence so as to prove
that this Accused has failed “to make a return”; an income tax return. The mere fact
that some supposedly government official or employee did not receive a return is
not a proof of a failure “to make a return”; an income tax return. This applies to all
counts.
4) This Accused renews the previously filed “4th MOTION TO DISMISS”,
especially at points 6 & 7, and herein contends that the government has not
adduced evidence such as to show when such a return must be made; not the when
that such a “return” supposedly must be “filed” because that has not been alleged,
nor has a “failure to supply information” been alleged. This applies to all counts.

5) The Information directly and specifically states that the Accused failed “to
make an income tax return TO a District Director of the Internal Revenue Service”,
or, as in an alternative, “TO a Director of an Internal Revenue Service Center”, or, as
another alternative, “TO any other proper officer of the United States”. The first two
alternatives of this allegation have been and are impossible of performance and
proof for the reason that the supposedly existing offices and officers specified as
“District Director” as well as “Director” (of a service center) ceased to exist by the
year 2000 because of an IRS Reorganization Plan as mandated by Title I of the
“Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998”, P.L. 105 – 206,
§1001, 112 Stat. 685, at 689.
6) In this case there is no proof that this Accused did not send (file?) a copy of
a “return” TO such non-existent personnel.
Accordingly, upon a lack of proof as above indicated, this court should rule an
acquittal. Be it so ordered.

Dated _____________

__________________________
&n bsp; & lt;
/SPAN> _________________________
IVE B. PERSECUTED, Accused
Cert of Service not needed.
Footnote --- This paper is to be “motioned-up” verbally at the close of the

government’s case, that is, immediately after the government “rests”. Provide a
copy of this paper to the judge and to the government attorney right after you have
motioned it up.
&nbs p;

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

BACKWARD DISTRICT OF ANYWHERE

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

MOTION TO DISMISS CHARGES

(Lack of Essential Element)

COMES NOW the Accused, by special appearance in challenge of jurisdiction,

pursuant Rule 12(b)(2), to state:

punishable under §7203.

C. FRCrP Rule 7 specifies the content of an Indictment, or an Information, and portions

relevant here are:

statement of the essential facts constituting the offense charged.”

the nature of the offense intended to be charged.

particular species of return.

section(s) that supposedly were violated, not section 7203!

concerning something that a statute supposedly says. Instead, the quoted phrase represents a

blatant fraud in pleading.

make an income tax return.

a substantial allegation of fact and emphatically not of an essential fact. Such a conclusion

should be treated as not being an allegation at all.

Dated this ______of April, 2009.

NOTE - - - [NOT to be appended to the above paper! This is info for you.

4 L. Ed.2d 127, 80 S. Ct. 144 (1959), quoting in pertinent part: