L. Strauss - ''What Do Liberal & Conservative Mean Here & Now'' 1968
L. Strauss - ''What Do Liberal & Conservative Mean Here & Now'' 1968
L. Strauss - ''What Do Liberal & Conservative Mean Here & Now'' 1968
vii
viii / Preface
foreign war; for revolutions backed by the sympathy, or at least the inter¬
ests, of the majority of the people concerned are not necessarily rejected
by liberals. There remains, however, one important difference between
liberalism and Communism regarding the goal itself. Liberals regard as
sacred the right of everyone, however humble, odd, or inarticulate, to
criticize the government, including the man at the top.
Someone might say that many liberals are much too pragmatic to aim
at the universal and homogeneous state: they would be fully satisfied with
a federation of all now existing or soon emerging states, with a truly
universal and greatly strengthened United Nations organization—an orga¬
nization that would include Communist China, the Federal Republic of
Germany, and Communist East Germany, although not necessarily Na¬
tionalist China. Still, this would mean that liberals aim at the greatest
possible approximation to the universal and homogeneous state or that
they are guided by the ideal of the universal and homogeneous state.
Some of them will object to the term “ideal” on the ground that the uni¬
versal and homogeneous state (or the greatest possible approximation to
it) is a requirement of hardheaded politics: that state has been rendered
necessary by economic and technological progress, which includes the ne¬
cessity of making thermonuclear war impossible for all the future, and by
ever increasing wealth of the advanced countries which are compelled by
sheer self-interest to develop the underdeveloped countries. As regards the
still existing tension between the liberal-democratic and the Communist
countries, liberals believe that this tension will be relaxed and will eventu¬
ally disappear as a consequence of the ever increasing welfarism of the
former and the ever increasing liberalism, due to the overwhelming de¬
mand for consumer goods of all kinds, of the latter.
Conservatives regard the universal and homogeneous state as either
undesirable, though possible, or as both undesirable and impossible. They
do not deny the necessity or desirability of larger political units than what
one may call the typical nation-state. For good or ill, they can indeed no
longer be imperialists. But there is no reason whatever why they should
be opposed to a United Free Europe, for instance. Yet they are likely to
understand such units differently from the liberals. An outstanding Euro¬
pean conservative has spoken of VEurope des patries. Conservatives look
with greater sympathy than liberals on the particular or particularist and
the heterogeneous; at least they are more willing than liberals to respect
and perpetuate a more fundamental diversity than the one ordinarily re¬
spected or taken for granted by liberals and even by Communists, that is,
the diversity regarding language, folk songs, pottery, and the like. Inasmuch
as the universalism in politics is founded on the universalism proceeding
from reason, conservativism is frequently characterized by distrust of reason
or by trust in tradition which as such is necessarily this or that tradition
and hence particular. Conservativism is therefore exposed to criticism that
Preface / i\
is guided by the notion of the unity of truth. Liberals, on the other hand,
especially those who know that their aspirations have their roots in the
Western tradition, are not sufficiently concerned with the fact that that
tradition is ever more being eroded by the very changes in the direction of
One World which they demand or applaud.
We remain closer to the surface by saying that the conservatives’ dis¬
trust of the universal and homogeneous state is rooted in their distrust of
change, in what is polemically called their “stand-patism,” whereas liberals
are more inclined than conservatives to be sanguine regarding change.
Liberals are inclined to believe that on the whole change is change for the
better, or progress. As a matter of fact, liberals frequently call themselves
progressives. Progressivism is indeed a better term than liberalism for the
opposite to conservativism. For if conservativism is, as its name indicates,
aversion to change or distrust of change, its opposite should be identified
with the opposite posture toward change, and not with something substan¬
tive like liberty or liberality.
The difficulty of defining the difference between liberalism and con¬
servativism with the necessary universality is particularly great in the
United States, since this country came into being through a revolution, a
violent change or break with the past. One of the most conservative groups
here calls itself Daughters of the American Revolution. The opposition
between conservativism and liberalism had a clear meaning at the time at
which and in the places in which it arose in these terms. Then and there
the conservatives stood for “throne and altar,” and the liberals stood for
popular sovereignty and the strictly nonpublic (private) character of re¬
ligion. Yet conservativism in this sense is no longer politically important.
The conservativism of our age is identical with what originally was liberal¬
ism, more or less modified by changes in the direction of present-day lib¬
eralism. One could go further and say that much of what goes now by the
name of conservativism has in the last analysis a common root with pres¬
ent-day liberalism and even with Communism. That this is the case would
appear most clearly if one were to go back to the origin of modernity, to
the break with the premodern tradition that took place in the seventeenth
century, or to the quarrel between the ancients and the moderns.
We are reminded of that quarrel immediately by the fact that the
term “liberal” is still used in its premodern sense, especially in the expres¬
sion “liberal education.” Liberal education is not the opposite of con¬
servative education, but of illiberal education. To be liberal in the original
sense means to practice the virtue of liberality. If it is true that all vir¬
tues in their perfection are inseparable from one another, the genuinely
liberal man is identical with the genuinely virtuous man. According to
the now prevailing usage, however, to be liberal means not to be con¬
servative. Hence it is no longer assumed that being liberal is the same as
being virtuous or even that being liberal has anything to do with being
x / Preface
posture toward liberalism. Even Jews who are politically conservative can
be observed to defer to contemporary Jewish “opinion leaders” who can
in no sense be described as politically conservative. This state of things
induces one to raise questions such as these: In what sense or to what
extent is Judaism one of the roots of liberalism? Are Jews compelled by
their heritage or their self-interest to be liberals? Is liberalism necessarily
friendly to Jews and Judaism? Can the liberal state claim to have solved
the Jewish problem? Can any state claim to have solved it? To these
questions I address myself in the two statements that conclude this
volume.
Leo Strauss
Claremont, California