VOL.

37, FEBRUARY 27, 1971 823

Bache & Co. (Phil.), Inc. vs. Ruiz

No. L-32409. February 27, 1971.

BACHE & CO. (PHIL.), INC. and FREDERICK E. SEGGERMAN,

petitioners, vs. HON.JUDGE VIVENCIO M. RUIZ,MISAEL P.
VERA, in his capacity as Commissioner of Internal Revenue,
ARTURO LOGRONIO,RODOLFO DE LEON, GAVINO
VELASQUEZ,MIMIR DELLOSA,NICANOR ALCORDO,JOHN
DOE,JOHN DOE,JOHN DOE, and JOHN DOE, respondents.

Remedial law; Search warrant; Procedure for the issuance warrant;

Examination of the complainant and witnesses by the judge himself.—The
examination of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, required
by Art. 111, Sec. 1, par. 3, of the Constitution, and Secs. 3 and 4, Rule 126
of the Revised Rules of Court, should be conducted by the judge himself
and net by others. The implementing rule in the Revised Rules of Court,
Sec. 4, Rule 126, is more emphatic and candid, for it requires the judge,
before issuing a search warrant, to personally examine on oath or
affirmation the complainant and any witnesses he may produce. Personal
examination by the judge of the complainant and his witnesses is necessary
to enable him to determine the existence or non-existence of a probable
cause, pursuant to Art. 111, Sec. 1, par. 3, of the Constitution, and Sec. 3,
Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Court, both of which prohibit the issuance
of warrants except “upon probable cause.” The determination of whether or
not a probable cause exists calls for the exercise of judgment after a judicial
appraisal of facts and should not be allowed to be delegated in the absence
of any rule to the contrary.

Same; Same; Deposition taken by Deputy Clerk of Court does not

comply with constitutional mandate.—The participa-

824
824 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Bache & Co. (Phil.), Inc. vs. Ruiz

tion of respondent Judge in the proceedings which led to the issuance of

Search Warrant No. 2-M-70 was thus limited to listening to the
stenographer’s reading of her notes, to a few words of warning against the
commission of perjury, and to administering the oath to the complainant and
his witness. This cannot be considered as a personal examination. If there
was an examination at all of the complainant and his witness, it was the one
conducted by the Deputy Clerk of Court. But the Constitution and the rules
required a personal examination by the judge. It was precisely on account of
the intention of the delegates to the Constitutional Convention to make it a
duty of the issuing judge to personally examine the complainant and his
witnesses that the question of how much time would be consumed by the
judge in examining them came up before the Convention. The reading of the
stenographic notes to respondent judge did not constitute sufficient
compliance with the constitutional mandate and the rule; for by that manner
respondent judge did not have opportunity to observe the demeanor of the
complainant and his witness, and to propound initial and follow-up
questions which the judicial mind, on account of its training, was in the best
position to conceive. These were important in arriving at a sound inference
on the all-important question of whether or not there was probable cause.

Same; Same; Search warrant to issue for one specific offense.—The

Supreme Court deemed it fit to amend Section 3 of Rule 122 of the former
Rules of Court by providing in its counterpart, under the Revised Rules of
Court, that “a search warrant shall not issue but upon probable cause in
connection with one specific offense.” Not satisfied with this qualification,
the Supreme Court added thereto a paragraph, directing that “no search
warrant shall issue for more than one specific offense.”

Same; Same; Particular description of things to be seized.—Under Art.

111, Sec. 1, of the Constitution, and of Sec. 3, Rule 126 of the Revised
Rules of Court, the warrant should particularly describe the things to be
seized.

Same; Seizure; Seizure of records pertaining to all business

transactions not a particular description.—The warrants authorized the
search for and seizure of records pertaining to all business transactions of
petitioners herein, regardless of whether the transactions were legal or
illegal. The warrants sanctioned the seizure of all records of the petitioners
and corporations, whatever their nature, thus openly contravening the
explicit command of the Bill of Rights—that the things to be seized be
particularly described —as well as tending to defeat its major objective; the
elimination of general warrants.

Same; Same; Purpose of particular description of things to

825

VOL. 37, FEBRUARY 27, 1971 825

Bache & Co. (Phil.), Inc. vs. Ruiz

be seized.—A search warrant should particularly describe the place to be

searched and the things to be seized. The evident purpose and intent of this
requirement is to limit the things to be seized to those, and only those,
particularly described in the search warrant—to leave the officers of the law
with no discretion regarding what articles they shall seize, to the end that
“unreasonable searches and seizures may not be made,—that abuses may
not be committed.

Same; Same; Where there is a particular description of things to be

seized.—A search warrant may be said to particularly describe the things to
be seized when the description therein is as specific as the circumstances
will ordinarily allow; or when the description expresses a conclusion of fact
—not of law—by which the warrant officer may be guided in making the
search and seizure; or when the things described are limited to those which
bear direct relation to the offense for which the warrant is being issued. If
the articles desired to be seized have any direct relation to an offense
committed, the applicant must necessarily have some evidence, other than
those articles, to prove the said offense; and the articles subject of search
and seizure should come in handy merely to strengthen such evidence.

Special civil action; Certiorari; When motion for reconsideration is not

a prerequisite to the institution of petition for certiorari.—When the
questions raised before the Supreme Court are the same as those which were
squarely raised in and passed upon by the court below, the filing of a motion
for reconsideration in said court before certiorari can be instituted in the
Supreme Court is no longer a prerequisite. The rule requiring the filing of a
motion for reconsideration before an application for a writ of certiorari can
be entertained was never intended to be applied without considering the
circumstances. The rule does not apply where, the deprivation of
petitioners’ fundamental right to due process taints the proceeding against
them in the court below not only with irregularity but also with nullity.
 Remedial law; Search and seizures; Right of corporation against
unreasonable searches and seizures.—A corporation is entitled to immunity
against unreasonable searches and seizures. A corporation is, after all, but
an association of individuals under an assumed name and with a distinct
legal entity. In organizing itself as a collective body it waives no
constitutional immunities appropriate to such body. Its property cannot be
taken without compensation. It can only be proceeded against by due
process of law, and is protected against unlawful discrimination.

Same; Same; Who can contest legality of seizure.—It is well settled

that the legality of a seizure can be contested only

826

826 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Bache & Co. (Phil.), Inc. vs. Ruiz

by the party whose rights have been impaired thereby, and that the objection
to an unlawful search and seizure is purely personal and cannot be availed
of by third parties. Consequently, petitioners herein may not validly object
to the use in evidence against them of the documents, papers and things
seized from the offices and premises of the corporations, since the right to
object belongs exclusively to the corporations, to whom the seized effects
belong, and may not be invoked by the corporate officers in proceedings
against them in their individual capacity.

ORIGINAL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Certiorari, prohibition

and mandamus with preliminary mandatory and prohibitory
injunction.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
     San Juan, Africa, Gonzales & San Agustin for petitioners.
          Solicitor General Felix Q. Antonio, Assistant Solicitor
General Crispin V. Bautista, Solicitor Pedro A. Ramirez and Special
Attorney Jaime M. Maza for respondents.

VILLAMOR, J.:

This is an original action of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus,

with prayer for a writ of preliminary mandatory and prohibitory
injunction. In their petition Bache & Co. (Phil.), Inc., a corporation
duly organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines, and its
President, Frederick E. Seggerman, pray this Court to declare null
and void Search Warrant No. 2-M-70 issued by respondent Judge on
February 25, 1970; to order respondents to desist from enforcing the
same and/or keeping the documents, papers and effects seized by
virtue thereof, as well as from enforcing the tax assessments on
petitioner corporation alleged by petitioners to have been made on
the basis of the said documents, papers and effects, and to order the
return of the latter to petitioners. We gave due course to the petition
but did not issue the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for
therein.
The pertinent facts of this case, as gathered from the record, are
as follows:
On February 24, 1970, respondent Misael P. Vera, Commissioner
of Internal Revenue, wrote a letter addressed

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Bache & Co. (Phil), Inc. vs. Ruiz

to respondent Judge Vivencio M. Ruiz requesting the issuance of a

search warrant against petitioners for violation of Section 46 (a) of
the National Internal Revenue Code, in relation to all other pertinent
provisions thereof, particularly Sections 53, 72, 73, 208 and 209,
and authorizing Revenue Examiner Rodolfo de Leon, one of herein
respondents, to make and file the application for search warrant
which was attached to the letter.
In the afternoon of the following day, February 25, 1970,
respondent De Leon and his witness, respondent Arturo Logronio,
went to the Court of First Instance of Rizal. They brought with them
the following papers: respondent Vera’s aforesaid letter-request; an
application for search warrant already filled up but still unsigned by
respondent De Leon; an affidavit of respondent Logronio subscribed
before respondent De Leon; a deposition in printed form of
respondent Logronio already accomplished and signed by him but
not yet subscribed; and a search warrant already accomplished but
still unsigned by respondent Judge.
At that time respondent Judge was hearing a certain case; so, by
means of a note, he instructed his Deputy Clerk of Court to take the
depositions of respondents De Leon and Logronio. After the session
had adjourned, respondent Judge was informed that the depositions
had already been taken. The stenographer, upon request of
respondent Judge, read to him her stenographic notes; and thereafter,
respondent Judge asked respondent Logronio to take the oath and
warned him that if his deposition was found to be false and without
legal basis, he could be charged for perjury. Respondent Judge
signed respondent de Leon’s application for search warrant and
respondent Logronio’s deposition, Search Warrant No. 2-M-70 was
then signed by respondent Judge and accordingly issued.
Three days later, or on February 28, 1970, which was a Saturday,
the BIR agents served the search warrant on petitioners at the offices
of petitioner corporation on Ayala Avenue, Makati, Rizal.
Petitioners’ lawyers protested the search on the ground that no
formal complaint or transcript of testimony was attached to the
warrant. The agents nevertheless proceeded with their search which
yielded six

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828 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Bache & Co. (Phil.), Inc. vs. Ruiz

boxes of documents.
On March 3, 1970, petitioners filed a petition with the Court of
First Instance of Rizal praying that the search warrant be quashed,
dissolved or recalled, that preliminary prohibitory and mandatory
writs of injunction be issued, that the search warrant be declared null
and void, and that the respondents be ordered to pay petitioners,
jointly and severally, damages and attorney’s fees. On March 18,
1970, the respondents, thru the Solicitor General, filed an answer to
the petition. After hearing, the court, presided over by respondent
Judge, issued on July 29, 1970, an order dismissing the petition for
dissolution of the search warrant. In the meantime, or on April 16,
1970, the Bureau of Internal Revenue made tax assessments on
petitioner corporation in the total sum of P2,594,729.97, partly, if
not entirely, based on the documents thus seized. Petitioners came to
this Court.
The petition should be granted for the following reasons:
1. Respondent Judge failed to personally examine the
complainant and his witness.
The pertinent provisions of the Constitution of the Philippines
and of the Revised Rules of Court are:

“(3) The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and
no warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the
judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.” (Art. III, Sec. 1,
Constitution.)
“SEC. 3. Requisites for issuing search warrant.—A search warrant shall
not issue but upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense to
be determined by the judge or justice of the peace after examination under
oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce,
and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or
things to be seized.
“No search warrant shall issue for more than one specific offense.

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Bache & Co. (Phil.), Inc. vs. Ruiz

“SEC. 4. Examination of the applicant.—The judge or justice of the peace

must, before issuing the warrant, personally examine on oath or affirmation
the complainant and any witnesses he may produce and take their
depositions in writing, and attach them to the record, in addition to any
affidavits presented to him.” (Rule 126, Revised Rules of Court.)

The examination of the complainant and the witnesses he may

produce, required by Art. III, Sec. 1, par. 3, of the Constitution, and
by Secs. 3 and 4, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Court, should be
conducted by the judge himself and not by others. The phrase
“which shall be determined by the judge after examination under
oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce,” appearing in the said constitutional provision, was
introduced by Delegate Francisco as an amendment to the draft
submitted by the Sub-Committee of Seven. The following
discussion in the Constitutional Convention (Laurel, Proceedings of
the Philippine Constitutional Convention, Vol. III, pp. 755-757) is
enlightening:

“SR. ORENSE. Vamos a dejar compañero los piropos y vamos al grano.

En los casos de una necesidad de actuar inmediatamente para que no se
frusten los fines de la justicia mediante el registro inmediato y la incautación
del cuerpo del delito, no cree Su Señorńa que causarńa cierta demora el
procedimiento apuntado en su enmienda en tal forma que podrńa frustrar los
fines de la justicia o si Su Señorńa encuentra un remedio para estos casos
con el fin de compaginar los fines de la justicia con los derechos del
individuo en su persona, bienes etcetera, etcetera.
“SR. FRANCISCO. No puedo ver en la práctica el caso hipotético que
Su Señorńa preg unta por la siguiente razón: el que solicita un mandamiento
de registro tiene que hacerlo por escrito y ese escrito no aparecerá en la
Mesa del Juez sin que alguien vaya el juez a presentar ese escrito o petición
de sucuestro. Esa persona que presenta el registro puede ser el mismo
denunciante o alguna persona que solicita dicho mandamiento de registro.
Ahora toda la enmienda en esos casos consiste en que haya petición de
registro y el juez no se atendrá solamente a sea petición sino que el juez
examinerá a ese denunciante y si tiene testigos también examinerá a los
testigos.
“SR. ORENSE. No cree Su Señorńa que el tomar le declaración de ese
denunciante po r escrito siempre requerirńa algún tiempo?

830

830 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Bache & Co. (Phil.), Inc. vs. Ruiz

“SR. FRANCISCO. Serńa cuestión de un par de horas, pero por otro lado
minimizamos en todo lo posible las vejaciones injustas con la expedición
arbitraria de los mandamientos de registro. Creo que entre dos males
debemos escoger. el menor.

x      x      x      x      x

“MR. LAUREL. x x x The reason why we are in favor of this

amendment is because we are incorporating in our constitution something of
a fundamental character. Now, before a judge could issue a search warrant,
he must be under the obligation to examine personally under oath the
complainant and if he has any witness, the witnesses that he may produce. x
x x.”

The implementing rule in the Revised Rules of Court, Sec. 4, Rule

126, is more emphatic and candid, for it requires the judge, before
issuing a search warrant, to “personally examine on oath or
affirmation the complainant and any witnesses he may produce x x
x.”
Personal examination by the judge of the complainant and his
witnesses is necessary to enable him to determine the existence or
non-existence of a probable cause, pursuant to Art. III, Sec. 1, par. 3,
of the Constitution, and Sec. 3, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of
Court, both of which prohibit the issuance of warrants except “upon
probable cause.” The determination of whether or not a probable
cause exists calls for the exercise of judgment after a judicial
appraisal of facts and should not be allowed to be delegated in the
absence of any rule to the contrary.
 In the case at bar, no personal examination at all was conducted
by respondent Judge of the complainant (respondent De Leon) and
his witness (respondent Logronio). While it is true that the
complainant’s application for search warrant and the witness’
printed-form deposition were subscribed and sworn to before
respondent Judge, the latter did not ask either of the two any
question the answer to which could possibly be the basis for
determining whether or not there was probable cause against herein
petitioners. Indeed, the participants seem to have attached so little
significance to the matter that notes of the proceedings before
respondent Judge were not even taken. At this juncture it may be
well to recall the salient facts. The tran-

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Bache & Co. (Phil), Inc. vs. Ruiz

script of stenographic notes (pp. 61-76, April 1, 1970, Annex J-2 of

the Petition) taken at the hearing of this case in the court below
shows that per instruction of respondent Judge, Mr. Eleodoro V.
Gonzales, Special Deputy Clerk of Court, took the depositions of the
complainant and his witness, and that stenographic notes thereof
were taken by Mrs. Gaspar. At that time respondent Judge was at the
sala hearing a case. After respondent Judge was through with the
hearing, Deputy Clerk Gonzales, stenographer Gaspar, complainant
De Leon and witness Logronio went to respondent Judge’s chamber
and informed the Judge that they had finished the depositions.
Respondent Judge then requested the stenographer to read to him her
stenographic notes. Special Deputy Clerk Gonzales testified as
follows:

“A And after finishing reading the stenographic notes, the

Honorable Judge requested or instructed them, requested Mr.
Logronio to raise his hand and warned him if his deposition will
be found to be false and without legal basis, he can be charged
criminally for perjury. The Honorable Court told Mr. Logronio
whether he affirms the facts contained in his deposition and the
affidavit executed before Mr. Rodolfo de Leon.
“Q And thereafter?
“A And thereafter, he signed the deposition of Mr. Logronio.
“Q Who is this he?
“A The Honorable Judge.
“Q The deposition or the affidavit?
“A The affidavit, Your Honor.”

Thereafter, respondent Judge signed the search warrant.

The participation of respondent Judge in the proceedings which
led to the issuance of Search Warrant No. 2-M-70 was thus limited
to listening to the stenographer’s reading of her notes, to a few
words of warning against the commission of perjury, and to
administering the oath to the complainant and his witness. This
cannot be considered as a personal examination. If there was an
examination at all of the complainant and his witness, it was the one
conducted by the Deputy Clerk of Court. But, as already stated, the
Constitution and the rules require a personal

832

832 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Bache & Co. (Phil.), Inc. vs. Ruiz

examination by the judge. It was precisely on account of the

intention of the delegates to the Constitutional Convention to make
it a duty of the issuing judge to personally examine the complainant
and his witnesses that the question of how much time would be
consumed by the judge in examining them came up before the
Convention, as can be seen from the record of the proceedings
quoted above. The reading of the stenographic notes to respondent
Judge did not constitute sufficient compliance with the constitutional
mandate and the rule; for by that manner respondent Judge did not
have the opportunity to observe the demeanor of the complainant
and his witness, and to propound initial and follow-up questions
which the judicial mind, on account of its training, was in the best
position to conceive. These were important in arriving at a sound
inference on the all-important question of whether or not there was
probable cause.
2. The search warrant was issued for more than one specific
offense.
Search Warrant No. 2-M-70 was issued for “[v]iolation of Sec.
46 (a) of the National Internal Revenue Code in relation to all other
pertinent provisions thereof particularly Secs. 53, 72, 73, 208 and
209.” The question is: Was the said search warrant issued “in
connection with one specific offense,” as required by Sec. 3, Rule
126?
 To arrive at the correct answer it is essential to examine closely
the provisions of the Tax Code referred to above. Thus we find the
following:
Sec. 46 (a) requires the filing of income tax returns by
corporations.
Sec. 53 requires the withholding of income taxes at source.
Sec. 72 imposes surcharges for failure to render income tax
returns and for rendering false and fraudulent returns.
Sec. 73 provides the penalty for failure to pay the income tax, to
make a return or to supply the information required under the Tax
Code.

833

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Bache & Co. (Phil.), Inc. vs. Ruiz

Sec. 208 penalizes “[a]ny pers on who distills, rectifies, repacks,

compounds, or manufactures any article subject to a specific tax,
without having paid the privilege tax therefore, or who aids or abets
in the conduct of illicit distilling, rectifying, compounding, or illicit
manufacture of any article subject to specific tax x x x,” and
provides that in the case of a corporation, partnership, or association,
the official and/or employee who caused the violation shall be
responsible.
Sec. 209 penalizes the failure to make a return of receipts, sales,
business, or gross value of output removed, or to pay the tax due
thereon.
The search warrant in question was issued for at least four
distinct offenses under the Tax Code. The first is the violation of
Sec. 46 (a), Sec. 72 and Sec. 73 (the filing of income tax returns),
which are interrelated. The second is the violation of Sec. 53
(withholding of income taxes at source). The third is the violation of
Sec. 208 (unlawful pursuit of business or occupation); and the fourth
is the violation of Sec. 209 (failure to make a return of receipts,
sales, business or gross value of output actually removed or to pay
the tax due thereon). Even in their classification the six above-
mentioned provisions are embraced in two different titles: Secs. 46
(a), 53, 72 and 73 are under Title II (Income Tax); while Secs. 208
and 209 are under Title V (Privilege Tax on Business and
Occupation).
Respondents argue that Stonehill, et al. vs. Diokno, et al., L-
19550, June 19, 1967 (20 SCRA 383), is not applicable, because
there the search warrants were issued for “violation of Central Bank
Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code;” whereas,
here Search Warrant No. 2-M-70 was issued for violation of only
one code, i.e., the National Internal Revenue Code. The distinction
is more apparent than real, because it was precisely on account of
the Stonehill incident, which occurred sometime before the present
Rules of Court took effect on January 1, 1964, that this Court
amended the former rule by inserting therein the phrase “in
connection with one specific offense,” and adding the sentence “No
search warrant shall issue for more than one specific offense,” in
what is

834

834 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Bache & Co. (Phil.), Inc. vs. Ruiz

now Sec. 3, Rule 126. Thus we said in Stonehill:

“Such is the seriousness of the irregularities committed in connection with

the disputed search warrants, that this Court deemed it fit to amend Section
3 of Rule 122 of the former Rules of Court that ‘a search warrant shall not
issue but upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense.’ Not
satisfied with this qualification, the Court added thereto a paragraph,
directing that ‘no search warrant shall issue for more than one specific
offense.’”

3. The search warrant does not particularly describe the things to be

seized.
The documents, papers and effects sought to be seized are
described in Search Warrant No. 2-M-70 in this manner:

“Unregistered and private books of accounts (ledgers, journals, columnars,

receipts and disbursements books, customers ledgers); receipts for payments
received; certificates of stocks and securities; contracts, promissory notes
and deeds of sale; telex and coded messages; business communications;
accounting and business records; checks and check stubs; records of bank
deposits and withdrawals; and records of foreign remittances, covering the
years 1966 to 1970.”

The description does not meet the requirement in Art. III, Sec. 1, of
the Constitution, and of Sec. 3, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of
Court, that the warrant should particularly describe the things to be
seized.
 In Stonehill, this Court, speaking thru Mr. Chief Justice Roberto
Concepcion, said:

“The grave violation of the Constitution made in the application for the
contested search warrants was compounded by the description therein made
of the effects to be searched for and seized, to wit:

‘Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, journals, correspondence, receipts,

ledgers, portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other documents and/or papers
showing all business transactions including disbursement receipts, balance sheets
and related profit and loss statements.’

“Thus, the warrants authorized the search for and seizure of records
pertaining to all business transactions of petitioners herein, regardless of
whether the transactions were legal or il-

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Bache & Co. (Phil.), Inc. vs. Ruiz

legal. The warrants sanctioned the seizure of all records of the petitioners
and the aforementioned corporations, whatever their nature, thus openly
contravening the explicit command of our Bill of Rights—that the things to
be seized be particularly described—as well as tending to defeat its major
objective: the elimination of general warrants.”

While the term “all business transactions” does not appear in Search
Warrant No. 2-M-70, the said warrant nevertheless tends to defeat
the major objective of the Bill of Rights, i.e., the elimination of
general warrants, for the language used therein is so all-embracing
as to include all conceivable records of petitioner corporation,
which, if seized, could possibly render its business inoperative.
In Uy Kheytin, et al. vs. Villareal, etc., et al., 42 Phil. 886, 896,
this Court had occasion to explain the purpose of the requirement
that the warrant should particularly describe the place to be searched
and the things to be seized, to wit:

“x x x Both the Jones Law (sec. 3) and General Orders No. 58 (sec. 97)
specifically require that a search warrant should particularly describe the
place to be searched and the things to be seized. The evident purpose and
intent of this requirement is to limit the things to be seized to those, and
only those, particularly described in the search warrant—to leave the
officers of the law with no discretion regarding what articles they shall
seize, to the end that ‘unreasonable searches and seizures’ may not be made,
—that abuses may not be committed. That this is the correct interpretation
of this constitutional provision is borne out by American authorities.”

The purpose as thus explained could, surely and effectively, be

defeated under the search warrant issued in this case.
A search warrant may be said to particularly describe the things
to be seized when the description therein is as specific as the
circumstances will ordinarily allow (People vs. Rubio, 57 Phil. 384);
or when the description expresses a conclusion of fact—not of law
—by which the warrant officer may be guided in making the search
and seizure (idem., dissent of Abad Santos, J.,); or when the things
described are limited to those which bear direct relation to the
offense for which the warrant is feeing issued (Sec. 2, Rule 126,
Revised Rules of Court). The herein search

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836 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Bache & Co. (Phil), Inc. vs. Ruiz

warrant does not conform to any of the foregoing tests. If the articles
desired to be seized have any direct relation to an offense
committed, the applicant must necessarily have some evidence,
other than those articles, to prove the said offense; and the articles
subject of search and seizure should come in handy merely to
strengthen such evidence. In this event, the description contained in
the herein disputed warrant should have mentioned, at least, the
dates, amounts, persons, and other pertinent data regarding the
receipts of payments, certificates of stocks and securities, contracts,
promissory notes, deeds of sale, messages and communications,
checks, bank deposits and withdrawals, records of foreign
remittances, among others, enumerated in the warrant.
Respondents contend that certiorari does not lie because
petitioners failed to file a motion for reconsideration of respondent
Judge’s order of July 29, 1970. The contention is without merit. In
the first place, when the questions raised before this Court are the
same as those which were squarely raised in and passed upon by the
court below, the filing of a motion for reconsideration in said court
before certiorari can be instituted in this Court is no longer a
prerequisite. (Pajo, etc., et al. vs. Ago, et al., 108 Phil., 905). In the
second place, the rule requiring the filing of a motion for
reconsideration before an application for a writ of certiorari can be
entertained was never intended to be applied without considering the
circumstances. (Matutina vs. Buslon, et al., 109 Phil., 140.) In the
case at bar time is of the essence in view of the tax assessment
sought to be enforced by respondent officers of the Bureau of
Internal Revenue against petitioner corporation, on account of which
immediate and more direct action becomes necessary. (Matute vs.
Court of Appeals, et al., 26 SCRA 768.) Lastly, the rule does not
apply where, as in this case, the deprivation of petitioners’
fundamental right to due process taints the proceeding against them
in the court below not only with irregularity but also with nullity.
(Matute vs. Court of Appeals, et al., supra.)
It is next contended by respondents that a corporation is not
entitled to protection against unreasonable searches and seizures.
Again, we find no merit in the contention.

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‘‘Although, for the reasons above stated, we are of the opinion that an
officer of a corporation which is charged with a violation of a statute of the
state of its creation, or of an act of Congress passed in the exercise of its
constitutional powers, cannot refuse to produce the books and papers of
such corporation, we do not wish to be understood as holding that a
corporation is not entitled to immunity, under the 4th Amendment, against
unreasonable searches and seizures. A corporation is, after all, but an
association of individuals under an assumed name and with a distinct legal
entity. In organizing itself as a collective body it waives no constitutional
immunities appropriate to such body. Its property cannot be taken without
compensation. It can only be proceeded against by due process of law, and
is protected, under the 14th Amendment, against unlawful discrimination, x
x x.” (Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 50 L. ed. 652.)
“In Linn v. United States, 163 C.C.A. 470, 251 Fed 476, 480, it was
thought that a different rule applied to a corporation, on the ground that it
was not privileged from producing its books and papers. But the rights of a
corporation against unlawful search and seizure are to be protected even if
the same result might have been achieved in a lawful way.” (Silverthorne
Lumber Company, et al. v. United States of America, 251 U.S. 385, 64 L.
ed. 319.)

In Stonehill, et al. vs. Diokno, et al., supra, this Court impliedly

recognized the right of a corporation to object against unreasonable
searches and seizures, thus:
“As regards the first group, we hold that petitioners herein have no cause of
action to assail the legality of the contested warrants and of the seizures
made in pursuance thereof, for the simple reason that said corporations have
their respective personalities, separate and distinct from the personality of
herein petitioners, regardless of the amount of shares of stock or of the
interest of each of them in said corporations, and whatever, the offices they
hold therein may be. Indeed, it is well settled that the legality of a seizure
can be contested only by the party whose rights have been impaired thereby,
and that the objection to an unlawful search and seizure is purely personal
and cannot be availed of by third parties. Consequently, petitioners herein
may not validly object to the use in evidence against them of the documents,
papers and things seized from the offices and premises of the corporations
adverted to above, since the right to object to the admission of said papers
in evidence belongs exclusively to the corporations, to whom the seized
effects belong, and may not be invoked by the corporate officers in
proceedings against them in their individual capacity. x x x.”

838

838 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Bache & Co. (Phil.), Inc. vs. Ruiz

In the Stonehill case only the officers of the various corporations in

whose offices documents, papers and effects were searched and
seized were the petitioners. In the case at bar, the corporation to
whom the seized documents belong, and whose rights have thereby
been impaired, is itself a petitioner. On that score, petitioner
corporation here stands on a different footing from the corporations
in Stonehill.
The tax assessments referred to earlier in this opinion were, if not
entirely—as claimed by petitioners—at least partly—as in effect
admitted by respondents—based on the documents seized by virtue
of Search Warrant No. 2-M-70. Furthermore, the fact that the
assessments were made some one and one-half months after the
search and seizure on February 25, 1970, is a strong indication that
the documents thus seized served as basis for the assessments. Those
assessments should therefore not be enforced.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition is granted. Accordingly,
Search Warrant No. 2-M-70 issued by respondent Judge is declared
null and void; respondents are permanently enjoined from enforcing
the said search warrant; the documents, papers and effects seized
thereunder are ordered to be returned to petitioners; and respondent
officials of the Bureau of Internal Revenue and their representatives
are permanently enjoined from enforcing the assessments mentioned
in Annex “G” of the present petition, as well as other assessments
based on the documents, papers and effects seized under the search
warrant herein nullified, and from using the same against petitioners,
in any criminal or other proceeding. No pronouncement as to costs.

          Concepcion, CJ., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Fernando,

Teehankee and Makasiar, JJ., concur.
     Reyes, J.B.L., J., concurs with Mr. Justice Barredo.
     Castro, J., concurs in the result.
     Barredo, J., concurs in a separate opinion.

BARREDO, J., concurring:

I concur.

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I agree with the ruling that the search warrants in question violates
the specific injunction of Section 3, Rule 126 that “No search
warrant shall issue for more than one specific offense.” There is no
question in my mind that, as very clearly pointed out by Mr. Justice
Villamor, the phrase “for violation of Section 46 (a) of the National
Internal Revenue Code in relation to all other pertinent provisions
thereof, particularly Sections 53, 72, 73, 208 and 209” refers to more
than one specific offense, considering that the violation of Section
53 which refers to withholding of income taxes at the sources,
Section 208 which punishes pursuit of business or occupation
without payment of the corresponding specific or privilege taxes,
and Section 209 which penalizes failure to make a return of receipts
sales, business or gross value output actually removed or to pay the
taxes thereon in connection with Title V on Privilege Taxes on
Business and Occupation can hardly be absorbed in a charge of
alleged violation of Section 46 (a), which merely requires the filing
of income tax returns by corporations, so as to constitute with it a
single offense. I perceive here the danger that the result of the search
applied for may be used as basis not only for a charge of violating
Section 46 (a) but also and separately of Section 53, 208 and 209. Of
course, it is to be admitted that Sections 72 and 73, also mentioned
in the application, are really directly related to Section 46 (a)
because Section 72 provides for surcharges for failure to render
returns and for rendering false and fraudulent returns and Section 73
refers to the penalty for failure to file returns or to pay the
corresponding tax. Taken together, they constitute one single offense
penalized under Section 73. I am not and cannot be in favor of any
scheme which amounts to an indirect means of achieving that which
is not allowed to be done directly. By merely saying that a party is
being charged with violation of one section of the code in relation to
a number of other sections thereof which in truth have no clear or
direct bearing with the first is to me condemnable because it is no
less than a shotgun device which trenches on the basic liberties
intended to be protected by the unequivocal limitations imposed by
the Constitution and the Rules of Court on the privilege to

840

840 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Bache & Co. (Phil.), Inc. vs. Ruiz

secure a search warrant with the aggravating circumstance of being

coupled with an attempt to mislead the judge before whom the
application for its issuance is presented.
I cannot close this brief concurrence without expressing my
vehement disapproval of the action taken by respondent internal
revenue authorities in using the documents and papers secured
during the search, the legality of which was pending resolution by
the court, as basis of an assessment, no matter how highly motivated
such action might have been. This smacks of lack of respect, if not
contempt for the court and is certainly intolerable. At the very least,
it appears as an attempt to render the court proceedings moot and
academic, and dealing as this case does with constitutionally
protected rights which are part and parcel of the basic concepts of
individual liberty and democracy, the government agents should
have been the first ones to refrain from trying to make a farce of
these court proceedings. Indeed, it is to be regretted that the
government agents and the court have acted irregularly, for it is
highly doubtful if it would be consistent with the sacredness of the
rights herein found to have been violated to permit the filing of
another application which complies with the constitutional
requirements above discussed and the making of another search
upon the return of the papers and documents now in their illegal
possession. This could be an instance wherein taxes properly due the
State will probably remain unassessed and unpaid only because the
ones in charge of the execution of the laws did not know how to
respect basic constitutional rights and liberties.
Petition granted.

Notes.—(a) Personal examination by judge.—The rule is the

same, and even more explicit as to warrants of arrest where the law
commands that “No warrant of arrest shall be issued x x x unless he
first examines the witness or witnesses personally, and the
examination shall be under oath and reduced to writing in the form
of searching questions and answers (Section 87, Judiciary Act of
1948, as amended by Republic Acts Nos. 2613 and 3828). It has,
however, been held with respect to warrants of arrest

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Bache & Co. (Phil.), Inc. vs. Ruiz

that the law is complied with where the judge adopts as his own
personal examination the questions asked by the PC or police
investigator as appearing in the written statements, which the judge
read over again to the witnesses whether said answers were theirs,
and whether said answers were true, to which the witnesses replied
in the affirmative, there being no prohibition in the law against
adoption by the judge of the previous investigator’s questions (Luna
vs. Plaza, L-27511, Nov. 29, 1968, 26 SCRA 310). But there is no
compliance with the requirement where the judge issuing the
warrant of arrest acted solely on the basis of affidavits of the
complainant and her one witness which were sworn to before
another judge, without personally examining the witnesses by asking
questions (Doce vs. Branch II of the the CFI of Quezon, L-26437,
March 13, 1968, 22 SCRA 1028).
(b) Particular description of the things to be seized.—While it is
true that the property to be seized under a search warrant must be
particularly described therein and no other property can be taken
thereunder, yet the description is required to be specific only insofar
as the circumstances will ordinarily allow. Where, by the nature of
the goods to be seized, their description must be rather general, it is
not required that a technical description be given as this would mean
that no warrant could issue. Thus, a description of the property to be
seized as “fraudulent books, invoices and records,” was held
sufficient (People vs. Rubio, 57 Phil. 384). In Alvarez vs. Court of
First Instance of Tayabas, 64 Phil. 33, the description “books,
documents, chits, receipts, lists, and other papers used by him in
 connection with his activities as money-lender” was held sufficient.
See also Yee Sue Koy vs. Almeda., 70 Phil. 141.

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