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    Bayan v. Ermita, GR No. 169838 (CONSOLIDATED CASE)

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    Gab Estiada
    This document summarizes a Supreme Court case regarding the constitutionality of Batas Pambansa No. 880, also known as the Public Assembly Act of 1985. There were three groups of petitioners who alleged that their rights were violated when peaceful protests and rallies were violently dispersed by police. The petitioners argued that the law was unconstitutional as it restricted freedoms of expression and assembly. The Supreme Court ultimately ruled that the law was constitutional and did not unduly restrict freedoms, as it provided clear standards for mayors to evaluate permit applications using the "clear and present danger" test. The Court struck down the separate "calibrated preemptive response policy" as it created confusion.

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    Bayan v. Ermita, GR No. 169838 (CONSOLIDATED CASE)

    Uploaded by

    Gab Estiada
    104 views2 pages
    This document summarizes a Supreme Court case regarding the constitutionality of Batas Pambansa No. 880, also known as the Public Assembly Act of 1985. There were three groups of petitioners who alleged that their rights were violated when peaceful protests and rallies were violently dispersed by police. The petitioners argued that the law was unconstitutional as it restricted freedoms of expression and assembly. The Supreme Court ultimately ruled that the law was constitutional and did not unduly restrict freedoms, as it provided clear standards for mayors to evaluate permit applications using the "clear and present danger" test. The Court struck down the separate "calibrated preemptive response policy" as it created confusion.

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    This document summarizes a Supreme Court case regarding the constitutionality of Batas Pambansa No. 880, also known as the Public Assembly Act of 1985. There were three groups of petitioners who alleged that their rights were violated when peaceful protests and rallies were violently dispersed by police. The petitioners argued that the law was unconstitutional as it restricted freedoms of expression and assembly. The Supreme Court ultimately ruled that the law was constitutional and did not unduly restrict freedoms, as it provided clear standards for mayors to evaluate permit applications using the "clear and present danger" test. The Court struck down the separate "calibrated preemptive response policy" as it created confusion.

    Copyright:

    © All Rights Reserved
    Download as DOCX, PDF, TXT or read online from Scribd
    Download as docx, pdf, or txt
    104 views2 pages

    Bayan v. Ermita, GR No. 169838 (CONSOLIDATED CASE)

    Uploaded by

    Gab Estiada
    This document summarizes a Supreme Court case regarding the constitutionality of Batas Pambansa No. 880, also known as the Public Assembly Act of 1985. There were three groups of petitioners who alleged that their rights were violated when peaceful protests and rallies were violently dispersed by police. The petitioners argued that the law was unconstitutional as it restricted freedoms of expression and assembly. The Supreme Court ultimately ruled that the law was constitutional and did not unduly restrict freedoms, as it provided clear standards for mayors to evaluate permit applications using the "clear and present danger" test. The Court struck down the separate "calibrated preemptive response policy" as it created confusion.

    Copyright:

    © All Rights Reserved
    Download as DOCX, PDF, TXT or read online from Scribd
    Download as docx, pdf, or txt
    of 2

    Bayan v. Ermita, GR No.

    169838 (CONSOLIDATED CASE)

    Petitioners come in three groups.

    The first petitioners, Bayan, et al., in G.R. No. 169838,1 allege that they are citizens and
    taxpayers of the Philippines and that their rights as organizations and individuals were violated
    when the rally they participated in on October 6, 2005 was violently dispersed by policemen
    implementing Batas Pambansa (B.P.) No. 880.

    The second group consists of 26 individual petitioners, Jess del Prado, et al., in G.R. No.
    169848,2 who allege that they were injured, arrested and detained when a peaceful mass action
    they held on September 26, 2005 was preempted and violently dispersed by the police. They
    further assert that on October 5, 2005, a group they participated in marched to Malacañang to
    protest issuances of the Palace which, they claim, put the country under an "undeclared" martial
    rule, and the protest was likewise dispersed violently and many among them were arrested and
    suffered injuries.

    The third group, Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU), et al., petitioners in G.R. No. 169881,3 allege that
    they conduct peaceful mass actions and that their rights as organizations and those of their
    individual members as citizens, specifically the right to peaceful assembly, are affected by Batas
    Pambansa No. 880 and the policy of "Calibrated Preemptive Response" (CPR) being followed to
    implement it.

    KMU, et al., claim that on October 4, 2005, a rally KMU co-sponsored was to be conducted at the
    Mendiola bridge but police blocked them along C.M. Recto and Lepanto Streets and forcibly
    dispersed them, causing injuries to several of their members. They further allege that on
    October 6, 2005, a multi-sectoral rally which KMU also co-sponsored was scheduled to proceed
    along España Avenue in front of the University of Santo Tomas and going towards Mendiola
    bridge. Police officers blocked them along Morayta Street and prevented them from proceeding
    further. They were then forcibly dispersed, causing injuries on one of them. Three other rallyists
    were arrested.

    All petitioners assail Batas Pambansa No. 880 The Public Assembly Act of 1985, some of them in
    toto and others only Sections 4, 5, 6, 12, 13(a), and 14(a), as well as the policy of CPR. They
    seek to stop violent dispersals of rallies under the "no permit, no rally" policy and the CPR policy
    recently announced.

    Petitioners Bayan, et al., contend that Batas Pambansa No. 880 is clearly a violation of the
    Constitution and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and other human rights
    treaties of which the Philippines is a signatory.

    They argue that B.P. No. 880 requires a permit before one can stage a public assembly
    regardless of the presence or absence of a clear and present danger. It also curtails the choice of
    venue and is thus repugnant to the freedom of expression clause as the time and place of a
    public assembly form part of the message for which the expression is sought. Furthermore, it is
    not content-neutral as it does not apply to mass actions in support of the government. The
    words “lawful cause,” “opinion,” “protesting or influencing” suggest the exposition of some cause
    not espoused by the government. Also, the phrase “maximum tolerance” shows that the law
    applies to assemblies against the government because they are being tolerated. As a content-
    based legislation, it cannot pass the strict scrutiny test.

    Petitioners Jess del Prado, et al., in turn, argue that B.P. No. 880 is unconstitutional as it is a
    curtailment of the right to peacefully assemble and petition for redress of grievances because it
    puts a condition for the valid exercise of that right. It also characterizes public assemblies
    without a permit as illegal and penalizes them and allows their dispersal. Thus, its provisions are
    not mere regulations but are actually prohibitions.
    Furthermore, the law delegates powers to the Mayor without providing clear standards. The two
    standards stated in the laws (clear and present danger and imminent and grave danger) are
    inconsistent.

    ISSUE: (Issue relevant to Legislative Department)

    Whether or not B.P. No, 880 which delegates powers to the Mayor provides clear standards.

    RULING:

    Yes. As to the delegation of powers to the mayor, the law provides a precise and sufficient
    standard – the clear and present danger test stated in Sec. 6 (a). The reference to “imminent
    and grave danger of a substantive evil” in Sec. 6 (c) substantially means the same thing and is
    not an inconsistent standard. As to whether respondent Mayor has the same power
    independently under Republic Act No. 7160 is thus not necessary to resolve in these
    proceedings, and was not pursued by the parties in their arguments.

    Sec. 6. Action to be taken on the application. – FOR YOUR INFORMATION 😊

    (a) It shall be the duty of the mayor or any official acting in his behalf to issue or grant a permit
    unless there is clear and convincing evidence that the public assembly will create a clear and
    present danger to public order, public safety, public convenience, public morals or public health.

    (b) The mayor or any official acting in his behalf shall act on the application within two (2)
    working days from the date the application was filed, failing which, the permit shall be deemed
    granted. Should for any reason the mayor or any official acting in his behalf refuse to accept the
    application for a permit, said application shall be posted by the applicant on the premises of the
    office of the mayor and shall be deemed to have been filed.

    (c) If the mayor is of the view that there is imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil
    warranting the denial or modification of the permit, he shall immediately inform the applicant
    who must be heard on the matter.

    (d) The action on the permit shall be in writing and served on the applica[nt] within twenty-four
    hours.

    (e) If the mayor or any official acting in his behalf denies the application or modifies the terms
    thereof in his permit, the applicant may contest the decision in an appropriate court of law.

    (f) In case suit is brought before the Metropolitan Trial Court, the Municipal Trial Court, the
    Municipal Circuit Trial Court, the Regional Trial Court, or the Intermediate Appellate court, its
    decisions may be appealed to the appropriate court within forty-eight (48) hours after receipt of
    the same. No appeal bond and record on appeal shall be required. A decision granting such
    permit or modifying it in terms satisfactory to the applicant shall be immediately executory.

    (g) All cases filed in court under this section shall be decided within twenty-four (24) hours from
    date of filing. Cases filed hereunder shall be immediately endorsed to the executive judge for
    disposition or, in his absence, to the next in rank.

    (h) In all cases, any decision may be appealed to the Supreme Court.

    (i) Telegraphic appeals to be followed by formal appeals are hereby allowed.

    The so-called calibrated preemptive response policy has no place in our legal firmament and
    must be struck down as a darkness that shrouds freedom. It merely confuses our people and is
    used by some police agents to justify abuses. On the other hand, B.P. No. 880 cannot be
    condemned as unconstitutional; it does not curtail or unduly restrict freedoms; it merely
    regulates the use of public places as to the time, place and manner of assemblies. Far from
    being insidious, “maximum tolerance” is for the benefit of rallyists, not the government. The
    delegation to the mayors of the power to issue rally “permits” is valid because it is subject to the
    constitutionally-sound “clear and present danger” standard.

    RATIO: Examples of standards held sufficient. – The following are legislative specifications are
    among those which have been held to state a sufficiently definite standard for administrative
    action in specific fields… “a clear and present danger,” and “imminent and grave danger of a
    substantive evil.”

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