Cicl Automatic Suspension of Sentence

PEOPLE V.
LABABO
G.R. NO. 234651
JUNE 6, 2018
Age at time of commission : 17 years old

Age at time of promulgation of judgment : 24 years old
Suspended Sentence
We note, however, that FFF, being a minor at the time of the commission of
the offense, should benefit from a suspended sentence pursuant to Section
38 of RA 9344, or the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006. Said
provision reads:
SEC. 38. Automatic Suspension of Sentence. - Once the child who is

under eighteen (18) years of age at the time of the commission of the
offense is found guilty of the offense charged, the court shall determine and
ascertain any civil liability which may have resulted from the offense
committed. However, instead of pronouncing the judgment of conviction,
the court shall place the child in conflict with the law under suspended
sentence, without need of application: Provided, however, That suspension
of sentence shall still be applied even if the juvenile is already eighteen
years (18) of age or more at the time of the pronouncement of his/her guilt.
Upon suspension of sentence and after considering the various

circumstances of the child, the court shall impose the appropriate
disposition measures as provided in the Supreme Court Rule on Juveniles
in Conflict with the Law. (emphasis ours)
It is well to recall that Section 38 of the law applies regardless of the

imposable penalty, since R.A. No. 9344 does not distinguish between a
minor who has been convicted of a capital offense and another who has
been convicted of a lesser offense. We, therefore, should also not
distinguish and should apply the automatic suspension of sentence to a
child in conflict with the law who has been found guilty of a heinous crime. 40
Furthermore, the age of the child in conflict with the law at the time of the
promulgation of judgment of conviction is immaterial. What matters is that
the offender committed the offense when he/she was still of tender age.
The promotion of the welfare of a child in conflict with the law should
extend even to one who has exceeded the age limit of twenty-one (21)
years, so long as he/she committed the crime when he/she was still a child.
The offender shall be entitled to the right to restoration, rehabilitation and
reintegration in accordance with the Act in order that he/she is given the
chance to live a normal life and become a productive member of the
community.41
FFF may thus be confined in an agricultural camp or any other

training facility in accordance with Section 51 of Republic Act No. 9344,
which provides that "[a] child in conflict with the law may, after conviction
and upon order of the court, be made to serve his/her sentence, in lieu of
confinement in a regular penal institution, in an agricultural camp and other
training facilities that may be established, maintained, supervised and
controlled by the BUCOR, in coordination with the DSWD." The case shall
thus be remanded to the court of origin to effect appellant's confinement in
an agricultural camp or other training facility, following the Court's
pronouncement in People v. Sarcia.42
PEOPLE V. RUPISAN
G.R. NO. 226494
FEBRUARY 14, 2018
Age at time of commission : 17 years old, 17 years old , 15 years old,

16 years old.
Age at time of promulgation of judgment : 24 years old , 24 years old

22 years old , 23 years old
It is error, however, for the RTC and the CA to not have applied Section 38
of R.A. 9344. Section 38 of RA No. 9344 provides that when the child
below 18 years of age who committed a crime and was found guilty, the
court shall place the child in conflict with the law under suspended
sentence even if such child has reached 18 years or more at the time of
judgment. Thus:
SEC. 38. Automatic Suspension of Sentence. - Once the child who is under

eighteen (18) years of age at the time of the commission of the offense is
found guilty of the offense charged, the court shall determine and ascertain
any civil liability which may have resulted from the offense committed.
However, instead of pronouncing the judgment of conviction, the court shall
place the child in conflict with the law under suspended sentence, without
need of application: Provided, however, That suspension of sentence shall
still be applied even if the juvenile is already eighteen (18) years of age or
more at the time of the pronouncement of his/her guilt.

in Conflict with the Law.
The applicability of the above provision has already been thoroughly
discussed by this Court in People v. Ancajas, et al.,29 thus:
In People v. Sarcia, we ruled on the applicability of Section 38, RA No.

8344 even if the minor therein was convicted of reclusion perpetua and we
ratiocinated as follows:
The above-quoted (Section 38 of RA No. 9344) provision makes no

distinction as to the nature of the offense committed by the child in conflict
with the law, unlike P.D. No. 603 and A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC. The said P.D.
and Supreme Court (SC) Rule provide that the benefit of suspended
sentence would not apply to a child in conflict with the law if, among others,
he/she has been convicted of an offense punishable by death, reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment. In construing Sec. 38 of R.A. No. 9344, the
Court is guided by the basic principle of statutory construction that when
the law does not distinguish, we should not distinguish. Since R.A. No.
9344 does not distinguish between a minor who has been convicted of a
capital offense and another who has been convicted of a lesser offense,
the Court should also not distinguish and should apply the automatic
suspension of sentence to a child in conflict with the law who has been
found guilty of a heinous crime.
Moreover, the legislative intent, to apply to heinous crimes the automatic

suspension of sentence of a child in conflict with the law can be gleaned
from the Senate deliberations on Senate Bill No. 1402 (Juvenile Justice
and Delinquency Prevention Act of 2005), the pertinent portion of which is
quoted below:
If a mature minor, maybe 16 years old to below 18 years old is charged,
accused with, or may have committed a serious offense, and may have
acted with discernment, then the child could be recommended by the
Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD), by the Local
Council for the Protection of Children (LCPC), or by my proposed Office of
Juvenile Welfare and Restoration to go through a judicial proceeding; but
the welfare, best interests, and restoration of the child should still be a
primordial or primary consideration. Even in heinous crimes, the intention
should still be the child's restoration, rehabilitation and reintegration. Xxx
In fact, the Court En Banc promulgated on November 24, 2009, the

Revised Rule on Children in Conflict with the Law, which echoed such
legislative intent.
Although suspension of sentence still applies even if the child in conflict

with the law is already 18 years of age or more at the time the judgment' of
conviction was rendered, however, such suspension is only until the minor
reaches the maximum age of 21 as provided under Section 40 of RA No.
9344, to wit:
SEC. 40. Return of the Child in Conflict with the Law to Court. - If the court
finds that the objective of the disposition measures imposed upon the child
in conflict with the law have not been fulfilled, or if the child in conflict with
the law has willfully failed to comply with the conditions of his/her
disposition or rehabilitation program, the child in conflict with the law shall
be brought before the court for execution of judgment.
If said child in conflict with the law has reached eighteen (18) years of age
while under suspended sentence, the court shall determine whether to
discharge the child in accordance with this Act, to order execution of
sentence, or to extend the suspended sentence for a certain specified
period or until the child reaches the maximum age of twenty one (21) years.
The RTC did not suspend the sentence of appellant Allain pursuant to
Section 38 of RA No. 9344. Appellant is now 34 years old, thus, Section 40
is also no longer applicable. Nonetheless, we have extended the
application of RA No. 9344 beyond the age of 21 years old to give meaning
to the legislative intent of the said law.
In People v. Jacinto, we ruled:

These developments notwithstanding, we find that the benefits of a
suspended sentence can no longer apply to appellant. The suspension of
sentence lasts only until the child in conflict with the law reaches the
maximum age of twenty-one (21) years. Section 40 of the law and Section
48 of the Rule are clear on the matter. Unfortunately, appellant is now
twenty-five (25) years old.
Be that as it may, to give meaning to the legislative intent of the Act, the
promotion of the welfare of a child in conflict with the law should extend
even to one who has exceeded the age limit of twenty-one (21) years, so
long as he/she committed the crime when he/she was still a child. The
offender shall be entitled to the right to restoration, rehabilitation and
community. The age of the child in conflict with the law at the time of the
promulgation of the judgment of conviction is not material. What matters is
that the offender committed the offense when he/she was still of tender
age.
Thus, appellant may be confined in an agricultural camp or any other

training facility in accordance with Sec. 51 of Republic Act No. 9344.
Sec. 51. Confinement of Convicted Children in Agricultural Camps and

Other Training Facilities. - A child in conflict with the law may, after
conviction and upon order of the court, be made to serve his/her sentence,
in lieu of confinement in a regular penal institution, in an agricultural camp
and other training facilities that may be established, maintained, supervised
and controlled by the BUCOR, in coordination with the DSWD.
Following the pronouncement in Sarcia, the case shall be remanded to the

court of origin to effect appellant's confinement in an agricultural camp or
other training facility.30
Necessarily, herein minor appellants shall be entitled to appropriate

disposition under Section 51, R.A. No. 9344, which extends even to one
who has exceeded the age limit of twenty-one (21) years, so long as he
committed the crime when he was still a child, and provides for the
confinement of convicted children.31
PEOPLE V. ANCAJAS
G.R. NO. 199270
OCTOBER 21, 2015
Age at time of commission: 17 years old

Age at time of promulgation of judgment: 26 years old
Section 38 of RA No. 9344 provides that when the child below 18 years of
age who committed a crime and was found guilty, the court shall place the
child in conflict with the law under suspended sentence even if such child
has reached 18 years or more at the time of judgment.

Upon suspension of sentence and alter considering the various

Notwithstanding, the RTC did not apply the law saying that the benefits of a
suspended sentence shall not apply to appellant Allain because he is
convicted of an offense punishable by reclusion perpetuamaking reference
to Section 32, A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC, 65
We do not agree.
In People v. Sarcia,66 we ruled on the applicability of Section 38, RA No.

8344 even if the minor therein was convicted of reclusion perpetua and we
ratiocinated as follows:
The above-quoted (Section 38 of RA No. 9344) provision makes no

distinction as to the nature of the offense committed by the child in conflict
with the law, unlike P.D. No. 603 and A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC. The said P.D.
and Supreme Court (SC) Rule provide that the benefit of suspended
sentence would not apply to a child in conflict with the law if, among others,
he/she has been convicted of an offense punishable by death, reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment. In construing Sec. 38 of R.A. No. 9344, the
Court is guided by the basic principle of statutory construction that when
the law does not distinguish, we should not distinguish. Since R.A. No.
9344 does not distinguish between a minor who has been convicted of a
capital offense and another who has been convicted of a lesser offense,
the Court should also not distinguish and should apply the automatic
suspension of sentence to a child in conflict with the law who has been
found guilty of a heinous crime.
Moreover, the legislative intent, to apply to heinous crimes the automatic

suspension of sentence of a child in conflict with the law can be gleaned
from the Senate deliberations on Senate Bill No. 1402 (Juvenile Justice
and Delinquency Prevention Act of 2005), the pertinent portion of which is
quoted below:

Council for the Protection of Children (LCPC), or by my proposed Office of
Juvenile Welfare and Restoration to go through a judicial proceeding; but
the welfare, best interests, and restoration of the child should still be a
primordial or primary consideration. Even in heinous crimes, the intention
should still be the child's restoration, rehabilitation and reintegration. x x x67
In fact, the Court En Bane promulgated on November 24, 2009, the

Revised Rule on Children in Conflict with the Law, which echoed such
legislative intent.68
Although suspension of sentence still applies even if the child in conflict

with the law is already 18 years of age or more at the time the judgment of
conviction was rendered, however, such suspension is only until the minor
reaches the maximum age of 21 as provided under Section 40 of RA No.
9344, to wit:
SEC. 40. Return of the Child in Conflict with the Law to Court. — If the
court finds that the objective of the disposition measures imposed upon the
child in conflict with the law have not been fulfilled, or if the child in conflict
with the law has willfully failed to comply with the conditions of his/her
period or until the child reaches the maximum age of twenty-one (21)
years.
The RTC did not suspend the sentence of appellant Allain pursuant to
Section 38 of RA No. 9344. Appellant is now 34 years old, thus, Section 40
is also no longer applicable. Nonetheless, we have extended the
application of RA No. 9344 beyond the age of 21 years old to give meaning
to the legislative intent of the said law.
In People v. Jacinto,69 we ruled:

maximum age of twenty-one (21) years. Section 40 of the law and Section
48 of the Rule are clear on the matter. Unfortunately, appellant is now
twenty-five (25) years old.
age.

training facility in accordance with Sec. 51 of Republic Act No. 9344.

Other Training Facilities. - A child in conflict with the law may, after
Following the pronouncement in Sarcia, the case shall be remanded to the

court of origin to effect appellant's confinement in an agricultural camp or
other training facility.
Thus, appellant Allain shall be confined in an agricultural camp or

other training facility pursuant to Section 51 of RA No. 9344.
PEOPLE V. GAMBAO Y ESMAIL

G.R. NO. 172707
OCTOBER 1, 2013

Under Section 38 of R.A. No. 9344, 66 the suspension of sentence of a child

in conflict with the law shall still be applied even if he/she is already
eighteen (18) years of age or more at the time of the pronouncement of
his/her guilt.
Unfortunately, at the present age of 31, Perpenian can no longer benefit

from the aforesaid provision, because under Article 40 of R.A. No.
9344,67 the suspension of sentence can be availed of only until the child in
conflict with the law reaches the maximum age of twenty-one (21) years.
This leaves the Court with no choice but to pronounce judgement.
Perpenian is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt as an accomplice in the
crime of kidnapping for ransom. Since this Court has ruled that death as
utilized in Article 71 of the Revised Penal Code shall no longer form part of
the equation in the graduation of penalties pursuant to R.A. No. 9346, 68 the
penalty imposed by law on accomplices in the commission of
consummated kidnapping for ransom is Reclusion Temporal, the penalty
one degree lower than what the principals would bear (Reclusion
Perpetua).69 Applying Article 68 of the Revised Penal Code, the imposable
penalty should then be adjusted to the penalty next lower than that
prescribed by law for accomplices. This Court, therefore, holds that as to
Perpenian, the penalty of Prision Mayor, the penalty lower than that
prescribed by law (Reclusion Temporal), should be imposed. Applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum penalty, which is one degree
lower than the maximum imposable penalty, shall be within the range of
Prision Correccional; and the maximum penalty shall be within the
minimum period of Prision Mayor, absent any aggravating circumstance
and there being one mitigating circumstance. Hence, the Court imposes the
indeterminate sentence of six (6) months and one (1) day of Prision
Correccional, as minimum, to six (6) years and one (1) day of Prision
Mayor, as maximum.
As regards Perpenian’s possible confinement in an agricultural camp

or other training facility in accordance with Section 51 of R.A. 9344,
this Court held in People v. Jacinto 70 that the age of the child in
conflict with the law at the time of the promulgation of the judgment is
not material. What matters is that the offender committed the offense
when he/she was still of tender age. This Court, however, finds such
arrangement no longer necessary in view of the fact that Perpenian’s
actual served term has already exceeded the imposable penalty for
her offense. For such reason, she may be immediately released from
detention.
PEOPLE V. MONTICALVO
G.R. NO. 193507
JANUARY 30, 2013
Section 38 of Republic Act No. 9344 warrants the suspension of sentence

of a child in conflict with the law notwithstanding that he/she has reached
the age of majority at the time the judgment of conviction is pronounced. 74It
reads, thus:
SEC. 38. Automatic Suspension of Sentence. – Once the child who is

sentence, without need of application: Provided, however, That suspension
of sentence shall still be applied even if the juvenile is already eighteen (18)
of age or more at the time of the pronouncement of his/her guilt.

in Conflict with the Law. [Emphasis supplied].
However, while Section 38 of Republic Act No. 9344 provides that

suspension of sentence can still be applied even if the child in conflict with
the law is already eighteen (18) years of age or more at the time of the
pronouncement of his/her guilt, Section 40 of the same law limits the said
suspension of sentence until the said child reaches the maximum age of
21, thus:75
SEC. 40. Return of the Child in Conflict with the Law to Court. – If the court
the law has willfully failed to comply with the conditions of his/her
years. [Emphasis supplied].
At present, appellant is already 27 years of age, and the judgment of the

trial court was promulgated prior to the effectivity of Republic Act No. 9344.
Therefore, the application of Sections 38 and 40 of the said law is already
moot and academic.
Be that as it may, to give meaning to the legislative intent of Republic Act

No. 9344, the promotion of the welfare of a child in conflict with the law
should extend even to one who has exceeded the age limit of 21 years, so
reintegration in accordance with Republic Act No. 9344 in order that he/she
is given the chance to live a normal life and become a productive member
of the community. The age of the child in conflict with the law at the time of
the promulgation of the judgment of conviction is not material. What
matters is that the offender committed the offense when he/she was still of
tender age.76 The appellant, therefore, shall be entitled to appropriate
disposition under Section 51 of Republic Act No. 9344, which provides for
the confinement of convicted children as follows: 77
SEC. 51. Confinement of Convicted Children in Agricultural Camps and

Other Training Facilities. – A child in conflict with the law may, after
To conform to this Court’s ruling in People v.Sarcia, 78 the case shall

be remanded to the court of origin to effect appellant’s confinement in
an agricultrual camp or other training facility. 79
PEOPLE V. ARPON Y JUNTILLA

G.R. NO. 183563
DECEMBER 14, 2011
In the instant case, the accused-appellant testified that he was born on

February 23, 1982 and that he was only 13 years old when the first incident
of rape allegedly happened in 1995. 72 Other than his testimony, no other
evidence was presented to prove the date of his birth. However, the
records of this case show neither any objection to the said testimony on the
part of the prosecution, nor any contrary evidence to dispute the same.
Thus, the RTC and the Court of Appeals should have appreciated the
accused-appellant’s minority in ascertaining the appropriate penalty.
Although the acts of rape in this case were committed before Republic Act
No. 9344 took effect on May 20, 2006, the said law is still applicable given
that Section 68 thereof expressly states:
SEC. 68. Children Who Have Been Convicted and are Serving Sentences.
— Persons who have been convicted and are serving sentence at the time
of the effectivity of this Act, and who were below the age of eighteen (18)
years at the time of the commission of the offense for which they were
convicted and are serving sentence, shall likewise benefit from the
retroactive application of this Act. They shall be entitled to appropriate
dispositions provided under this Act and their sentences shall be adjusted
accordingly. They shall be immediately released if they are so qualified
under this Act or other applicable law.
People v. Sarcia73 further stressed that "[w]ith more reason, the Act should
apply to [a] case wherein the conviction by the lower court is still under
review."
Thus, in the matter of assigning criminal responsibility, Section 6 of

Republic Act No. 9344 is explicit in providing that:
SEC. 6. Minimum Age of Criminal Responsibility. — A child fifteen (15)

years of age or under at the time of the commission of the offense shall be
exempt from criminal liability. However, the child shall be subjected to an
intervention program pursuant to Section 20 of the Act.
A child above fifteen (15) years but below eighteen (18) years of age shall
likewise be exempt from criminal liability and be subjected to an
intervention program, unless he/she has acted with discernment, in which
case, such child shall be subjected to the appropriate proceedings in
accordance with this Act.
The exemption from criminal liability herein established does not include
exemption from civil liability, which shall be enforced in accordance with
existing laws. (Emphases ours.)
As held in Sierra, the above provision effectively modified the minimum age
limit of criminal irresponsibility in paragraphs 2 and 3 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended,74 "i.e., from ‘under nine years of age’ and ‘above nine
years of age and under fifteen’ (who acted without discernment) - to ‘fifteen
years old or under’ and ‘above fifteen but below 18’ (who acted without
discernment) in determining exemption from criminal liability." 75
Accordingly, for the first count of rape, which in the information in Criminal
Case No. 2000-01-46 was allegedly committed in 1995, the testimony of
the accused-appellant sufficiently established that he was only 13 years old
at that time. In view of the failure of the prosecution to prove the exact date
and year of the first incident of rape, i.e., whether the same occurred in
1995 or in 1998 as previously discussed, any doubt therein "should be
resolved in favor of the accused, it being more beneficial to the
latter."76 The Court, thus, exempts the accused-appellant from criminal
liability for the first count of rape pursuant to the first paragraph of Section 6
of Republic Act No. 9344. The accused-appellant, nevertheless, remains
civilly liable therefor.
For the second and third counts of rape that were committed in the year
1999, the accused-appellant was already 17 years old. We likewise find
that in the said instances, the accused-appellant acted with discernment. In
Madali v. People,77 the Court had the occasion to reiterate that
"[d]iscernment is that mental capacity of a minor to fully appreciate the
consequences of his unlawful act. Such capacity may be known and should
be determined by taking into consideration all the facts and circumstances
afforded by the records in each case." In this case, the fact that the
accused-appellant acted with discernment was satisfactorily established by
the testimony of AAA, which we had already found to be credible. Verily,
AAA testified that she at first did not tell anybody about the sexual assault
she suffered at the hands of the accused-appellant because the latter told
her that he would kill her mother if she did so. That the accused-appellant
had to threaten AAA in an effort to conceal his dastardly acts only proved
that he knew full well that what he did was wrong and that he was aware of
the consequences thereof.
Accordant with the second paragraph of Article 68 of the Revised Penal

Code, as amended, and in conformity with our ruling in Sarcia, when the
offender is a minor under eighteen (18) years of age, "the penalty next
lower than that prescribed by law shall be imposed, but always in the
proper period. However, for purposes of determining the proper penalty
because of the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority, the penalty of
death is still the penalty to be reckoned with." Thus, for the second and
third counts of rape, the proper penalty imposable upon the accused-
appellant is reclusion perpetua for each count.
Had the trial court correctly appreciated in favor of the accused-appellant

the circumstance of his minority, the latter would have been entitled to a
suspension of sentence for the second and third counts of rape under
Section 38 of Republic Act No. 9344, which reads:
SEC. 38. Automatic Suspension of Sentence. — Once the child who is

sentence, without need of application. Provided, however, That suspension
of sentence shall still be supplied even if the juvenile is already eighteen
years (18) of age or more at the time of the pronouncement of his/her guilt.

disposition measures as provided in the Supreme Court Rule on Juvenile in
Conflict with the Law.1awphi1
Be that as it may, the suspension of sentence may no longer be applied in

the instant case given that the accused-appellant is now about 29 years of
age and Section 40 of Republic Act No. 9344 puts a limit to the application
of a suspended sentence, namely, when the child reaches a maximum age
of 21. The said provision states:
SEC. 40. Return of the Child in Conflict with the Law to Court. — If the
court finds that the objective of the disposition measures imposed upon the
child in conflict with the law have not been fulfilled, or if the child in conflict
with the law has willfully failed to comply with the conditions of his/her
years. (Emphasis ours.)
Nonetheless, the disposition set forth under Section 51 of Republic

Act No. 9344 is warranted in the instant case, to wit:
SEC. 51. Confinement of Convicted Children in Agricultural Camps

and Other Training Facilities. — A child in conflict with the law may
after conviction and upon order of the court, be made to serve his/her
sentence, in lieu of confinement in a regular penal institution, in an
agricultural camp and other training facilities that may be established,
maintained, supervised and controlled by the [Bureau of Corrections],
in coordination with the [Department of Social Welfare and
Development]
PEOPLE V. MANTALABA
G.R. NO. 186227
JULY 20, 2011
Age at time of commission of the crime: 17 years old

It must be noted that RA 9344 took effect on May 20, 2006, while the RTC
promulgated its decision on this case on September 14, 2005, when said
appellant was no longer a minor. The RTC did not suspend the sentence in
accordance with Article 192 of P.D. 603, The Child and Youth Welfare
Code31 and Section 32 of A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC, the Rule on Juveniles in
Conflict with the Law,32 the laws that were applicable at the time of the
promulgation of judgment, because the imposable penalty for violation of
Section 5 of RA 9165 is life imprisonment to death.
It may be argued that the appellant should have been entitled to a

suspension of his sentence under Sections 38 and 68 of RA 9344 which
provide for its retroactive application, thus:
still be applied even if the juvenile is already eighteen years (18) of age or

disposition measures as provided in the Supreme Court [Rule] on Juveniles
xxxx
Sec. 68. Children Who Have Been Convicted and are Serving Sentence. -
Persons who have been convicted and are serving sentence at the time of
the effectivity of this Act, and who were below the age of eighteen (18)
years at the time of the commission of the offense for which they were
convicted and are serving sentence, shall likewise benefit from the
retroactive application of this Act. x x x
However, this Court has already ruled in People v. Sarcia33 that while

Section 38 of RA 9344 provides that suspension of sentence can still be
applied even if the child in conflict with the law is already eighteen (18)
years of age or more at the time of the pronouncement of his/her guilt,
Section 40 of the same law limits the said suspension of sentence until the
child reaches the maximum age of 21. The provision states:
SEC. 40. Return of the Child in Conflict with the Law to Court. - If the court
the law has willfully failed to comply with the condition of his/her disposition
or rehabilitation program, the child in conflict with the law shall be brought
before the court for execution of judgment.
years.
Hence, the appellant, who is now beyond the age of twenty-one (21) years
can no longer avail of the provisions of Sections 38 and 40 of RA 9344 as
to his suspension of sentence, because such is already moot and
academic. It is highly noted that this would not have happened if the CA,
when this case was under its jurisdiction, suspended the sentence of the
appellant. The records show that the appellant filed his notice of appeal at
the age of 19 (2005), hence, when RA 9344 became effective in 2006,
appellant was 20 years old, and the case having been elevated to the CA,
the latter should have suspended the sentence of the appellant because he
was already entitled to the provisions of Section 38 of the same law, which
now allows the suspension of sentence of minors regardless of the penalty
imposed as opposed to the provisions of Article 192 of P.D. 603. 34
Nevertheless, the appellant shall be entitled to appropriate disposition

under Section 51 of RA No. 9344, which provides for the confinement
of convicted children as follows:35
SEC. 51. Confinement of Convicted Children in Agricultural Camps

and other Training Facilities. - A child in conflict with the law may,
after conviction and upon order of the court, be made to serve his/her
sentence, in lieu of confinement in a regular penal institution, in an
agricultural camp and other training facilities that may be established,
maintained, supervised and controlled by the BUCOR, in coordination
with the DSWD
PEOPLE V. JACINTO
G.R. NO. 182239
MARCH 16, 2011

Automatic Suspension of Sentence; Duration; Appropriate Disposition after

the Lapse of the Period of Suspension of Sentence
Republic Act No. 9344 warrants the suspension of sentence of a child in

conflict with the law notwithstanding that he/she has reached the age of
majority at the time the judgment of conviction is pronounced. Thus:

more at the time of the pronouncement of his/her guilt. (Emphasis
supplied.)
xxxx
Applying Declarador v. Gubaton,153 which was promulgated on 18 August

2006, the Court of Appeals held that, consistent with Article 192 of
Presidential Decree No. 603, as amended, 154 the aforestated provision
does not apply to one who has been convicted of an offense punishable by
death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment.155
Meanwhile, on 10 September 2009, this Court promulgated the decision

in Sarcia,156 overturning the ruling in Gubaton. Thus:
The xxx provision makes no distinction as to the nature of the offense

committed by the child in conflict with the law, unlike P.D. No. 603 and A.M.
No. 02-1-18-SC. The said P.D. and Supreme Court (SC) Rule provide that
the benefit of suspended sentence would not apply to a child in conflict with
the law if, among others, he/she has been convicted of an offense
punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. In construing
Sec. 38 of R.A. No. 9344, the Court is guided by the basic principle of
statutory construction that when the law does not distinguish, we should not
distinguish. Since R.A. No. 9344 does not distinguish between a minor who
has been convicted of a capital offense and another who has been
convicted of a lesser offense, the Court should also not distinguish and
should apply the automatic suspension of sentence to a child in conflict
with the law who has been found guilty of a heinous crime. 157
The legislative intent reflected in the Senate deliberations 158 on Senate Bill
No. 1402 (Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act of 2005) further
strengthened the new position of this Court to cover heinous crimes in the
application of the provision on the automatic suspension of sentence of a
child in conflict with the law. The pertinent portion of the deliberation reads:

Council for the Protection of Children (LCPC), or by [Senator Miriam
Defensor-Santiago’s] proposed Office of Juvenile Welfare and Restoration
to go through a judicial proceeding; but the welfare, best interests, and
restoration of the child should still be a primordial or primary consideration.
Even in heinous crimes, the intention should still be the child’s restoration,
rehabilitation and reintegration. xxx (Italics supplied in Sarcia.)159
On 24 November 2009, the Court En Banc promulgated the Revised Rule

on Children in Conflict with the Law,which reflected the same position.160

maximum age of twenty-one (21) years. 161 Section 40162 of the law and
Section 48163 of the Rule are clear on the matter. Unfortunately, appellant is
now twenty-five (25) years old.
age.

training facility in accordance with Sec. 51 of Republic Act No. 9344. 164

Other Training Facilities. – A child in conflict with the law may, after
Following the pronouncement in Sarcia,165 the case shall be remanded to

the court of origin to effect appellant’s confinement in an agricultrual camp
or other training facility.

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PEOPLE V.

Age at time of commission : 17 years old

SEC. 38. Automatic Suspension of Sentence. - Once the child who is

Upon suspension of sentence and after considering the various

It is well to recall that Section 38 of the law applies regardless of the

FFF may thus be confined in an agricultural camp or any other

Age at time of commission : 17 years old, 17 years old , 15 years old,

Age at time of promulgation of judgment : 24 years old , 24 years old

SEC. 38. Automatic Suspension of Sentence. - Once the child who is under

Upon suspension of sentence and after considering the various

In People v. Sarcia, we ruled on the applicability of Section 38, RA No.

The above-quoted (Section 38 of RA No. 9344) provision makes no

Moreover, the legislative intent, to apply to heinous crimes the automatic

In fact, the Court En Banc promulgated on November 24, 2009, the

Although suspension of sentence still applies even if the child in conflict

In People v. Jacinto, we ruled:

Thus, appellant may be confined in an agricultural camp or any other

Sec. 51. Confinement of Convicted Children in Agricultural Camps and

Following the pronouncement in Sarcia, the case shall be remanded to the

Necessarily, herein minor appellants shall be entitled to appropriate

Age at time of commission: 17 years old

SEC. 38. Automatic Suspension of Sentence. - Once the child who is under

Upon suspension of sentence and alter considering the various

In People v. Sarcia,66 we ruled on the applicability of Section 38, RA No.

The above-quoted (Section 38 of RA No. 9344) provision makes no

Moreover, the legislative intent, to apply to heinous crimes the automatic

If a mature minor, maybe 16 years old to below 18 years old is charged,

In fact, the Court En Bane promulgated on November 24, 2009, the

Although suspension of sentence still applies even if the child in conflict

In People v. Jacinto,69 we ruled:

These developments notwithstanding, we find that the benefits of a

Thus, appellant may be confined in an agricultural camp or any other

Sec. 51. Confinement of Convicted Children in Agricultural Camps and

Following the pronouncement in Sarcia, the case shall be remanded to the

Thus, appellant Allain shall be confined in an agricultural camp or

PEOPLE V. GAMBAO Y ESMAIL

Age at time of commission : 17 years old

Under Section 38 of R.A. No. 9344, 66 the suspension of sentence of a child

Unfortunately, at the present age of 31, Perpenian can no longer benefit

As regards Perpenian’s possible confinement in an agricultural camp

Section 38 of Republic Act No. 9344 warrants the suspension of sentence

SEC. 38. Automatic Suspension of Sentence. – Once the child who is

Upon suspension of sentence and after considering the various

However, while Section 38 of Republic Act No. 9344 provides that

At present, appellant is already 27 years of age, and the judgment of the

Be that as it may, to give meaning to the legislative intent of Republic Act

SEC. 51. Confinement of Convicted Children in Agricultural Camps and

To conform to this Court’s ruling in People v.Sarcia, 78 the case shall

PEOPLE V. ARPON Y JUNTILLA

In the instant case, the accused-appellant testified that he was born on

Thus, in the matter of assigning criminal responsibility, Section 6 of

SEC. 6. Minimum Age of Criminal Responsibility. — A child fifteen (15)

Accordant with the second paragraph of Article 68 of the Revised Penal

Had the trial court correctly appreciated in favor of the accused-appellant

SEC. 38. Automatic Suspension of Sentence. — Once the child who is

Upon suspension of sentence and after considering the various

Be that as it may, the suspension of sentence may no longer be applied in

Nonetheless, the disposition set forth under Section 51 of Republic

SEC. 51. Confinement of Convicted Children in Agricultural Camps