Cu
Cu
Cu
Facts: Judgment for plaintiff Cu Unjieng e Hijos was rendered in a foreclosure suit instituted
against defendant Mabalacat Sugar Company. A writ of execution was later issued and the
mortgaged property, consisting of a sugar central, ordered sold at public auction. At the sale,
Berkenkotter, filed a third-party claim over certain machineries of the central, but a bond having
been filed by plaintiff, the sheriff proceeded with the public auction, at which plaintiff was the
highest bidder. The sale was confirmed by the trial court, and, upon appeal to this court, the
order of confirmation was affirmed. On motion, the receiver in possession of the property sold
was caused to deliver the same to the plaintiff, and at that time the judgment debt, together
Meanwhile Berkenkotter instituted a separate proceeding against plaintiff for vindication of his
claim over the machineries. From an adverse decision of the trial court, he appealed to SC. While
pending, Mabalacat presented a petition in the trial court, praying that it be declared entitled to
the proceeds of the central during the period of its receivership, aggregating P36,793.99. The
judgment debt at the time the property sold was delivered to the plaintiff, amounted to
P226,036.80, and the mortgaged property was sold to the plaintiff for P177,000, leaving thus a
balance of P49,036.80. Defendant contended that the sum of P177,000 offered by the plaintiff at
the auction sale was for the mortgaged property with the exclusion of the machineries, valued at
P50,000 which were the subject matter of Berkenkotter's third-party claim, and that should
Berkenkotter lose his appeal in this Court and the machineries thus claimed by him be declared
included in the property sold at public auction, plaintiff should be charged not only with the
amount of P177,000 but also with the sum of P50,000, or a total of P227,000 which covered the
entire amount of the judgment debt. Plaintiff contend that the P177,000 he offered at the public
auction was for the whole property mortgaged including the machineries claimed by
Berkenkotter, and that, therefore, he was entitled to a deficiency judgment to which the net
proceeds of the central during the period of its receivership should be applied. On November
1935, Trial court held that the balance of P36,793.99 must correspond to defendant if plaintiff
has won the lawsuit over certain parts of the machinery because, then, they will have collected
all their credit. Thus, any of them will present a certified copy of the decision in said matter.
Plaintiff filed a petition for deficiency judgment. Defendant claimed that the question raised had
already been adjudged in the court's order of November 1935. Upon motion, trial court received
the certified copy of the decision of the Supreme Court in the Berkenkotter's case as evidence.
Trial court held that the sum of P36,793.99 representing the net proceeds of the receivership
and which has already been turned over to the plaintiff, be applied to the judgment debt, and
rendered a deficiency judgment in the amount of P35,737.99, which was the last balance unpaid.
Defendant now contends that the second order is null and void, for it has been rendered
without jurisdiction to amend or reverse the first order since the first order had already become
Ruling: No. The November 1935 order was conditioned upon a contingency, namely, the
outcome of the Berkenkotter case that was then pending appeal the Court. It did not dispose
definitely of the issue as to who should be awarded the amount of P36,793.99. It provided that
the sum should be awarded to plaintiff if Berkenkotter should win the case, or to the defendant
should Berkenkotter lose the case in this Court. And this is not a final disposition of the case.
Orders or judgments subject to the performance of a condition precedent are not final until the
condition is performed. Before the condition is performed or the contingency has happened, the
judgment is not effective and is not capable of execution. Such judgment contains no
disposition at all and is a mere anticipated statement of what the court shall do in the future
when a particular event should happen. As a general rule, judgments conditioned upon a
contingency are held to be null and void. A judgment must be definite. The decision itself must
purport to decide finally the rights of the parties upon the issue submitted, by specially denying
or granting the remedy sought by the action. When a definitive judgment cannot be rendered
because it depends upon a contingency, the proper procedure is to render no judgment at all
case. The requirements was proper, for only after such decision is rendered and a certified copy
thereof presented to the trial court could a final order be issued reciting how the contingency
has happened and setting definitely the rights of the parties in accordance therewith. But the
certified copy was presented in court on March 28, 1936, and no final order has as yet been
issued thereon. There was, therefore, nothing which could legally bar the issuance of the second
order of May 29, 1936. It is a well-settled rule that interlocutory or provisional orders are subject
to vacation or amendment at any time before final judgment is rendered or has become
executory. We conclude that the second order is valid.