Strategy and Command The First Two Years

Foreword
For the United States, full involvement in World War II began and
ended in the Pacific Ocean. Although the accepted grand strategy of the
war was the defeat of Germany first, the sweep of Japanese victory in the
weeks and months after Pearl Harbor impelled the United States to move
as rapidly as it could to stem the enemy tide of conquest in the Pacific.
Shocked as they were by the initial attack, the American people were also
united in their determination to defeat Japan, and the Pacific war became
peculiarly their own affair. In this great theater it was the United States
that ran the war, and had the determining voice in answering questions of
strategy and command as they arose. The natural environment made the
prosecution of war in the Pacific of necessity an interservice effort, and any
real account of it must, as this work does, take into full account the views
and actions of the Navy as well as those of the Army and its Air Forces.
These are the factors—a predominantly American theater of war cover-
ing nearly one-third the globe, and a joint conduct of war by land, sea, and
air on the largest scale in American history—that make this volume on the
Pacific war of particular significance today. It is the capstone of the eleven
volumes published or being published in the Army's World War II series
that deal with military operations in the Pacific area, and it is one that
should command wide attention from the thoughtful public as well as the
military reader in these days of global tension.
Washington, D. C. JAMES A. NORELL

5 April 1961 Brigadier General, U.S.A.
Chief of Military History
vii
The Author
Louis Morton, now Professor of History at Dartmouth College, was a
member of the Office of the Chief of Military History from 1946 to 1959.
During that time, he served as chief of the Pacific Section, responsible for
the preparation of the 11-volume subseries on The War in the Pacific,
deputy to the Chief Historian, and historical adviser for the post-World
War II program. The present volume is the second he has written for the
series UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II. The first, The
Fall of the Philippines, was published in 1953. In addition, he has contrib-
uted substantially to other publications of this office, including Command
Decisions, and has published numerous articles in professional military
and historical journals.
A graduate of New York University, Mr. Morton received his doctorate
from Duke University in 1938 in the field of American colonial history.
After a brief teaching career, he joined the Williamsburg Restoration,
which published his study, Robert Carter of Nomini Hall, and then in
May 1942 volunteered for military service. Most of his Army career was
spent in the Pacific on historical assignments, and it was during this period
that his interest in military history began. He has served as consultant and
lecturer at a number of military and civilian institutions and teaches
military history at Dartmouth.
viii
Preface
Strategy is a many-sided word, connoting different things to different
people. The author of any work on strategy, therefore, owes it to his
reader to define at the outset his own conception of this ambiguous term.
For it is this conception that underlies the shape of his work and largely
determines what belongs to it and what does not, what emphasis will be
accorded certain subjects, and how they will be treated.
In the present volume, the author has viewed strategy broadly, including
within it not only the art of military command—the original meaning of
the term—but all those activities associated with the preparation for and
the conduct of war in the Pacific. Strictly speaking, this book is not about
military operations at all (though it includes operational strategy), for
these belong in the realm of tactics and are covered fully in the other
volumes of the Pacific subseries. It is focused rather on the exceedingly
complicated and difficult, if less dangerous, tasks that are necessary to bring
men with all that they need to the chosen field of battle at a given moment
of time. These may be less glamorous endeavors than those usually asso-
ciated with war, but they are as vital and were particularly important and
complex in the Pacific, often determining the outcome of battle.
Viewed thus, the arena of Pacific strategy is the council chamber rather
than the coral atoll; its weapons are not bombs and guns but the mountains
of memoranda, messages, studies, and plans that poured forth from the
deliberative bodies entrusted with the conduct of the war; its sound is not
the clash of arms but the cool voice of reason or the heated words of debate
thousands of miles from the scene of conflict. The setting for this volume,
therefore, is the war room; its substance, the plans for war and the statistics
of shipping and manpower. It deals with policy and grand strategy on the
highest level—war aims, the choice of allies and theaters of operations, the
distribution of forces and supplies, and the organization created to use them.
On only a slightly lower level, it deals with more strictly military matters—
with the choice of strategies, with planning and the selection of objectives,
with the timing of operations, the movement of forces and, finally, their
employment in battle.
Strategy in its larger sense is more than the handmaiden of war, it is an
inherent element of statecraft, akin to policy, and encompasses preparations
for war as well as the war itself. Thus, this volume treats the prewar period
in some detail, not in any sense as introductory to the main theme but as
ix
an integral and important part of the story of Pacific strategy. The great
lessons of war, it has been observed, are to be found in the events preceding
the outbreak of hostilities. It is then that the great decisions are made and
the nature of the war largely determined. Certainly this was the case in
World War II, and the years before Pearl Harbor are rich in lessons for
our own day.
The original design for the Pacific subseries of the UNITED STATES
ARMY IN WORLD WAR II envisaged a single volume on strategy cover-
ing the entire period of the war as well as the prewar period. But it subse-
quently became evident that it would be impossible to tell so large a story
in any meaningful way in so brief a span. An additional volume was there-
fore allocated to Pacific strategy. The terminal date for the present volume,
December 1943, was selected partly for reasons of length but also because
that date provided a logical dividing point in the story of Pacific strategy
for a variety of reasons. Other volumes will deal with the final year and a
half of the war, from December 1943 to August 1945.
Even so, it has been necessary to condense much of the story of Pacific
strategy and to omit some things that perhaps should have been included.
In each instance of this sort, the author has based his decision on the signifi-
cance of the subject and its relevance to the larger theme of the book. Thus,
the author emphasized the organization for planning on the higher levels,
at the expense of the organization of theater headquarters because it seemed
to him that the area of decision deserved the greater attention. Similarly,
he avoided a detailed account of theater organization for its own sake, since
a pro forma account would shed little light on the major problems of the
Pacific war. But when theater organization emerges as a major factor, as it
does in the account of joint command or Army-Navy relationships, it
receives considerable attention.
The temptation to deal in this book with the larger problems of global
strategy became at times almost irresistible. Constantly the author had to
remind himself that his subject was the Pacific war and that global strategy
was treated in full elsewhere in this series. He attempted, therefore, to
include only so much of the larger picture as was necessary to put the
Pacific into its proper perspective. The same is true of logistics and of
operations. UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II is a large
series with volumes on a great many subjects, many of them closely related
to one another and to this one. Thus, the author had constantly to skirt a
narrow path between those volumes dealing with the higher echelons of
the War Department and those dealing with operations in the theater.
When he trespassed, he did so because it seemed necessary for an under-
standing of the story of Pacific strategy; to do otherwise would have been a
disservice to the reader.
Every author who sets out to write a book incurs numerous obligations.
But none owes more than one whose book is part of a larger series and who
works within the framework of an organization in which many people eon-
tribute to the volume in the course of their daily work. This is such a book,
and the debts of the author to his colleagues and associates are heavy indeed,
even though he alone is responsible for interpretations made and conclu-
sions drawn in this volume as well as for any errors of omission or commis-
sion. The list of those whose assistance eased the author's task extends from
the Chiefs of Military History and the Chief Historians, past and present,
to the typists who deciphered penciled scribblings and the file clerks who
saved the author many valuable hours. Included in this long list are editors
and cartographers, librarians and archivists, participants in the events
described, and observers, supervisors, and subordinates. But the heaviest
debts are to my fellow historians in this adventure in co-operative history,
and especially to the authors of the other volumes in the Pacific subseries.
The references to their work, which appear so often on the pages that follow,
are only a partial acknowledgment of their contribution. Full acknowledg-
ment would have to include also the less tangible but equally important
benefits derived from close association and frequent conversation. For this
aid, the author owes much to his colleagues, civilian and military, but he
owes more perhaps to their encouragement and to the support and friend-
ship they gave so freely during the years it took to write this book.
Hanover, New Hampshire LOUIS MORTON

20 September 1960
xi
Contents
Introduction
Page
T H E PACIFIC WORLD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
T h e Ocean a n d I t s Islands . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
The Great Powers in the Pacific . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
PART ONE
The Road to War
Chapter
I. THE BEGINNINGS OF PACIFIC STRATEGY . . . . 21
Early Plans for Defense .................... 21
T h e ORANGE Plan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 4
RED and RED-ORANGE ................... 31
Strategic Dilemma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 3
II. JAPANESE POLICY AND STRATEGY, 1931-JULY 1941 . . . . . . 45
Japanese Expansion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 6
Economic a n d Military Preparations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 4
Japan Moves South . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 8
III. EUROPE VERSUS T H E PACIFIC . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
Strategic Adjustment, 1938-1940 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
T h e Critical Summer o f 1940 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
Shift to the Atlantic, September 1940-January 1941 . . . . . . . . 79
RAINBOW 5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
I V . T H E FATAL TURN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 2
T h e July Crisis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 2
America Faces t h e F a r East . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 6
The Plan for War ...................... 103
V . T H E DECISION F O R W A R . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . U S
Tojo Takes Over . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 1 3
The Progress of Negotiations ................. in
The Die Is Cast ....................... 121
Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124
xiii
PART TWO
The Defensive: Pearl Harbor to Midway
Chapter Page
VI. THE FIRST WEEKS OF WAR, 7-26 DECEMBER . . . . . . . . . 131
The Japanese Offensive: First Phase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131
Meeting the Emergency .................... 139
VII. T H E MALAY BARRIER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 5 4

Allied Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 5 4
T h e ABDACOM Interlude . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 6 6
VI
II.
T HEPHI
L I
P PI
N ES181
T h e Siege o f Bataan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 8 1
Strategy a n d Logistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 8 6
Command . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 193
IX. AUSTRALIA AND THE LINE OF COMMUNICATION ... 198

T h e Northeast Area . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 9 8
The Line of Communications ................. 204
T h e Japanese Threat . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 1 2
Pacific Build-up . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 1 7
X. THE U.S. AND JAPANESE HIGH COMMANDS . . . . . 225

T h e Washington Command Post . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 2 5
T h e Japanese High Command . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 3 4
X I . ORGANIZATION A N D COMMAND O F T H E PACIFIC . 2 4 0

The Problem of Responsibility ................. 240
The Southwest Pacific and Pacific Ocean Areas . . . . . . . . . . 244
T h e South Pacific Area . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 5 6
.
X
T
II
R A
N ST
I
O
I N
The Fall of the Philippines ................. 264
The Tokyo Raid ....................... 269
Coral Sea and Midway .................... 274
PART THREE
Seizing The Initiative
XIII. PLANNING T H E OFFENSIVE . . . . . . . . . . . 289

Early Plans . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .290
Strategy a n d Command . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 294
Compromise: T h e 2 July Directive . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 301
xiv
Chapter Page
XIV. PREPARATIONS A N D PROBLEMS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 305
Logistics and Strategy ..................... 305
T h e Pacific Versus Europe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 308
MacArthur Prepares . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 311
Final Preparations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 318
XV. CRISIS IN THE PACIFIC, AUGUST-NOVEMBER 1942 . . . . . 324

Emergency Measures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 325
T h e Debate Over Priorities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 333
T h e October Crisis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 340
The Shipping Crisis ..................... M5
T h e Crisis Ends . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 349
XVI. COMMAND A N D CO-OPERATION . . . . . . . . . . . . ... 352

Army-Navy Relations in the South Pacific . . . . . . . . . . . . 352
T h e Southwest a n d Central Pacific . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 357
Joint Staffs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 359
A Unified Command for the Pacific . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 361
XVII. JAPANESE AND AMERICAN PLANS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 364

T h e Japanese Regroup . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 364
Tasks Two and Three: The Indivisibility of Strategy and
Command . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 370
XVIII. T H E PACIFIC I N GRAND STRATEGY . . . . . . . . . . . . . 376

Strategic Concepts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 376
T h e Casablanca Conference . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 380
Strategy f o r 1943 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 385
XIX. MEANS A N D ENDS: T H E MARCH 1943 DIRECTIVE . 3 8 7

Theater Plans . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 8 7
T h e Pacific Military Conference . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 9 0
X X . CARTWHEEL A N D T H E I-GO OPERATION . . . . . . . . . . 4 0 0
T h e I-GO Operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 1 1
PART FOUR
Emerging Patterns
XXI. THE NORTH PACIFIC AND THE SOVIET UNION ... 419
Strategic Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 1 9
The Aleutians ........................ 421
Chapter Page
XXT
I
I
.H E R E V IV A L O F O R A N 4 .
G
..
3
..
..
4
..
.E
.
.....
T h e Central Pacific W a r . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 3 4
T h e Philippines i n Central Pacific Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 3 7
The Japanese ........................ 444
T h e Central Pacific i n Long-Range Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . 4 4 7
XXIII. CENTRAL PACIFIC TIMETABLE . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . 454
T h e TRIDENT Conference . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . 454
T h e Marshalls Plan . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . 460
Alternate Proposals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . 463
Gilberts-Nauru Plan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 468
XXIV. ORGANIZING FOR THE OFFENSIVE ......... .... 473

The Problem ........................ 473
Theater Organization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 8 1
T h e Joint Staff . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 9 0
XXV. OPERATIONS AND PLANS, SUMMER 1943 . . . . . . . . . . 502

CARTWHEEL Begins . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 0 2
Strategic Forecast, August 1943 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 1 2
XXVI. REVIEW A N D ADJUSTMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 2 1

Ships and Plans ....................... 521
Strategic Role of the North Pacific . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 527
CARTWHEEL and RENO ................. .533
XXVII. T H E JAPANESE REVISE THEIR STRATEGY . . . . . . . . . . 5 4 3

T h e N e w Operational Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 4 3
The Decision Is Made .................... 547
T h e N e w Strategy i n Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 5 0
XXVIII. THE EXECUTION OF STRATEGY: PACIFIC OPERATIONS,

AUGUST-DECEMBER 1943 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 5 9
New Georgia ........................ 559
Salamaua to Sio ....................... 563
T h e Gilbert Islands . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 6 7
CARTWHEEL Completed .............. 575
XXIX. PROSPECTS FOR THE FUTURE 584

T h e Pattern o f Pacific Warfare . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 8 5
T h e Prospects f o r Japan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 9 0
Long-Range Plans for the Defeat of Japan . . . . . . . . . . . . 592
Operations for 1944 ..................... 601
xvi
Appendix Page
A. DIRECTIVE TO THE SUPREME COMMANDER, ABDA AREA,
3 JANUARY 1942 (ABC-4/5) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 0 7
B. GENERAL OUTLINE OF POLICY OF FUTURE WAR GUID-

ANCE, ADOPTED BY LIAISON CONFERENCE, 7 MARCH
1942. AND REPORT OF PRIME MINISTER AND CHIEFS
O F STAFF T O EMPEROR, 1 3 MARCH 1942 . . . . . . . . 611
C. DIRECTIVE TO THE SUPREME COMMANDER IN THE

SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA, 30 MARCH 1942 (CGS
57/1) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 1 4
D. DIRECTIVE TO THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF OF THE

PACIFIC OCEAN AREA, 30 MARCH 1942 (CGS 57/1) ... 617
E. JOINT DIRECTIVE FOR OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS IN THE
SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA AGREED UPON BY THE
UNITED STATES CHIEFS OF STAFF, 2 JULY 1942 . . 619
F. LETTER OF INSTRUCTIONS To MAJ. GEN. MILLARD F.
HARMON, COMMANDING GENERAL, U.S. ARMY
FORCES IN THE SOUTH PACIFIC, 7 JULY 1942 . . . . . . 621
G. JAPANESE ARMY-NAVY CENTRAL AGREEMENT CONCERN-

ING SOUTH PACIFIC AREA OPERATIONS, WITH SUP-
PLEMENT, 4 JANUARY 1943 . 6 2
H. CONDUCT OF THE WAR IN THE PACIFIC THEATER IN

1943, MEMORANDUM BY U.S. JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF,
2 2 JANUARY 1943 (CGS 168) . . . . . . . . . . . 627
I. THE ELKTON PLAN FOR THE SEIZURE AND OCCUPATION

OF THE NEW BRITAIN-NEW IRELAND-NEW GUINEA
AREA, PREPARED BY GHQ, SWPA, 28 FEBRUARY 1943 630
J. JAPANESE ARMY-NAVY CENTRAL AGREEMENT ON SOUTH-

EAST AREA OPERATIONS, WITH SUPPLEMENT, 15
MARCH 1943 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 3 6
K. JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF DIRECTIVE: OFFENSIVE OPERA-

TIONS IN THE SOUTH AND SOUTHWEST PACIFIC
AREAS DURING 1943, 28 MARCH 1943 (JCS 238/5/D) . . 641
xvii
Appendix Page
L. JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF DIRECTIVE: UNIFIED COMMAND
FOR U.S. JOINT OPERATIONS, 20 APRIL 1943 (JCS
263/2/D) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 4 2
M. JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF MEMORANDUM: STRATEGIC

PLAN FOR THE DEFEAT OF JAPAN, APPROVED BY
THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF, 19 MAY 1943 (JCS
287/1 A N D C C S 220) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 4 4
N. EXTRACT FROM THE FINAL REPORT OF THE COMBINED

CHIEFS OF STAFF TO THE PRESIDENT AND PRIME
MINISTER AT THE TRIDENT CONFERENCE, AP-
PROVED 25 MAY 1943 (CCS 242/6) . . . . . . . . . . . . .648
O. EXTRACT FROM THE FINAL REPORT OF THE COMBINED
CHIEFS OF STAFF TO THE PRESIDENT AND PRIME
MINISTER AT THE QUADRANT CONFERENCE, 24
AUGUST 1943 (CCS 319/5) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 5 0
P. APPOINTMENT OF LT. GEN. ROBERT C. RICHARDSON, JR.,

AS COMMANDING GENERAL, U.S. ARMY FORCES, CEN-
TRAL PACIFIC AREA, 16 AUGUST 1943 . . . . . . . . 654
Q. JAPANESE GENERAL OUTLINE OF THE FUTURE WAR

DIRECTION POLICY, ADOPTED AT THE IMPERIAL
CONFERENCE, 3 0 SEPTEMBER 1943 . . . . . . . . . . . 6 5 5
R. JAPANESE ARMY-NAVY CENTRAL AGREEMENT CONCERN-

ING THE CENTRAL AND SOUTH PACIFIC OPERA-
TIONS, WITH SUPPLEMENT, 30 SEPTEMBER 1943 657
S. SUMMARY OF RENO III, OUTLINE PLAN FOR OPERATIONS

OF THE SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA To REOCCUPY
THE SOUTHERN PHILIPPINES, PREPARED BY GHQ,
SWPA, 20 OCTOBER 1943 ................ . . 661
T. OVERALL PLAN FOR THE DEFEAT OF JAPAN: REPORT

BY THE COMBINED STAFF PLANNERS, APPROVED IN
PRINCIPLE, 2 DECEMBER 1943 (CCS 417) 668
U. SPECIFIC OPERATIONS FOR THE DEFEAT OF JAPAN, 1944,

3 DECEMBER 1943 (CCS 397 REV), MEMORANDUM BY
THE U.S. CHIEFS OF STAFF 673
xviii
Appendix Page
V. "ELKTON" III, GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, SOUTHWEST
PACIFIC AREA, 2 6 APRIL 1943 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 7 5
W. RENO III, HISTORICAL RECORD INDEX CARD, GHQ SWPA,

2 0 OCTOBER 1943 . . . . . . . . 6 8 6
GUIDE T O FOOTNOTES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 9 3
THESOURCES.
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
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6 97
BASIC MILITARY M A P SYMBOLS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 1 6
INDEX . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 2 1
Tables
No. Page
1. Japanese Military Budget, 1931-1940 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
2. Japanese Army Ground and Air Forces and Navy Air Forces, 1937-1941 ... 57
3. Major Army Combat Forces for the Pacific, Present and Projected,
April-May 1942 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 1 3
4. Army Strength in the Pacific, April 1942 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 224
5. Timetable of Pacific Operations, August 1943 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 1 6
6. Strength, U.S. Forces in the Pacific, 31 December 1943 . . . . . . . . . . . 538
7. Major U.S. Combat Forces in the Pacific, 31 December 1943 . . . . . . . . . 539
8. Major U.S. Combat and Air Forces in Pacific and European Areas,
3 1 December 1943 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 4 0
9. Japanese Shipping Losses, 7 December 1941—20 September 1943 . . . . . . . 546
10. Japanese Army Reinforcements, Central Pacific, September 1943—January
1944 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 5 4
11. Army (and AAF) Battle Casualties, Pacific Areas, December 1941-
December 1943 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 8 5
12. Battle Casualties, Navy and Marine Corps, December 1941—December 1943 . . . 586
13. Specific Operations for the Defeat of Japan, 1944 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 604
Charts
1. Disposition of Major Japanese Forces for War, December 1941 . . . . . . 110
2. Organization o f ABDACOM, January-February 1942 . . . . . . . . . . 1 6 9
3. The Washington High Command and the Pacific Theaters, December 1942 . . . 232
4. T h e Japanese High Command . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .238
xix
No. Page
5. Command Organization in the Pacific, July 1942 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 254
6. Organization of Japanese Forces, Solomons-New Guinea Area, January
1943 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 6 6
7. Command Organization, South Pacific Forces, August 1943 . . . . . . . . . 404

8. Organization for Administration and Supply, U.S. Army Forces, South
Pacific Area, July 1943 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 0 5
9. Organization of South Pacific Air Forces, Solomon Islands, July 1943 . . . . . 406
10. Command Organization, Southwest Pacific Area, July 1943 . . . . . . . . . 409
11. Organization for Administration and Supply, U.S. Army Forces, South-
west Pacific Area, July 1943 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 1 0
12. Organization of Japanese Forces, Southeast Area, July 1943 . . . . . . . . . 414
13. Command Organization, Pacific Ocean Areas, October 1943 . . . . . . . . . 483
14. Organization for Administration and Supply, U.S. Army Forces, Central
Pacific Area, December 1943 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 488
15. Headquarters Organization, CINCPOA-CINCPAC FLEET, October 1943 ... 497
16. Organization of Japanese Forces in Pacific and Southeast Asia, November
1943 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 5 6
Maps
1. The Japanese Plan for War, December 1941 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
2. T h e ABDACOM Area, January-February 1942 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 6 2
3. The South Pacific Line of Communications to Australia, 1942 . . . . . . . . 206
4. The Japanese Advance Into the Solomons—New Guinea Area, January-
Jul y 1942 ........................... 291
5. The Battle Area, August 1942 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 314
6. T h e North Pacific . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 422
7. T h e Central Pacific . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 435
8. New Georgia Operations, 21 June-5 July 1943 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 506
9. Japan's National Defense Zone, Southeast Area . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 548
10. South Pacific Operations, June—November 1943 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 561
11. Southwest Pacific Operations, September 1943-February 1944 . . . . . . . . 567
12.Maki
nAt
o l
l .
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
...
.568
1 3 . Tarawa Atoll . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 7 0
14. Progress and Prospects, 31 December 1943 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 588
Maps I-III are in inverse order inside back cover

I. The Japanese Offensive, December 1941-May 1942
II. The Pacific and Adjacent Theaters, April 1942
III. The CARTWHEEL Operations
xx
Illustrations
Page
Fujiyama . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
O n Board t h e Powhatan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
View From Manila B a y . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
Washington Conference, 1921-22 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
General Douglas MacArthur . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
Brig. Gen. Stanley D . Embick . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 0
Japanese Cabinet, March 1936 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 9
Japanese Troops Marching Through the Peiping Gate . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
Konoye Cabinet o f June 1937 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 3
General George G . Marshall . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
Admiral Harold R . Stark . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
Brig. Gen. George V. Strong . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
General Teiichi Suzuki . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
Admiral Osami Nagano . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
L t . Gen. Walter C . Short . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
Admiral Husband E . Kimmel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 0 3
Japanese Mock-up of Ford Island and Battleship Row . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
General Hideki Tojo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 1 6
Japanese Signs Proclaiming Economy Drive . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 1 7
Joint Board Meeting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 2 0
Kurusu a n d Nomura . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 2 5
" B a n z a i! ". ... ............................1 3 4
Pearl Harbor, 7 December 1941 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135
President Franklin D . Roosevelt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142
Admiral Ernest J . King . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145
L t . Gen. Delos C . Emmons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145
Admiral Chester W . Nimitz . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 4 5
Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149
L t . Gen. H . t e r Poorten . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 6 7
A B D A C o m m a n d .
.....
....
....
....
....
... .
.
.170
Vice Adm. Conrad E. L. Helfrich and Admiral Thomas C. Hart . . . . . . . . . 173
L t . Gen. Masaharu Homma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 8 3
General MacArthur With Brig. Gen. Patrick J. Hurley . . . . . . . . . . . . . 196
Brig. Gen. Alexander M . Patch, J r . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 1 0
Forward Echelon o f t h e 41st Division . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 1 1
Joint Chiefs of Staff ......................... 228
General MacArthur a n d Admiral Nimitz . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 4 9
Vice Adm. Herbert F . Leary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 5 3
Rear Adm. Robert L . Ghormley . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 5 8
Rear Adm. John R . McCain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 258
Rear Adm. Aubrey W . Fitch . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 5 9
Rear Adm. Richmond K. Turner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 259
xxi
Page
Lt. Gen. Jonathan M. Wainwright . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 268

Lt. Col. James H. Doolittle and Capt. Marc A. Mitscher . . . . . . . . . . . . 271
Explosion o n t h e Lexington . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 277
Battle o f Midway . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 285
Training o n Australian Beaches . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 293
Brig. Gen. Thomas T. Handy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 298
Rear Adm. Charles M. Cooke, Jr. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 299
General MacArthur and Maj. Gen. George C. Kenney . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1 2
Maj. Gen. Robert L. Eichelberger and General Sir Thomas Blarney . . . . . . . . 312
A-20 Skip-Bombing a n Enemy Freighter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 320
B-17 Over t h e Solomons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 321
NewP-
3 8s
' atNoumea.
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
.332
L t . Gen. Henry H . Arnold . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 3 8
Admiral Nimitz at Noumea ........................ 339
Ships at Noumea ............................. 346
Damaged Supplies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 5 5
Henderson Field . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 5 6
Admiral William F. Halsey, Jr., and Maj. Gen. Millard F. Harmon . . . . . . . 357
L t . Gen. Hatazo Adachi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 6 8
L t . Gen. Haruyoshi Hyakutake . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 6 8
Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 6 9
L t . Gen. Hitoshi Imamura . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 6 9
Plenary Session a t Casablanca . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 8 4
Conference a t ALAMO Headquarters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 0 7
L t . Gen. John L . Dewitt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2 8
Rear Adm. Thomas C . Kincaid . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2 9
Planning the Kiska Operation ....................... 432
Vice Adm. Raymond A. Spruance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 484
Lt. Gen. Robert C. Richardson, Jr. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 484
Maj. Gen. Holland M . Smith . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 8 5
Rear Adm. John H . Hoover . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 8 5
Maj. Gen. Willis H . Hale . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 8 9
Fijian Commandos . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 0 4
Rendova Commanders . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 0 8
Rendova Landing Forces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 0 8
Munda Airfield . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 1 2
O n N e w Georgia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 1 3
American Strategic Planners a t QUADRANT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 1 8
The Combined Chiefs of Staff at Quebec . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 519
Vice Adm. Jinichi Kusaka . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 5 1
Australian Troops Go Ashore Near Lae . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 564
Airborne Operations at Nadzab ....................... 565
LVT's at Tarawa ........................... 572
Landing Craft Moving in on Butaritari Island . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 574
xxii
Page
Admiral Halsey with Maj. Gen. Robert S. Beightler and Maj. Gen. Roy S.
Geiger . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 578
Maj. Gen. Oscar W. Griswold and General Harmon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 579
Supply Road o n Bougainville . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 580
Cairo Conference . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 594
Tehran Conference . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 595
General Marshall at Southwest Pacific Headquarters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 603
Illustrations are from the following sources:

National Archives: pages 49, 52, 53, 117, 142, 196, 428.
Captured Japanese films: pages 95, 96, 116, 183, 268, 369, 551.
Life photograph taken by McAvoy: page 125. © Thomas McAvoy/Timepix (2002)
The Netherlands Department of Defense: pages 167, 170, 173.
Australian War Memorial: page 368.
All other photographs are from Department of Defense files.
xxiii
INTRODUCTION
THE PACIFIC WORLD
The theater of war is the province of strategy.

SIR EDWARD BRUCE HAMLEY
The Mediterranean is the ocean of the past, the Atlantic, the ocean of the
present, and the Pacific, the ocean of the future.
JOHN HAY
INTRODUCTION
The Pacific World

Much that has been written about the teaus, parched treeless plains, and live
Pacific area is a mixture of romanticism volcanoes throwing up new islands and
and exaggeration. But for those who destroying old ones.
seek an understanding of the Pacific as a Racially and culturally the Pacific
theater of war, a knowledge of the ocean, world is a bewildering patchwork woven
its islands, its peoples, and its history is a out of millenia of isolation and migra-
prerequisite. It was these factors which tion, when small bands of black and
in large measure determined where and brown men, the "Vikings of the Sunrise,"
how the war would be fought, shaped pushed their way eastward in fragile
strategy, complicated logistics, and con- canoes across the whole wide Pacific to
ditioned tactics. Before his return jour- populate its far-flung islands. The white
ney came to an end under the Golden explorers, when they ventured into these
Gate Bridge, the World War II soldier waters centuries later, found there an
who had fought his way across the Pacific astonishing variety of peoples and cul-
had seen many strange sights and heard tures. In the mountainous interior of
stranger tales. Nowhere did the grim New Guinea, in the Indies, and in the
reality of life in the Pacific correspond Philippines, were the dark, woolly haired,
with the idyllic existence pictured in pygmy Negritos, who, like the aborigine
romantic literature. of Australia, existed in almost neolithic
The Pacific Ocean is the world of Mel- state, traveling naked in migrant bands
ville and Maugham, of white whales and and living on roots, grubs, reptiles, and
long-extinct animals and birds, of Lilli- game; in Papua the fuzzy-haired natives
put and Brobdingnag, and of the long- lived much like the Negrito but had a
sought continent of the South Seas, Terra primitive political and social organiza-
Australis Incognita. In its vast reaches tion in which prestige often depended
lie countless islands ranging in size from upon the number of heads a man could
the tiniest coral outcroppings, so low they collect; in the Solomons, the Fijis, and
barely break the rays of the setting sun, New Guinea, were the dark-skinned
to continental Australia, three million Melanesians, fierce fighters who carved
square miles in extent. It has every kind intricate and grotesque patterns in wood,
of clime from sweltering heat to polar ate human flesh, and were as addicted to
cold, and a startling variety of physical exclusive men's clubs and secret societies
settings—steaming and noisome jungles, as the American of today; and in the lush,
foggy, frozen, wind-swept islands, deserts, beautiful islands of the eastern Pacific,
palm-covered coral atolls, grassland pla- where the Europeans came first, dwelt
4 STRATEGY AND COMMAND: THE FIRST TWO YEARS
the tall, gold-skinned Polynesian who, the powers. Henceforth, they could gain
with more time for leisure in a land additional land there only at each other's
where food abounded, created complex expense. The islands of the Pacific had
mythological and religious rites, and de- become pawns in the great game of inter-
veloped intricate social patterns. national rivalry and their fate rested on
In the wake of the European explorers the moves dictated in the great capitals
came the treasure seeker and trader, the of the world.
scientist and map maker, the whaler and Even in the twentieth century the
planter, the beachcomber and missionary. Pacific world has lived up to its reputa-
They were of all nationalities—Portu- tion for vastness and variety. The first
guese, Spanish, Dutch, English, French, World War and the subsequent reshuf-
American, German, and Japanese—and fling of control under the mandate system
they brought with them the doubtful passed almost unnoticed by the islanders,
blessings of a superior technology and who, like the natives of Rabaul, were only
civilization. Some exploited the native bewildered by pronouncement "No more
mercilessly, cheated and robbed him, 'um Kaiser; God save 'um King." But
others altered and destroyed his institu- the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor
tions, pushed him off the land, took away opened a war which was fought all the
his few possessions and enslaved him. In way from Hawaii and Australia to Japan
the interests of progress, they converted and the coast of Asia. It was a war waged
islands into pastures, plantations, and in all the elements. Large fleets ranged
mines; ceremonial halls into school- the vast ocean searching for the enemy,
houses; and, with firearms, gin, andaircraft flew hundreds and thousands of
white man's diseases, depopulated large miles over water to drop their bombs,
areas and annihilated whole tribes. submarines hunted secretly in the lanes
When the less savory aspects of this of empire for their prey, and troops
era of "discovery" and exploitation could fought desperately for islands with
no longer be ignored, the great powers strange and unpronounceable names.
stepped in to stem lawlessness and con- Solomon Islanders helped carve airstrips
trol trade. National prestige and power out of jungle, Fijian and Tongan scouts
and the acquisition of strategic bases be- performed heroic feats behind the Jap-
came the touchstones of policy; colonial anese lines on Bougainville, Papuans
administrators and naval officers the sym- carried supplies over the Owen Stanley
bol of the new authority. Under official Range to the troops in New Guinea, and
sponsorship the annexation of the islands, Filipino guerrillas met MacArthur on
begun almost four hundred years earlier the beaches at Leyte. Volcanic wastes
with Magellan's great voyage, went for- and coral atolls rising in a lonely ocean
ward so rapidly that by the end of the were scrutinized from the air and sea and
nineteenth century all of the Pacific charted with all the meticulous care of
world, "every exposed volcanic crust and modern science. Islands where few white
coral outcrop,"1 had been divided among men had ever been were the subject of
serious and lengthy debate at the council
1
Douglas L. Oliver, The Pacific Islands (Cam- tables in Washington and London before
bridge: Harvard University Press, 1952), p. 253. they became major battlegrounds of the
THE PACIFIC WORLD 5
war and then, overnight, great bases on imagine yourself on Mars, observing the
the road to Japan. planet Earth through a telescope more
The war came to an end with the loud- powerful than any yet built. From this
est man-made explosion the world had vantage point, the most prominent fea-
yet heard. It was in the Pacific—last to ture on the globe before you, dwarfing
be settled by primitive man, last to be the mountains and the continents, is the
divided among the colonial powers, and Pacific Ocean. But to the earth-bound,
last to witness the terrible ferocity and who see their planet most often in Mer-
devastation of modern war — that the cator projection on a flat map, the great
atom age opened. The Pacific world, the ocean shrinks in size and takes on distor-
home of the head hunter, had, by the tions which seriously limit an apprecia-
middle of the twentieth century, become tion of its actual dimensions. By showing
the proving ground of the H-bomb. meridians of longitude as parallel—actu-
ally they converge at the poles—and
The Ocean and Its Islands by increasing the spread between the
parallels of latitude in proportion to their
The Pacific is the biggest and the deep- distance from the equator, the Mercator
est body of water on the earth. With a projection produces a double distortion
total area of 68,634,000 square miles, it which has the effect of blowing up the
is twice as large as the Atlantic and covers size of the areas to the north and south.
more than one-third of the surface of the Thus, Greenland appears larger than the
entire globe. Measured along the equator continental United States on a map
it is about 10,000 miles wide, but its drawn to Mercator projection, whereas
greatest width, 12,500 miles, is between it is actually less than one-third the size.
Panama and Malaya where it extends Conversely, New Guinea, which lies just
half the distance around the earth. From below the equator, appears on a flat map
Bering Strait on the north, where the to be only as large as New Zealand, 2,000
ocean is only 56 miles wide and 300 feet miles to the south, but its total area is
deep, to the Antarctic Circle, the Pacific actually three times greater and its 1,300-
measures 9,300 miles.2 So vast is its extent mile length would reach almost halfway
that if a giant bulldozer scraped off all across the United States.
the land on the surface of the earth to Though practically all the islands of
sea level and dumped it into the ocean, the Pacific were formed by violent up-
the Pacific would still have an average heavals of the earth's crust and volcanic
depth of two miles. activity and consist essentially of hard-
The best way to get a true picture of ened lava, their origin is often masked
the immensity of the Pacific world is to by a coating of coral rock, the remains
2
Unless otherwise indicated, this section is based of once-living plants and animals. The
upon O. W. Freeman, ed., Geography of the Pacific most familiar of these is the coral polyp,
(New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1951), pp. 1-34; Fair-
field Osborn, ed., The Pacific World (New York: a tiny marine animal that builds its own
W. W. Norton & Co., 1944), pp. 21-42; Don Leet, shell by extracting lime from sea water,
Causes of Catastrophe (New York and London: thus providing the aviation engineers of
McGraw-Hill, 1948), pp. 150-53, 189; R. W. Robson,
The Pacific Islands Handbook (New York: The Mac-
World War II with the base for many
millan Company, 1946). of their airfields.
The coral polyp creates not only islands the islands, whatever the basis chosen,
but atolls and reefs as well. The atoll, must of necessity be a compromise. But
so characteristic of the eastern Pacific, since it is necessary, for convenience of
consists of a chain of coral-encrusted description, to adopt some system, per-
islets, usually roughly circular or horse- haps the most suitable would be that
shoe-shaped in formation and enclosing a which was most familiar to the soldier of
shallow lagoon; the reefs—in this case, World War II, the division of the Pacific
fringing reefs—are platforms built upon world into five groups—Australia, Indo-
the shoulders of volcanic peaks and ex- nesia, Micronesia, Melanesia, and Poly-
tending between the shore and deep nesia.
water. Reefs which are separated from Before examining this grouping more
the shore by a stretch of open water are closely, it would be well to understand
called barrier reefs, and the largest of clearly the meaning of certain geographic
these, the 1,200-mile-long Great Barrier terms-frequently used in connection with
Reef off the northeast coast of Australia, the Pacific world. One of these is the
is probably the greatest monument left South Seas. As used by its originator, the
by the tiny polyp. Spanish explorer Balboa who first sighted
The coral atoll with its many islets the Pacific from his well-publicized peak
and reefs is actually the visible portion in Darien, it referred to the waters off
of a single land mass resting on a sub- Panama, then to the trade routes followed
terranean mountain. It is a haven in a by the Spanish galleons. More recently,
wilderness of ocean that forever rolls high it has been used loosely to refer to that
to boil whitely against the fringing reefs. portion of the ocean south of the equator.
In the lagoon, where the waters are blue Oceania is another term that is loosely
and calm and where fish abound, lie safety used. Generally it is taken to mean all
and sustenance. Troops stationed on a the islands of the Pacific but some author-
coral atoll during the war admired its ities exclude Australia and the Indies,
beaches of dazzling sand where thousands and others reserve the term for the
of birds nest, and its rows of graceful French possessions in the southeast Pa-
palm trees whose fruit is the lifeblood cific. There is no disagreement, however,
of the atoll. And everywhere they saw about the international date line where
coral, shaped and colored in infinite one moves mysteriously from one day to
variety, and incomparably beautiful. another and which rarely failed to con-
It is the coral atoll that has become fuse the soldiers who sailed across it. It
for many the typical South Sea island. is the line which, except for zigzags to
Actually there is no typical Pacific island. place politically related areas in the same
Some are made of the same stuff as conti- time zone, coincides with the 180th me-
nents, some of volcanic rock, and some of ridian. When it is Sunday to the east of
coral. In climate, size, height, and shape; the line, it is Monday to the west.
in distribution of plant and animal life; Of the five regions of the Pacific,
in population, culture, and political affili- Australia is the smallest in terms of ocean
ation, they vary so widely as to defy any area covered, but the largest in terms of
simple classification. Any grouping of land mass. About 7,000 statute miles of
THE PACIFIC WORLD 7
ocean separate it from San Francisco and New Guinea, lie the Moluccas or Spice
and 8,000 from the Panama Canal, and, Islands. The entire archipelago, from the
whether one travels east or west, London tip of Sumatra on the west to the Moluccas
is 12,000 miles distant. These facts alone on the east, is almost 3,000 miles long, and
explain why for centuries Australia, from Borneo to Bali, about 1,000 miles
closer to but ignored by Asiatic countries, wide. To the south is the Indian Ocean
was for Europeans and Americans an and to the north the Pacific Ocean and the
isolated continent. South China Sea, that vital water route to
The area of Australia is approximately the ports of Asia and Japan. Thus, lying
the same as that of the continental between two continents and two oceans,
United States, but most of it is flat and Indonesia is the key to the control of the
much of the western and central region is lines of communication in one of the most
a desert. The coast line is regular—no strategic areas in the world.
continent has a more compact or smooth- Few regions of the world are so rich
er form—with few large natural harbors. in resources, have so even and compara-
The climate varies from tropical to tem- tively pleasant a climate, and so much
perate, and, since it lies entirely in the natural beauty and variety as Indonesia.
southern hemisphere, its seasons are the The islands have mountainous spines
reverse of those in the United States. The skirted by extensive plains of great fer-
most favorable year-round temperature is tility, and a variety of plant and animal
in the east and south, and it is there that life equaled nowhere on earth. Gold, silk,
the Europeans first settled, where indus- spices, tea, and precious stones attracted
try and agriculture flourish, and where adventurers and merchants from India
American troops were first stationed dur- and China to Indonesia centuries before
ing the war. the Portuguese and the Dutch ventured
Second of the major divisions of the there in search of the luxuries of the
Pacific world is Indonesia, the world's Orient. Since then it has become one of
largest archipelago and the treasure house the chief sources of the world's supply
of the Pacific.3 of rubber and quinine, kapok, pepper,
The islands of Indonesia are divided and tea. It is one of the few places in
into three groups. The largest and most the Far East where petroleum is found
important of these, and the one that con- and its mineral resources are enormous.
tains the bulk of the land in the archipela- Little wonder that the islands of Indo-
go, is the Greatest Sunda group, which nesia have been coveted by the nations
includes Sumatra, Java, Borneo, and the of Europe and Asia since earliest times.
Celebes. Extending eastward from Java to- North of Indonesia, fringing the coast
ward Australia is a double chain of smaller of Asia, are several large groups of islands
islands known as the Lesser Sunda group which some geographers consider, with
in which lie Timor and the famed island of Indonesia, as part of the Asiatic land
Bali. To the north, between the Celebes mass. To the American troops the best
3 known of these were the Philippines.
Indonesia as a geographical and cultural unit is
not to be confused with the political entity, the Comprising almost 7,100 islands, only
recently established Republic of Indonesia. one-third of them named, and extending
FUJIYAMA, sacred mountain of Japan, dominates the Tokyo Bay area. (Photo taken in 1945
with American warships in the harbor.)
for 1, 150 miles from Borneo to Formosa, by the Dutch and the Japanese, Formosa
the Philippine archipelago is strategically has been largely under the control of the
situated in the geographic heart of the Far Chinese, who named the land Taiwan,
East, athwart the trade routes between or terrace bay, for its giant green terrace-
Japan and China to the north and Indo- like cliffs. The island has an area of 13,887
nesia and southeast Asia to the south. square miles, almost twice that of the state
Only eleven of the islands have an area of Maryland. About a hundred miles to
greater than 1,000 square miles and two the west, across Formosa Strait, lies the
of these, Luzon and Mindanao, together southeast coast of China, and Hong Kong
comprise more than two-thirds of the is only 360 miles away.
115,600 square miles of land in the archi- The Ryukyu Islands, scene of one of
pelago. the last great battles of World War II,
Between the Philippines and Japan, separate the East China Sea from the
forming a series of stepping stones north- Pacific Ocean and extend in a wide arc
ward, are Formosa and the Ryukyus. from Formosa to Japan. In ancient times
Named by Portuguese navigators the the land was ruled by native dynasties,
"Beautiful Island" and occupied briefly but after the fourteenth century the is-
THE PACIFIC WORLD 9
ON BOARD THE POWHATAN. Commodore Perry entertains the Japanese Commissioners in

July 1854.
lands paid tribute to China and then, 20 percent of the land is arable. Most of
in the twentieth century, to the Japa- Japan's people live on the plains, the most
nese, who finally took over control of the notable of which is the Kanto Plain,
country. which includes Tokyo and has a popula-
The Japanese archipelago consists of tion density of 750 to 900 persons to the
four main islands, Hokkaido, Honshu, square mile. It is on these plains that
Shikoku, and Kyushu, and hundreds of the rice, barley, and millet needed to
smaller islands which extend in a 1,250- feed the people is grown and so intensive
mile-long arc off the coast of Asia. The is the system of cultivation that as many
total land area of the archipelago is about as four crops are produced in a year.
the same as that of the state of Montana, Fishing boats swarm over the waters
147,000 square miles, over half of which around Japan and provide that other
is accounted for by Honshu, the so-called staple of the Japanese diet. Meat, milk,
Japanese mainland and site of the capital and dairy products are scarce and little
and chief cities. The structure of the used in Japan, and cheese is so little liked
islands is volcanic and mountainous, but that it is said even the Japanese rats will
there are few mineral resources and only not eat it.
The Japanese islands are the only ones 3,000 feet. Farthest north and closest to
in the Pacific that have retained their the Bonins, scene of the bloody battle for
independence and integrity since earliest Iwo Jima, are the Mariana Islands, rest-
times. According to legend, Japan was ing on the edge of a vast submerged
founded by the goddess of the sun and its mountain chain jutting deeply into
rulers are her direct descendants. Before Micronesia. It is on the southern ex-
the middle of the sixteenth century the tremity of this group that Guam, the
islands had a loosely organized feudal largest island of Micronesia and an im-
government headed by a shogun, or mili- portant American base in World War
tary leader, and virtually independent II, is located. Westernmost of the Micro-
lords. After a period of internal conflict nesian islands and about 500 miles off
in the sixteenth century, the country the coast of Mindanao are the Palaus
came under new rulers who reformed the where soldiers and marines also fought
government and followed a policy of during the war. From here the islands
complete isolation from the rest of the stretch eastward, south of the Marianas,
world. It was not until Admiral Perry's for about 2,000 miles through the mys-
visit in 1853 that Japan entered the terious Caroline Islands, where lie Yap
community of nations, began to adopt and Truk. Along the eastern border of
western customs and techniques, and Micronesia, roughly parallel to the date
embarked on a policy of expansion. line, are two other island groups: the
Eastward across the Pacific, the direc- Marshall Islands, to which belong Bikini
tion taken by the successive waves of and Eniwetok, and the Gilbert Islands,
migration from Asia, lie the three re- where lie Makin and Tarawa, the scenes
maining major divisions of the Pacific of important battles in the war against
world: Micronesia and Melanesia, lying Japan.
side by side along the equator, and Poly- The importance of the tiny islands of
nesia, whose islands fall within a vast Micronesia is far out of proportion to
triangle extending from Hawaii to Easter their size. For the prehistoric settlers
Island to New Zealand. These names, so from Asia they provided malaria-free
deceptively alike, include areas of wide homes and, for those who followed later,
variation in climate and physical en- stopping places on the voyage farther
vironment, and a great diversity in racial eastward. Since Magellan's time they
and cultural patterns. have been a vital link in Pacific trade
The islands of Micronesia (meaning and communication, and a source of
tiny islands in Greek) lie north of the critical materials such as phosphate and
equator, between the Philippines and bauxite. Guam served the Spanish gal-
the date line, an ocean area larger than leons, and, 300 years later, the U.S. Navy
the continental United States. The and Pan-American aircraft. Truk, once
amount of land in this huge expanse of a Spanish and then a German possession,
ocean, however, totals only 1,260 square became later the nerve center for the
miles, about as much as Rhode Island. Japanese Imperial Navy in the central
Most of this land consists of low coral Pacific. Today, naval bases, airports, and
atolls, but many of the islands are vol- cable and weather stations are scattered
canic in structure with peaks as high as throughout the area and it is here that
THE PACIFIC WORLD 11
the latest models of the atom and hydro- them great strategic importance.
gen bombs have been tested. The eastern portion of Melanesia con-
South of Micronesia, parallel and al- sists of six major groups of islands: the
most equal to it in extent, is Melanesia, Solomons, Santa Cruz, New Hebrides,
the black islands, so named for the com- New Caledonia, Loyalty, and Fiji. The
plexion of its people. The islands of Solomon Islands, which stretch in a
Melanesia form a broad-curving arc that double northwest-southeast chain for 7oo
stretches east and south from Indonesia miles to the east of New Guinea, include
to the date line. Though these islands seven major and many small islands,
have certain characteristics in common whose names sound the roll of notable
—climate, location, and structure—they American battles: Guadalcanal, Tulagi,
represent the widest diversity of cultur- New Georgia, Vella Lavella, and Bou-
al and racial patterns in the Pacific gainville. With their damp, hot climate,
and are grouped together only because it malarial mosquito, and well-nigh im-
would be more confusing to group them penetrable jungle they constitute one of
separately. the most forbidding areas on earth.
Melanesia is probably the poorest Southeast of the Solomons lie the New
place in the world to live, to work, or to Hebrides, and below them, New Cale-
fight, a verdict with which all soldiers donia. To the east and forming the
unlucky enough to be stationed there eastern limit of Melanesia are the Fiji
heartily agreed. For convenience, it may Islands, whose remarkably well-built na-
be divided into a western and an eastern tives were once the most famous canni-
area. The first includes dragon-shaped bals of the South Seas.
New Guinea, second largest island in the Last and largest of the regions of
world and almost continental in the Oceania and the most homogeneous of
variety of its climate, structure, and plant its cultural and racial groupings, is
and animal life; the islands of the Bis- Polynesia. It extends from New Zealand,
marck Archipelago, New Ireland, and far to the south and 1,200 miles east of
New Britain with its magnificent natural Australia, to lonely Easter Island, out-
harbor at Rabaul; and, guarding the post of Polynesia and home of an ancient
northern approaches to the Bismarck and still unknown civilization, a distance
Archipelago, the Admiralty Islands. To- of 4,000 miles. And from Easter to Mid-
gether, these islands comprise one of the way and Kure, northernmost of the
most backward and least-known regions Hawaiian chain, is almost 1,000 miles
of the world, peopled largely by the prim- more. In this vast ocean area, four times
itive black, fuzzy-haired Papuans, and a larger than the continental United States,
strange variety of bird life—the ostrich- are scattered innumerable bits of land
like cassowary, the brilliantly hued but whose total area, exclusive of New Zea-
raucous bird of paradise, and the snow- land, is no larger than the state of Ver-
white cockatoo. But their shore lines mont.
contain anchorages large enough to ac- The southern apex of Polynesia con-
commodate the combined fleets of the sists of two large mountainous islands
world, and their position adjacent to and their outlying clusters of land known
Indonesia and north of Australia gives collectively as New Zealand. The islands,
which became a rest area for American the north extend in an east-west direction
troops during the war, measure about for about 300 miles. Western Samoa,
1,000 miles from north to south and which includes the two largest islands, is
extend from the subtropical to the sub- under the control of New Zealand, and
arctic regions with seasons comparable the eastern portion, including Tutuila
to but reversed from those in the United with its splendid harbor of Pago Pago,
States. is American and was administered by
Northernmost of the Polynesian is- the U.S. Navy until 1951.
lands is the Hawaiian chain and the French Oceania is comprised of seven
island outposts nearby. The chain ex- separate groups of islands, the most im-
tends for almost 2,000 miles in a north- portant of which are the Marquesas,
west-southeast direction. Located 2,100 Society, and Tuamotu. The Society
miles from San Francisco, 3,400 miles Islands are probably the most storied
from Yokohama, and midway between islands of Oceania. Almost all of the
Panama and Manila, the Hawaiian Is- eighteenth century explorers of the Pa-
lands stand at the crossroads of the air cific stopped there and wrote glowing
and water routes of the central Pacific. accounts of the people and the land.
Only eight of the Hawaiian islands The largest island in the group and the
are inhabited. The most important are one most often associated with tales of
Hawaii, Maui, and Oahu, where the adventure and romance is Tahiti. The
capital city and most of the islands' mili- Tuamotu group is one of the largest
tary and naval installations are located.
archipelagoes in the Pacific, consisting
At the opposite end of the Hawaiian
of seventy-six atolls and stretching south-
chain, 1,300 miles northwest of Hono-
east of the Societies for about 1,300
lulu, is Midway, a lonely coral atoll six
miles in diameter, where the United miles. Remote from Asia, America, or
States won its first important victory Australia, subject to destructive hurri-
after Pearl Harbor. Together with Wake canes, and lacking fresh water or a fertile
and Johnston Islands, Midway is impor- soil, the Tuamotu Islands have never
tant chiefly as a civil air station and mili- attracted as much interest as other Poly-
tary base. nesian islands.
The remaining islands of Polynesia, Far to the north of Polynesia, separat-
with a few minor exceptions, lie below ing the Pacific Ocean from the Bering
the equator and east of the Fijis, an area Sea, lie the Aleutian Islands. From
to which few American troops found Alaska they sweep eastward for over
their way. The most important of these 1,000 miles, like a finger pointing at Asia.
are Tonga, Samoa, and the islands of Poor in resources and scene of some of
French Oceania. The Tonga, or Friendly the most disagreeable weather in the
Islands as Captain Cook called them, lie world, the islands were for many years
to the east of the Fijis and extend for 200 almost ignored by the great powers. But
miles north and south. There are about their strategic location between America
150 islands in the group, the largest of and Asia marked them as outposts for
which, Tongatabu, is about 100 square the defense of Alaska and a target for
miles in extent. The Samoa Islands to the Japanese early in the war.
The Great Powers in the Pacific men's souls or on settlements. With

single-minded persistence they sought
The exploitation and settlement of the economic advantages in the Far East and
Pacific world by Europeans had begun ultimately established a flourishing com-
with the first voyages of the Portuguese mercial empire extending as far as For-
and Spanish.4 Under the papal Line of mosa and Japan.
Demarcation, these two nations had in The English and French entered the
1494 divided the world between them, Pacific much later. Following the prece-
Spain claiming exclusive rights to all dent set by Sir Francis Drake, they first
land 370 leagues west of the Cape Verde sought the wealth of the Pacific in the
Islands and Portugal all land to the holds of Spanish galleons and in weakly
east. The main objective of Magellan's defended Spanish settlements. In the
voyage had been to find a shorter, west- years from 1675 to 1726 alone there were
ern passage to the Spice Islands, which over a hundred English and French
the Portuguese held, and thus prove that voyages into the Pacific, most of them
these islands fell within Spain's half of officially sponsored buccaneering expe-
the world. Though he found the western ditions. But, despite the weakness of
passage, Magellan failed to establish Spain, neither government showed any
Spain's rights to the Spice Islands and inclination to extend its sovereignty into
the Portuguese continued to enjoy ex- the Pacific. Instead, it was the whalers,
clusive control of the highly profitable the traders, and the blackbirders who
trade of the Indies. There was none to first brought western civilization to
challenge Spain's rights to the rest of the Oceania.
Pacific world, however, and Spanish gal- The establishment of trading posts,
leons sailed regularly between ports in plantations, and missions was the prel-
the new world and the outposts of em- ude to annexation. As a result of the
pire in the Marshalls, the Carolines, the explorations of the eighteenth century,
Marianas, and the Philippines. England and France had established con-
The Dutch empire in the Far East flicting claims to most of the Pacific
was exclusively economic. The Portu- world, but because of trouble in Europe
guese and Spanish sought converts to and the belief that these islands were
Christianity as well as spice and gold; scarcely worth the risk of war neither
the Dutch wasted no energy on saving government had pushed its claims. Eng-
land, it is true, had established a penal
4
For accounts of the exploration and exploitation colony in Australia shortly after the
of the Pacific, see J. G. Beaglehole, The Exploration American Revolution, but no one op-
of the Pacific (London: A & C Black, Ltd., 1934);
Oliver, The Pacific Islands, pp. 63-103; Freeman, ed., posed British claims to the isolated
Geography of the Pacific, pp. 61-87; Robson, The continent. Nor was there any serious
Pacific Islands Handbook; Samuel Eliot Morison, opposition when France established a
The Maritime History of Massachusetts, 1783-1860
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1921); Christo- protectorate over Tahiti, then over all
pher Lloyd, Pacific Horizons, The Exploration of the Society and Marquesas Islands. But
the Pacific Before Captain Cook (London: Allen & under the urging of the planters, mer-
Unwin, 1946); James A. Williamson, Cook and the
Opening of the Pacific (New York: The Macmillan chants, and missionaries who now had
Company, 1948). an important stake in the Pacific, the
attitude of the governments changed and The German Government began ac-
each sought to establish its claims. To quiring land in the Pacific in 1884, after
these interests was added later in the Bismarck had endorsed a strong expan-
century the need for coaling stations sionist policy. In that year the Germans
and strategic bases, a need created by seized the Bismarck Archipelago and the
the use of steamships and the increased northeast coast of New Guinea. The
importance of Japan, Australia, and New Dutch had already added western New
Zealand in world politics and economics. Guinea to their empire in 1828 and the
By the middle of the nineteenth cen- British took the remaining portion of
tury, the fight for the most desirable New Guinea for themselves. The next
islands in the Pacific was on in earnest. year the Germans seized control of the
England's efforts to settle New Zealand northern Solomons and, with splendid
in the 1820's and 1830's had met strong disdain for Spanish rights, hoisted the
opposition from the French and its was imperial flag over Yap and established a
not until 1840 that the British felt their protectorate over the Caroline and Mar-
claim to the islands sufficiently strong to shall Islands. The English and French
annex them. The French in their turn thereupon proceeded to help themselves
barely nosed out the English in New to additional slices of the Pacific pie.
Caledonia, which Captain Cook had The two nations in 1887 established
discovered, and annexed the island with joint dominion (condominium) over
its rich mineral resources in 1853.5 the New Hebrides and the following
When German vessels began appear- year England established a protectorate
ing in the Pacific, the race became three- over the Cook Islands. Before the end
cornered. In 1868 the Hamburg firm of of the century, Samoa, the Gilbert and
Godeffroy began operations from Samoa Ellice Islands, the Southern Solomons
and before long had branches in Hawaii, and Tonga had been divided among the
Fiji, and New Guinea. Though these powers, with England getting the lion's
activities were not official, they worried share.
the British enough to make them annex The United States embarked on a
the Fijis when German vessels began colonial career in the Pacific compara-
showing an undue interest in these is- tively late. With its energies absorbed
lands. The French then strengthened in the settlement of a continent and in
their position in French Oceania by the Civil War, the United States was
making Tahiti a colony and formally unable to take advantage of the early
annexing the Tuamotus. interest of the whalers and traders who
5
had ventured so daringly and profited
For the rivalry of the Western Powers in the
Pacific, see: Jean I. Brookes, International Rivalry so enormously in the Pacific. But the
in the Pacific Islands, 1800-1875 (Berkeley, Calif.: ambition to establish mastery of the
University of California Press, 1941); Foster R. ocean and its commerce was almost as
Dulles, America in the Pacific (Boston: Houghton
Mifflin Company, 1932); Sylvia Masterman, The Ori-
old as the republic, and formed a con-
gins of International Rivalry in Samoa, 1845-1884 sistent pattern in the patchwork of west-
(Palo Alto, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1934); ward expansion to the Pacific coast.
Richard W. Van Alstyne, "Great Britain, the United
States, and Hawaiian Independence, 1850-1855,"
Americans had discovered the mouth of
Pacific Historical Review, IV (1935), 15-24. the Columbia River in 1792, and had
taken the lead in the whaling industry first was acquired, with the Aleutians, by
and the China trade. During the War purchase from Russia in 1867 and gave
of 1812, Captain David Porter raised the the United States many more thousands
American flag in the Marquesas and of miles of Pacific coast line as well as an
established happy relations with the na- arc of islands extending far across the
tives, a relationship which "with the north Pacific. Midway, which was dis-
common sailors and their girls all was covered by an American vessel in 1859,
helter skelter."6 was formally annexed the same year as
But the government showed little in- the Alaska purchase, and about the same
clination to follow up Porter's action and time other small islands between it and
no claim was made to the island. Forty Hawaii were acquired. But all proposals
years later another naval officer, Commo- to take over the Hawaiian Islands, where
dore Matthew G. Perry, met the same the Americans held a dominant position,
reception to his proposals to establish were rejected by Congress. The United
bases in the Ryukyus, the Bonins, and States did, however, at the urging of the
Formosa. Ironically, the most significant Navy acquire the right to establish a
result of his expedition to Japan was to naval station at Pearl Harbor in 1884.
promote the development of a nation It was also largely through the efforts of
which in time was to become America's the Navy, backed by commercial groups,
chief rival in the Pacific. that the United States gained the harbor
Despite the hopes and initiative of of Pago Pago in 1877. More than twenty
many who dreamed of an American em- years later the United States acquired
pire in the Pacific, the government moved Tutuila in eastern Samoa while Ger-
slowly. In 1856 it passed the Guano Act many took the western half of the islands.
which permitted U.S. claims to unoccu- England, in return for German conces-
pied islands for the purpose of working sions in Tonga and the Solomons, with-
the guano deposits. These deposits were drew altogether from Samoa.
much in demand as fertilizer, and claims American expansion into the Pacific
were laid to forty-eight islands, largely reached its peak with the annexation of
in the Line and Phoenix groups. But the the Hawaiian and Philippine Islands at
guano, which had required thousands of the end of the century. As early as 1843
years and countless millions of birds to there were more Americans in Hawaii
create, was exhausted in twenty-five years than all other foreign nationals, and the
and with it disappeared American inter- value of their property was over one
est in the islands. Most of the islands million dollars. They held posts of re-
finally went to England, but the United sponsibility in the government and virtu-
States did establish claims to Howland, ally controlled the political and economic
Baker, Palmyra, and other small islands life of the island. For years they urged
which proved useful later in building a annexation by the mother country and
military air route across the south Pacific. by 1860 the issue was being debated
The acquisition of Alaska, Midway, hotly in the United States. Finally in
and Samoa also came in this period. The 1893 the Americans in Hawaii overthrew
6
Quoted from Captain David Porter's Journal by the native monarch, established a repub-
Dulles, America in the Pacific, p. 100. lic, and requested annexation to the Unit-
ed States. The offer was rejected, largely the journey, and the French began work
because of President Cleveland's opposi- on a canal in 1880. This effort failed,
tion, but the new republic of Hawaii was but American engineers took up the task
recognized as the rightful government in 1902 and when the canal opened in
and, with support from important in- 1914 the United States gained control of
terests in the United States, continued the eastern gateway to the Pacific.
to press for annexation. The Spanish- Last to enter the Pacific in search of
American war and the increasing interest empire, though itself a Pacific power, was
of the Japanese in the islands led to a Japan. In the years after Commodore
change of attitude. On 11 July 1898, by a Perry's visit, Japan, emulating the West-
joint resolution of Congress, the Repub- ern Powers, began to extend its control
lic of Hawaii was annexed by the United over weaker neighbors and to push its
States. boundaries north and south. Between
The great prize of the Spanish-Ameri- 1875 and 1880 the Japanese acquired the
can War, which ousted Spain from the Kurils (Chishima) , the Bonins, and the
Pacific and made the United States a full- Ryukyus. The Sino-Japanese War in
fledged colonial power, was the Philip- 1894-95 gave Japan Formosa and the
pine islands. But having won the islands Pescadores, accorded Korea a nominal
by force, the American Government still independence, and demonstrated to a
had to decide what to do with them. surprised world that Japan was a factor
Germany, fishing in troubled waters, had to be reckoned with in the Far East. In
a fleet in Manila Bay and was ready to the treaty ending the war China also
take over if the United States defaulted. ceded to Japan the Liaotung Peninsula
McKinley's decision was for annexation, in southern Manchuria, but Russia,
and formal cession of the islands, as well France, and Germany forced Japan to
as of Guam, was made on 10 December disgorge the peninsula. 7
1898 with the signing of the Treaty of American annexation of Hawaii and,
Paris. Few considered the other Marianas next year, of the Philippines aroused
and the Carolines worth taking and Ger- strong hostility in a Japan which was al-
many purchased them from Spain soon ready angered by the French, Russian,
after. and German interference with the provi-
The construction of the Panama Canal sions of the treaty with China. Many
completed the transformation of the Japanese were convinced that the aims
United States into a Pacific power. The of the nation could only be achieved by
first Spanish explorers had searched eager- force, and the influence of the Army and
ly for a way around America and had Navy, already considerable, increased
found the westward passage far to the sharply. As a result Japan embarked on
south. But this route was a long one, and a military and naval expansion program
Americans during the California gold designed to make the nation so strong
rush had as often gone overland across
the disease-ridden Isthmus of Panama to 7
It is interesting to note that acceptance of the
save time. A water route across the isth- Russian, German, and French terms was decided by
a seidan, that is, a sacred or personal decision of the
mus from the Atlantic to the Pacific Emperor Meiji, and was the only precedent for Hiro-
would cut off almost 10,000 miles from hito's personal decision to end the war in 1945.
that it would never again suffer so humil- go by without gain to themselves. Aus-
iating an experience.8 tralia took over the German possessions
Japan's first opportunity to test its new in New Guinea, the Solomons, and the
strength came in 1904 when, without the Bismark Archipelago, and New Zealand
formality of a declaration of war, it at- troops occupied western Samoa. Japan,
tacked Russia. Despite unqualified suc- not content with expansion into the
cess on land and sea, the Japanese were Pacific, took over Germany's interests in
anxious to end the war within a year the Shantung Province of China and the
because of the heavy drain on the na- port of Tsingtao as well. The following
tion's resources. When President Theo- year, 1915, in the Twenty-One Demands,
dore Roosevelt offered to mediate the Japan requested from China enormous
dispute, therefore, both nations promptly additional economic and political con-
accepted and some months later the cessions which, had they been granted,
Treaty of Portsmouth was signed. By would have brought that nation under
this treaty, Russia recognized Japan's Japanese domination. But a vigorous
paramount interests in Korea and trans- protest from the United States, and other
ferred to Japan the lease on the Liaotung reasons, forced Japan to withdraw the
Peninsula, railway and mining privileges most drastic of the demands.
in southern Manchuria, and the south- By the Treaty of Versailles, Japan's
ern half of Sakhalin. Five years later wartime acquisitions, already approved
Japan added Korea to its empire, and, by secret agreements with Britain,
by secret agreement with Russia, made France, Russia, and Italy, were formally
southern Manchuria a Japanese sphere sanctioned. President Wilson opposed
of influence. strongly the cession of the German is-
Japan's opportunity to expand into lands to Japan, asserting that their only
the Pacific came with the outbreak of war value was military and that their con-
in Europe in 1914. Using the pretext trol by Japan would make the defense
of the alliance with England signed in of the Philippines virtually impossible.
1902, Japan declared war on Germany But he failed to win over the Allies and
and seized the Marshall, Caroline and Japan was granted under a mandate the
Mariana (except Guam) Islands, thus islands it had seized, while England and
extending the Japanese empire almost Australia secured similar sanction for
3,000 miles into the Pacific. Other their actions.
Pacific powers, it should be noted, did With the Treaty of Versailles, the
not let this opportunity for expansion division of the Pacific world was com-
plete. Japan was the dominant power
8
For Japanese expansion and Japan's relations to in the western Pacific, north of the
other powers in the Pacific, see Roy H. Akagi, Japan's equator, and held almost all of Micro-
Foreign Relations, 1542-1936 (Tokyo: Hokuseido nesia. The United States controlled the
Press, 1937); Payson J. Treat, Diplomatic Relations
Between the United States and Japan, 1853-1895, northeast Pacific with Hawaii and the
2 vols. (Palo Alto, Calif.: Stanford University Press, Aleutians, and held outposts deep in
1932); Kenneth Scott Latourette, The History of Japanese-controlled territory in Guam,
Japan (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1947);
Paul Clyde, The Far East (New York: Prentice-Hall, Wake, and the Philippines. The British
1947). Empire was dominant in the central and
southwestern Pacific, from Samoa west- in the Pacific except at the expense of
ward to Australia and New Guinea, in- another and in violation of existing
cluding almost all of Melanesia. France treaties. For Japan, this meant conflict
held most of the southeast Pacific, with the stronger Western Powers. But
French Oceania, as well as New Caledo- on the Asiatic continent lay a weakened
nia, and, jointly with the English, the China and it was there that Japan sought
New Hebrides. The Dutch still had the fulfillment for her dreams of empire.
their rich empire in the East Indies, and And it was there, in China and Man-
in addition held the western portion of churia, that the seeds for conflict with
New Guinea. No nation could expand the United States were sown.
PART ONE
THE ROAD TO WAR
Am I deceived, or was there a clash of arms? I am not deceived, it was

a clash of arms; Mars approaches, and, approaching, gave the sign of war.
OVID
For as the nature of foul weather lieth not in a shower of rain but in an
inclination thereto of many days together; so the nature of war consisteth
not in actual fighting but in the known disposition thereto during all the
time there is no assurance to the contrary. THOMAS HOBBES
CHAPTER I
The Beginnings of Pacific Strategy

Covenants without swords are but words.
HOBBES, Leviathan
At the turn of the twentieth century, this background that American strategy
after the war with Spain, the United in the Pacific and plans for the defense
States for the first time in a hundred of U.S. island outposts must be viewed;
years found itself involved closely in the it explains many of the seeming incon-
affairs of other nations. Possession of sistencies between policies and plans.
the Philippine Islands, Guam, Hawaii,
and part of the Samoan archipelago had Early Plans for Defense
made the United States a world power
and imposed on it the grave responsibil- The defense of the 7,100 islands in
ity of defending outposts far from its the Philippine archipelago, lying in an
shores. Such a defense rested, as Admiral exposed position 7,ooo miles from the
Alfred Thayer Mahan had demonstrated, west coast of the United States, was for
on sea power, on the possession of naval over thirty years the basic problem of
bases and a powerful fleet. Without Pacific strategy. From the start it was
these, no island garrison could hope to apparent that it would be impossible to
prevail against a naval power strong defend all or even the major islands. A
enough to gain supremacy in the Pacific. choice had to be made, and it fell inevi-
Theodore Roosevelt, a close friend tably on Luzon, the largest, richest, and
and student of Admiral Mahan, under- most important of the islands. Only a
stood the importance of sea power and few months after his victory in Manila
it was no accident that during his admin- Bay, Admiral Dewey, asserting that
istration steps were taken to strengthen Luzon was the most valuable island in
the Navy and to build the Panama the Philippines, "whether considered
Canal. But the work begun by him was from a commercial or military stand-
not pushed vigorously in the years that point," recommended that a naval sta-
followed. The American people were tion be established there.1 In the years
overwhelmingly isolationist and unwill- that followed there was never any devia-
ing to pay the price of colonial empire. tion from this view. Down to the out-
Thus, almost from the beginning of break of World War II that island, and
America's venture into imperialism the
nation committed itself to political ob- l
Ltr, Dewey to John D. Long, Secy Navy, 29 Aug
jectives but would not maintain the 98, quoted in O. J. Clinard, "Japan's Influence on
American Naval .Power, 1897-1917," University of
naval and military forces required to California Publications in History, vol. XXXVI
support these objectives. It is against (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1947), p 27-
especially the Manila area with its fine 1904, shortly after Japan's attack on
harbor and transportation facilities, re- Russia, that the Joint Board develop a
mained the chief problem for American series of plans for joint action in an
strategic planners. emergency requiring the co-operation of
Though the basic element of Pacific the services. These plans, he suggested,
strategy was a strong Navy with support- should be based upon studies developed
ing bases, this alone would not suffice. by the Army General Staff and the Gen-
Successful defense of an insular position eral Board of the Navy.3
like the Philippines required an Army From General Chaffee's proposal
garrison, coastal fortifications, and mo- stemmed a series of war plans known as
bile forces to resist invasion. And per- the color plans. Each of these plans was
haps as important as any of these was designed to meet a specific emergency
the close co-operation of the Army and designated by a color corresponding usu-
Navy. In a sense, this was the vital ele- ally to the code name of the nation in-
ment that would blend the ingredients volved—RED for Great Britain, BLACK
of defense into a strategic formula for for Germany, GREEN for Mexico, ORANGE
victory. for Japan. On the basis of these joint
The mechanism devised for Army- color plans each of the services developed
Navy co-operation was the Joint Board, its own plan to guide its operations in
established in 1903 by the two service an emergency, and Army and Navy field
Secretaries. The board, consisting of and fleet commanders drew up the plans
eight members—four from the Army's to carry out these operations. In some
General Staff and four from the General cases, the early war plans were little
Board of the Navy—had a modest task more than abstract exercises and bore
initially. To it came all matters that little relation to actual events. But in
required co-operation between the two the case of Japan, the ORANGE plans were
services. It had no executive functions kept under constant review and revised
or command authority, and reported to frequently to accord with changes in the
the War and Navy Secretaries. Its recom- international scene.
mendations were purely advisory, and The first serious examination of plans
became effective only upon approval by to resist a Japanese attack came in the
both Secretaries, and, in some cases, by summer of 1907. At that time tension
the President himself.2 between the United States and Japan,
Almost from the start, the main task which had begun with the Japanese vic-
of the Joint Board was the development tory over Russia in 1905 and the San
of war plans. The impetus was provided Francisco School Board segregation order
by Lt. Gen. Adna R. Chaffee, Army in 1906, reached the proportions of a
Chief of Staff, who proposed in April war scare. War seemed imminent and
2 the protection of American interests in
The board initially had no staff and its member-
ship was by individual appointment rather than by the Far East, especially of the newly
office. In 1919, is was reorganized, given a Joint Plan-
3
ning Committee which functioned as a working Ltr, Chaffee to Secy War, 22 Apr 04; Mins, JB
group, and its membership reduced to six—the chiefs Mtgs, 23 May and 24 Jun 04; Ltr, Brig Gen Tasker H.
of the services, their deputies, and the chiefs of the Bliss to Secy JB, 10 Jun 04, all in JB 325 (1903-1905),
two War Plans Divisions. ser. 16.
THE BEGINNINGS OF PACIFIC STRATEGY 23
acquired Philippine Islands, became an

urgent problem. On 18 June 1907, in
response to an inquiry from President
Theodore Roosevelt, the Joint Board
recommended that the fleet be sent to
the Orient as soon as possible and that
Army and Navy forces in the Philippines
be immediately deployed in such a man-
ner as to protect the naval station at
Subic Bay. Because of Japan's strength,
the Joint Board stated, "The United
States would be compelled ... to take
a defensive attitude in the Pacific and
maintain that attitude until reinforce-
ments could be sent. . . . " 4 This view,
adopted by necessity in 1907, became
finally the keystone of America's strategy
in the Pacific and the basis of all plan-
ning for a war against Japan. VIEW FROM MANILA BAY, showing Cor-
regidor Island at center with Caballo Island
The crisis of the summer of 1907,
at lower left and a portion of Bataan Pen-
t h o u g h it passed w i t h o u t i n c i d e n t , insula at upper right.
brought into sharp focus two weaknesses
of America's position in the Pacific: the
need for a major naval base in the area base in the Pacific should be located in
and the fact that the Philippine Islands the Philippines or Hawaii; and second,
could not be held except at great ex- whether the Philippines base should be
pense and with a large force. The islands, in Subic Bay or Manila Bay. Though
wrote Roosevelt at the height of the strong representation was made — espe-
crisis, "form our heel of Achilles. . . . cially by the Army — for locating the
I would rather see this nation fight all major base in the Philippine Islands,
her life than to see her give them up to the Joint Board in January 1908 selected
Japan or to any other nation under Pearl Harbor. The Hawaiian base, the
duress." 5 board pointed out, was not designed to
The question of naval bases was de- defend the Hawaiian Islands alone but
bated by the Joint Board and by Con- to provide "a buffer of defense" for the
gressional committees during the months entire Pacific coast and to lay the basis
that followed. Two questions had to be for American naval supremacy in the
decided: first, whether America's major Pacific. In May of that year Congress
4
authorized construction of the Pearl
A summary of the Joint Board's views is contained
in Ltr, Maj Gen Fred C. Ainsworth, TAG, to Maj
Harbor base and appropriated $ 1,000,000
Gen Leonard Wood, CG Philippines Div, 6 Jul 07, for the purpose. This step, the House
AG 1260092, National Archives.
5
Naval Affairs Committee believed, would
Ltr, Roosevelt to Taft, 21 Aug 07, quoted by
Henry F. Pringle, Theodore Roosevelt (New York: constitute in the future "one of the
Harcourt. Brace and Company, 1931), pp. 408-09. strongest factors in the prevention of
war with any powers in the Far East." 6 by concentrating fleet facilities in Hawaii,
Though the decision had been made had, in effect, relegated the Philippines
to locate America's Pacific bastion in to a secondary place in strategic plans
Hawaii, it was still necessary to provide for the Pacific and made all hopes for
for the defense of the Philippines, 5,000 its defense dependent upon the security
miles away. A naval repair station and of Hawaii and the ability of the fleet to
a secondary fleet base would have to be move westward from Pearl Harbor.
constructed in the islands, but there was
strong disagreement even on this ques- The ORANGE Plan
tion. The Navy favored Subic Bay but
the Army asserted that a base there The first ORANGE plans were hardly
would be indefensible against land at- plans at all but rather statements of
tack and that Manila Bay, for a variety principles, which, it was hoped, could
of reasons, should be selected. The Joint be followed in the event of war with
Board finally decided in favor of Cavite, Japan. By 1913, the strategic principles
on the south shore of Manila Bay, and of the plan had been exhaustively studied
the Army adopted a plan to concentrate and were well understood. In case of
its defenses in and around that bay on war with Japan, it was assumed that the
the islands in its narrow neck—Corregi- Philippines would be the enemy's first
dor, Caballo, El Fraile, and Carabao— objective. Defense of the islands was
thus screening the naval base as well as recognized as dependent on the Battle
the capital and chief city of the islands. Fleet, which, on outbreak of war, would
It was this concept—the defense of the have to make its way from the Caribbean
Manila Bay area and the fortification of area around the Cape — the Panama
Corregidor and its neighboring islands— Canal was not yet completed—and then
that guided American planners until the across the wide Pacific. Along the way
outbreak of war in 1941.7 the fleet would have to secure its line of
But no system of fortifications could communication, using the incomplete
guarantee the defense of the islands. The base at Pearl Harbor and the undevel-
essential thing, as Maj. Gen. Leonard oped harbor at Guam. Once the fleet
Wood pointed out at the time, was a was established in Philippine waters,
strong fleet based in the Philippines. it could relieve the defenders, who pre-
"Once sea control is lost," he asserted, sumably would have held on during this
"the enemy can move troops in force period, variously estimated at three and
and the question then becomes one of four months. Thereafter, Army forces,
time."8 Congress and the Joint Board, reinforced by a steady stream of men and
supplies, could take the offensive on the
6
House Reports, No. 1385, 6oth Cong., 1st sess., ground while the Navy contested for
4 Apr 08, pp. 2-3.
7
control of the western Pacific.9
Cable, Wood to Ainsworth, 1 Nov 07; Ltrs, Lt Col
9
Frederic V. Abbot and Capt Stanley D. Embick to Memo, Brig Gen Montgomery M. Macomb, Chief,
Wood, 27 Nov 07, both in AG 1260092, National War College Div, for Chief of Staff, 13 Apr 15, sub:
Archives; Memos, JB for Secys War and Navy, 31 Jan Plan for War With Japan, WCD 7820-16; Army Plan
and 5 Mar 08, JB 325. in Case of War in the Pacific Before the Panama
8
Ltr, Wood to Ainsworth, 23 Dec 07, AG 1260092, Canal Is Completed, 19 May 13, approved by CofS,
National Archives. 20 May 13, by order of Secy War, WCD 7820-13.
During World War I planning for tance was the transfer to Japan of the
war in the Pacific was discontinued ex- German islands in the Central Pacific.
cept for a brief flurry of activity in 1916, President Wilson had opposed this move
when Japanese vessels appeared off the at Versailles, arguing that it would place
Philippine Islands. And in the postwar Japan astride the U.S. line of communi-
period, the planners faced a situation cations and make the defense of the
considerably different from that of the Philippines virtually impossible. But
earlier years. Then, Germany had been Wilson had been overruled by the other
the chief threat to the peace in Europe. Allied leaders, and Japan had acquired
Now, with Germany in defeat and the islands under a mandate from the
Russia in the throes of revolution, only League of Nations which prohibited
Great Britain was in a position to engage their fortification. "At one time," wrote
the United States in war with any pros- Capt. Harry E. Yarnell, one of the Navy
pect of success. But economically and planners, "it was the plan of the Navy
financially, England was in no condition Department to send a fleet to the Philip-
for another conflict and there was no pines on the outbreak of war. I am
sentiment for war on either side of the sure that this would not be done at the
Atlantic. present time ... it seems certain that
The situation in the Pacific and Far in the course of time the Philippines
East was different. Between Japan and and whatever forces we may have there
the United States there were a number will be captured." 10
of unresolved differences and a reservoir Japan's position was further strength-
of misunderstanding and ill will that ened during these years by the agree-
made the possibility of conflict in that ments reached at the Washington
area much more likely than in the Atlan- Conference of 1921—22. In the Five-Pow-
tic. Moreover, Japan's position had been er Naval Treaty concluded in February
greatly strengthened as a result of the 1922, Japan accepted the short end of
war and the treaties that followed. In the 5:5:3 ratio in capital ships in return
the view of the planners, the most prob- for a promise from the other powers that
able enemy in the foreseeable future was they would preserve the status quo with
Japan. Thus, U.S. strategic thought in regard to their bases in the western
the years from 1919 to 1938 was largely Pacific. This meant, in effect, that the
concentrated on the problems presented United States would refrain from further
by a conflict arising out of Japanese fortifying its bases in the Philippines,
aggression against American interests or Guam, the Aleutians, and other islands
territory in the Far East. west of Hawaii, and that Great Britain
The strategic position of the United would do the same in its possessions.
States in the Far East was altered funda- The net result of this bargain was to
mentally by World War I. Military avia- give Japan a strong advantage over the
tion had proved itself during the war Western Powers in the Pacific, for the
and though its enormous potentialities agreement virtually removed the threat
for naval warfare were not yet fully
appreciated it was still a factor to be 10
Ltr, Yarnell to Col John McA. Palmer, 25 Apr 19,
considered. Of more immediate impor- JB 325, ser. 28 C.
WASHINGTON CONFERENCE, 1921-22. Seated at table, from left: Prince Iyesato Tokugawa
(Japan), Jules Jusserand (France), Albert Sarraut (France), Rene Viviani (France),
Aristide Briand (France), Oscar W. Underwood (U.S.), Elihu Root (U.S.), Henry Cabot
Lodge (U.S.), Charles Evans Hughes (U.S.), Lord A. J. Balfour (Britain), Lord Lee of
Fareham (Britain), Sir Aukland Geddes (Britain), Sir Robert Borden (Canada), G. F. Pearce
(Australia), Sir John Salmond (New Zealand), and Srinivasa Sastri (India).
posed by the Philippines, Guam, and The Washington Conference brought

Hong Kong. The British still had Singa- the Philippines to the fore in a way
pore, but the United States had lost the apparently neither intended nor fore-
opportunity to develop adequate base seen. Of the bases available for opera-
facilities in the far Pacific. With that tions in the western Pacific they alone
loss, wrote Capt. Dudley W. Knox, went had facilities capable of supporting a
all chances of defending the Philippines naval force large enough to challenge
and providing a military sanction for Japanese supremacy in that region.
American policy.11 Guam, which up to this time had been
11
regarded as a more desirable base site
Capt Dudley W. Knox (USN), The Eclipse of
American Sea Power (New York: American Army & than the Philippines but which had not
Navy Journal, Inc., 1922), pp. 135-36. yet been developed, now became of sec-
ondary importance. The Aleutians and The Navy planners had by this time
Samoa were too remote to serve the pur- completed their own estimate of the
pose. The Philippines were, therefore, situation in the Pacific. Their conclu-
in the words of the recently formed sion, submitted at the end of July 1922,
Planning Committee, set up in 1919 to was that the Japanese could, if they
assist the Joint Board, "our most valu- wished, take both the Philippines and
able strategic possession in the Western Guam before the U.S. Fleet could reach
Pacific." So long as the Five-Power Naval the western Pacific. The role of the
Treaty remained in effect, they argued, Philippine garrison, as the Navy plan-
the islands' fleet facilities and coastal ners saw it, would be to hold out as long
defenses should be maintained to the as possible and to make the operation
extent permitted. At the same time, the as costly as possible for the enemy. What
Philippine garrison should be so strength- would happen to the garrison thereafter
ened, urged the planners, as to make the the planners did not specify, but they
capture of the islands by any enemy "a hoped that the sacrifice of American
costly major operation."12 forces would be justified by the damage
By now the situation in the Pacific done to the enemy.14
had so invalidated the assumption of But Leonard Wood, Governor-Gen-
earlier planning for a war with Japan eral of the Philippines, disagreed strongly
as to require a complete review of strategy with the Navy estimate. A former Chief
and the preparation of new plans. This of Staff of the U.S. Army and commander
need was emphasized by the Army plan- of the Philippine Department, with
ners when they submitted to the Joint influential friends in Washington, his
Planning Committee in December 1921 word carried considerable weight. In
a "Preliminary Estimate of the Situa- his view, the "assumption on the part
tion," together with a recommendation of the Navy that in case of war with
for a new joint Army-Navy ORANGE plan. Japan the Philippine Islands could not
"It may safely be assumed," they de- be defended, must be abandoned, and a
clared, "that Japan is the most probable long war waged to take them back and
enemy." That nation's policy of expan- re-establish ourselves in the Far East"
sion and its evident intention to secure was a fatal error. Such a course, he told
a dominant position in the Far East, the Secretary of War with feeling, would
argued the Army planners, were bound damage the prestige of the United States
to come into conflict sooner or later with in the eyes of the world, would have a
American interests and policy in that "disintegrating and demoralizing effect
region. Unless either or both countries upon our people," and could end
showed some disposition to give way, a only in national dishonor. "I feel sure,"
contingency the planners regarded as General Wood told the Secretary, "that
unlikely, this conflict of interests would when you and the President realize the
lead ultimately to war.13 effect of this on our future . . . , steps
will be taken at once to see that the
12
Ltr, JPC to JB, 13 Apr 22, sub: Defense of Phil, Army and Navy assume that the Philip-
JB 303, ser. 179.
13 14
Preliminary Estimate of the Situation, War Plan Ltr, Secy War to CG Phil Dept, 27 Jul 22, cited in
ORANGE, 3 Dec 21, WPD 368. Ltr, Wood to Secy War, 5 Feb 23, JB 305, ser. 209.
592496 O-62-4
pine Islands must not only be abso- declared, would be primarily naval in
lutely defended but succored by the character and would require offensive
Fleet." And in words reminiscent of a sea and air operations against Japanese
later day he warned the Secretary that naval forces and vital sea communica-
the American people would not stand tions. The first concern of the Army and
for a policy that required "abandonment Navy in such a war, therefore, would be
of American posts, American soldiers, "to establish at the earliest possible date
an American fleet, American citizens in American sea power in the Western
the Far East. . . ."15 Pacific in strength superior to that of
Just how the fleet would come to the Japan." To accomplish this, the United
rescue of the Philippines in the event of States would require a base in that area
war, Governor Wood did not specify, but capable of serving the entire U.S. Fleet.
he felt sure the planners in Washington Since the only base west of Pearl Harbor
could solve the problem. They had large enough for this purpose was in
undoubtedly reached their conclusions, Manila Bay, it would be essential, said
he observed sympathetically, when faced the planners, to hold the bay in case of
by seemingly impossible tasks. But war and be ready to rush reinforcements,
American ingenuity was equal to any under naval protection, to the islands in
task, declared General Wood, and the time to prevent their capture. An addi-
planners "should be directed to keep tional mission recommended by the plan-
alive that problem and work it out to ners was the early capture of bases in the
show just what could be done to make Japanese-mandated islands along the line
it possible." And as a starting point, he of communications to the Philippines.17
recommended that the Navy take for its Within two weeks the Joint Board had
mission: "First, the relief of the Philip- taken action. On 7 July 1923, General
pines and the establishment of its base of the Armies John J. Pershing, senior
in Manila as an essential preliminary to member of the board, noted the board's
the accomplishment of our main objec- agreement with the study made by the
tive. . . . Second, the destruction of planners and recommended to the Secre-
the Japanese fleet."16 That the Navy taries of War and Navy that it be
would agree to so flagrant a violation of approved as the basis for the preparation
the first canon of naval strategy, that of a war plan. The Joint Board,
the primary mission of a fleet was always Pershing told the Secretaries, had reached
to destroy the enemy fleet, was, to say the following conclusions with regard to
the least, doubtful. the Philippines:
Whether as a result of Governor
Wood's intervention or for other reasons, 1. That the islands were of great strategic
value to the United States for they provided
the final estimate presented to the Joint the best available bases for military and
Board as a basis for the preparation of a naval forces operating in defense of Amer-
war plan carefully skirted the question of ican interests in the Far East.
the abandonment of the Philippines. A
17
war with Japan, the Joint Planners now Memo, JPC to JB, 25 May 23, sub: Synopsis of the
Joint Army and Navy Estimate of the ORANGE Situa-
15
Ltr, Wood to Secy War, 5 Feb 23, JB 305, ser. 209. tion, JB 325, ser. 207. See also General Board 425,
16
Ibid. ser. 1136, 26 Apr 23.
2. That their capture by Japan would the emphasis placed on sea power and
seriously affect American prestige and make
a naval base in the Philippines. The first
offensive operations in the western Pacific
concern of the United .States in a war
extremely difficult.
with Japan and the initial mission of the
3. That the recapture of the islands would
Army and Navy, declared the Joint Plan-
be a long and costly undertaking, requiring
ners, would be to establish sea power in
a far greater effort than timely measures for
defense. the western Pacific "in strength superior
4. That the national interests and mili-to that of Japan." This, they recognized,
tary necessity require that the Philippines
would require a "main outlying base" in
be made as strong as possible in peacetime.18
that region. Manila Bay, it was acknowl-
With the Secretaries' approval, given edged, best met the requirements for
three days later, work on Joint War Plan such a base and its retention would be
ORANGE moved forward rapidly. As a essential in the event of hostilities. Thus,
matter of fact, the planners had by this the primary mission of the Philippine
time already adopted the basic strategic Department in the ORANGE plan was to
concept to guide American forces in a hold Manila Bay.19
war with Japan. Such a war, they fore- One notable aspect of the ORANGE
saw, would be primarily naval in charac- plan was its provision for a unified com-
ter. The United States, in their view, mand and a joint staff. Normal practice
should take the offensive and engage in dictated separate Army and Navy com-
operations "directed toward the isolation manders, acting under the principle of
and harassment of Japan." These opera- co-operation in joint operations. But the
tions they thought could be achieved by planners had come to the conclusion that
gaining control of Japan's vital sea com- such operations required "that all Army
munications and by offensive air and and Navy forces . .. form one command
naval operations against Japan's naval and that its commander have the whole
forces and economic life. If these meas- responsibility and full power."20 They
ures alone did not bring Japan to her therefore included in the plan provision
knees, then the planners would take for a single commander, to be designated
"such further action as may be required by the President and to have full power
to win the war." The major role in a commensurate with his responsibility.
war fought as the planners envisaged it In making this proposal the planners
would be played by the Navy. To the were far ahead of their time. Neither of
Army would fall the vital task of holding the services was ready to operate in this
the base in Manila Bay until the arrival way and there was as yet no doctrine or
of the fleet. Without it, the fleet would set of principles to guide commanders
be unable to operate in Far Eastern with such wide authority. The Joint
waters. Board, therefore, though it accepted
The concept of "an offensive war, without question most of the provisions
primarily naval" was firmly embodied in of the ORANGE plan submitted by the
the plan finally evolved. From it stemmed Joint Planning Committee, returned
18 19
Memo, Pershing to Secy War, 7 Jul 23, sub: Draft, Joint Army-Navy Basic War Plan ORANGE,
Defense of Phil, JB 305, ser. 208. A similar memoran- 12 Mar 24, JB 325, ser. 228.
20
dum went to the Secretary of the Navy. Ibid.
that portion dealing with command. The final approval of War Plan
The planners, the board instructed, ORANGE in September 1924 gave the
were to eliminate the objectionable United States for the first time since the
paragraphs.21 end of World War I a broad outline of
Surprisingly enough, the planners operations and objectives in the event of
balked at these instructions and tried war with Japan. But the plan was really
once more to convince their superiors of more a statement of hopes than a real-
the necessity for unity of command. The istic appraisal of what could be done.
plan, they pointed out, was the product To have carried out such a plan in 1925
of over three years of intensive study was far beyond the capabilities of either
during which the problem of command service. The entire military establish-
in joint operations had been considered ment in the Philippines did not then
carefully and from every viewpoint. On number more than 15,000 men. The
the basis of their exhaustive study of the 50,000 men who, according to the plan,
subject, the planners told the Joint were to sail for the Philippines from the
Board, they could not recommend that west coast on the outbreak of war, repre-
operations on so large a scale and of such sented more than one third the total
grave importance as those contemplated strength of the Army. Moreover, naval
in the ORANGE plan "could be entrusted facilities in Manila Bay were entirely
to co-operation alone."22 inadequate to support the fleet. The
This stand availed the committee lit- station at Cavite along the south shore
tle for the Joint Board returned the plan of the bay had been largely neglected by
again, this time with a more strongly the Navy and the facilities at Olongapo
worded injunction to remove the offend- in Subic Bay dated from the early years
ing references to unity of command.23 of the century. Neither was capable of
The planners had no choice now but to providing more than minor repairs.
make the required changes. Striking out Only at Pearl Harbor, 5,000 miles to the
all references to unity of command and east, was there a base even partially capa-
a supreme commander and substituting ble of servicing the major surface units
the familiar formulas of "mutual co- of the Battle Fleet.
operation" and "paramount interest," The advantages of distance and loca-
they resubmitted the plan on 16 July. tion, which gave the Philippines their
This the board accepted and on its rec- strategic importance, were all on the
ommendation the Secretary of War and side of the Japanese. Japan's southern-
the Secretary of the Navy gave their most naval bases were less than 1,500
formal approval.24 miles from the Philippines, and Formosa
21
Ltr, Secy JB to JPC, 7 Jun 24, JB 325, ser. 228.
was only half that distance away. An
22
Ltr, Col John L. De Witt, and Capt William H. expeditionary force from Japan could
Standley (USN) to JB, 20 Jun 24, sub: Joint Army- reach Manila in three days; one mounted
Navy Basic War Plan ORANGE, JB 325, ser. 228.
23
Memo, Secy JB to JPC, 10 Jul 24, sub: Joint
from Formosa on the Ryukyus could
Army-Navy War Plan ORANGE, JB 325, ser. 228. make the journey in a much shorter time.
24
Ltrs, Col Walter Krueger and Standley, 16 Jul 24; An American force, even assuming it
Rear Adm Edward W. Eberle, JB to Secy War, 15
Aug 24, sub: Joint Army-Navy Basic War Plan
reached the Philippines safely in record
ORANGE, JB 325, ser. 228. time, would require several weeks for the
journey. By that time, the Japanese flag to present the gravest threat to Ameri-
might be waving over Manila and the can security, one that would require a
U.S. Fleet with its bunkers depleted full-scale mobilization and the greatest
would be "forced to fight under the most military effort.
disadvantageous conditions or to beat an In their study of these two contingen-
ignominious retreat."25 cies the military planners came to grips
with strategic problems quite different
RED and RED-ORANGE from those presented by ORANGE. A war
with Japan would be primarily a naval
The ORANGE plan was based on a situ- war fought in the Pacific. So far as any-
ation that never came to pass, that is, a one could foresee, there would be no
war between the United States and Japan requirement for large ground armies.
alone. Neither side, the planners as- There was a possibility, of course, that
sumed, would have allies or attack the Japan would attack the Panama Canal,
territory of a third power. The ORANGE Hawaii, and even the west coast, but no
war, as envisaged by the planners, was a real danger that Japan could seize and
war that was to be fought entirely in the occupy any of these places. But in the
Pacific, with the decisive action to take unlikely event of a conflict between
place in the waters off the Asiatic coast. Great Britain and the United States,
These assumptions by the military there was a real possibility of invasion of
strategists of the Army and Navy were the United States as well as attacks
entirely justified by the existing inter- against the Canal and American interests
national situation and reflected a reason- in the Caribbean area. In such a war,
able estimate of the most probable threat the major threat clearly would lie in the
to American interests, an estimate that Atlantic, Plans developed to meet this
was shared by most responsible officials remote danger, in contrast to ORANGE,
during these years. But the planners did called for the immediate deployment of
not, indeed could not, ignore other possi- the bulk of the U.S. Fleet to the Atlantic
bilities, no matter how remote. Thus, and large-scale ground operations, defen-
during the same years in which they sive in nature, to deprive the enemy of
labored on ORANGE, the Joint Board bases in the Western Hemisphere. As in
Planners considered a variety of other ORANGE, it was assumed that neither side
contingencies that might require the use would have allies among the great powers
of American military forces. The most of Europe and Asia, and no plans were
serious if not the most likely of these made for an invasion of the enemy's
was a war with Great Britain alone homeland by an American expeditionary
(RED) arising from commercial rivalry force. This was to be a limited war in
between the two nations, or with Great which the United States would adopt a
Britain and Japan (RED-ORANGE) . The strategic defensive with the object of
latter contingency was conceded by all frustrating the enemy's assumed objec-
tive in opening hostilities.
25
Hector Bywater, Sea Power in the Pacific: A The problems presented by a RED-
Study of the American-Japanese Naval Problem
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1921), pp.
ORANGE coalition, though highly theo-
256-57. retical, were more complicated. Here
the American strategists had to face all seas possessions to capture, and imposed
the possibilities of an ORANGE and a RED on the American people a restraint
war—seizure of American possessions in inconsistent with their traditions and
the western Pacific, violation of the Mon- spirit. Also, it involved serious and hu-
roe Doctrine, attacks on the Panama miliating defeats in the Pacific during
Canal, Hawaii, and other places, and, the first phase of the war and the almost
finally, the invasion of the United States certain loss of outlying possessions in
itself. Basically, the problem was to that region.
prepare for a war in both oceans against But the strategic offensive-defensive
the two great naval powers, Great Britain had definite advantages. It enabled the
and Japan. United States to conduct operations in
As the planners viewed this problem, close proximity to its home bases and
the strategic choices open to the United to force the enemy to fight at great dis-
States were limited. Certainly the United tance from his own home bases at the
States did not have the naval strength end of a long line of communications.
to conduct offensive operations simul- Moreover, the forces raised in the process
taneously in both the Atlantic and Pacific of producing a favorable decision in the
Oceans; it must adopt a strategic de- Atlantic would give the United States
fensive on both fronts or else assume the such a superiority that Japan might well
strategic offensive in one theater while negotiate rather than fight the United
standing on the defensive in the other. States alone, "It is not unreasonable to
The recommended solution to this prob- hope," the planners observed, "that the
lem—and it was only a recommended situation at the end of the struggle with
solution, for no joint war plan was ever RED may be such as to induce ORANGE
adopted—was "to concentrate on obtain- to yield rather than face a war carried to
ing a favorable decision" in the Atlantic the Western Pacific." 26
and to stand on the defensive in the Paci- The strategic concept adopted deter-
fic with minimum forces. This solution mined the missions, theaters of opera-
was based on the assumption that since tion, and major tasks of U.S. forces. The
the Atlantic enemy was the stronger Navy's main task, in the event of a simul-
and since the vital areas of the United taneous attack in both oceans would be
States were located in the northeast, the to gain control of the North Atlantic and
main effort of the hostile coalition would to cut the enemy's line of communica-
be made there. For this reason, the ini- tions to possible bases in the New World,
tial effort of the United States, the plan- in Canada and the Caribbean; the
ners argued, should be in the Atlantic. Army's task would be to capture these
A strategic offensive-defensive in a two- bases, thus denying Britain the oppor-
front war, American strategists recog- tunity to launch attacks against the
nized, entailed serious disadvantages. It United States. The principal theater of
gave the hostile coalition freedom of 26
Proposed Joint Estimate and Plan—RED-ORANGE,
action to attack at points of its own prepared in WPD (Army) and approved by CofS, 3
choosing, compelled the United States June 1930, as basis for joint plan, G-3 Obsolete Plans
Reg Doc 245-C. Additional material on RED-ORANGE
to be prepared to meet attacks practi- may be found in the same file, 245-A through F and
cally everywhere, exposed all U.S. over- in WPD 3202. No joint plan was ever approved.
operations in a RED-ORANGE war, assum- the mood of Congress, and military ne-
ing Canada would side with Britain, cessity. And with each change the gap
would be, for the Navy, the Western between American commitment to the
North Atlantic, the Caribbean and West defense of the Philippines and the forces
Indian waters; for the Army, those areas the United States was willing to commit
that could be used by RED or ORANGE to to this defense became wider. By 1938
launch an invasion. Operations in the the dichotomy between national policy
main theater would eventually bring and military strategy in the Far East had
about the defeat of enemy forces in North made the task of the planners charged
America, the economic exhaustion but with the defense of America's position in
not the total defeat of Great Britain, and that region all but impossible.
finally a negotiated peace with Japan on The first revision of ORANGE came in
terms favorable to the United States. November 1926 and was designed to cor-
This plan for a RED-ORANGE war was rect ambiguities in the original plan and
admittedly unrealistic in terms of the to clear up the confusion in regard to
international situation during the 1920'5 timing and forces. This was done by
and 1930's. The military planners knew designating M-day, the date on which a
this as well as and better than most and general mobilization would go into effect,
often noted this fact in the draft plans as the starting point for the plan. On
they wrote.27 But as a strategic exercise that day, the actions required to imple-
it was of great value, for it forced the
ment the plan would begin, and from
military planners to consider seriouslythat day were measured the phases speci-
the problems presented by a war in fied in the plan.
which the United States would have to The 1926 plan clearly specified Hawaii
fight simultaneously in the Atlantic and
as the point of assembly for troops and
Pacific Oceans. In an era when most supplies. Convoys were to be formed
war planning was focused on the Pacificthere for the journey westward. But the
and when Japan seemed the most likely assumption of the earlier plan that rein-
enemy, this experience may have seemed forcements would sail directly to the
irrelevent. But it was to prove im- Philippines—a doubtful assumption—
mensely useful in the plans developed was dropped in the 1926 plan. The Mar-
for World War II. shall, Caroline, and Mariana Islands, it
was recognized, would have to be brought
Strategic Dilemma under American control first, and bases
established in one or more of these
Between 1924 and 1938 the ORANGE island groups to guard the line of
plan was revised many times in response communications.28
to changes in the international situation,
Reg Doc 245-F; Ltr, Dir ONI to Dir WPD, 27 Jun
27
In 1923, the Army draft of RED-ORANGE started 35, sub: Jt Estimate of Situation, RED-ORANGE, copy
with the statement, "Under existing conditions a in WPD 3202. By 1935, planning for such a war had
coalition of RED and ORANGE is unlikely," and twelve virtually ended.
28
years later the Director of Naval Intelligence, com- Joint Army-Navy Basic War Plan ORANGE, 6 Oct
menting on another draft plan, stated that a RED- 26; Ltr, JPC to JB, 11 Oct 26, sub: Revision of Plan
ORANGE combination was "highly improbable" in the ORANGE; Mins, JB Mtg, 14 Oct 26, all in JB 325, ser.
next decade, if at all. Army Draft RED-ORANGE, 1923, 280.
Not satisfied with these changes, the Within three months, the new plan was
planners proposed additional revisions completed. Though it retained the orig-
in November of 1926, with the result inal concept of a naval advance across the
that the Joint Board directed the prepara- Pacific, it allowed more time to assemble
tion of an entirely new plan.29 A differ- reinforcements and paid more attention
ence of opinion became apparent almost to securing the line of communications.
immediately as the planners searched for Forces in the Philippines were assigned
a strategic formula that would produce the primary mission of holding the en-
victory in a war with Japan. One group trance to Manila Bay (Bataan and Cor-
argued for a strategic offensive in the regidor) , and the secondary mission of
western Pacific as the only way to exert holding the bay area "as long as consistent
sufficient pressure on Japan to win the with the successful accomplishment of
war, and the other for a strategic defense, the primary mission." 32
that is, the retention of the bulk of That there was even then little expec-
America's naval strength east of Hawaii, tation that the Philippines could be held
as the preferable course. is evident in the Army's estimate of the
The advocates of the defensive hoped enemy's capacities as compared to its own.
to gain victory over Japan by economic Japan, it noted, could raise and transport
pressure and raids on Japanese com- to the Philippines a force of 300,000 men
merce, but conceded that this strategy in 30 days. Within 7 days of an attack,
would expose the Philippines, Guam, it could have 50,000 to 60,000 men off
and Samoa to attack and would probably Luzon, within 15 another 100,000. The
cut off trade to the Far East. The strength Americans would have to meet this at-
of a defensive strategy, it was argued, lay tack with the forces then present in the
in the fact that it would make the west Philippines: 11,000 troops of which 7,000
coast and Hawaii "impregnable against were Filipinos, a native constabulary
attack," would cause little interference numbering about 6,000 men, and an air
in the economy of the United States, "and component consisting of nine bombers
would still permit our government to and eleven pursuit planes. So great a
employ the political and industrial power discrepancy made any hope for a success-
and the great wealth of the country in an ful defense mere illusion. The best that
attempt to cut off Japanese world mar- could be hoped for under such circum-
kets to both export and import." 30 stances was a delaying action that might
Faced with this choice of strategies, the buy enough- time for the fleet to arrive
Joint Board elected the former and on 26 with reinforcements.
January 1928 directed the planners to The move to grant the Philippines
prepare a plan based on the concept of a their independence, which was finding
strategic offensive.31 increasing support among the American
29
people and in Congress in the early
Ltr, JPC to JB, 26 Nov 26, sub: Revision of
ORANGE, JB 325, ser. 280.
30 32
Ltr, JPC to JB, 9 Jan 28, sub: Joint Estimate of Joint Basic War Plan ORANGE, 24 Apr 28, JB 325,
Situation Blue-ORANGE, and Joint Army-Navy War ser. 280. Other papers relating to the plan are in the
Plan ORANGE, JB 325, ser. 280. same file. The plan was approved by the Secretary of
31
Memo, JB for JPC, 26 Jan 28, sub: Joint Army- the Navy on 19 June 1928, and by the Secretary of
Navy Basic War Plan ORANGE, JB 325, ser. 280. War on 10 July.
1930's, complicated enormously the prob- the use of Manila Bay. But the enemy
lems of Pacific strategy and precipitated could reach Manila from the land side
a number of reviews and studies by the and deny the U.S. Fleet a sheltered har-
planners of the effect of such a step. The bor in which to overhaul and repair
conclusion of these studies was that the major fleet units. It would be necessary,
islands represented a powerful military therefore, for the fleet to seize and de-
asset to the United States and that their velop bases as it moved across the Pacific,
retention was necessary to support Amer- and this process, he estimated, would take
ican policy in the Far East. The with- two or three years. Certainly the small
drawal of the United States from these garrison in the Philippines could not
islands, asserted the joint planners, would resist that long. Unless the American
upset the balance of power in the Far people were willing to spend large sums
East, give Japan a free hand in the west- for the defense of the islands—and there
ern Pacific, and force the abandonment of was in 1933 not the slightest hope that
the open-door policy. Though inade- they would—the Corregidor commander
quately defended and far removed from and his superior, the commander of the
the nearest American base in Hawaii, the Philippine Department, both advised
Philippines were, in the opinion of the that the United States arrange for the
Washington planners, of great strategic neutralization of the Philippines, with-
importance, indispensable in a war draw its forces from the Far East, and
against Japan. "We should relinquish adopt the line Alaska-Oahu-Panama as
our bases," they concluded, "only when the "strategic peacetime frontier in the
we are prepared to relinquish our posi- Pacific."
tion as a nation of major influence in The planners in Washington, what-
the affairs of Asia and the Western ever their personal convictions may have
Pacific." 33 been, did not accept this view. Indeed,
From the Philippines came a strong they could not, for national policy dic-
dissenting voice. To the officers stationed tated that the Philippines must be de-
in the islands, the plan to hold out against fended, no matter how hopeless the
a powerful Japanese attack until rein- assignment seemed to those responsible
forcements arrived seemed nothing less for its defense. The withdrawal of
than self-delusion. "To carry out the United States forces from the Philippines
present ORANGE plan," wrote the com- and from China was a political ques-
mander of the Corregidor defenses, "with tion and the decision rested with the
its provisions for the early dispatch of President and Congress.
our fleet to Philippine waters, would be From the military point of view, the
literally an act of madness." 34 Corregi- Army planners in Washington found the
dor, he admitted, could probably hold assumptions of the Philippine command-
out for about a year and thus deny Japan ers unwarranted. The field commanders,
33
Ltr, JPC to JB, sub: Independence of Phil Is, they maintained, had stressed the concept
28 Feb 34, JB 305, ser. 525. See also JB 305, ser. 499 of an offensive in the western Pacific,
for earlier views. but the plan did not require the immedi-
34
Memo, Brig Gen Stanley D. Embick for CG Phil
Dept, 19 Apr 33, sub: Mil Policy of U.S. in Phil Is, ate advance of the fleet westward "unless
and 1st Ind, Hq Phil Dept, 25 Apr 33, WPD 3251-15. the situation existing . . . justifies such
action."35 Instead, the fleet would ad- not carry out their missions under the
vance step by step through the mandates, ORANGE plan. The "spectacular rise" of
taking such islands as it needed and con- Japan as a military power, together with
structing advance bases before moving the improvement of military aviation,
on. It was just this course, the Army and increases in the speed and armament
planners pointed out, that the Navy now of surface vessels, nullified, in their
favored. judgment, the value of Manila Bay as a
To the Washington experts the idea base. The time had come, it seemed to
that the Philippines could be neutralized them, to make a decision on American
by agreement with other powers was policy. If the United States intended to
completely unrealistic. They thought it defend the islands—and their defense
"highly improbable of attainment," at was basic to the ORANGE plan—even after
least so long as the United States re- they were granted independence, then
tained military and naval bases in the naval and land forces would have to be
islands. When the Philippines became increased, those treaties prohibiting its
fully independent, it might be possible fortification abrogated, and a base ade-
to follow this course, provided that the quate for maintaining the fleet con-
United States withdrew all of its forces. structed. If the United States intended
The Army planners in Washington to withdraw and relinquish its control
dismissed also the fear that Japan would over the Philippines and responsibility
attack the United States in the near fu- for their defense, then, said the two com-
ture. In their view, Japan was too manders, only such American forces as
dependent upon trade with the United would be needed to maintain order dur-
States to risk a war that would place all ing the transition period should be kept
her gains on the Asiatic mainland in in the islands.37
jeopardy. "Only by adoption on the part The decision of the Joint Board settled
of the United States of a policy of armed none of the questions raised by the Asi-
intervention," they concluded, "would atic Fleet and Philippine Department
ORANGE be justified in bringing on a commanders. National policy was not
war." 36 within its province and it could only as-
In March 1934, when the Tydings- sert that the Philippines would be de-
McDuffie act granting the Philippines fended and that reinforcements would
their independence by 1946 was passed, be forthcoming, as planned in ORANGE,
the Army and Navy commanders in the in the event of war. The board was for-
Philippines reopened the question of tified in this view by the Army planners
American strategy in the Far East. In a who felt that the existing force in the
joint letter to their respective chiefs the Philippines was large enough to give
two commanders asserted that, in view "reasonable assurance" that Manila Bay
of the reductions in military and naval could be held, and by the belief of the
strength in the Philippines, they could naval planners that reinforcements could
35 37
Memo, Chief, WPD for CofS, 12 Jun 33, sub: Mil Ltr, CinC Asiatic Fleet and CG Phil Dept to CNO
Policy
36
of U.S. in Phil Is, WPD 3251-15. and CofS, 1 Mar 34, sub: Inadequacy of Present Mil
Ibid. and Naval Forces in Phil Area ..., JB 325, ser. 533.
be convoyed across the Pacific in time to Army planners. Japan had revealed its
avert disaster.38 expansionist aims in Manchuria and in
Hardly had this decision been made China, had placed a veil of secrecy over
when the ORANGE plan came under scru- the mandated islands, withdrawn from
tiny again. This time it was General the League of Nations and from the
Douglas MacArthur, then Chief of Staff, naval limitations agreements of 1922 and
who called for its revision to bring it 1930, and was rapidly building up its
into conformity with the new mobiliza- military strength and naval forces. The
tion plan and the 4-army organization situation in Europe was threatening, too,
of the field forces. These changes did with Hitler and Mussolini beginning to
not affect the basic concept of the plan, test their new found strength. Under
but during the discussions the Navy the circumstances, the Philippine Islands
planners proposed a new line of action, might well prove a liability, draining off
foreshadowed in 1928, calling for an ad- the forces needed to defend Hawaii, the
vance in progressive stages across the Panama Canal, and the continental
Pacific through the mandated islands, United States.
seizing in turn the Marshalls and Caro- In recognition of the growing threat
lines and developing there the bases in Europe and the Far East, the Secre-
needed to secure the line of communica- taries of the War and Navy Departments
tions to the western Pacific. The Ma- in the fall of 1935 called upon the Joint
rine and Army troops to carry out these Board to re-examine America's military
operations were to sail from the west position in the Far East. At the same
coast in echelons, the first leaving for the time, they asked Secretary of State Cor-
Marshalls twelve days after M-day. In- del Hull to designate a State Department
corporated into the 1935 revision of the representative to meet with the board.
ORANGE plan, this concept underscored How seriously the Secretaries regarded
the importance of holding Manila Bay the situation may be judged by their
to provide a base for the fleet when it note to Hull. "The cumulative efforts
finally fought its way through with of successive developments during the
reinforcements.39 past two decades have so weakened our
Despite the careful plans to hold the military position vis-a-vis Japan," they
Philippines in case of a Japanese attack, wrote, "that our position in the Far East
the view that the islands could not be is one that may result not only in our
held and that it would take several years being forced into war but into a war that
to establish naval superiority in the would have to be fought under condi-
western Pacific spread rapidly among the tions that might preclude its successful
38
Memo, Brig Gen C. R. Kilbourne for Army Mem- prosecution." 40
bers, JPC, 1 May 34, sub: Mil Policy in Phil Is, WPD The Secretaries' action set off another
3251—18; Ltr, JB to Secy War, 20 Jun 34, sub: Inade- round of discussions over strategy that
quacy of Present Mil and Naval Forces ..., JB 325,
ser. 533.
39 40
Ltrs, MacArthur to JB, 18 Jun 35; JPC to JB, 23 Ltr, Actg Secy War and Secy Navy to Secy State,
Apr 35; JB to Secy War, 8 May 35, all titled Revision 26 Nov 35, JB 305, ser. 573. Stanley K. Hornbeck,
of Joint Army-Navy Basic War Plan ORANGE and Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs, was ap-
filed in JB 325, ser. 546. The Secretaries of War and pointed the State Department representative. Ltr,
Navy approved the revised plan on 9 May 1935. Hull to Woodring, 27 Nov 35, same file.
the use of the fleet in offensive operations
west of Hawaii, and the acceptance of
the strategic triangle would leave the
Navy with little to do other than patrol
the critical area and fend off an enemy
attack.
These differences were fundamental
and the planners, unable to reach agree-
ment, submitted separate reports. The
Army members recommended that, when
the Philippines became independent, the
United States should withdraw entirely
from the islands and from China; the
Navy members, that no decision on
America's future military policy in the
Far East should be made at this time but
should await a complete re-examination
of the ORANGE plan.
This was hardly an acceptable basis
for decision by the Joint Board, and
GENERAL MACARTHUR again they referred the problem to their
planners. This time the planners agreed
ended in one more revision of ORANGE. by avoiding the issue, and in May 1936
The case for the Army planners was sum- submitted a revision of ORANGE which
marized by Brig. Gen. Stanley D. Em- restricted the mission of the Philippine
bick, Chief of the War Plans Division garrison to holding the entrance to Ma-
and long associated with the Philippines nila Bay, that is, Corregidor and its
and Pacific strategy. Reliance on a base neighboring islands. Up to that time it
that was inadequately defended, he ob- had been required to hold the Manila
served, was to invite disaster. American Bay area as long as possible. The naval
strategy in the Pacific, he insisted, should concept of a progressive movement
concentrate on holding the strategic tri- t h r o u g h t h e m a n d a t e s remained
angle, Alaska-Hawaii-Panama. Such a unchanged.
course would place the United States in Though the Army planners had failed
an invulnerable position and permit its to win their point, their efforts did result
military and naval forces to conduct in a review of the Hawaiian defenses and
operations "in such a manner that will to an emphasis on their importance in
promise success instead of national the revised ORANGE plan. The mission
disaster."41 of the Hawaiian garrison was stated sim-
The naval planners were of a different ply: to hold Oahu "as a main outlying
opinion. All their plans were based on naval base," and provision was made for
41
a defense reserve for seventy days, the
App. A to Memo initialed S.D.E., 2 Dec 35, sub:
Mil Aspects of ... Retention of U.S. of ... Phil Is, JB
maximum time required for the fleet to
305, ser. 573. reach Hawaiian waters. Prophetically,
the plan recognized the danger of a sur- would provide for "a position of readi-
prise raid and pointed out that a success- ness" on the line Alaska-Hawaii-Panama
ful defense would depend "almost wholly —the so-called "strategic triangle." In
upon our not being totally surprised by addition, the planners were to make
the enemy," and would "require an ef- "exploratory studies and estimates" of
ficient intelligence service, not only in the various courses of action to be fol-
the Hawaiian Islands but elsewhere." 42 lowed after the position of readiness had
It was abundantly clear by now that been assumed.44
the Philippine garrison would not be In less than two weeks the Joint Plan-
able to hold out until such time—vari- ning Committee reported its inability to
ously estimated at from two to three reach an agreement. The Army mem-
years—as the fleet could arrive with rein- bers, reading their instructions literally,
forcements. This fact was never explicitly wanted to restrict themselves to the area
stated but, significantly, the Army's 1936 specified by the board and draw up a
ORANGE plan, unlike earlier plans, made plan, defensive in nature, which would
no provision for reinforcements. The provide for the security of the conti-
defense would have to be conducted by nental United States and the Pacific
the peacetime garrison, a force of about Ocean as far as Hawaii. A war plan,
10,000men, plus the Philippine Army they reasoned, must take into account
then being organized by General Mac- political and economic factors and it
Arthur. 43 was impossible at this time to determine
The debate over Pacific and Far East whether the United States would be
strategy continued through 1936, when willing to fight an unlimited war against
Japan joined Germany and Italy in the Japan. With the European Axis clearly
Anti-Comintern Pact, and into 1937. In in mind they pointed out that political
the fall of that year, after Japan embarked considerations might require limited
on its war of aggression in China, the action and purely defensive operations in
Joint Board again ordered a re-examina- the Pacific. Moreover, the forces avail-
tion of existing plans, which it considered able at the outbreak of war would hardly
"unsound in general" and "wholly inap- be adequate for assuming the defense of
plicable" to the international situation. vital areas in the Western Hemisphere.
What it wanted from its planning com- To uncover these positions for an offen-
mittee was a new ORANGE plan that sive in the far Pacific, the Army planners
42
Memo, Krueger for CofS, etc, 14 Feb 36, sub: Mil
declared, would be foolhardy indeed.45
and Naval Position in Far East, with Incls dated 6 The Navy members of the Joint Plan-
Feb and 5 Mar 36, JB 305, ser. 573; Ltr, JB to Secy ning Committee took the position that
War, 19 May 36, sub: Revision of Joint Army and
Navy Basic War Plan ORANGE, JB 325, ser. 570; Ltrs,
American strategy could not be limited
JPC to JB 13 May 26, sub: US Forces, Hawaiian Is, to a purely defensive position of readi-
and JB to Secy War, 19 May 36, same sub, JB 325, ser. ness but should aim at the defeat of the
580; Ltr, JB to Secy War, 9 Dec 36, sub: Changes in
ORANGE, JB 325, ser. 594.
43 44
Army Strategical Plan ORANGE, 1936 Revision, JB Memos, JB for JPC, 10 Nov 37, sub: Joint Basic
325, sers. 546 and 325. For MacArthur's plans to War Plan ORANGE, JB 325, ser. 617; Embick to WPD,
build a Philippine Army, see Louis Morton, The 3 Nov 37, same sub. AGO 225.
45
Fall of the Philippines, UNITED STATES ARMY Draft Memo, Krueger, 22 Nov 37, sub: Some
IN WORLD WAR II (Washington, 1953), pp. 8-13. Thoughts on Joint War Plans, AGO 225.
enemy. If it failed to do that, it was not,

in the view of the naval planners, a real-
istic guide for the services in time of
war.46
Once war began, the Navy members
argued, production would be quickly
increased to provide the means required
for both the security of the continental
United States and for offensive opera-
tions in the Pacific. While these forces
were being assembled, the Navy was
prepared to take the offensive beyond
Hawaii into Japanese territory. Should
the European Axis give aid to the enemy,
the planners assumed that the United
States would have allies to provide the
assistance needed by the U.S. Fleet to
maintain naval superiority over Japan
and to permit the projection of Ameri-
can naval power into the Western Pacific.
GENERAL EMBICK, Chief, Army War
"The character, amount, and location of
Plans Division, 1935.
allied assistance," they added, "cannot
be predicted."47
The separate reports submitted by the in readiness" for the Pacific coast and the
Army and Navy members of the Joint strategic triangle. This last, the board
Planning Committee put the choice be- further directed, was to be the Army's
tween the opposing strategies squarely job; the Navy's task would consist of
up to the Joint Board. The board "offensive operations against ORANGE
avoided this choice by issuing a new armed forces and the interruption of
directive to the planners on 7 December ORANGE vital sea communications."
1937. Suggested by the Chief of Naval Finally, the planners were to recommend
Operations, Admiral William D. Leahy, the forces and materiel which would be
this directive attempted to compromise required by each of the services to accom-
the differing interpretations of the Army plish its mission in the new plan.48
and Navy planners, but gave the edge to Even under these revised instructions,
the latter. The new plan, the board now the planners were unable to agree on the
specified, should have as its basic objec- best way to protect American interests
tive the defeat of Japan and should pro- in the Pacific and Far East in the event
vide for "an initial temporary position of war with Japan. The Army planners,
thinking possibly of the situation in
46
Ltrs, Army and Navy Members JPC to JB, 29 and Europe, wished to maintain a defense
30 Nov 37, sub: Joint Basic War Plan ORANGE, JB position east of the 180th meridian—the
325, ser. 617. The Army plan is in Appendix A, the
48
Navy's in Appendix B. Directive, JB to JPC, 7 Dec 37, sub: Joint Basic
47
Ibid. War Plan ORANGE, JB 325, ser. 618.
outermost limits of the Hawaiian chain. Admiral Leahy asserted that "the only
Offensive operations to the west of that way that war, once begun, can be brought
line, they believed, should be under- to a successful conclusion is by making
taken only when necessary and they only the enemy want to stop fighting. . . .
with the specific authorization of the Prompt and effective injury to an enemy
President. Naval operations alone, they at a distance from our shores is the only
asserted, could not ensure the defeat of correct strategy to be employed." 51
Japan and ultimately the maximum Faced with another split report, the
efforts of the two services would be Joint Board turned over the task of
required. working out a compromise to General
Throughout their version of the plan, Embick and Rear Adm. James O.
the Army planners emphasized the defen- Richardson. These two, after a month
sive mission of the Army to defend the of discussion, finally submitted on 18
United States and its possessions. Though February 1938 a new ORANGE plan. This
they did not exclude the Philippines, plan embodied the essential points of
neither did they provide for augmenting each of the services with the result that
the forces there as they did for American its provisions were sometimes less than
territory east of the 180th meridian. The clear. In return for the Army's removal
defense of the Islands would have to be of the proviso that operations west of
conducted by the forces already assigned the Hawaiian Islands would require
plus whatever additional troops were Presidential authorization, the Navy
available locally.49 took out its references to an offensive
The naval planners, still offensive- war, the destruction of the Japanese
minded so far as the Pacific was con- forces, and the early movement of the
cerned, emphasized in their version of fleet into the western Pacific. The result
the plan operations designed to bring was a broad statement of strategy calling
about the defeat of Japan. Thus, they for "military and economic pressure,"
made the destruction of ORANGE forces increasing in severity until "the national
the primary mission of joint and separate objective," the defeat of Japan, was
Army and Navy forces. Nor did they attained. Initial operations under this
place any limits on operations in the concept were to be primarily naval but
western Pacific, merely repeating the would be coupled with measures required
time-honored formula that victory would to ensure the security of the continental
be won by establishing "at the earliest U n i t e d States, Alaska, O a h u , and
practicable date, U.S. naval power in the Panama.52
western Pacific in strength superior to Though each of the services retreated
that of ORANGE and to operate offen- from its original position, each won rec-
sively in that area."50 This preference ognition of principles it held important.
for the offensive was clearly reflected in 51
Joint Committee on the Investigation of the
his testimony to the Senate Naval Affairs Pearl Harbor Attack, 79th Cong., 1st sess., Hearings,
Committee the following February when pt. I, p. 294.
52
Joint Basic War Plan ORANGE, 21 Feb 38, JB 325,
49
Ltr, JPC to JB, 27 Dec 37, sub: Joint War Plan ser. 618. The plan was approved by the Secretary of
ORANGE, JB 325, ser. 618. the Navy on 26 February and by the Secretary of War
50
Ibid. two days later.
The Navy retained its concept of a pro- strategic triangle, the coastal defenses of
gressive advance across the Pacific, but the United States, and oversea posses-
avoided commitment on the time re- sions. At the same time, the Navy would
quired for such a move — an essential make preparations, in co-operation with
point in any plan for the defense of the the Army, to open the offensive as soon
Philippines. The Army, on its side, as possible.
gained recognition of the primary impor- The plan outlined also the specific
tance of the strategic triangle formed by measures that would have to be taken
Alaska, Oahu, and Panama to the defense to support offensive operations. These
of the United States. The earlier provi- included the following:
sion for the defense of Manila Bay was 1. Mobilization of Army forces, ini-
retained, but the omission of any refer- tially 750,000 men, excluding strategic
ence to the reinforcement of the Philip- reserves ready if needed to support the
pine garrison or to the length of time Navy.
it would take the fleet to advance across 2. Mobilization of naval vessels and
the Pacific was a tacit admission that the an increase in personnel strength to
planners did not believe the position 320,000 (including marines).
could be held. 3. An increase in the strength of the
A war with Japan, the ORANGE plan Marine Corps to 35,000 men.
of 1938 assumed, would be preceded by 4. Additional increases in all services
a period of strained relations, during at a later date if necessary.
which the United States would have time 5. Plans for the movement of troops
to prepare for mobilization. No formal to vital areas for their defense and to
declaration of war was expected; when ports for overseas movement.
war came the planners expected it to Having assumed a position of readiness
come with a sudden surprise attack—an and completed initial preparations, the
assumption that had been made in every military and naval forces of the United
ORANGE plan since the Russo-Japanese States would then be free to meet any
war. They thought, too, that American unexpected situation that might develop,
forces at the start of the war would be including, presumably, an attack in the
strong enough to permit naval opera- Atlantic. If none did, the Navy could
tions west of Pearl Harbor, and that no then proceed to take the offensive against
assistance Japan could receive—presum- Japan with operations directed initially
ably from Germany and Italy — would against the mandated islands and extend-
materially affect the balance of naval ing progressively westward across the
power in the Pacific. Pacific. These operations combined with
On the outbreak of a war, the United economic pressure (blockade) would, it
States would first assume a position of was believed, result in the defeat of
readiness to meet all emergencies that Japan and a settlement that would assure
might arise, a point the Army planners the peace and safeguard American
had insisted upon. During this initial interests in the Far East.53
period, the Army and Navy would place The prospective loss of the Philippine
priority on such measures as were re-
53
quired to defend the west coast, the Ibid
base in 1946 and the abrogation by "should the fleet ever be called upon
Japan of the Washington Treaty limita- for operations in the Far East." 56 And
tions on fortifications led after 1936 to even if the United States withdrew from
a renewed interest in Guam. The whole the western Pacific, the base at Guam, as
problem of naval bases came under Con- Admiral Leahy pointed out, would have
gressional scrutiny when a board headed great value as a deterrent to any nation
by Rear Adm. Arthur J. Hepburn sub- "contemplating a hostile move from the
mitted its report on naval bases in general area towards the Hawaiian
December 1938. The findings of the Islands." 57 But Congress, after a heated
board, which had been appointed by debate, rejected the board's recommen-
Congress, reflected clearly the naval dations for fear of offending Japan, with
strategy of the day. Guam, it declared, the result that Guam, lying exposed at
should be developed into a fully equip- the southern end of the Marianas, was
ped fleet base with air and submarine left virtually undefended.
facilities. Such a project, it reminded The failure to fortify Guam, like the
the Congress, had been prepared earlier, refusal to strengthen the forces in the
but had been put aside because of the Philippines, reveals strikingly the dilem-
Washington Treaty. That treaty had ma of America's position in the Pacific
now expired and there was no longer any and Far East. National policy dictated
restriction on the military fortification of the defense of an insular position which,
Guam.54 in the opinion of the military planners,
The advantages of establishing a strong could not be defended with existing
base at Guam were enormous, in the forces. The ORANGE plan of 1938, with
view of the board. For one thing, it the compromise between an offensive
would greatly simplify the task of defend- and defensive strategy, was merely a
ing the Philippine Islands. In the opin- reflection of this contradiction between
ion of "the most authoritative sources" American interests and commitments in
such a base would make the islands the Pacific. The nation would not aban-
practically immune from attack, would don the Philippines but neither would
create "the most favorable conditions it grant the Army and Navy funds to
. . . for the prosecution of naval opera- ensure their defense. Nowhere in the
tions in the western Pacific," and would country, even where feeling against Japa-
contribute greatly to the defense of nese aggression in Asia ran highest, was
Hawaii and the continental United there firm support for military appro-
States.55 By limiting hostile naval opera- priations. Strong isolationist sentiment
tions to the south, a fortified base at supported a Congressional economy
Guam would also serve to protect the which by 1938 had so reduced the effec-
trade routes to the Netherlands Indies tiveness of the nation's armed forces as
and greatly simplify naval problems to make its outposts in the Pacific "a
distinct and exceedingly grave liability."
54
House Doc. 65, 76th Cong., 1st sess., Report on American policy had created a wide gap
Need of Additional Naval Bases To Defend the 56
Coast of the United States, Its Territories, and Pos-
57
Ibid.,p.27.
sessions
55 (Hepburn Board Report), pp. 27-28. Hearings, House Committee on Naval Affairs, 25
Ibid.,p.28. Jan-17 Feb 1939, p. 55.
between objectives and means and forced danger ahead, and a disposition to pre-
on its planners a compromise strategy pare the country's defenses, but the neg-
and the virtual abandonment of Guam lect of almost two decades could not be
and the Philippines. Already there was overcome in the three years of peace
a shift in sentiment, a recognition of the that remained.
CHAPTER II
Japanese Policy and Strategy,

1931-July 1941
It may even reasonably be said that the intensely sharp competitive
preparation for war by the nation is the real war, permanent, increasing;
and that battles are only a sort of public verification of mastery gained
during the "peace" intervals. WILLIAM JAMES
In the period between the two world mitted. Since the turn of the century,
wars, Japan sought to establish control when it had annexed the Philippines,
first of east Asia and then of the south- the United States had been inextricably
west Pacific. After a decade of liberal drawn into the confused politics and
ascendancy and acquiescence in the post- imperialist rivalries of the Far East.
World War I agreements, the extremists Despite the nation's traditional prefer-
in Japan gained power and embarked on ence for remaining aloof from world
a program of military preparation and affairs, it was abundantly clear that
territorial aggrandizement. First the America could not remain indifferent to
Japanese moved into Manchuria and any change in the status quo in the
then into China, where they soon be- Pacific or in Asia. John Hay had defined
came involved in a war that dragged on America's position in China in 1899, and
interminably and from which they could his statement—that there must be equal
extract neither victory nor honor. Hav- opportunity for trade, or an open door,
ing scrapped the Washington Treaty in China — remained the keystone of
system, they withdrew from the League American policy in the years that fol-
of Nations and from the naval disarma- lowed. It was inevitable, therefore, that
ment system established in 1922 and the United States would challenge the
1930. Gradually they moved toward a efforts of any power to gain a dominant
closer understanding with Germany and position on the mainland of Asia.
Italy, and, in 1940, turned south to the America's opposition to Japanese ex-
rich British, French, and Dutch colonies pansion in Asia, its insistence on the
of southeast Asia in search of raw mate- open-door policy and the integrity of
rials they needed to carry on the war China, led to mutual distrust and sus-
in China. picion. No Japanese government could
The United States opposed all these accept America's solution for the deep-
moves as vigorously as circumstances per- ening crisis and remain in power; nor
would the United States accede under importance. Moreover, they could, by
any conditions to the dismemberment resigning from the Cabinet, force the
of China. There was no escape from this resignation of the Premier and the for-
dilemma and by mid-1941, despite the mation of a new government, for under
utmost efforts of men of good will on the Constitution, no Cabinet could exist
both sides of the Pacific, Japan was mov- without the War and Navy Ministers.
ing rapidly down the road that led to An even more significant aspect of the
Pearl Harbor. relationship of the services to the govern-
ment of prewar Japan was the control of
Japanese Expansion the Army and Navy over their respective
Ministers. By custom, and after 1936 by
The impulse to expansion and domi- law, the War and Navy Ministers were
nation of East Asia had its roots deep in chosen from among the senior officers
Japanese tradition, patriotism, and eco- (3-star officers or higher) on the active
nomic necessity; its strongest support list. Thus, the Army selected the Minis-
came from the militarists and extreme ter, who, if not himself a member of the
nationalists. In marked contrast to the General Staff, was almost certain to reflect
position of the armed forces in demo- its views. Opposition of the civil authori-
cratic countries, the Army in Japan had ties could be quickly overcome by the
a tradition of political leadership and threat of withdrawing the service Minis-
enjoyed a position high in the esteem of ters from the Cabinet. The Chiefs of
the people. It was not, as in the United the General Staffs had the right also to
States and Great Britain, the servant of report directly to the Emperor and had
the government, controlled through re- considerable freedom of action. So great
sponsible civil officials and by the power was their prestige and influence in politi-
of appropriation. Under the Japanese cal matters and so unlimited their ability
Constitution the Emperor commanded for independent action, that they could
the Army and Navy, and the Diet had virtually commit the government to a
little control over the organization of course of action, and the nation to war.2
the military forces.1 Despite the enormous power and
Military control in prewar Japan was prestige of the Army, the liberal and
exercised by the War and Navy Minis- moderate elements in Japan were not
ters and the General Staffs of the Army without influence. The decade of the
and Navy, not by the civil government. 1920's was theirs and during these years
The services were in a peculiarly inde- Japan followed a moderate course. This
pendent position. The War and Navy
Ministers, though members of the Cabi-
net, could go over the head of the Pre- 2
E. E. N. Causton, Militarism and Foreign Policy
mier and appeal directly to the throne in Japan (London: G. Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1936),
pp. 75-82; R. K. Reischauer, Japan, Government and
in military or naval matters of great Politics (New York: Ronald Press Company, 1939),
pp. 90-93. For a general description of the Japanese
high command, see Yale Candee Maxon, Control of
1
Under Articles 11, 12, and 62 of the Japanese Con- Japanese Foreign Policy: A Study of Civil-Military
stitution, the Diet had partial control of the budget Rivalry, 1930-1945 (Berkeley: University of Califor-
and this gave it some leverage over the military. nia Press, 1957).
JAPANESE POLICY AND STRATEGY, 1931-JULY 1941 47
course was based on the belief that the and dreams of expansion in Asia. By
limits of profitable armed expansion had 1931 the Chinese had already regained
been reached and that the future of the partial economic control of Manchuria
nation lay in peaceful economic expan- and were seeking to remove foreign
sion and co-operation with the United influence from China. The liberal gov-
States and Great Britain. It was this ernment of Japan had made clear its
view that made possible the signing of intention of maintaining Japanese rights
the Washington Treaties in 1921-22, in Manchuria, but by peaceful means.
which established the status quo in the The Army, doubtful of the efficacy of
Pacific, recognized the sovereignty and such means and acutely aware of the
territorial integrity of China, forbade strategic importance of Manchuria, de-
additional fortification of certain islands cided on bolder measures and in Septem-
in the Pacific, and limited capital ship ber 1931 seized control of key cities in
construction. Manchuria by force.
As the decade of the 1920's came to The seizure of Manchuria was the
an end, the popular discontent arising work of the Army extremists acting on
from the poverty and despair of world- their own authority and in defiance of
wide depression was channeled into na- government policy. Presented with a
tional and fascist movements. American fait accompli and fearing open revolt,
exclusion of Japanese immigrants in the government gave its reluctant con-
1924, although balanced by generous and sent to the Army's action and the Foreign
ready sympathy during the Tokyo earth- Office did its best to justify to the rest
quake, had strengthened the hand of the of the world this violation of the Wash-
discontented. Further, the acceptance ington Treaties, the Kellogg Peace Pact,
by the liberal government in 1930 of and the Covenant of the League of Na-
the extension of naval limitation to tions. But the Japanese troops in Man-
cruisers, destroyers, and submarines pro- churia, the Kwantung Army, did not
vided the advocates of expansion with stop there. Despite opposition in the
strong arguments for scrapping the Cabinet and even from the throne, the
entire Washington Treaty system, as Kwantung Army extended its control
well as the pretext for the assassination over the rest of Manchuria, established
of the Premier. Nationalist groups read- a puppet regime there, and began to
ily joined forces with the supporters of move into the northern provinces of
the Army and the extreme right to de- China. Nor did opposition from the
mand a reversal of the liberal program United States, whose Secretary of State,
and a return to the policy of expansion. Henry L. Stimson, informed Japan that
Events in China gave strong support his country could not recognize as legal
for the aggressive policy urged by the this infringement on existing treaties or
expansionists. Under Chiang Kai-shek the violation of the open door policy in
the Chinese were displaying symptoms China, halt the Japanese Army. In 1933,
of a nationalism and unity which boded after the League of Nations adopted the
ill for Japanese interests in Manchuria strongly critical report of the Lytton
Commission, Japan withdrew from the eral movement opposed to fascism and
League.3 militarism and calling for a return to
The Manchurian incident was but the full parliamentary government began to
first step in the Army's rise to power. take form. Liberals in the Diet attacked
Having defied the government and set sharply the government's policy and criti-
the nation on a course opposed by the cized the War Ministry so strongly that
Cabinet, the Army gained virtual control it felt constrained to discipline some of
the following year, 1932, as a result of the extremists in the Army. The ex-
the celebrated incident of 15 May when tremists retaliated in February 1936,
a group of young Army and Navy officers after the victory of the liberals in the
terrorized Tokyo for several hours and elections of that month, with a full-scale
assassinated Premier Inukai. armed revolt against the government.
With the death of the Premier, party The mutineers, numbering 1,500 sol-
rule in Japan virtually ceased. The Em- diers led by twenty-two junior officers of
peror's advisers, recognizing that either the 1st and Guard Divisions (supported,
outright opposition to or complete ac- there is reason to believe, by other high-
ceptance of the Army's program would ranking officers), attacked members of
be equally disastrous, urged a middle the Cabinet, high court officials, and
course. The result was a series of com- even senior Army officers thought to
promise Cabinets in which the moderate be lukewarm to the cause. The Finance
and liberal elements opposed the dan- Minister and one of the most important
gerous policies of the militarists as far members of the high command were
as prudence would allow and yielded to k i l l e d , while the Premier himself
them when necessary.4 narrowly escaped assassination.
The balance thus achieved lasted only The government and the high com-
five years, years in which Japan re- mand reacted with vigor. Army leaders,
nounced its adherence to the naval dis- fearing that the forces they had raised
armament agreements of 1922 and 1930 might destroy them as well as their ene-
and made abundantly clear its opposi- mies, made serious efforts to restore dis-
tion to the Nine-Power Treaty of 1922 cipline. The revolt was soon suppressed
guaranteeing the sovereignty and terri- and the leading offenders court-mar-
torial integrity of China. In 1935 a lib- tialed and punished, though lightly.
3 Then followed an effective purge of the
The Japan Year Book, 1934 (Tokyo: Foreign Af-
fairs Association of Japan, 1934); Henry L. Stimson,
The Far Eastern Crisis (New York: Harper & Broth-
ers, 1936); International Military Tribunal for the ment, International Military Tribunal for the Far
Far East (IMTFE), Defense and Prosecution Cases of East, November 1948 (hereafter cited as IMTFE,
Japanese Aggression in Manchuria, Japanese War Judgment), pt. B, pp. 98-103, copy in OCMH. Unless
Crimes Files, National Archives; Political Strategy otherwise noted, the account which follows is based
Prior to Outbreak of War (in 5 parts), pt. I, Japanese on these sources, passim, and on Herbert Feis, The
Studies in World War II, 144, pp. 1-9, Mil Hist Sec, Road to Pearl Harbor, The Coming of the War Be-
Far East Command (FEC). This series was prepared tween the United States and Japan (Princeton:
by former Japanese Army and Navy Officers under Princeton University Press, 1950); Joseph W. Ballan-
the supervision of G-2, FEC. Both the original Japa- tine, "Mukden to Pearl Harbor: The Foreign Policies
nese version and translations are on file in OCMH. of Japan," Foreign Affairs, XXVII, No. 4 (July,
4
Reischauer, Japan, Government and Politics, pp. 1949), 651-64; and Maxon, Control of Japanese
154-57; Clyde, The Far East, pp. 600-604, 664; Judg- Foreign Policy, passim.
NEW ARMY-CONTROLLED JAPANESE CABINET, MARCH 1936. At left, War Minister

Terauchi in uniform, with Navy Minister Nagano at his left.
Army, directed by the War Minister and To determine just who made Army
the General Staff and designed to pre- policy is extremely difficult. Not even
vent unauthorized or untimely revolts the leading civilian statesmen of Japan
which the high command itself did not seem to have known, and Prince Aya-
favor.5 maro Konoye, thrice Premier and a poli-
The 26 February incident marked one tician who made co-operation with the
more step in the Army's rise to power. Army the keystone of his career, com-
Ten days after the mutiny, the Premier plained that he never knew where Army
resigned and a new government more opinion originated.6 But there was no
favorably disposed to the Army's pro- doubt about the essentials of this pro-
gram took office. From this time on, gram. Its basic objective was to make
Japanese policy must be read in terms Japan strong enough to become the un-
of military strategy.
6
Memoirs of Prince Konoye, in Pearl Harbor At-
5
IMTFE, Judgment, pt. B, pp. 113-19; Hugh Byas, tack: Hearings Before the Joint Committee on the
Government by Assassination (New York: Alfred A. Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack (Washing-
Knopf, 1942); Latourette, The History of Japan, p. ton, 1946), 39 Parts, (hereafter cited as Pearl Harbor
219; The Japan Year Book, 1939, pp. 134-36. Attack Hearings), pt. 20, exhibit 173, p. 4014.
challenged leader of Asia. This could increase their bodily strength and foster
be accomplished, the Japanese military sound thinking."7
leaders believed, only by the expansion The five Ministers carefully avoided
of the heavy industries necessary to sup- any reference to military action. Rather,
port a modern war machine, the inte- they stated explicitly that the expansion
gration of the economic resources of southward was to be gradual and peace-
Manchuria into the Japanese economy, ful, that every care would be exercised
the establishment of a firm position on "to avoid aggravating friendly relations
the Asiatic continent, and the acquisition with other nations" and "to allay the
of the strategic raw materials needed to Great Powers' suspicion and apprehen-
make the nation self-sufficient. Without sion toward the Empire."8 But the goals
these materials, most of which could be these Ministers set for Japan clearly im-
found in the East Indies and Malaya, plied military action. The Soviet Union
Japan's pretensions to leadership in Asia would certainly oppose expansion in the
were empty shadows. north, and Great Britain and the United
The Army's program became the of- States could be expected to dispute any
ficial policy of the Japanese Government violation of the territorial integrity of
in August 1936. At that time the most China. To these opponents could be
important members of the Cabinet, in- added the French and the Dutch, who
cluding the Premier and the War, Navy, would challenge Japan's expansion
Foreign, and Finance Ministers, met to southward. Basic, therefore, to the new
fix the program of the new administra- administration's program was the success
tion. The agreement reached at that of the effort to increase the nation's mili-
meeting gave the Army and the nation- tary and naval might and its capacity to
alists all they wanted. Japan, the five wage war.
Ministers agreed, must acquire a "firm With agreement on the aims and
position" on the Asiatic continent—a methods of national policy, the Army-
euphemistic way of saying that China dominated Japanese Government moved
must be conquered; expand into south- closer to its natural allies, Germany and
east Asia to secure the bases and raw Italy, and on 25 November 1936 signed
materials needed to make the nation the Anti-Comintern Pact directed prin-
strong; and take steps to counter the cipally against Soviet Russia. The next
Russian menace to the north. The Min- move came in July 1937 when Japanese
isters had no difficulty in agreeing on military forces, after a trumped-up inci-
the measures required to achieve these dent near Peiping, marched into north-
objectives: the Army (including its air ern China. This action, like the
arm) and the Navy would have to be Manchurian incident, was taken by the
strengthened, trade and industry expand- Army alone, without the knowledge or
ed, and air and sea transportation im- approval of the Cabinet, but no difficul-
proved. Finally, the Ministers agreed
that to steel the national will and unify
7
public opinion for the coming emer- IMTFE, exhibit 216; Political Strategy Prior to
Outbreak of War, pt. I, Japanese Studies in World
gency, it would be necessary "to establish War
8 II, 144, app. 1.
good living conditions for the people, Ibid.
ties developed on that account in the first Japan was just as anxious to avoid an
phase. The government readily support- open break and when the Panay was
ed the Army, on condition that it exert sunk in December 1937, quickly apol-
every effort to prevent the spread of the ogized and made indemnity. But so
incident.9 long as Japan persisted in its efforts to
The vigor of the Chinese reaction conquer China and the United States
soon led to full-scale war, an eventuality continued to insist on the territorial in-
the Japanese military leaders neither ex- tegrity of China and to aid that nation,
pected nor desired.10 With command of no real solution of the China incident
the sea and air and with overwhelming or restoration of good relations between
superiority in men and equipment, the the two countries was possible.
Japanese were able to occupy quickly As the area of disagreement with the
the capital and the large coastal cities of United States and Great Britain grew
China. But they were never able to ex- larger, Japan moved closer to the Axis.
tend their control much beyond the To the military, the future of Japan was
navigable rivers and the railroads or to closely tied to the destiny of Nazi Ger-
bring the China incident to a successful many. The Anti-Comintern Pact had
close. It became an increasingly heavy already paid dividends. Hitler had re-
drain on the nation's resources and a fused to participate in the Brussels Con-
constant source of embarrassment to the ference of November 1937, called to seek
Army. a settlement of the conflict in China,
The United States, like the other pow- and had kept the Western Powers so pre-
ers with interests in China, could hardly occupied with European problems that
be expected to acquiesce in this new ven- they were unwilling to take any co-
ture and in the destruction of the Nine- ordinated action in the Far East. But
Power Treaty. In unmistakable terms when the Japanese sought a full political
it made clear to Japan that it still stood and military alliance which would free
by the open-door policy and the terri- them from the danger of Russian inter-
torial integrity of China, and that it ference and recognize their special posi-
considered Japan's action in China a vio- tion in China, Hitler countered with a
lation of existing treaties. At the same demand for military aid against Britain
time the United States Government acted and France. This the Japanese were not
with extreme caution and restraint, re- prepared to promise and for two years
sisting public pressure to boycott the the negotiations hung fire.
shipment of oil and scrap iron to Japan Meanwhile the relations between
and declining all offers to mediate in Japan and the United States steadily
the dispute. worsened. Six months after the sinking
of the Panay, the United States placed a
9
"moral embargo" on the export of air-
Political Strategy Prior to the Outbreak of War,
pt. I, app. 5, Japanese Studies in World War II, 144. craft and aircraft equipment to Japan,
10
Diary of Marquis Koichi Kido, submitted as an the first in a series of economic meas-
affidavit to IMTFE, p. 34. For a full account of the ures designed to deter Japanese aggres-
China incident from the Japanese point of view, see
Political Strategy Prior to Outbreak of War, pt. I,
sion. Japan responded in November by
Japanese Studies in World War II, 144. announcing its intention of establishing
JAPANESE TROOPS MARCHING THROUGH THE PEIPING GATE, September 1937.
a "Co-Prosperity Sphere" in east Asia were willing, however, to agree to lesser

and expressing a pious hope that other commitments in the hope that the United
nations would "understand the true States and Great Britain might thus be
intentions of Japan and adopt policies forced to accept the situation in China.
suitable for the new conditions."11 Both But the Army pressed for the full mili-
the United States and Great Britain rec- tary agreement demanded by Germany,
ognized this policy for what it was and and even planned to negotiate separately
countered with loans to the Chungking to secure such an alliance. Neither side
government. would give way.
By the spring of 1939 the Army was On 23 August 1939 Germany, without
ready to commit Japan fully to the Axis. Japan's knowledge, concluded a neutral-
But there was sharp disagreement in ity pact with Russia. A week later Ger-
the Cabinet. The Navy and Foreign many invaded Poland and the war in
Ministers insisted on an agreement Europe began. The German-Soviet Pact
directed primarily against the Soviet was a stunning blow to Japan's program
Union and refused to accept any com- for expansion and to the Army's pres-
mitment which might involve Japan in tige. The Japanese felt betrayed and
a war against the Western Powers. They bewildered and the Premier promptly
offered his resignation to the Emperor,
11
United States Relations with China, Dept of asserting bitterly that the failure of Ja-
State Pub 3573 (Washington, 1949), p. 21. pan's foreign policy had resulted from
KONOYE CABINET OF JUNE 1937. Circled faces are, from left, Admiral Yonai, Premier
Konoye, and General Sugiyama.
"the unreasonableness of the Army."12 two countries since 1911, and in Decem-
A combination of civilian statesmen and ber of 1939 prohibited Americans from
Navy leaders, taking advantage of the furnishing Japan with technical infor-
Army's political eclipse, then attempted mation and manufacturing rights for
to reorient national policy toward better the production of high-grade aviation
relations with Great Britain and the gasoline. After January 1940, when the
United States. The Cabinet formed for commercial treaty lapsed, the United
this purpose lasted only four months States was free to employ economic sanc-
and was succeeded by a compromise tions against Japan. Congress, in June
Cabinet headed by Admiral Mitsumasa of that year, passed the National Defense
Yonai, the former Navy Minister. Act which made it possible for the Presi-
All efforts to win over America and dent to prohibit exports to Japan and
Britain foundered on the issue of China. on 2 July President Franklin D. Roose-
On 26 July the United States had served velt put the export license system into
notice on Japan of its intention to abro- effect by restricting the shipment of arms
gate the commercial treaty which had and ammunition, certain strategic mate-
governed the trade relations between the rials such as aluminum, and airplane
parts.
12
Saionji-Harada Memoirs, 1931-1940 (24 parts Japanese sentiment, which had veered
with appendixes), Civil Intel Sec, G-2 FEC, copy in
OCMH, quoted in Feis, The Road to Pearl Harbor, toward the Western Powers after the
P-34. German-Soviet Pact, shifted back toward
Germany in the spring of 1940 as the hoped, could be accomplished peacefully,

Axis gained one victory after another in but if not, the Japanese intended to be
quick succession. Once more the Army ready, for since 1931 they had been pre-
point of view found favor and support. paring the nation for war.
The German-Soviet Pact had ruled out,
at least temporarily, expansion north- Economic and Military Preparations
ward, but the opportunities for easy con-
quest in the south were better than ever In the decade 1930-40, industrial pro-
once Holland and France had fallen. duction in Japan increased at a phenom-
The forces behind a full military and enal rate. In the opening year of the
political alliance with Germany could decade, Japanese industrial output was
now argue that such an alliance would valued at six billion yen and the em-
secure Japan on the north, discourage phasis was on the light industries; by
American interference in China, and 1941 production had increased fivefold
smooth the paths of empire to the south. and heavy industry constituted 72.7 per-
Once more overtures were made to the cent of the total.13
Germans. This time Hitler asked as The military significance of this sensa-
payment for supporting Japan's ambi- tional rise in industrial production can
tions in southeast Asia a Japanese com- be found in the emphasis on heavy in-
mitment to hold the United States at dustries, the basis of any modern mili-
bay by threatening Hawaii and the Phil- tary machine, and a measure of its
ippines if America entered the war in importance lies in the increase in annual
Europe. The Premier thought the price steel production from 1.8 to 6.8 million
too high, and the Army, now fully re- tons. In 1930 Japan had produced only
stored to its former prestige and political 500 vehicles and 400 aircraft. Ten years
influence, brought about the fall of the later the annual production of vehicles
Cabinet on 16 July 1940. Prince Konoye, was 48,000 units, and the Japanese air-
who had been Premier in 1938 and was craft industry was manufacturing over
favorable to the Army's program, took 5,000 planes annually. Shipbuilding in
over the reigns of government next. Japan showed a similar increase during
In July 1940 Japan stood ready to these years. Deliveries under the naval
embark on a course of unreserved expan- construction program in this period to-
sion to establish the new order in Greater taled 476,000 tons, and construction of
East Asia on the ruins of the crumbling merchant ships rose from 92,093 tons in
British, Dutch, and French Empires. 1931 to 405,195 tons in 1937.14
Only the United States was in a position
to check Japan's ambitions, but such 13
Jerome B. Cohen, Japan's Economy in War and
opposition, the Japanese believed, could Reconstruction (Minneapolis, Minn.: University of
be overcome with the assistance of Ger- Minnesota Press, 1949), p. 1; United States Strategic
Bombing Survey (USSBS), The Effects of Strategic
many and Italy. Once a military pact Bombing on Japan's War Economy (Washington,
with the Axis Powers had been signed 1946), p. 12.
and the war in China ended, then Japan 14
Cohen, Japan's Economy in War and Reconstruc-
tion, pp. 2-3; USSBS, Japanese Naval Shipbuilding
would be free to establish the new order (Washington, 1946), p. 1; USSBS, Japanese Merchant
in Asia. All this, the Japanese leaders Shipbuilding (Washington, 1947), pp. 4-5.
TABLE 1—JAPANESE MILITARY BUDGET, 1931-1940

(in millions of yen)
Source: Cohen, Japan's Economy in War and Reconstruction, p. S.
Much of this increase in industrial ed for rapid expansion.16 Some success

production, especially in the heavy in- was achieved in Manchuria under the
dustries, was due to government expend- 5-year plan but the program for Japan
itures for military purposes which rose had to be modified several times. The
sharply after 1936 as a result of the Feb- aviation and munitions industries made
ruary 1936 incident and the Army's rapid progress, the steel industry
ascendancy. (Table I) Military expendi- achieved a remarkable success, and the
tures after 1936 reflected military dom- production of machine tools surpassed
ination of political life. The entire the goals established. But other basic
economy of the nation was rigidly con- industries, such as the production of
trolled and oriented toward war; the synthetic oil and hydroelectric power,
armament industries were expanded, were limited by the shortage of raw
and every effort was made to stockpile materials, and, despite the most strenu-
strategic raw materials.15 ous efforts, failed to reach the goals set
The production of armaments after by the Army.17
1936 increased rapidly to meet the de- During these years the Japanese armed
mands of the China war. This increase forces also began building up stockpiles
was accomplished under a 5-year plan of essential supplies. Reserves of weap-
developed by the Army in 1937 and ons, ammunition, and other important
officially adopted by the Cabinet two military equipment were adequate, but
years later. Separate programs were es- those of certain strategic materials were
tablished for Japan, Manchuria, and 16
northern China, and certain industries
17
Ibid., p. 353.
History of the Army Section, Imperial General
considered essential for war were select- Headquarters, 1941-1945, Japanese Studies in World
War II, 72, p. 5; Cohen, Japan's Economy in War and
15
IMTFE, Judgment, pt. B, pp. 114ff. Reconstruction, ch. I.
not. The quantity of bauxite on hand er the total had risen to 50: 27 in China,
in 1941 totaled 254,740 tons, which rep- 12 in Manchuria, and the remainder in
resented a 9-month supply. Also, since Korea and the home islands. The Army
1938, Japan had been forced to draw Air Forces showed the greatest pro-
upon its stockpile of iron ore for the portionate growth, increasing from 54
war in China, and at the end of 1941 squadrons in 1937 to 150 in 1941. Pilots
had only a few months' reserve.18 were well trained and about half of
The shortage of petroleum produc- them had actual combat experience in
tion was the key to Japan's military situ- China or in border fighting with Soviet
ation. It was the main problem for those Russia.20 (Table 2)
preparing for war and, at the same time, Japan's naval forces, which had been
the reason that the nation was moving limited first by the Washington Naval
toward war. For the Navy, the shortage Conference (1921) and then by the Lon-
of oil was critical; for the Army it was don Naval Conference (1930), grew
always a limitation. To secure reserves rapidly after 1936 when Japan with-
of this precious commodity, Japan im- drew from the naval conference of that
ported heavily during the decade of the year. In 1937, twenty new vessels with
1930's, the amount reaching 37,160,000 a tonnage of 55,360 tons were complet-
barrels in 1940. During that year Japan ed; the next year this amount increased
produced only 3,163,000 barrels, less to 63,589 tons, and by 1941 had reached
than 12 percent of the nation's peace- the prewar peak of 225,159 tons. This
time requirements. To increase the tonnage represented one battleship of
amount available for military use, civil- the Yamato class, 10 carriers of unspeci-
ian consumption of oil was curtailed fied tonnages, 7 cruisers, and 37 destroy-
sharply after 1937, and practically all ers.21 By 1941, Japanese combat ton-
civilian motor traffic was abolished or nage had risen to 1,059,000 tons, more
required to use wood and charcoal burn- than twice that of 1922, and Japan's fleet
ers. Despite these measures, Japan had was more powerful than the combined
only 43,000,000 barrels of oil reserves in United States-British fleets in the Pacific.
1941, an amount sufficient at most for Despite these preparations for war,
two years of war under the most favor- the Japanese Army and Navy had no
able conditions, if supplemented by military or naval plans to guide them.
resources within the empire.19 There were in the files of the supreme
The growth of Japan's military forces command statements dealing with na-
matched its industrial growth during tional defense policy and with the em-
these critical years. Between 1936 and ployment of troops, but these dated from
1941, the number of men conscripted 1930 and were expressed in general prin-
for the Army doubled. At the end of ciples rather than in terms of specific
1937 Japan had 24 divisions, 16 of which operations. Moreover, they provided
were stationed in China; three years lat- only for a defensive war against either
18 20
Cohen, Japan's Economy in War and Reconstruc- Hist of Army Sec, Imperial GHQ, Japanese
tion, p. 48. Studies in World War II, 72, pp. 2-3; USSBS, Japa-
19
USSBS, Oil in Japan's War (Washington, 1946), nese Air Power (Washington, 1946), pp. 4-5.
21
p. 1. USSBS, Japanese Naval Shipbuilding, app. A.
TABLE 2—JAPANESE ARMY GROUND AND AIR FORCES

AND NAVY AIR FORCES
1937-1941
Source: Japanese Opns in SWPA, GHQ Hist Series, II, p. 54.
the United States or the Soviet Union, possible to establish priorities, for a war
and emphasized that in no case should against Russia would require strengthen-
Japan fight more than one of these coun- ing the Army and a war against the
tries at the same time. There was no United States would call for larger naval
mention in these statements of a possible appropriations. The Navy's 1940 plan
war with Great Britain or the Nether- for a war with the United States, there-
lands, or of war against a combination fore, simply declared that the Imperial
of these powers. They were, in the words Navy, in co-operation with the Army,
of one Japanese officer, "outdated writ- would destroy American strength in the
ings" and "utterly nonsensical from the Far East and maintain command of Far
standpoint of authority and contents."22 Eastern waters "by intercepting and
The lack of a concrete strategical plan crushing American fleets."23 How Amer-
was partially overcome by the Army and ica was to be defeated was never even
Navy's annual operations plans. Each considered.
year the two services worked out their The Army's annual plan for 1940 em-
own plans for operations against the phasized defensive operations against the
two named enemies separately and then Soviet Union from Manchuria. Opera-
submitted them for Imperial approval. tions to the south were "secondary and
These plans made no provision for total supplementary in importance."24 In case
war, and so long as the government re- of war with the United States, the plan-
fused to decide which was the most likely ners expected that Japanese forces would
enemy or to admit the possibility of war 23
with more than one nation, it was im- 24
Ibid., p. 2.
Deposition of former Lt. Gen. Shinichi Tanaka,
22
Political Strategy Prior to Outbreak of War, pt. Chief of Operations, Japanese General Staff, IMTFE,
IV, Japanese Studies in World War II, 150, pp. 1-2. exhibit 3027.
take the Philippines and Guam, but Japan Moves South

made no concrete plans for their seizure
or for countering American reaction. The program of the Konoye Cabinet,
The main objective of the Army, they which took office on 22 July 1940, set
believed, was to prepare against attack, the course of Japanese policy for the
not to fight a war against the United next critical year. This program was
States. The 1940 plan was equally vague drawn up on 19 July, even before the
about Great Britain and the Nether- Cabinet had been organized, and was
lands. In case of war the plan provided accepted by the four principal ministers
for the seizure of Hong Kong and Singa- — the Premier, Prince Konoye, War
pore, but not for the Netherlands Indies, Minister Hideki Tojo, Navy Minister
Burma, India, or Australia. Japan, said Zengo Yoshida, and Foreign Minister
the Army's Chief of Operations, "had Yosuke Matsuoka, whom Cordell Hull
no capacity to meet the need of a crisis called "as crooked as a basket of fish-
. . . with drastic measures on a grand hooks." The new administration, it was
scale."25 agreed, would make its main objective
Thus, throughout the decade of the the establishment of a new order in east
1930's, the Japanese leaders had no mili- Asia, known as the Greater East Asia
tary strategy for a war against a coalition Co-Prosperity Sphere. Included in this
such as they later faced, and their policy sphere at first were Hong Kong, Burma,
was based almost entirely on political French Indochina, Thailand, Malaya,
considerations and on what one officer the Netherlands Indies, the Philippines,
called their "exceedingly conceptual and and New Guinea; later India, Australia,
common sense understanding of war and New Zealand were added to the
strategy." Deliberations of the Cabinet list. Specific measures designed to gain
and of the Liaison and Imperial Confer- this grand objective included a closer
ences,26 though attended by Army and alliance with the Axis, a nonaggression
Navy officers, were not limited by pre- pact with the Soviet Union, and every
cise studies and plans outlining the effort necessary to bring the China war
course of military and naval action to be to an end. While there were some dif-
taken in every conceivable situation. ferences among the four ministers over
They were guided, rather, by political the nature and timing of the actual
strategy "pushed without any considera- measures to be taken, there was no ques-
tion of a definite war strategy plan."27 tion about basic objectives. And all were
agreed that any nation that opposed this
25 program was the enemy of Japan.28
26
Ibid.
The Liaison Conference was an informal body
consisting of the service chiefs, the principal civilian
28
ministers, and other high government officials, and Political Strategy Prior to Outbreak of War pt.
served as a link between Imperial General Head- II, Japanese Studies in World War II, 146, pp. 10-16.
quarters and the Cabinet. The same body when it Unless otherwise indicated, this section is based upon
met with the Emperor on more important occasions Feis, The Road to Pearl Harbor, passim; Ballantine,
and under more formal circumstances was known as "Mukden to Pearl Harbor," Foreign Affairs (July,
the Imperial Conference. 1949), pp. 658-61; IMTFE, Judgment, pt. B, pp.
27
Political Strategy Prior to Outbreak of War, pt. 487-520, pp. 864-903, and the Japanese sources cited
IV, Japanese Studies in World War II, 150, p. 3. above.
The program outlined on the19th The first and most pressing problem
was discussed and approved by the full for the new Konoye Cabinet was the
Cabinet on the 26th and, the following conflict in China. Already the United
day, by a Liaison Conference. The deci- States had indicated that it was in no
sions of this last conference, which be- mood to discontinue its support of Chi-
came, in effect, the policy of the Japa- ang. On 25 July, only three days after
nese Government, differed only slightly Prince Konoye had taken office, Presi-
from the preliminary program drawn up dent Roosevelt added scrap iron and oil
by the four ministers on the 19th. They to the list of items whose export was
were embodied in a document entitled subject to license. But the Japanese,
General Principles To Cope With the undeterred by this warning and by the
Changing World Situation, laying down prompt rejection of fresh peace over-
four specific measures designed to end tures to the Chungking Government,
the war in China and to give Japan a sought to take advantage of the weakness
dominant position in southeast Asia: of Vichy France by demanding, first, the
1. The elimination of all aid to the right to send troops into northern Indo-
Chungking government by third powers. china, adjacent to the China border, to
2. Adoption of "a firm attitude" to- intercept supplies to Chiang Kai-shek;
ward the United States and, at the same and second, control of the airfields there
time, the strengthening of political ties to provide bases from which to bomb the
with the Axis and a drastic readjustment Burma Road and Chungking. These de-
of relations with Russia. mands had been specifically outlined in
3. Stronger d i p l o m a t i c measures the "General Principles" adopted on 27
against the Netherlands Indies in order July and Japan was ready to resort to
to secure vital raw materials. force to gain them. But military action
4. Intensification of political, eco- proved unnecessary, for on 29 August,
nomic, and military preparations for after the Germans had brought pressure
war. on Vichy France, the French yielded. A
Japan hoped to gain these objectives by month later Japanese troops entered
peaceful means but was prepared where Indochina.30 Despite the explanation of
necessary to use force. "In employing Foreign Minister Matsuoka that this ac-
armed strength," it was agreed at the tion was a normal military measure
Liaison Conference, "efforts will be against China, the United States entered
made to limit the war adversary to Great a formal protest. This was an empty
Britain insofar as possible. However, gesture; more tangible was the loan of
thorough preparations for the com- another twenty-five million dollars to
mencement of hostilities against the Chiang Kai-shek and extension of the
United States will be made as it may embargo on scrap iron and steel.
prove impossible to avoid war with that The effort of the Konoye Cabinet to
country."29 secure strategic raw materials from the
Netherlands Indies, an effort which
29 30
IMTFE, exhibit 1310; Political Strategy Prior to Political Strategy Prior to Outbreak of War, pt.
Outbreak of War, pt. II, Japanese Studies in World II, Japanese Studies in World War II, 146, pp. 7-9,
War II, 146, app. 2. app. 2.
American economic measures had made aid "with all political, economic, and
more urgent, met with little success. On military means" should any of them be
16 July the Japanese had notified the attacked by a power with which it was
Dutch that they wished to send a mission not then at war. Since Germany and
to discuss the relations between the two Italy were at war with the western Euro-
countries, and, after an exchange of pean nations, and since the pact was not
notes limiting the scope of the mission to have any effect on the existing rela-
to economic matters, the Minister of tions of the signatories with Soviet Rus-
Commerce, Ichizo Kobayashi, and a staff sia, it was evident that the Tripartite
of twenty-four experts, left for Batavia. Pact was a warning to the United States
The talks began early in September with to remain neutral.
the Japanese demanding large oil con- The decision to conclude the Tripar-
cessions in the Indies and three million tite Pact had been made on 19 Septem-
tons of oil annually for five years, an ber at the Imperial Conference. The
amount that represented about three- agreements reached at this meeting con-
fifths of Japan's normal requirements. stitute an important guide to what Japan
The Dutch companies with whom the hoped to achieve from the alliance with
Japanese dealt, urged on by the British Germany and Italy and what the policy
and the Americans, refused to meet these of the nation would be in the months to
large demands. They were willing to come. Clearly, the ministers expected
send only half the amount requested support in their efforts to expand south-
and that on a 6-month contract basis. ward and end the war in China. With
Kobayashi left Batavia on 22 October, the co-operation of the Axis they hoped
and, though the conversations continued to induce the Russians to advance to-
for some months more, the Japanese ward the Persian Gulf, and possibly
were never able to get what they want- India, that is, in a direction that would
ed. But they took what they could—a not threaten Japan. They hoped also,
slight increase in the amount of rubber, with the co-operation of Germany and
tin, and bauxite, and an agreement with Italy, to bring pressure on the United
the oil companies for the quantities States to accept Japan's claims in the
offered. south and in China.
On 27 September, four days after the But the four ministers did not expect
dispatch of troops into French Indo- to pay for this support with military
china, Japan concluded the Tripartite action, except where it was necessary to
Pact with Germany and Italy, thus gain their own objectives. They agreed
achieving one more objective in the that they would assist the Axis against
program outlined by the Liaison Con- Great Britain by measures short of war,
ference. Under the terms of this agree- but reserved the right to make their own
ment, Germany and Italy recognized the decisions on the use of armed force
leadership of Japan in bringing a new against that nation and the United
order to Asia, and Japan, on its part, States. If the war in China were near a
recognized the new order in Europe. conclusion, the four ministers decided,
More important was the commitment of then Japan might resort to force to gain
the signatories to come to each other's its objectives, waiting only for the right
moment. But until that time, they tude. Cordell Hull announced to news-
agreed, Japan would not go to war men that the pact did not substantially
against Great Britain or the United alter the situation, but his statement was
States unless the situation permitted no belied by the announcement on 8 Octo-
delay.31 ber 1940 that consuls in the Far East had
It is clear that Japan did not interpret been instructed to advise American citi-
the Tripartite Pact as a commitment to zens to return home, and that three lin-
war, and, as a matter of fact, the Em- ers had been sent to the Orient to hasten
peror agreed to it with misgivings and their evacuation.34 Already the Pacific
only after he had been assured that it Fleet, which was normally based on the
would not lead to hostilities.32 The west coast, had been ordered to remain
Konoye Cabinet evidently believed that at Pearl Harbor indefinitely, and prepa-
the United States (and the Soviet rations were being made to strengthen
Union) would not intervene in the Far American garrisons in Alaska, Hawaii,
East if the advance southward was and Panama.35
achieved gradually and by diplomatic While maintaining a firm attitude to-
means. They hoped that the United ward Japan, the United States Govern-
States would be forced by the Tripartite ment adopted a policy designed to "avoid
Pact to remain neutral and that the issue an open struggle in the Pacific" so that
would be between Japan and the British, American resources would not be divert-
Dutch, and French who were in no ed from the main tasks—strengthening
position to dispute Japanese expansion the nation's military forces and aiding
southward. Soviet opposition was to be Britain. Japan, it was agreed, was not
overcome through the intervention of to be pushed "to the point where her
Germany.33 military elements would demand war."36
These hopes were entirely unrealistic. The door was to be left open for discus-
The United States had never retreated sion and agreement, but the United
from its position on China and had States was to maintain its treaty rights
declined time and again to recognize in the Far East, continue to exert eco-
Japan's interpretation of treaties to which nomic pressure against Japan, and pro-
the United States was a party. Instead vide aid to China. The Tripartite Pact,
of showing any timidity or weakness, the in the view of the United States, had
United States Government on this occa- placed Japan in the Axis camp and
sion adopted a firm but cautious atti- Japan was to be treated as one of the
31 34
IMTFE, exhibit 541; IMTFE, Judgment, pp. Cordell Hull, The Memoirs of Cordell Hull, 2
504—508. Takushiro Hattori, The Complete History vols. (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1948), I,
of the Greater East Asia War, translated from Japa- 914-15; Robert E. Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins:
nese by FEC, Doe. 78002,1, 42-45, OCMH. An Intimate History (New York: Harper & Brothers,
32
Political Strategy Prior to the Outbreak of War, 1948), p. 271. See also Ltr. Joseph C. Grew, formerly
pt. II, Japanese Studies in World War II, 146, app. 4 U.S. Ambassador to Japan, to author, 19 Jun 49, copy
and pp. 20-25. The latter reference contains an ac- in OCMH.
35
count of the 26 September conference with the Em- Pearl Harbor Attack Hearings, pt. I, exhibit 9,
peror to discuss the treaty. p. 943. Mark Skinner Watson, Chief of Staff: Prewar
33
German-Japanese Relations From 1936 to 1943, Plans and Preparations, UNITED STATES ARMY
MIS237954, Mil Intel Div Library; IMTFE, exhibits IN WORLD WAR II (Washington, 1950), ch, XIV.
36
551.552. Hull, Memoirs, I, 911.
Axis Powers. The last chance of settling In Indochina and Thailand the Japa-
Japanese-American conflicts as a separate nese made important gains. Seizing the
problem, divorced from European af- pretext of a border dispute between the
fairs, was gone. In his Fireside Chat of two countries, Japan offered its services
29 December 1940, President Roosevelt as mediator, after prior arrangement
emphasized that the Tripartite Pact rep- with Thailand, "on the ground of main-
resented a threat to the United States taining stability in Greater East Asia."39
and that the nation for its own defense Britain was particularly concerned over
must increase, its aid to the free nations Japan's entry into the dispute and the
and make greater efforts to rearm.37 possibility of Japanese military inter-
In spite of the fact that the Tripartite vention in an area so close to Burma,
Pact had failed to convince the United Malaya, and Singapore, and urged the
States that acceptance of Japan's pro- French to negotiate. Neither British
gram for expansion was desirable, the nor American efforts to end the dispute
Konoye Cabinet continued along the proved successful, and on 20 January
path laid out by the Liaison Conference 1941 Japan made a formal offer of medi-
of 27 July. Every effort was made to ation. It was accepted by both parties,
bring the war in China to an end; when the Vichy Government acceding only
air bombardment failed, the Japanese after German persuasion, and on the last
solicited the support of German diplo- day of the month a truce was signed.
macy. The only result of these measures But a final settlement was still to be
was another American loan to Chiang reached.
Kai-shek, this time for a hundred million Japan's aims in the border dispute be-
dollars. Japanese policy was no more tween Thailand and French Indochina
successful in the Indies. The conversa- were defined at the Liaison Conference
tions begun in September dragged on, of 30 January, when it was decided that
with a new special envoy taking Koba- Japan would use its position as mediator
yashi's place in January 1941. The to obtain from the French naval bases
Dutch so stoutly resisted Japanese pres- in Camranh Bay and air bases near
sure for economic co-operation that the Saigon for a possible attack later against
new envoy reported that force alone Singapore, an attack which the Germans
would produce the desired results. "How were urging with vigor. Both countries
can we compromise," complained one of would be required to sign agreements
the Japanese delegates, "when you re- with Japan and promise not to conclude
fuse to accept our views."38 But Japan with any third power pacts affecting that
was not yet ready for war and rather nation. If either proved intractable it
than lose prestige by breaking off the was agreed that force would be used, and
negotiations Konoye instructed the dele- for this purpose a large naval force was
gates to remain in Batavia. ordered to take up positions along the
coasts of Indochina and Thailand. To
37
U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the rest of the world, which noted these
the United States, Japan: 1931-1941, 2 vols. (Wash- naval movements with considerable con-
ington, 1943), II, 173-81.
38 39
Joseph C. Grew, Ten Years in Japan (New York: Political Strategy Prior to Outbreak of War, pt.
Simon and Schuster, 1944), p. 213. III, Japanese Studies in World War II, 147, p. 12.
JAPANESE POLICY AND STRATEGY, 1931—JULY 1941 63
cern, Japan protested that its only inter- Principles To Cope With the Changing
est in the affair was to bring about peace World Situation. One of the objectives
in east Asia. of this program, it will be recalled, was
Conversations for the settlement of "the readjustment of diplomatic rela-
the boundary dispute were to open in tions with Soviet Russia."40 Until the
Tokyo at the beginning of February, but beginning of 1941 the Konoye Cabinet
the Vichy Government, though it had had been too involved in other matters
agreed to the armistice, would not agree to act on this front, but at that time, as
so readily to Japanese mediation. Un- Mr. Matsuoka, the Foreign Minister, was
fortunately, neither the United States preparing to visit Europe, the question
nor Great Britain was in a position to of an agreement with the Soviet Union
affect the outcome, and the French fin- came up again. The trip to Europe was
ally agreed on 11 March, under the com- approved and Matsuoka was instructed
bined pressure of Germany and Japan, to seek Soviet recognition of Japanese
to accept mediation of the dispute and supremacy in east Asia but to avoid mili-
not to enter into any agreement inimical tary commitments. Matsuoka left Tokyo
to Japan. The boundary controversy on 4 March. His first stop was Moscow
was settled on 9 May when the French where he talked with Molotov about the
ceded to Thailand most of the land in possibility of a nonaggression pact. Noth-
dispute, but Japan did not receive its ing tangible resulted from these conver-
wages until the end of July. sations and Matsuoka went on to Berlin.
The date on which Vichy France ac- Hitler had already decided to attack
ceded to the Japanese mediation plan, Russia, and urged that Japan take ag-
11 March, was by coincidence the day gressive action in the Far East, specifi-
on which the American Congress ap- cally against Singapore, to bring about
proved and the President signed the the final collapse of England. Not a word
Lend-Lease Act. The stated purpose of was said about the forthcoming attack
this law was to promote the defense of on Russia, although Matsuoka may have
the United States, but its real meaning surmised it; instead, the Germans hinted
lay in the aid it offered to the nations darkly about worsening relations with
fighting the Axis. It was clearly a decla- the Soviet Union when the Japanese For-
ration of cold war against the Axis Pow- eign Minister explained the nature of
ers, and was taken by them as such. his talks with Molotov.
There was no longer any doubt for those On his return trip Matsuoka stopped
who could read American opinion right- again in Moscow. The Russians had had
ly that the United States had taken its a month to consider his proposals. Per-
stand with Britain and China and would suaded perhaps by foreknowledge of the
push all measures short of war to prevent impending German attack, as well as a
their defeat. willingness to encourage Japan's drive
The Konoye Cabinet, indifferent to southward, Molotov and Stalin proved
or unable to comprehend the extent of remarkably amenable to Matsuoka's pro-
American opposition, persisted in its ef- posals. On 13 April, after only a week
forts to push through the program laid 40
Political Strategy Prior to Outbreak of War, pt.
down on 27 July 1940 in the General II, Japanese Studies in World War II, 146, app. 2.
of deliberation, an agreement that Singapore, probably in May, but refused

pledged Japan and the Soviet Union to to commit themselves beyond the occu-
respect each other's territorial integrity pation of Saigon. They also assured the
and to remain neutral in case of attack Germans that they were making prepa-
by a third power was signed. rations for a possible war against the
The Japanese were jubilant over the United States, but had actually devel-
pact with Russia and immediately made oped no plans for such a war other than
plans to push the program for expansion a personal study initiated in January by
to the south, a program to which the Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto, command-
Army and Navy were already heavily er of the Combined Fleet and an ardent
committed. It had been decided earlier advocate of carrier-based operations, for
that this expansion was to be achieved an attack against Pearl Harbor.42
by diplomatic means, but that prepara- Japan's position in Indochina had
tions for military action must be rushed been greatly strengthened in May when
if peaceful methods failed. On 6 Decem- an economic and political agreement
ber 1940 the Army had designated three with the Vichy Government was con-
divisions, then in south China, to be cluded. But in southern Indochina,
trained for operations in tropical areas, where there were no Japanese troops,
and ten days later had directed com- there was strong anti-Japanese sentiment
manders in China and Formosa to study supported by the de Gaullists, the Chin-
the problems involved in such operations ese, the British, and the Americans. The
and to prepare area studies of the Indies, economic results of this sentiment were
Malaya, Indochina, Thailand, Burma, most disadvantageous to the Japanese
the Philippines, and Guam.41 Next and were reflected in the decreased
month the Japanese had begun aerial quantity of rice exported from Indo-
reconnaissance of the Malayan coast and china to Japan and the threat that other
the War Ministry and Foreign Office be- vital Indochinese resources such as rub-
gan to print military currency for use ber, tin, coal, and manganese would find
in the southern area. their way into other markets. The occu-
Among the military preparations the pation of southern Indochina, therefore,
Japanese undertook in the early spring became an urgent matter for the Japa-
of 1941 was a plan to take Singapore, a nese and one which was to have an im-
step the Germans favored highly for portant effect on their relations with
their own purposes. The Japanese were other nations.
not averse to German support and were Nor were Japanese efforts to wrest
using this support to wrest from the concessions from the Dutch meeting with
Vichy Government advance bases in In- success. The conversations had been
dochina from which, presumably, they going from bad to worse, although the
would attack the British Far Eastern Dutch had increased slightly the
bastion. Repeatedly the Japanese assured
the Germans that they hoped to take 42
Apparently this study was kept a secret from the
authorities, and even Yamamoto's staff, except
41
Imperial GHQ Army Dept Directives, 791, 6 Dec for Rear Adm. Ohnishi, knew nothing of it. State-
40; Sio, 16 Jan 41; and 812, 18 Jan 41, copies in ment of Rear Adm. Tomioka, then Chief of the
OCMH. Operational Section, Navy General Staff.
amounts of rubber, tin, bauxite, and attached a "verbal memo" containing a

nickel promised the Japanese earlier. delicate reference to the lack of confi-
But the requests for more oil and for dence the Americans had in the pro-Axis
concessions in the Indies had not yet Japanese Foreign Minister, Mr. Mat-
been granted. Finally, on 17 June, Japan suoka. The negotiations had reached a
broke off the conversations and ordered deadlock and the only hopeful sign was
its delegates home. Though the Japa- the trouble brewing within the Japanese
nese sought to minimize its meaning, Cabinet where a change might produce
this action was clearly an admission of a shift in the direction of Japanese
defeat. policy.
By this time Japan was feeling the The impending crisis in the Japanese
pinch of shortages created by the con- Government was rapidly accelerated by
trols the United States had instituted the German invasion of the Soviet Union
over shipments to Japan, and the rela- on 22 June, the day after Hull handed
tions between the two countries had im- his note to Nomura. Though the Japa-
proved not at all. Efforts to settle the nese had expected the attack, they were
outstanding disagreements between them greatly upset when it came for it changed
had begun in February, when Ambassa- the entire complexion of world events
dor Kichisaburo Nomura arrived in the and strengthened America's hand in the
United States.43 After a series of pre- Pacific. The Japanese were oriented to-
liminary talks with President Roosevelt ward the south and seeking to obtain
and Mr. Hull, Nomura, on 18 April, from Vichy France, with Germany's help,
handed the Americans a 7-point proposal control over southern Indochina. This
as the basis for an agreement. Essential- new development opened up the possi-
ly, this proposal called for the United bility of an advance northward, and thus
States to provide, or assist Japan in secur- required a thorough review of Japan's
ing, strategic raw materials, and to per- position and a reconsideration of the
suade Chiang to reach agreement with program established a year before.
Japan. In return, Japan would agree The course charted by the Liaison
not to start war in the southwest Pacific Conference in July 1940 had by the mid-
and to interpret the Tripartite Pact as dle of June 1941 brought Japan few of
meaning Japan would support Germany the advantages so optimistically expect-
only if that nation were the object of ed. More by military pressure than
aggression. The proposal was not accept- diplomacy Japan had obtained from a
able to the Americans and was made defeated and subjugated France the
even less so by revisions from Tokyo. right to occupy Tonkin Province in In-
On 30 May, Mr. Hull presented an indochina and the use of French air bases
terim American proposal to Nomura and and military facilities there. Hopes for
on 21 June a second draft, to which was a base in southern Indochina had not
yet been realized; the results of the eco-
43
These conversations were initiated unofficially by nomic agreement were proving disap-
two clergymen. IMTFE, exhibit 3441, Ltr, Joseph pointing, and important opposition to
C. Grew to author, 19 Jun 49, OCMH. A full account
from the American side can be found in Hull,
the new order in Asia was developing
Memoirs. in Indochina. Efforts to secure from the
Dutch the oil and other resources needed partite Pact had paid dividends, but, as
so desperately to support operations in events turned out, had proved unneces-
China and to prepare for war had yield- sary and had created a formidable ob-
ed meager results and ended in a serious stacle to an agreement with the United
diplomatic defeat. Negotiations with the States. But the Japanese were never able
United States had produced as yet no to resolve the deadlock in China, and it
easy formula for peace and there was no was this failure that forced them to adopt
sign that America would yield to the in desperation a course that led almost
minimum Japanese demands. The Tri- irresistibly to war.
CHAPTER III
Europe Versus the Pacific

The second rule is to concentrate your power as much as possible against
that section where the chief blows are to be delivered and to incur
disadvantages elsewhere. CLAUSEWITZ
Since 1938, when the last revision of in the plan, but it was modified by an
ORANGE was completed, American mili- increasing awareness of the uncertainties
tary strategists had made every effort to of a world threatened by the rising tide
bring their plans into line with the of Axis aggression. The Army, with its
rapidly changing situation in Europe concern for the defense of the United
and Asia. The world was dividing into States, was shifting away from the Pacific
two armed camps. On one side were orientation that had dominated strategic
Germany and Italy, associated with planning since World War I and was
Japan by the Anti-Comintern Pact. For turning anxious eyes toward Europe. A
three years, these powers had been RED or a RED-ORANGE war was no longer
pursuing their aggressive policies in within the realm of probability, but the
the Rhineland, Ethiopia, Austria, and Atlantic area occupied more and more of
China. On the other side were the the attention of the strategists after 1938.1
democratic powers, Great Britain and
France. Still suffering from the pro-
longed economic crisis of the early 1930's
1
and weakened by domestic conflicts, The material covered in this chapter has been
treated more fully from different points of view and
these two had remained passive in the with different emphases in a number of works in the
face of Axis threats and sought to avert series UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR
armed conflict by a policy of appease- II: Maurice Matloff and Edwin M. Snell, Strategic
Planning for Coalition Warfare, 1941-1942 (Wash-
ment. While such hopes did not seem ington, 1953), chs. I-III; Watson, Chief of Staff:
entirely without foundation at the time, Prewar Plans and Preparations, chs. IV, X, and XII;
American leaders could no longer ignore Richard M. Leighton and Robert W. Coakley,
Global Logistics and Strategy, 1940-1943 (Washing-
the possibility of becoming involved in ton, 1953), pt. one; Stetson Conn and Byron Fair-
a two-ocean war. child, The Framework of Hemisphere Defense
The 1938 revision of ORANGE, with its (Washington, 1960), chs. I-V; and also in William
L. Langer and S. Everett Gleason, The Undeclared
emphasis on flexibility, represented an War, 1940-1941 (New York: Harper & Brothers,
effort to bring strategy into line with 1953). The present account is based on the original
the international situation. The Navy's sources, except where otherwise indicated, and has
appeared in slightly different form in Kent R. Green-
single-minded insistence on an advance field, gen. ed., Command Decisions (New York:
into the western Pacific was still reflected Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1959).
Strategic Adjustment, 1938-1940 more interested in the Pacific than the

Army planners.2
Though it was the Army planners who Events in Europe in the fall of 1938
seemed most aware of the danger from fully justified the concern of American
Europe, it was the Navy that made the policy makers and planners, and the
first move to strengthen America's Atlan- Munich crisis in September of that year
tic defenses. In December 1937, shortly provided the impetus to a comprehensive
after the Panay incident, the Director of review of American strategy. Taking the
the Navy War Plans Division, Capt. lead from the public statements of Pres-
Royal E. Ingersoll, was sent to London ident Roosevelt and Secretary of State
to discuss informally with the British Hull, the Joint Board directed its plan-
Admiralty the new construction pro- ning committee in November to make a
grams of the two navies and the condi- study of the course the United States
tions of U.S.-British naval co-operation should follow if German and Italian
in the event both nations were involved aggression in Europe and Japanese ex-
in a war against Japan. During the course pansion in the Far East should threaten
of these discussions, the possibility of a American security and interests in both
3
German war inevitably arose. The Brit- the Atlantic and Pacific simultaneously.
ish viewed this possibility with real con- Here, for the first time, was a specific
cern, for the Germans could be expected directive to the planners to study, within
to attack British trade routes in the the context of the current international
Atlantic. Should Italy join Germany, situation, the problems presented by a
the prospects were even more alarming. two-ocean war in which the United
The French, if they entered the war, States, acting in concert with allies,
would hold the western Mediterranean, would be opposed by a coalition. These
but the British would still have to place problems had been studied before in the
the bulk of their forces in the Atlantic. ORANGE-RED plans, but under entirely
They would have little, therefore, to different assumptions and in a com-
send to the Far East. Here the United pletely different situation. They had
States could perform a valuable service been considered briefly and tangentially
in the common cause by taking up the also in the latest revision of ORANGE with
slack in the Far East in return for the its provision for a position of readiness
security the Royal Navy would provide and co-operation with allies. The infor-
in the Atlantic. Even if the United mal naval conversations in London in
States became involved in the European January 1938 were a clear recognition
conflict, Great Britain could still be relied of the possibility of such a war and the
upon to man the Atlantic barrier so long first step toward the intimate military
as the U.S. Fleet assumed responsibility collaboration that marked the Anglo-
for the Pacific. It is perhaps for this 2
reason that the Navy members of the donFor an account of the staff conversations in Lon-
early in 1938, see Pearl Harbor Attack Hearings,
Joint Planning Committee, in their dis- pt. 9, pp. 4272-78 and Capt. Tracy B. Kittredge,
cussions over ORANGE in 1938, seemed pt. U.S.-British Naval Cooperation, 1939-1945, sec. I,
C, pp. 37-38, MS in OCMH.
less concerned about the Atlantic and 3
Mins, JB Mtg, 9 Nov 1938.
EUROPE VERSUS THE PACIFIC 69
American relationship during World countries, including the United States,

War II. reacted promptly and vigorously to such
For almost six months the planners of action then a general war might well
the Joint Board considered the problem follow.
presented by simultaneous Axis aggres- The reaction of the United States to
sion in the Atlantic and Pacific areas and these or any other situations that might
finally in April 1939 submitted their arise, the planners pointed out, would
report. In it they reviewed the world depend in large measure on the forces
situation, estimated the likelihood of available and the extent to which Amer-
war, calculated the probable objectives ican interests were involved. In the
of the Axis in Europe and Japan in the event of a threat in both oceans simul-
Far East, discussed the effects of con- taneously, the United States, they main-
certed action by these powers on the tained, should assume the defensive in
United States, and analyzed the strategic the Pacific, retaining adequate forces
problems involved in the various situa- based on Hawaii to guard the strategic
tions that might result from such action. triangle. Arguing further in a manner
So comprehensive was the report, such a reminiscent of RED-ORANGE planning,
model of strategic analysis, that it was the strategists of the Joint Board declared
characterized by the Joint Board as "a that priority in a two-ocean war must go
monument" to its planning committee first to the defense of vital positions in
and became the basis for much of the the Western Hemisphere—the Panama
strategic planning before Pearl Harbor.4 Canal and the Caribbean area. From
In their effort to arrive at a sound bases in that region, the U.S. Fleet could
military strategy for the United States, operate in either ocean as the situation
the joint planners examined the various demanded, but its primary obligation
contingencies that might arise as a result must always be to control the Atlantic
of Axis aggression. Based on this approaches to the Western Hemisphere,
examination, they concluded: especially to the south where the conti-
1. Germany and Italy would take overt nent was most exposed. This task would
action in the Western Hemisphere only not be difficult if Great Britain and
if Great Britain and France remained France actively opposed Axis aggression,
neutral or were defeated. but if they did not the security of the
2. Japan would continue to expand South Atlantic would become the major
into China and Southeast Asia at the concern of U.S. forces. In this situation,
expense of Great Britain and the United the active co-operation of the Latin
States, by peaceful means if possible but American states was indispensable.
by force if necessary. In their studies the planners also con-
3. The three Axis Powers would act sidered the possibility of a war with
together whenever the international Japan alone. The United States would
situation seemed favorable. If other have to expect to lose all its possessions
west of 180 degrees early in such a war,
4
Mins, JB Mtg, 6 May 1939; Ltr, JPC Rpt, Explor- which, the planners prophetically pointed
atory Studies, 21 April 1939, JB 325, ser. 634. The
discussion of the report is based on the Exploratory out, might well begin with a Japanese
Studies and related papers in the same file. effort "to damage major fleet units with-
out warning," or a surprise attempt "to frained from an advance to the western
block the fleet in Pearl Harbor." It Pacific, the European Axis would prob-
would be necessary, then, for American ably not undertake any aggressive adven-
forces to fight their way back across the tures in the Western Hemisphere. Thus,
Pacific in a series of amphibious opera- on all accounts, the planners held that a
tions using one of four routes: (1) the defensive strategy in the Pacific was
Aleutians; (2) Pearl Harbor-Midway- preferable to any other course.
Luzon; (3) the Marshalls-Carolines- On the basis of their study the joint
Marianas-Yap-Pelileu; and (4) Samoa- planners recommended that a series of
New Guinea-Mindanao. The planners war plans be prepared, each of them to
favored the second and third routes and be applicable to a different situation.
thought that a combination of the two Priority in these plans, they held, must
would have to be used. The garrisons be given to the defense of the United
in Hawaii, Alaska, and Panama were to States, and this would require safeguard-
be reinforced, but not the Philippines, ing the security of the Western Hemi-
apparently on the assumption that their sphere. To hold firm to these objectives
loss was certain. The planners were would be no easy task, the planners rec-
astute enough to recognize, however, ognized. Not only must strategy be
that "emotionalized opinion rather than linked to policy, but it must also take
... a reasoned adjustment of operations cognizance of such intangibles as tradi-
to the means at hand" might ultimately tion, the spirit of the nation, and
dictate the choice of battleground. "emotionalized public opinion."
American military forces in 1939 The pioneering study by the joint
seemed sufficiently strong to accomplish planners in 1939 raised sharply and
the minimum tasks required under the dramatically the question of American
strategic concept proposed by the plan- policy in the event of concerted aggres-
ners—defense of U.S. vital interests in sion by Germany, Italy, and Japan. By
the Western Hemisphere and in the focusing on the threat to the Caribbean
Atlantic area. After hostilities began, and South America, the planners chal-
American forces could be strengthened lenged strongly the long-standing orien-
sufficiently to defeat the enemy operating tation of American strategy toward the
in the Atlantic, even without the aid of Pacific and gave weight to the Army's
Great Britain and France. If, at the same arguments against offensive operations
time, the United States maintained ade- in the western Pacific.
quate defensive forces in the Pacific, The planners raised another issue that
Japan could probably be restricted to needed to be resolved before the course
the western Pacific. It was even possible, of national policy could be charted. All
in such a situation, that the Japanese the color plans had been based on the
leaders might prefer peace with the assumption the United States would act
United States, hoping thereby to reap a alone. Was this assumption valid in
profit from the war without cost to them- terms of the international situation and
selves. If, on the other hand, Japan ini- in the face of a threatening Axis coali-
tiated hostilities and the United States tion? Should the strategists in drawing
adopted a position of readiness but re- up their plans therefore assume that the
United States would have allies? And if assumption that the United States would
so, who would they be and what would face a coalition rather than a single
the United States be expected to do for power.
them and they for this nation? Like the The five specific situations forming
Atlantic vs. Pacific issue, this question of the basis of the five RAINBOW plans were
allies involved political matters and defined by the Joint Board as follows:
would have to be resolved by the RAINBOW 1 assumed the United States to
President himself. be at war without major allies. United
It was perhaps as well that no firm States forces would act jointly to prevent
answers were forthcoming in the spring the violation of the Monroe Doctrine by
of 1939, for the course of events was still protecting the territory of the Western
far from clear. The planners recognized Hemisphere north of latitude 10° south,
from which the vital tasks of the United
this when they proposed that alternative States might be threatened. The joint tasks
plans be prepared to meet different situ- of the Army and Navy included protection
ations in which the United States would of the United States, its possessions and its
have to meet the combined threat of seaborne trade. A strategic defensive was to
Germany, Italy, and Japan. The Joint be maintained in the Pacific, from behind
the line Alaska-Hawaii-Panama, until de-
Board, in approving the work of the velopments for offensive action against
planners, accepted this recommendation Japan.
and in June 1939 laid down the guide RAINBOW 2 assumed that the United
lines for the development of these war States, Great Britain, and France would be
plans, aptly designated RAINBOW to dis- acting in concert, with limited participa-
tinguish them from the color plans.5 tion of U.S. forces in continental Europe
and in the Atlantic. The United States
There were ultimately five RAINBOW could, therefore, undertake immediate of-
plans in all, each of them based on a fensive operations across the Pacific to
different situation. The objective of all sustain the interests of democratic powers
was the same—to defend the United by the defeat of enemy forces.
States and the Western Hemisphere from RAINBOW 3 assumed the United States
to be at war without major allies. Hemi-
Axis aggression and penetration, overt sphere defense was to be assured, as in
or concealed. In each of the plans the RAINBOW 1, but with early projection of
planners "set forth the specific co-opera- U.S. forces from Hawaii into the western
tion that should be sought from allied Pacific.
or neutral Democratic Powers, with re- RAINBOW 4 assumed the United States to
spect to specific Theaters of Operations be at war without major allies, employing
its forces in defense of the whole of the
to render our efforts fully effective." Western Hemisphere, but also with pro-
Common to all of the plans was the vision for United States Army forces to be
sent to the southern part of South America,
and to be used in joint operations in east-
5
The first directive of the Joint Board was dated ern Atlantic areas. A strategic defensive,
11 May 1939, but on further study was revised and as in RAINBOW 1, was to be maintained in
amended instructions issued on 30 June. Mins, JB the Pacific until the situation in the At-
Mtg, 6 May 39, and 30 June, JB 325, ser. 634; Ltrs,
JB to JPC, 11 May 39, sub: Joint Army and Navy
lantic permitted transfer of major naval
Basic War Plans, RAINBOW'S 1, 2, 3, and 4; JPC to JB, forces for an offensive against Japan.
23 Jun 39, same sub; JB to JPC, 30 Jun 39, same sub. RAINBOW 5 assumed the United States,
All in JB 325, ser. 642 and 642-1. Great Britain, and France to be acting in
concert; hemisphere defense was to be as- these were not foreseen at the time. Like
sured as in RAINBOW 1, with early projec- RAINBOW 2, it assumed the active col-
tion of U.S. forces to the eastern Atlantic, laboration of Great Britain and France.
and to either or both the African and
European continents; offensive operations But unlike that plan, which called for
were to be conducted, in concert with the United States to make the major ef-
British and allied forces, to effect the de- fort in the Pacific, RAINBOW 5 envisaged
feat of Germany and Italy. A strategic the rapid projection of American forces
defensive was to be maintained in the across the Atlantic to Africa or Europe
Pacific until success against European Axis "in order to effect the decisive defeat of
Powers permitted transfer of major forces Germany, Italy, or both." Clearly im-
to the Pacific for an offensive against
Japan.6 plied in this statement was the concept
that finally emerged as the basic strategy
Of the five plans, RAINBOW 1 was of World War II: that in a war with
basic, though most limited. Providing the European Axis and Japan, Germany
for the defense of the Western Hemi- would be the major enemy and the main
sphere from the bulge of Brazil to effort would be made in Europe to
Greenland and as far west as Midway secure the decisive defeat of Germany at
in the Pacific, it established the necessary the earliest possible date.
conditions that had to be met before any The summer of 1939 was one of tense
of the other plans could be executed. expectancy. Europe was on the verge of
RAINBOW'S 2 and 3 called for offensive war and Japan showed no disposition to
operations into the western Pacific, the abandon aggression in Asia. During
former on the assumption that Great these months, a joint RAINBOW 1 plan,
Britain and France would be allies, and which had first priority, was completed
the latter that they would not. In this and the two services hurriedly pushed
respect, RAINBOW 3 established virtually forward completion of their own plans
the same conditions as the ORANGE for hemisphere defense.7
plan. RAINBOW 4 also assumed that There were important organizational
Great Britain and France would be neu- changes, too, at this time. In an effort
tral, presumably as a result of Axis mili- to keep in close touch with his military
tary action, and therefore emphasized the advisers, President Roosevelt on 5 July
defense of the Western Hemisphere 1939 placed the Joint Board under his
against external aggression. Emphasis in immediate "supervision and direction."
this plan as in RAINBOW 1 was on limited Up to that time, the board, it will be re-
action to fend off any Axis threat to the called, had reported to the two service
American republics. In neither RAIN- Secretaries, under whose authority the
BOW 1 nor 4 were major U.S. forces to board functioned. It had now a broader
be sent to Europe or to the far Pacific. basis, but still sent its recommendations
The situation envisaged in RAINBOW through the Secretaries, for the President
5 came closer to the conditions of World had no desire to alter existing proce-
War II than any of the others, though
7
Joint War Plan RAINBOW 1, JB 325, ser. 642-1.
6
Kittredge, U.S.-British Naval Cooperation, sec. Approved by the Joint Board on 9 August, by the
I, Part D, Notes pp. 42-46; Memo, JPC to JB, 23 Jun Secretary of War and Secretary of Navy on 14 August
39; Mins, JB Mtg, 30 Jun 39, JB 325, ser. 642. 1939, and by the President orally two months later.
GENERAL MARSHALL. (1944 photo.) ADMIRAL STARK
dures.8 This change coincided with a ities he proclaimed the neutrality of the
change in the high command. On 1 United States, while ordering the Army
August, Admiral Harold R. Stark was and Navy to bring their strength up to
appointed Chief of Naval Operations to the full authorized level. On his initia-
succeed Admiral Leahy, and a month tive, the Foreign Ministers of the Amer-
later General George C. Marshall for- ican Republics met at Panama at the end
mally succeeded General Malin Craig as of September to proclaim their neutral-
Chief of Staff of the Army after two ity and to devise measures for their joint
months as Acting Chief. defense. American security zones were
The outbreak of war in Europe early proclaimed in the western Atlantic and
in September 1939 gave a fresh urgency eastern Pacific, and plans made to patrol
to RAINBOW planning. RAINBOW 2 these zones to keep war away from the
seemed to fit the situation of the moment Americas.
best and while work went forward on the Throughout the winter of 1939-1940,
development of plans, the President took the period of the "phony war," the joint
measures to strengthen the nation's de- planners sought to develop plans to meet
fenses and to keep America out of war the RAINBOW 2 contingency. The task
by keeping war away from America. proved a formidable one, indeed, for
Immediately on the outbreak of hostil- the range of possibilities was wide.
8
Mil Order, 5 Jul 39; Memo of Secy JB, 20 Jul 39,
Moreover, each proposed course of
JB 346, ser. 646. action in the Pacific had to be co-ordi-
nated with that of the Allies. But with- trine," and there was every indication
out specific knowledge of the plans of that Japan intended to exploit the Axis
their allies, the planners were faced with victories in Europe and take over the
many uncertainties. In April 1940, French, British, and Dutch possessions in
therefore, they proposed that conversa- Asia and the Southwest Pacific. Only the
tions should be held with the British, United States was in a position to chal-
French, and Dutch "as soon as the diplo- lenge Japan, and on 10 April 1940 the
matic situation permits." By that time, Joint Board instructed its planners to
the Army planners had prepared four give priority to the development of plans
drafts of a proposed RAINBOW 2 plan, on based on RAINBOW'S 2 and 3, both of
each of which the Navy had commented which called for offensive operations in
in detail.9 the Pacific.10 That same month, the
Pacific Fleet moved into Hawaiian
The Critical Summer of 1940 waters for maneuvers, and despite the
protests of its commander was kept there
The planners were still trying to solve throughout the spring as a deterrent to
the problems posed by RAINBOW 2 when Japanese aggression. Finally in June,
the nature of the war in Europe changed when a Soviet-Japanese pact freed Japan
abruptly in the spring of 1940. Early in for further aggression to the south, the
April, German forces invaded Denmark fleet was ordered to remain indefinitely
and Norway and by the end of the month in Hawaiian waters. So tense was the
had occupied both countries. On 10 situation that on the 17th of the month,
May, the German campaign against as a result of reports of possible attacks
France opened with the attack on the on Pearl Harbor or Panama Canal, Gen-
Netherlands and Belgium, and four days eral Marshall sent alerts to the Army
later German armor broke through the commanders in Hawaii and Panama.11
French defenses in the Ardennes. At the In this crisis, American strategy under-
end of the month the British began the went a critical review. Clearly the
evacuation from Dunkerque, and on 10 greater danger was in Europe, and RAIN-
June, Italy declared war. A week later, BOW'S 2 and 3 with their orientation to-
the beaten and disorganized French ward the far Pacific were scarcely appli-
Government sued for peace. With cable. The defeat of France in June and
France defeated and England open to 10
Mins, JB Mtgs, 22 Feb and 10 Apr 1940; JPC to
attack and invasion, the threat from the JB, 9 Apr 40, sub: Joint War Plans RAINBOW, ap-
Atlantic looked real indeed. proved 10 April, JB 325, Ser. 642-1. The priorities
Nor was there any consolation to be established for RAINBOW planning at this time were
1. Complete RAINBOW 2.
found in the situation in Asia. In China, 2. Develop RAINBOW 3 as far as the main courses
the Japanese had succeeded in occupy- of action.
ing North China, the coastal area as far 3. Develop RAINBOW 5 as far as the main courses
of action.
south as Canton, and the principal river 4. Complete RAINBOW 3.
and rail lines. Tokyo diplomats were 5. Complete RAINBOW 5.
speaking of a Japanese "Monroe Doc- RAINBOW 4 was assigned the lowest priority and no
planning for it was scheduled.
9 11
The various drafts of RAINBOW 2 can be found The alert message is reproduced in Pearl Harbor
in the Army files of the JPC, JB 325, ser. 642-2. Attack Hearings, pt. 15, p. 1594.
the possibility that Great Britain might Acceptance by the Joint Board of the
soon fall outweighed any danger that RAINBOW 4 plan was the beginning
Japanese aggression could present to rather than the end of the comprehen-
American security. Calling for an early sive review of strategy precipitated by
decision from higher authority, the Germany's startling success in Europe.
Army planners argued that since the Still in doubt was the fate of Great
United States could not fight everywhere Britain and the French Navy, and Amer-
—in the Far East, Europe, Africa, and ican policy depended to a very large
South America—it should limit itself to degree on these two unknowns. Posses-
a single course. Defense of the Western sion of the British and French Fleets
Hemisphere, they held, should consti- would give the European Axis naval
tute the main effort of American forces. equality with the U.S. Fleet and make
In any case, the United States should not possible within six months, the time re-
become involved with Japan and should quired to make the captured fleets oper-
concentrate on meeting the threat of ational, hostile Axis operations in the
Axis penetration into South America.12 Western Hemisphere. Since consider-
The Army's concern about America's able time would be required to mobilize,
ability to meet a possible threat from an equip, and train American forces, the
Axis-dominated Europe in which the planners asserted that "the date of the
British and French Navies might be em- loss of the British or French Fleets
ployed against the United States was automatically sets the date of our
shared by the Navy. As a result, the mobilization."14
joint planners began work on RAINBOW During the dramatic weeks of May
4, which only a month earlier had been and June 1940, the President met with
accorded the lowest priority, and by the his military advisers frequently and dis-
end of May had completed a plan. The cussed with them every major develop-
situation envisaged now in RAINBOW 4 ment of the war. On 13 June, shortly
was a violation of the Monroe Doctrine before the fall of France, he called in
by Germany and Italy coupled with the intelligence chiefs of the Army and
armed aggression in Asia after the elimi- Navy for an evaluation of the situation,
nation of British and French forces and posing a number of specific questions.
the termination of the war in Europe. This request precipitated an interim
Under these conditions, the United review of the various courses of action
States was to limit itself to defense of open to the United States in the light of
the entire Western Hemisphere, with the rapidly changing situation. As the
American forces occupying British and planners saw it, there were three
French bases in the western Atlantic.13 alternatives:
1. To maintain a strong position in the
12
Memos, WPD for CofS, 22 May 40, sub: National Pacific and to avoid commitment every-
Strategic Decisions; CofS for WPD, 23 May 40, no where else.
sub; Aide Mémoire, Maj Matthew B. Ridgway, 23
May 40. All in WPD 4175-10. soon after. It was not approved by the President
13
Ltr, JPC to JB, 31 May 40, sub: Joint Army and until 14 August. Relevant papers are in JB 325, ser.
Navy Basic War Plan RAINBOW 4. The Joint Board 624-4.
14
approved the plan early in June and the Secretaries Joint War Plan RAINBOW 4, JB 325, ser. 642-4.
question of reframing our national

policy, that is, purely defensive action in
the Pacific, with a main effort on the
Atlantic side? We have to be pre-
pared," Marshall told his staff, "to meet
the worst situation that may develop,
that is, if we do not have the Allied fleet
in the Atlantic." The time had come,
he thought, to mobilize the National
Guard and to discontinue shipments to
England of munitions that would be
needed for American mobilization.16
On the basis of this discussion, the
Chief of the War Plans Division, Brig.
Gen. George V. Strong, recommended
that same day that the Chief of Staff and
the Chief of Naval Operations propose
to the President as the basic policy of the
United States: first, a purely defensive
position in the Pacific; second, no fur-
GENERAL STRONG ther commitments for material aid to the
Allies; and third, immediate mobiliza-
2. To make every effort, including bellig- tion for hemisphere defense. These rec-
erent participation, to sustain Great Britain ommendations reflected the pessimistic
and France. and strongly conservative outlook of the
3. To take whatever measures were re- Army staff at the time, a view the Army
quired to prevent Axis penetration into the planner made no effort to conceal. His
Western Hemisphere.15 proposal, Strong stated frankly, was "a
All three possibilities had already been recognition of the early defeat of the
considered in one or another of the Allies, an admission of our inability to
RAINBOW plans, but, as the planners furnish means in quantities sufficient to
pointed out, the essence of the problem affect the situation, and an acknowledge-
now was time. RAINBOW 4 was the best ment that we recognize the probability
course to follow in this situation, in that we are next on the list of Axis
their view, and the end of British or powers. . . ."17
French resistance, they held, should be General Marshall and Admiral Stark
the signal for American mobilization. approved General Strong's recommenda-
On the morning of 17 June, the day tions in principle on 18 June and di-
after the planners had submitted their rected their planners to outline the
report, General Marshall discussed the measures required "to effect an imme-
problem with his immediate assistants.
16
"Are we not forced," he asked, "into a Notes on Conf in OCofS, 17 Jun 40, Misc Confs,
binder 3.
15 17
Memo, Sr Army and Navy Members JPC to Dirs Memo, WPD for CofS, 17 Jun 40, sub: National
WPD, 16 Jun 40, WPD 4250-3. Defense Policy, WPD 4250-3.
diate mobilization of national effort for to support full mobilization of man-

Hemisphere Defense." The result was power and industry. He agreed on the
a comprehensive review of national pol- necessity for defense of the Western
icy during the latter part of June by the Hemisphere and the protective occupa-
War and Navy Departments, the State tion of European colonial possessions as
Department, and the President. With well as other strategic positions in the
the study of the questions proposed by Caribbean area and in Central and South
Roosevelt on the 13th, this review fur- America, but only after consultation and
nished an estimate of probable war de- negotiation with the Latin American
velopments and outlined the action nations concerned.
required for full-scale mobilization and As a result of these discussions, the
for aid to Britain and her allies. Though planners recommended that American
never approved by the President, the policy be based on the following:
conclusion of the planners nevertheless 1. That the British Empire would
reflected his views and constituted an continue to exist in the fall and winter
important milestone in the develop- of 1940, though Great Britain itself
ment of U.S. strategy for World War might not remain an active combatant.
II.18 2. That France would be occupied by
The critical point at issue in the dis- German forces, and even if the French
cussions was the fate of the French Fleet in North Africa and elsewhere contin-
and the future of Great Britain. Mili- ued resistance, U.S. aid would not alter
tary leaders wished to base their plans on substantially the French position.
the worst of all possible contingencies— 3. That U.S. participation in the war
that England, if not the British Empire, as an active belligerent could not pre-
would be forced out of the war and that vent the defeat of France or of Great
the French and British Fleets would fall Britain at this time.
to the Axis. The President, on the other This estimate of the situation at the
hand, believed that American action end of June, which incorporated the
should be based on the assumption that President's views, led the planners to
Great Britain would remain an active recommend as the "Basis for Immediate
belligerent and that the military situa- Decisions Concerning the National De-
tion in Europe would not alter appre- fense" a defensive in the Pacific, irre-
ciably in the next six months. He did spective of the fate of the French Fleet.
not feel, either, that aid to Britain But if that fleet did fall into German
should be cut off entirely, and countered hands, the planners recognized they
the planner's arguments with the obser- would have to consider the question of
vation that if a small amount of aid whether to move the major portion of
would see the British through without the U.S. Fleet to the Atlantic. The plan-
seriously retarding American prepara- ners thought, too, that the further re:
tions, then that aid should be furnished. lease of war materials needed for
Nor was the President willing to put American forces would seriously weaken
the armed forces on a wartime basis or the United States. But they did not rule
out altogether aid to Britain and stipu-
18
The relevant papers are filed in WPD 4250-3. lated, in accordance with Roosevelt's
wishes, that aid would be given "under own Admiralty Committee to consider
certain circumstances."19 "naval cooperation with the United
During the summer of 1940, Ameri- States Navy" in the event of American
can policy and strategy were shaped in entry into the war, and had made clear
large measure by President Roosevelt's to the Americans in a general way how
conviction that Britain must be en- they intended to fight the war.21
couraged to resist and that the British "With the arrival of the special observ-
Fleet must not be permitted to fall to ers in London in August 1940, the con-
Germany. In a real sense, therefore, versations which had been carried on
American strategy was dependent upon informally by the Navy since December
British fortunes. Only "one force," said 1937 were broadened to include Army
Henry Stimson on the day after France's representatives and enlarged in scope to
surrender, "remained between the Nazis include basic questions of strategy, com-
and the Western Hemisphere—the Brit- mand arrangements, and materiel re-
ish Fleet." Faced with this "appalling quirements. None of the observers
prospect," the United States would stand doubted the determination of the Brit-
alone if that fleet were lost."20 ish people to continue their resistance.
Reassurances from the British that In their month in England, Generals
they had no intention of giving up the Emmons and Strong were greatly im-
fight were gratifying to a President so pressed by the coolness and confidence
closely committed to British support, of the British under attack, and by the
but a more objective estimate of Great organization, training, and techniques
Britain's ability to resist invasion and for defense against air attack.22 British
detailed information on which to base faith in the efficacy of air bombardment,
plans were needed. To fill this need as and the independent position of the
well as to see for themselves how the Royal Air Force had an effect also on the
British were fighting and what they two Army observers. Implicit in their
needed most, the Army and Navy sent report was a reflection of the British
special observers to London in the sum- belief that Germany could be so weak-
mer of 1940 at Mr. Churchill's invita- ened ultimately by air bombardment as
tion. The Army observers were General to make ground operations on the
Strong, Chief of the War Plans Division, Continent feasible.
and Maj. Gen. Delos C. Emmons of the The American observers also learned
Air Corps. Both would remain for only much about British strategy for the con-
a few weeks, but the Navy observer, Rear duct of the war. In broad terms, the
Adm. Robert L. Ghormley, was to re- British Chiefs outlined for the Ameri-
main in London on extended duty. cans their policy for the conduct of the
Already, the British had appointed their war:
19
1. The security of the United King-
Memo, CofS and CNO for President, 27 Jun 40,
sub: Basis for Immediate Decisions . . . ; see also pre-
21
liminary studies by the planners, with the President's For a complete account of these developments
comments, in WPD 4250-3. and naval conversations, see Kittredge, U.S.-British
20
Henry L. Stimson and McGeorge Bundy, On Naval Cooperation, sec. III, pt. A and B.
22
Active Service in Peace and War (New York: Harper Memo, Emmons and Strong for CofS, 22 Sep 40,
& Brothers, 1948), pp. 318-19. sub: Observations in England, WPD 4368.
dom and Imperial possessions and the "eventual active cooperation" of the
interests. United States, the British Chiefs were
2. Command of the home waters and somewhat evasive. "No account had
the eastern Mediterranean, combined been taken" of this possibility, they told
with an attempt to regain command of the Americans, "since this was clearly a
the entire Mediterranean. matter of high political policy."
3. An intensified air offensive and For the British, Germany was clearly
economic pressures against both Germany the main enemy and the "mainspring"
and Italy. of the Axis effort in Europe. Arguing
4. Development of resources for major from this basis, the British insisted that
o f f e n s i v e ground operations when "whatever action may be necessary
opportunity offered.23 against any other country must, there-
In the Far East, the British admitted fore, be related to our main object,
frankly, their interests would be best which is the defeat of Germany"—a
served if the U.S. Fleet remained in the statement that came very close to the
Pacific. Their original plan had been to basic strategic decision of World War IL
send a naval force to the Far East in the And when Admiral Ghormley asked the
event of a Japanese attack, but that was British how they expected to defeat
no longer possible. On the other hand, Germany and whether the final issue
if Japan came into the war and if the would be decided on land, they replied
United States sent a portion of the fleet that "in the long run it was inevitable
into the Atlantic, British surface vessels that the Army should deliver the coup
from the Home Fleet and the force at de grace." But they hoped that the
Gibraltar could be sent to the Far East. Army's task could be made considerably
"The support of the American battle easier by "a serious weakening in the
fleet," observed the British Chief of the morale and fighting efficiency of the
Air Staff, "would obviously transform German machine, if not a complete
the whole strategical situation in the breakdown." How this would be accom-
Far East." plished, the British did not specify, but
On the question of American material their emphasis on bombardment indi-
aid, the British were equally frank. In cated that air power would certainly play
response to a question from Admiral a leading role in the defeat of Germany.
Ghormley as to whether the British were
relying on economic support and even- Shift to the Atlantic, September 1940-
tual co-operation of the United States, January 1941
they replied that in the plans for the
future "we were certainly relying on the Events in Europe after June 1940
continued economic and industrial co- gave hope for a brighter future than had
operation of the United States in ever- seemed possible after the German of-
increasing volume." American supply, fensive in April and May. The success
they declared, was "fundamental to our of the British in beating off the attacks
whole strategy." But on the question of of the Luftwaffe and the reports of the
23
Minutes of the meetings with the British are in
special observers led to a more favorable
WPD 4402-1. program of support for the British war
effort and to other measures such as the States should remain on the defensive
transfer of fifty old destroyers in return in the Pacific. It was also a powerful
for a lease on British air and naval base argument for continued aid to Britain,
sites in British possessions in the west- and for opposition to any move that
ern Atlantic. For the moment, the Axis might risk serious hostilities with the
threat in Europe seemed to be blunted. Japanese.
Meanwhile, the situation in the Far Early in October, the entire subject
East had taken a turn for the worse. On of American policy toward Japan was
22 September, Japanese troops entered reviewed on the highest level in Wash-
northern Indochina, and five days later ington. Inevitably the question of Brit-
the Japanese Government announced its ish co-operation arose. The military
adherence to the Rome-Berlin Axis. chiefs opposed strong action on the
Just two days before the signing of the ground that the British would be unable
Tripartite Pact, the Army planners had to send any forces into the area and that
completed a report on the ability of the the United States could not undertake
United States to cope with the problems to assume Allied obligations in the Far
presented by the Axis threat. After re- East. Despite the well-known views of
viewing the possibilities in Europe, the the American staff, the British continued
planners pointed out that the United their efforts to persuade the Americans
States might soon face renewed advances to join the defense of their Far Eastern
in the Far East, possibly against the possessions by sending naval units to
Netherlands Indies or the Philippines, Singapore. In May 1940, Churchill had
but that it would not be possible to op- offered to let the Americans use Singa-
pose such moves by a major effort in the pore "in any way convenient" in order,
Pacific in view of the greater danger in as he put it, to "keep the Japanese quiet
the Atlantic. Operations in the Pacific, in the Pacific." On 4 October he tried
they maintained, should be held to the again. In a strong personal message to
minimum.24 President Roosevelt discussing the Far
There was general agreement in Wash- Eastern situation, he asked, "Would it
ington with this view. The main prob- not be possible for you to send an Amer-
lem was how to avoid a conflict with ican Squadron, the bigger the better, to
Japan and at the same time maintain pay a friendly visit to Singapore? There
American interests and defend American they would be welcomed in a perfectly
possessions in the Far East. The answer normal and rightful way." 25
perhaps lay in Europe, for there was Both Admiral Stark and General Mar-
strong reason to believe that Japan shall were opposed to the dispatch of an
would take no overt military action American naval force to Singapore and
against the United States or Great agreed that the greater danger was in
Britain until German victory seemed the eastern Atlantic. Secretary Hull also
assured. This line of reasoning served opposed the move. As he told the Brit-
to strengthen the view that as long as ish Ambassador, "It will not be wise,
Great Britain was in danger, the United 25
The message is quoted in Winston S. Churchill,
24
Memo, WPD for CofS, 25 Sep 40, sub: Problem Their Finest Hour (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Com-
of Production ..., WPD 4321-9. pany, 1949), pp. 497-98.
even from the British standpoint, for the various courses of action open to the
two wars to be raging at the same time, United States, the military effect of devel-
one in the East and the other in the opments in Europe and Asia, and the
West. If this country should enter any close relationship between British for-
war, this would immediately result in tunes and American policy. Known as
greatly cutting off military supplies to the "Plan Dog" memorandum because
Great Britain."26 The move would be the recommended course of action if the
politically inexpedient also, for this was United States became a belligerent was
an election year and Roosevelt was al- contained in paragraph D ("Dog" in
ready in the midst of a campaign for military parlance), Admiral Stark's study
election to a third term. A military constitutes perhaps the most important
gesture such as Churchill had proposed single document in the development of
was likely to lose more votes than it World War II strategy.
would gain. Thus, on grounds of politi- The central point of Admiral Stark's
cal expediency as well as strategy, the analysis was the recognition that Ameri-
President turned down Mr. Churchill's can security depended to a very large
invitation. extent on the fate of Great Britain. This
Yet developments since the summer note he sounded at the very outset with
of 1940 had made the need for a closer the assertion that "if Britain wins deci-
co-ordination of British and American sively against Germany we could win
plans increasingly evident. Almost every everywhere; but that if she loses the
important problem faced by the military problems confronting us would be very
planners raised questions that could not great; and while we might not lose
be settled without an intimate knowl- everywhere, we might, possibly, not win
edge of British capabilities and plans. anywhere." Should the British Empire
But the hectic months of a Presidential collapse, it seemed probable to Stark
campaign and the uncertainty of the that the victorious Axis powers would
outcome discouraged any serious effort seek to expand their control, economi-
to lay the basis for such co-ordination. cally at first and then politically and
By early November, President Roose- militarily, into the Western Hemisphere.
velt's re-election seemed certain and on The military consequences of a British
the eve of the election Admiral Stark defeat were so serious for the United
made the first bid for a firm and clear States, Stark declared, that the British
statement of American policy that would ought to be assisted in every way pos-
provide the basis for co-ordinated U.S.- sible. He did not believe, either, that
British plans.27 It was the strongest and Britain had the manpower or material
most comprehensive analysis thus far of resources to conquer Germany alone.
Assistance by powerful allies would be
26
necessary ultimately, and to be ready for
Memoirs of Cordell Hull, I, 906.
27
Memo, Stark for Secy Navy, 12 Nov 40, no sub. this eventuality Britain "must not only
This is a revision of the original 4 November memo- continue to maintain the blockade, but
randum, no copies of which are in the Army file, she must also retain intact geographi-
revised to include the Army WPD comments and
sent to the President. All papers relevant to this cal positions from which successful land
memo are filed in WPD 4175-15. actions can later be launched."
In facing the consequences of close ited war from becoming unlimited, as

co-operation with the British, Admiral the Japanese later found out. Nor did
Stark boldly raised the possibility—thus Stark see how the defeat of Japan, even
far avoided—of active American partici- if this could be accomplished, would
pation in the war. Since Britain could contribute materially to the more im-
not herself defeat Germany, the question portant objectives of the defense of the
was how American resources in men and Western Hemisphere and the continued
supplies could be employed in combina- existence of the British Empire. To per-
tion with the British to achieve this end. form all the tasks required to achieve
Admiral Ghormley, it will be recalled, these objectives, the United States could
had raised this question with the British "do little more in the Pacific than remain
in London in August, asking whether on a strict defensive."
large-scale ground operations would be The major alternative courses of ac-
necessary. He had received an affirma- tion open to the United States, as Stark
tive reply from the British then, and viewed the possibilities, were four, and
Stark now returned to this point. he stated them as questions:
Blockade and bombardment, the means
A. Shall our principal military effort be
favored by the British, he did not think directed toward hemisphere defense and
would do the job. The only certain s e c u r i t y in both oceans? (Similar to
way of defeating Germany was "by mili- RAINBOW'S 1 and 4.)
tary success on shore," and for that, B. Shall we prepare for a full offensive
bases close to the European continent against Japan, premised on assistance from
the British and Dutch forces in the Far
would be required. "I believe," Stark East and remain on the strict defensive in
declared, "that the United States, in the Atlantic? (Similar to RAINBOW 2, or
addition to sending naval assistance, RAINBOW 3 and ORANGE with allies.)
would also need to send large air and C. Shall we plan for sending the strong-
land forces to Europe or Africa, or both, est possible military assistance both to the
and to participate strongly in this land British in Europe and to the British, Dutch
and Chinese in the Far East? (In effect, this
offensive." would call for an equal effort on two fronts
Considering the importance of the while defending the Western Hemisphere.)
Atlantic to American security, Stark D. Shall we direct our efforts toward an
argued strongly against major commit- eventual strong offensive in the Atlantic as
ments in the far Pacific that would in- an ally of the British, and a defensive in the
Pacific? (Similar to RAINBOW 5.)
volve the United States in an all-out
effort against Japan, as envisaged in There was no doubt in Admiral
ORANGE. Such a course would have the Stark's mind that the alternative out-
effect of drawing resources away from lined in paragraph "Dog" would best
the Atlantic and cutting down aid to serve the national interests. It would
Britain. Even a limited war against enable the United States to exert all its
Japan would require strong reinforce- effort in a single direction, make pos-
ments in the Southwest Pacific and sible the greatest assistance to Britain,
Southeast Asia to defend British and and provide the strongest defense of the
Dutch possessions. Also, it might prove Western Hemisphere. The one great
very difficult indeed to prevent a lim- disadvantage of the Plan Dog, of course,
was that it would leave Japan free to The reaction of General Marshall and
pursue her program of expansion in Asia the Army planners to Plan Dog was en-
and the Southwest Pacific. Therefore the tirely favorable. As a matter of fact, the
United States, while making every effort Army had argued substantially along
to avoid war with Japan, should seek to these lines in June 1940, when the pros-
keep that nation from occupying British pect of an Axis victory in Europe had
and Dutch possessions in the Far East. seemed so great, and General Marshall
Plan Dog was the course to be fol- had then asked whether it would not
lowed in the event of war—and Stark be advisable to reframe U.S. naval pol-
seemed to have little doubt that the icy so as to place the main effort in the
United States would soon be involved Atlantic with "purely defensive action in
in the European conflict. But if war did the Pacific."29 Thus, except for minor
not come, or, as he put it "until such comments, the Army planners endorsed
time as the United States should decide the Stark proposals, which went forward
to engage its full forces in war," the best to the President on 13 November. On
course to follow would be that outlined the 18th, the Joint Board instructed its
in paragraph A, that is, to build up the planning committee to study the ques-
defenses of the Western Hemisphere and tions raised by Admiral Stark and pre-
stand ready to fight off a threat in either pare recommendations for submission to
ocean. the President and the two service
Admiral Stark also had a program for Secretaries.30
carrying out the policy he proposed. The British, who presumably learned
The first step would be to prepare a of Plan Dog from Admiral Ghormley,
joint plan as a guide for Army and Navy also agreed with Admiral Stark. Since
planning, and at least the "skeleton" of the plan was based so largely on the need
alternative plans for other situations to maintain the British Empire, this is
that might develop. Such plans, how- not surprising. Churchill thought the
ever, would be of limited value, he plan "strategically sound" and "highly
pointed out, if there was not a "clear adapted to our interests," as indeed it
understanding between the nations in- was, but only because of the identity of
volved as to the strength and extent of British and American interests. He was
the participation which may be expected "much encouraged by the American
in any particular theater. . . ." For this naval view," and cautioned his staff "to
reason, therefore, Stark recommended strengthen the policy of Admiral Stark"
that secret staff talks be initiated with
British military and naval authorities
"to reach agreements and lay down plans Ambassador to Secretary Hull in Washington, and by
for promoting unity of allied effort Admiral Sir Dudley Pound to Ghormley in London.
29
should the United States find it necessary Notes of Conf in OCS, 17 Jun 40, sub: Defense
Problems, OCS Misc Confs.
to enter the war."28 30
Ltr, CofS to JB, 18 Nov 40, sub: National De-
fense Policy for the United States, JB 325, ser. 670;
Memos, WPD for CofS, 13 Nov 40, sub: National
28
The British had already suggested such conversa- Policy of the U.S.; Secy, Gen Staff for WPD, same
tions on various occasions. The most recent sug- date, no sub; CofS for Secy War, same date, no sub.
gestions were made in October by the British All in WPD 4175-15.
and "not use arguments inconsistent with wealth. Until forced to enter the war,
it."31 Apparently the British Chiefs took the United States should follow the
this advice seriously for on 23 Novem- course advocated in paragraph A of
ber Admiral Ghormley reported to Stark Stark's memorandum; if forced into war
that in the view of the Admiralty, which with Japan, the United States should at
he believed to be the view of the British the same time enter the war in the
Government, "the primary objective of Atlantic and limit operations in the mid-
the war is the defeat of Germany and Pacific and Far East so as "to permit
Italy," and that in case Japan and the prompt movement to the Atlantic of
United States should enter the war, U.S.- forces fully adequate to conduct a major
British strategy in the Pacific should be offensive in that ocean."33 American pol-
to contain the Japanese and prevent ex- icy and strategy, therefore, would be
tension of the operations to the south designed to defeat Germany and her
and to the Indian Ocean.32 But the Brit- allies in order to prevent the extension
ish clung to their faith in Singapore, and of Axis influence into the Western Hem-
still hoped the United States would send isphere, while seeking to keep the Japa-
a naval force there to hold it against the nese from entering the war or from
Japanese. attacking British and Dutch territory in
While arrangements went forward for the Far East.
conversations with the British, the joint The Joint Board approved the work
planners continued their efforts to proof its planners on 21 December, and the
duce a statement of national defense Secretaries of War and Navy gave their
policy based on Admiral Stark's recom- approval soon after. The original inten-
mendation. If acceptable, this document tion was to have the Secretary of State
was to be submitted for approval to the join the two service Secretaries in sub-
President by the Secretaries of State, mitting these recommendations to the
War, and Navy, and serve as the basis President for his approval as the basis
for instructions to the American repre- for future action by all agencies of the
sentatives in the forthcoming staff con- government. But Mr. Hull refused. He
versations. On 21 December 1940, the was in general agreement with these pol-
joint planners completed their work. In icies, he declared, but was doubtful of
all essential respects, their recommenda- the propriety of "joining in the submis-
tions were similar to those of Admiral sion to the President of a technical mili-
Stark. The major objective of U.S. tary statement of the present situation."34
defense policy, they said, was the secu- Arrangements for staff conferences
rity of the Western Hemisphere, and with the British were completed early
this was to be secured by full coin January 1941, and on the 15th of the
operation with the British Common- month the British delegation left for the
31
Churchill, Their Finest Hour, pp. 690-91. The
33
quotations are from his message of 22 November Ltr, JPC to JB, 21 Dec 40, sub: National Defense
1940 to the First Sea Lord. Policy for the U.S., JB 325, ser. 670. Earlier drafts
32
Ghormley to Stark, 23 Nov 40, quoted in Kitt- and directives are in the same file. See also relevant
redge, U.S.British Naval Relations, se. III pt. D, p. papers in WPD 4175-15 and JB 325, ser. 674.
34
313, and Notes, app. B. Records of Admiralty Memo, Brig Gen Leonard T. Gerow for CofS, 3
Meeting, 22 Nov 40. Jan 41, sub: Conf with Secy State, WPD 4175-15.
United States. There had been prelimi- properly trained, to assist the govern-
nary exchanges of view by cable and a ments in their resistance to subversive
proposed set of instructions had been Axis activity.
prepared for the American representa- The President's view of American pol-
tives. But the military authorities still icy in the Pacific coincided closely with
did not have President Roosevelt's that of the military authorities. There
approval of the recommended national the United States would stand on the
defense policy, which was to constitute defensive with the fleet based on Hawaii.
the guide lines for the American dele- There was to be no naval reinforce-
gates. Finally, on 16 January, the Presi- ment of the Philippines, and the Com-
dent met with his military advisers, the mander of the Asiatic Fleet, based in
two Secretaries and the service Chiefs. the Philippines, was to have discretion-
Present at the meeting also was the Sec- ary authority in the event of attack to
retary of State, who, with the others withdraw when he thought it necessary.
constituted a group known informally The choice was his and it would be up
as the "War Council." to him to decide whether to sail east
The meeting opened with a considera- toward Pearl Harbor or south to
tion of the problems raised by the possi- Singapore, as the British wished.35
bility of simultaneous action by Germany By the middle of January 1941, the
and Japan against the United States. major lines of American strategy in
The President thought there was only World War II had emerged and the re-
"one chance in five" of such an attack election of President Roosevelt assured
but he avoided any. commitment on the a continuation of the policy established
basic question of whether to plan for during the critical summer months of
a major effort in the Atlantic or Pacific. 1940. While hoping to achieve his aims
On one point, though, he left no doubt. by measures short of war, the President
There was to be no curtailment of aid had publicly stressed during the preced-
to Britain, even in the event of a con- ing months America's unreadiness for
certed attack in the Atlantic and Pacific. war and the danger from Europe and
Clearly, the President's major concern the Far East. Army and Navy planners
was with Great Britain. In that sense, had defined the problem facing the
he was of the same mind as his chief United States in a series of studies, and
military and civilian advisers. He had made plans to meet various situa-
thought the Navy should be prepared tions which might arise. The most likely
to convoy shipping in the Atlantic and contingency in early 1941 was that the
continue to patrol the coast. But he was United States, allied with Great Britain,
equally anxious that the Army should might be involved in a two-ocean war
not be committed to any operations until against a combination of Germany, Italy,
it was fully prepared, and that American and Japan. In such a contingency, it
military policy should be "very conserv- was generally agreed, the United States
ative" until its strength had been greatly would adopt a defensive role in the
increased. In Latin America, the United Pacific and make its main effort against
States would have to be prepared, the 35
Memo, CofS for WPD, 17 Jan 41, sub: White
President declared, to provide forces, House Conf of 16 Jan 41, WPD 4175-18.
the most powerful and dangerous enemy, military effort in the Atlantic, or "naval-
Germany. But before firm plans could ly in the Mediterranean"—another Pres-
be made, it was first necessary to reach idential phrase. In the way of practical
agreement with Great Britain on the advice in negotiating with the British,
broad aims of the war and the major the delegates were to keep the following
outlines of strategy. in mind:
It is believed that we cannot afford, nor
RAINBOW 5 do we need, to entrust our national future
to British direction. . . .
During the first three weeks of Janu- United States Army and Navy officials
ary 1941 the planners of the Joint Board are in rather general agreement that Great
completed their arrangements for the Britain cannot encompass the defeat of Ger-
American-British staff conference. On many unless the United States provides that
nation with direct military assistance. . . .
21 January, they submitted to the board It is to be expected, that proposals of the
a proposed agenda for the meetings and British representatives will have been drawn
a statement of the American position. up with chief regard for the support of the
The meetings were to be nonpolitical; British Commonwealth. Never absent from
no specific commitments were to be made British minds are their postwar interests,
"except as to technical method of coop- commercial and military. We should like-
wise safeguard our own eventual interests.36
eration," and agreements reached would
be subject to approval by the two gov- The Joint Board gave its approval to
ernments. Within this framework, the these instructions and procedures on 22
delegates were to determine the best January, submitting them in turn to the
methods by which the forces of both Secretaries of War and the Navy with
nations could defeat Germany and its the suggestion that the statement defin-
allies should the United States be "coming the military position and strategy
pelled to resort to war"—a phrase intro- governing the action of U.S. forces be
duced by the President; reach agreement approved by the President. As a result
on the methods and nature of military Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox per-
co-operation; and co-ordinate plans for sonally submitted the report to the Presi-
the use of their forces. dent on the 23d and three days later
As a guide for the delegates, American Roosevelt approved it with minor
national objectives were defined in vir- changes in wording.37
tually the same terms used by Admiral The American-British staff conversa-
Stark: (1) protection of the Western tions opened in Washington on 29 Janu-
Hemisphere against military or political ary 1941 and continued through fourteen
encroachment by any other power; (2) sessions to 29 March, when the dele-
aid to the British Commonwealth; (3)
opposition by diplomatic means to Japa-
nese expansion. In the event of war, the 36
JPC to JB, 21 Jan 41, sub: Joint Instr for Army
"broad military objective" of the United and Navy Representatives . . . , JB 325, ser. 674. The
States and Britain would be the defeat Presidential changes were made on 26 January; see
note 37.
of Germany, which would be "most effec- 37
Memo, FDR for Secy Navy, 26 Jan 41, JB 325,
tively attained" by placing the principal Ser. 674; Mins, JB Mtg, 22 Jan 41.
gates submitted a final report, commonly considered of paramount interest, with

known as ABC-1.38 first call on American forces. British
At the outset, the British stated their interests were broader, encompassing the
position clearly and fully: security of the British Commonwealth
of Nations. "A cardinal feature of British
1. The European Theater is the vital the-
ater where a decision must first be sought. strategic policy," the delegates agreed,
2. The general policy should therefore "is the retention of a position in the Far
be to defeat Germany and Italy first, and East such as will insure cohesion and
then deal with Japan. security of the British Commonwealth
3. The security of the Far Eastern posi- and the maintenance of its war effort."
tion, including Australia and New Zealand,
is essential to the cohesion of the British The third point of British strategy, the
Commonwealth and to the maintenance of importance of Singapore, involved the
its war effort. Singapore is the key to the whole question of Far Eastern strategy.
defense of these interests and its retention On this, there was a fundamental dis-
must be assured. agreement between the British and
In line with this strategy, U.S. naval American delegates. This disagreement
forces, after appropriate dispositions for stemmed partly from different national
defense of the Western Hemisphere, interests. The British had to deal with
should be employed mainly in the Atlan- problems of imperial security, and in
tic and Mediterranean, the British stated. their view Singapore was essential to the
But they also declared that the United defense of India, Australia, and New
States should maintain in the Pacific a Zealand. American interests in the Far
fleet large enough to prevent the Japa- East, though substantial, were not as
nese from prejudicing the main effort in vital. The only American possession of
the Atlantic. importance in the area, the Philippines,
There was no disagreement between had v i r t u a l l y been w r i t t e n off as
the Americans and the British on the indefensible in a war with Japan.
first two points. Both sides were agreed There was a basic difference in out-
that Germany was the main enemy and look also between the British and Amer-
the first objective of the allies. They icans. Reflecting their insular position
agreed further that the Atlantic would and long tradition in wars against Con-
be the decisive theater of the war and tinental powers, the British placed their
the principal effort of the two nations main emphasis on sea and air power
would be made there. The delegates rather than large-scale ground forces.
also recognized the legitimate interests The reduction of Germany by these
of each side, an indispensable basis for means would be a slow process, but the
co-operation. On the American side, the British were accustomed to long wars
security of the United States and the and had no doubt of ultimate victory.
defense of the Western Hemisphere were The final blow, they expected, would
be delivered by ground armies, but to
38
Papers relating to the meeting are located in prepare for that eventuality they would
OPD Exec Files, item 11, Exec 4 and WPD 4402—1 first secure or regain the strategic posi-
passim. The report itself is found in several files, but
is available in printed form in Pearl Harbor Attack
tions required for the offensive—Singa-
Hearings, exhibit 49, pt. 15, pp. 1485-1542. pore, the Mediterranean—and then con-
centrate on weakening the enemy's war their own special interests, as the United
machine. Victory with minimum losses States would look after its own in the
and minimum risks, exploitation of supe- Philippines, and that the two nations
rior naval power, and avoidance of large- should act together where their interests
scale continental operations — that was coincided—in the North Atlantic and
the classic British strategy. the British Isles.
The Americans, conscious of their The report submitted by the Ameri-
overwhelming material resources and can and British delegates laid down the
unwilling to face the prospects of a basic guide lines of Allied co-operation
long war, wished to concentrate all their in World War IL It defined clearly the
power at the earliest possible moment policies, the "paramount interests" of
against the main enemy. To achieve both countries, and the general strategic
this aim and end the war quickly with concepts designed to support these poli-
fewer casualties in the long run, they cies. Among the major strategic objec-
were willing to face the temporary loss tives accepted by both sides were the
of strategic positions like the Philippines following:
and to risk substantial casualties initially 1. The early defeat of Germany as
rather than disperse their forces or adopt the predominant member of the Axis,
a purely defensive or delaying strategy. with the principal military effort of the
These differences emerged sharply in United States being exerted in the Atlan-
the discussions over Singapore. What tic and European area, the decisive thea-
the British were asking the Americans ter. Operations in other theaters to be
to do was to underwrite the defense of conducted in such a manner as to
the Empire and incorporate, as a central facilitate the main effort.
feature of Allied strategy, the British 2. The maintenance of British and
concept of the importance of Singapore Allied positions in the Mediterranean
as the key to defense of the Far East, area.
even at the expense of concentrating for 3. A strategic defensive in the Far
a decisive blow against Germany at the East, with the U.S. Fleet employed offen-
earliest possible date. Though the sively "in the manner best calculated to
Americans appreciated the political, eco- weaken Japanese economic power, and
nomic, and symbolic significance of Sin- to support the defense of the Malay
gapore for the British Empire, they Barrier by directing Japanese strength
doubted its strategic value and the wis- away from Malaysia."
dom of underwriting its defense. To To secure these objectives, the dele-
accept the British proposal would not gates agreed on a number of specific
only have been contrary to their instruc- measures, including economic pressure,
tions but would constitute, the Ameri- a sustained air offensive against German
can delegates believed, "a strategic error military power, the early elimination of
of incalculable magnitude." 39 They Italy from the war, raids and minor
therefore refused to budge from the posi- offensives at every opportunity, and the
tion that the British must look after support of resistance movements in Axis-
39
Memo, Army Delegates for CofS, 12 Feb 41, sub:
dominated countries. All these would
Dispatch of U.S. Forces to Singapore, WPD 4402-3. be preparatory to the final offensive
against Germany. For that it would be of the African and European continents
necessary to secure bases in the Medi- as rapidly as possible" to accomplish the
terranean and on the west and north- decisive defeat of Germany. The plan-
west shores of Europe, and to gather ning done in May on this basis was
"maximum land forces, composed large- rendered obsolete within a month by
ly of mobile armored divisions" to defeat the fall of France. Moreover, it seemed
and destroy the German Army. doubtful at the time that Great Britain
The agreements reached between the would survive, and the planners turned
American and British staffs and embod- their efforts to other RAINBOW situations
ied in ABC-1 were not intended to be —first RAINBOW 4 (hemisphere defense),
binding on the two nations or to have and then RAINBOW 3 (United States
any political or official character, but alone in a major effort against Japan).
only to determine the way in which the By the end of 1940, when it appeared
United States and the British Common- that Britain would survive and a revised
wealth could defeat Germany "should RAINBOW 5 situation was the most likely
the United States be compelled to resort contingency for which to plan, arrange-
to war." From the start it was under- ments were already under way for the
stood that conclusions reached by the American-British staff conversations.
conferees would have to be confirmed by Once the Chief of Staff and Chief of
the Chiefs of Staff of both nations and Naval Operations had given their
were contingent upon political agree- approval to ABC-1, work on RAINBOW
ments by the two governments. In line 5 progressed rapidly. By 30 April, the
with this understanding, General Mar- Army and Navy had agreed on a joint
shall and Admiral Stark gave their ten- plan and on that date submitted their
tative approval to the report and advised work to the Joint Board. For the pur-
the British Chiefs that they would pre- poses of this plan, the Allies—Associated
sent it to the President for approval at Powers, they were called—were assumed
an appropriate time.40 At the same time, to be the United States, the British Com-
the Joint Board issued a new directive monwealth (less Eire), the Netherlands
for the preparation of RAINBOW 5, the Indies, Greece, Yugoslavia, China, the
situation most closely meeting the Governments-in-Exile, and the Free
requirements laid down in ABC-1. French; the Axis nations, Germany,
Work on RAINBOW 5 had been ini- Italy, Rumania, Hungary, Bulgaria, and
tiated originally in May 1940, after the possibly Japan and Thailand. These
German offensive in the west but before last two, even if they were not in the
the fall of France. The situation envis- war initially, were potential enemies and
aged then in RAINBOW 5 was a war in the possibility of their intervention was
which the United States, allied with therefore taken into account in the
Great Britain and France, would pro- plan.41
ject its armed forces "to either or both RAINBOW 5 was virtually identical
with ABC-1. As a matter of fact, one
40
Ltr, CofS and CNO to Special Army and Navy of the first assumptions of the plan was
Observers in London, 4 Apr 41, sub: Tentative Ap-
41
proval of ABC-1, WPD 4402-18. See notation on Ltr, JPC to JB, 30 Apr 41, sub: Joint Basic War
Copy 98, Pearl Harbor Attack Hearings, pt. 15, 1485. Plan RAINBOW 5, incl A, JB 325, ser. 642-5.
that the Allies would conduct the war ish Chiefs of Staff had approved ABC-1
"in accord with ABC-1." Thus, the provisionally and submitted it to their
strategic concepts, supporting measures, government for approval. The President
and missions enumerated in ABC-1 were apparently read the two documents care-
repeated almost verbatim in RAINBOW 5. fully but withheld approval of ABC-1
For the U.S. Army, "the primary imme- on the ground that the British had not
diate effort" would be to build up large yet approved it. Nor would he approve
land and air forces "for major offensive RAINBOW 5, presumably because it was
operations against the Axis powers" and based on ABC-1, that is, on arrange-
other operations were to be restricted to ments with the British which had not
those that would "not materially delay yet been accepted by that government.
this effort." Just what these operations He did request, however, that "in case
would consist of was not specified, al- of war" the two plans be returned to
though reference was made, as in ABC-1, him for his approval.43
to a large-scale attack by ground forces The President's ambiguous response
against Germany and to the capture of to the carefully worked out arrange-
bases from which to launch such an ments with the British, and to the Amer-
offensive. As one of the Army planners ican plans based on these arrangements,
explained at the time, "a plan must raised the question of whether the Army
be formulated upon a situation and no and Navy were authorized to proceed
prediction of the situation which will with their own planning for war on a
exist when such a plan can be RAINBOW 5 contingency. This question
implemented should be made."42 was resolved on 10 June at a meeting
RAINBOW 5 was neither a blueprint in Mr. Stimson's office. General Mar-
for victory nor a plan of operations. It shall's view was that since the President
merely outlined the objectives and mis- had not disapproved the plan, the Army
sions of American forces in case of war could proceed with its own arrange-
on
42
the WPD
Memo, basis for
of CofS
assumptions
(May 1941),that
sub: seemed
Analy- ments. This seemed reasonable, and it
sound at the time. Specific plans to was on that basis that the services pro-
achieve these objectives were still to be ceeded to make detailed plans for the
made. The first step was to secure employment of their forces.44
authority to proceed. By the middle of 1941 American pol-
Joint Board authority came on 14 May icy and military strategy had subordi-
when the board formally approved both nated the Pacific to a secondary position,
RAINBOW 5 and ABC-1, which it had while maintaining that the United States
tentatively approved early in April. would defend its overseas possessions and
Approval by the Secretaries came on 28 its interests in the Far East. The danger
May (Navy) and 2 June (Army), at of war with Japan was a real one, but
which time both plans went to the Presi-
dent, with the explanation that the Brit- 43
Mins, JB Mtg, 14 May. The correspondence
relating to the approval by the Secretaries and the
statement recording the President's reaction are filed
sis of Plans for Overseas Expeditions, cited in Mat- in JB 325, ser. 642-5.
44
loff and Snell, Strategic Planning 1941—1942, pp. Mins, Conf Office, Secy War, 10 Jun 41, WDCSA,
45-46. Secy of War Confs, I.
in the face of the greater threat from the fleet would advance step by step
Germany it had been decided to place across the Pacific through the Mandated
the main effort in the Atlantic and to Islands, specifically the Marshalls and
restrain Japan by political and economic the Carolines, to the Philippines, and
means. If Japan did attack, the United that it would then seek to establish
States would have to limit itself to the supremacy in the western Pacific was
defense of that area in the Pacific vital well understood and accepted. But be-
to its security, Alaska-Hawaii-Panama, yond the general statement that Japan
and accept the loss of the Philippines, would be brought to her knees by eco-
Wake, and Guam. But there were some nomic pressure, blockade, and air bom-
who still believed that the Philippines bardment, there was no specific plan for
could and should be reinforced and that operations to defeat the enemy. More-
the obligation of the United States to over, though it was assumed that Brit-
the Filipinos and its position in the Far ish, Dutch, and Chinese forces would
East transcended the logic of the military fight the common enemy, there were
strategists. no plans for concerted action and there
The circumstances under which a war was still disagreement between the Amer-
with Japan would begin were not yet ican and British planners over the role
known and, except for local defense of Singapore. There was much still to
plans, there was no settled solution on be done—forces to be raised, weapons
a plan to defeat Japan. The general produced, and plans written. Until then,
pattern of the war and the courses of the United States would have to restrain
action open to American forces had been an increasingly aggressive Japan by all
fixed over a long period of time. That means short of war.
CHAPTER IV
The Fatal Turn

Be audacious and cunning in your plans, firm and persevering in their
execution, determined to find a glorious end.
CLAUSEWITZ
The summer of 1941 was a crucial one efforts to stockpile strategic materials
for both Japan and the United States. and prepare the nation for any eventu-
Over a period of several years American ality. Japan was truly at the crossroad.
planners had devised a strategy designed
to protect the Western Hemisphere The July Crisis
against Axis aggression and, if the United
States was forced into war, to throw the Negotiations to settle the issues
bulk of its resources against Germany. between Japan and the United States
But this strategy assumed, first, that had been in progress since February 1941
Japan could be deterred from aggression when Ambassador Nomura had arrived
by means short of war, and second, that in Washington. By summer, little prog-
in the event hostilities in the Far East ress had been made. The American posi-
could not be avoided, the United States tion had been defined early in the
would accept the loss of American terri- conversations by Mr. Hull:
tory in that area. The planners, unwill- (1) Respect for the territorial integ-
ing to face the unpleasant prospect of rity and the sovereignty of each and all
large-scale military operations in the nations.
western Pacific, accepted these assump- (2) Support of the principle of non-
tions. But there were many, including interference in the internal affairs of
the President and his Secretary of War, other countries.
who found the conclusions of military (3) Support of the principle of equal-
logic distasteful and sought a way out ity, including equality of commercial
of the dilemma. The solution provided opportunity.
by the advocates of air power turned (4) Nondisturbance of the status quo
American eyes once more to the Far in the Pacific except as the status quo
East. may be altered by peaceful means.
The crisis facing the Japanese leaders
was more serious. In their view the very But so long as the Japanese persisted in
existence of the nation depended on pursuing an aggressive policy in China
their decisions. There seemed to be no and in southeast Asia there was not, in
way to end the war in China and eco- Mr. Hull's words, "one chance in twenty
nomic restrictions were crippling their or one in fifty or even one in one hun-
THE FATAL TURN 93
dred of reaching a peaceful settlement." 1 MAGIC 3 and which President Roosevelt

In the year since Prince Konoye had characterized as "a real drag-down and
become Premier (16 July 1940), the knock-out fight ... to decide which way
Japanese had achieved two of the four they are going to jump—attack Russia,
objectives outlined in the "General Prin- attack the South Seas . . . [or] sit on the
ciples."2 The Tripartite Pact had been fence and be more friendly with us."
signed on 27 September 1940, and a neu- Foreign Minister Matsuoka favored the
trality pact concluded with Russia on first course, the Army the second, and
13 April 1941. Expansion by diplomacy Premier Konoye inclined toward the
had failed everywhere, except in Thai- third course. Finally, on 2 July 1941,
land. By agreement with Vichy France, an Imperial Conference, consisting of
Japan had obtained the right to mili- the chief members of the government
tary occupation of Tonkin Province and and the armed forces meeting with the
the use of air bases and military facili- Emperor, made the final decision on
ties in northern Indochina. But the Japan's future course.4
Dutch, backed by the Americans and The question of a Soviet attack was
British, had stubbornly resisted Japanese put to rest by the Imperial Conference
efforts to gain economic concessions, and which decided that, regardless of any
the Chinese showed no disposition to change in the international situation,
lay down their arms and accept Japanese Japan would adhere to the Tripartite
terms for a settlement. Pact and to its plan for expansion to
The German invasion of the Soviet the south. If a favorable opportunity
Union on 22 June 1941 had a profound arose to take advantage of the war
effect on the international situation and between Germany and the Soviet Union,
led the Japanese to re-examine the pol- Japan would be ready to do so. The
icy established only a year earlier. There negotiations with the United States were
was much heated discussion among Japa- to be continued while preparations to
nese political and military leaders of the place the nation on a war basis and
probable effect of the Russo-German strengthen its defenses were to be pushed
war, discussions which the Americans forward with vigor. Also, steps were to
learned about through the medium of be taken to bring about Chiang's sur-
render, and plans for the domination
1
of Thailand and Indochina were to be
Pearl Harbor Attack: Report of the Joint Com-
mittee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor executed immediately. "We will not be
Attack, Doc. 244, 79th Cong., 2d sess. (hereafter deterred," the Imperial Conference
cited as Pearl Harbor Report), p. 294. Unless decreed, "by the possibility of being
otherwise noted this section is based on the Pearl
Harbor Report; Pearl Harbor Attack Hearings, pt.
involved in a war with England and
20, Memoirs of Prince Konoye; IMTFE, Judgment, America."
pp. 924-35; Department of State, Foreign Relations
3
of the United States, Japan, II, 342, 527-38, 549-55; Code name given to the interception and decoding
Political Strategy Prior to Outbreak of War, pt. IV, of the Japanese messages.
4
Japanese Studies in World War II, 150. The most Ltr, Roosevelt to Harold L. Ickes, 1 Jul 41, cited
detailed accounts in secondary sources are Langer in Langer and Gleason, The Undeclared War, p.
and Gleason, The Undeclared War, and, on the 646. The 2 July decision is included among IMTFE
Japanese side, Feis, The Road to Pearl Harbor. Exhibits, 588. See also Ltr, Grew to author, 19 Jun
2
See above, ch. II. 49, OCMH.
The problems posed by Germany's lowing day Japanese troops moved into
attack on the Soviet Union were hardly the southern portion of Indochina. Japan
settled and the decision made to abide now possessed strategically located air
by the Tripartite Pact and continue the and naval bases from which to launch at-
drive southward when a new crisis arose. tacks on Singapore, the Philippines, and
Still unanswered was the note Hull had the Netherlands Indies.
handed Nomura on 21 June, asking for Although the French acquiesced in
some clear indication of a genuine desire this raid on their empire, the United
for peace and making allusions to the States was not so obliging. In the view
pro-German attitude of certain mem- of the State Department, this fresh Japa-
bers of the Japanese Government. nese aggression constituted a threat to
Matsuoka, the foremost advocate of the American interests in the Far East and
alliance with Germany, insisted on an justified the imposition of additional
outright rejection of the note and the economic restrictions, then being con-
termination of the talks. Premier Konoye, sidered by the President, as a warning to
fearful that a flat rejection would end Japan. These restrictions were finally
the negotiations, wished to reply with put into effect on 26 July when the Presi-
counterproposals already prepared by dent issued an order freezing Japanese
the Army and Navy. Matsuoka would assets in the United States. Since Japan
not budge from his position and Konoye, no longer had the dollars with which to
given the nod by Tojo and after consul- purchase the urgently needed materials
tation with the Emperor, moved to oust of war, the effect of this measure, which
the pro-German Foreign Minister. First, the British and Dutch supported, was to
on 16 July, he submitted the resignation create an economic blockade of Japan.
of the entire Cabinet to the Emperor. The "obvious conclusion" of the "vi-
Two days later he received the Imperial cious circle of reprisal and counterre-
mandate to form a new Cabinet. This prisal," wrote Ambassador Grew, "is
he
5
Rad,did
CNOby selecting
to CINCAF, the41,same
25 Jul ministers
in Pearl Harbor eventual war," and Admiral Stark took
as before except for Matsuoka, whom so serious a view of the situation that he
he replaced with Admiral Toyoda. The warned Admiral Thomas C. Hart, com-
Japanese could now go ahead with the mander of the Asiatic Fleet, on the 25th,
program outlined at the Imperial to take "appropriate precautionary meas-
Conference of 2 July. ures against possible eventualities." 5
The first move of the new government The sharp American and British re-
was the virtual occupation of French action to their move into Indochina
Indochina. Protesting that Indochina
was being encircled, Japan issued what
was in effect an ultimatum to the Vichy
Government on 19 July. On the 24th, Attack Hearings, pt. 14, pp. 1400-1401; Grew Diary,
July 1941, cited in Langer and Gleason, The Unde-
Roosevelt offered to guarantee to the clared War, p. 654. Admiral Stark opposed a total
Japanese equal access to the raw mate- embargo on oil at this time, but did favor a partial
rials and food of Indochina in return embargo that would provide Japan with enough for
essential peacetime needs, but none for military pur-
for the neutralization of that country poses. Ltr, Stark to Col Warren G. Hoover, Actg
Nothing came of the proposal. The fol- Chief of Mil Hist, 5 Aug 59, OCMH.
THE FATAL TURN 95
"without hesitation." 6 The Navy's view

was equally gloomy. There was only
enough oil, Admiral Nagano told the
Emperor, to maintain the fleet under
war conditions for one and a half years
and he was doubtful that Japan could
win a "sweeping victory" in that time.
His advice, therefore, was that every
effort should be made to reach a peace-
ful settlement with the United States.
By the middle of August the two serv-
ices had agreed on a broad line of strat-
egy. The impetus came from a series of
studies presented by the Total War Re-
search Institute, a subordinate body of
the Cabinet.7 Forecasting the course of
events during the next six months, the
institute called for the invasion of the
Netherlands Indies in November, fol-
lowed the next month by surprise
GENERAL SUZUKI, president of the Japa-
attacks on British and American posses-
nese Planning Board, 1941. sions in the Far East. Anticipating that
the United States and Great Britain
would utilize Soviet bases in a war
against Japan, the institute predicted
came as a surprise to the Japanese and that Russia, too, would become involved
precipitated an intensive review of the in the war, probably between April and
nation's
7
8
IMTFE, readiness
This group
exhibits 870, to wage
was established
870-A, war.
871. The
inandOctober 1940pic-
to October 1942. The bulk of the insti-
ture was not encouraging. The power- tute's studies, however, dealt with the
ful Planning Board which co-ordinated problems of economic mobilization; mil-
the vast, complex structure of Japan's itary planning, except in the most gen-
war economy found the country's re- eral sense, was left to the services.8
sources meager and only enough, in These studies, as well as others, were
view of the recent action of the United used as reference material by the Gen-
States, for a quick, decisive war to gain eral Staffs in developing their own plans
the riches of the Southern Area. "If the during the tense days that followed the
present condition is left unchecked," embargo. From these discussions
asserted Teiichi Suzuki, president of the emerged four alternative lines of strat-
board, "Japan will find herself totally
exhausted and unable to rise in the 6
Political Strategy Prior to Outbreak of War, pt.
future." The blockade, he believed, IV, Japanese Studies in World War II, 150, pp. 73-77.
would bring about Japan's collapse with-
in two years, and he urged that a final conduct research into wartime measures, in co-opera-
tion with the Planning Board.
decision on war or peace be made
enter into the calculations of the plan-

ners at this time.
Army and Navy planners agreed that
the first plan was too risky for it would
leave Japanese forces exposed to attack
from the Philippines and Malaya. The
Navy preferred the second plan; it was
safe, provided for a step-by-step advance,
and created no serious problems. The
Army objected to it, however, on the
ground that by the time the main ob-
jectives in the Netherlands Indies and
Malaya were reached the enemy would
have had time to strengthen his defenses.
The third plan, with its early seizure of
Malaya and bypassing of the Philippines,
appealed greatly to the Army planners,
who hoped in this way to gain Southeast
Asia and delay American entry into the
war. But this course, as the Navy pointed
out, also placed American naval and air
ADMIRAL NAGANO forces in the Philippines in a strategic
position athwart Japan's line of com-
egy, all of them designed to accomplish munication and constituted a risk of the
the swift destruction of Allied forces in utmost magnitude. The fourth course,
the Far East and the early seizure of the simultaneous attacks and advance along
Netherlands Indies. The first was based two axes, created serious problems of
on
9
the Strategy
Political institute's
Prior studies andof provided
to Outbreak War, pt. co-ordination and timing and a danger-
for the seizure of the Indies and then ous dispersion of forces. But because it
of the Philippines and Malaya. The was the only course which compromised
second called for a step-by-step advance the views of both groups, it was finally
from the Philippines to Borneo, then adopted. For the first time the Japanese
Java, Sumatra, and Malaya. The re- had a strategic plan for offensive opera-
verse, from Malaya to the Philippines, tions designed to achieve the goals of
constituted a third line of action and one national policy against a coalition of
which would have the advantage of de- enemies.9
laying attack against American territory.
The fourth plan proposed at this time America Faces the Far East
consisted of simultaneous attacks against
the Philippines and Malaya followed by By mid-August 1941, American mili-
a rapid advance along both axes to the tary strategy for the Pacific and Far
Indies. Admiral Yamamoto's plan for
an attack against Pearl Harbor, work on
which had begun in January, did not IV, Japanese Studies in World War II, 150, pp. 9-10.
THE FATAL TURN 97
East—which reflected the determination ground that it might force Japan into
to avoid war with Japan and to remain war to gain the oil it so badly needed
on the defensive even if it meant the loss and thus imperil American interests in
of the Philippines, Guam, and Wake— the Atlantic.11 The President believed
no longer reflected the policy of the too, as he had written Secretary of the
U.S. Government. There had been Interior Harold L. Ickes earlier in the
signs even before RAINBOW 5 was com- month, that "it is terribly important for
pleted that American policy toward the control of the Atlantic for us to help
Japan was stiffening. The President's to keep peace in the Pacific," but felt,
action in May making China eligible for after the German attack on the Soviet
lend-lease had marked the beginning of Union had in effect lessened the imme-
a shift in Far Eastern policy. Though diate danger in the Atlantic and freed
it proved difficult to find any munitions Japan to move south, that the United
to furnish China because early plans for States could take a stronger stand in the
lend-lease had been made entirely in Pacific.12 This conviction, shared by
terms of aid to Britain, by July the prin- Stimson and others, was a basic factor
ciple of arming a compact Chinese Army in the decisions made during the months
and Air Force with American weapons before Pearl Harbor.
had been accepted with all the implica- A strong policy called for larger forces
tions this had for relations with the and for a revision of military plans.
Japanese. In addition, a mission under These were not long in coming. On
Brig. Gen. John Magruder was dis- the same day the oil embargo was im-
patched to China to aid in delivery of posed, General MacArthur, since 1936
materials over the Burma Road and to the Military Adviser of the Philippine
assist the Chinese both in using the Commonwealth and architect of the
materials received and in placing orders Philippine Army, was recalled to active
properly. Magruder did not, however, duty and given command of all U.S.
11
12
Memo, Turner to
Ltr, Roosevelt
have authorityforIckes,
Stark,1 19
JulJul
to discuss 41,41, sub:inStudy
cited
military of
Langer
plans Army Forces in the Far East (USAFFE).
with the Chinese, nor was he told what At the same time, by executive order,
he should do if war broke out between the Philippine Army was called into the
the United States and Japan.10 service of the United States.13 But it was
The order of 26 July freezing Japa- the RAINBOW strategy and not the Presi-
nese assets in the United States and dent's desire to strengthen American de-
establishing a de facto oil embargo gave fenses that dictated the instructions sent
further confirmation of America's stif- to MacArthur. Except for approximately
fening policy toward Japan. The plan- 400 reserve officers to assist in training
ners had objected to the move on the
10
Rpt, JPC to JB, Aircraft Rqmts for Chinese Effect of Embargo..., Pearl Harbor Attack Hear-
Govt, 9 Jul 41, JB 355, ser. 691; U.S. Mil Mission to ings, pt. 5, pp. 2382-84.
China, 12 Sep 41, JB 354, ser. 716; Mins, JB Mtg, 12
Jul 41. For a full account of prewar policy toward and Gleason, The Undeclared War, p. 646.
13
China, see Riley Sunderland and Charles F. Ro- For an account of these measures, and of the
manus, Stilwell's Mission to China, UNITED reinforcement of the Philippines which followed,
STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II (Washington, see Morton, The Fall of the Philippines, chs. II and
1953), ch. I. III.
the Philippine Army, he was told, he defense of the Philippines. A force of

would not receive any reinforcements. these bombers based in the Philippines,
On the last day of July, only two days it was contended, would not only serve
after he had told MacArthur not to ex- to defend the islands but would consti-
pect any reinforcements, Marshall radi- tute such a threat to Japanese movements
cally altered the Army position "to go southward toward the Netherlands In-
to no further expense for permanent dies as to deter Japan from further
improvements unless savings will re- aggression in that direction.
sult." American policy, he told his staff, The air staff proposal was approved
was to defend the Philippines, and pre- early in August and on the 14th the War
sumably to reinforce them, but not to Plans Division of the General Staff sub-
such an extent as to "jeopardize the suc- mitted a program for reinforcing the
cess of the major efforts made in the Philippines with antiaircraft artillery,
theater of the Atlantic."14 This scarcely modern combat planes, and tanks "to
constituted a reversal of the RAINBOW 5 enhance the probability of holding
strategy, but it did justify approval of a Luzon, and, in any event, giving a rea-
proposal to reinforce the Philippines sonable assurance of holding Manila
with guns, tanks, and ammunition. Bay."15 General Marshall gave the plan
This shift was not as sudden as it ap- his approval and then notified Mac-
peared. There had been earlier pro- Arthur that he would receive 1 coast
posals to reinforce the Philippines, most artillery regiment, 1 battalion of tanks,
of which had been rejected only because an ordnance company, and 31 P-40's
of a lack of funds. The previous year sometime in September, and shortly after
President Manuel Quezon, with the sup- that another 50 P-40's directly from the
port of the Philippine Department com- factory. At the same time the Air Corps
mander, had sought to secure additional allocated 4 heavy bomber and 2 pursuit
money for Philippine defense by using groups to MacArthur's Far East Air
the
14
sugarOffice
Gerow's excise funds—a
Diary, project
entry of 31 Jul 41, which
OPD Force and ordered a provisional squad-
required Congressional approval—and ron of 9 B-17's from Hawaii to the
early in 1941 the strength of the Philip- Philippines. These planes, after a his-
pine Scouts had been doubled. More- toric pioneer flight from Oahu by way
over, Secretary Stimson, who had served of Midway, Wake, Port Moresby, and
as governor-general of the Philippines Darwin, reached Clark Field on 12 Sep-
and had long advocated a firm attitude tember. By this time the reinforcement
toward Japan, favored the reinforce- of the Philippines enjoyed the highest
ment of the islands, as did other men in priority in the War Department.
high places. But it was the airmen's During the months that followed, air-
argument that their long-range bomber, craft, weapons, supplies, and men in
the B-17, could do what the Navy could increasing numbers were marked for
not that convinced the more skeptical shipment to the Philippines. But it
and paved the way for a new view of the took time to get orders filled, pack and
ship them to the ports, find the vessels
15
Exec Files; Phil Dept Def Proj, 1940, May 41, OPD Memo, Gerow for CofS, 14 Aug 41, sub: Rein-
Reg. Docs. forcement of Phil, WPD 3251-55.
THE FATAL TURN 99
to transport them, and sail them across 19 September, that the reinforcements
the ocean. At every step of the way there planned would have a profound strategic
were delays, but none so serious as the effect in a Pacific conflict and might well
shortage of cargo ships. By November be the decisive element in deterring
the backlog in U.S. ports of equipment Japan from opening hostilities.17 All
marked for the Philippines amounted to that was needed was time to prepare.
approximately one million tons. Though The general estimate was that prepara-
a shipping schedule that provided for ad- tions would be completed by March 1942.
ditional sailings in the next two months Until that time there was a risk that the
was established, a considerable quantity Japanese would attack, but it was a risk
of supplies and a large number of men the Army planners were apparently
destined for the Philippines never got willing to take.
there. The view that Japan would not strike
The decision to reinforce the Philip- until the spring of 1942 was based on
pines brought into sharp focus the prob- careful studies of the Far Eastern situa-
lem of developing a trans-Pacific air tion. Japan, it was assumed, wished to
route less exposed than the one via Mid- gain control of Asiatic Russia, China,
way and Wake. Airmen had long urged and Malaysia, and would, if conditions
such a project, which had the additional were favorable, resort to war to gain its
advantages of guarding the line of com- aims. The Philippines, strategically lo-
munication to Australia and New Zea- cated along the path of Japan's south-
land and providing protection for ward course, would be one of the early
surface vessels along the sea lanes of the objectives in a war with the United
South Pacific, but did not gain approval States. Thus far Japan had hesitated to
until August 1941. Construction was seize these territories, the Army planners
begun in October, when funds were believed, because of Soviet Russia's un-
made available, and by the time war expected and successful showing against
came
17
theMtg,
Mins, JB route across
19 Sep 41. the South Pacific the Wehrmacht, because of economic
by way of Christmas, Canton, Samoa, pressure from the United States, Great
Fijis, and New Caledonia was nearing Britain, and the Netherlands, and be-
completion.16 cause of the continued resistance of the
The prevailing mood in Washington Chinese Nationalists. Moreover, in the
in the fall of 1941 was one of optimism opinion of the planners, the conquest of
over the possibility of defending the the Philippines would be so costly an
Philippines. It was the opinion of the operation that Japan "will hesitate to
Joint Board, expressed at the meeting of make the effort except as a last resort."
The more formidable the Philippine
defenses, therefore, the less likelihood
16
For a full account of the development of this was there of a Japanese war. "Air and
route, see Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate,
eds., Plans and Early Operations—January 1939 to ground units now available or scheduled
August 1942, "The Army Air Forces in World War for dispatch to the Philippine Islands in
II," vol. I (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, the immediate future," concluded the
1948) (hereafter cited as AAF I), pp. 180-82; AAF,
Hist Study 9. The Development of the South Pacific
Air Route, pp. 23-28, Air Hist Office.
planners, "have changed the entire Manila Bay. Moreover, the existence of
picture in the Asiatic Area." 18 a greatly enlarged air force in the Phil-
Though the major assumptions and ippines was recognized by the provision
conclusions of RAINBOW 5 were still for air attacks against "Japanese forces
valid, its provisions for the defense of and installations within tactical opera-
the Philippines were obviously in need ting radius of available bases." How far
of revision. Drawn up on the assump- some of the planners had moved from
tion that the islands could not be rein- their original defensive concept is per-
forced and that their loss was probable, haps most strikingly revealed in the first
it called for a limited defense of the en- draft of a letter to MacArthur which the
trance to Manila Bay by the existing planners prepared for General Marshall.
garrison and local forces. MacArthur's Air reinforcements, they wrote, had
recall to active duty and the induction of modified the conception of purely de-
the Philippine Army into the service fensive operations "to include strong
of the United States, and the new view of offensive air action," a phrase which
the defensibility of the islands and their Marshall prudently changed to "strong
role as a base for air operations against air operations in the furtherance of the
Japan, were eloquent testimony that strategic defensive." 20 But words could
events had once more outrun plans. In not gloss over the fact that the B-17 was
a strong letter to the War Department an offensive weapon and that a force of
General MacArthur pointed out these heavy bombers in the Philippines had
facts, asserting that he would soon have only one purpose—offensive operations.
a force of approximately 200,000 men Marshall himself acknowledged this fact
organized into eleven divisions and a in an off-the-record press interview when
greatly strengthened air force. The time he indicated "that though the last thing
had come, he believed, to reject the the United States wants is a war with the
"citadel type defense" of the ORANGE Japanese," it was preparing for "an
and
21
NotesRAINBOW
on Conf inplans in 15
OCofS, favor
Nov of an active
copy in offensive war against Japan," a war
defense of the entire archipelago.19 which would be waged "mercilessly
This proposal, so in accord with the everywhere in the Pacific.21
new optimism over the defense of the Though the Japanese did not wait
Philippines, met with favor in the War until the spring of 1942 to open hostili-
Department and then in the Joint Board ties and MacArthur did not receive all
which on 21 November approved a re- that had been promised him, the Philip-
vision of RAINBOW 5. In this revision, pine garrison constituted in December
the mission of the Philippine garrison 1941 a far stronger force than it had six
was expanded to include "all the land months earlier. The strength of the
and sea areas necessary for the defense ground forces, exclusive of the Philip-
of the Philippine Archipelago," that is,
of the entire Philippines and not only 20
Ltr, CofS to CG USAFFE, 21 Nov 41, sub: U.S.-
British Cooperation in the Far East, with Incl,
18
Memo, Gerow for Secy of War, 8 Oct 41, sub: extract of changes in RAINBOW 5, WPD 4402-112.
Strategic Concept of the Phil Is, WPD 3251-60.
19
Ltr, MacArthur to TAG, 1 Oct 41, sub: Opns OCMH. The quotation is not General Marshall's
Plan R-5, WPD 4178-18. but is from the notes of the meeting.
THE FATAL TURN 101
pine Army, had been increased by 8,563 work out a plan for concerted naval ac-
men and now numbered 31,095. The tion in the Far East proved unsuccessful.
ten reserve divisions of the Philippine American bases along the line of com-
Army had been two-thirds mobilized but munications between Hawaii and the
were still poorly equipped and inade- Philippines had also been strengthened
quately trained. The air force had been in 1941, but still represented little more
strengthened and reorganized. At Clark than token forces. Guam, whose fortifi-
Field were 35 B-17's and scattered cation had been recommended by the
among the various fields on Luzon were Hepburn Report in 1938 but denied by
over 100 P-40's. Much remained to be Congress, was still "practically defense-
done to create a balanced air force, but less against determined attack."22 Its
the Philippines had nevertheless a garrison was composed of 365 Marines,
larger number of modern combat air- a small force of natives, and a navy con-
craft than any other overseas base, sisting of three patrol boats; weapons
including Hawaii and Panama. included nothing larger than the .30-
Even the Asiatic Fleet had been rein- caliber machine gun. The defense of
forced, despite the Navy's assertion Wake Island, for which Congress had
earlier in the year that it would not be. appropriated funds on the recommenda-
No major surface elements, it is true, tion of the Hepburn Board, was a case,
had been added but Admiral Hart had like that of the Philippines, of too little
received an additional squadron of and too late. Construction was still in
PBY's for a total of 32, 6 motor torpedo progress on 7 December but there was
boats, and 18 submarines, most of them one Marine fighter squadron of twelve
of the latest type, giving him all together Grumman Wildcats on the island, and
a fleet of 29 underwater craft. In addi- a 388-man detachment of the 1st Marine
tion, he had 1 heavy and 2 light cruisers, Defense Battalion armed with 5-inch
13 old destroyers of World War I vin- coastal guns, 3-inch and .50 caliber anti-
tage, 6 gunboats, and miscellaneous ves- aircraft guns, .30-caliber machine guns,
sels. Also under his command was the and small arms. The largest group on
4th Marine Regiment, withdrawn from the island were civilians, 70 Pan Ameri-
China at the end of November. can Airway employees and over 1,000
The most powerful American force in construction men. Midway, the "sentry
the Pacific was the Pacific Fleet, based for Hawaii" and, in the opinion of the
at Pearl Harbor and consisting of 9 bat- Hepburn Board, second in importance
tleships, 3 aircraft carriers, 12 heavy and only to Pearl Harbor, had since mid-
8 light cruisers, 50 destroyers, 33 sub- 1940 been garrisoned by a small Marine
marines, and 100 patrol bombers. In force. In the summer of 1941 a naval
addition, British and Dutch vessels in air station was established on the island
Far Eastern waters could be expected, in and in September the 6th Defense Bat-
the event of war with Japan, to fight the talion with 784 officers and men relieved
common foe. Thus, the Allies could the original garrison. The planes des-
muster a naval force of considerable tined for Midway were embarked on the
strength to oppose the Japanese Com-
bined Fleet. Unfortunately, all efforts to 22
Hepburn Report, p. 27.
lay in the Pacific and figured in the plans

for offensive operations against Japan in
the event of war; Alaska and Panama,
though fully as important, were more
closely associated with hemisphere
defense plans.
The planners had recognized early
that the chief danger to Hawaii lay not
so much in an effort by the Japanese to
capture the islands, but rather in a sud-
den and unexpected attack, probably
from the air, on the great naval base at
Pearl Harbor. This thought had ap-
peared from time to time in studies and
estimates and was included in the local
plans for defense.24
The transfer of the U.S. Fleet to
Pearl Harbor in April 1940 and its re-
tention there on the President's orders,
a move designed to deter the Japanese,
increased enormously the problems of
GENERAL SHORT defending the naval base and the grow-
ing number of airfield installations.
Lexington on 5 December, to be deliv- During the summer and fall of 1940,
ered on the morning of the 7th, but Maj. Gen. Charles D. Herron repeatedly
other events intervened and they did not urged that heavy bombers and antiair-
arrive until the 17th.23 craft defenses, including artillery, and
While the Navy, with Army air forces, air warning equipment, be sent to Ha-
provided the first line of defense in the waii, and that bomb-proof shelters be
Pacific, the Army, with certain excep- built. The Navy, too, was concerned
tions, provided the forces to defend those about the protection of its base from a
bases from which ships and planes op- surprise carrier-based air attack, and
erated. The most important of these lay Secretary Knox gave strong support to
along the triangle Alaska-Hawaii-Pana- Herron's requests in a letter to Stimson
ma. Not only were they vital bases but in January 1941. All were agreed on the
they constituted the strategic frontier of danger and sought, within the limita-
the United States and the outer defenses tions imposed by appropriations, to pro-
of the west coast. Of these, only Hawaii, vide what was needed. But at that time
2,000 miles distant from San Francisco, Hawaii was the best equipped American
base and had high priority for modern
23
Lt. Col. Robert D. Heinl, Jr., The Defense of aircraft, antiaircraft guns, air warning
Wake (Washington: U.S. Marine Corps Historical
Section, 1947), pp. 4-11; Marines at Midway (Wash-
24
ington: U.S. Marine Corps Historical Section, 1948), Watson, Prewar Plans and Preparations, pp. 465-
pp. 3-9, 16. 75.
THE FATAL TURN 103
responsibilities of each of the services.

Included with the plan was the Army
and Navy air commanders' estimate
which, with remarkable prescience, out-
lined the probable course of a Japanese
attack as a sudden air raid against ships
and installations on Oahu, coming with-
out warning and originating- from car-
riers not more than 300 miles distant.
"In a dawn attack," they foretold, "there
is a high probability that it could be
delivered as a complete surprise in spite
of any patrols we might be using."25
By December 1941, the Army garrison
in Hawaii had been considerably rein-
forced and was in many respects the
strongest base in the Pacific. Assigned
to its ground defense were 2 under-
strength infantry divisions, 4 antiair-
craft artillery regiments, almost 4 com-
plete coast artillery regiments, and1
ADMIRAL KIMMEL company of light tanks, with supporting
service troops. Of the total of 234 air-
equipment, and barrage balloons. There craft, only about half were operational.
was little more, Stimson assured Knox, Included in this total were a large num-
that could be done except to provide for ber of obsolescent types and only six
closer co-ordination between the Army B-17's. The air warning system, though
and Navy. not yet completed, consisted of six mo-
When Lt. Gen. Walter C. Short as- bile radar sets and three fixed stations
sumed command of the Hawaiian De- in place but not completely installed.
partment in February 1941—at the same
time that Admiral Husband E. Kimmel The Plan for War
took over the Pacific Fleet—General
Marshall carefully defined his mission Despite repeated assertions of a will-
for him as the protection of the naval ingness to go to war to gain its objectives,
base and the fleet, and warned against the Japanese Government in July had
allowing service feuds to interfere with drawn back quickly in the face of the
joint defense plans. Short continued unexpectedly strong reaction from the
along the lines already marked out, push- United States. Contributing to this
ing construction of airfields, the air
warning system, dispersal areas, and gun
25
installations. In April he and Kimmel Joint Estimate of Army and Navy Air Action, 31
Mar 41, Pearl Harbor Attack Hearings, pt. 15, ex-
submitted a revised plan for the defense hibit 44, p. 1437; Pearl Harbor Report, pp. 83-84;
of Oahu which carefully specified the ltr, Marshall to Short, 7 Feb 41, WPD 4449-1.
JAPANESE MOCK-UP OF FORD ISLAND AND BATTLESHIP Row, Pearl Harbor, used in
Japanese table-top maneuvers.
lack of resolution was the slowing down sion to the south. The American reply
of Germany's advance in Russia and on the 17th that a prerequisite to such a
the Japanese Navy's concern over the meeting was the settlement of the issues
shortage of oil reserves. From the end between the two countries confirmed
of July until his resignation in October, Tojo and the Army leaders in their view
Premier Konoye sought to persuade his that the United States would never yield
Cabinet colleagues to adopt a less ag- to the Japanese demands and that war
gressive policy in an effort to reach should begin as soon as the Army and
agreement with the United States. Navy were ready.
The first sign of this new policy was a The difference between Konoye's and
proposal, delivered by Admiral Nomura Tojo's views was temporarily resolved
in Washington on 6 August, for a per- early in September and formalized at an
sonal meeting, a "leaders' conference," Imperial Conference held on the 6th of
between the Premier and President the month. The agreement was charac-
Roosevelt. War Minister Tojo had teristically Japanese and expressed in
agreed to this proposal only on the un- language both sides could accept and
derstanding that Konoye would use the interpret in their own way. The nego-
occasion to press the program for expan- tiations with the United States, it was
THE FATAL TURN 105
agreed, would be continued, as Konoye advance, except in China; to withdraw

wished. But at the same time, military from Indochina "after an impartial
preparations would be pushed to com- peace" had been established in the Far
pletion so that the nation would be ready East; and, finally, to guarantee the neu-
for war by the end of October, that is, trality of the Philippine Islands.27
in six weeks. "If by the early part of While negotiations went forward, the
October," the conferees decided, "there Army and Navy General Staff continued
is no reasonable hope of having our de- their preparations for war and the troops
mands agreed to in the diplomatic nego- earmarked for operations in the south
tiations . . . we will immediately make intensified their training, usually under
up our minds to get ready for war. . . ."26 conditions approximating those of the
The Imperial Conference also fixed areas in which they would fight. Since
the minimum demands Japan would agreement had already been reached on
make and the maximum concessions it the strategy for war, General Sugiyama,
would grant in the negotiations with Chief of the Army's General Staff, was
the United States and Great Britain. able shortly after the 6 September Im-
The minimum demands Japan asked perial Conference, to direct that detailed
were, first, both the Western Powers operational plans for the seizure of
would promise to discontinue aid to Malaya, Java, Borneo, the Bismarck Ar-
China, close the Burma Road, and chipelago, the Netherlands Indies, and
"neither meddle in nor interrupt" a set- the Philippines be prepared. 28 The
tlement between Japan and China; sec- Army planners immediately went to
ond, America and Britain would recog- work and the next two months witnessed
nize Japan's "special position in French feverish activity in the General Staff.
Indochina and agree not to establish or By the end of August the Navy staff
reinforce their bases in the Far East or had worked out plans for seizing bases in
take any action which might threaten the western Pacific, arid had from Ad-
Japan;
27
28
IMTFE
Ibid., and Doc.
IMTFE
exhibit third,
2244,
1652, both
exhibit nations
Deposition of Tanaka.would
588. miral Yamamoto a separate plan for an
resume commercial relations with Japan, attack on Pearl Harbor. "Table-top ma-
supply the materials "indispensable for neuvers" at Tokyo Naval War College
her self-existence," and "gladly coop- between 10-13 September resulted in
erate" in Japan's economic program in agreement on operations for the seizure
Thailand and Indochina. In return for of the Philippines, Malaya, the Nether-
these "minimum demands" the Japa- lands Indies, Burma, and islands in the
nese were willing to agree not to use South Pacific. But there was still some
Indochina as a base for further military doubt about Yamamoto's plan. The ex-
ercise had demonstrated that a Pearl
26
Konoye Memoirs, Pearl Harbor Attack Hearings, Harbor strike was practicable, but many
pt. 20, pp. 4022—23. The wording of this important felt that it was too risky, that the U.S.
statement varies in different documents. IMTFE
Doc. 1579 gives a slightly different wording as does Pacific Fleet might not be in port on the
IMTFE Judgment, ch. VII, p. 939. The Japanese day of the attack, and that the danger of
phrase "kaiseno ketsui su" may be translated literally
"decide to open hostilities." Konoye apparently did
not interpret the phrase as meaning that it was a
decision for war; Tojo did.
107
discovery during the long voyage to

Hawaii was too great. But Admiral
Yamamoto refused to give up his plan
and finally, when he failed to convert
his colleagues, offered to resign from the
Navy. The combination of his strong
argument that the success of the south-
ward drive depended on the destruction
of the American fleet, his enormous
prestige, and his threat to resign were
too much for opponents of the plan. In
mid-October, a month after the maneu-
vers, the Navy General Staff finally
adopted his concept of a surprise carrier-
based attack on Pearl Harbor and in-
corporated it into the larger plan for
war.29
This larger plan, which was virtually
complete by 20 October and was the one
followed by the Japanese when war came,
had as its immediate objective the cap-
ture of the rich Dutch and British pos-
sessions in southeast Asia, especially
Malaya and the Netherlands Indies. To
secure these areas, the Japanese believed
it necessary to destroy or neutralize the
U.S. Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor, and
29
For a full account of the evolution of the Pearl to deprive the United States of its base
in the Philippines. America's line of
communications across the Pacific was
to be cut by the seizure of Wake and
Guam. Once the coveted area to the
south had been secured, Japan would
occupy strategic positions in Asia and in
the Pacific and fortify them immediately.
These bases were to form a powerful de-
fensive perimeter around the newly
acquired southern area, the home is-
Harbor plan see Robert E. Ward, "The Inside Story

of the Pearl Harbor Plan," U.S. Naval Institute Pro-
ceedings, LXXVII, No. 12 (December 1951), pp.
1272-81.
lands, and the vital shipping lanes con- Borneo. The results thus obtained were
necting Japan with its sources of supply.30 to be immediately exploited by large-
The area marked for conquest formed scale landings in the Philippines and in
a vast triangle, whose east arm stretched Malaya, followed by the rapid occupa-
from the Kuril Islands on the north tion of those areas. At the same time,
through Wake, to the Marshall and Thailand was to be "stabilized," Hong
Gilbert Islands. The base of the tri- Kong seized, and Wake and Guam oc-
angle was formed by a line connecting cupied. The conquest of the Bismarck
the Marshall and Gilbert Islands, the Bis- Archipelago would follow the seizure of
marck Archipelago, Java and Sumatra. the last two islands.
The western arm extended from Malaya During this first period, Army and
and southern Burma through Indochina, Navy forces were to seize advance air
and thence along the China coast. bases in the Celebes, Dutch Borneo,
(Map I) southern Sumatra, the Moluccas, and
The acquisition of this area would Timor. The bases thus seized were to be
give to Japan control of the resources of immediately utilized for air attacks on
Southeast Asia and would satisfy the Java, while other preparations for the
national objectives in going to war. invasion of that island were speedily
Perhaps later, if all went well, the Japa- completed.
nese believed, the area of conquest could With the U.S. Fleet and the Philip-
be extended. But there is no evidence pines neutralized, and with advance
in the Japanese plans of an intention to bases in the Netherlands Indies, the
defeat the United States. Japan planned Japanese would move against Java and
to fight a war of limited objectives and, Sumatra. Taking Singapore under fire
having gained what it wanted, expected from the land side, that is, from Malaya,
to negotiate for a favorable peace. Japanese forces would first invade and
Operations to secure these objectives occupy this British bastion. Once that
and others would begin on the first day fortress was reduced, the Japanese would
of war, when Japanese military forces move on to northern Sumatra, in prepa-
would go into action simultaneously on ration for the drive on Java. Meanwhile,
many fronts. Navy carrier-based aircraft other Japanese forces moving southward
would attack the U.S. Pacific Fleet in through the Netherlands Indies were to
the Hawaii area. Immediately after, join those in Sumatra in the final attack
joint Army and Navy air forces would on Java.
strike American air and naval forces in While Java was being occupied, the
the Philippines, while other Japanese Japanese would complete their seizure of
forces hit British Malaya. After these Sumatra and capture air bases on the
simultaneous attacks, advance Army southern tip of Burma at the earliest
units were to be landed at various points possible moment. If conditions were
in Malaya, the Philippines, and British favorable they would then push on in
Burma and occupy the Andaman and
30
This account of the Japanese plan is based on a Nicobar Islands in the Indian Ocean.
number of documents which, together with the
plan, are described in Morton, The Fall of the Phil- Operations in China would be contin-
ippines, pp. 51-55. ued throughout this period in order
THE FATAL TURN 109
to maintain "the present strategic be suspended, even if the final order to

situation."31 attack had been issued. The second pos-
The occupation of the Netherlands sibility was that the United States might
Indies would complete the first period of take action before the attack on Pearl
the war and would, the Japanese esti- Harbor by sending elements of the Pa-
mated, require five months. The Philip- cific Fleet to the Far East. In that event,
pines they expected to take in 50 days, the Combined Fleet would be deployed
Malaya in 100, the Indies in 150. After to intercept American naval forces. The
that time the Japanese would consoli- attacks against the Philippines and
date their position and strengthen the Malaya were to proceed according to
bases along the perimeter of their newly schedule.
gained empire in order to repulse any If the Americans or British launched
Allied effort to penetrate this defensive local attacks, Japanese ground forces
ring or threaten the vital area within it. were to meet the attack and air power
During this period the Army would con- was to be brought into the area to
tinue its operations in China and Burma destroy the enemy. These local opera-
and establish a system of administration tions were not to interrupt the execution
for the southern area. of the general plan, but if the United
The Navy's plan for the period after States or Great Britain seized the initia-
the initial operations was to intercept tive by opening operations first, Japa-
with a strong force anticipated trans- nese forces were to await orders from
pacific operations of U.S. naval forces. Imperial General Headquarters before
Its plan lists as "areas expected to be beginning their assigned operations.
occupied or destroyed" eastern New The possibility of a Soviet attack, or of
Guinea, New Britain, the Fiji Islands, a joint United States-Soviet invasion
Samoa, the Aleutians, Midway, and from the north, was also considered by
"strategic points in the Australia area."32 the Japanese planners. To meet such a
But operations to seize these objectives contingency, Japanese forces in Man-
were not authorized by Imperial Gen- churia were to be strengthened. Should
eral Headquarters until the spring of this attack materialize the Philippine
1942. and Malay operations were to proceed
Japanese planners anticipated that as planned, while air units were to be
certain events might require an altera- immediately transferred from the home
tion in their strategy and outlined islands or China to destroy Russian air
alternative courses of action. The first forces in the Far East. Ground forces
possibility was that Japanese-American were to be deployed to Manchuria at the
negotiations then in progress would same time to meet Soviet forces on the
prove successful. If this unexpected suc- ground.
cess was achieved, all operations were to The forces required to execute this
vast plan for conquest were very care-
31
Hist of Army Sec, Imperial GHQ, Japanese fully calculated by Imperial General
Studies in World War II, 72, p. 16.
32
Headquarters. (Chart I) A large force
Combined Fleet Top Secret Operational Order 1,
5 Nov 41, in Pearl Harbor Attack Hearings, pt. 13, had to be left in Manchuria, and an even
p.438. larger one in China. Garrisons for
CHART 1—DISPOSITION OF MAJOR JAPANESE FORCES FOR WAR, DECEMBER 1941
Source: Japanese Opns in SWPA, II, pp. 60-64

THE FATAL TURN 111
Korea, Formosa, Indochina, and the de- 312; Thailand, 177; China, 130. The
fense of the home islands required addi- Hawaiian air force was not included in
tional forces. Thus, only a small fraction the Japanese estimates.
of the Japanese Army was available for American naval strength was over-
operations in the south. Of the total estimated. The Japanese believed there
strength of the Army's 51 divisions,1 were 5 carriers in the Pacific area. They
cavalry group, 59 mixed brigades, and placed 2 cruisers, 1 heavy and 1 light, in
1,500 first-line planes, Imperial General the Asiatic Fleet, and another 3 in the
Headquarters could give the Southern Pacific Fleet, which was thought to con-
Army, which had the mission of carrying tain also 11 battleships, 84 destroyers,
out all these operations, only 11 divi- and 30 submarines. The submarine
sions and the bulk of 2 air groups with force in Philippine waters was estimated
approximately 700 planes. at 17 underwater craft. Their estimate
The Japanese allocated their forces of British and Dutch naval forces was
for the initial operations only after a equally inaccurate.
careful estimate of the enemy forces.33 In the execution of this complicated
In the Philippines, the Japanese cor- and intricate plan, the Japanese planners
rectly estimated there was a U.S. Army realized, success would depend on care-
garrison (exclusive of Scouts) of 22,000 ful timing and on the closest co-opera-
men and 110,000 Philippine Army tion between Army and Navy forces. No
troops. The air strength in the islands provision was made for unified com-
was thought to consist of 270 planes of mand of all services. Instead, separate
all types, 70 of which were heavy planes. agreements were made between Army
The British were thought to have in and Navy Fleet commanders for each
Malaya alone 90,000 troops, and in Burma operation. These agreements provided
another 35,000. Dutch ground forces in simply for co-operation at the time of
the Indies were estimated to number landing and for the distribution of
85,000 men. The total enemy ground forces.
strength was placed at 447,000 men, in- In addition to supporting the Army's
cluding British, American, Dutch, and operations in the south, the Combined
Thailand troops. This figure did not Fleet had other important missions.
include Chinese, Indian, Australian, and Perhaps the most important, and cer-
New Zealand troops. The total enemy tainly the most spectacular, was that as-
air strength, the Japanese estimated, consigned the Pearl Harbor Striking Force.
sisted of 1,249 aircraft distributed as Later, this force was to support opera-
follows: Malaya, 330; Burma, 60; Philip- tions of the 4th Fleet and then assist in
pine Islands, 270; Netherlands Indies, the southern operations. The 6th Fleet
(submarines) was to operate in Hawaii-
an waters and along the west coast of
33
Army estimates are based on Hist of Army Sec, the United States to observe the move-
Imperial GHQ, Japanese Studies in World War II, ments of the U.S. Pacific Fleet and
72, pp. 12, 18-22; Navy estimates on Political Strat- destroy lines of communication by sur-
egy Prior to Outbreak of War, pt. V, same series, 152,
pp. 19-20. The estimates are for November 1941: the prise attacks on shipping. The 5th Fleet
first source. was to patrol the waters east of Japan, in
readiness for enemy surprise attacks, when it would go into effect. That de-
and, above all, to keep on the alert cision awaited another more important
against Russia. decision: whether or not Japan would
The Japanese plan for war was com- go to war. The answer was not long in
plete in all respects but one—the date coming.
CHAPTER V
The Decision for War

One would have lingering wars with little cost;
Another would fly swift, but wanteth wings;
A third thinks, without expense at all,
By guileful fair words peace may be obtained.
SHAKESPEARE, Henry VI
By the fall of 1941 relations between nation would be dependent upon the
the United States and Japan had reached United States and Great Britain. Thus,
a critical stage. American leaders had the Japanese were in the unenviable
made it clear that so long as Japan ad- position—or thought they were—of
hered to the Tripartite Pact and to its either making concessions or going to
efforts to conquer China there was little war. They could not afford delay.
chance for compromise. But they needed "Time had become the meter of strategy
time to complete their preparations. for both governments. But one did not
For the Japanese, most of whom were mind its passing, while the other was
unwilling to pay the American price for crazed by the tick of the clock."1
peace, time was of the essence. They
were convinced that acceptance of Tojo Takes Over
American peace terms would only lead
to further demands and ultimately leave The six weeks' reprieve Prince
Japan dependent on the United States Konoye had won on 6 September to
and Great Britain. To them the gambles
of
1
Feis,war
The seemed
Road to preferable
Pearl Harbor,top.the ignominy
270. Unless otherwise noted, this chapter is based on this work
of a disgraceful peace. and upon the Konoye Memoirs, Pearl Harbor Attack
The necessity for a prompt decision on Hearings, pt 20; The Japanese intercepts in pt. 12,
pp. 1—254; Pearl Harbor Report; IMTFE, Judgment,
Japan's future course was pressing, the ch. VII, pp. 935-95; U.S. Foreign Relations, Japan:
Japanese leaders believed. The economic 1931-41, II, 549-58, 709-16, 766-70; U.S. Department
blockade was slowly depriving the of State, Peace and War, United States Foreign Pol-
icy, 1031—1041 (Washington, Government Printing
nation of the power to fight. Signs of Office, 1943). Other works of value for this period are
military co-operation among the Allies Langer and Gleason, The Undeclared War; Walter
and of their intention to reinforce their Millis, This is Pearl! The United States and Japan—
1941 (New York: William Morrow and Company,
Far Eastern bases were too clear to be 1947); Stimson and Bundy, On Active Service in Peace
ignored. Failure to seize the right mo- and War; Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, Hull,
ment for action might lose for Japan Memoirs; Samuel Eliot Morison, The Rising Sun in
the Pacific, 1931—April 1942, vol. III, "History of
the vital resources of Malaya and the United States Naval Operations in World War II"
Netherlands Indies without which the (Boston: Little, Brown and Company).
settle the outstanding issues between the With no agreement in sight Konoye
United States and Japan by diplomacy sought to win an extension. On 12 Octo-
went by quickly without producing a ber he invited War Minister Tojo, the
settlement. A new proposal, which Am- Navy and Foreign Ministers, and the
bassador Nomura delivered to Hull on president of the Planning Board to his
27 September, was rejected by the home for a final conference on the ques-
Americans. On 10 October, Nomura, tion of war and peace. At the meeting
who had renewed the request for a meet- the Premier argued strongly for continu-
ing between Roosevelt and Konoye, ing the negotiations beyond the dead-
wrote Foreign Minister Soemu Toyoda line, then set at 15 October. The Navy
that there was not "the slightest chance Minister would not commit himself but
on earth" of a leader's conference "so General Tojo, on the ground that suc-
long as Japan refused to compromise." cess in the negotiations would require
The negotiations, in the words of Toy- concessions in China, refused to go
oda, had "slowly but surely . . . reached along with Konoye. The issue had now
the decisive stage." 2 been narrowed to the withdrawal of
The domestic situation was no better. Japanese troops from China and on the
Even more insistently, the Army and morning of the 14th the Premier again
Navy pressed for a quick decision on the sought Tojo's consent. "On this occa-
question of war. Oil stocks, the services sion," he urged the War Minister, "we
pointed out, were steadily diminishing, ought to give in for a time . . . and
the United States was rapidly reinforc- save ourselves from the crisis of a
ing the Philippines, and the most favora- Japanese-American war." Tojo again
ble season of the year for operations refused, and at a Cabinet meeting later
was rapidly approaching. Failure to act in the day demanded that the negotia-
soon, they declared, might result in a tions be terminated. Finally, late that
delay of many months and expose the night, he sent Konoye a message stating
Japanese to a Soviet attack in Man- that the Cabinet ought to resign, "de-
churia. Finally, on 24 September, Gen- clare insolvent everything that has hap-
eral Sugiyama and Admiral Osami pened up to now, and reconsider our
Nagano, the Army and Navy Chiefs of plans once more."4
Staff, submitted a joint letter calling at- Without Tojo's support Konoye had
tention to the shortage of supplies, the no recourse but to resign. The Army,
effect of the weather on operations, and seeking possibly to avoid responsibility
the problems of mobilizing, staging, and for the decision which must soon be
deploying their forces. "With all the made, suggested as his successor a mem-
force of their position" they asked for a ber of the Imperial family, Prince
quick decision "by 15 October at the Naruhiko Higashikuni. The suggestion
latest," so that they could start operations was rejected as contrary to tradition and
by mid-November.3 the Marquis Kido, together with the
council of senior statesmen (former pre-
2
Pearl Harbor Report, p. 322.
3 4
Political Strategy Prior to Outbreak of War, pt. Konoye Memoirs, Pearl Harbor Attack Hearings,
IV, Japanese Studies in World War II, 150, pp. 13-15. pt. 20, p. 4010.
THE DECISION FOR WAR 115
miers), recommended that Tojo him- Liaison Conferences, considered every

self be named premier. The Emperor aspect of Japan's position and completed
accepted this recommendation. On the the plans for war. Finally, on 5 Novem-
18th Tojo took office with an Imperial ber a decision was reached and con-
mandate to reconsider Japan's policy in firmed by an Imperial Conference. This
relation to the world situation without decision was substantially the same as
regard for the 6 September decision. that reached on 6 September: to con-
The fate of Japan was in the hands of tinue negotiations in an effort to reach
its generals. an agreement with the United States,
In Washington where every Japanese and, if no settlement was reached, to
move was carefully weighed and ana- open hostilities. The deadline first set
lyzed, the Cabinet crisis was cause for was 25 November, later extended to the
real concern and Ambassador Grew's 29th of the month. The significance of
cables did little to lessen it. On the 16th this decision was revealed in a message
when Konoye resigned, Admiral Stark the new Foreign Minister, Shigenori
told Pacific and Asiatic Fleet command- Togo, sent Admiral Nomura on the 4th
ers that there was "a strong possibility" telling him that relations between the
of war between Japan and the Soviet two countries had "reached the edge."
Union. Warning them that Japan might Next day he wrote that time was "exceed-
also attack the United States, Stark ingly short," and the situation "very
instructed the two commanders to take critical." "Absolutely no delays can be
"due precautions." This message Hart permitted. Please bear this in mind and
and Kimmel passed on to their Army do your best," Togo said. "I wish to
colleagues who a few days later received stress this point over and over." 6
5quite a different message from Washing-
6 The Imperial Conference of 5 Novem-
Memo,
Dispatch,
Gerow
TogofortoCofS,
Nomura,
18 Oct
4 and
41, sub:
5 Nov
Resigna-
41, in
ton informing them that they need not ber agreed that Japan should make pro-
expect an "abrupt change in Japanese posals to the United States. The first,
foreign policy." 5 Apparently the Army Proposal A, was an amendment to the
did not agree with the Navy's estimate latest Japanese proposal and provided
of the international situation, and nei- for a withdrawal from China and French
ther mentioned the possibility of an Indochina, when and if a peace treaty
attack on Pearl Harbor. had been signed with Chiang Kai-shek.
The period from 18 October to 5 In certain areas in China, to be specified
November was one of mounting ten- in the treaty, Japanese troops would
sion and frantic preparations on both remain for a "suitable period," vaguely
sides of the Pacific. In Tokyo the Tojo and informally estimated at about
Cabinet and the high command, meet- twenty-five years. Further, the Japanese
ing in an almost continuous series of Government would interpret its obliga-
tions under the Tripartite Pact inde-
pendently of the other Axis Powers.
Lastly, Japan would agree not to dis-
tion of Japanese Cabinet; Rad, CNO to CINCPAC
and CINCAF, 16 Oct 41, both in Pearl Harbor Attack
Hearings, pt. 14, pp. 1389, 1402. See also Ltr, Grew to
author, 19 Jun 49, OCMH. Pearl Harbor Attack Hearings, pt. 12, exhibit 1, p. 92.
ral resources in the Netherlands Indies.

Finally, the United States was to resume
commercial relations with Japan, and to
provide that nation with oil. 7
With the decision made and the dead-
line set, the Army and Navy drew up
an agreement embodying the objectives
of the war and an outline of operations.
On the same day the Navy Chief of Staff
sent the Combined Fleet orders outlin-
ing the Navy's operations for war, with
the explanation that "anticipating that
war with the United States, Great Brit-
ain, and the Netherlands will begin in
the early part of December, for self-
preservation and self-defense, the Em-
pire has decided to complete the various
preparations for war." 8 During the re-
mainder of the month, the fleet was
assembled, and on the 21st all forces,
including the Carrier Striking Force
GENERAL TOJO scheduled to attack the Pacific Fleet,
were ordered into operational waters.
criminate in trade, provided all other Most of the submarines for the Hawaiian
nations did the same. In his instructions area left Japan around 20 November.
to Nomura, Foreign Minister Togo em- On the 6th, the Army Chief of Staff
phasized that while other matters could issued instructions to the Southern Army
be compromised in his negotiations with to prepare detailed plans for operations
the United States, Japan could not yield in the event that the negotiations failed.
on the question of China. At a meeting in Tokyo on 10 November,
In Proposal B, to be made if the first the Army and Navy commanders reached
was rejected, no mention was made of agreement on the details of their plans.
the Tripartite Pact or the removal of At the same time, the major field com-
Japanese troops from China. Japan manders received orders to proceed with
would withdraw its troops from south- their preparations. On 20 November,
ern Indochina immediately and from the actual order for the attack was issued,
the northern part of that country only but with the proviso that it would be
after the negotiation of a peace treaty
with Chiang Kai-shek, or after the con- 7
The text of the two proposals is reproduced in
clusion of a "just peace" in the Pacific. IMTFE exhibit 779.
In return, the United States was to agree 8
USSBS, The Campaigns of the Pacific War,
not to interfere in the negotiations with (Washington, 1946), app. 12, pp. 43—46, app. 14, p. 49.
The Combined Fleet Top Secret Order 1 is repro-
China, and to co-operate with Japan in duced in Pearl Harbor Attack Hearings, pt. 13, pp.
the acquisition and exploitation of natu- 431-84.
held until the results of the diplomatic

negotiations were known.9
In Washington, the privileged few
followed each diplomatic move of the
Japanese in the mirror of MAGIC while
observing in reports from all parts of
the Far East increasing evidence of Jap-
anese military preparations. Japanese
ship movements toward Malaya and the
concentration of shipping at Formosa,
staging area for an attack on the Philip-
pines, were quickly detected by Ameri-
can observers. Mr. Grew, who had
reported as early as 27 January 1941
that there was talk in Tokyo of a sur-
prise attack on Pearl Harbor, warned
on 3 November that recent troop move-
ments placed Japan in a position to
start operations "in either Siberia or
the Southwest Pacific or in both," and
that war might come with "dramatic and
JAPANESE SIGNS proclaiming an economy
dangerous suddenness." "Things seem
drive in Tokyo.
to be moving steadily toward a crisis in
the Pacific," wrote Admiral Stark to his
Pacific Fleet commander on 7 November. came it proved to be a rejection of Pro-
"A month may see, literally, most posal A on the ground that the offer
anything. ... It doesn't look good." 10 to withdraw troops from China and
9
Hist of Southern Army, 1941-45, Japanese Studies Indochina was indefinite and uncertain,
The Progress of Negotiations and that the United States could not
agree to the Japanese definition of
The first proposal agreed upon at the nondiscrimination in trade.
Imperial Conference of 5 November was On 20 November, Admiral Nomura,
handed to Mr. Hull by Ambassador who now had the benefit of the advice
Nomura two days later. On the 12th, of his newly arrived colleague Saburo
the Secretary of State told the Japanese Kurusu, presented Proposal B, virtually
Ambassador that the proposal was being a restatement of the "minimum de-
studied and that he hoped to have a mands" and "maximum concessions" of
reply ready within three days. When it the 6 September Imperial Conference.
Intercepted Japanese messages had
in World II, 72, pp. 4—8; Hist of Army Sec. Imperial already revealed to Mr. Hull that this was
GHQ, revised ed., same series, 72, pp. 29-39. to be Japan's last offer for a settlement.
10
Telgs, Grew to Hull, 27 Jan and 3 Nov 41, in To the Secretary, the Japanese offer "put
Pearl Harbor Attack Hearings, pt. 14, exhibit 15, pp.
1042, 1045—60; Ltr, CNO to Kimmel, 7 Nov 41, G-3 conditions that would have assured Ja-
Exec Files. pan's domination of the Pacific, placing
us in serious danger for decades to worth of cotton a month, medical sup-

come." The commitments which the plies, and oil "for civilian needs." The
United States would have had to make modus vivendi was to remain in force
were, in his opinion, "virtually a three months.13
surrender."11 The modus vivendi and the reply to
The problem faced by American polit- Japan's Proposal B were the subjects of
ical and military leaders was a serious a lively discussion by the War Council
one. An outright rejection of Proposal on 25 November. The general view was
B might well provide Japan with the that the modus vivendi should be
pretext for war. Full acceptance was adopted, but Hull was pessimistic and
out of the question. The only way out expressed the view that the Japanese
of the dilemma was to find a "reasonable might "break out any time with new
counterproposal" or a basis for tempo- acts of conquest by force" and that na-
rary agreement. In support of this point tional security now "lies in the hands
of view, Admiral Stark and General of the Army and Navy." 14 Nor could
Gerow pointed out to the Secretary of the U.S. Government ignore the unfa-
State that a modus vivendi would "attain vorable reaction of other powers to the
one of our present major objectives— modus vivendi. Great Britain, China,
the avoidance of war with Japan." "Even the Netherlands, and Australia felt that
a temporary peace in the Pacific," Gerow, it represented a move in the direction
who was acting for Marshall, urged, of appeasement. The Chinese reaction
"would permit us to complete defensive was especially sharp, and from Chiang
preparations in the Philippines and at came a bitter protest, supported by a
the same time insure continuance of cable from Churchill.
material assistance to the British—both The President was faced with a fateful
of which are highly important."12 decision. The Army and Navy wanted
During the next four days, various time to prepare for war, and were will-
drafts
12
14
Memos,ofStark
a modus
Hull, Memoirs,and vivendi
Gerow
II, 1080. were
for Secy prepared,
State, 21 Nov ing to buy it with minor concessions.
and a final draft was completed on the But the slight prospect of Japanese
25th. This document provided that both acceptance of the modus vivendi was,
nations would refrain from "any advance in the view of the Secretary of State,
by force" into any areas in eastern Asia hardly worth the risk of lowering Chi-
or the Pacific, and that Japan would nese morale and resistance, and opening
withdraw from southern Indochina, re- the way for appeasement. At a meeting
duce the number of troops in that coun- in the White House on 26 November,
try, and not send any reinforcements the President and Mr. Hull agreed that
there. In return, the United States the small results expected from the
agreed to modify its economic restric- modus vivendi did not justify the risks.
tions to permit the shipment of $600,000
13
Pearl Harbor Attack Hearings, pt. 14, exhibit 18,
11
Hull, Memoirs, II, 1069. pp. 1085-1201. Mr. Hull characterized the economic
concessions as "chicken feed." Pearl Harbor Report,
41, in Pearl Harbor Attack Hearings, pt. 14, pp. p. 381.
1104-07.
That afternoon, therefore, when the Sec- warned immediately. Already, the Navy
retary of State handed the Japanese had sent out word on the 24th—to be
Ambassador his 10-point reply to Pro- passed on to the Army commanders—
posal B, he omitted the modus vivendi that prospects for an agreement with
which had been intended as an intro- Japan were slight and that Japanese
duction to these points outlining the troop movements indicated that "a sur-
basis for a peaceful settlement. prise aggressive movement in any direc-
Though the military leaders were tion, including attack on Philippines or
informed on the evening of the 26th Guam" was a possibility.17 Now, on the
of the decision to abandon the modus 27th, Stimson asked General Gerow—
vivendi, they were apparently not ad- Marshall had left for the Carolina ma-
vised of the action taken on the ten neuvers—whether the Army should not
points. Consequently, the discussions on send a warning. Gerow showed him the
the morning of the 26th in General Navy message of the 24th, but this failed
Marshall's office, and in the Joint Board to satisfy Stimson who observed that the
later in the day, were held without President wanted a warning message sent
knowledge of the final rejection of to the Philippines. After a number of
Japan's last proposal.15 On the follow- hurried meetings of the War Council,
ing morning, 27 November, Marshall the 27 November war warning was
and Stark summarized for the President drafted. Considered by the War Depart-
their view of the situation. A Japanese ment as a "final alert," the message was
offensive seemed imminent to them, but sent to Hawaii, the Philippines, Panama,
the direction of the attack "cannot now and San Francisco. The commander of
be forecast." "The most essential thing, each of these garrisons was told of the
from the United States point of view," status of the negotiations with Japan,
they declared, "is to gain time" to com- the imminence of hostilities, and the
plete the preparations for war. Military desirability of having Japan commit the
action
17
15
before
Rad, OPNAV
OCofS Conf, the
26 toNov 41, completion
Comdrs Pacific381
WDCSA of
andPhil the
Asiatic
(12- "first overt act." Each was instructed
reinforcement of the Philippines, they to "undertake such reconnaissance and
urged, should be avoided "so long as other measures" as he thought necessary
consistent with the national policy," and and to carry out the tasks assigned in
should be considered "only if Japan RAINBOW 5 if hostilities occurred. With
attacks or directly threatens United the exception of MacArthur, each of the
States, British, or Dutch territory." 16 commanders was also warned not to
In view of the seriousness of the situa- alarm the civilian population or to "dis-
tion, the Army and Navy chiefs felt that close intent." At the same time G-2 of
commanders in the Pacific should be the War Department sent an additional
and briefer message to Hawaii and Pan-
ama, but not to the Philippines, warning
4—41); Pearl Harbor Attack Hearings, pt. 15, pp. against subversive activities.
1641-43; Langer and Gleason, The Undeclared War,
pp. 898-99.
16
Memo, Marshall and Stark for President, 27 Nov
41, sub: Far Eastern Situation, Pearl Harbor Attack Fleets, 2005, 24 Nov 41, Pearl Harbor Attack Hear-
Hearings, pt. 14, p. 1083. ings, pt. 14, p. 1405.
JOINT BOARD MEETING, NOVEMBER 1941. This is the first photograph taken of the Joint
Board. Seated around the table, from left: Brig. Gen. Harold F. Loomis, Maj. Gen. Henry H.
Arnold, Maj. Gen. William Bryden, General Marshall, Admiral Stark, Rear Adm. Royal E.
Ingersoll, Rear Adm. John H. Towers, Rear Adm. Richmond K. Turner.
The Navy warning of the 27th, which bor was not mentioned in either of the
was passed on to the Army commanders, messages.18
was more strongly worded and was defi- The response to these warnings was
nitely an alert for war. "This dispatch," immediate. From MacArthur, who had
it read, "is to be considered a war warn- promptly alerted his command, came the
ing. . . . An aggressive move by Japan report that air reconnaissance had been
is expected within the next few days." extended and intensified "in conjunc-
Navy commanders were alerted to the 18
Memo, Gerow for Marshall, 27 Nov. 41, sub: Far
likelihood of amphibious operations Eastern Situation; Rads, Marshall to CG USAFFE,
against either the Philippines, the Kra Hawaiian Dept, and Caribbean Defense Comd, Nos.
624, 472, 461, 27 Nov 41, OCS 18136-118 and WPD
Peninsula, or Borneo and instructed to 4544-16; Brig Gen Sherman Miles to G-2 Hawaiian
"execute an appropriate defensive de- Dept. No. 472, 27 Nov 41. Most of these are published
ployment" preparatory to carrying out in Pearl Harbor Attack Hearings, pt. 3, p. 1021, pt.
the tasks assigned in their war plans. 14, pp. 1328-30. Stimson's account of these events is
in pt. 39, p. 84. The Navy message is in pt. 14, p. 1406.
The possibility of attack on Pearl Har- See also Pearl Harbor Report, pp. 199-201.
tion with the Navy," and that measures inet. Tojo presented the Cabinet view
for ground security had been taken. for war, but several of the senior states-
"Within the limitations imposed by pres- men expressed doubts about the wisdom
ent state of development of this theater of a war with the United States. Prince
of operations," he told the Chief of Konoye asked why it was not possible
Staff, "everything is in readiness for the to continue "with broken economic rela-
conduct of a successful defense." The tions but without war," to which Tojo
reply from General Short in Hawaii, replied that the final consequence of
where both the war warning and the such a course would be "gradual impov-
G-2 message had arrived at about the erishment." 20 Later that day, the same
same time, read simply: "Report Depart- group met with the Emperor, and each
ment alerted to prevent sabotage." This man presented his views.
clear indication of confusion in Hawaii The Liaison Conference, which met
went unnoticed in the Munitions Build- in Tokyo at the Imperial Palace on 29
ing. To General Marshall and his chief November 1941, was the conference at
aides Hawaii was the only base "reason- which the final details for the opening
ably well equipped," its commanders had of hostilities were decided. Agreement
been fully alerted, and they "felt reason- was reached on the form and substance
ably secure at that one point." Their of a note to the United States which, in
eyes were focused on the Philippines and effect, would end the negotiations. The
Southeast Asia.19 conferees agreed that a declaration of
war would not be necessary. The timing
The Die is Cast of the note to be delivered in Washing-
ton was discussed, and it was finally
The day 29 November, the deadline decided to allow the Army and Navy to
set by the Japanese, found the force fix the interval between the delivery of
scheduled to attack Pearl Harbor already the note and the opening of the attack.21
on its way and elements of the Southern The decisions of the Liaison Confer-
Army assembling for their various tasks. ence were formalized and sanctioned by
Since Hull's note of the 26th—which a the Imperial Conference on 1 December.
Liaison Conference had summarily re- Tojo, who presided at this meeting,
jected the next day—it had been clear explained the purpose of the conference,
to the Japanese leaders that no agree- and then the Cabinet ministers and the
ment was possible. But a few more days Chiefs of Staff discussed the question of
were needed, so on the 28th Nomura war with the United States, Great Brit-
and Kurusu were instructed to do their 20
Konoye Memoirs, Pearl Harbor Attack Hearings,
best to keep the conversations open. pt. 20, p. 4012.
The next day the council of senior 21
IMTFE, exhibits 2954 and 2955, Depositions of
statesmen met with members of the Cab- Tojo and Togo. On 4 December, Admiral Ito, Vice
Chief of the Navy General Staff, conferred with Mr.
19
Rads, MacArthur to Marshall, No. 1004, 28 Nov Togo, Foreign Minister, in regard to the time inter-
41, OCS 18136-118; Short to Marshall, 27 Nov 41, val between the delivery of the note and the opening
WPD 4544-13. For testimony of Generals Marshall of the attack. The Navy at first insisted on a 15-
and Gerow on this question, see Pearl Harbor Attack minute interval, but finally agreed to thirty minutes.
Hearings, pt. 3, pp. 1036, 1423; pt. 27, p. 2191; Pearl Statement by Rear Adm. Tomioka, then Chief of
Harbor Report, pp. 150-51. the Operational Section, Navy General Staff.
ain, and the Netherlands. The decision March 1942, make the execution of the
was in favor of war. "Our negotiations Japanese plan extremely hazardous, if
with the United States regarding the not impossible. The Army was anxious
execution of our national policy, adopted to start operations immediately, to pre-
5 November, have finally failed," reads vent the United States and Great Brit-
the record of the meeting. "Japan will ain from completing preparations in the
open hostilities against the United States, Philippines and Malaya. Weather was
Great Britain, and the Netherlands." a decisive consideration also. December
The Emperor spoke not a single word and January were favorable months for
during the meeting.22 amphibious operations, with the tide
All was in readiness; only the date and moon in favor of landings. Sunday
for the start of war remained to be fixed morning was selected with a full knowl-
and that was quickly decided. The 8th edge of American weekend activities.24
of December (Japanese Standard Time) The first week of December 1941 was
was the date selected and on the 2d the one of strain and nervous tension in
Army and Navy Chiefs passed the infor- Tokyo and of suspense and somber
mation on to the forces already moving watchfulness in Washington. The signs
into position for attack. But on the slim of an early break were too clear to be
chance that by a miracle the United missed by those who could read the
States would agree to the Japanese terms, intercepted Japanese messages and intel-
the naval Chief of Staff added that should ligence reports. Nomura and Kurusu
an amicable settlement be reached "all saw Hull several times, but both sides
forces of the Combined Fleet are to be knew nothing could come of these meet-
ordered to reassemble and return to ings. On the 4th, Thursday, Congress
their bases." From Admiral Yamamoto's adjourned for a long weekend. Next day
flagship went the message Niitaka Yama the Japanese Embassy staff began to leave
Nobore 1208 (Climb Mount Niitaka Washington and Nomura reported the
1208),
22
24
IMTFE
Hist of the
Armyprearranged
exhibit 588, Imperial
Sec, signal
Doc. 1652, toof carry
RecordJapanese
GHQ, Im- partial destruction of codes.
out the attacks as scheduled.23 On 6 December, President Roosevelt
Various considerations underlay the composed a last-minute plea for peace
choice of date and the decision to strike to the Emperor. On the same day a
without warning. Both the Army and Liaison Conference in Tokyo approved
Navy held that delay would be disastrous the decision to have Nomura deliver
and that surprise was an essential pre- Japan's final note at 1300 the next day,
requisite to the success of the plan. The thirty minutes before the scheduled
Navy, moreover, feared that America's launching of the attack on Pearl Harbor.
potential naval superiority would, by This note, in fourteen parts, began to
arrive in Washington later in the day.
Thirteen of the fourteen parts of the
perial Conferences.
23
These messages are reproduced in USSBS, The
message were in American hands that
Campaigns of the Pacific War (Washington, 1946), night, together with reports of two large
p.51; Morison, The Rising Sun in the Pacific, p. 93.
The message went out to all Navy forces at 1730, 2
December, as Combined Fleet Radio Operational Studies in World War II, 72, p. 36; IMTFE, exhibit
Order 6. 3646, Deposition of Togo.
Japanese convoys off Indochina, headed southern Thailand and Kota Bharu in
south. Unidentified aircraft, presum- British Malaya.
ably Japanese, had been observed over On the morning of the 7th, Sunday,
Luzon where by this time a full air alert the fourteenth and last part of the final
was in effect and where the troops had Japanese note was intercepted and de-
already moved into defensive positions coded. The War Department had its
along the beaches. In Manila, Admiral copy by about 0900. Though it did not
Sir Tom Phillips, commander of the indicate when or where war would start,
British Far Eastern Fleet, was just leav- its intent was clear. A short time later
ing for his flagship Prince of Wales after two additional messages were inter-
concluding arrangements with Hart and cepted. Taken with the 14-part note
MacArthur for concerted naval action breaking off the negotiations, they were
in the event of an attack. From Hawaii starkly revealing. One instructed the
came a reassuring message that work on Japanese ambassador to destroy the code
the South Pacific ferry route was pro- machines and secret documents; the
gressing satisfactorily. Fourteen B-17's other to deliver the 14-part message at
left San Francisco that night for Oahu, 1300 (Washington time). At 1030 that
after a personal inspection by Maj. Gen. morning Stimson and Knox went to
Henry H. Arnold, on the first leg of Hull's office where they were closeted
their run to the Philippines. Their for well over an hour and at 1230 the
ground crews were already on the high President received the Chinese Ambas-
seas in a heavily loaded convoy of seven sador to whom he read his note of the
vessels carrying aircraft, artillery, am- day before to the Emperor. "This is,"
munition, fuel, men, and supplies to he told Hu Shih, "my last effort for
General MacArthur. peace. I am afraid it may fail." 25
That same day, 6 December, Japanese General Marshall spent Sunday morn-
forces were rapidly approaching their ing on the bridle path and reached his
various
25
Feis, Thedestinations. The Pearl
Road to Pearl Harbor, p. 340. Harbor office before 1100. The intercepted mes-
force after a voyage across the North sage giving the 1300 deadline (0730
Pacific was heading southeast and at Hawaiian time) for delivery of the
2300 (Washington time) was about 600 14-part note struck him as significant
miles north of Oahu. On Formosa air- and he suggested to Admiral Stark that
fields the planes for the attack on Clark an additional warning be sent to the
Field were lined up, and the troops Pacific. He then composed a message to
scheduled to seize advance airfields in the commanders in Hawaii, the Philip-
the Philippines had already left staging pines, Panama, and San Francisco telling
areas in Formosa and the Pescadores. them that the Japanese were destroying
The invasion force for Guam was in their coding machines and would pre-
position fifty miles north, on the island sent at 1300 "what amounts to an ulti-
of Rota, and the Wake force stood ready matum." "Just what significance the
at Kwajalein. Advance units of the Japa- hour set may have," he added, "we do
nese 25th Army had left Hainan in two not know, but be on alert accordingly."
convoys on 4 December on their way
to Malaya and on the 6th were nearing
Declining an offer from Admiral Stark planet was capable of uttering them."27
for the use of the Navy's radio, Marshall The Japanese left without making any
turned the message over to an officer comment.
for transmission over the Army's net- In Tokyo, Ambassador Grew received
work and was assured shortly before from Foreign Minister Togo the Japa-
noon that it would be delivered in thirty nese note breaking off the negotiations
minutes. By a series of ironical circum- about four hours later (approximately
stances and unexpected delays the mes- 0800, Tokyo time). Later that morning,
sage to Hawaii was in turn entrusted to after Japanese bombs had fallen on
commercial telegraph and radio and then Hawaii, Guam, and Wake, after Japa-
to a bicycle messenger who, on his way nese forces had attacked the Philippines,
from Honolulu to Fort Shatter, was Hong Kong, and Shanghai, and Japa-
caught in the attack with his still nese troops had landed in Malaya, Mr.
encoded message.26 Grew received an announcement that a
President Roosevelt's personal note to state of war existed between Japan and
the Emperor reached Tokyo at noon of the United States. Around noon, Pre-
the 7th (Tokyo time), but was not mier Tojo read to "a stunned and silent
delivered to Ambassador Grew until nation" the Imperial Rescript declaring
2100 that night. Shortly after midnight war. The broadcast closed on the martial
(about 1100 of the 7th, Washington strains of "Umi Yukaba":
time), he called on the Foreign Minis- Across the sea, corpses in the water;
ter to request an audience with the Across the mountain, corpses in the field;
Emperor, but Togo said he would de- I shall die only for the Emperor,
liver the message himself. Meanwhile I shall never look back.28
Ambassador Nomura had made an
appointment to see Mr. Hull at 1345. Conclusion
He and Kurusu arrived at the State
28
27
Department
Japanese
Pearl ain half
OpnsReport,
Harbor p. hour
Southwest late Area,
41. Pacific and Hist
were From the vantage point of hindsight,
admitted to Hull's office at 1420, only Japan's decision to go to war appears
a few minutes after the Secretary had as a supreme act of folly. By this deci-
received a telephone call from the Presi- sion, the Japanese leaders appear to have
dent telling him of the attack on Pearl deliberately committed their country to
Harbor. The Japanese emissaries a hopeless struggle against a coalition
handed the secretary the 14-part note, vastly superior in potential industrial
which he already had on his desk. "In and military strength. The Pearl Har-
all my fifty years of public service," he bor attack, which brought the United
said with feeling, "I have never seen a States into the war, has been character-
document that was more crowded with ized as politically "disastrous" and stra-
infamous falsehoods and distortions— tegically "idiotic." "One can search
infamous falsehoods and distortions on military history in vain," writes the
a scale so huge that I never imagined historian of naval operations in World
until today that any Government on this
26
Pearl Harbor Report, pp. 219-28. series II, p. 41, OCMH.
War II, "for an operation more fatal

to the aggressor."29
To the Japanese the decision to go
to war was a difficult choice, made only
under the greatest necessity and with an
awareness of the danger involved. But,
after calculating all the risks, the Japa-
nese believed they had a fair chance
of success. They fully appreciated the
industrial potential of the United States
and that nation's ability to fight a major
war on two fronts. But they had to
accept this risk, as General Tojo said,
"in order to tide over the present crisis
for self-existence and self-defense." 30
They recognized, too, that victory would
have to be won quickly and that the
longer the war lasted the more disadvan-
tageous would Japan's position vis-a-vis
the United States become. Their plans
provided for such a victory, but made KURUSU AND NOMURA in Washington,
no provision for the defeat of the United December 1941.
States or Great Britain. The Japanese
intended to fight a limited war for lim- defenses. To the Japanese leaders, this
ited objectives and having once secured seemed an entirely reasonable view.
these objectives they planned to set up Perhaps the major error of the Japa-
a defense in such depth and of such nese was their decision to attack the
strength that the Allies would prefer United States when the main objective
a settlement to the long and costly war of the war was to gain the strategic
that would be required to reduce these resources of Southeast Asia. Had they
bypassed the Philippines and rejected
Yamamoto's plan for the strike against
29
Morison, The Rising Sun in the Pacific, p. 132. Pearl Harbor, it is possible that the
Admiral Stark later recalled a conversation with
Nomura, to whom he said, prophetically: "If you United States might not have gone to
attack us we will break your empire before we are war, or, if it had, that the American
through with you. While you may have initial success people would have been more favorably
due to timing and surprise, the time will come when
you too will have your losses but there will be this disposed toward a negotiated peace.
great difference. You not only will be unable to make While the Japanese would have had to
up your losses but will grow weaker as time goes on; accept certain risks in following such a
while on the other hand we not only will make up
our losses but will grow stronger as time goes on. It course, they would not have forced the
is inevitable that we shall crush you before we are United States to declare war. The Presi-
through with you." Nomura made no reply. Ltr, dent and his chief advisers were prepared
Stark to Hoover, 5 Aug 59, OCMH.
30
Political Strategy Prior to Outbreak of War, to ask Congress for a declaration of war
Japanese Studies in World War II, 150, p. 37. if Japan attacked Great Britain. The
Japanese knew this, but they did not Gen. John F. C. Fuller, "the Americans
know, or seriously miscalculated, the discovered they were naked. Their eyes
strength of isolationist sentiment in the were most unexpectedly opened, and
United States. To a large part of the they suddenly realized that they had been
American people, a war with Japan over living in a fool's paradise. . . ,"32
Malaya or the Netherlands Indies would The Japanese placed great reliance
have appeared as an effort to pull Brit- for the success of their plans on the
ish and Dutch chestnuts out of the fire. situation in Europe. Even if Germany
Such a war would have split the country did not defeat England or Soviet Russia
and made difficult the full mobilization they thought there was little possibility
of American and industrial might. "I of peace. They did not expect an early
don't know," Hull remarked later to invasion of England, but did anticipate
Admiral Stark, "whether we would have that Germany would establish control
been in the war yet if Japan had not of the European continent in the near
attacked us." 31 future. And even if Germany did not
The United States Government was in defeat England or the Soviet Union,
a difficult position in the winter of 1941. both those nations would be too pre-
It was committed to a major effort in occupied to make a major effort in the
the Atlantic and the support of the Brit- Far East. The possibility of Soviet action
ish Isles but had drawn a line in the in Manchuria or American use of Soviet
Far East beyond which it would not bases in Asia was not discounted and
permit Japan to go. At the same time, provision was made in the plan for either
it was preparing for offensive operations contingency. But such action, it was
against Japan, preparations that would believed, would not come until after
be completed within several months. the southern area had been seized.
Had Japan, without abandoning its aims
in Southeast Asia, sedulously avoided any 32
Maj. Gen. J. F. C. Fuller, The Second World War,
overt act against the United States—a 1939-1945 (New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1949),
course that was debated in Tokyo until p. 133. Evidence on public opinion is not conclusive.
A Gallup poll reported in the New York Times for
the end of November—the administra- 23 February 1941 found that although 56 percent of
tion would have been faced with a dis- those polled were in favor of an effort "to keep Japan
tasteful choice: (1) to declare war from seizing the Dutch East Indies and Singapore,"
only 39 percent supported risking war in such an
against Japan and risk an unpopular attempt. Again, in August 1941, a Fortune poll
war, or (2) to stand idly by while the showed that 33.7 percent of those polled were in
Japanese secured the rich resources of favor of defending the Philippines, East Indies, and
Australia, and only 22.3 percent favored the defense
Malaya and the Indies which would of an unspecified portion of this area. The conclusion
enable them to push the war in China. of John W. Masland, writing in 1941, was that "pow-
The Japanese, by attacking Pearl Har- erful commercial interests and articulate isolationist
pressure groups" opposed American opposition of
bor, made a choice unnecessary and uni- Japan. John W. Masland, "American Attitudes To-
fied the American people as nothing else ward Japan," Annals of the American Academy of
could have done. "Like Adam and Eve," Political and Social Science (May 1941), p. 165. See
also Public Opinion, 1935—1946, prepared by Mildred
says the British military historian, Maj. Strunk under editorial direction of Hadley Contril
(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1951),
31
Ltr, Stark to Hoover, 5 Aug 59, OCMH. p. 1077, items 33-35, 38, 39.
Considering the alternatives, the inter- The United States and Great Britain,
national situation in the fall of 1941, they were convinced, were bent on de-
and the risks, the Japanese plan was not stroying Japan or reducing it to a minor
altogether as unrealistic as it has ap- power. Submission was unthinkable and
peared to many. The seizure of South- Japan had no alternative, "but to reso-
east Asia and the time allotted did not lutely plunge into war" while it still had
seem too difficult, and with the resources the power to do so. The nation entered
of this area the Japanese believed they the war, wrote a prince of the Imperial
could wage a defensive war along their family, "with a tragic determination and
outer perimeter for a long time. Cer- in desperate self-abandonment." If it
tainly this course, even with its risks, lost, "there will be nothing to regret
was preferable from their point of view because she is doomed to collapse even
to submission. without war."33
In the view of the leaders of Japan,
there was no honorable choice but war. G-2 FEC, copy in OCMH.
33
Statement of Prince Higashikuni, 9 Jun 49, ATIS,
PART TWO
THE DEFENSIVE: PEARL HARBOR

TO MIDWAY
With broken heart and head bowed in sadness but not in shame,
I report to your Excellency that today I must arrange terms for the
surrender of the fortified islands of Manila Bay. . . . With profound
regret and with continued pride in my gallant troops, I go to meet the
Japanese commander.
General Wainwright to President Roosevelt, 6 May 1942
Why, victor, dost thou exult? The victory will be your ruin.
OVID
CHAPTER VI
The First Weeks of War, 7 — 2 6 December

Mars, unscrupulous god of war, rages throughout the world.
VERGIL
When the Japanese opened hostilities pines by occupying Guam, Wake, and
in the Pacific they struck with such dra- the Gilberts; destroy American air power
matic suddenness, at so many points, in the Philippines to remove the threat
and over so vast an area that the Ameri- to their own right flank and as a prelude
cans, whose eyes were fixed on the Phil- to the invasion of the islands; occupy
ippines and Southeast Asia, were taken Thailand to secure a base for operations
completely by surprise. Almost simul- against Malaya and Burma; land in
taneously the Japanese attacked Hawaii, northern Malaya and on the Isthmus of
the Philippines, Wake, Guam, Singapore, Kra to begin the drive toward Singapore
Hong Kong, Malaya and Thailand. All off the base of the Malaya Peninsula;
these assaults, even the one against Pearl and take over the British outpost at
Harbor, had been foreseen but no one Hong Kong. (Map I)
had anticipated that they would all be The force assigned to the Pearl Harbor
made at once, on the first day of war. attack—4 heavy and 2 light carriers sup-
ported by 2 fast battleships, 2 heavy
The Japanese Offensive: First Phase cruisers, a destroyer squadron, subma-
rines, tankers, and supply ships—left the
In the Japanese plan for war, the assembly area in Tankan Bay in the des-
5-month period allotted to the seizure olate, snowbound Kurils on 26 Novem-
of the southern area, supporting opera- ber, Tokyo time. Following a northerly
tions, and the capture of positions nec- route across the Pacific, well off the
essary to establish a strong defensive shipping lanes and beyond the range of
perimeter was divided into three phases. patrol planes from Wake and Midway,
The first phase consisted of six separate Vice Adm. Chuichi Nagumo took his
and widely scattered operations, synchro- formidable fleet eastward through fog
nized to obtain the maximum advantage and rough sea and early on the 4th of
of surprise, and timed to begin simulta- December, after the weather had mod-
neously on the date set for war. On that erated sufficiently to permit refueling,
day Japanese forces would launch the reached a point about 900 miles north
attack on Pearl Harbor to destroy or of Midway. There the fleet turned south-
neutralize the U.S. Pacific Fleet; cut the east until it was about 500 miles north
line of communications to the Philip- of Oahu. Then it shifted course due
south for the final run to the target at bor, the Japanese planes dropped their
a speed of twenty-four knots. It was now first bombs.
2100 of the 6th, Hawaiian time (1700 of The next two hours of that Sabbath
the 7th Tokyo time). In less than nine morning on Oahu, where all attention
hours, just before 0600 of the 7th, the up to then had been focused on the
carriers had reached their launching possibility of sabotage, were a nightmare.
point some 200 miles north of Oahu, Bombs and torpedoes dropped every-
having come 3,000 miles across the where, on ships in the harbor, on Army
Pacific, much of it by dead reckoning, installations, on depots, and other tar-
without detection. Immediately the gets. Dive bombers machine-gunned
heavy cruisers sent up four reconnais- parked planes and the ground crews
sance planes. Except for the richest rushed pell-mell to their battle stations.
prize, the three carriers and their escort, Within a half hour almost all the great
the entire Pacific Fleet was in port.1 ships lined up in "Battleship Row" had
It was still dark when the Japanese been hit. Oklahoma capsized, West Vir-
pilots, cheered by shouts of "Banzai" ginia sank, Arizona was aflame, and Cali-
from their comrades, took off from the fornia was going down. Hickam and
carriers. The first wave of 183 planes Wheeler Fields, hit in the first attack,
was formed and headed for Oahu by suffered badly. The Army planes, parked
0615, to be followed an hour later by in close order, wing tip to wing tip,
a second wave of 167 planes. Already were perfect targets.
a force consisting of Japan's most mod- By 1000 the raid was over and the
ern submarines, based on Kwajalein in Japanese planes were heading north to-
the Marshalls, had taken up positions ward the carriers. Three hours later the
covering the entrance to Pearl Harbor, carriers were speeding away to the north-
and five midget submarines were mak- west, still undetected, leaving behind
ing their way toward the open submarine them on Oahu death and destruction.
net.
1
T h e account which follows is based on Japanese Some of the submarines remained in
Flying at 9,000 feet, above a dense Hawaiian waters until early January, a
but broken layer of clouds, into a mag- few venturing as far as the west coast,
nificent sunrise, the first wave of aircraft to report on the movements of the
reached Oahu, "still asleep in the morn- Pacific Fleet and to attack American
ing mist," at 0750. Part of the formation shipping.
headed for the Army's Wheeler and The results achieved by the raid were
Hickam airfields; the rest for the fleet a complete vindication of Admiral Yama-
anchorage at Ford Island. Five minutes moto, originator of the plan. The Japa-
later, after at least three of the midget nese pilots had studied their charts and
submarines had penetrated into the har- intelligence reports well and knew ex-
actly what to go after. Though there
were 94 naval vessels in the harbor, they
Opns in SWPA, pp. 68-71; Japan's Decision to Fight, concentrated on the battle force of the
ATIS Research Rpt No. 131; Morison, The Rising Pacific Fleet, sinking or putting out of
Sun in the Pacific, pp. 88-95; Craven and Cate, AAF
I, pp. 194—201; Morton, The Fall of the Philippines, action in less than two hours 8 battle-
pp. 78-79. ships, 3 light cruisers, 3 destroyers, and
THE FIRST WEEKS OF WAR, 7-26 DECEMBER 133
a number of auxiliary vessels. They nese forces were moving to cut the
also destroyed 92 naval planes and dam- American line of communications to the
aged 31 more. The Army lost a total Philippines and to knock out General
of 96 aircraft, including those destroyed MacArthur's air force. Planes from
in depots and those later cannibalized. Saipan hit Guam shortly after the Pearl
American casualties for the day were Harbor attack, and at about the same
2,403 men killed and 1,178 wounded, time planes based on Kwajalein began
most of them naval personnel.2 the bombardment of Wake. These at-
Despite the enormous damage they tacks marked the opening of softening-
wrought, the Japanese had failed to take up operations which continued for two
full advantage of their opportunity. For days and on the 10th the invasion force
some unaccountable reason they over- moved up. Against Guam, Vice Adm.
looked entirely the installations at Pearl, Shigeyoshi Inouye, commander of the
the repair shops, the dry dock, and the Fourth Fleet, sent the Army's South Seas
oil tanks then filled to capacity. And Detachment plus supporting naval units,
even less understandable is their failure all together about 5,000 men. Landing
to seek out and destroy the American before dawn on the northwestern and
carriers at sea, which, with the cruisers, eastern shores of Guam, this force
destroyers, and submarines, constituted quickly overcame the small Marine gar-
an effective striking force. Both these rison and the native police and gained
failures cost the Japanese dearly later, possession of the island in a matter of
but for the moment they had good rea- hours. That same day, the Japanese also
son to rejoice. With the loss of only occupied Makin and Tarawa in the
about fifty planes and five midget sub- British-held Gilbert Islands without
marines, they had inflicted on the United resistance.
States what an official Congressional re- At Wake, where the defenders were
port described as "the greatest military more numerous and better prepared, the
and naval disaster" in the nation's Japanese sent a smaller force and with
history.3 quite different results. Led by Maj.
While Admiral Nagumo's carrier- James P. S. Devereux, the marines, on
based planes were immobilizing the U.S. the morning of the 10th, beat off the
Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor, other Japa- first landing attempt by about 500 spe-
2
cial naval landing troops. The weak
Morison, The Rising Sun in the Pacific, p. 126.
These figures are revised estimates and are slightly Japanese force, less two destroyers sunk
higher than those given in Pearl Harbor Report, pp. by Marine aircraft, withdrew to Kwa-
64-65. Other figures are used in Stetson Conn, Rose jalein to await reinforcements and was
C. Engelman, and Byron Fairchild, Guarding the
United States and Its Outposts, ch. VII, a volume back on the 22d with 500 more men and
now in preparation for the series UNITED STATES additional naval and air support, in-
ARMY IN WORLD WAR II. The reader should cluding two carriers diverted from the
consult this work for a fuller treatment of the Army's
role in the Pearl Harbor attack. retiring Pearl Harbor force. Early the
3
Pearl Harbor Report, p. 65. Admiral Stark wrote next morning the Japanese landed and
later, "Had the Japs devoted some of their attack to before the day was over the garrison,
our shops, oil storage, etc.—it would have been a lot
rougher going for a considerable period." Ltr, Stark after a bitter resistance, was forced to
to Hoover, 5 Aug 59, OCMH. surrender. A naval expedition, sent to
"BANZAI!" Japanese sailors cheer the Pearl Harbor attack force as the airplanes take off from
a carrier, 7 December 1941.
relieve the island, had approached to stroy the Far East Air Force, then land
within 425 miles of Wake by the morn- advance units to build airstrips for the
ing of 23 December. But when news of short-range Army fighters which would
the surrender reached Hawaii, it was cover the landing and subsequent opera-
ordered to return to Pearl Harbor, to tions of the main invasion force when it
the bitter disappointment of the Marine came ashore later. The task of conquer-
aviators aboard the Saratoga. With the ing the Philippines was assigned to Lt.
capture of Wake the Japanese gained Gen. Masaharu Homma's 14th Army;
control of the line of communication naval support would be provided by the
across the Central Pacific.4 3d Fleet assisted by elements of the 2d
As at Pearl Harbor, the keynote to the Fleet; air support, by the 5th Air Group
Japanese attack against the Philippines and11th Air Fleet. The main staging
was surprise. The first aim was to de- area for the invasion force was Formosa,
4
Heinl, The Defense of Wake; Morison, The but units staged from the Ryukyus,
Rising Sun in the Pacific, pp. 184-86. A Japanese Pescadores, and Palau as well. Naval air-
account of these actions is contained in Japanese craft of the11th Air Fleet based on For-
Opns in SWPA, p. 71; a fuller account of the Guam
action is in Opns of the South Seas Detachment,
mosa were to deliver the main attack on
Japanese Studies in World War II, 36. American air installations in central
PEARL HARBOR, 7 DECEMBER 1941
Luzon and Army aircraft, which had a were sure, would by now have news of
shorter
5
range,
F o r a full would
account strike
of this targets
plan and of thetoevents
the the Pearl Harbor raid and would have
north.5 taken precautions against air attack.
The opening air offensive was planned Even more frightening was the possibil-
for daylight of the 8th—the 7th east of ity that this delay would enable the
the date line—about three hours after heavy bombers of the Far East Air Force
the raid on Pearl Harbor. Simultaneous to attack Formosa. Indeed, after an
action was impossible, for the sun rose erroneous report and a misunderstood
earlier in Hawaii. But even this plan radio message, the alarmed Japanese
for a 3-hour delay went awry, for at began passing out gas masks.
dawn of the 8th dense clouds of heavy News of the Pearl Harbor attack had
fog blanketed the Formosa airfields. The indeed reached Manila, as the Japanese
Japanese were filled with dismay. As the feared. The Navy radio picked up the
early morning hours rolled by, their message announcing the raid at 0230 of
anxiety increased. The Americans, they the 8th (0800, 7 December, Hawaiian
time), and within two hours all com-
which followed, see Morton, The Fall of the Philip- manders had been alerted and troops
pines, ch. V, passim. ordered to battle positions. At about
0500, Maj. Gen. Lewis H. Brereton, com- the hangars, barracks, and warehouses.
mander of the Far East Air Force, was The greatest casualties were inflicted by
waiting outside MacArthur's office for the low-level attacks of the Zeros, which
permission to send his B-17's, half of destroyed and damaged 17 or 18 B-17's
which had been moved south to Del and 18 P-40's—almost the entire force
Monte airfield in Mindanao, against based at Clark—on the ground. Casu-
Formosa. The events which followed alties were fifty-five killed and more
have been obscured by the conflicting than a hundred wounded. Japanese
statements of the several participants, losses could not have been more than six
but this much is clear: (1) That an at- fighters. The two squadrons of B-17's
tack against Formosa was proposed; (2) which had been transferred to the Del
that it was deferred in favor of a photo Monte airfield in Mindanao escaped the
reconnaissance mission; (3) that at about attack.
1100 the strike against Formosa was Simultaneously with the raid on Clark
finally authorized; and (4) that the Field the Japanese struck the fighter base
heavy bombers at Clark Field, which at Iba, to the west, destroying all but two
had been ordered aloft at about 0800 of the P-40's there as well as the radar
were called in to make ready for the raid station, barracks, warehouses, and equip-
on Formosa.6 ment. Before dawn the next day they
Despite the fog a few Japanese Army hit Nichols Field near Manila, and on
aircraft had taken off from Formosa and the loth the naval yard at Cavite, which
bombed targets in northern Luzon be- they practically destroyed. Thus, in two
tween 0930 and 1030. Finally at 1015, days and with insignificant casualties the
as the fog began to lift, the 11th Air Japanese virtually wiped out America's
Fleet sent its planes out for the attack air power in the Far East and removed
on Clark Field. The assignment was an the threat to the flank of their advances
important one and the pilots of the 192 southward.
aircraft
6
assigned
A full account toevents
of the the mission
precedingwere the
the attack At the start of war most of the surface
best and most experienced men availa- strength of the small U.S. Asiatic Fleet
ble. They arrived over the target at was based south of Manila Bay, in the
about 1220 to find the B-17's lined up Visayas. By evening of the 8th, the
on the field below and the fighters fleet, except for the submarines and
readying for a take-off. After the delay auxiliary craft, was steaming south out
in getting started and the lapse of time of Philippine waters. On the 14th, Pa-
since the Pearl Harbor attack, the Japa- trol Wing 10 and three tenders followed,
nese had not expected to find so rich a and two days later the remaining B-17's
harvest. But they did not question their flew from Mindanao to Darwin in
good fortune and went in for the attack. northwest Australia.
The raid lasted for more than an The Japanese began their landings in
hour, the first flights concentrating on the Philippines on the first day of war on
Batan Island, 150 miles north of Luzon.
On the 10th, they made two more land-
on Clark Field can be found in Morton, The Fall of ings, one at Aparri and one at Vigan, in
the Philippines, pp. 79-84. northern Luzon, and two days later more
Japanese came ashore at Legaspi, on the The Japanese had achieved remarka-
southeast tip of the island. These were ble success thus far in their campaign
not the main landings and were designed to take the Philippines. Within a period
only to secure airfields and to cut com- of three weeks they had established com-
munications between Luzon and the plete aerial and naval supremacy, cut
islands to the south. General MacArthur the line between the Philippines and
read the meaning of these moves right Australia, and now they stood ready to
and refused to shift his forces to meet move in force on Manila.
them, but waited instead for the main In the China area, the Japanese met
landings to come. with equal success. Their plans called
The Japanese landings in the southern for the occupation of the British base
Philippines had as their primary purpose at Hong Kong, and the seizure of the
the acquisition of bases for the attack on foreign concessions in Shanghai and
Borneo. Two landings were made: one Tientsin. The latter were taken without
at Davao in Mindanao on 20 December difficulty, but the British and Canadian
by a force from Palau; and another, by garrison at Hong Kong put up a stiff
elements of the same force, on Jolo Is- resistance. On the morning of 8 Decem-
land in the Sulu Archipelago four days ber Japanese planes from Canton
later. In neither case were the Ameri- bombed the Kowloon airfield on the
cans or Filipinos able to offer more than mainland just across the strait from
a token resistance. Within a short time Hong Kong. The Japanese 38th Divi-
the Japanese had moved two naval air sion, also based at Canton, moved out
flotillas from Formosa to Davao and at about the same time and by 14
Jolo, and the 3d Fleet began assembling December had penetrated the British
in Davao harbor for the invasion of defenses on the mainland to reach the
Borneo. Kowloon Peninsula. On the night of
The main landings of the 14th Army the 18th, the 38th Division, aided by the
came on 22 December at Lingayen Gulf Second
7
Despatch by Maj GenExpeditionary
China E. M. Maltby, "Operations
Fleet,
120 miles north of Manila, with a sec- began to cross the strait and by morn-
ondary effort at Lamon Bay, southeast ing of the next day was firmly entrenched
of the capital, two days later. Opposition on the island of Hong Kong. The next
was slight and by Christmas Day Gen- week witnessed bitter fighting, but the
eral Homma had secured a firm lodg- odds against the British and Canadians
ment and was ready to drive on Manila were too great. On Christmas Day the
from two directions. Next day General garrison surrendered.7
MacArthur declared the capital an open
city and transferred his headquarters to
Corregidor. Already General Brereton, in Hong Kong, 8—25 December 1941," Supplement to
commander of the Far East Air Force, the London Gazette, January 29, 1948: Japanese
Opns in SWPA, p. 75. For full account of the battle
had left for Australia; Admiral Hart was for Hong Kong, see the official British volume, Maj.
on his way south to join his fleet; and Gen. S. Woodburn Kirby, C. T. Addis, J. F. Meikle-
the American and Filipino troops on john, G. T. Wards, and N. L. Desoer, The Loss of
vol. I, "History of the Second World War:
Luzon were falling back to the Bataan Singapore,
The War Against Japan" (London: Her Majesty's
Peninsula. Stationery Office, 1957).
The success of the Japanese at Pearl of these two warships signaled the end
Harbor, in the Philippines, and in of British naval power in the Far East.
China was, in a sense, meaningless with- With the occupation of Singora,
out similar successes in the principal Pattani, and Kota Bharu, General Yama-
theater of operations, Southeast Asia. It shita was soon able to gain control of
was there that the strategic resources the air over Malaya and close support
Japan needed so badly were and it was for his ground forces. Deployed in par-
there that the Japanese concentrated allel columns along the east and west
their main strength—three armies, with coasts of the peninsula, the 25th Army
supporting air and naval forces. Malaya began its drive toward Johore Bharu
and Singapore were to be taken by Lt. just across the strait from Singapore. By
Gen. Tomoyuki Yamashita's 25tk Army; Christmas it was only 150 miles from its
the Netherlands Indies by the 16th objective.
Army, and Burma by the 15th. The 3d While the campaign for Malaya was
Air Group, based in south China and moving forward rapidly, the Japanese
northern Indochina, and the Southern took steps to gain control over Thailand.
Expeditionary Fleet were to support the On the first day of war, elements of the
forces in Malaya. Imperial Guards Division, stationed in
Advance units of the 25th Army left Indochina and attached to the 15th
Hainan Island on 4 December and on Army, moved across the border into
the morning of the 8th began landing at Thailand while other elements of the
Singora and Pattani in southern Thai- division were landed at points along the
land, and at Kota Bharu, just across the narrow Kra Isthmus. The Thailanders
border, in British Malaya. At the same offered no opposition and, after consoli-
time Japanese aircraft in Indochina dating their position the Japanese began
bombed military installations in Singa- to assemble their forces in Thailand for
pore. The first two landings were unop- the invasion of Burma.
posed, and even assisted by local Thai Japanese operations in Indonesia,
authorities, but the Kota Bharu force which in this phase included only the
came under strong attack from British seizure of positions in Borneo, met with
aircraft and beach defense guns and the same success as had operations else-
withdrew with heavy losses. Later in the where. From Camranh Bay in French
day, with stronger air protection, the Indochina came the force which made
Japanese tried again and this time suc- the first landings in British Borneo.
ceeded in establishing a beachhead. On Composed of three battalions of infantry
the evening of the 9th, the main body of and special naval troops, covered by1
the 25th Army began to arrive, and next carrier, 1 battleship, 3 cruisers, and 4
day Japanese land-based naval aircraft destroyers, this force embarked on 13
removed the last danger to the beach- December and three days later landed
head by sinking the Prince of Wales and near Miri where it promptly occupied
Repulse, which had ventured forth from an airstrip and seized the partially de-
Singapore without air cover. The loss stroyed oil fields. On the 24th it made
an amphibious hop to Kuching, capital fied positions, using flanking maneuvers

of Sarawak, a native state in northwest where possible. And when they could
Borneo ruled by a British rajah.8 not avoid direct assault they struck at
Their success in the opening weeks of night and pushed on, regardless of loss.
the war exceeded the expectations of Their first objectives were always air-
even the most optimistic Japanese lead- fields, and air power (land- and carrier-
ers. By Christmas they had achieved all based) dominated their operations
of the objectives outlined in their plan during these first weeks of war, as it
for the first phase of the war and were would dominate Allied operations later
well on their way to completing the sec- in the war.
ond phase. Except for the temporary
setbacks at Wake and Kota Bharu, oper- Meeting the Emergency
ations had proceeded with a smoothness
rare in war. American and British forces The first reaction in Washington to
everywhere had been decisively beaten Admiral Kimmel's message—"Air raid
and were on the defensive; the safety of on Pearl Harbor. This is not drill"—
the home islands was assured, and the received at 1350 of the 7th, was one of
resources of Southeast Asia were within surprise and shock. "My God," ex-
grasp. Never were Japan's self-esteem claimed Secretary Knox incredulously,
and its prestige in Asia so high; the "this can't be true. This must mean the
fortunes of the Allies so low. Philippines." He immediately tele-
The amazing success of the Japanese phoned the White House where Mr.
can be attributed as much to the unpre- Roosevelt, who was lunching with Harry
paredness of the Allies and the sudden- Hopkins, remarked that "the Japanese
ness of the attack as to the superiority of had made the decision for him." Hull
Japanese tactics, troops, and equipment. had the news before the Japanese Am-
By concentrating overwhelming air and bassadors arrived for their final meeting
naval
8 powerin for
Operations the Thailand,
Malaya, attack and striking
and Borneo are and expressed himself, when they ap-
with a swiftness that gained for them the peared, in "pretty strong Tennessee
full advantage of surprise, they were mountain language." Stimson, who re-
able to win their objectives with a min- ceived the startling report a short time
imum of losses. From each new base later, was astonished that the Japanese
they moved forward in the same manner, should have chosen Hawaii as "the point
always achieving local air and naval of attack."9
supremacy before landing their troops. As soon as confirmation of the first
They avoided direct assault against forti- report was received by telephone from
Oahu, the Army and Navy put into ef-
described in Kirby, et al, The Loss of Singapore; fect their war plans. Messages went out
Japanese Opns in SWPA, pp. 72—75; Morison, The to all commanders informing them that
Rising Sun in the Pacific, pp. 187-92; Despatches of
Lt Gen A. E. Percival and Air Chief Marshal Sir Japan had opened hostilities and
Robert Brook-Popham in the Supplement to the directing them to carry out the tasks
London Gazette, January 22 and February 26, 1948;
9
Borneo Opns, 1941-42, Japanese Studies in World Quotes are from Pearl Harbor Report, p. 439;
War II, 22; and 25th Army Opns in Malaya, same Stimson and Bundy, On Active Service, p. 391; Sher-
series, 85. wood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, p. 431.
assigned in RAINBOW 5, so far as they That day and the next, more news, all
pertained to Japan. In Hawaii there was of it bad, continued to trickle into
confusion over references to a warning Washington. The Japanese bombings
about a Japanese attack, and it was not of Guam, Wake, Hong Kong, and Singa-
until 1500 that the confusion was re- pore and their landings in Malaya and
solved by the receipt of the long-delayed Thailand were noted but without much
message Marshall had sent shortly before surprise. Most of these attacks had been
noon.10 The command there made a expected and none had the impact of
quick recovery from the attack and be- Pearl Harbor and Clark Field. What was
fore the end of the day had instituted most alarming was the lack of informa-
martial law in the islands, taken stock tion on the size and location of the force
of its losses, and sent off an urgent plea which had hit Pearl Harbor. For all
for heavy bombers and fighters.11 anyone knew it might return to Pearl
With the War Department's message Harbor to bomb the installations over-
to General MacArthur invoking RAIN- looked before. Or it might be on its way
BOW 5 went assurances of confidence and to the Panama Canal or the unguarded
"every possible assistance and support west coast of the United States. Seattle
within our power." No word had been had only one 3-inch gun and one auto-
received from the Philippines and when matic weapons battery; San Francisco,
this message failed to evoke any response an antiaircraft brigade, and Los Angeles
General Marshall sent still another ask- a regiment— and all those cities and
ing whether the Philippines had yet many others were clamoring for more
been attacked. Finally, General Gerow protection. Hawaii needed more planes,
was able to establish telephone commu- guns, and men; help would have to be
nications with Manila and talk to Mac- sent to General MacArthur; and Pan-
Arthur. He had known since about 0300 ama was too vital to be ignored. Be-
(Manila time) of the Pearl Harbor tween San Francisco and Hawaii were
raid,
11
10
MacArthur
Affidavit
Rad, Shortof and
Capt.
Martin said,
William
to TAG,but
B. Cobb, there
No.cited had
1068,in7 His-
Dec three transports carrying men and sup-
been no attacks as yet and, he told plies and farther west was a large convoy
Gerow, "our tails are up." General headed for Manila. All these problems
Arnold, too, talked by telephone with and many more had to be solved at once,
his air commander in the Philippines, in an atmosphere of frenzied activity and
General Brereton, and warned him spe- deep concern over where the blow would
cifically against a surprise Japanese at- fall next.
tack.12 A short time later came news of Complicating the task of commanders
the Japanese attack against Clark Field. in Washington and in the Pacific was
the inevitable flood of rumors and specu-
lations, some of which were given cred-
tory of United States Army Forces, Middle Pacific ence in the highest official circles.
and Predecessor Commands During World War II
(hereafter cited as USAFMIDPAC Hist), pt. I, vol. 1,
Japanese aircraft were reported over Los
p. 58, copy in OCMH. Angeles, San Francisco, and other west
41, AG 381 (11-27-41 Gen) Far East. of Tel Conv between Gerow and MacArthur, WPD
12
Rads, Marshall to MacArthur, Nos 736 and 737, 4622; Henry H. Arnold, Global Mission (New York:
7 Dec 41, AG 381 (11-27-41 Gen) Far East; Record Harper & Brothers, 1949), p. 272.
coast cities on the first day of war and The excitable Filipinos saw as many
for days thereafter. Pilots mistook float- specters as did the Hawaiians and Ameri-
ing logs for submarines and every vessel cans. Many of the Japanese bombers
for a Japanese carrier. On the day fol- which hit Clark and Nichols Fields were
lowing Pearl Harbor there was an alert believed to be piloted by Caucasians—
in San Francisco and the schools in Oak- presumably Germans. Arrows, like those
land were closed on the basis of a report in the sugar fields of Oahu, but formed
that enemy carriers were off the coast of by headlights, pointed at military tar-
California. Another report, which came gets; Japanese voices were heard over
from the Chief of Staff, alerted the West- short wave. There were reports, as in
ern Defense commander to the presence Hawaii, of landings, of Japanese carriers
of a hostile force believed to be only off the coast, of paratroopers, poisoned
400 miles away. water supply, and of active fifth colum-
In Hawaii, where "invasion fever" ran nists. As elsewhere, these reports had
high, the rumors were even wilder. to be checked, and the staff kept busy
There were at least a dozen reports of searching for the grain of truth in the
paratroop landings in different places wild rumors that came in over the
on the 7th, and Japanese voices were wires.13
heard constantly on short wave radio. Matters of grand strategy required lit-
People saw flashing signal lights, flares, tle attention during the first days of the
swatches cut in sugar cane fields to form war. There was no disagreement about
arrows pointing at vital installations. them, and they had little relevance to the
Word that the water supply of Hono- immediate problems facing the Army
lulu had been poisoned spread rapidly, and Navy. The staff conversations with
and Japanese landing parties were ob- the British early in the year had pro-
served at various points. The wildest vided a global strategy and a basis for
tales were believed. A truck that had concerted action "so that at the very
been
13 delivering
USAFMIDPAC milk
Hist, pt. I, vol.for months
2, app. 3E; Cravento beginning," as General Marshall later
Hickam Field became, on the morning explained, "we had a fair understanding
of the 7th, a Japanese armored vehicle, of what we had best do rather than the
complete with troops and machine guns. necessity of engaging in prolonged con-
Japanese cars and trucks were supposed versations. . . ,"14 This understanding,
to have deliberately created traffic jams which included a recognition that Ger-
on the roads leading to military installa- many was the main enemy and that the
tions. Japanese pilots wore civilian major effort would be made initially in
clothes, it was thought, so that they could Europe, was obviously not applicable in
mingle with the civil population if they the present situation. Of first import-
were shot down. Finally, it was reliably ance now was the necessity to check the
reported that on a specified kilocycle a Japanese, to unify and co-ordinate "the
message—"Chopsticks, I don't want to set
the world on fire. Why can't it happen
again tonight"—was heard, and all prep- and Cate, AAF I, pp. 278-79; Morton, The Fall of
the Philippines, p. 115. For rumors received in Wash-
arations were made for another attack on ington see OCS 21105-3 and WPD 4622-13.
Pearl Harbor. 14
Pearl Harbor Attack Hearings, pt. 3, p. 1222.
tinuing shipments of war materials to

Britain and the Soviet Union, and dis-
cussed at length the specific measures
required to redress the naval balance in
the Pacific and to defend vital installa-
tions in the United States and overseas.
The President also told his advisors
during the meeting that he would go
before Congress next day to ask for a
declaration of war.
Relations with the European Axis was
one of the most troublesome questions
facing the President. Japan alone had
attacked the United States, but American
strategy was oriented toward Europe and
the nation was committed to the support
of the powers fighting Germany and
Italy as well as Japan. A declaration of
war against the European Axis, without
provocation, might arouse opposition in
PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT signs the Declara- Congress and in the country. That there
tion of War, December 1941. was no intention of abandoning England
and the Soviet Union had been made
forces of all opposition to Japan in the clear in the meeting of the War Council,
Far East, with special reference to the and again, later in the day, when Mr.
South Seas area."15 Churchill telephoned the President to
It was to this task and to the imme- offer his support and say that he intend-
diate
15
16
Hull,measures
Sherwood,
Memoirs, II,required
Roosevelt1113. to put pp.
and Hopkins, the432-33,
nation ed to go before the House of Commons
on a war footing that the President and to ask for a declaration of war against
his chief military and naval advisers ad- Japan. He proposed also that he come
dressed themselves on the outbreak of to Washington with his principal mili-
war. On the afternoon of the 7th, only tary advisers to discuss the changed situ-
a few hours after the Pearl Harbor at- ation now that "we are all in the same
tack, the President met with his War boat." To this, Roosevelt had promptly
Council to consider what must be done. agreed.16
Those present at the meeting—Hull, The question of relations with the
Stimson, Knox, Marshall, and Stark— European Axis was discussed on the eve-
agreed that America's position in the ning of the 7th in a Cabinet meeting
Far East had been greatly weakened but which Roosevelt termed the most serious
that the Japanese attack had mobilized "since Lincoln met with his Cabinet at
the nation as nothing else could have. the outbreak of the Civil War."17 The
They recognized the necessity for con-
439; Hull, Memoirs, II, 1059-1100.
17
Sherwood. Roosevelt and Hopkins, p. 433.
draft message he read to the Cabinet The new mission of the Pacific Fleet was
members contained no mention of Ger- now almost entirely defensive. Deleted
many or Italy. Evidently, in the belief were the provisions for the support of
that these nations would support Japan, British naval forces, operations against
he preferred to wait and let them declare the Caroline and Marshall Islands, and
war first. Later that night the President the diversion of Japanese forces from the
reviewed the situation with Congres- Malay Barrier. Kimmel was to limit
sional leaders and the next day went be- himself largely to the defense of the is-
fore Congress which, with only one lands and sea communications east of
dissenting vote, approved the declara- the date line. This decision was approved
tion of war against Japan. Great Britain, by the Joint Board the same day and
the Netherlands Government-in-exile, about a week later, after further study
the British Dominions, and various Cen- by the naval planners, was communicated
tral American republics followed suit to the British.19
soon after. It was not until the 11 th that More than a change in mission was
Germany and Italy declared war against required to remedy the damage at Pearl
the United States, thus ending the un- Harbor. The first step in re-establishing
certainty of America's relations with the American power in the Central Pacific
European Axis. and sharpening the badly dulled edge of
the "strategic triangle" was to strengthen
Hawaii the Pacific Fleet. This was accomplished
by ordering back to the Pacific those
The significance of the damage in- warships that had been sent to the
flicted on the Pacific Fleet on the first Atlantic in the spring and summer to
day of war was apparent almost imme- protect the convoys to England — the
diately. The offensive power of the carrier Yorktown, 3 battleships, 9 de-
fleet, it seemed, had been shattered and stroyers, and 12 old submarines. This
its
18
ability
Mins, to defend
JB Mtg, 8 Dec 41. Hawaii and to
Admiral Stark, pro-
though action, too, constituted a revision of the
vide a screen for the west coast and the existing war plan, which provided for
Panama Canal greatly reduced. In fact, the transfer of units of the Pacific Fleet
there was a "grave possibility," the Navy to the Mediterranean in the event of war
planners thought, that "the Japanese so that the British could reinforce their
might capture the Hawaiian Islands."18 Far Eastern fleet.20 Such a step was
On the 8th, therefore, the Navy changed obviously out of the question.
Admiral Kimmel's instructions, and, in The Pearl Harbor attack had not only
effect modified RAINBOW 5 and ABC-1.
19
Rad, CNO to CINCPAC, 0139, 9 Dec 41; Ltr, Secy
for Collab to Chief Staff Officer, British Staff Mis-
sion, 16 Dec 41, sub: ABC—1 Modification, both
he did not minimize the seriousness of the damage cited by Lt. Grace P. Hayes, USN, in Hist of JCS in
at Pearl Harbor, reminded the President on the World War II: The War Against Japan, vol. I, ch. II,
morning of the 8th that the striking force of the fleet p. 10; Mins, JB Mtg, 8 Dec 41.
20
—the carriers, cruisers, destroyers, and submarines— Mins, JB Mtg, 8 Dec 41; Rad, CNO to CinC At-
had largely escaped damage and that shore base lantic, 8 Dec 41, copy in WPD Msg File, No. 116;
facilities were intact. Ltr, Stark to Hoover, 5 Aug 59, ABC-1, pars. 55 and 57, Pearl Harbor Attack Hear-
OCMH. ings, pt. 15, pp. 1526-27.
revealed the weakness of American de- sponsibility. . . . Both Stark and I were
fenses in the Pacific but had brought struggling to the same end. . . ,"22
into the open, with dramatic suddenness, The establishment of unity of com-
the inadequacies of command by mutual mand coincided with a complete turn-
co-operation and the danger of divided over in the high command in Hawaii.
responsibility. These weaknesses had As early as the 12th demands for an in-
been recognized before the war, General quiry into the causes of the disaster at
Marshall complaining in February 1941 Pearl Harbor were being made in Con-
that "old Army and Navy feuds" in gress, but they were staved off until the
Hawaii were becoming confused with 14th when Secretary Knox returned
questions of national defense.21 But all from Hawaii after a quick inspection.
efforts to establish unity of command in His description of the situation there in
those areas where the Army and Navy the days preceding the attack did noth-
were jointly responsible for defense had ing to lessen the demand for an inquiry
foundered on the sharp crags of service and the next day the President appointed
jealousies and rivalries. a 5-man board headed by Supreme
The disaster at Pearl Harbor aroused Court Justice Owen J. Roberts to make
the President to the dangers of divided an official investigation. With the pub-
command. Determined that there should lic explanation that it was acting to
be no repetition of the confusion of re- "avoid a situation where officials charged
sponsibility that had existed in Hawaii, with responsibility for the future security
he ordered his military and naval ad- of the vital base would otherwise at this
visers on the 12th to establish a unified critical hour also be involved in a search-
command in Panama under the Army. ing investigation," the Navy on the 17th
Though some of the naval members of relieved Admiral Kimmel, General
the Joint Board were opposed to the Short, and Maj. Gen. Frederick L.
move, they had no choice but to accept Martin, the air commander. Rear Adm.
it, for, as the minutes recorded, "unless Chester W. Nimitz was jumped two
unified control was effected by joint grades and appointed in Kimmel's
agreement between the Army and Navy, place. Pending his arrival in Hawaii,
the establishment of a Department of Vice Adm. William S. Pye took over
National Defense . . . might be consid- command of the Pacific Fleet and of all
ered a certainty." In Hawaii, the Navy forces in the area under the principles
was given command effective 17 Decem- of unified command. Short's replace-
ber. "For your confidential informa- ment, Lt. Gen. Delos C. Emmons, an air
tion," Marshall explained to the Army 22
Ltr, CofS to CG Hawaiian Dept, 20 Dec 41,
commander in Hawaii, this action had Pearl Harbor Attack Hearings, pt. 15, p. 1483; Mins,
been taken because "the Secretary of JB Mtgs, 13 and 17 Dec 41; Memo, Stark for Mar-
War and the Secretary of the Navy were shall, 17 Dec 41, sub: Unity of Command, WPD
2917-38. Ltr, Emmons to Hoover, 10 Jul 59, OCMH.
determined that there would be no General Emmons recalled that on the morning of 8
question of future confusion as to re- December he and Maj. Gen. Lesley J. McNair called
on Marshall for instructions, and recommended that
unity of command be established immediately in the
21
Ltr, Marshall to Short, 7 Feb 41, WPD4449-1; Pacific. General Marshall told them that he intended
Ltr, Stark to Hoover, 5 Aug 59, OCMH. to take the matter up with the Navy.
ADMIRAL KING GENERAL EMMONS ADMIRAL NIMITZ
force officer, was in San Francisco when resisted these demands, but did agree
he received Marshall's telephone call to with their naval colleagues on the stra-
proceed to Hawaii at once and take com- tegic importance of Hawaii and the need
mand of the Department. He arrived for reinforcements. The question was
on the night of the 16th and the follow- how much of the slender resources then
ing morning relieved General Short. available should be sent and how much
Brig. Gen. Clarence L. Tinker flew out should be allotted to other commands
the same day to take over command of and for civilian defense.
the air forces.23 General Marshall sur- The problem of Hawaii's defenses was
vived this crisis but his naval colleague, thoroughly discussed at the Joint Board
Admiral
2
Stark,
4
wasR ultimately
a replacedd meetings on t 8o and
, Short 9 December.
Marshall, 8 D e c 4 1 Already
, A G 3 8 1 (11-
by Admiral Ernest J. King. the War Department had received Gen-
The safety of the fleet base in Hawaii eral Short's estimates of the equipment,
continued to be the main preoccupation supplies, and troops needed for his com-
of the Navy and the chief subject of demand, and had approved most of his
bate between the Navy and Army plan- requests, including those for 60 heavy
ners during the first weeks of the war. bombers and 100 pursuit craft, 10,000,000
The former believed that all available rounds of .50-caliber ammunition, and
resources should be sent to Oahu imme- a large number of bombs.24 But the Navy
diately. The latter, harassed by calls for did not regard these reinforcements—
protection from civilian agencies and which were scheduled to leave the west
military commanders and fearful of at- coast after 12 December—as adequate.
tacks against the west coast and Panama, It wanted all available antiaircraft artil-
lery and a large force dispatched to Oahu
23
New York Times, December 18, 1941; Memo, immediately, even, Admiral Stark de-
Deputy CofS for TAG, 16 Dec 41, no sub; Tel Conf
of CofS and Emmons, 16 Dec 41, both in OPD Exec
Files. Ltr, Emmons to Hoover, 10 Jul 59, OCMH. 27-41 Sec 1) Far East.
clared, "at the risk of taking a chance on "a very powerful striking force of car-
leaving some installations in the United riers, cruisers and destroyers survives.
States unprotected." So serious was the These forces must be operated boldly and
danger, in Stark's estimation, that he vigorously on the tactical offensive in
advised Kimmel not to use Pearl Harbor order to retrieve our initial disaster." 27
as a base, except for submarines and The Army planners, though they were
patrol craft, until it was reinforced.25 unwilling to reinforce Hawaii to the ex-
The position taken by Stark and his tent desired by their naval colleagues or
naval planners was not an unreasonable by Admiral Kimmel, did not minimize
one. Disaster had followed disaster in the the danger to that outpost. In an esti-
Pacific. The naval base at Cavite in the mate of 10 December, G-2 pointed out
Philippines had been virtually destroyed that the Japanese were striking out "in
and Admiral Hart on the 10th had re- all directions simultaneously" and that
ported that Manila was no longer tenable their next objectives might include
as a naval base and that he was sending major elements of the fleet, installations
the rest of his fleet, except the subma- and factories on the west coast, Alaska,
rines and patrol craft, south, a decision and Panama. Of these the most serious,
which Admiral Stark approved.26 Hard G-2 thought, would be the loss of the
on the heels of this news came word that Panama Canal and of major elements of
the Prince of Wales and Repulse had the fleet. An Army War Plans Division
been sunk. Added to the loss of Ameri- estimate two days later listed five possible
can strength in the Pacific and Far East, lines of Japanese action: continued oper-
these fresh disasters had a profound effect ations in the Philippines and Malaya;
on naval thinking and strategy. attacks against Hawaii, seizure of a base
Oddly enough, the naval commander in the Aleutians; air strikes on the
in Hawaii, Admiral Kimmel, did not Panama Canal; and raids against ship-
share the pessimism of his Washington ping and installations on the west coast.
superiors, though he pressed for rein- To counter these the United States
forcements as vigorously as any and would only be able first, to resist Japa-
yielded to none in his view of the seri- nese attacks in the Philippines with the
ousness of the situation. But he also saw forces already there; second, reinforce
the bright side of the picture. For one Hawaii and defend it against attack, with
thing, the workshops and depots at Pearl the knowledge that "the naval situation
Harbor were still intact. And more im- in the Pacific is such that a successful de-
portant, the three carriers had escaped fense of Hawaii cannot be absolutely
the attack and were available for limited assured"; and, finally, defend Alaska, the
missions. Certainly the strategy for the west coast, and the Panama Canal.28
use of the fleet would have to be changed, The Navy's estimates differed from the
Kimmel told Secretary Knox when he 27
Quoted in Morison, The Rising Sun in the Pa-
visited Hawaii on the 11th, but he added, cific, p. 220. The original of Kimmel's report has
not been found in the Navy's files.
25 28
Mins, JB Mtg, 9 Dec 41; Morison, The Rising Memos, G-2 for GHQ, 10 Dec 41, sub: Brief Esti-
Sun in the Pacific, p. 219. mate of the Situation, WPD 4544—28; Gerow for
26
Rad, CINCAF to OPNAV, 1330, 10 Dec 41; Mins, CofS, 12 Dec 41, sub: Brief Current Strategic Esti-
JB Mtg, 10 Dec 41. mate, WPD 4622-37.
Army's mainly in the emphasis placed on Finally, after a week of discussion, the
Hawaii. Admiral Kimmel had admitted, two Chiefs collaborated on a joint esti-
even while urging boldness, that the mate for the President that reflected
most probable enemy action in his thea- Stark's view of the seriousness of the
ter was a raid by fast striking forces danger, but made allowance for the
against Oahu, Midway, or the Aleutians. needs of other areas and listed the meas-
But Admiral Stark took a more serious ures already taken.31
view. The Japanese, he told Marshall By this time the danger to Hawaii,
on the 11th, had the ships and men to though not ended, was waning. Reports
land on any of the outlying islands in the of enemy landings and imminent attacks
Hawaiian chain, blockade Oahu, or at- had all proved false. In General Short's
tack the west coast, Alaska, and Panama. opinion there was, by 15 December, little
"This picture," he declared, "is not over- danger of a hostile landing; raids, he
drawn. The Hawaiian Islands are in ter- thought, were still possible. His succes-
rible danger of early capture. Every sor, General Emmons, added to Short's
resource of the United States in ships, requests for reinforcements two square
troops, aircraft, and material should be divisions, two antiaircraft regiments, and
considered available for use in this emer- 10,000 service troops. He was given only
gency. . . . "29 He proposed, therefore, one of the divisions, the 27th, and told
that the equivalent of three divisions, as that reinforcements would reach him
many planes as possible, a large naval over an extended period of time, priority
force, and a large amount of supplies— for emergency shipments having already
altogether 100,000 men and 500,000 tons passed to the Southwest Pacific.32 By
of shipping—be dispatched immediately Christmas it was clear that Hawaii was
to Hawaii. And until these reinforce- no longer in immediate danger of inva-
ments arrived, he declared, the Navy sion, a view endorsed by the British plan-
would discontinue the use of Pearl ners who believed that the main Japa-
Harbor
30
29
31
33
Memo, asDec
ABC-4,CofS
CNO
CofS
24 afor
forbase.
and CNO,
41,
CofS,
CNO 12
ann.
11 2Dec
for
Dec 41,
41, sub:
ARCADIA
President, Defense of
sub:Proceedings.
20
TheDec
Dan-
41 nese effort was in Southeast Asia, and
Such grand-scale reinforcement was that, while raids and hit-and-run attacks
impossible, even if the shipping could in the eastern Pacific were still possible,
be found, without abandoning the de- a large amphibious operation in that
fense of other vital points and endanger- area was most unlikely.33
ing the safety of the Atlantic sea lanes.
General Marshall reminded Stark of
these obligations, while admitting the
importance of Hawaii and agreeing to
(?), sub: Dangerous Strategic Situation, WPD 4449-6.
send additional reinforcements to the 32
Rad, Short to Marshall, 15 Dec 41, AG 381 (11-
islands if it could be done without "jeop- 27-41 Sec 1) Far East; memos, WPD for CofS, 23 Dec
ardizing the security of the Panama 41, sub: Hawaiian Defenses, and WPD for TAG, 25
Dec 41, sub: Reinf for Hawaii, both in WPD 3444-
Canal and Continental United States."30 19; Ltr, Emmons to Hoover, 10 Jul 59, OCMH.
For reinforcements to Hawaii during this period, see

gerous Strategic Situation, OPD Exec Files. Leighton and Coakley, Global Logistics and Strategy,
ch. VI, and ABC 381 (11-27-41 Gen) Far East, WPD
Oahu, WPD 4544-29. 3444-14 and 15, 4622-39, and 3674-74.
The Philippines reinforcements designed to make the

islands strong enough to resist invasion.
The shift in focus of interest from Ha- The program was still incomplete when
waii to the western Pacific evidenced by war came and it was evident at once that
the higher priority given Australia and the defense of the islands had become,
the Philippines on 24 December was the as Secretary Stimson wrote, "once more
culmination of a dispute that had begun the desperate and losing struggle which
on the first day of war. The issue had had been forecast in the planning of
been raised by the necessity for deciding earlier years."35
the fate of a convoy of seven ships, es- Though the action of the Joint Board
corted by the cruiser Pensacola and in ordering the Pensacola convoy back
carrying men and munitions to Manila to Hawaii may have been necessary for
via the South Pacific route. The Navy military reasons, it overlooked the moral,
had, on the 8th, ordered the Pensacola psychological, and political considera-
convoy to put in at Suva in the Fijis tions which affected the attitude of
to await further orders, and on the 9th, America toward the Philippines and its
at a meeting of the Joint Board, proposition in the Far East. Though these
posed that the ships be brought back to considerations were not, perhaps, strictly
Hawaii to reinforce that badly battered within the province of the Army and
garrison. The Army members of the Navy planners, their existence and po-
board, notably General Gerow, support- tential importance had been recognized
ed this view and suggested further that in some of the early studies. As late as
a portion of the convoy might be re- December 1940 the two service Secre-
turned to the United States. Following taries and the President had approved a
discussion the board agreed that the Joint Board study that made the point
convoy should be ordered back to that in the event of war with Germany
Hawaii. General Marshall concurred and Japan, the decision to make the
34
without
34
36
35
Stimson
Memo, comment.
and
Mins, JBCNO Bundy,
Mtg,for8 and
CofS,
9 Dec
On 15 Dec
41. Service,
Active In
41, the p.Extract
Incl: 395.was
convoy main effort in the Atlantic initially
This decision of the Joint Board rep- might well be endangered "should Japa-
resented virtually the abandonment of nese success seem imminent." Public
the Philippines. There was ample prec- opinion, the board had suggested then,
edent for such a policy in the prewar might lead to heavy pressure "to support
studies of the planners, approved by the the forces engaged in the Far East instead
Joint Board, demonstrating that the of leaving them to their fate" and result
Philippines could not be held in the face in stronger effort in that area than pro-
of a determined Japanese attack. But vided for in the plans.36
between July and December 1941 there Though no war plans that took into
had been a reversal of that view and the full account the moral and political fac-
inauguration of a large-scale program of tors of the situation in the Far East were
ever made, it was these factors that ulti-
a field artillery brigade, eighteen P-40s, fifty-two mately decided the strategy of the United
A-24's, a large quantity of ammunition and miscel-
laneous equipment, many vehicles and about 5,000
troops. Rad, Marshall to MacArthur, No. 776, 12
Dec 41, WPD 4628. from JB 325, ser. 670, 21 Dec 40, WPD 4561-10.
of a strong policy in the Far East, Mr.

Stimson needed no urging to do all in
his power for the Filipinos and General
MacArthur, and immediately went to
the White House with the problem.
There, where there was a sensitive ap-
preciation for the moral and political
consequences of the Joint Board deci-
sion, he found ready support and a
promise of aid. This assistance took the
form of a request by the President that
the Joint Board reconsider its decision
on the fate of the Pensacola convoy.
Thus, when the Board met that after-
noon, 10 December, it had little choice
but to reverse itself, though the naval
members still felt that there was little
hope of getting the supplies to Mac-
SECRETARY STIMSON confers with General Arthur. The Army members followed
Marshall, January 1942. the lead of their chief and argued that
the vessels should proceed to Brisbane,
States during the opening months of the after which some means would be sought
war. The President, Secretary Stimson, to convoy them northward. Two days
and General Marshall all felt strongly later, the senior Army officer in the con-
with the American people that the voy, Brig. Gen. Julian F. Barnes, was
United States had an obligation to do placed under MacArthur's command
all in its power to aid the Philippine and told that his principal task was to
people
38
Mins, JBand
Mtg,support
10 Dec 41;General MacArthur
Rad, OPNAV to CTF get the men, planes, and munitions in
whatever the risks. Moreover, General the holds of the seven ships to the Phi-
Marshall had already assured MacArthur lippines by any means available and as
that he could expect "every possible quickly as possible.38
assistance," and he was reluctant to tell The news that reinforcements were on
him now, after the Joint Board's deci- the way was received with enthusiasm in
sion, that the Pensacola convoy had been Manila. But Admiral Hart's response to
turned back. He wanted "to send some MacArthur's request for help in bring-
news," he told Stimson on the morning ing the convoy in dampened this enthu-
of the loth, "which would buck General siasm. Like Admirals Stark and Turner,
MacArthur up."37 and like many Army planners as well,
Secretary Stimson was thoroughly in Hart thought the cause of the Philip-
sympathy with the Chief of Staff's views.
A former governor-general of the Philip-
pines and one of the foremost advocates 15, 10 Dec 41, WPD Msg File; Memo, CofS for Comdr
D. H. Harries, Australian Naval Attache, 12 Dec 41,
37
Mins, CofS Conf, 10 Dec 41, WDCSA CofS sub: Msg for Transmission; Rad, Marshall to Mac-
Conf, II. Arthur, No. 776, 12 Dec 41, both in WPD 4628.
pines was a hopeless one. The Japanese, MacArthur not only refused to accept
he believed, would have established a the view that the Philippines were
complete blockade of the Philippines doomed, but warned that "if the sus-
before the convoy could arrive, and he picion of such action ever materializes
could not, he told MacArthur, take the the entire structure will collapse over
responsibility for protecting the convoy my head." What he wanted was a review
if it tried to make the journey between of the accepted strategy in the Pacific
Australia and the Philippines.39 and Far East "lest a fatal mistake be
MacArthur took strong exception to made." To him "the locus of victory or
Hart's view that the convoys could not defeat" lay in the Philippines. If they
be brought in safely, but the admiral and the Indies fell, so would Singapore
found firm support in Washington. The and the Asiatic continent. The defense
Chief of Naval Operations not only of the islands, therefore, justified, in his
agreed with Hart's estimate but urged view, the allocation of the combined
him to leave the Philippines as soon as resources of the Allies to the Pacific.
possible "to support the defense of the "If the Western Pacific is to be saved,"
Netherlands East Indies and Australia." he told the Chief of Staff in language
Foreseeing the loss of Singapore and similar to that used by Admiral Stark
Luzon and unwilling to risk the loss of in describing the plight of Hawaii, "it
its warships in a hopeless cause, the will have to be saved here and now."41
Navy wished to concentrate Allied re- Constantly he urged on the Chief of Staff
sources on the defense of the Malay a bold course of action against an over-
Barrier and northwest Australia. The extended enemy. On the 10th, asserting
artillery and ammunition earmarked for that there existed a "golden opportunity
MacArthur, it proposed, should be . . . for a master stroke," he suggested
retained in Australia and used for the a strong carrier-based air attack against
defense of Darwin. The Army planners the Japanese home islands which, he
did
41
42
39
40
Rad,not
Rads,
Rad, differ
MacArthur
MacArthur
MacArthur
Milid with
to
to the No.
Marshall,
Marshall,
Marshall,
Melbourne to WD, naval
13and
13
No. 198,10
Dec14
40, estimate
1841,
Dec
DecOPD
41, declared, would "at once relieve pres-
of the probable loss of the Philippines sure from objectives of Japanese drive
or of the importance of the Malay Bar- to southward" for Japan itself was
rier, but they did oppose any effort to weakly defended. "Definite information
divert aid from MacArthur. And so did available here," he added significantly,
naval officers in Australia, who asserted "shows that entry of Russia is enemy's
their belief that the Pensacola convoy greatest fear." A few days later he ad-
could still reach the Philippines, vanced the idea that aircraft carriers be
provided that there was "adequate used to bring in 300 pursuit planes,
cooperation" between the Army and a proposal the Navy vigorously and
Navy.40 successfully opposed.42
OPD Exec Files; CNO to CINCAF, 1958, 10 Dec 41, Exec Files.
WPD 4622-30.
WPD 4544-26; 14 Dec 41, OPD Exec Files; memo,
WPD 4622-38; CNO to CINCAF, 14 Dec 41, copy in CNO for CofS, 23 Dec 41, sub: Transportation of
AG 381 (11-27-41 Gen) Far East; MacArthur to Short Range Aircraft, AG 381 (11-27-41 Gen) Far
Marshall, 14 Dec 41, OPD Exec Files. East.
Additional weight was given Mac- MacArthur, "and there has been and
Arthur's pleas by the arguments of will be no repeat no wavering in the
Francis B. Sayre, High Commissioner determination to support you."45
for the Philippines. Stressing the moral This pledge was no empty promise.
and political aspects of the Philippine Marshall was doing everything possible
campaign and the importance of that to give MacArthur what he needed and
campaign to America's position in the had only the day before assigned the
Far East, he urged the President to send newly arrived deputy chief of the War
MacArthur the reinforcements and sup- Plans Division, Brig. Gen. Dwight D.
plies he had requested. Rumors that Eisenhower, the task of co-ordinating
the United States was leaving the Fili- and directing this program of reinforce-
pinos to their fate were circulating in ment. Like Stimson and Marshall,
Manila, Sayre told Mr. Roosevelt, and Eisenhower believed that it was neces-
if reinforcements did not arrive soon the sary to make every effort to reinforce
Filipinos might abandon all resistance the Philippines, even if the hope of suc-
and submit passively to the Japanese.43 cess was slim. The program would have
MacArthur's and Sayre's requests were to be based on Australia, he believed,
received sympathetically in Washington, and work should begin at once to con-
where they brought immediate results. struct military bases there from which
The President had already ordered the to send supplies and men northward.
Army and Navy to make every effort "We must take great risks," he wrote,
to aid the Philippine garrison, but the "and spend any amount of money
latter was noticeably lacking in enthu- required."46
siasm for the program. This reluctance Eisenhower's plan, which Marshall
Roosevelt sought to overcome by calling quickly approved, was to use the forces
in Acting Secretary of the Navy, James in the Pensacola convoy, due in Bris-
V. Forrestal, and telling him that "he bane on the 22d, as the nucleus of the
was
46
44
bound
Stimson
General and to help
Bundy,
Dwight the
ActivePhilippines
D.OnEisenhower,
Service, p. 396.and
Crusade in new command. Designated U.S. Army
the Navy has got to help in it."44 To Forces in Australia (USAFIA), this com-
Sayre the President sent reassurances mand would be essentially an air and
that he was keeping directly in touch supply base. General Barnes, when he
with the situation in the Far East. At arrived in Brisbane, was to be relieved
the same time Marshall sent a separate as commander of the forces in the con-
message to MacArthur explaining that voy by an air officer from the Philippines.
the problem of getting supplies to him Eventually, Maj. Gen. George H. Brett,
had been "complicated by Naval losses," then in Chungking, would take over
but that reinforcements were being command of USAFIA, with Col. Stephen
"rushed" to the Philippines. "The stra-
tegic importance of the Philippines is
fully recognized," the Chief of Staff told 45
Rads, Marshall to MacArthur, No. 787, 15 Dec
41; President to Sayre, 15 Dec 41, both in WPD
4622-38.
43
Rad, Sayre to President, No. 628, 15 Dec 41, WPD
4622-38. Europe (New York: Doubleday and Company, 1948),
p. 18.
J. Chamberlin, later to become Mac- between Australia and the Philippines.49

Arthur's G-3, as chief of staff.47 The pri- These measures added up to an impres-
mary task of the Australian command sive program of reinforcement and rep-
would be the support of the Philippines resented considerable staff work in
and for this purpose its commander Washington, but to MacArthur in the
would take his instructions from Gen- Philippines it was only a paper program.
eral MacArthur. In addition, the Until the aircraft and supplies reached
USAFIA commander was to arrange for him, he and his men could find little
the flight of the planes in the Pensacola consolation in such summaries.
convoy northward, loaded with all the On 22 December, the same day that
ammunition they could carry, and to the bulk of the Japanese 14th Army
co-operate with the Navy in securing landed at Lingayen Gulf, the Pensacola
the sea lanes. Any course that would convoy with its valuable cargo of air-
achieve these results, the Chief of Staff craft, artillery, and ammunition arrived
directed, was authorized.48 in Brisbane. Already General Mac-
General MacArthur was kept fully in- Arthur had instructed the USAFIA com-
formed of these developments and on the mander to send the convoy (less the
18th Marshall undertook to summarize aircraft, which were to be unloaded,
for him the measures being taken to send assembled, and flown north) to the Phil-
him help. Two transports, he told him, ippines, and the Joint Board had pro-
were to be loaded with aircraft and am- vided for co-ordination between the
munition and dispatched shortly from Army and Navy forces in the area. This
San Francisco. Two additional ship- co-ordination it hoped to achieve by
ments were scheduled to reach Brisbane directing General Brett and Rear Adm.
early in January and would give that William A. Glassford, Hart's representa-
base 230 aircraft. Via the South Atlan- tive, to meet "for the purpose of agree-
tic-Africa route, two Pan American clip- ing upon common action" to transport
pers
49
47
Rad, loaded
Memo, Marshall
WPD forwith 50-caliber
to CofS,
MacArthur,
17 DecNo. ammunition
41,824,
sub:18Plan
Dec for
41, the supplies MacArthur needed, and, in
were heading for Australia. Fifteen co-operation with the Australians, estab-
heavy bombers were being diverted from lish a base at Darwin and defend north-
their original destinations and ordered west Australia.50 Marshall had done all
to the Southwest Pacific on a flight sched- he could to assure the transshipment of
ule which would see the arrival of three the convoy to the Philippines, and, on
planes a day between Christmas and the the day the convoy reached its destina-
New Year. Finally, Marshall said, the tion, once again reminded the Army
War Department was making available commanders in Australia to spare nei-
to the USAFIA commander the sum of ther effort nor expense to accomplish
$10,000,000 to finance blockade-runners their task. At the same time, the Navy
instructed its representatives in Austra-
Australian Base, WPD 4628-1.

48
Ltr, Maj Gen Richard C. Moore to Brett, 19 Dec WPD 4622-28.
50
41, OCS 18136-161; Rad, Marshall to MilAttaché Rad, Marshall to Brett, 21 Dec 41, WPD 4622-38;
Melbourne for Brett, No. 31, 17 Dec 41, WPD 4628-1. JB 325, ser. 783.
lia to assist in every way and Admiral that of Borneo will determine what can
Stark asked Hart, who was to leave be done at any moment. . . ."52
Manila shortly, to impress on the Aus- Though there was no relaxation in
tralians the importance of keeping open the determination to reinforce the Phil-
the Torres Strait route for supplies to ippines, it was evident by the last week
Darwin and the Philippines.51 in December that these efforts had but
Despite these elaborate preparations slight chance of success and that the men
and the efforts of the small group of and supplies in and en route to Austra-
officers in Australia, none of the planes, lia might be available for another cause.
men, or munitions of the Pensacola con- The President wanted them to be used
voy ever reached the Philippines. When "in whatever manner might best serve
the planes were assembled it was discov- the joint cause in the Far East"; the
ered that they lacked vital parts needed British wanted them for Singapore, and
in combat. Before the missing parts the Navy pushed for the establishment
could be found or shipped from the of a strong base at Darwin. The Army
United States, the fields on which the planners, who were reluctantly coming
planes would base had fallen to the to share the pessimism of their naval col-
enemy. The field artillery brigade, to- leagues about the fate of the Philippines,
gether with other reinforcements and limited their plans to the development
supplies from the convoy, left Brisbane of a strong air base in Australia from
on the 28th on two fast ships. By the which to project air operations forward
time the ships got to Darwin the Japa- for the defense of Singapore and the
nese had already established themselves Malay Barrier.53 It was to this problem
in Borneo athwart the line of commu- that the American planners in Washing-
nication northward and the convoy was ton and their British allies turned their
halted. "It now appears," General Mar- attention during the weeks that followed.
shall wrote the Far East commander,
"that
51
52
53
Rad,
Notes the
on plans
Rads,Marshall
Marshall
White for
toHouse reaching
toMacArthur,
Mil Mtg,
Attaché
24879, you
Melbourne,
Dec 24 Dec.
41, OPDquickly
41,Exec
AG
No.
381 (11-27-41 Gen) Far East; Morton, The Fall of
with pursuit plane support are jeopar- the Philippines, p. 154.
dized. Your day to day situation and
Files; Ltr, Marshall to Lt Gen H. C. B. Wemyss, Brit-
ish Mission, 24 Dec 41, AG 381 (11-27-41 Gen) Far
36, 22 Dec 41, WPD 4630-2; OPNAV to CINCAF, East; Rad, Marshall to Mil Att Melbourne, No. 41,
2302, 22 Dec 41, Office of Naval Records. 25 Dec 41, WPD 4628-3.
CHAPTER VII
The Malay Barrier

Defensive warfare, therefore, does not consist of waiting idly for things
to happen.
CLAUSEWITZ, Principles of War
Though the program to reinforce the ance on the eastern front would be dis-
Philippines and establish an American astrous to the Allied cause. But it was
base in Australia developed almost acci- undeniable, he pointed out, that a So-
dentally from the improvisations of the viet attack against Japan would improve
first day of the war, it clearly foreshad-
America's position in the Pacific. The
owed the direction of American strategy fact that Japan had not attacked the
in the Pacific. But no clear statement Maritime Provinces seemed to him sig-
nificant. "If immediate fighting in the
of this strategy, let alone specific plans
to put it into effect, existed when the Manchukuo front is disadvantageous to
program was adopted. Before either Japan," Marshall declared, "it is, for
could be developed it would be neces- that reason, immediately advantageous
sary to correlate American and Allied to us."1
strategy in the Pacific and to develop But participation by the Soviet Union
a program of action against the common in the war against Japan was not the
enemy. only way that nation could aid the Allied
cause in the Far East. In the Maritime
Allied Strategy Provinces were bases that lay within
bombing distance of the industrial heart
When General MacArthur told Mar- of Japan. In the hands of American
shall on 10 December that what Japan forces, these bases would constitute a
feared most was Soviet entry into the formidable threat to the Japanese enemy.
war, he emphasized a fact well under- The possibility that the Soviet Union
stood in Washington. That did not would allow the United States to base
mean, however, that military authorities its forces in the Maritime Provinces was
were unanimously in favor of Soviet par- a specter that haunted the Japanese and
ticipation. Admiral Stark, for example, was always a factor in their planning.
seriously questioned the advisability of The Americans had considered this pos-
such a move because of the effect it sibility in their prewar plans and esti-
would have on the war in Europe. 1
Memos, Gerow for Marshall, 17 Dec 41, sub:
General Marshall agreed fully that any Memo for President (not used); Stark for President,
move that would weaken Soviet resist- 3 Dec 41, no sub, both in WPD 4557.
THE MALAY BARRIER 155
mates, and had sought to make the or troops in the event of war with Japan.
necessary arrangements with the Soviet The first suggestion that China become
Union. These efforts had been unsuccess- an active partner in such a war came
ful, but as late as November 1941, Gen- from Chiang who, when he heard of
eral Marshall was still optimistic and
the Pearl Harbor attack, summoned the
confided to a group of newsmen that American and Soviet ambassadors and
"arrangements are being made to pro- told them of his hopes for a military
vide landing fields for flying fortresses alliance of all the anti-Axis nations un-
in Vladivostok" and that the Philippine- der American leadership. This thought
based B-17's would shuttle between the Ambassadors passed on to their gov-
Clark Field and Vladivostok in the event ernments, but it was not until the11th
of war, dropping their bombs en route that the Generalissimo formally proposed
on the "paper cities of Japan."2 such an alliance, as well as the prepa-
The Pearl Harbor attack gave impetus ration of comprehensive plans for con-
to the efforts to complete arrangements certed action against Japan and the
with the Soviet Union for American use formation of a military mission headed
of the Maritime Provinces. On the day by an American, with headquarters at
after the attack Secretary Hull sounded Chungking.4
out Maxim Litvinov, the Soviet Am- In Washington, the desirability of
bassador, on this question and Marshall international military collaboration was
raised it in military conference. But fully recognized and plans for a meeting
Litvinov, on instructions from his gov- were already being made. Chiang's sug-
ernment, quickly put an end to such gestions, therefore, though they were not
hopes. To the President, during a visit entirely in accord with American views,
to the White House, and to Mr. Hull were readily accepted by Roosevelt, but
later, he made it perfectly clear that the with the proviso that several conferences,
USSR would have to maintain a neu- not one, be held to co-ordinate the efforts
tral position in the Far East. His coun- of the Allies. All together there would
try, Litvinov explained, was too heavily be three: one in Chungking, one in Sin-
committed in the war against Germany gapore, and one in Moscow, and invi-
and "could not risk an attack by tations went out immediately. Chiang
Japan."3 quickly agreed, as did the British, who
Stalin's reluctance to engage in dis- were scheduled to meet separately with
cussions dealing with the Far East was the Americans in Washington later in
in marked contrast to Chiang Kai-shek's the month. But Stalin asked that his
eagerness for concerted action. China country not be pressed into any action
had not been included in the prewar against Japan, and Roosevelt's invitation
discussions of strategy and no plans had
4
been made for the use of Chinese bases Telg. U.S. Ambassador, Chungking, 8 Dec 41,
WPD 4389-42; Memo, Laughlin Currie for Pres, 11
2
Notes on Mtg of newspaper correspondents with Dec 41, WPD 4389-46; Rad, Magruder to Secy War,
Gen Marshall, 15 Nov 41. The notes were made by No. 95, 11 Dec 41, WPD Msg File. For full story of
the correspondents, one of whom supplied the author this incident, see Charles F. Romanus and Riley Sun-
with his copy. derland, Stilwell's Mission to China, UNITED
3
Hull, Memoirs, II, 1111; Mins, CofS Mtg, 10 Dec STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II (Washing-
41, WDCSA Conf II. ton, 1953), ch. II.
for a meeting in Moscow trailed off in ners in Asia. After considerable discus-
a series of inconclusive messages.5 sion, a plan that placed control in
Preparations for the other two meet- Washington and called for only limited
ings, to be held concurrently and to operations in Asia was evolved by the
consider ways to halt the Japanese, were delegates and sent to Washington. The
quickly completed. Representing the Generalissimo thought it unsatisfactory
United States at Chungking would be and sent his own. Neither contained any
Generals Brett, then in India, and concrete suggestions on command or lo-
Magruder, head of the mission to China. gistics, two problems that would plague
Lt. Col. Francis G. Brink, military ob- the Allies in China for the next three
server in Singapore and an old hand in years. The conference ended on the 23d,
the Far East, would attend the meeting having produced, one of the planners
there. The results of these conferences, wrote, "very little in the way of concrete
Roosevelt stipulated, were to be for- results."6
warded to Washington by 20 December The Singapore Conference (18-20
so that they could be used in the forth- December), though it produced no plan
coming meeting with Churchill and the to halt the Japanese drive, was more
British Chiefs of Staff, scheduled for 22 fruitful, for from it came the first con-
December. crete proposal for an Allied command
When the Chungking Conference con- in the Southwest Pacific. Colonel Brink's
vened on 17 December neither Lt. Gen. instructions were to present MacArthur's
Sir Archibald Wavell, the British dele- views on Far East strategy, which Gen-
gate, nor Brett was present. Nevertheless eral Marshall summarized for him as
the Generalissimo took the opportunity follows:
to present his plans for the formation of American, Australian, and Dutch air and
an Allied general staff at Chungking, naval forces should cooperate to keep open
and for the prosecution of the war line of communications from Australia to
against
5
Japan.to Chiang,
Rads, Roosevelt On the1222d,
and 14 Brett,
Dec 41; who
to Philippines. Successful defense of Philip-
had just received orders to go to Aus- pines considered essential to maintenance
tralia and take command of U.S. Army of Allied defensive structure in the Western
Pacific. Plans for immediate Philippine
forces there, arrived with Wavell and reinforcement definitely dependent for
the conversations with the Chinese be- success upon establishment of air traffic
gan in earnest. Brett's instructions from between Philippines and bases south. Every
Washington were to join with the others effort should be made to supplement air
in seeking ways to take advantage of supply by reestablishment of limited sea
Japan's "present over-extension"—Mac- communications between Australia and
Philippines.
Arthur's thesis—and to reassure the Chi-
nese that the United States was not These views, Marshall added "are gener-
abandoning the Philippines or its part- ally concurred in by the President." At
the same time he informed MacArthur
6
Stalin, 13 Dec 41; Stimson to Magruder, 13 Dec 41; Romanus and Sunderland, Stilwell's Mission to
Stalin to Chiang, 12 Dec 41, OPD Exec Files; Roma- China, p. 57; Rads, Marshall to Brett, No. 71, 15 Dec
nus and Sunderland, Stilwell's Mission to China, pp. 41, and Brett to Marshall, 27 Dec 41, WPD 4389-54
50-52. and 58, and other related papers in this file.
of the forthcoming meetings and of his The most important result of the
instructions to the American delegates, Singapore meeting was the proposal
adding the suggestion that he correspond made by Brink for a unified command.
directly with them "if practicable from The conference, he told the Chief of
the viewpoint of secrecy."7 Staff, "clearly indicated the need for one
With these instructions and with the supreme head over a combined allied
additional statement from MacArthur staff" to co-ordinate the efforts of the
and Hart, couched in MacArthurian American, British, Australian, and
language, that "the Far East area is now Dutch forces in the area and to make
the dominant locus of the war," Colonel plans for the future. The "unofficial
Brink presented to the Singapore con- opinions" of the conferees, he added,
ferees the American view of the impor- indicated that the appointment of an
tance of the Philippines and the necessity American familiar with the Pacific area
for keeping open the lines of communi- to this post "would not only be accept-
cation. But the British view of the able but desirable." If such an appoint-
importance of Singapore predominated. ment were made and a headquarters
The report of the conferees, therefore, established, Brink suggested that it be
while it called for large reinforcements located in Java. But he did not fail to
to the Southwest Pacific and adopted all point out that the majority of the dele-
of MacArthur's suggestions for the pro- gates believed the major base of Allied
tection of the air and sea lanes between operations in the Southwest Pacific
Malaya and the Philippines, gave second should be in Australia, with an advance
place to the defense of the Philippines. base in the Indies.9
Japanese conquest of Singapore, the con- Brink's suggestion was quickly picked
ferees thought, would be a disaster of up in Washington. In the Army War
the first order. Not only would it make Plans Division, where it went first for
certain the loss of the Netherlands comment, the idea of a unified com-
Indies with is vast resources in oil and mand in the Far East was described as
rubber, but it would also place the "an absolute essential for the successful
enemy in position to isolate Australia prosecution of the war effort in this
and New Zealand and to separate the theater," and a matter that ought to be
British and American fleets in the Far discussed with the British. Action in
East. The importance of the Philippines the division ended with the note, "This
was limited, in the report of the Singa- matter is being considered by the Chief
pore Conference, to its use "as an of Staff. It has been discussed at the
advanced and flanking base for offen- White House."10
sive action against Japanese lines of
communication." 8
Chairman of the Conf, no addressee, 20 Dec 41,
WPD 4402-137.
shall to MacArthur, same date, both in WPD 4544- 179; comments by Brink on Singapore Conf, attached
31.987 to Rpt of Conf, WPD 4544-31.
10
Rads,
Rad,
Rad, Brink
Brink
Marshall
to
to Marshall,
Marshall,
to Brink, No.
21
21 Dec
Dec
59, 15
41,
41,Dec
OCS
OCS41;18136-
18136-
Mar- Memo, Maj Elmer J. Rogers, Jr., for ACofS WPD,
179; Ltr, Brink to Marshall, 25 Dec 41, sub: Singa- 22 Dec 41, sub: Rpt of Singapore Conf, WPD
pore Conf, WPD 4544-31; Rad, Duff Cooper, British 4544-31;
By the time the reports of the Singa- put before them. The British, too,
pore and Chungking Conferences sought the early defeat of the enemy,
reached the War Department, Churchill but they differed with the Americans
and his Chiefs of Staff had arrived in on how to do it. Further, their national
Washington for the first of the many interests encompassed the security and
wartime conferences which marked the future of a far-flung empire with its
most successful military alliance in the long lines of communication. Their
history of warfare. This meeting, which task was more complex than that of the
lasted from 22 December 1941 to 14 Americans and their path to victory
January 1942 and is known by the code more circuitous. For them, the Middle
name ARCADIA, was in many respects the East, Singapore, Malaya, Australia, India
most important of the conferences held —all held an importance the Americans
during the war. It established an organ- could not grant on purely military
ization for the conduct of coalition war- grounds. The British pressed hard for
fare that survived all the stresses and the allocation of Allied resources to the
strains of conflicting national interests; defense of these positions, not only at
reaffirmed the basic decision to make the ARCADIA but at the conferences that fol-
major effort in Europe at a time when lowed, while the Americans pushed sin-
the American people had not yet recov- gle-mindedly for those operations that
ered from the shock of Pearl Harbor would bring about the defeat of the
and when disaster threatened in the enemy. But determination to agree and
Pacific and Asia; established the first good will on both sides overcame all
Allied command of the war; and laid differences.
down a broad program for the future About one thing, the major objective
as well as a plan for immediate action.11 of Allied strategy, there was no disagree-
The divergence between British and ment. The principals subscribed to a
American views, which had been plainly basic statement of war aims that served
evident at the ABC meetings early in as the strategic objective for the year
1941, was again apparent at the ARCADIA 1942 and the basis for the division of
conference. The Americans believed the resources of the two nations. "Much
that their national interests would best has happened since February last," the
be served and the security of the United conferees noted, "but notwithstanding
States best assured by the early defeat the entry of Japan into the War, our
of Germany and Japan. This objective view remains that Germany is still the
they put ahead of all others and made prime enemy and her defeat is the key
the measuring rod for every problem to victory. Once Germany is defeated the
collapse of Italy and the defeat of Japan
must follow."12 It was agreed therefore,
bound separately and, with the records of the confer- as "a cardinal principle" of American
ence, are filed in ABC 337, ARCADIA. For accounts of
the work of the conference, see Matloff and Snell, and British strategy, "that only the
Strategic Planning, 1941-42, ch. V: Hayes, The War minimum of force necessary for the safe-
Against Japan, ch. I, pp. 45-72; Winston S. Churchill,
11
guarding of vital interests in other thea-
The The minutes
Grand of the
Alliance (Boston: Houghton
ARCADIA Mifflin
conference are
12
Company, 1950), chs. 15-17; Sherwood, Roosevelt ABC-4/CS1, 31 Dec 41. The original British ver-
and Hopkins, ch. XX. sion of the final phrase reads "must speedily follow."
ters should be diverted from operations assigned each of the vital positions still
against Germany." in Allied hands but defended by a vari-
In terms of the existing situation, this ety of national forces and independent
"cardinal principle" meant that the pro- commanders. Both sides were appar-
duction of armaments would have to be ently reluctant to enter into detailed
stepped up; that essential positions would discussions of this subject, but they
have to be defended; that the vital lines agreed that the planners should study
of communication would have to be the question of the disposition of the
held; and that, by a combination of forces in and en route to the Southwest
bombing, blockade, and propaganda, Pacific. This study, the Chiefs stipu-
German resistance would have to be lated, should be based on three alterna-
reduced so that the Allies could land tive assumptions; first, that the Allies
on the Continent in 1943. But the prin- would hold both the Philippines and
ciple of minimum force in the Pacific Singapore; second, that they would hold
was one that could be interpreted vari- Singapore and the Netherlands Indies
ously and usually was, depending on the but lose the Philippines; and third, that
situation. There were always those who they would lose Singapore and the
could justify additional forces for the Philippines.
Pacific on the ground that they were The planners went to work on the
required to safeguard vital interests problem immediately and quickly pro-
there. This was the Navy's position, duced a report the Chiefs approved on
argued forcefully and consistently by the last day of the year. Recognizing
Admiral King. that the forces then in the area could
In the Pacific and Far East, the Ameri- not hold the positions prescribed and
cans and the British Chiefs of Staff that immediate reinforcements would
agreed, it would be necessary to main- have to be provided, the planners framed
tain the security of Australia, New Zea- the following statement of Allied aims:
land, and India; to support China; and 1. Hold the Malay Barrier, that is the
to gain "points of vantage" from which Malay Peninsula, Sumatra, Java, and the
an offensive against Japan could "even- islands stretching eastward to northwest
tually be developed." These were long- Australia, "as the basic defensive posi-
range objectives; the "immediate object" tion"; and Burma and Australia "as
was to hold Hawaii, Alaska, Singapore, essential supporting positions."
the Malay Barrier, the Philippines, 2. Re-establish communications with
Rangoon, and the route to China. the Philippines and support the garri-
As a general statement of strategy, the son there, while maintaining communi-
objectives outlined by the U.S. and Brit- cations to Burma and Australia and
ish Chiefs of Staff had little relevance within the Far East area.
to the immediate emergency in the Far Appended to the report were lists of
East where the Japanese were advancing the forces already in the theater and
rapidly on every front. What was needed scheduled to arrive by 1 February. These
was agreement on the apportionment of the planners recommended be deployed
the resources of both nations to that "as now arranged," if the Philippines
area, and, specifically, the amount to be and Singapore held. If they did not, the
reinforcements should be used to defend he said, "has a distinct advantage over

the Malay Barrier, Burma, and Australia, a man with brilliant judgment who must
with American troops being used on the rely on cooperation." But the consensus
east side of the barrier (Australia), Brit- of the meeting was not in Marshall's
ish and Commonwealth forces on the favor and the subject was dropped after
west (Burma and India). Should the polite comment.14
Philippines alone fall to the Japanese— The next day Mr. Roosevelt, appar-
an admission the Americans were not ently after discussion with Marshall and
yet willing to make to the British who King, raised the question of a unified
firmly believed that Singapore would command in the Far East at a White
hold—then U.S. reinforcements would House meeting with Churchill and
be employed along the barrier and the others. The Prime Minister, like his
lines of communication to the east.13 military advisers, did not favor the idea
By the time this study was approved, and there the matter rested for the
the Chiefs of Staff had already decided moment. But neither the President nor
to set up a unified American command General Marshall abandoned their fight
in the Far East. The dangers and dis- and both privately did their utmost to
advantages of command by co-operation change Churchill's mind.15 In this they
had been made abundantly clear by the were successful so far as the principle of
disaster at Pearl Harbor, and Marshall unified command was concerned but
felt very strongly that unity of command agreement on the officer who would
was perhaps even more important than exercise such a command and the limits
the allocation of resources or the assign- of his authority was not so easily reached.
ment of troops. On the 25th, after he Oddly enough, the British wanted an
had Brink's report on the Singapore American and the Americans favored
Conference, he raised the problem with a British officer, specifically General
his American and British colleagues. Wavell, then Commander-in-chief,
"The matters being settled here," he India, for the post. Finally on 28 Decem-
told them, "are mere details which will ber, Churchill agreed to the American
continuously reoccur unless settled in a proposal and Wavell was alerted to his
broader way. ... I am convinced that coming appointment. It was decided
there must be one man in command of also that Wavell, when he assumed com-
the entire theater. ... If we make a mand, would report to the Combined
plan for unified command now, it will Chiefs of Staff, then being established,
solve nine-tenths of our troubles." With- and that his headquarters would be
out minimizing the difficulties of estab- located in Java.
lishing such a command over the forces Meanwhile U.S. Army planners had
of four nations, Marshall believed that been working on a directive designed
it could be done and was willing "to go
the limit" to achieve it. "A man with Eisenhower, 28 Dec 41, sub: Notes of Chiefs of Staff
good judgment and unity of command," Conf, 25 Dec 41, WPD 4639.
14
15
13
Mins,
Gerow,ARCADIA
Notes
ABC-4/3, Mtg,
on
31 Dec 25 JPC
White
41; Dec 41;
House
Rpt,Memo
Conf, for
28 Dec Filesub:
26 41,
Dec by
41, OPD Exec Files; Mins of White House Conf, 26 Dec
Supporting Measures for SWP, ABC-4/3; Rad, Mar- 41, WDSCA Conf I; Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hop-
shall to MacArthur, 1 Jan 42, WPD 4639. kins, p. 457.
primarily to show whether one could be omission from the discussions in Wash-
drawn "which would leave the Supreme ington and their lack of representation
Commander with enough power to im- in the Combined Chiefs of Staff, accepted
prove the situation and still not give the terms of the directive and permitted
him power to destroy national interests their troops in the ABDA area to become
or to exploit one theater without due a part of Wavell's command. USAFIA
consideration to another."16 The task (U.S. Army Forces in Australia), how-
was a difficult one and the results were ever, was not included in the new com-
not entirely satisfactory, the British mand on the ground that its primary
Chiefs objecting on the ground that the responsibility was to MacArthur and its
limitations placed on the commander main task to support the defense of the
were too heavy. It was sent to the Allied Philippines. Soon after Wavell assumed
planners, therefore, for further study command, when it became apparent that
and a revised draft was prepared. This only limited aid could be sent to the
one, with slight modifications, proved Philippines, the mission of USAFIA was
acceptable and was finally approved, broadened to include the support of
though with some reluctance, by all the operations in the ABDA area. And the
governments involved on 10 January northwest portion of Australia was also
1942.17 added to ABDACOM at General Wavell's
The new command Wavell was to request.19
head was to be known as ABDACOM, The staff of the new command, it was
for the initials of the national forces understood, would represent all the
involved (American, British, Dutch, and nations concerned. The American and
Australian) and included Burma, British Chiefs of Staff did not attempt
Malaya, the Netherlands Indies, and the to name Wavell's staff, but they did seek
Philippines. The inclusion of the Phil- to guard against the preponderance of
ippines in Wavell's command was a one nationality in his headquarters.
formal gesture and one Wavell himself Thus, they stipulated that his deputy
wished to avoid.18 Significantly, neither and the commander of the naval forces
China nor Australia was included in would be Americans, and that a British
the ABDA area. (Map 2) As much for officer would command the air forces
political as military reasons the former and a Dutch officer the ground forces.
was organized as a separate theater The problem of protecting the inter-
commanded by Chiang Kai-shek, but ests of each nation represented in
independent of Allied control. The Aus- ABDACOM without unduly restricting
tralians, though they protested their the commander was resolved by limit-
16
Mins, ARCADIA, 27 Dec 41. ing Wavell's authority to the "effective
17
ABC-4/5, Directive to Supreme Comdr in ABDA coordination of forces." He was given
Area, 10 Jan 42. An earlier version of the directive command of all forces "afloat, ashore,
can be found in the 30 December meeting of the
conference, and the directive actually issued to
Wavell is dated 2 January, the day after the Presi-
dent and Prime Minister approved it. China, pp. 61-63; Rads, Marshall to Barnes, Nos. 206
18
19
Romanus and to
Rad, Marshall Sunderland,
MacArthur, No. 930,Mission
Stilwell's 12 Jan 42,
to and 223, 27 and 30 Jan 42, both in WPD 4628-25;
WPD 4639-14. For additional papers on this subject, CCS 8, 24 Jan 42, sub: Inclusion of Darwin in ABDA,
see WPD 4639-19. ABC 323.31 POA (1-29-42).
and in the air," but was permitted to motivated by an understandable reluc-

exercise that control only through sub- tance in Washington to dedicate a com
ordinate commanders whom he could mand to defensive action, but there was
not relieve and who had the right to a clear realization that the forces in the
appeal to their governments if they con- theater were then and for some time
sidered their orders and national inter- would be hard pressed even to hold
ests to be in conflict. Though he could their own. And even as these instruc-
assign missions to his forces, form task tions were being written the enemy was
forces for specific operations, and appoint moving swiftly and in force toward those
their commanders, he was prohibited "key positions" Wavell was to hold.
from altering the tactical organization Having established the ABDA area
of the national forces in his command, and appointed General Wavell its com-
using their supplies, or controlling their mander, the American and British staffs
communications with the home govern- in Washington had still to settle the
ment. And in matters of logistics and problem of reinforcements to the South-
administration he could exercise only west Pacific, for it was obvious with
the most general control. each passing day that the situation there
The severe limitations placed on Gen- was rapidly worsening. This problem
eral Wavell's authority were in marked brought the assembled planners up
contrast to the heavy responsibilities laid against the hard fact, which was to
upon him by the chiefs in Washington. plague them throughout the war, that
Not only was he given the task of main- there were not enough ships to do all
taining "as many key positions as possi- the jobs required. They had earlier in
ble" under the strategic objectives the conference agreed that American
already outlined (that is, to hold the troops would be sent to Iceland and
Malay Barrier, Burma, and Australia), northern Ireland, and that landings
a formidable enough undertaking in might be made in North Africa later in
itself, but he was also enjoined "to take the year. The shipping requirements
the offensive at the earliest opportunity for these operations alone were so great
and ultimately to conduct an allout that the North Atlantic sailings were
offensive against Japan." "The first approved only on the understanding
essential," the Chiefs told him, "is to that they would be discontinued "if
gain general air superiority at the earli- other considerations intervened."21 The
est possible moment." With the lesson necessity for speeding up the schedule of
of the first Japanese successes still fresh reinforcements to the Southwest Pacific
in mind, they cautioned Wavell against created an additional and immediate
dispersing his air forces or using them in demand for the ships already allocated
piecemeal fashion.20 to the North Atlantic projects and led to
These instructions, with their empha- a re-examination of the entire shipping
sis on offensive operations, were probably shortage.
The debate over Atlantic versus Pa-
20
2
ABC-4/5, Directive for the Supreme Com-
1
cific priority on shipping was precipi-
mander, 2 Jan 42. A copy is printed in General Notes on White House Mtg, 1 Jan 42, WDCSA
Wavell's account entitled "ABDACOM," app. A,
copy in OCMH. 334 Mtgs and Confs.
tated by Admiral Stark, who, on 11 submitted before the meeting was an

January, a day after General Wavell item calling for the establishment of
arrived in Batavia but before he assumed "joint machinery" for collaboration.
command, reviewed the critical situation Just what the British had in mind was
in the Far East and raised the question not clear, but in preparation for the
of diverting ships from the less critical coming discussion the Americans studied
North Atlantic route to the Pacific. In the matter and decided they would seek
this he had the support of General Mar- as their solution to the problem of col-
shall and Admiral King, but the British, laboration the establishment of a Su-
in the belief that Singapore would hold preme Allied War Council, patterned
and anxious for the Americans to re- on the World War I model, and of two
lieve then in Iceland and Ireland, sought committees to support the council—a
other ways to find the ships. The matter Military Joint Planning Committee and
was finally referred to the shipping ex- a Joint Supply Committe.23
perts who reported the next day that by The idea of a Supreme Allied War
delaying the North Atlantic sailings one Council came up early in the confer-
month, which would have the effect also ence. It quickly became apparent that
of delaying the proposed North African the World War I model would hardly
operation, and by reducing lend-lease meet the requirements of a global war,
shipments to the Soviet Union, it would and action was deferred until the more
be possible to send aircraft, gasoline, ar- urgent problems were disposed of. Fi-
tillery, and about 22,000 men across the nally, on the 13th, the British returned
Pacific on 20 January and an additional to the subject of the organization of the
23,300 British troops shortly after. The alliance. By this time the ABDA com-
Chiefs accepted this solution, as did the mand had been created and Admiral Sir
President and Prime Minister when Mr. Dudley Pound suggested that the same
Hopkins assured them that ships would pattern be followed on a global scale.
be found to keep supplies moving to the This was entirely agreeable to the
Soviet Union.22 The minimum force Americans, as was the British suggestion
principle for allocation of resources to to avoid confusion between Allied and
the Pacific had now been stretched so national activities by adopting a stand-
far as to justify the postponement of ard nomenclature. Joint was to be used
troop movements to Iceland and north- for interservice collaboration of one
ern Ireland and, in part at least, the nation; combined, for collaboration
delay of the North African landings. In between two or more nations.24
the days to come it was to be stretched One further matter remained to be
even further. settled—the location of the Allied com-
The conference scored one other major mand post. The British, naturally,
achievement before its close on 14 Janu- 23
JB 325, ser 729. For full discussion of this subject,
ary. Last on the agenda the British had see Vernon E. Davis, Origins of the Joint and Com-
bined Chiefs of Staff, vol. I, Organizational Develop-
22
Mins, ARCADIA, 11 and 12 Jan 42; ann. 1 to 10th ment, ch. V, History of the JCS in World War II.
24
Mtg, 12 Jan 42; CofS Conf, 12 Jan 42, ABC 337 Mins, ARCADIA Mtg, 13 Jan 42; Post Arcadia Col-
ARCADIA; White House Conf, same date, OPD Reg. laboration, 10 Jan 42, an. 4 to Mins, ARCADIA, 10
Docs. Jun 42.
wanted it in London; the Americans, in ing of the conference. On the evening

Washington. There had been some con- of the 13th the Americans prepared a
sideration earlier in the conference of a draft of the arrangements already agreed
dual system operating out of both capi- upon, which with some modifications was
tals, but this idea was quickly discarded. accepted by the British and became the
By the 13th it had been virtually decided basis for the organization of the Com-
that the headquarters of the alliance bined Chiefs of Staff during the war.26
would be in Washington. The British As defined by the conferees, the Com-
therefore proposed to leave in the bined Chiefs of Staff consisted of the
American capital Field Marshal Sir John British Chiefs of Staff or their represen-
Dill to represent Mr. Churchill on the tatives in Washington, and the U.S.
highest levels, and the heads of the Joint Chiefs, who, in the accepted terminology,
Staff Mission, the organization estab- were designated as the U.S. Joint Chiefs
lished after the ABC-1 meetings in of Staff. The Combined Chiefs were to
March 1940, to represent the Chiefs of sit in Washington only and to meet
Staff. Similarly, the Americans were to weekly, or more often if necessary. They
designate their own officials to represent were to have a secretariat to maintain
the President and the Chiefs of Staff in their records and prepare and distribute
London. their papers, and a staff of planners
The Americans did not favor this designated the Combined Staff Planners
solution. Though they did not object (consisting of the chief American plan-
to Sir John Dill's appointment and even ners and their British opposite numbers).
preferred him to anyone else, they felt This latter group was "to make such
that British representation in Washing- studies, draft such plans, and perform
ton should be limited to the level of the such other work" as directed by the
Chiefs of Staff. The assignment of a Chiefs.
high-ranking British officer in Washing- The authority granted to the Com-
ton with access to the President would, bined Chiefs was broad. They were to
they believed, create many problems. "develop and submit recommendations"
The proposal also seemed to them to for the ABDA area and for the other
suggest the dual command post concept. areas "in which the United Nations may
To General Marshall, "there could be decide to act in concert . . . modified as
no question of having any duplication necessary to meet the particular circum-
of the Combined Chiefs of Staff organ- stances." To perform these functions,
ization in Washington and London." they were given responsibility for recom-
Though he had no objection to parallel mending to their political superiors "a
subordinate committees, "there could broad program" of the requirements for
be," he asserted, "only one Combined implementing strategic decisions and for
Chiefs of Staff who would give broad di- preparing general directives establishing
rections on the allocation of materiel."25 policy governing the distribution of the
The final details for U.S.-British col- weapons of war. Such weapons and war
laboration were settled at the last meet- equipment were to be allocated "in ac-
26
ABC-4/CS 4, 14 Jan 42, sub: Post- ARCADIA Col-
25
Mins, ARCADIA Mtg, 13 Jan 42. laboration; Mins, ARCADIA Mtg, 14 Jan 42, an. 2.
cordance with strategical needs" through basis and the organization for the con-
appropriate groups in Washington and duct of the war, the Japanese Army and
London under the authority of the Com- Navy had continued their drive into
bined Chiefs. Finally, the Combined Southeast Asia and the Southwest Pa-
Chiefs were given responsibility to settle cific with unabated vigor. Operations
the broad issues of priority for overseas during the first phase of their plan for
military movements. seizing the southern area had been re-
The combined organization estab- markably successful and in the first week
lished at the ARCADIA Conference, of January 1942 they opened the second
though it stemmed in large measure phase. The objectives of this phase of the
from the efforts to meet the crisis in the plan included the seizure of the Bis-
Southwest Pacific, was patterned on the marck Archipelago and Malay Peninsula;
ABC-1 arrangements and on British the capture of Singapore; and, in prepa-
practice. Under the former, an effective ration for the final assault on Java, heart
and well-manned British Joint Staff Mis- of the Indies, the acquisition of air and
sion had been established in Washington, naval bases in southern Sumatra, Dutch
and it was this body that provided the Borneo, the Celebes, Amboina, and
basis for a Combined Chiefs of Staff or- Timor. The occupation of Java itself
ganization in the American capital. and of northern Sumatra was scheduled
British experience with committee organ- for the third phase, after which the Japa-
ization provided the other key to the nese would complete their operations in
combined system established at ARCADIA. Burma and consolidate their position in
Thus, the Combined Chiefs were respon- the conquered area. All these operations
sible to the President and Prime Minis- were to be completed by the end of
ter in much the same way as the British April, in time to meet possible attack
Chiefs were already responsible to from the Soviet Union, which, the Japa-
Churchill in his dual capacity as Prime nese believed, would come in the spring,
Minister and Minister of Defense.27 And if it came at all that year.
the organization of the U.S. Joint Chiefs In Malaya there was no clear demarca-
of Staff that emerged during the months tion between the first and second phase.
after the ARCADIA Conference was shaped There the Japanese, driving in two col-
in large degree by the necessity for pro- umns down the east and west coasts of
viding American counterparts to the the peninsula, continued to advance
highly developed system of committees without halt. Combining amphibious
and secretariats under the British Chiefs encirclement with frontal assault, Gen-
and the War Cabinet. eral Yamashita was able to force the
stubborn British defenders back time
The ABDACOM Interlude after time until by 10 January he stood
at the gates of Kuala Lumpur, on the
While the American and British heads west coast of Malaya, which his 5th
of state with their military staffs were Division captured the next day. His
in Washington establishing the strategic eastern column meanwhile had advanced
27
Davis, Origins of Joint and Combined Chiefs of
to within 100 miles of Singapore. By the
Staff, I, p. 269. middle of the month, he had united his
thus making possible the invasion of

Java a month earlier than planned. At
Imperial General Headquarters the Ter-
auchi-Kondo proposal met a favorable
reception, for it would not only speed
operations in the south and keep the
enemy off balance but it would also make
available at an earlier date the troops
needed in Manchuria if the Soviet
Union should enter the war—a danger
that continued to haunt the Japanese.
Early in January, therefore, Imperial
General Headquarters approved the
recommendation and advanced the time-
table for the seizure of the southern
area.29
The first signs of the increased tempo
of Japanese operations in the Nether-
lands Indies came very quickly. Late in
GENERAL TER POORTEN greets General December the Japanese had gained con-
Wavell (left) on his arrival at Batavia.
trol of British Borneo and the South
China Sea approaches to the Malay
two columns and was preparing to at- Barrier. Now, in the first week of Janu-
tack the single line the gallant defenders ary, the 16th Army, which had been
had formed before the plain which con- given the 38th Division to accelerate its
stitutes the southern tip of the drive into the Indies, completed its prep-
peninsula.28 arations for the advance. At Davao in
So rapidly had their forces moved and the southern Philippines it organized
so light had been resistance that even two task forces, one to take the import-
before the end of the year Japanese com- ant oil center of Tarakan in northern
manders in the field were urging their Borneo, and the other Menado in the
superiors in Tokyo to speed the time- Celebes. Both left Davao at the same
table of conquest. In the last week of time, 9 January. The first landed at
December, Field Marshal Hisaichi Ter- Tarakan on 11 January and, after over-
auchi, commander of the Southern coming slight resistance from the Dutch
Army, and Vice Adm. Nobutake Kondo, defenders aided by American B-17's
2d Fleet commander, jointly recom- based near Surabaya, took that town the
mended advancing the schedule of op- same day. The second force, reinforced
erations against Sumatra and Borneo, by about 330 naval paratroopers and
supported by the seaplane tenders
World War II, 85; Despatch by Lt Gen A. E. Perci- Chitose and Mizuho and three heavy
val, Opns of Malaya Command, 8 Dec 41-15 Feb 42,
28
29 cruisers, took Menado at the same time.
Hist
25th Army
Supplement toOpns
of Army in Malaya,
Section,
the London Japanese
Imperial GHQ
Gazette, Studies
(rev. ed.),
February in
20,
1948. Kirby, et al, The Loss of Singapore, chs. XIV,
XVII. Japanese Studies in World War II, 72, pp. 42-43.
The seizure of these two points com- where in the Indies; a naval force—in-
pleted the Japanese control of the cluding the U.S. Asiatic Fleet—of1
Celebes Sea and the northern approaches heavy and 8 light cruisers, 23 destroyers,
to Makassar Strait. Through that strait and 36 submarines; and an air force of
lay one of the routes to Java.30 4 fighter and 6 bomber squadrons, in-
It was at this juncture, on 10 January, cluding the remnants of the Far East Air
that General Wavell reached Batavia, Force, plus 250 more planes in Burma
capital of the Netherlands Indies, lo- and Malaya. With these meager forces
cated on the northwest coast of Java. General Wavell could only try to hold
Already there or soon to arrive were his back the Japanese tide while waiting for
deputy, General Brett, and the com- reinforcements which never came.32
manders of his ground and naval force, The urgent need for reinforcements
Lt. Gen. H. ter Poorten and Admiral was only one of Wavell's problems.
Hart. In the absence of Air Marshal Sir Keeping the peace within his own small
Richard E. C. Peirse, General Brereton international headquarters, unraveling
was appointed deputy commander of the the confused command relationships be-
air forces. On the 15th, General Wavell tween his forces, and reconciling con-
formally assumed command of the flicting national interests and strategic
ABDA area (ABDACOM) with head- concepts were others almost as serious.
quarters at Lembang, inland from the Even so minor a matter as the location of
capital and about ten miles north of the headquarters could not be settled
Bandoeng.31 (Chart 2) amicably and it was only after he had
From the start it was apparent that overridden the strong objections of his
the defense of the ABDA area, even in naval commanders that Wavell estab-
the unlikely event that the promised re- lished his headquarters at Lembang.33
inforcements arrived in time, had little The relationship between Wavell and
chance of success. Already the Japanese MacArthur, though it created no diffi-
had taken Hong Kong, isolated the Phil- culties, illustrated the confused situation
ippines, landed in Borneo and the in ABDACOM. In addition to the task
Celebes, and were making rapid progress of holding the Malay Barrier, Wavell
down the Malay Peninsula. To oppose had also been instructed to re-establish
their advance Wavell had, in addition to communications with Luzon and to sup
the British forces fighting a losing battle port the Philippine garrison. Before
in Malaya and the American forces in assuming command, he objected to this
the Philippines, two Dutch divisions in assignment and proposed that the islands
Java and small Dutch garrisons else- be excluded from the ABDA area. Pres-
ident Roosevelt, without consulting his
30
Hist of Southern Army, Japanese Studies in military advisers, approved this sugges-
World War II, 24, pp. 16, 19; Naval Opns in Invasion tion to avoid any delay in Wavell's as-
of NEI, Japanese Studies in World War II, 17, pp.
18-20; Morison, The Rising Sun in the Pacific, pp. sumption of command. When General
280-281; Craven and Cate, AAF I, p. 380. The tenders Marshall learned of this action he saw
were later converted into light carriers.
31 32
Rads, Marshall to MacArthur, No. 930, 12 Jan 42; Wavell, "ABDACOM," pp. 16-18.
33
to Brereton, No. 52, same date, both in WPD Msg Narrative of Events, Asiatic Fleet, Leading up to
File; Wavell, "ABDACOM," pp. 1-2. War, 8 Dec 41 to 15 Feb 42, pp. 54-55, OCMH.
CHART 2—ORGANIZATION OF ABDACOM, JANUARY-FEBRUARY 1942
Source: ABDACOM, pp. 3-8

ABDA COMMAND meeting with General Wavell for the first time. Seated around the table,
from left: Admirals Layton, Helfrich, and Hart, General ter Poorten, Colonel Kengen, Royal
Netherlands Army (at head of table), and Generals Wavell, Brett, and Brereton.
that it might well have an adverse effect The establishment of the ABDA area
upon morale in the Philippines and was made necessary also a reshuffling of the
contrary to the ABDA agreement. An U.S. Army commands already in exist-
important reason for the establishment ence in the Southwest Pacific and South-
of Wavell's command had been the de- east Asia. Although MacArthur was
sire to co-ordinate the efforts of the assured by the War Department that the
Allies in the Far East, and the United establishment of ABDACOM would not
States had allocated to the defense of alter his position or affect his forces, he
ABDA aircraft which had been under actually lost a part of his command. The
MacArthur's command or sent out orig- U.S. Army Forces in Australia were then
inally for his use. With King's support, a part of USAFFE (U.S. Army Forces,
therefore, Marshall recommended to the Far East) and under MacArthur's direc-
President that he rescind his earlier mes- tion. Now he was told that these forces
sage. The President saw the point im- would be formed into a separate com-
mediately, and Wavell was told the day mand on a level with USAFFE and
after he assumed command that the placed under General Brereton, who
Philippines would remain in his area.34 had been selected because of his "inti-
mate knowledge of your situation and
34
Rad, Wavell to British Chiefs of Staff, ABDA 48, needs." The reason for this move was
14 Jan 42; Memo, WPD for U.S. Secy CCS, 16 Jan 42, that the Japanese advance into the Indies
both in WPD 4639-19; Ltr, U.S. Secy CCS to Brig V.
Dykes, 16 Jan 42, sub: Responsibility of Supreme had made control by MacArthur of the
Commander ABDA, ABC 381 SWPA (1-12-42). forces in Australia and the Netherlands
Indies impractical. But, he was assured, General Wavell, at Brereton's request,

"when satisfactory communications with asked Marshall to relieve Brereton of
the Philippines have once been reestab- his responsibilities in Australia so that
lished your resumption of actual com- he could concentrate on the full-time
mand of all American Army forces in the job of directing his air forces. This was
Far East will be easily accomplished."35 quickly done, and General Barnes, who
Other than the paper changes in com- had in effect been directing the activi-
mand, the establishment of ABDACOM ties of USAFIA since the 12th, was au-
had no effect on operations in the Philip- thorized to assume command of base
pines. MacArthur reported formally by facilities in Australia.37
radio to his new superior and sent repre- Barnes himself seems to have been
sentatives from Mindanao to Java to somewhat confused about his status and
solicit what aid they could, but the rela- responsibilities for he was never formally
tionship between the two headquarters designated as a commander of USAFIA
was never more than nominal. and Brereton continued to receive mes-
General Brereton's assignment as air sages addressed to him with that title.
commander in the ABDA area, pending Moreover, when Brereton had difficulty
the arrival of Air Marshal Pierse, com- getting logistical support from Australia
plicated an already confusing situation. that he wanted, he complained to the
Brereton was also commander of U.S. War Department, which promptly in-
Army Forces in Australia (USAFIA), a formed Barnes that he was to provide
post General Brett had held before him, that support as best he could. At the
and in this capacity also came under same time, the War Department made it
Wavell's control. But this control was clear to Barnes that he was not under
only partial, for, as the War Department Brereton's but Wavell's command, and
explained to Brereton, "U.S. troops in that General Brett, as Wavell's deputy,
Australian territory come under the could issue orders to him. So far as the
control of General Wavell only when War Department was concerned this
specifically allotted for service in the ended the matter, but General Barnes,
ABDA area."36 even at the end of January, was appar-
The physical difficulties of exercising ently not clear on his relationship to
command simultaneously over USAFIA, ABDACOM "in general" and to General
a logistical and administrative head- Brett "in particular regarding troops
quarters in Australia, and over ABDAIR, and supplies in Australia."38
an operational headquarters in Java, as Not only was there confusion over
well as the conflicting missions of the command in the ABDA area, but na-
two, made it imperative to clarify tional commanders differed with one
Brereton's status. On the 16th, there-
37
fore, a day after he assumed command, Rads, Brett to Marshall, ABDA 7 and 22, 15 and
16 Jan 42, WPD Msg File; Wavell to Marshall, ABDA
71, 16 Jan 42; Marshall to Wavell, No. 25, same date;
35
Rad, Marshall to MacArthur, No. 930, 11 Jan 42, both in WPD 4639-19.
38
WPD 4639-14. Rads, Barnes to Marshall, No. 130, 29 Jan 42;
36
Rad, WD to Brereton, No. 52, 12 Jan 42, WPD No. 138, 31 Jan 42, WPD Msg File; Marshall to
4628-20; Marshall to MacArthur, No. 930, same date, Barnes, No. 206 and 223, 27 and 30 Jan 42; Marshall
WPD 4639-14. to Brett, No. 48, 27 Jan 42, all in WPD 4628-25.
another and with the Supreme Com- forcements. Most of the British and
mander over the conduct of operations Dutch vessels in the area were assigned
and the allocation of resources. To the to convoy duty, leaving only the U.S.
American, Dutch, and Australian offi- Asiatic Fleet, based on Surabaya, free
cers, it seemed that General Wavell was for operations. The Dutch, whose naval
devoting far too much attention, as well forces were under the operational con-
as a disproportionate share of Allied re- trol of the British, were none too happy
sources, to the defense of Malaya, Singa- over this assignment, preferring to em-
pore, and Burma, an attitude that ploy their vessels in the defense of Dutch
seemed to them to reflect British rather territory. Their irritation was further
than Allied interests. The American increased by the British announcement
commanders, Admiral Hart and Gen- of the transfer of some of their cruisers
eral Brereton, free from any territorial and destroyers to the Indian Ocean and
interest in the area, wished to protect American refusal to provide naval rein-
the lines of communication and air and forcements for convoy duty. Ultimately
naval bases along the Malay Barrier, the Australians were persuaded to send
which they believed essential links in additional vessels into the area, but the
defensive structure of the Southwest damage had been done and the Dutch
Pacific and the starting points for offen- resentment persisted.40
sive operations. The Dutch desired The Dutch were displeased also with
above all else to concentrate Allied re- the way naval operations were being con-
sources on the defense of their territories. ducted. Admiral Hart, they felt, had his
And the Australians, concerned over the forces too far back and was showing
defense of the homeland, continually more concern over Darwin and the sup-
pressed for a greater share of the theater's ply routes to Australia than over the
resources on the east. If General Wavell progress of the enemy through Makassar
made any effort to reconcile these views, Strait and the Molucca Sea. They were
the records do not show it. Despite the disappointed, too, over their failure to
representations of the national com- gain command of the naval elements in
manders to their governments—in ABDA. Their interests, they felt, were
Washington Brett's were refuted by the predominant and their knowledge of the
Army planners, as was his proposal to area greater than that of the Americans.
break up the new theater—Wavell con- This attitude, which Dutch naval offi-
tinued to act on the assumption that the cers made little effort to conceal, added
security of the Netherlands Indies and to Hart's already considerable burdens
Australia depended on the defense of and complicated his task enormously.
Malaya and Singapore.39 By the end of January, relations be-
These difficulties were brought out tween Admiral Hart and the Dutch
sharply in the discussion of naval rein- naval commander had become so strained
39
Hart, Narrative of Events, passim; Lewis H.
that they could no longer be ignored.
Brereton, The Brereton Diaries (New York: William It was then that General Wavell sug-
Morrow and Company, 1946, pp. 88-89; Memo, WPD gested to the Prime Minister that Hart
for TAG, 17 Jan 42, sub: Comd in ABDA, WPD
40
4639-29; Rad, Brett to Marshall, ABDA 95, OPD Hayes, The War Against Japan, ch. III, pp.
Exec Files. 17-20.
be relieved on account of his age and

that a Dutch officer, or, if the United
States would send naval reinforcements
to the ABDA area, a younger American
be given command. The suggestion was
passed on to Washington and finally to
Hart himself who replied that he did
not consider himself too old to discharge
his duties and did not wish to be relieved.
Though both Admirals King and Stark
supported the Asiatic Fleet commander,
the President decided to adopt Wavell's
suggestion. His decision was influenced
largely by the fact that the United States
had refused to send naval reinforcements
to the area and by the hope that the
Dutch would assume a more active role
in the naval defense of ABDA. There
was never any feeling, Admirals King
and Stark later recalled, that Hart had ADMIRALS HELFRICH AND HART
proved unfit or that he was too old to
exercise command. After the President Allied air forces. Both the President and
had made his decision Hart had no re- the Prime Minister supported the nomi-
course but to step down, which he did nation, but Brett seems to have had
on the 5th by asking to be relieved on larger ambitions and argued that such a
account of ill health, a course Admiral "drastic change" would be unsettling.
Stark had recommended to him. Six The matter was dropped.42
days later the Secretary of the Navy While the Allies sought to solve the
ordered him home.41 His place was problem of command and bring rein-
taken by Vice Adm. Conrad E. L. forcements into the area, the Japanese
Helfrich, Dutch naval commander. continued to advance almost without
With the relief of Admiral Hart, interruption. In Malaya General Yama-
ABDACOM lost its last American force shita forced the British back from line
commander. Air Marshall Pierse had after line until on 27 January Lt. Gen.
taken over from General Brereton on A. E. Percival, the British commander in
28 January, as originally intended, and Malaya, withdrew his forces to Singa-
the Dutch continued to command the pore. The causeway connecting the fort-
ground forces. The U.S. Chiefs, anxious ress to the mainland was blown on 31
to secure direction of one of the major January. Only the waters of Johore
elements in ABDACOM in the interests Strait lay between Yamashita and his goal.
of "homeland support," put forward For a week, while the Singapore gar-
Brett's name as commander of the 42
Rads, Marshall to Brett, No. 73, 4 Feb 42, WPD
41
Ibid., pp. 20-22; Hart, Narrative of Events; Mins, 4628-27; Brett to Marshall, 3 Feb 42, AB 371
CCS Mtg, 10 Feb 42. (2-3-42).
rison desperately prepared its defenses, For ABDACOM, which had been
Japanese aircraft and artillery paved the established only a month before, the fall
way for the final assault. Shortly before of Singapore was a crushing blow. In
midnight of 8 February, under cover of anticipation of this disaster, General
an extremely heavy artillery bombard- Wavell had warned the Chiefs of Staff
ment, the Japanese began to cross the on the 13th that a drastic change in plans
straits. By the morning of the 9th, they might soon be necessary. It was doubt-
had established a firm position on the ful, he wrote, that Sumatra, obviously
island and were pouring reinforcements the next Japanese objective, could be
into the lodgment area. From there the held, and if it were not, then Java would
Japanese spread over the island, infiltrat- fall. Though he told the Chiefs he in-
ing the defender's lines and isolating tended to continue his present plans for
them into small pockets of resistance. the defense of Java "until situation en-
On the 15th General Percival, with his forces changes," it was apparent by the
water, food, and ammunition gone, de- 13th that he had no real hope for suc-
cided that further resistance was impos- cess, a view that was reinforced by his
sible. That afternoon, he met Yamashita recommendation to divert reinforce-
at the Ford Motor Factory and formally ments, two Australian divisions, already
surrendered his command, an act which en route from the Middle East to Java,
symbolized the end of British imperial to Australia or Burma, preferably the
power in the Far East.43 latter.44
The loss of Singapore was a major The Dutch took violent exception to
blow to the Allied cause in the Far East Wavell's estimate. They insisted that
and a disaster of the first magnitude for Java must be defended, regardless of the
the British who had long regarded it as fate of Sumatra. To them and to the
an impregnable fortress and the key to Netherlands Government-in-exile Java
the defense of Australia, New Zealand, had an even greater political, moral, and
and India. Fortunately, the British es- sentimental significance than Singapore
timate of the importance of Singapore to had for the British. Wavell's proposal
the security of the Dominions proved in- seemed to them an abandonment by their
correct, but that did not lessen the imme- Allies and confirmed their worst fears
diate shock or minimize the seriousness that ABDACOM was a device to use
of the blow to the British Far Eastern Allied resources for the defense of Singa-
Fleet, which had already suffered the loss pore and of British interests in the Far
of the Prince of Wales and Repulse. East.
With its base gone, the British Navy Unpalatable as it was to the Dutch,
now had to retire to Sydney in Australia Wavell's estimate had to be accepted for
and to Ceylon, and when Ceylon was not only was Singapore about to fall into
threatened briefly in April, to the east Japanese hands, but Java was clearly
coast of Africa. threatened from three directions—the
South China Sea, Makassar Strait, and
43
Percival, Opns in Malaya; 25th Army Opns in Molucca Sea. Following up the Borneo
Malaya, Japanese Studies in World War II, 85, pp.
44
58-110; Wavell, "ABDACOM," pp. 32-42; Kirby, Rads, Wavell to CCS, 13 Feb 42, CCOS 7; Wavell
et al, The Loss of Singapore, ch. XXIV. to CCS, 15 Feb 42, CCOS 8, OPD ABDA Msg File.
landings of late December and early matra. From Camranh Bay in Indo-
January, the Japanese, moving by water china came a strong naval force to
through Makassar Strait, had landed at support the transports headed for
Balikpapan on the 24th. The landings Palembang with its airfield and oil re-
had been made only after a battle with finery. On the 14th about 700 para-
U.S. naval forces—their first of the war troopers were dropped in the Palembang
—in which the American destroyers won area, but achieved only a limited success
a tactical victory but failed to stop the against the Dutch and British defenders.
enemy. The Japanese took Balikpapan At the end of the day Allied troops were
easily but failed to capture the oil re- still in control, but next morning, when
fineries there. These, the Dutch had the main Japanese force landed upshore
already gutted. and began to move toward Palembang,
From Balikpapan, the Japanese moved they withdrew. Two days later, the Japa-
on to Bandjermasin, along the southeast nese were in control of southern Su-
coast of Borneo, which they took on 10 matra, leaving the northern part of the
February. Only a day before, another island to the conquerors of Singapore.
Japanese force had sailed through the Only the Straits of Sunda now separated
Molucca Sea to land at Makassar on the the Japanese from their main objective,
southwest tip of Celebes Island, facing Java.45
Makassar Strait. By 10 February that By 16 February, three days after
strait and the north shore of the Java Wavell had told the Combined Chiefs in
Sea were under Japanese control. Washington that he might not be able
The Molucca Sea approach to the to hold Sumatra, the situation in the
Malay Barrier fell into Japanese hands ABDA area had rapidly worsened. There
as a result of amphibious hops and was no longer any chance of holding
naval-air engagements in which the Java, Wavell now told the Chiefs. Its
Allies fought a desperate but losing loss would be serious, he asserted, and
battle. From Menado, which they had would deprive the Allies of their only
taken on 11 January, the Japanese moved base in the South China Sea. But, he
on to Kendari on the 24th, the same day pointed out, the fall of Java would not
they landed at Balikpapan. Amboina be fatal to the Allied cause. Burma and
Island was occupied a week later by a Australia, not Java, he declared, were
strong force which overcame the small the "absolutely vital" positions in the
Dutch and Australian garrison with little war against Japan. He therefore recom-
difficulty. By the end of the month the mended again that the two Australian
Japanese controlled the Molucca Sea and divisions be diverted to Burma, with
were in position to cut the line between
Java and Australia and to breach the 45
For accounts of these operations, see Wavell,
east flank of the Malay Barrier. "ABDACOM," pp. 52-67; Morison The Rising Sun
in the Pacific, pp. 280-311; Craven and Cate, AAF I,
On the western flank of the barrier, ch I, ch X; Hist of Southern Army, Japanese Studies
the Japanese had early secured the South in World War II, 24, pp. 16, 19; Naval Opns in
China Sea approaches and on 9 February, Invasion of NEI, Japanese Studies in World War
II, 17, pp. 18-20, 22-23, 26-27; Ambon and Timor
without waiting for the fall of Singapore, Invasions, Japanese Studies in World War II, 30,
launched their attack on southern Su- pp. 1-15.
Americans providing reinforcements for ing their Dutch allies. On the 20th,
Australia.46 therefore, the Combined Chiefs, assert-
Washington agreed with Wavell's es- ing that "every day gained is of import-
timate of the probable loss of Java. ance," directed Wavell to defend Java
Reinforcement was evidently futile and "with the utmost resolution" and not to
the wisest course, the Combined Chiefs withdraw or surrender any of the troops
thought, would be to send at least one there. To minimize the loss of Allied
of the Australian divisions to Burma and troops in Java, the Chiefs specifically
the other to Australia. It was clear also prohibited Wavell from reinforcing that
that the fall of Java would split the island further, but did give him discre-
ABDA area and make a co-ordinated tion to use his naval forces and American
defense of its eastern and western ex- planes in Australia as he thought best.49
tremities impossible. The British there- Even as these fresh instructions were
fore suggested that Burma be taken out being received at ABDACOM, the Japa-
of ABDACOM and transferred to their nese were making their execution impos-
command in India, a proposal that the sible. On the 19th, they landed on the
U.S. Chiefs and General Wavell, who southern tip of Bali, immediately to the
had always believed Burma was an inte- east of Java. Next day they landed on
gral part of the Indian command, readily Timor, half of which was Dutch and
accepted. This was accomplished formal- half Portuguese. Control of these islands,
ly on 21 February.47 The plan for send- lying between Java and northwest Aus-
ing the Australian divisions to Burma, tralia, completed the isolation of Java,
however, came to naught. Concerned placed Japanese land-based fighters with-
over the defense of their own country, in bombing range of the Dutch base at
the Australians persistently refused, de- Surabaya, and made further reinforce-
spite strong appeals from Churchill and ments from Australia impossible.
Roosevelt, to permit the diversion of With the Japanese making ready for
these divisions to Burma, and finally, on the final assault on Java, General Wavell
23 February, they were ordered home.48 turned to his superiors for new instruc-
Though the loss of Java was conceded tions. Their orders were to transfer
by all except the Dutch, there was a re- command of Java to the Dutch and with-
luctance to act on this assumption. To draw, but to maintain ABDACOM and
do so would create the impression that keep his headquarters intact. When and
the Americans and British were desert- where he would go was left to him.
Ground forces "for whom there are
arms" were to remain and continue the
42, OPD ABDA Msg File.
47
Mins, CCS Mtg, 17 Feb 42; Rads, CCS to fight, but air forces that could operate
ABDACOM, 17 and 21 Feb 42; ABDACOM to CCS, from bases outside Java and other troops
19 Feb 42, OPD ABDA Msg File. "who cannot contribute to defense"
Wigmore, The Japanese Thrust, ser. I, vol. 4, "Aus-
were to be withdrawn, the Americans and
tralia in the War of 1939—1945" (Canberra: Aus- Australians to go to Australia. General
tralian War Memorial, 1957), pp. 442—65. Churchill's
46
48
Brett was to return to Australia, when
For
Rad, aof
account Wavell
full
thisdiscussion
to Primeisof
incident Minister
this matter,
somewhat and Dill,
see 16
Lionel
different. Feb
Win-
49
ston S. Churchill, The Hinge of Fate (Boston: Rad, CCS to ABDACOM, DBA 19, 20 Feb 42,
Houghton Mifflin Company, 1950), pp. 155—66. OPD ABDA Msg File.
released by Wavell, to command the U.S. fidence of the Dutch and obviously
forces there.50 wanted to pull out, they agreed to the
The ABDA commander did not agree dissolution of his headquarters and his
with the program. What he wanted was transfer to India, leaving control of the
the dissolution of ABDACOM, all rea- ABDA area to the Dutch. And lest the
son for its existence having disappeared. Dutch should think that the Americans
Burma, he pointed out, had already been had made this arrangement to shirk their
separated from the ABDA theater and commitments, Marshall assured the
Java's defense was a local problem, best Dutch governor that the forces then as-
handled by the Dutch themselves. If the sembling in Australia were "seeking
Philippines, which had never really been opportunity to enter the ABDA battle"
under his control, were taken over by and would "continue their full support
the Americans again and northwest Aus- of the Dutch commanders in their
tralia by the Australians, he told the magnificent fight."53
Chiefs, he could turn over his remaining On the 25th General Wavell turned
forces to the Dutch and leave the area over command to the Dutch and left for
by 25 February.51 India where General Brereton had al-
This recommendation was in line with ready gone to organize an American air
the solution being proposed by the force. This move placed MacArthur
British Chiefs of Staff for the establish- technically under the Dutch, but he had
ment of two areas in the Far East, one already been told that "because of your
to be under American control and to special situation all procedures in your
include Australia; the other a British case remain as heretofore."54 The bur-
area encompassing India and the Indian den of defending Java was now squarely
Ocean. The Dutch opposed such a solu- on the Dutch. Their forces, with the
tion for fear it would mean the end of exception of minor ground units (in-
Allied assistance in the Netherlands cluding an American artillery battalion),
Indies. 'For God's sake,' wrote the Dutch American and British naval units, and
governor-general to Marshall, "take the a small U.S.-Australian fighter force,
strong and active decisions and don't composed the entire command.
stop sending materials and men."52 There was still a chance that fighters
Still anxious to avoid the appearance could be brought in by sea, though the
of abandoning their allies, the U.S. air ferry route had been closed by the
Chiefs continued to oppose the dissolu- Japanese seizure of Timor. To this task
tion of ABDACOM. But in recognition was assigned the aircraft tender Langley,
of the fact that Wavell had lost the con- which on 23 February had been ordered
to Tjilatjap, on the south coast of Java,
50
Rads, CCS to ABDACOM, DBA 20 and 22, 21 and
53
22 Feb 42, OPD ABDA Msg File; Marshall to Brett, Rad, Marshall to Van Mook, 24 Feb 42, WPD
No. 185, 21 Feb 42, WPD 4639-48; Mins, CCS Mtg, 4639-55; British COS to Joint Staff Mission, No. 76,
21 Feb 42. 23 Feb 42, ABC 323.31 POA; Mins, CCS Mtg, 23 Feb
42; CCS to ABDACOM, DBA 23, 23 Feb 42, OPD
54
51
and 23 Feb
Rads,
Rad, 42, OPD
Marshall
ABDACOM to ABDA Msg
MacArthur,
to CCS, File.
CCOS
No. 191083,
and 24
20,Feb
22 ABDA Msg File.
52
Rad, H. J. Van Mook to Marshall, 22 Feb 42,
OPD ABDA Msg File. 42, WPD 4639-54.
with its cargo of thirty-two assembled and Admiral Doorman. The Japanese
P-40's and their pilots. On the 27th, had not lost a single vessel.56
almost within sight of Java, it was spot- During the next few days the Japanese
ted by Japanese patrol planes and sunk. completed their control of the air and
The freighter Seawitch with 27 P-40's in sea approaches to Java. From their
her hold had left Fremantle at the same circle of bases surrounding the island
time, but sailed separately and made its patrol planes kept constant watch while
way successfully to Java. It arrived there bombers completed the destruction of
on the eve of invasion and the P-40's, Allied airfields and military installations.
still crated, were dumped into the sea At the same time the powerful battle
to prevent their capture.55 fleet ranged the waters of the Java Sea
Meanwhile the Japanese had com- to hunt down the remnants of the Allied
pleted their preparations for the invasion fleet which were split between Surabaya
of Java. D-day was set for 28 February. and Batavia, seeking some way to make
Supporting the invasion was the largest their escape into the Indian Ocean. The
force of warships the Japanese had yet last fight began on the night of 28 Feb-
assembled for an amphibious operation. ruary when the heavy cruisers USS Hou-
In it were four battleships, led by Ad- ston and H.M.S. Exeter, accompanied by
miral Kondo, a carrier group led by the light cruisers H.M.A.S. Perth and
Admiral Nagumo of Pearl Harbor fame, two destroyers, tried to slip through
and the two attack forces, each now con- Sunda Strait, between Java and Sumatra.
siderably reinforced. The Japanese had already closed the
The approach of the Japanese was strait and the Allied warships sailed into
carefully traced by the Allies, and Ad- a trap. That night, in a vigorous battle
miral Helfrich, Hart's successor as Allied which lasted past midnight, the Houston
naval commander, estimated that the and Perth went down. Next day,1
convoys would reach Javanese waters March, the Exeter was sunk off the coast
early on the 27th. Hurriedly he made his of Borneo.
plans to meet the attack with a woefully Meanwhile the Japanese convoys had
inferior naval force led by Rear Adm. come in for the landing. On the way
K. W. F. M. Doorman. All Doorman the convoy was attacked by three sub-
had were 2 heavy cruisers, one of them marines and the remaining planes of the
the USS Houston, 3 light cruisers, and Allied air force, about ten light bombers
11 destroyers. Contact between the op- and fifteen fighters, and suffered some
posing forces came shortly after 1500 of damage. But the landing was accom-
the 27th, and the fight that began then plished without serious difficulty, and by
raged throughout the afternoon and into morning of the 1st the Japanese were
the night. By the time the battle of the consolidating their positions and rapidly
Java Sea was over the Allies had lost expanding the beachheads.
half their ships, including the flagship 56
For an exciting account of the battle, see Mori-
son, The Rising Sun in the Pacific, pp. 342—59. An
analysis of the battle is contained in Rear Adm
55
Morison, The Rising Sun in the Pacific, pp. 359- William A. Glassford, Narrative of Events in the
SW Pacific, 14 Feb-5 Apr 42, WDCSA 210.72 (5-20-
63; Craven and Cate, AAF I, 396-98. 42) SPA.
Though the Dutch had concentrated The defeat of ABDACOM was, in a

their remaining ground forces in Java, sense, the inevitable outcome of Allied
mostly in the western portion of the weakness. There was no time to as-
island, the issue was never in doubt. semble in an area so remote from the
The Japanese moved inland rapidly, sources of supply sufficient aircraft to
splitting the Dutch Army on the island contest Japanese domination of the air.
and isolating the defenders into small Although reinforcements adequate for
groups. Batavia fell on the 2d without this task were allocated by the Com-
a struggle, after the government moved bined Chiefs of Staff, only a trickle,
inland to Bandoeng. It was not safe even barely enough to replace losses, reached
there, for the Japanese closed in on this its destination. The warships that might
mountain retreat and by the 8th were in have challenged the invaders were en-
position to attack the remnants of the gaged in other tasks, and when they were
Dutch Army defending it. The next finally organized into a combined strik-
morning the Dutch surrendered and the ing force it was already too late. In the
fight for Java was over.57 six weeks of its existence ABDACOM
For the Japanese, the conquest of the never had a chance to test the validity
Indies was the crowning achievement of of General Marshall's contention that a
the war. It realized their long-cherished unified command would "solve nine-
dream of empire. The rich resources of tenths of our troubles." But important
Southeast Asia, the oil, rubber, and lessons about Allied command could be
manganese needed for war and for the learned from the disagreements and dif-
control of Asia, were now in their pos- ferences which marked the brief exist-
session. And all this had been won in ence of ABDACOM and these were not
three months. lost when the time came to establish
For the Allies the fall of Java marked other commands later in the war.
the loss of the Malay Barrier, "the basic While the campaign for Java was in
defensive position" in the Far East. The progress, the Japanese had pushed on
strategic significance of this loss was to take northern Sumatra and central
enormous. Not only did the Allies lose Burma, thus consolidating their control
the resources of the Indies and their lines of the southern area and cutting China
of communications northward, but they off from its Allies. From Singapore, ten
found themselves in a perilous position, days after that fortress had fallen, came
split into two areas and threatened by the troops to take northern Sumatra.
invasion. The gateway to the Indian With their arrival the defenders of the
Ocean lay open and Australia and India island fled to Java in time to join the
were in dire danger. And the Allies fight there, and eventually to surrender.
could ill afford to lose the ships, planes, Burma was to have been seized in two
and men that went down in the heroic phases and its occupation completed
defense of Malaya, Singapore, and the only after operations to the south were
Indies. over. But early in January the schedule
57
had been speeded up and before the end
Invasion of the NEI, Japanese Studies in World
War II, 16; Morison, The Rising Sun in the Pacific,
of the month the 15th Army had pushed
pp. 36-75; Craven and Cate, AAF I, 397-98. across the Thai-Burma border and seized
Moulmein. On 8 March, after the battle fallen.58 By the end of March, the vast
of Sittang Bridge where the Japanese area of sea and land from New Guinea
destroyed two Indian brigades, they cap- and northwest Australia to central Bur-
tured Rangoon, southern terminus of ma, which had formed ABDACOM,
the supply line to China and the port of was under Japanese control. Only to
entry for lend-lease supplies. Pushing on the north, in the Philippines, where
to the north, they had by mid-March American and Filipino troops still stood
reached the Toungoo-Prome line in cen- fast, had the Japanese failed to meet
tral Burma, and though they did not their timetable of conquest.
finally gain victory there until early in 58
For an account of the campaign in Burma, see
May they had effectively blockaded Romanus and Sunderland, Stilwell's Mission to
China by the time the Indies had China, chs. III and IV.
CHAPTER VIII
The Philippines
Posterity, thinned by the crimes of the ancestors, shall hear of those battles.
HORACE
In the period when the Japanese were tion. But his victory was a hollow one.
overrunning Malaya and the Indies their The enemy army was still intact and in
campaign in the Philippines progressed control of the entrance to Manila Bay.
slowly. Their initial success had been So long as it maintained its hold on
spectacular. First they had knocked out Bataan and Corregidor Homma would
the Far East Air Force, established air be unable to use the great port of Manila
and naval supremacy in the Philippines, or to claim victory in the Philippines.
and seized advance airfields on Luzon. South of Luzon, the Japanese had
Then, on 22 December, General Homma made only one important conquest in
put the bulk of his 14th Army ashore at the Philippines when they occupied the
Lingayen Gulf, north of Manila. The harbor of Davao in Mindanao, as a base
remainder landed two days later at La- for the invasion of Borneo. But the
mon Bay, south of the capital, to form American and Philippine forces on that
the southern arm of a giant pincer move- island were undefeated. Well-organized
ment converging on Manila. But Hom- and led, they still held the airfield at
ma quickly discovered he was dealing Del Monte. In the central Philippines
with a determined and able foe. Mac- the Japanese had as yet made no land-
Arthur did not, as Homma and Imperial ings. There the scattered garrisons on
General Headquarters expected, stay to Panay, Cebu, Bohol, Leyte, and other
fight it out on the central plain of Lu- islands, strengthened their defenses and
zon. Instead he put into effect the long- made plans for the day when the enemy
standing ORANGE plan and withdrew his would appear off their shores.
forces to the Bataan Peninsula in a skill-
ful and dangerous double retrograde The Siege of Bataan
movement, made in two weeks under the
most difficult circumstances and constant In the Japanese scheme of conquest,
pressure. At the same time he pro- the Philippines occupied only a second-
claimed Manila an open city and trans- ary place and Imperial General Head-
ferred his headquarters to Corregidor. quarters had not been generous with
Thus, when Homma, on 2 January, General Homma. All it had given him
reached his objective, the capital city, to take the islands, a job that was sched-
he was able to take it without opposi- uled to be completed in fifty days, were
two divisions, the 16th and 48th, two rather than an assault against a strongly
tank regiments, an air group, and service fortified position. Such operations,
and supporting troops. One other unit, Homma felt, could be safely entrusted
the 65th Brigade, consisting of three to the inexperienced and untrained 65 th
2-battalion regiments, was to come in Brigade, reinforced with seasoned troops
later to mop up and garrison the islands. of the 16th Division and aided by sup-
But Homma was not allowed to keep porting artillery and armor.
even this force, for Imperial General General Homma's optimism was en-
Headquarters, having decided late in tirely unfounded. Arrayed against him
December to speed up operations in the on a line extending across the northern
southern area, took from him his best part of the jungled mountain fastness
unit, the 48th Division, as well as the of Bataan were two corps, one led by
air group. Word of this decision reached Maj. Gen. Jonathan M. Wainwright
Homma via Southern Army headquar- and the other by Maj. Gen. George M.
ters on 2 January, the day he occupied Parker, Jr. In Wainwright's corps on
Manila. the left (west) were three of the recently-
Fortunately for the Japanese cause, inducted Philippine Army divisions, the
Homma, for reasons entirely unrelated 26th Cavalry of Philippine Scouts (Fili-
to the decision of Imperial General pino citizens forming part of the Regu-
Headquarters, had already ordered the lar Army of the United States), and
65th Brigade to the Philippines, three other troops, for a total of 22,500 men.
weeks earlier than intended. The bri- On the right (Manila Bay side) of the
gade, which in the opinion of its com- peninsula, in Parker's corps, were four
mander was "absolutely unfit for combat more Philippine Army divisions, a Phil-
duty," reached Luzon on New Year's ippine Scout regiment, plus supporting
Day, just in time to replace the 48th troops, all together 25,000 men. To the
Division in the coming battle for Bataan.1 rear were the regular U.S. Army Philip-
Despite this weakening of his forces, pine Division (composed largely of Phil-
Homma felt certain of an early victory. ippine Scouts), two battalions of light
On the basis of faulty intelligence he tanks, a 75-mm. SPM group, together
concluded that resistance would be with corps and USAFFE artillery. The
weak, and that the American and Fili- southern tip of the peninsula, designated
pino troops would make their stand the Service Command Area, was de-
around Mariveles, near the tip of the fended by a heterogeneous force com-
peninsula, then withdraw to Corregidor. posed of constabulary, Philippine Army
Japanese operations on Bataan would troops, grounded airmen, bluejackets,
therefore take the form of a pursuit and marines.2 Control of the two corps
and of the elements to the rear was
1
65th Brig Opns Rpt, Mt. Natib, p. 3; 14th Army retained by General MacArthur's head-
Opns, Japanese Studies in World War II, 1, I, 39, quarters on Corregidor, with an ad-
60-62, 73—76. Most of the material covered in this
chapter is treated at greater length in Morton, The vance echelon on Bataan.
Fall of the Philippines, chs. XV-XXII. For the con- Despite this considerable force, num-
venience of the researcher, footnote references are to
2
the original sources rather than to the author's USAFFE Field Orders 1 and 2, 6 and 7, Jan 42 and
earlier volume. GO 3, 7 Jan 42, copies in OCMH.
THE PHILIPPINES 183
GENERAL HOMMA COMES ASHORE
bering about 90,000 men, the American main force, which attacked first, was
position was not a strong one. There repulsed in a series of bloody battles
had been little time to build fortifica- and was finally forced to shift to the
tions; communications were inadequate, west in search of an opening in the
and many of the troops were untrained American lines, while another column
and poorly equipped. Food was scarce sought to turn Parker's left flank on
and there was a shortage of supplies of the slopes of Mt. Natib. Finally, on
all types. Moreover, the main battle the 15th, the Japanese found an opening
position was not a continuous line. Sep- and drove through. By the evening of
arating the two corps was the 4,222-foot- the 16th they were in position to out-
high Mt. Natib which made physical flank the corps. Hastily a counterattack
contact and mutual support virtually was organized with troops from the Phil-
impossible. ippine Division, but to no avail.3
The Japanese opened the battle for Meanwhile the Japanese on the other
Bataan on 9 January with an artillery side of the peninsula, traversing the
barrage that "shook the northern por- jungled height near the center, had cut
tion" of the peninsula, after which the 3
65th Brig Opns Rpt, Mt. Natib, apps. 3 and 20,
infantry moved out to the attack. The p. 15.
behind Wainwright's line on 21 January moment to attack, could, in Homma's

and established a block along the only words, have walked to Manila "without
road in the area. Unable to reduce the encountering much resistance on our
block, the troops in Wainwright's corps part." 6
withdrew, pulling back along the coast. But by this time MacArthur's troops
At about the same time, 24 January, were showing the alarming effects of
MacArthur ordered a general with- reduced rations, lack of quinine, and
drawal to the reserve battle position. continuous combat. Almost the first
The first battle was over but Homma official action on Bataan had been an
was still far from victory. He had won order cutting the ration in half. This
this round but at such heavy cost that meant the Americans would theoreti-
the 65th Brigade, in the words of its cally receive 36 ounces of food a day,
commander, had "reached the extreme the Filipinos 32.7 Actually they never
stages of exhaustion."4 The American received even that amount. The ration
and Filipino forces had disengaged suc- varied from day to day and was based
cessfully and occupied their new line solely on the amount of food on hand.
across the waist of the peninsula on 26 From an average of about 30 ounces a
January. They had saved Bataan for day it decreased steadily until it was
another day. But there was no further barely enough to sustain life. Not only
retreat from this line. "With its occu- was the diet inadequate, but it was un-
pation," MacArthur wrote, "all maneu- balanced as well, deficient in vitamins
vering possibilities will cease. I intend and lacking the minor luxuries which
to fight it out to complete destruction." 5 might have compensated for its bareness
During the next two weeks Homma and monotony. There was no butter,
committed the remainder of the 16th coffee, tea, jam, fresh milk, or vegetables,
Division and, by a series of frontal at- and precious little sugar, fruit, and to-
tacks combined with amphibious as- bacco. Deprived of the solace of ciga-
saults behind the enemy line, sought to rettes and coffee, the soldier living on
gain the victory which had thus far little more than 20 ounces of food a day
eluded him. Again he failed, this time could be very miserable indeed.8
with such heavy casualties that he had The consequences of the inadequate
to break off the fight and call on Impe- and unbalanced ration and other short-
rial General Headquarters for reinforce- ages soon became evident in the high
ments. From 6 January to 1 March, incidence of malnutrition and vitamin
14th Army had suffered almost 7,000 deficiency diseases and a marked de-
casualties, 2,700 killed and over 4,000 crease in combat efficiency. Signs of
wounded. Between 10,000 and 12,000
more men were down with malaria, beri- pp. 3062-63, testimony of Homma; pp. 2450, 2457,
beri, and dysentery. So depleted was 2576, testimony of Lt. Gen. Takaji Wachi and Col.
Yoshio Nakajima, National Archives; 14th Army
the 14th Army that the American and Opns, Japanese Studies in World War II, 1, I, 116.
Filipino troops, had they chosen that
6
7
8
4
Jan 42, AG 430 (25 Dec 41); Inventory of Rations,
United
See
Rad,
65thRpts
MacArthur
States
Brig of the
Opns ofRpt,
QM
America
to CG
PhilBataan
Mt. DeptMasaharu
Natib,
vs. in
Service
pp.AG
33, 319.1
Homma,
Comd,(29
38. 5 3 Jan 42, AG 430.2 (3 Jan 42) both in Phil Rcds.
5
Rad, MacArthur to Marshall, No. 108, 23 Jan 42,
AG 381 (11-27-41 sec. 1) Far East. Jan 42) Phil Rcds.
THE PHILIPPINES 185
serious muscle waste and depletion of to 25 percent. The condition of the

fat reserve were plain in the thin bodies troops, wrote an inspecting officer, "was
and hollow cheeks of the hungry men. utter nightmare." In one regiment the
Night blindness, swelling, diarrhea, and men "were just able to fire a rifle out
dysentery became common, and beriberi of the trench, and no more."11
in its incipient stages was almost univer- The one great hope that fortified the
sal among the troops. The men had men on Bataan and Corregidor was their
lost the capacity to resist even the most belief that somehow large reinforce-
minor ailment, and any disease, warned ments and shiploads of food and sup-
the Bataan surgeon, would assume plies would break through the Japanese
epidemic proportions. blockade and come to their rescue. This
These fears were soon justified in the belief was based partly on the desperate
rapid spread of malaria. For a time the desire to believe it and partly on Mac-
disease had been kept under control by Arthur's promise in January that "thou-
prophylactic doses of quinine, but the sands of troops and hundreds of planes"
supply was limited and its use, except were on the way.12 President Quezon
for those already infected, was discon- and High Commissioner Sayre had given
tinued at the end of February. Within the same promise in public statements
a week the number of daily malaria ad- earlier, based on Roosevelt's broadcast
missions to the hospitals jumped to 500 of 29 December, which the New York
and a month later was approaching the Times headlined with, "All aid prom-
fantastic figure of 1,000. Despite every ised. President pledges protection."
expedient it proved impossible to obtain Sustaining the faith of the troops on
a large enough supply of quinine to Bataan also was the conviction that their
bring the disease under control or per- country would never abandon them to
mit its use as a prophylaxis.9 By the end the enemy and that somehow they would
of March the two general hospitals, de- be rescued.13 These hopes were badly
signed to accommodate 1,000 patients shaken when President Roosevelt, in his
each, had about 8,500 patients, and February 23d Fireside Chat, placed the
another 4,000 were being treated in a Philippines in their proper perspective
provisional hospital. Undetermined "in the big picture of the war." His
numbers were hospitalized in their listeners on Bataan could find no hope
units, and all medical installations on for relief in the President's remarks
Bataan were bursting with patients.10 about the nature of global warfare, the
The effects of disease and starvation tremendous tasks facing the American
upon combat efficiency were disastrous. people, and the volume of production.
A month after they reached Bataan, the What they needed was food, clothing,
men were only about 75 percent effec- and medicine, and they needed them im-
tive; six weeks later this figure dropped
9
Material on the prevalence of disease can be found No. 18; Col Ray M. O'Day, Hist of 21st Div (PA),
in AG 440 (26 Jan 42) and AG 710 (24 Mar 42) Phil II, 39, both in OCMH.
Rcds; Col Wibb E. Cooper, Med Dept Activities in
10
the12
11
Cooper,
Ltr
Col Med
Phil,Order,
Harry
ann. A. Dept
of Activities,
USAFFE
XIVSkerry, Comments pp.on
to All Unit
USAFFE-USFIP 32—33,55,
Comdrs,
Engineer57—61.
Rpt of15 Hist,
Jan
Opns, 42, sub: Msg from Gen MacArthur, copy in OCMH.
13
copy in OCMH. Ltr, MacArthur to Hoover, 21 Jul 59, OCMH.
New York Times, December 21, 1941.
mediately. "Plain for all to see," wrote reinforcements could be brought into
one officer, "was the handwriting on the Luzon and the enemy driven from the
wall, at the end of which the President Philippines. "Enemy appears to have
had placed a large and emphatic period. tendency to become overconfident," he
The President had—with regret—wiped wrote, "and time is ripe for brilliant
us off the page and closed the book."14 thrust with air carriers."15
So important were these operations,
Strategy and Logistics in- MacArthur's view, so vital were they
to the Allied position in the Far East
If the troops on Bataan thought—mis- and the defense of Allied territory that
takenly—they had been abandoned, they he did not hesitate to urge that the re-
could be sure that they had in General sources of Great Britain, as well as those
MacArthur an eloquent and powerful of the United States, be placed at his
champion to plead their cause in the disposal. After all, he pointed out, the
councils of war. Constantly and per- British Empire would benefit most from
sistently, in the strongest terms, he urged these operations. Singapore, Australia,
the President and Chief of Staff on to and India would be saved and the Brit-
bolder measures and stronger efforts for ish line of communications in the Far
the relief of the Philippine garrison. East made secure. England itself would
The support of the Philippine Islands, be free from attack during the winter
he asserted time and again, was the most months and could safely release forces
important objective of the Allied cause and lend material aid to a cause which
in the Far East and no effort should be was so greatly to its benefit.16
spared to achieve this end. The arrange- But this effort, if it was to be under-
ments and plans made for the defense taken, must be made soon, MacArthur
of the Malay Barrier and the establish- warned Marshall. Already his food sup
ment of a base in Australia, while con- ply was low and his munitions, especially
tributing to this cause, did not, Mac- in antiaircraft ammunition, limited. The
Arthur held, materially affect his own Corregidor garrison, whose existence
situation. depended on its vulnerable water and
What MacArthur wanted was a major power supply, could not hold out indefi-
Allied effort in the Southwest Pacific nitely. Unsupported, he told the Chief
that would have as its objective the relief of Staff on 1 January, he would be able
of the Philippines. This effort, he be- to resist serious attack at most for three
lieved, should take the form of an ad- months. Pending the arrival of the ex-
vance, by air and naval forces, from peditionary force it would be necessary
Australia through the Netherlands therefore to restore his line of commu-
Indies and Borneo to Mindanao. Once nication to the United States "by aggres-
air and naval supremacy had been estab- sive air and naval action," a course he
lished, an Army corps could be landed 15
Rad, MacArthur to Marshall, No. 20, 7 Jan 42,
on Mindanao, and from there, project- AG 381 (11-27-41 Gen) Far East. See also his mes-
ing air and naval forces northward, sages of 27 December and 1 January to the Chiefs of
Staff, in same file and in WPD 4639-2.
14 16
Col Richard C. Mallonee, Bataan Diary, II, 69, Rad, MacArthur to Marshall, Nos. 2 and 3, 1 Jan
copy in OCMH. 42, WPD 4639-2.
THE PHILIPPINES 187
had urged before and continued to islands were "the locus of victory or
urge.17 defeat," and if they fell so would the
MacArthur's pleas for a major Allied Malay Barrier and the entire Asiatic
effort in the Southwest Pacific reached continent. This view the Washington
Washington at a time when the ARCADIA planners, whose perspective encom-
Conference was in session and while passed a war on many fronts, never
the U.S. and British Chiefs of Staff were accepted.
themselves considering how best to halt What MacArthur did not know was
the Japanese advance. But the sympa- that the Army planners in Washington
thetic response to his messages and the had on the 3d of January submitted a
assurance that "the President and Prime study proving that the Philippines could
Minister, Colonel Stimson and Colonel not be reinforced and that his plan for
Knox, the British Chiefs of Staff and our an offensive northward from Australia
corresponding officials" were doing to Mindanao would constitute "an en-
everything possible to strengthen Allied tirely unjustifiable diversion of forces
forces in the Far East could not disguise from the principal theater—the Atlan-
the fact that Washington and London tic." It would require, they noted, about
did not attach the same importance to 1,500 aircraft of various types, at least
the defense of the Philippines as Mac- half of which would have to come from
Arthur did. "Our great hope," General other areas, service and construction
Marshall told him, "is that the rapid units to build airfields along the line of
development of an overwhelming air advance, a large logistical organization,
power on the Malay Barrier will cut the and the transfer from the Atlantic and
Japanese communications south of Bor- Mediterranean of 7-9 capital ships, 5-7
neo and permit an assault on the carriers, about 50 destroyers, 60 subma-
southern Philippines."18 rines, and the necessary auxiliaries. The
The emphasis in such a strategy, as greatest effort that could be justified in
MacArthur well knew, was not on the terms of global strategy, the planners
drive northward but on holding the stated, was to hold the Malay Barrier
Malay Barrier and its east and west an- while projecting operations as far north
chors, Burma and Australia. The sup- as possible. Since this view was essen-
port of the Philippine garrison and the tially that already accepted by the Com-
re-establishment of the line of communi- bined Chiefs, the effect of the Army
cations to Luzon, though included as planners' study was to confirm the deci-
one of the objectives of Allied strategy, sion already made when ABDACOM
clearly came after these. MacArthur was established.19
agreed that the Japanese drive south- The conclusions of the Army plan-
ward must be halted, but believed that ners, however valid they were, did not
this objective could best be accomplished affect the determination of the Presi-
by holding the Philippines. To him the dent, Mr. Stimson, or General Marshall
17 19
Ibid.; Rad, MacArthur to Marshall, No. 20, 7 Jan Memo, Gerow for CofS, 3 Jan 42, sub: Relief of
42, AG 381 (11-27-41 Gen) Far East. Phil, WPD 4639-3. There is no record of formal ap-
18
Rad, Marshall to MacArthur, 2 Jan 42, WPD proval of this study. Both Stimson and Marshall
4639-2. noted it, but made no comment.
to send MacArthur all possible aid. That problems of their own, had not the same
program was already under way and sense of urgency as impelled MacArthur
everything possible was being done in to insist that failure to reach him with
Washington to ensure its success. Thus, supplies would have "monumental" and
when MacArthur on the 4th, the day "disastrous" results. This sense of ur-
after the planners had submitted their gency Marshall undertook to impart to
study, suggested, first, that a plan for these officers after MacArthur had given
blockade running be developed and put his "professional" assurance that the
into effect immediately; and second, in blockade could easily be pierced. To
a tart reference to the Navy, that "some Brereton and Brett he dispatched simi-
relief be obtained on use of submarine lar messages on 17 January calling for
transportation," Marshall took what ac- "comprehensive efforts" to run the block-
tion he could. Already the funds to ade. "To insure utmost energy" in carry-
initiate blockade running had been allo- ing out these efforts, Marshall made ten
cated, but the program would have to million dollars of the Chief of Staff's
await further arrangements in Australia. funds available to Brereton and prom-
Meanwhile he asked Admiral Hart to ised more if needed to induce ship's
send MacArthur by submarine the anti- masters and their crews to undertake
aircraft ammunition he needed so badly. the hazardous journey. "Risks will be
The response was discouraging. Hart great," he wrote. "Rewards must be
replied that he could not spare any of proportional." At the same time he
his submarines for such a mission and it made another million available to Mac-
was not until the end of the month, Arthur and sent Col. Patrick J. Hurley,
after Marshall had enlisted the aid of former Secretary of War and an old
Admiral King, that the submarine was friend of the Philippine commander, to
dispatched. There was nothing Mac- Australia immediately to lend his "ener-
Arthur could do, for Hart's fleet was not getic support" to the blockade-running
under his control, but he did not hesi- program. "Only indomitable determi-
tate to express his feelings. "I urge," nation and pertinacity will succeed,"
he wrote Marshall, "steps be taken to wrote Marshall, "and success must be
obtain a more aggressive and resourceful ours." 21
handling of naval forces in this area." 20 Under the impetus of Marshall's ur-
In this view he would soon have the gent instructions for a comprehensive
support of the Dutch. program and the use of "bold and re-
But assurances and messages from sourceful men," General Brereton began
Washington did not get supplies to the to draw up elaborate and ambitious
Philippines. That task was the responsi- plans. But there was no time for such
bility of commanders in Australia and plans and when Marshall learned of
the Netherlands Indies, who, beset with them he quickly registered his disappro-
20
Rads. MacArthur to Marshall, No. 9, 4 Jan 42;
21
AG 381 (11-27-41 Sec. 1) Far East; Marshall to Brett, Rads, MacArthur to Marshall, No. 72, 17 Jan 42;
No. 671, 5 Jan 42; COMINCH to CINCAF, same date; Marshall to CG USAFIA, same date, both in AG 381
MacArthur to Marshall, No. 26; COMINCH to (11-27-41 sec. 1) Far East; Marshall to Brett, ABDA
CINCAF; Brett to Marshall, No. 485, all dated 9 Jan No. 26, same date, WPD 4560-9; Marshall to Mac-
42 and in WPD Msg File. Arthur, No. 949, same date, OCS 18136-196.
THE PHILIPPINES 189
val. Action and results were needed; he a result, the war would be indefinitely
wrote, not plans.22 prolonged. The only way to defeat the
Thus urged, the commanders in Aus- enemy was to seek combat with him.
tralia concentrated on getting ships and "Counsels of timidity based upon theo-
supplies, but it was a long, hard job, ries of safety first," he warned, "will not
beset with many obstacles, including the win against such an aggressive and auda-
reluctance of the Dutch and British to cious adversary as Japan." "What the
risk the loss of precious shipping. By 2 Allies ought to do," he asserted, was
February, despite the high rewards and attack the Japanese line of communi-
frantic efforts, only five vessels had been cations "stretched over 2,000 miles of
enlisted in the cause. One was already sea." The argument that naval forces
en route to Corregidor with 700 tons of for such an attack were not available he
rations and ammunition; the other four brushed aside with the observation that
were loading in Brisbane and were a great naval victory was not necessary;
scheduled to leave in the near future. "the threat alone would go far toward
All but one would sail directly for the the desired end."24
Philippines. The Mormacsun, under or- General Marshall's reply, though sym-
ders from Washington not to go further pathetic, made it perfectly clear that the
north than the Netherlands Indies, would Allies were doing all they could in the
transfer its cargo at a Dutch port to Pacific. No one denied the advantages
smaller vessels for the last leg of the of an attack against Japan's line of com-
journey.23 munication, he pointed out, but neither
These efforts were satisfactory as far the naval forces nor the bases for such
as they went but they did not add up to an attack were available. Moreover,
the aggressive strategy MacArthur felt MacArthur's proposal did not take into
should be followed in the Far East. consideration the need to keep open the
Early in February he again presented his Allied line of communication. The
views on this subject in a message to the course the Allies had adopted, he ex-
Chief of Staff with the hope that they plained, was all that could be done with
would be shown "to the highest author- existing forces. Until additional forces
ity." The message opened with the could be accumulated the Allies had
startling statement that the present stra- little choice but to "limit the hostile
tegy, aimed at building up forces before advance so as to deny him [the enemy]
the Japanese advance, was "a fatal mis- free access to land and sea areas that will
take on the part of the Democratic immeasurably strengthen his war-mak-
Allies." The plan to build a base and ing powers or will be valuable to us
acquire air supremacy in the Southwest as jump off positions when we can start
Pacific, he predicted, would fail and, as a general offensive." 25
22 24
Rads, Brereton to TAG, 19 Jan 42; Marshall to Rad, MacArthur to Marshall, No. 201, 4 Feb 42,
Brereton, same date, both in AG 381 (11-27-41 sec. WDCSA 381 (2-17-42) Phil. This message, as well as
1) Far East. many others from MacArthur, was forwarded to the
23
Rad, Brereton to Marshall, No. 88, 22 Jan 42; President.
25
Barnes to TAG, No. 154, 2 Feb 42, both in AG 381 Rad, Marshall to MacArthur, 8 Feb 42, WDCSA
(11-27-41 sec 2A) Far East. 381 (2-17-12) Phil.
26
On the same day that the Chief of would still secure at least equal delay."
Staff dispatched his reply to MacArthur, The reaction from Washington to
President Quezon, who had moved the Quezon's proposal was prompt and em-
seat of the Commonwealth Government phatic. President Roosevelt repudiated
to Corregidor, offered a plan to bring the scheme outright and declared, in a
hostilities in the Philippines to a close. personal message to Quezon, that the
This plan was based on the assumption American Government would never
that the Japanese were in the Philippines agree to such a solution to the war in
only because the United States was there. the Philippines. But he softened the
If the United States Government would blow by pledging that "so long as the
grant the Philippines their indepen- flag of the United States flies on Filipino
dence immediately and withdraw its Soil ... it would be defended by our
forces, Quezon explained to President own men to the death." To MacArthur
Roosevelt, then he would seek to per- the President sent strict instructions to
suade Japan to do the same. If Japan continue the fight without surrender of
agreed, as he thought it would, then he American troops "so long as there re-
would disband the Philippine Army and mains any possibility of resistance."27
leave his country without fortifications There was no misunderstanding the
of any kind. The major powers could meaning and tone of this message.
then neutralize the Philippines and save Both Quezon and MacArthur ac-
it from the ravages of a war in which it cepted the President's decision without
had no real interest. question. Quezon wrote that he fully
Quezon's disquieting proposal, which appreciated the President's position and
the American High Commissioner sup- would abide by the decision. Mac-
ported, was accompanied by an estimate Arthur, in his reply, explained that his
from General MacArthur painting a message had been misunderstood, that
dark picture of the military situation in he never had any intention of surrender-
the Philippines. "So far as the military ing and would fight "to destruction" on
angle is concerned," MacArthur wrote, Bataan and Corregidor.28
"the problem presents itself as to This matter was hardly settled when
whether the plan of President Quezon events in the Pacific, gloomy at best,
might offer the best possible solution of took a turn for the worse. Already the
what is about to be a disastrous debacle." Japanese had taken Malaya, Borneo, and
He did not believe it would affect the the Celebes, and on 15 February Singa-
ultimate fate of the Philippines; that, pore fell. Its loss provided MacArthur
he thought, would be decided by the with the occasion for still another plea
outcome of the war in other theaters. 26
Rads, Ft. Mills to Marshall, Nos. 226 and 227, 8
"If the Japanese Government rejects Feb 42, CofS Phil Sit File. The first part of the mes-
President Quezon's proposition," he told sage is addressed to Roosevelt and signed Quezon;
the second to Marshall signed MacArthur. Ltr, Mac-
Marshall, "it would psychologically Arthur to Hoover, 21 Jul 59, OCMH.
strengthen our hold because of their 27
Rad, Roosevelt to MacArthur for Quezon, No.
Prime Minister's public statement offer- 1029,
28
9 Feb 42, CofS Phil Sit File.
Rads, MacArthur to Roosevelt, No. 252, 11 Feb
ing independence. If it accepts it, we 42; Quezon to Roosevelt, No. 262, 12 Feb 42, both in
lose no military advantage because we OPD Exec Files.
THE PHILIPPINES 191
for an attack against the Japanese line munition, 8,000 rounds of 81-mm. am-
of communications. "The opportuni- munition, and miscellaneous medical,
ties still exist for a complete reversal of signal, and engineer supplies.31
the situation," he declared with charac- But the delivery of these supplies left
teristic optimism. "It will soon, how- them far from the battlefield of Bataan.
ever, be too late for such a movement." 29 From Mindanao and Cebu they still had
To the planners in Washington and to be transported northward through
the officers of USAFIA and ABDACOM, the inland seas to Manila Bay. For this
the loss of Singapore and the rapid Japa- leg of the journey, fast interisland motor
nese advance into the Netherlands Indies ships with a capacity of 300 to 1,000
was hardly the occasion for attack. To tons were used. Cebu was the headquar-
them it forecast the invasion of Sumatra ters for these vessels and from there
and Java and an end to blockade-run- thousands of tons went northward. The
ning. Pat Hurley, who had arrived in Legaspi was the first to make the jour-
Australia on 8 February, reported from ney safely, arriving at Corregidor on 22
Java on the 17th that "movements are January with a cargo of rice and other
progressing as expeditiously as can be food. Two other vessels, the Princessa
expected under existing condition." But and Elcano, performed the same feat in
he also warned that the sea routes north February, the latter carrying rations un-
of Australia were becoming increasingly loaded from the Coast Farmer. Three
hazardous. A few days later he told the other vessels carrying the remainder of
Chief of Staff that there were "almost that ship's cargo were sunk as were
insuperable d i f f i c u l t i e s " in getting others carrying the supplies brought in
supplies to MacArthur.30 by the Dona Nati and Anhui. Of the
The former Secretary of War did not 10,000 tons of rations that had reached
exaggerate. Despite the elaborate prep- the Philippines, only about 1,000 tons—
arations and large funds, the five vessels a 4-day supply for the 100,000 soldiers
reported on 2 February were all that and civilians on Bataan—ever reached
ever joined the blockade-running pro- Manila Bay.32
gram. Of these only three, the Coast Before the end of February it was
Farmer, Dona Nati, and Anhui, got already evident that the blockade-run-
through. The first, a 3,000-ton Army ning program from Australia was a fail-
freighter with a speed of 10 knots, left ure, but it was not until the Japanese
Australia on 4 February and put in at a landed in Java that the officers in charge
Mindanao port fifteen days later. The of the program admitted their inability
other two left later and arrived at Cebu to supply the Philippines. This admis-
in mid-March. All together, they sion came to General Marshall in a joint
brought in more than 10,000 tons of message from Brett and Hurley recom-
rations, 4,000 rounds of small arms am- 31
Maj Gen Julian F. Barnes, Rpt of Orgn of
USAFIA; Maj Richard M. Leighton and Elizabeth
29
Rad, MacArthur to Marshall, No. 297, 16 Feb 42, Bingham. Development of U.S. Supply Base in Aus-
WDCSA 381 (2-17-42) Phil. tralia, both in OCMH.
30 32
Rads, Hurley to Marshall, ABDACOM No. 2, 17 Rpt of QM Opns in Phil Campaign, ann. of
Feb 42, AG 381 (11-27-41 sec. 28) Far East; 21 Feb USAFFE-USFIP Rpt of Opns, pp. 29-40, 69-70, and
42, OPD 381 SWPA, sec. 1 case 21. app. A, Rpt of Opns, Cebu Depot, OCMH.
mending that the program be aban- The schedule established under the
doned and that the Philippines be sup- new program called for six sailings, the
plied directly from the United States via first vessel to leave New Orleans on 28
Hawaii "through open sea areas in February, the last on 22 March. But
which the chance of reaching destina- there were delays in assembling the car-
tion is much greater than through nar- goes, selecting the route, and finding
row channels between island and block- gun crews, and it was not until 2 March
ade areas of the Southwest Pacific."33 that the first ship sailed. The others fol-
The Brett-Hurley proposal was a lowed later in the month, two sailing
sound one; it had already been made by from New Orleans through the Panama
MacArthur who, on 22 February had Canal to Los Angeles and then Hono-
expressed strong dissatisfaction with the lulu, the others directly from the west
efforts being made in Australia. The coast. But they had left too late and
program, he had asserted, should be con- none ever reached their destination.36
trolled from Washington and other Submarines and aircraft as well as
routes, including that across the central surface vessels were utilized in the des-
Pacific from Hawaii, be utilized. "If it perate attempt to supply the beleaguered
is left as a subsidiary effort," he told garrison. The underwater craft could
Marshall, "it will never be accom- carry rations and ammunition directly
plished."34 Immediately the supply ex- to Corregidor but in such limited
perts in the War Department, on the amounts that the ten trips made netted
basis of the President's request, made a a total of only 53 tons of food (less than
quick survey of the problem. Their one meal for the men on Bataan), 3,500
conclusion was that direct supply of the rounds of badly needed 3-inch antiair-
Philippines from the United States by craft ammunition, over 1 ,000,000 rounds
way of Hawaii was "practical and desir- of .50 and .30-caliber ammunition, and
able." Six World War I destroyers, they about 30,000 gallons of diesel oil for
pointed out, could be converted to cargo the power plant on Corregidor. The
vessels for this purpose. The plan was aircraft, with more limited space, were
quickly approved.35 used largely for medical supplies. They
succeeded in bringing their cargoes as far
33
Rad, Hurley and Brett for Marshall, 483, 4 Mar as Del Monte in Mindanao, but most of
42, AG 381 (11-27-41 sec. 3) Far East.
34
the quinine and morphine so critically
Rad, MacArthur to Marshall, 344, 22 Feb 42,
WPD Ready Ref File, Phil.
needed on Bataan remained there.37
35
Memos, Somervell for Marshall, 22 Feb 42, sub: By mid-March the opportunity to
Supply of U.S. Forces in Phil, OCS 18136-258; Mar- bring supplies to Bataan and Corregi-
shall for Roosevelt, 24 Feb 42, no sub, WPD 4560-26,
Marshall for Roosevelt, 28 Feb 42; sub: Blockade dor had been lost. The Japanese were
Runners, OCS 18136-268. Vice Adm. Bernhard H. in control of the air and sea routes and
Bieri (ret.), then one of the naval planners, recalled
36
later that he never heard of this plan to use World Messages dealing with these vessels can be found
War I destroyers and doubted that it had been sub- in AG 384.3 GHQ SWPA and in the Hist Br, OCT,
mitted to the Navy. Anyone familiar with the steam- SWPA, Phil Shipping.
37
ing characteristics of these 1,000-ton destroyers and Rpt, CTF 51 to CINCSWPA, 15 May 42, sub:
with the distances in the Pacific, he wrote, "would Submarine Relief Activities, ser. FF6-4, A 16-3, copy
have crossed it out as a practical operation." Ltr, in OCMH; Ltr, GHQ SWPA to CG US. Air Service,
Bieri to Hoover, 17 Jul 59, OCMH. 14 May 42, sub: Phil Relief Shipments, AG 384-3M.
THE PHILIPPINES 193
had blocked the passage between Min- that his reputation, "his honor and his
danao and the Visayas to Manila Bay. record as a soldier," would not be
The total effort and large sums ex- compromised.38
pended by that time had produced neg- The first reference to this matter came
ligible results in terms of tonnages on 4 February when General Marshall,
delivered to the troops. But it was an undoubtedly at the direction of the
effort that had to be made, no matter President, mentioned to MacArthur the
how high the cost or slim the chance possibility of his transfer to another com-
of success. The American people owed mand should Bataan fall, leaving only
at least that much to the gallant Corregidor in American hands.39 "Under
Philippine garrison. these conditions," he told MacArthur,
"the need for your services there might
Command well be less pressing than at other points
in the Far East." There were, Marshall
From the beginning there was little explained, two possibilities. One was for
doubt in Washington that the Philip- MacArthur to go to Mindanao to direct
pine garrison was doomed. After the guerrilla operations and to await the
Japanese victory in Malaya and in the supplies which would make a counter-
Netherlands Indies, the outcome in the attack possible. The other was to go
Philippines was certain. It was only a directly to Australia and there resume
question of time and there were many command of all U.S. Army forces in the
who thought the battle would be over Far East. No decision had yet been made
very soon. But if the garrison was on his future employment, Marshall
doomed, what would happen to General went on, and before one was he wanted
MacArthur? Was he to be allowed to the confidential views of the Philippine
fall into Japanese hands, lost forever to commander. "It is to be understood,"
the Allied cause? The answer was self- he concluded, "that in case your with-
evident. MacArthur's services were too drawal from immediate leadership of
valuable to be sacrificed in a hopeless your beleaguered force is to be carried
cause and he must be rescued to lead out it will be by direct order of the
other forces in the war against Japan. President to you."40
There were difficulties to this solu- Whatever MacArthur thought about
tion. A command commensurate with this proposal he kept his own counsel
his rank and seniority must be found for
him. The timing and circumstances of 38
Memo, Hurley for Marshall, 21 Feb 42, OPD 381
his departure must be arranged with SWPA, sec. 1, case 21.
39
Rear Adm. Charles A. Moore, one of the Navy
great care to avoid the appearance of planners in February 1942, served on the panel that
abandoning the Filipinos to whom he reviewed the present manuscript before publication.
was the symbol of resistance. And Mac- At that time, July 1959, he recalled that on several
occasions he had mentioned to Secretary of State
Arthur himself might show an under- Cordell Hull the necessity for getting MacArthur out
standable reluctance to leave his troops of the Philippines, and that it was Hull who finally
in the midst of battle. If he was ordered went to the President with this suggestion. Notes of
Panel Meeting, 17 July 1959.
out, Colonel Hurley said, it would have 40
Rad, Marshall to MacArthur, 4 Feb 42, WDCSA
to be by the President and in such a way 370-5 (3-17-42) Phil.
and carefully avoided the subject in the Arthur to leave for Australia as soon as
days that followed. But he did say to possible, stopping at Mindanao only long
the President, a week later and in another enough "to insure a prolonged defense."
connection, that he and his family—his On his arrival in Australia he would
wife and young son were still on Cor- assume command of a new theater of
regidor with him—would "share the fate operations in the Southwest Pacific, ar-
of the garrison."41 Marshall picked up rangements for which were then in
this statement and a few days later, in a progress. So urgent was this new assign-
message dealing with the need for antiair- ment that he was to make ready imme-
craft ammunition, urged MacArthur to diately and not to "delay in Mindanao"
send his family to safety for his next as- longer than a week. Washington would
signment might separate them "under provide the transportation.44
circumstances of greatly increased peril" MacArthur's first reaction was to refuse
and "poignant embarrassment." Mac- the assignment and remain with his men.
Arthur answered the inquiry about am- But after consultation with the senior
munition but pointedly omitted any members of his staff, who pointed out
reference to the personal aspects of that he could do more for the Philippine
Marshall's message.42 garrison in Australia than on Corregi-
Nothing further was said about the dor, he decided to accept.45. He did not,
matter for another week, though it must however, accept the injunction to leave
have been discussed more than once at immediately. Pointing out that his
the White House where MacArthur's abrupt departure might have an adverse
worth was rated by one officer as the effect on morale, he asked for permission
equivalent of five Army corps. Finally, to delay his departure until, as he put it,
on 21 February, when it was already the "psychological time" presented it-
evident that ABDACOM was doomed self. "Please be guided by me in this
and that a new command would have to matter," he urged the President. "I
be established in the Southwest Pacific, know the situation here in the Philip-
MacArthur received word that the Presi- pines and unless the right moment is
dent had tentatively decided to order chosen for this delicate operation, a sud-
him to Mindanao, but was not "suffi- den collapse might occur." This permis-
ciently informed as to the situation and sion was readily granted as was authority
circumstances to be certain that the to call on the Army and Navy command-
proposal meets the actual situation."43 ers in Australia for the transportation
The next day, without waiting for a he would require.46
reply from Corregidor, the President 44
Rad, Marshall to MacArthur, No. 1078, 22 Feb
made his decision and ordered Mac- 42, CofS folder entitled MacArthur's Move to Aus-
tralia.
41 45
Rad, MacArthur to Roosevelt, No. 252, 11 Feb 42, Frazier Hunt, MacArthur and the War Against
OPD Exec Files. Japan (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1944),
42
Rads, Marshall to MacArthur, 14 Feb 42; Mac- p. 64. In this connection, see Jonathan M. Wain-
Arthur to Marshall, 15 Feb 42, both in WDCSA wright, General Wainwright's Story (New York:
370.05 (3-17-42) Phil. Doubleday and Company, 1945), pp. 1-5.
43 46
Rad, Marshall to MacArthur, 21 Feb 42, WDCSA Rads, MacArthur to Marshall, No. 358, 24 Feb
370.05 (3-17-42) Phil; Eisenhower Personal Note- 42; Marshall to MacArthur, No. 1087, 25 Feb 42, both
book, entry of 23 Feb 42, copy in OCMH. in WDCSA 370.05 (3-17-42) Phil.
THE PHILIPPINES 195
The "psychological time" arrived in perate and important trip with inade-
the second week of March. It was then quate equipment," he wrote, "would
that MacArthur judged the situation on amount to consigning the whole party to
Bataan stable enough for him to leave death and I could not accept such a
without risking "a sudden collapse." responsibility." 48
Arrangements for transportation were Three B-17's were dispatched from
quickly made and the officers to accom- Australia immediately. Two of them
pany him and his family carefully se- reached Del Monte on the night of the
lected. On the 11th all was ready and as 16th, the other soon after. That night
darkness settled over Manila Bay, Mac- the entire group took off and arrived at
Arthur stepped into the first of the four Darwin at 0900 the next morning. From
PT boats that would take him and the there MacArthur proceeded to Mel-
rest of the group, all together twenty-one bourne, where his arrival was greeted
persons, to Mindanao.47 with wild enthusiasm by the Australians.
The trip to Mindanao took two nights. He had made the hazardous journey,
On the first the group reached a small "undoubtedly unique in military annals"
uninhabited island in the central Philip- he told General Marshall, in safety, but
pines (Cuyo Island). The small craft it would be more than two and a half
had broken formation during the night years before he would redeem his pledge
and became separated, one of them to return to the Philippines.49
dumping its spare fuel when it mistook The departure of General MacArthur
another PT boat for an enemy vessel. had no immediate effect on operations in
The next night the group continued the Philippines, but it resulted in a com-
south in the three remaining vessels, plete change in the top command in the
reaching Mindanao at daybreak. There islands. This change was not Mac-
they were met by Maj. Gen. William F. Arthur's doing. He fully intended to
Sharp, commander of the Mindanao retain his control of the forces in the
Force, and driven to Del Monte airfield Philippines as commander of USAFFE
to board the three B-17's which should from his new headquarters 4,000 miles
have been waiting there to take them to away. The headquarters itself as well as
Australia. But there was only one on its most important staff officers he took
the airfield and MacArthur considered to Australia with him. But he left be-
that unfit for passengers. Incensed, he hind an advance echelon and it was
dispatched two messages, one to General through this small staff headed by his
Brett in Australia asking for other planes G-4, Col. Lewis C. Beebe, whom he des-
immediately and the other to General ignated deputy chief of staff of USAAFE
Marshall calling for "the best three planes and recommended for promotion, that
in the United States or Hawaii" with he intended to exercise his control.
veteran crews. "To attempt such a des- Beebe's main task would be to get sup-
plies for Corregidor and Bataan; the di-
47
Rads, Marshall to MacArthur, 6 Mar 42, WDCSA
48
370.05 (2-17-42) Phil; Brett to Marshall, No. 760, Rad, MacArthur to Marshall, No. 482, 14 Mar 42,
19 Mar 42, AG 371 (3-19-42); Rear Adm Francis W. WDCSA 370.05 (2-17-42) Phil.
49
Rockwell, Rpt on Gen MacArthur's Evacuation, Rad, MacArthur to Marshall, No. 5, 21 Mar 42,
Office CNO, Naval Hist Div. OPD Exec Files.
Gen. Albert M. Jones. Thus, for the

first time in the campaign the fighting
on Bataan came under a separate com-
mand, which was, in effect, an army
headquarters directing the operations of
two corps. Previously this direction had
been provided by USAFFE.51
The task of holding Corregidor until
his return, MacArthur assigned to Maj.
Gen. George F. Moore, commander of
the Harbor Defense of Manila Bay. His
last instructions to Moore were to set
aside enough food to maintain 20,000
men on half-rations until 30 June 1942
in the expectation that if Bataan fell the
Philippine Division would be brought
to Corregidor to make a last stand there.
When he could hold out no longer,
MacArthur told him, he was to destroy
Corregidor's formidable armament so
that it could not be used against the
Americans when they returned.52
The other two commands MacArthur
left behind included the remaining
forces in the Philippines. Previously
GENERAL MACARTHUR WITH GENERAL these forces had been organized into the
HURLEY after arriving in Australia. composite V i s a y a n - M i n d a n a o Force
under General Sharp. On 4 March,
rection of operations would be handled MacArthur split this command and
in MacArthur's own headquarters.50 created a separate Visayan Force under
MacArthur realized full well the dis- Brig. Gen. Bradford C. Chynoweth.
advantages of exercising command so far Sharp remained in command of Min-
from the battlefield. These he sought to danao, the only island south of Luzon on
overcome by organizing his forces into which a major Japanese force had
four major commands and giving to landed.53 This move was probably de-
each greater control over its operations. signed to permit General Sharp to
For the troops on Bataan, and those still devote all his energies to the defense of
holding out in the mountains of Luzon, Mindanao, the base from which Mac-
he established the Luzon Force and Arthur still hoped to mount a counter-
named General Wainwright as its com- offensive against the Japanese.
mander. Wainwright's old job as I But careful as he had been in making
Corps commander was given to Maj. 51
Wainwright, General Wainwright's Story, p. 2.
50 52
Rpt of Harbor Defense of Manila Bay, ann. VIII Rpt of Harbor Defense, pp. 33, 42ff.
53
of USAFFE-USFIP Rpt of Opns, p. 42. USAFFE-USFIP Rpt of Opns, p. 55.
THE PHILIPPINES 197
these arrangements (to go into effect the MacArthur, he commanded the naval
day after his departure), and briefing forces as well as those of the Army, and
the force commanders and new deputy was therefore a joint commander.56
chief of staff, MacArthur neglected one It was only when MacArthur learned
thing—to inform the War Department. of Wainwright's assumption of command
Whatever the reasons, the result was on the 21st that he informed the War
utter confusion. The War Department Department of his own arrangements.
assumed that Wainwright, the senior To Marshall these seemed unsatisfactory
officer in the islands, was in command of for a variety of reasons, and he told the
all forces in the Philippines as Mac- President so. Wainwright, he felt, should
Arthur had been, and addressed him as continue in command. The President
such. But the messages, intended for accepted this advice and MacArthur was
Wainwright and marked for the com- advised that unless he had strenuous
mander in the Philippines came to Beebe objections, Wainwright would retain his
who had no recourse but to refer them to new post.57 MacArthur made no objec-
MacArthur, then en route to Australia. tions. He understood thoroughly Mar-
Beebe's position was an embarrassing shall's difficulties, he said, and would
one and he urged his chief repeatedly to accommodate himself to the arrange-
clear up the matter with Washington. ments already made. "Heartily in accord
But to no avail. MacArthur remained with Wainwright's promotion to lieuten-
silent and the War D e p a r t m e n t ant general," he radioed, "His assign-
uninformed.54 ment to P h i l i p p i n e command is
Events finally overwhelmed General appropriate."58
Beebe. On the 20th came messages from Thus ended the uncertainty and con-
the President and Chief of Staff, address- fusion. Wainwright was now confirmed
ing Wainwright as commander in the as the commander of all forces in the Phil-
Philippines and telling him of his pro- ippine Islands with the large authority
motion to lieutenant general. No con- and heavy responsibilities formerly pos-
fusion was possible. "Upon the sessed by General MacArthur. But he
departure of General MacArthur," wrote was not independent of his former com-
Marshall, "you become commander of mander, for MacArthur, though not yet
U.S. forces in the Philippines."55 Beebe officially appointed to his new office, had
had no choice but to turn over the mes- acquired even greater responsibilities
sages to Wainwright, who, next morning, than before and command over an area
formally assumed command of U.S. stretching from Melbourne to Manila.
Forces in the Philippines (USFIP), the
name of his new headquarters, and des- 56
MacArthur had acquired this control on 30 Jan-
ignated Beebe his chief of staff. Like uary 1942. Rad, Marshall to MacArthur, 30 Jan 42,
WPD 3251-75.
54 57
Rad, Marshall to USAFIA, No. 740, 18 Mar 42, Rad, MacArthur to Marshall, No. 3, 21 Mar 42,
OPD 381, Phil, sec 1, case 13. The correspondence AG 311.23 (4 Feb 42) GHQ SWPA; Memo, Marshall
between Beebe and MacArthur is filed in AG 311.23 for Pres, 22 Mar 42, sub: Comd in Phil; Rad, Mar-
(4 Feb 42) GHQ SWPA. shall to MacArthur, No. 810, 22 Mar 42, both in OPD
55
Rads, Roosevelt to CG USAFFE, No. 1198; Mar- Exec Files.
58
shall to Wainwright, No. 1204, both dated 19 Mar Rad, MacArthur to Marshall, No. 19, 24 Mar 42,
42, and No. 1203, 20 Mar 42, OPD Exec Files. AG 311.23 (4 Feb 42) GHQ SWPA.
CHAPTER IX
Australia and the Line of Communication

Logistics comprises the means and arrangements which work out the
plans of strategy and tactics.
BARON DE JOMINI, The Art of War
When in December the War Depart- islands stretching across the South Pa-
ment established in Australia the com- cific—the life line to Australia. The
mand known as USAFIA it had no results, largely unforseen and never antic-
intention of using its ground forces to ipated in prewar plans, were to have a
defend that subcontinent or of creating profound effect on the war in the Pacific.
a theater of operations. All it wanted to
do was to provide a base from which to The Northeast Area
supply the Philippines. That purpose
was soon enlarged to include the support North of Australia, "like a prehistoric
of ABDACOM, but not to the extent of monster, half bird and half reptile,"2
committing large ground forces. The lies New Guinea, separating Indonesia
American contribution in that area, to the west from the islands of Melanesia
General Marshall told Brett before he to the east. The eastern half of New
assumed command of USAFIA, was to Guinea (except for the Papuan Penin-
be "predominantly air, with other ele- sula), with the islands of the Bismarck
ments limited to those necessary for Archipelago—New Britain, New Ireland,
efficient air operation and the security and the Admiralties—and those of the
of the bases."1 northern Solomons—Buka and Bougain-
The advance of the Japanese into the ville—compose the Australian Mandated
Bismarck Archipelago, New Guinea, and Territory. The Papuan Peninsula, which
the Solomons, combined with their suc- formed the tail of the New Guinea mon-
cess along the Malay Barrier in Decem- ster, was Australian colonial territory.
ber and January, brought into sharp To the east of Papua lay the southern
relief the danger to Australia and the Solomons, constituting a British colony.
necessity of enlarging its defenses. This The strategic significance of the inac-
task was assumed, somewhat reluctantly, cessible and inhospitable region compris-
by the United States, and with it went
the additional burden of defending the
2
Samuel Eliot Morison, Breaking the Bismarcks
Barrier, 22 July 1942 -1 May 1944, vol. VI, "History
1
Rad, Marshall to Brett, No. 41, 25 Dec 41, WPD of United States Naval Operations in World War II"
4628-3. (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1957), p. 27.
AUSTRALIA AND THE LINE OF COMMUNICATION 199
ing the southeast portion of New Guinea and elsewhere, the Australians could do
and the Solomons lay in the fact that its no more than place token garrisons in
straits and seas and its isolated com- the Northeast Area. At Port Moresby
munities provided a double path to the was a brigade group of about 3,000 men,
important east coast of Australia and a handful of planes, and some artillery.
the line of communications to the United The rest of New Guinea was defended
States. Both paths began at the Bismarck by a local militia called the New Guinea
Archipelago. The western route led Volunteer Reserve, while Rabaul was
along the New Guinea coast, from Lae garrisoned by a mixed force numbering
and Salumaua to the tip of the Papuan about 1,500 men.3
Peninsula, and then through the Coral The Japanese had no plan to invade
Sea to the developed and industrialized Australia when they went to war, but
east coast of Australia. The second route they recognized fully the importance of
extended from the Bismarck Archipelago Rabaul and the Bismarck Archipelago
in a southeasterly direction through the as a base for offensive operations and as
Solomons to the New Hebrides, New an outpost for the defense of Truk and
Caledonia, the Fijis, and the island chain their own line of communications. In
stretching eastward to Hawaii. Far to their plans, therefore, they provided for
the south lay New Zealand, like Aus- the "seizure of strategic points in the
tralia a British Dominion and a vital link Bismarck Archipelago."4 This task was
in the imperial system. to be accomplished after the occupation
At the apex of these two routes, on of Guam and by the same force which
the island of New Britain, lay Rabaul, took that lonely American outpost—a
capital of the Australian Mandated Ter- joint force consisting of the Army's
ritory and key to the defense of the South Seas Detachment and the Navy's
Northeast Area. With its first-rate har- South Seas Force.
bor and airfield sites, Rabaul was po- Vice Adm. Shigeyoshi Inouye, 4th
tentially the finest base in the region for Fleet commander, began making his
an enemy advance along either or both plans for an advance into the Bismarck
routes. Conversely it could be used as a Archipelago immediately after the occu-
springboard from which to attack with pation of Guam on 10 December. It was
air or naval forces the Japanese strong- not until 4 January, however, that Maj.
hold at Truk, which lay only 640 miles General Tomitaro Horii, commander of
to the north, and to drive in the right the South Seas Detachment, was told by
flank of the Japanese position in the Imperial General Headquarters to make
Central Pacific. The other key Allied
base in the Northeast Area was Port
Moresby, which faced northeastern Aus- 3
Dudley McCarthy, Southwest Pacific Area—First
tralia across the Gulf of Papua and Year: Kokoda to Wau (Canberra: Australian War
Memorial, 1959), ch. II; Samuel Milner, Victory in
Torres Strait. To its rear, providing a Papua, UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD
measure of security, lay the towering WAR II (Washington, 1957), ch. I; USSBS, The
Owen Stanley range. Allied Campaign Against Rabaul (Washington,
1946), p. 6.
With their limited forces, many of 4
Army-Navy Central Agreement, Nov 1941, in
which were serving in the Middle East USSBS, The Campaigns of the Pacific War, app. 12.
ready for the invasion of Rabaul, to be destruction begun on the 4th by Truk-
undertaken around the middle of the based bombers. Then, while the carriers
month. Inouye and Horii, who was di- and cruisers stood off to the north to
rectly under the control of Imperial repel a counterattack and the submarines
General Headquarters, quickly made ar- took up positions before St. George's
rangements for the coming operations. Channel between New Britain and New
The South Seas Detachment would take Ireland, the convoys moved toward the
Rabaul; the South Seas Force of the 4th target. An hour before midnight of the
Fleet, Kavieng in New Ireland. D-day 22d the invasion force hove to in Rabaul
was set for 23 January. With a full ap- Harbor.
preciation of the importance of Rabaul The weeks of bombing had accom-
to the Allies, the Japanese anticipated a plished their purpose and Rabaul was
naval reaction, either from Australia or virtually without air or coastal defenses
Hawaii, and took every precaution to when Horii took his South Seas Detach-
meet such a contingency. But they had ment ashore in the early hours of the
an accurate knowledge of the defenses of 23d. The Australians put up only a
Rabaul and Kavieng and did not foresee nominal defense. Hopelessly outnum-
any difficulty in overcoming either gar- bered and outgunned, they retreated
rison. Nevertheless they made their into the hills and jungle behind the
plans carefully, reconnoitered thor- town. Four hundred men of the garrison
oughly, and began softening up the made good their escape; the rest were
target three weeks before the invasion captured or killed. By noon the Japa-
date.5 nese were in control of Rabaul.6
On 14 January the South Seas Detach- Meanwhile, the force designated for
ment., a heavily reinforced regimental the occupation of Kavieng, two compa-
combat team numbering about 5,000 nies of special naval landing troops, had
men, left Guam escorted by units of the left Truk on the 20th and under separate
4th Fleet. Additional protection was escort sailed directly to New Ireland. On
furnished by three carriers and support- the morning of the 23d this force landed
ing warships detached from the Pearl at Kavieng without opposition, the de-
Harbor force and led by Admiral fenders having been captured as they
Nagumo himself; a scouting force of sought to make their escape in small
four heavy cruisers; and a separate sub- boats. Thus, in a few hours, with almost
marine force of six large underwater no casualties, the Japanese had gained
craft. At dawn of the 20th and again on control of the strategic Bismarck Archi-
the 21st, Nagumo sent his carrier planes pelago and uncovered the outer defenses
against Rabaul and nearby points along of the Northeast Area.
the New Guinea coast to complete the In the weeks that followed the Japa-
nese consolidated their hold on the area
5
This account of the planning and seizure of
and began to convert Rabaul into a
Rabaul and Kavieng is based on Hist of the South formidable base. Mopping-up operations
Seas Detachment, Japanese Studies in World War II,
36; Japanese Opns in SWPA, series II, ch. V; South-
6
east Area Air Opns and Southeast Area Naval Opns, For an account of the Rabaul operation, see Wig-
Japanese Studies in World War II, 38 and 48. more, The Japanese Thrust, ch. XVIII.
were completed by the end of the month of an American flag officer responsible to
and troops posted on adjacent islands to the Commander in Chief of the Pacific
establish an outer ring of defense. In the Fleet.8
invasion convoy had been a large num- This proposal, as finally amended by
ber of construction troops and these Admiral King and the British First Sea
were put to work immediately to repair Lord, Admiral Pound, was submitted to
and improve existing airfields, build new the Australian Government on 8 Janu-
ones, and construct naval facilities. On ary. For reasons that are not clear, the
30 January 9 Zeros from Truk moved to Australians, though extremely concerned
Rabaul, and soon after 20 medium over the defense of the Northeast Area,
bombers landed at the Vinakauan air- took no action for two weeks. Finally,
field outside the town. By the end of on 23 January, the day the Japanese took
February an entire air group—48 me- Rabaul, the Australian Prime Minister,
dium bombers, a similar number of John Curtin, agreed to the establish-
fighters, and 12 flying boats—was based ment of the ANZAC area under Ameri-
at Rabaul.7 can command, but with assumptions
The fall of Rabaul alarmed the Aus- about the responsibilities of the Pacific
tralians as nothing else had. General Fleet commander that took another week
Wavell's ABDACOM still provided some to remove. It was not until the end of
measure of protection against invasion the month, therefore, that ANZAC was
from the northwest, but the Northeast formally established, with Vice Adm.
Area was now virtually unprotected. Herbert F. Leary in command. His task
This possibility had been foreseen when was to cover the eastern and northeastern
the ABDA area was created and the approaches to Australia and New Zea-
British had then suggested that the U.S. land; protect Allied shipping and sup-
Pacific Fleet assume responsibility for port the defense of the islands in the
the defense of the northeast approaches to area; and, finally, destroy enemy forces
Australia and for the line of communi- and attack enemy positions in the area.
cation. Still reeling from the blow at The ANZAC command, like
Pearl Harbor, the Navy refused this ad- ABDACOM, was short-lived, but un-
ditional burden, but Admiral King had like that ill-fated command did not dis-
on 1 January directed his planners to integrate under Japanese pressure but
study the problem. The result was a because it had outlived its usefulness.
recommendation to establish the ANZAC Nor did Admiral Leary have responsi-
area envisaged a year before in ABC-1, bility for the defense of the land areas
but to enlarge it on the north and east to included in ANZAC; his was exclusively
include the Fijis, New Hebrides, and a naval and air command. Initially it
New Caledonia. Air and naval forces in consisted of three Australian cruisers,
this area would be supplied by Australia plus some destroyers and corvettes. To
and New Zealand, assisted by the United
States, and would be under the direction 8
CCS 15, The ANZAC Area, 29 Jan 42, ABC 323.31
(1-24-42) POA 1; Mins, White House Conf, 1 Jan
42, WDCSA 334 Mtgs and Conf; Hayes, The War
7
USSBS, The Allied Campaign Against Rabaul, Against Japan, vol. I, ch. I, pp. 61-64; ABC-1, ann. 3,
pp. 6-7, 11-12. in Pearl Harbor Attack Hearings, pt. 15, p. 1516.
these were added the USS Chicago and a squadron of the American P-40's al-
two destroyers from the Pacific Fleet. A lotted to General Wavell. Neither the
squadron of B-17's from Hawaii was British nor the American Chiefs could
assigned and it reached Townsville in meet this new and unexpected request,
northeast Australia on 17 February. but offered as an alternative to include
Several days later these bombers hit Ra- Port Moresby in the ABDA area. Gen-
baul in the first blow of a long campaign eral Wavell argued strongly against this
of attrition to neutralize that rapidly solution as well as the suggestion that he
growing Japanese base.9 divert some of his planes to the Aus-
The establishment of ANZAC was tralians, and the matter was dropped.12
only one of the measures taken to meet But the problem of meeting Aus-
the danger created by Japanese tralia's demand for fighter planes was
occupation of Rabaul.10 It was at this still not solved. After considerable dis-
time, too, that the Australians approved cussion, General Marshall agreed to
a proposal the Combined Chiefs had divert one American squadron to the
made on 11 January to include Darwin defense of Port Moresby. This solution,
and the northwest coast of Australia in though it failed to satisfy the Austral-
General Wavell's ABDA area. This ians, was one which, perforce, they had
approval came on 23 January, the same to accept.13 But by the time this deci-
day that the Australians agreed to the sion was made the ANZAC force had
establishment of ANZAC, and the Com- taken over responsibility for the air and
bined Chiefs immediately notified naval defense of the Northeast Area.
Wavell of his new responsibilities.11 It was now early February and the
While this change gave some hope for signs of disintegration along the Malay
the security of Darwin (which the U.S. Barrier to the northwest were clearly
Navy was then using as a base, but evident. Here was another threat to an
which it abandoned after the attack of Australia already concerned over the
19 February), it did not meet the prob- security of the northeast flank. Two of
lem of defending Port Moresby in the its divisions, the 6th and 7th, were due
Northeast Area. The ANZAC force from the Middle East this month and
alone could not, the Australians believed, the next. Under existing plans they
give them the protection they needed were to be used in the defense of the
and they so informed the British while Netherlands Indies, and thus, indirectly,
requesting 250 more fighter planes and of Australia itself. To this arrangement
the Australian Government had no ob-
9
G. Harmon Gill, Royal Australian Navy, 1939- jections. But on 13 February General
42, ser. 2, vol. 1, "Australia in the War of 1939-1945"
(Canberra: Australian War Memorial, 1957), p. 519;
Wavell raised another possibility. In
Milner, Victory in Papua, p. 8.
10 12
The measures discussed in the remainder of this Memo, Gerow for Marshall, 27 Jan 42, sub: Msgs
section are covered fully in Hayes, The War Against for Australia, WPD 4628-24; Rads, CCS to ABDA
Japan, ch. II, pp. 7-12; Matloff and Snell, Strategic COM, DBA 5, 29 Jan 42; Wavell to CCS, 00649, 1 Feb
Planning, 1941-42, pp. 128-31. 42; all in OPD ABDA Msg File; Mins, CCS Mtgs, 23
11
CCS 8, Inclusion of Port Darwin in ABDA, 24 Jan and 27 Jan 42.
13
42, ABC 323.31 (1-29-42); Wavell, "ABDACOM," Mins, CCS Mtg, 3 Feb 42; Rads, CCS to Wavell,
p. 4; Rad, CCS to Wavell, DBA 2, 24 Jan 42, OPD DBA 8, 3 Feb 42; Marshall to Wavell, 5 Feb 42, OPD
ABDA Msg File; Gill, Royal Australian Navy, p. 517. ABDA Msg File.
view of the early loss of Singapore and Australia. Two days later, with the help
the prospects of an invasion of Sumatra of Harry Hopkins, the ships required for
and Java he suggested to the Combined most of these troops had been found. In
Chiefs that at least one of the two Aus- a period when shipping space was the
tralian divisions be sent instead to most precious of Allied resources, this
Burma.14 rapid action was indeed remarkable.16
In Washington there was a full appre- The Americans and British now turned
ciation of the seriousness of the situation to the Australian Government for aid in
along the Malay Barrier. It was recog- Burma. On the 16th, after the fall of
nized, too, that, in the event ABDACOM Singapore, Wavell had come out flatly
fell, the United States could best defend for the diversion of both the 6th and 7th
the right (east) flank and the British the Australian Divisions to Burma on the
left in Southeast Asia.15 But the British ground that they would have a "very
could ill spare the troops to send there great effect on Japanese strategy and a
and the Australians had already made it heartening effect on China and India."17
evident that they would not permit their Reinforcements for Australia, he said,
divisions to serve in Burma. Moreover unaware of the decision made in Wash-
there was in the Middle East a third ington two days earlier, should be pro-
Australian division, the 9th, which was vided by the United States. The United
scheduled to return home soon. If the States and British Governments, unwill-
British were to have the use of any of ing to go as far as Wavell and believing
these troops, then the United States, it that Australia would never consent to
was becoming increasingly clear, would his proposal, asked Curtin for only one
have to provide more than air or service of the divisions for Burma. To these
troops for the defense of Australia. official requests were added the personal
It is against this background that the appeals of Churchill and Roosevelt, the
action that followed Wavell's message of latter enjoining the Australian Prime
the 13th can be best understood. Up to Minister to "have every confidence that
that time the policy of the War Depart- we are going to reinforce your position
ment, reiterated time and again, had with all possible speed."18 But the Aus-
been to send out only aircraft and the tralians were adamant. They had con-
necessary service and supporting troops tributed much to the imperial cause and
to Australia. Now, on 14 February, the would neither risk the loss of their men
War Department suddenly reversed it- in Burma nor jeopardize the security of
self and decided to send an infantry divi-
sion — the 41st — as well as additional 16
Rad, Wavell to Prime Minister, 16 Feb 42, OPD
supporting troops, all together about ABDA Msg File; Memo, Marshall for Eisenhower, 14
25,000 men, for the ground defense of Feb 42, no sub, WPD 4630-64; Churchill, Hinge of
Fate, pp. 140, passim; Matloff and Snell, Strategic
Planning, 1941-42, pp. 128-30; Leighton and Coak-
ley, Global Logistics and Strategy, p. 174.
14 17
Rad, Wavell to CCS, CCOS 7, 13 Feb 42, OPD Rad, Wavell to Prime Minister, 16 Feb 42, OPD
ABDA Msg File. ABDA Msg File.
15 18
Rad, Roosevelt to Prime Minister, 18 Feb 43, Rad. Roosevelt to Curtin, No. 330, 20 Feb 42,
ABC 323.31 (1-29-42 sec. 1A) POA; Sherwood, OPD ABDA Msg File; Churchill, Hinge of Fate, p.
Roosevelt and Hopkins, pp. 502-03. 157.
592496 O-62-15
the homeland to grant the British the clude these islands in their war plans for
use of their 7th Division.19 the timetable of conquest was too close
This refusal did not affect the move- and the initial operations too numerous
ment of American ground troops to Aus- and scattered. But they did not overlook
tralia. The first echelon of the 41st Divi- them either. In his order to the Com-
sion left the west coast early in March bined Fleet setting out the tasks to be
and the rest sailed from San Francisco accomplished, Admiral Yamamoto listed
later in the month and during April.20 among the "areas expected to be occu-
Thus, the United States had committed pied or destroyed as quickly as opera-
itself, less than three months after the tional conditions permit the Fijis. . .and
attack on Pearl Harbor, to the ground Samoa," as well as "strategic points in
21
defense of Australia, with all that such a the Australian Area." Taken in con-
defense implied. junction with the occupation of the Bis-
marck Archipelago and the islands of the
The Line of Communications Central Pacific, this statement of inten-
tions had large implications for the war
Intimately associated with the defense in the Pacific.
of Australia as well as the larger prob- The United States had recognized
lems of future strategy in the Pacific was early the importance of the islands of
the line of communications between that the South Pacific and in October 1941
country and the United States. The is- had begun building airfields on some of
lands along this line lay generally south them to provide an alternate air ferry
of the equator, far from the well-traveled route to the Philippines. But the work
air and sea routes to the north. Their had only just begun when war came and,
strategic significance lay in the fact that except for local defense forces, none of
once the Central Pacific was lost, they the islands had been garrisoned. This
offered the only route to the sister Do- lack was partially remedied in the days
minions of Australia and New Zealand. following Pearl Harbor when General
Should this South Pacific line be cut Short in Hawaii sent token forces con-
these Dominions would be isolated and sisting of a few gun crews to Canton and
the island possessions of the Allies lost Christmas Islands, both of which were
to the enemy. under his jurisdiction. He could do no
This fact was thoroughly understood more until his own urgent needs were
by the Japanese naval planners. The filled.22
lessons taught by Admiral Mahan had Primary responsibility for the local
not been lost on these officers and they defense of the islands of the Pacific
looked on the islands of the South Pacific rested with the governing nations—
with an envious eye. Fortunately for the Great Britain, New Zealand, the Free
Allied cause, they were unable to in- French, Australia, and, in the case of
19 21
Rad, Curtin to Churchill, 21 Feb 42, OPD ABDA Combined Fleet Opn Order No. 1, 5 Nov 41, copy
Msg File. in Pearl Harbor Attack Hearings, pt. 3, p. 438.
20 22
Memos, WPD for G-3, 17 and 19 Feb 42, sub: See above, p. 99; Mins, JB Mtg, 26 Nov 41;
Movement of Troops to SUMAC, WPD 4630-66 and Msgs in AG 381 (11-27-41 sec. 1) Far East; K. Will-
70; Leighton and Coakley, Global Logistics and Stra- iams, The South Pacific Air Route, USAF Hist
tegy, p. 174. Studies, No. 45.
Hawaii, Samoa, and other small islands, communication from Midway to Hawaii
the United States. But the task of guard- and the west coast.24
ing the sea lanes to Australia and New This decision did not ensure the secu-
Zealand—a separate though related prob- rity of the line of communications, how-
lem to that of local defense—was the ever, for it still left the area west of the
responsibility of the Pacific Fleet and Fijis uncovered and made no provision
British naval forces. Under ABC-1 and for local defense. The problem was
the RAINBOW plan, the former was re- therefore laid before the first U.S.-British
sponsible for the defense of the area east conference then in session in Washing-
of the 180th meridian, that is, up to but ton. No one there disagreed with the
not including the Fijis and New Zea- necessity for holding the islands, which
land; the latter for the region to the it was recognized not only furnished an
west as far as longitude 155° east. The air route across the Pacific but provided
Pacific Fleet had the additional mission bases for Allied air and naval forces and
of supporting the British in their area outposts for the defense of Hawaii and
of responsibility which included the east Australia as well. (Map 3) The real
coast of Australia and the southeast problem for the planners was to find
portion of the Papuan Peninsula.23 the troops to do the job and the shipping
This arrangement was invalidated al- to support them. The formula finally
most immediately on the outbreak of war agreed upon, on 10 January, was to allo-
when the Chief of Naval Operations had cate responsibility for the defense of the
declared that the Pacific Fleet could do islands east of the 180th meridian to the
no more than defend the area east of the United States, and those west of that line
180th meridian. The result of this deci- to New Zealand and Australia.25
sion, which the British and Australians Even before this agreement was
accepted only because they had to, left reached, the Americans had been assem-
a vacuum in the Allied defenses, which, bling the forces needed to garrison the
it was apparent, the Japanese would soon islands in their area of responsibility.
fill if the Allies did not. Late in Decem- The Army, it had been decided, would
ber, therefore, when the initial shock of provide the garrisons for Christmas, Can-
the Pearl Harbor attack had worn off, ton, and Bora Bora; the Navy, for Palmy-
Admiral King ordered the recently ap- ra and Samoa. These garrisons would be
pointed Commander in Chief of the small, for it was recognized that the secu-
Pacific Fleet, Admiral Nimitz, to main- rity of the islands depended ultimately
tain the line of communication to Aus- on air and naval power, rather than on
tralia by extending his control of the the strength of the ground forces. To
line Hawaii-Samoa westward to include convert each island into an impregnable
the Fijis "at earliest practicable date."
24
This task, King told Nimitz, was second Ltr, Secy for Collab to Br Staff Mission, 16 Dec 41,
sub: Modification of ABC-1; Rad, COMINCH to
and "only in small degrees less impor- CINCPAC, 1740, 30 Dec 41, both cited in Hayes, The
tant" than the protection of the line of War Against Japan, ch. I, pp. 11, 58.
25
ABC-4, 31 Dec 41; ABC-4/8, 10 Jan 42, sub:
Defense of Island Bases, both in ARCADIA; Memo,
23
ABC-1, copy in Pearl Harbor Attack Hearings, WPD for CofS, 4 Jan 42, sub: Troop Movements to
pt. 15; Mins, JB Mtg, 8 Dec 41. Pacific Bases, WPD 4571-22.
MAP3
fortress would not only be wasteful of Palmyra, between Hawaii and Canton,
precious troop strength and shipping, was an essential link in the new air ferry
but would probably be less effective than route. The Navy had begun, a year
defense by mobile air and naval forces. before the war, to develop a seaplane
Thus the strength of the Canton and base there but wished now to enlarge
Christmas garrisons was set at about its facilities and to garrison the island.
2,000 men each, chiefly infantry and ar- For this purpose it sent out a Marine
tillery, and a squadron of pursuit planes. detachment and naval construction units,
Bora Bora, which the Navy planned to while the Army supplied a pursuit
use as a refueling station, was given an squadron for local protection. Plans for
Army garrison of 4,000 consisting largely the expansion of military facilities in
of an infantry and an antiaircraft American Samoa, which had been under
artillery regiment.26 naval administration since its acquisition
26
Relevant papers on the planning and organiza-
tion of these garrisons are filed in WPD 4571-22 and is told in Leighton and Coakley, Global Logistics and
24. The story of the establishment of the base at Strategy, ch. VII; see also, Craven and Cate, AAF I,
Bora Bora, with emphasis on the logistical problem, p. 431.
in 1899 and already possessed air and ready authorized, the whole question of
naval installations, were also pushed vig- the defense of Hawaii and its troop re-
orously by the Navy. Its defenses were quirements came up for review. By this
provided by a Marine brigade which time it was clear that the major part of
left San Diego on 6 January, escorted the Japanese forces was committed to the
by a naval force including the carriers Southwest Pacific and that Hawaii was
Enterprise and Yorktown, and which no longer in danger of invasion. The
reached the island seventeen days later.27 Japanese were still capable of air and
The defense of Hawaii was a special naval raids against the islands, but this
case. In the first days of war its rein- threat could be met by the Pacific Fleet
forcement had seemed perhaps the most and the air strength already allotted.
urgent task facing the Army and Navy, It was recognized, moreover, that the
but by Christmas 1941 concern for its assignment of additional air and ground
safety had somewhat abated. Priority for forces to Hawaii would play into Japan's
troops and equipment had then shifted hands for it would pin down American
to the Southwest Pacific. But General strength and consume valuable shipping
Emmons, the new commander of the space without any appreciable effect on
Hawaiian Department, had been prom- Japanese military forces. The Joint
ised in December large reinforcements, Chiefs therefore turned down Emmons'
including one square division, an ar- new requests and decided to send him
mored regiment, aircraft of all types, and only what had been promised earlier.29
service troops. These, he had been told This decision made, the Army hast-
at the time, would be shipped later, after ened the shipment of the promised but
the emergency in the Southwest Pacific long-overdue reinforcements to Hawaii.
had passed. The threat in that area, In mid-February an advance party of the
however, had increased rather than 27th Division left the west coast to make
diminished, and, with the additional ne- preparations for the arrival of the rest
cessity of reinforcing the line of commu- of the division. In ships loaned by the
nications, had made the prospect of British, the New York National Guard
strengthening Hawaii's defenses more division was moved to Hawaii in three
remote than ever.28 echelons during March. But at the end
In February, therefore, when Emmons of the month there were still 40,000
requested reinforcements above those al- troops allocated to the Hawaiian garrison
in the United States awaiting shipment.30
Providing forces for the islands west
27
of the 180th meridian was not initially
Department of the Navy, Building the Navy's
Bases in World War II, (Washington, 1947), pp. 121- an American responsibility. For the
22, 190-95, 208-13; Morison, The Rising Sun in the
Pacific, p. 259; Craven and Cate, AAF I, p. 437.
28
Rad, Marshall to Emmons, No. 1013, 16 Jan 42;
29
Emmons to TAG, No. 1677, 13 Jan 42, both in WPD JCS 11 and 11/1, Hawaiian Defense Forces, 12
Msg File; Memo, Gerow for Eisenhower, 20 Feb 42, Feb 42, ABC 381 (2-12-42) Hawaii.
30
sub: Reinforcements for Hawaii, WPD 3444-19. See Edmund G. Love, The 27th Infantry Division in
also Matloff and Snell, Strategic Planning, 1941-42, World War II (Washington: Infantry Journal Press,
p. 152; Conn, Engelman, and Fairchild, Guarding 1949), p. 18. Relevant papers are filed in AG 370-5
the United States and Its Outposts, ch. VIII. (12-26-41).
Fijis, which many thought to be seriously projected the United States into the con-
threatened, the United States agreed to fused politics of New Caledonia and
provide air and antiaircraft forces. But made that island one of the major
it was New Zealand which furnished American bases in the Pacific.32
most of the air as well as the ground American interest in New Caledonia
defenses of the island, a contribution predated the war. Since October 1941
which exceeded 8,000 men, including the United States had been actively nego-
the native Fijian troops who later ac- tiating with the Free French for the right
quired an awesome reputation as jungle to construct an airfield there. Work on
fighters.31 the field was well along on 7 December,
The security of New Caledonia was despite conflict between the French and
one of the most bothersome problems the Australians who were building the
of the Pacific area. Second in size only airstrip. Pearl Harbor gave an added
to New Zealand among the islands in impetus to this effort and an urgency
the South Pacific and an important sta- to the island's defense that was height-
tion along the air ferry route, New Cale- ened when General Charles de Gaulle
donia had a dual strategic significance. threw in his lot with the powers arrayed
Not only did it lie at the end of the against Japan and offered to make avail-
long line of islands stretching across the able to the Allies the Free French islands
Pacific, but it flanked the northeast ap- of the Pacific.33 Neither Australia nor
proaches to Australia from New Guinea the United States, however, was yet ready
and the Solomons. Moreover it con- to assume responsibility for the defense
tained valuable deposits of nickel and of the island.
chrome, which would undoubtedly make The progress of negotiations soon hit
it a tempting prize, Admiral King a snag. General de Gaulle and his Pacific
thought, for the metal-hungry Japanese. representative, Admiral d'Argenlieu, had
The defense of New Caledonia was approved American plans for the devel-
complicated by political factors. Sover- opment of airfields in New Caledonia
eignty was exercised by the Free French with the understanding that these fields
Government in London through a High would be under a French commander
Commissioner, Admiral Georges Thierry who would in turn be subordinate to
d'Argenlieu, but responsibility for its any Allied command established in the
defense was assigned by the Allies to Southwest Pacific. Such an Allied com-
Australia. Neither could spare the large
forces required to make this vital outpost
32
secure. The French had on the island This account of the reinforcement of New Cale-
donia is based on OPD Hist MS, Delaying and Con-
1 ,400 poorly equipped, ill-trained troops, taining Action in the Pacific, pp. 28-35; Matloff and
mostly natives, and the Australians could Snell, Strategic Planning, 1941-42, pp. 115-17; Hayes,
contribute only a single company of The War Against Japan, ch. II, pp. 59-60; Capt.
Francis D. Cronin, Under the Southern Cross (Wash-
commandos. Reinforcements were ur- ington: Combat Forces Press, 1951), ch. I. Valuable
gently needed, and it was this need that material is contained in WPD 3718, AG 381 (11-27-
42) (1-19-42), and folder entitled Political Distur-
bances, New Caledonia, OCMH.
33
Capt Tracy B. Kittredge, Evolution of Global
31
Craven and Cate, AAF I, pp. 430-31, 434. Strategy, pt. II, ch. II, pp. 29-30, JCS Hist Div.
mand, they had assumed, would be islands along the line of communica-
American. By arrangements between the tions. By that decision, which was kept
Americans and British, however, New a carefully guarded secret from the
Caledonia fell into the British area of French, the United States agreed to as-
responsibility, and had been delegated sume Australia's obligations in New
by them to the Australians. When Caledonia. The size of the force it agreed
d'Argenlieu learned of this arrangement to send there was the largest yet allo-
he insisted that the French command all cated to the Pacific, except for Hawaii
Allied forces and installations on the and Australia, and consisted of one divi-
island and demanded that he be in- sion (reinforced), two air squadrons, and
formed of plans for the area. He per- service troops. So large an undertaking
mitted the Australians to continue work strained an already overloaded shipping
on the airfield, but on a temporary schedule and made even more marked
basis.34 the discrepancy between a strategy that
Weeks passed and d'Argenlieu replaced the war in Europe first and a
ceived no word of plans for the defense program that sent the bulk of the troops
of the island or of the decisions reached to the Pacific.
by the Americans and British then meet- The Army planners recognized—and
ing in Washington. Increasingly nervous deplored — this and other diversions
over the safety of the island, where Jap- from the main theater but could not
anese submarines had already been deny the necessity that had created them.
sighted, and unable to get any satisfac- Immediately they set to work assembling
tion from the Australians, the French the forces required and making arrange-
turned to the Americans—to General ments for their shipment. Instead of
Emmons in Hawaii and to officials in selecting a division already organized
Washington—with their complaints. Fi- and trained the planners put together a
nally, on about 15 January, d'Argenlieu force, under the command of Brig. Gen.
told Emmons that if reinforcements were Alexander M. Patch, Jr., of about 15,000
not sent immediately it would be neces- men, many of them from the recently
sary to stop all work on the airfields triangularized 26th and 33d National
because they would, when completed, Guard Divisions. Though this force,
provide the Japanese with a strong in- designated Task Force 6184, consisted
ducement for attacking New Caledonia.35 of an "odd conglomeration" of units
Already a decision on the defense of that gave it the appearance, at first
New Caledonia had been made, based glance, of a "military stew of men and
not on d'Argenlieu's thinly veiled equipment," it had many of the marks
threats but on a sober review by the of an infantry division. There was a
Combined Chiefs of the needs of the brigade headquarters from the 26th Divi-
sion, two infantry regiments, the 132d
and 184th, a field artillery regiment with
34
Ibid., pp. 31-33. 155-mm. howitzers, and the usual service
35
Memo, CofS for Secy State, 20 Jan 42, sub: De- elements, strengthened by attachments.
fense of New Caledonia, WPD 3718-14. Many of the
papers dealing with New Caledonia are located in
But it included also a battalion of light
this file. tanks, a pursuit squadron, an antiair-
craft regiment, and a coast artillery bat-

talion.36
The mission given General Patch was
brief: to hold New Caledonia, in co-
operation with the military forces of the
United Nations, against all attacks. Pre-
sumably he would receive no reinforce-
ments. He was an independent com-
mander, responsible only to the War
Department and reporting directly to
Washington. But his authority was more
restricted than it appeared on the sur-
face. He had, for example, no control
over the airfields which were causing so
much difficulty with the French. That
was the responsibility of General
Emmons, over 3,000 miles away, and of
the Australians who were doing the con-
struction work. Also, responsibility for GENERAL PATCH being greeted by Admiral
the supply of his force was shared by the d'Argenlieu.
San Francisco Port of Embarkation and
General Barnes in Australia, who had
also to meet the demands of Brereton Panama Canal, on 26 February. In Aus-
and Brett for the ABDA area and Mac- tralia, where there was considerable anx-
Arthur for the Philippines. Finally, as iety over the safety of the homeland and
Patch soon learned, the question of where American ground forces had not
French participation in the command yet made their appearance, envious eyes
of forces on the island was still far from were cast upon this large force, not only
settled.37 by the Australians but by the American
In the record time of two weeks, not commanders as well. But there was no
without considerable difficulty and con- mistaking the destination of Task Force
fusion, Task Force 6184, including about 6184 or General Marshall's injunction
4,000 air and service troops for Austra- that this force was to be used along the
lia, was organized, equipped, and loaded line of communications, not as reinforce-
aboard seven transports, all that could ments for Australia or the ABDA area.38
be assembled on the east coast at that Meanwhile Admiral d'Argenlieu had
time. On 23 January it sailed from New become more and more insistent in his
York and reached Melbourne, via the demand for troops and equipment. Fear-
ing premature disclosure through Free
French channels of the movement of so
36
Cronin, Under the Southern Cross, p. 4. For a list large a force, General Marshall was ada-
of the units in TF 6184, see p. 422; Matloff and Snell,
Strategic Planning, 1941-42, p. 149, N. 10.
37 38
Memo, WPD for TAG, 22 Jan 42, sub: Defense Rad, Marshall to Brett, No. 69, 2 Feb 42, AG 381
of New Caledonia, WPD 3718-17. (11-27-41 sec. 2A), Far East.
FORWARD ECHELON OF THE 41ST DIVISION en route to Australia unloading at Oro Bay,
New Guinea.
mant in his refusal to do more than sorted, rearranged, and loaded.39 Gen-
authorize General Emmons to tell the eral Patch had left for Australia by air
admiral that the Allies would provide via the South Atlantic route to make
for the defense of New Caledonia. The these arrangements, carrying with him
nationality, composition, size, and time the manifests and other documents. But
of arrival of the force were kept secret he fell ill in Trinidad and had to return
and d'Argenlieu, perforce, had to con- to Washington for Hospitalization. Later
tent himself with Emmons' assurances he flew directly across the Pacific to New
that the island would be defended. Caledonia, stopping only at Hawaii to
The transshipment of Task Force 6184 consult with General Emmons. Mean-
from Melbourne to New Caledonia was while Barnes made whatever prepara-
a heavy task. The troops had to be tions he could until another courier
debarked and those intended for use arrived.
in Australia sent to their destinations
39
with their equipment. The remainder Leighton and Coakley, Global Logistics and Stra-
tegy, p. 150 passim. The documents on this shipment
of the men had to be housed and fed are well summarized in Matloff and Snell, Strategic
in nearby camps while the cargo was Planning, 1491-42, p. 150, n. 14.
Laboring in the heat of the Australian two months later. The Christmas Island
summer, the dock workers at Melbourne and Canton garrisons left San Francisco
completed their task by 6 March and on on 31 January and were at their stations
that date the seven transports of Task before the middle of February.40 The
Force 6184, with naval escort, set sail line of communications between the
for New Caledonia. After an unevent- United States and Australia, which had
ful voyage they entered the harbor of lain so nakedly exposed to Japanese
Noumea at the southwest tip of the cigar- attack in the dark days after Pearl Har-
shaped island six days later. There bor, was, three months later, rapidly
arrangements for their unloading had being converted into a chain of island
already been made by an advance party bases linking the two countries. But it
flown in from Melbourne. General was still only a thin line of defense,
Patch had arrived on the 5th, bringing weakly held and easily pierced, and the
with him the information that d'Argen- danger of attack was still a live threat.
lieu had been seeking for so long and (Table 3)
the news that a large force would soon
reach the island. This news and the The Japanese Threat
arrival of Task Force 6184 put to rest
the uncertainty and fears of the French, The Japanese had not been idle dur-
but, unfortunately, did not end the dif- ing these months. Even before the war
ficulties that had plagued the planners their naval planners had contended that
and diplomats and now rested on Patch's they could not stop with the seizure of
shoulders. Rabaul but must go on to establish con-
Although General Patch had been told trol over the Solomons and the northeast
he could expect no reinforcements, these coast of New Guinea. Such action would
were soon on the way. In mid-April, he not only secure the Japanese position in
received a third infantry regiment, the the Bismarck Archipelago with the least
164th, and authority to organize from cost through air attrition, but would, the
his force an infantry division. This was naval planners noted, provide a spring-
done in May when the Americal Divi- board for further advances to the Fijis,
sion, which was to fight its way from Samoa, and "strategic points in the Aus-
Guadalcanal to Tokyo, was created. tralia Area." Though they were unable
By the time Task Force 6184 arrived to win approval for this scheme in the
in New Caledonia the 41st Division was prewar plan, the naval planners did
on its way to Australia and the garrisons not abandon the project but placed it
organized early in January to defend the on their agenda, to be accomplished
line of communications had already "as quickly as operational conditions
reached their destinations. In the Fijis permit."41
was the 70th Pursuit Squadron. The Hardly had Rabaul fallen when the
Bora Bora garrison, which left Charles-
ton on 27 January, completed its jour- 40
Matloff and Snell, Strategic Planning, 1941-42,
ney in three weeks but so hastily had it p. 150; Leighton and Coakley, Global Logistics and
Strategy, ch. VII.
been assembled and shipped that it did 41
Combined Fleet Operational Order No. 1, 5 Nov
not complete its unloading until almost 41, Pearl Harbor Attack Hearings, pt. 3, p. 438.
TABLE 3—MAJOR ARMY COMBAT FORCES FOR THE PACIFIC, PRESENT AND PROJECTED,
APRIL-MAY 1942
Navy high command raised the question mirals put it, had succumbed to the
of a further advance into the area north- "so-called Victory Disease."43
east of Australia. "Operational condi- No decision was reached on the inva-
tions," the naval officers thought, were sion of Australia or India at this time.
ripe for an extension of the original At least twelve divisions would be re-
perimeter into the Solomon Islands and quired to invade Australia, the Army
northeast New Guinea, to Lae and Sala- planners said, as well as supplies and
maua in the Huon Gulf, and even to shipping in such magnitude as to make
Port Moresby. Such a move, they ar- the operation "a reckless undertaking far
gued, would not only strengthen Japan's in excess of Japan capabilities."44 Simi-
defensive position but would deny the lar reasons ruled out the move against
Allies key bases for counterattack. From India. The Navy did not push these
airfields in this area the Imperial Navy projects—though it had its own plans
could keep a close watch on enemy naval for carrier strikes in the Indian Ocean
movements far to the south and at the —and was satisfied to let the matter rest
same time "intensify pressure on north- for the time being.
eastern Australia," hindering its use for To the proposal to advance into New
air operations by the Allies. These large Guinea and the Solomons the Army
results, naval officers did not fail to point could find few objections. It was a fea-
out to their Army colleagues, could be sible operation, would have significant
achieved at slight cost and with few results, and would require relatively few
troops.42 Army troops. Agreement was quickly
While the Army planners were digest- reached. On 29 January Imperial Gen-
ing this tempting morsel, the Navy pre- eral Headquarters issued orders direct-
sented them with still another dish— ing Army and Navy forces in the
one on which they nearly choked. Since Bismarcks to occupy the Lae-Salamaua
the main reason for advancing beyond area in New Guinea and then, "if pos-
the original perimeter was to delay an sible," move on to take Port Moresby.
Allied counteroffensive from the south, Operations to seize air bases in the Solo-
why not, the Navy asked, seize the main mons and capture Tulagi, just north of
enemy base by taking Australia itself? Guadalcanal, were authorized at the same
Apparently carried away by its own
boldness the Navy went even further—
there were no limits to this kind of 43
Statement of Rear Adm Tadaichi Hara, cited in
strategy—and proposed that India, too, Samuel Eliot Morison, Coral Sea, Midway and Sub-
be taken as a means of forestalling Allied marine Actions, May 1942-August 1942, vol. IV,
"History of United States Naval Operations in World
recovery and reorganization. Clearly the War II" (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1949),
naval staff, as one of the Japanese ad- p. 4; Japanese Opns in SWPA, ch. V pp. 10-11; Arisue
Questionnaire, pp. 28-29; Interrog of Lt Gen Shini-
chi Tanaka, 25 Oct 47, copy in OCMH; Statements
42
Japanese Opns in SWPA, SWPA Series II, ch. V, of Rear Adm Sadatoshi Tomioka, Navy Sec, Imperial
pp. 6-7; Hist of Army Sec, Imperial GHQ, Japanese GHQ, 2 Aug 50, ATIS Doc 61232; Col Takushiro
Studies in World War II, 72, pp. 33-34; Lt Gen Seizo Hattori, Army Sec, Imperial GHQ, 29 Aug 49, ATIS
Arisue, formerly intelligence chief of the General Doc 50307, both in Statements of Japanese Officials,
Staff, reply to author's questions, 14 Jul 49, ATIS IV, 314 and I, 331, copy in OCMH.
44
Doc No. 49157. p. 27, copy in OCMH. Arisue Questionnaire, p. 29.
time but would be carried out by naval prising the Japanese had been lost and
forces alone.45 the ships were running short of fuel.
Plans for the invasion of Lae and Sala- Two days later the ANZAC B-17's made
maua, like those for the Bismarck area, their first attack on Rabaul.47
were made by General Horii, com- These raids, while they did not alter
mander of the South Seas Detachment, the Japanese plan, did postpone its exe-
and Admiral Inouye, 4th Fleet com- cution. Finally, on 5 March, all was in
mander. With a full knowledge of the readiness and the invasion force sortied
weakness of the Australian garrisons in from Rabaul harbor to reach Huon Gulf
New Guinea, the two commanders as- two days later. There it split, one group
signed only small forces to the operation. heading for Lae, the other for Salamaua.
Salamaua was to be taken by one battal- Early next morning, 8 March, the troops
ion of Horii's detachment, supported by went ashore, covered by aircraft from
an artillery battery and other smaller Rabaul and Gasmata which had been
units; Lae by a naval landing force of bombing the target area as well as Port
battalion size. Naval escort and support, Moresby since the 2d. There was no
including four heavy and two light cruis- opposition at the beaches or in the
ers, would be provided by Inouye's 4th towns, and during the next two days
Fleet, and air cover by the 4th Air Group the Japanese unloaded their supplies and
based at Rabaul. These plans were com- began to build the bases. Thus, at al-
pleted on 16 February, with the landing most no cost, the Japanese acquired
scheduled for the end of the month.46 control of the straits between northeast
The concentration of Japanese forces New Guinea and New Britain and posi-
at Rabaul had not gone unnoticed and tions from which they could support a
Admiral Nimitz had sent the carrier further advance southward and prevent
Lexington into the area. With Admiral the Allies from breaking out into the
Leary's B-17's at Townsville, this car- open seas north of the Bismarck
rier force was to meet the enemy and, Archipelago.48
if possible, destroy it. On 20 February The absence of opposition did not
the Lexington, accompanied by four mean the Allies would take this fresh
heavy cruisers and ten destroyers, reached assault without reprisal. Since the in-
a point about 350 miles south of Rabaul conclusive raid of the Lexington on 20
where it was detected and attacked by February, Admiral Nimitz had assem-
Japanese aircraft. The battle that fol- bled another force, almost double that
lowed was inconclusive. The American of the first, in an effort to halt the Japa-
carrier force drove off the Japanese nese advance into Australia's Northeast
planes, but abandoned any further effort 47
Early raids in the Pacific Ocean, 1 Feb-10 Mar
against Rabaul because all chance of sur- 42, Combat Narrative, ONI, pp. 35-40. See General
Marshall's warning of probable enemy carrier opera-
45
Navy Sec, Imperial GHQ, Directive No. 47, 29 tions northeast of Australia in his letter to Barnes,
Jan 42. The order is quoted in Japanese Opns in undated, but written early in February, WPD
SWPA, ch. V, pp. 7-8. 4630-57.
46 48
Southeast Area Naval Opns, Japanese Studies in Japanese Opns in SWPA, ch. V, p. 9; Hist of
World War II, 48, pp. 19-20; Japanese Opns in South Seas Detachment, Japanese Studies in World
SWPA, ch. V, pp. 8-9; Milner, Victory in Papua, War II, 36, I, 10-11; Naval Invasion of Eastern New
ch. I. Guinea, Japanese Studies in World War II, 101.
Area. This time he used two carriers, strength of Allied air power in Australia,
the Lexington and the Yorktown, sup- that assumption was no longer valid.
ported by more cruisers and destroyers The seizure of Port Moresby and Tulagi
plus elements of the ANZAC force. would be far riskier than anticipated,
These vessels sortied northward toward Inouye concluded, and would require
Rabaul early in March, too late to inter- carrier support. But the carriers that he
cept the convoys headed for Lae and needed were no longer available, for the
Salamaua. But they were not too late striking force of the Combined Fleet
to do damage, and on 10 March, from with five carriers and four battleships
positions in the Gulf of Papua, the car- was making ready for a raid against Cey-
riers sent their planes aloft toward Huon lon, scheduled for early April. Admiral
Gulf. The strike apparently came as a Inouye had no choice, therefore, but to
complete surprise to the Japanese, who await the return of the fleet from the
lost four vessels sunk, three more dam- Indian Ocean. In the interim he con-
aged, and almost 400 men killed and solidated his position in the Bismarck
wounded. Next day the B-17's from Archipelago and advanced into the
Townsville came over Lae and Salamaua, northern Solomons — to the Shortland
but with less effect. That attack marked Islands and Bougainville.50
the last serious effort made during this Meanwhile in Tokyo the question of
period against the Japanese, who by this an invasion of Australia had come up
time had brought aircraft into the area again. The Navy pushed more vigor-
and declared it secure. They were now ously for its plan this time, arguing that
within 170 air miles of Port Moresby.49 the U. S. Fleet would be unable to take
Operations against Port Moresby and offensive action in the western Pacific
Tulagi, which the Japanese intended to until the end of 1942. In the meantime,
use as air bases, were to have begun im- the naval planners warned, the Allies
mediately after the capture of Lae and were pouring airplanes, men, and sup-
Salamaua, according to the 29 January plies into Australia and converting it
directive from Imperial General Head- into a base for offensive operations. The
quarters. But by the time those bases Army's desire to consolidate along the
had been taken more than a month later, original perimeter and concentrate on
Admiral Inouye had revised his view of the war in China and preparations for a
the seriousness of the next step. His possible attack by Soviet Russia, the
original plan had been based on the naval planners argued, constituted a de-
assumption that the Allies would be un- fensive and negative policy. "Such a
able to bring air power to the target and policy," asserted Yamamoto's chief of
that therefore he would need only the staff, "would in effect render futile all
long-range planes from Rabaul as sup- our military successes" and put Japan
port. In view of what had happened "in the position of waiting for her ene-
since 20 February, and the growing mies to attack without any special ad-
50
49
Morison, The Rising Sun in the Pacific, p. 387; Japanese Opns in SWPA, ch. V, p. 10; Southeast
Early Raids in the Pacific, ONI Combat Narrative, Area Naval Opns, Japanese Studies in World War II,
pp. 57-68; Hist of South Seas Detachment, Japanese 48, I, pp. 1-2; Hist of South Seas Detachment, Japa-
Studies in World War II, 36, I, 11-12. nese Studies in World War II, 36, p. 8.
vantage to herself. . . ."51 The wisest and supplies to Australia and prevent
course, therefore, was to continue on the the development on that continent of a
offensive, with Australia as the ultimate base for an Allied counteroffensive. Ob-
objective. viously this was a compromise which
The Army remained adamant in its favored the Navy point of view.53
opposition to this plan. Its original con- Preparations for the Tulagi and Port
ception of operations in the Southwest Moresby invasions were already com-
Pacific had been defensive and the plete when Imperial General Headquar-
Navy's proposal for an aggressive policy ters issued its new plan on 28 April. The
in that area was alarming. Army forces, South Seas Detachment and the naval
already widely scattered throughout the landing troops of the 4th Fleet were
Netherlands Indies, Malaya, Burma, In- standing by, ready to embark; three days
dochina, the Philippines, and elsewhere, earlier Rabaul-based bombers had be-
would have to be spread dangerously gun to strike northeast Australia. D-day
thin if Japan embarked on new and cost- for Tulagi was set for 3 May; for Port
ly adventures. Moreover, the fear of Moresby, a week later. On 29 April the
Russia, which had dictated the time of 5th Carrier Division (two carriers) and
attack and the speed of the advance, had the 5th Cruiser Division reached Truk.
not abated and the Army was anxious to At long last, Admiral Inouye could begin
adhere to the original plan to deploy its the Port Moresby operation.
forces to the north. All these considera- On 4 May, the day after Inouye moved
tions, plus the size of the force required his headquarters from Truk to Rabaul
and the difficulties of supplying and and a naval force landed at Tulagi, the
maintaining this force, convinced the Port Moresby invasion force set sail. Al-
Army that the invasion of Australia was ready the joint staff in Tokyo was mak-
a "ridiculous operation."52 ing plans for the invasion of New
The outcome of this debate, which Caledonia, the Fijis, and Samoa.
lasted through March and April, was a
compromise plan, approved on 28 April, Pacific Build-up
to cut the line of communications and
isolate Australia. Under this plan, the At the same time the Japanese were
long-deferred Port Moresby and Tulagi heatedly debating their future course,
operation would be speedily concluded the American planners in Washington
and would be followed by the occupa- were reviewing the twin problems of
tion of important points in New Cale- strategy and deployment in the Pacific
donia, the Fijis, and Samoa. From these in the light of the decision to make the
newly acquired bases, Japanese aircraft main effort against Germany. Despite
and submarines could interrupt if not every effort to halt the movement of
cut off entirely the flow of weapons, men, troops, planes, and weapons to the Paci-
51
Private Papers of Rear Adm Mutome Ugaki,
fic and every argument that these move-
quoted in Japanese Opns in SWPA, ch. V, p. 11, n. 30; ments and the precious shipping they
Hist of Army Sec, Imperial GHQ, Japanese Studies in
53
World War II, 72, pp. 45-50. Hist of Army Sec, Imperial GHQ, pp. 50-51;
52
Hist of Army Sec, Imperial GHQ, p. 50; Japanese Arisue Questionnaire, pp. 28-29; Deposition of
Opns in the SWPA, ch. V, pp. 11-13. Shinichi Tanaka, IMTFE Exhibit 2676.
consumed were in violation of the ac- In addition to these requests, there

cepted strategy, this flow continued and were other demands to be met by the
even increased. And with each shipment Army. Its obligation in Hawaii had not
of troops came increased demands for been fulfilled, and there was from Ad-
additional troops, for more planes, and miral King a request that the Army fur-
for supplies. nish garrisons for two more islands in
No one could deny the necessity that the South Pacific—Tongatabu in the
created these demands. The Japanese Tonga Group, southeast of the Fijis, and
were not pursuing a plan that fitted into Efate in the New Hebrides, between
the Allied blueprint, and it was the New Caledonia and the Solomons. The
Japanese advance, not Allied strategy, first would provide protection for the
which dictated what must be done. But southern route from Samoa to Australia,
the mounting drain of the Pacific war the second an outpost for the defense of
on the limited resources of the Allies New Caledonia and the Fijis. "The
could, by the end of February, no longer Navy," complained General Eisenhower,
be ignored. "Through a combination of "wants to take all the islands in the Pa-
circumstances," observed General Eisen- cific—have them held by Army troops,
hower, the Chief of the War Plans to become bases for Army pursuit and
Division, "we are being drawn into a bombers. Then! the Navy will have a
deployment in the Southwest Pacific that safe place to sail its vessels."56
far exceeds original planning objectives Eisenhower's comment was indicative
and which in the absence of powerful air of a difference in view between the Army
and naval forces ... is not warranted."54 and Navy over the importance of the
The immediate occasion for a review Pacific and the priority it should enjoy
of the entire problem by the staff in in the constant struggle for men and ma-
Washington was the demand from almost teriel. The Army planners recognized
every quarter for planes and more planes. fully the importance of Australia and
Aircraft, especially heavy bombers, were, the line of communications but consid-
after shipping, perhaps the most critical ered their retention as desirable rather
of the Allied resources. The Australians than vital operations. Their support
wanted about 200 P-40's to meet the should be accomplished, they believed,
threat to Port Moresby; the New Zea- with a minimum of effort, and priority
landers asked for bombers for the pro- should go to Europe to make possible an
tection of the Fijis; Admiral Leary early offensive against Germany. "We've
needed a squadron of B-17's for his got to go to Europe and fight," wrote
ANZAC force; and the Dutch, who were Eisenhower, "we've got to quit wasting
making ready for a last-ditch defense of resources all over the world—and still
Java, pressed hard for 72 fighters.55 worse—wasting time."57
For the Navy, with its traditional in-
54
Memo, Eisenhower for Marshall, 28 Feb 42, sub:
56
Strategic Conceptions, OPD 384 PTO sec. 1, case 11. Eisenhower Notations, 17 Feb 42, copy in OCMH;
55
The material in this section is treated fully in Memo, King, no addressee, 18 Feb 42, noted in Memo,
Hayes, The War Against Japan, ch. V, pp. 1-48; Marshall for Ring, 24 Feb 42, sub: Garrison for Efate,
Matloff and Snell, Strategic Planning, 1941-42, pp. OPD Exec Files.
57
156-64, 210-16, 221-27. Eisenhower Notations, 22 Jan 42, copy in OCMH.
terest in the Pacific, that area held a immediately to construct a naval base
greater importance than for the Army and airfield. Like the Bora Bora force,
and its reinforcement had first priority. which it greatly resembled, it was assem-
The safety of the line of communica- bled and loaded in haste and paid the
tions was essential to the fleet and until penalty in the difficulties it met when it
the Japanese threat to the islands along began to debark.59
that line had been met—and for the Meanwhile the review of strategy and
Navy this threat was still a very live one deployment, which had begun on 11
—the naval planners considered the February with a directive from the Com-
Allied position in the Pacific precarious. bined Chiefs, had almost run its course.
They did not wish to abandon the efforts The results were far from conclusive.
to launch an early offensive in Europe, About all the planners could agree on
but felt strongly that until the danger after a month of intensive study was a
was over the Pacific should have first call recommendation that the Joint Chiefs
on American resources. There were ex- decide immediately "on a clear course of
tremists on both sides, too, some who action," and then follow that course
were willing to risk the loss of the South- "with the utmost vigor." They did,
west Pacific for the advantage of an early however, suggest three possibilities, each
offensive against Germany, and others representing substantially a view held at
who would concentrate entirely on the the outset of the debate, for the Joint
Pacific, even if it meant the abandon- Chiefs to choose from, thus leaving to
ment, for the time being, of the Atlantic their superiors the decision they were
theater.58 themselves unable to make. The Chiefs
Despite this difference, Admiral King made their choice two days later, on 16
finally secured the garrisons he wanted March. The United States, they then
for Efate and Tongatabu. For the former agreed, should assemble in the United
the Army furnished a reinforced infantry Kingdom the forces needed for an of-
regiment, the 24th, numbering about fensive "at the earliest practicable time,"
5,000 men, and the Navy the aircraft and and provide for the Pacific only those
artillery (both Marine). This force ar- forces allocated under "current commit-
rived early in May to relieve the small ments." This meant, in effect, that the
detachment Patch had sent up from New Joint Chiefs would thereafter test the de-
Caledonia to guard this important out- mands from the Pacific against the needs
post. Later, a portion of the Efate gar- of the European theater and the priority
rison moved up to Espiritu Santo to of operations there.60
build a bomber strip there. The Tonga- 59
Memos, Marshall for King, 24 Feb 42, sub: Gar-
tabu garrison, composed of an infantry risons for Efate; King for JCS, 2 Mar 42, sub: Defense
regiment (less one battalion), a regi- of Tongatabu and Efate, ABC 381 (3-2-42).
60
ment of antiaircraft artillery, and a pur- JPS 2/1 Directive to JUSSC, 11 Feb 42; Mins, CCS
Mtg, 10 Feb 42; JPS 2/2, Review of Strategic Situa-
suit squadron, plus a naval contingent, tion in Japanese Theater, 18 Feb 42, with minority
amounted to 8,200 men. It reached its report JPS 2/2 (A); Mins, JPS Mtgs, 19, 21, 24 Feb 42;
destination on 14 May and began work JPS 2/4 (D) Strategic Deployment, 24 Feb 42; JPS 2/5
and 2/6, same title, 6 Mar 42; JCS 23, same title, 14
58
For these views and others, see the JPS 2 series, Mar 42; Mins, JCS Mtg, 16 Mar 42. All in ABC 370
ABC 370 (1-28-42). (1-28-42) and CCS 281 (1-30-42).
This policy had hardly been formu- raising the question early in April of the
lated when it became necessary to depart defenses of Fiji and New Caledonia, a
from it. On 5 March, when the situation review that led to a change in the
in the Middle East appeared critical, destination of the 37th Division.
Winston Churchill had asked Roosevelt The discussions that followed the
if the United States would, among other President's query made it clear that the
things, send a division to Australia and differences which had split the planners
one to New Zealand. In this way he before were still unresolved. The Navy,
hoped to retain in the Middle East those with a clear appreciation of Japanese
troops the Dominions wanted brought intentions, persisted in its belief that
home for their own protection. After the strength allocated to the Pacific,
consulting his military advisers, Roose- especially in aircraft, was inadequate to
velt agreed to the Prime Minister's pro- meet the danger there. The Army took
posal, subject to approval by the a more optimistic view. While admitting
Australian and New Zealand Govern- the inadequacy of Allied air defenses in
ments. The Australians, who had cor- the Pacific, the Army planners asserted
rectly diagnosed the Japanese plan to —at a time when the enemy was prepar-
take Port Moresby and cut the line of ing to move to Port Moresby, Tulagi,
communications, accepted this arrange- New Caledonia, the Fijis, and Midway
ment as a temporary solution to their —that the danger in the Pacific was not
difficulties. The War Department there- great enough to warrant the diversion of
upon selected the 32d Division, already aircraft from the planned major effort in
alerted for shipment to Ireland, for as- Europe. Failure to reinforce the Pacific,
signment to Australia. It would arrive Army planners admitted, involved risks,
in May, and, with the 41st, scheduled to but such risks, they insisted, must be
leave within the month, would place taken in order to move against Germany.
two American divisions in the Southwest To these differing views were now
Pacific.61 added those of General MacArthur, re-
For New Zealand the Army planners cently arrived in Australia, reinforced by
picked the 37th Division (Ohio National the representations of the Dominion
Guard). Already that division's 147th governments. The second front, Mac-
Infantry Regiment (less one battalion) Arthur held, should be in the Pacific.
had been sent to Tongatabu, and in mid- Not only would an offensive there aid
April an advance detachment of eighty Russia by releasing the forces held down
men left for New Zealand. The division in Manchuria, he argued, but it would
itself was scheduled to sail late the next also protect Australia and India and
month. But before it left the President have the enthusiastic support of the
precipitated another comprehensive re- American people.62 This proposal and
view of deployment to the Pacific by
62
Rad, MacArthur to Marshall, No. 176, 8 May 42,
61
Memo, WPD for CofS, 5 Mar 42, sub: Answer to CM-IN 2333; Memo, Capt John L. McCrea, naval
Prime Minister, OPD Exec Files; CCS 56 and 56/1, aide to President, to JCS, 2 Apr 42, with JPS 21 ser.,
Prime Minister Msg, 5 and 6 Mar 42, ABC 311.5 ABC 381 (1-22-42) Pacific Bases. The views of the
(1-30-42); Rad, Marshall to MacArthur, No. 739, Army and Navy planners can be found in the same
18 Mar 42, OPD MacArthur File. file. Mins, JPS Mtgs, 4 and 6 Apr 42.
others like it all added up to a strong MacArthur went even further than the
plea for priority in the Pacific. Navy in his demands on Allied resources.
The month-long debate that ensued Not only did he want reinforcements to
raised sharply the entire question of hold his present position and a 100 per-
strategy in the Pacific and its relation to cent increase in aircraft but also the
the war against Germany. On the assump- forces required to conduct operations
tion that Japanese forces were capable northward from Australia—three more
of attacking the line of communications divisions and aircraft carriers. In Wash-
and that their next move would be in ington there was no intention of under-
that direction, the Navy wished to taking the kind of campaign MacArthur
strengthen each of the bases along that contemplated, which consisted essentially
line with bombers and fighters. Mobile of an active and aggressive defense from
forces in Hawaii and Australia, the naval Port Moresby rather than Australia it-
planners believed, would be unable to self. His requests, therefore, were po-
concentrate at the point of attack in time litely but firmly denied. But MacArthur
to prevent an enemy landing. The Navy was not one to accept defeat easily and
had another reason for wanting to build with Prime Minister Curtin's support
up the forces along the line of commu- continued to press for reinforcements
nications. Already it was planning to through other channels. Though this
use these islands as bases for offensive procedure brought him a reprimand—
operations and for the support of the which the President softened by a gra-
fleet. "Given the naval forces, air units cious letter—it also brought the prob-
and amphibious forces," Admiral King lem forcibly to the attention of the
told the President, "we can drive north- highest authority.65
westward from the New Hebrides into Plans for war against Germany had by
the Solomons and the Bismarck Archi- early May created heavy requirements
pelago after the same fashion of step by for men and matériel in the European
step advances that the Japanese used in theater that threatened to put a strong
the South China Sea."63 brake on Pacific deployment. In mid-
The position taken by the Army and April at a conference in London between
Air Force planners was that the area American and British representatives, it
should be defended by mobile forces, had been agreed, largely at American
with bombers based on the flanks, in insistence, that the Allies would begin
Australia and Hawaii. There would thus planning immediately for an invasion of
be no necessity to pin down large forces the Continent in 1943 (ROUNDUP). It
on each of the islands. The line of com- was recognized, however, that action
munications, it was true, lacked defense against Germany might have to be under-
in depth but that was preferable, the
Army planners believed, to scattering the attached OPD Notes on JPS 13th Mtg, 22 Apr 42,
bombers needed for the projected air ABC 65
( 1 - 2 2 - 4 2 sec. 2) Pacific Bases.
Rads, Marshall to MacArthur, Nos. 739 and 1499,
64
offensive against Germany. 18 Mar and 26 Apr 42, OPD MacArthur File; Mac-
Arthur to Marshall, Nos. 70470 and 588, 4 and 25 Apr
63
Memo, King for President, 5 Mar 42, no sub, OPD and 1 May 42, CM-IN-6643 and 0186; Marshall to
Exec Files. MacArthur, No. 31, 6 May 42, CM-OUT-1136; Mac-
64
JPS 21/7, Defense of Island Bases, 18 Apr 42, and Arthur to Marshall, No. 176, 8 May 42, CM-IN-2333.
taken earlier in the event of disastrous of the Continent.68 On 4 May, the entire
Soviet reverses or some unexpected favor- problem was discussed at a meeting of
able development that would present the the Joint Chiefs of Staff. General Mar-
Allies with an opportunity to exploit a shall held firmly to the position already
weakness in the German position. To stated by the Army planners that any
meet such a possibility, the Allies agreed increase in the forces already allotted to
on a contingency operation for the in- the Pacific would make BOLERO impos-
vasion of the Continent in the fall of sible. The Joint Chiefs, he asserted, must
1942 (SLEDGEHAMMER), by which time therefore stoutly resist all demands from
Pacific deployment would be largely that theater, no matter how legitimate.
completed. Forces for the invasion in Admiral King argued strongly against
1943 would be assembled in the British this view. Without denying the desira-
Isles on a schedule, worked out in great bility of an early offensive in Europe, he
detail after the London Conference, that insisted that the reinforcement of the
would place sufficient forces in Britain Pacific was fully as important as BOLERO,
in time to meet the requirements of an and more urgent. "We must not permit
emergency operation in the fall of 1942 diversion of our forces to any proposed
should that prove necessary or desirable. operation in any other theater," he
This build-up in the British Isles, which argued, "to the extent that we find our-
was known by the code name BOLERO, selves unable to fulfill our obligation to
became the basis for the planned implement our basic strategic plan in the
deployment of forces to Europe.66 Pacific theater." This strategy he stated
The competing demands of Europe simply as holding "what we have against
and the Pacific came into sharp conflict any attack" the Japanese could launch.69
early in May, after the President had The implications of such a strategy were
expressed a desire, presumably in re- clear.
sponse to pressure from the Australian Unable to reach agreement, the Joint
Prime Minister, to raise the number of Chiefs could only refer the matter to the
ground troops planned for Australia President himself for decision, and on 6
from 25,000 to 100,000.67 This proposal May General Marshall, after outlining
created serious concern among the Army his own and King's position, asked the
planners, and General Marshall, imme- Commander in Chief in effect to make
diately on his return from a tour of the choice. The answer came two days
inspection, protested directly to the later: "I do not want 'BOLERO' slowed
President, pointing out that this diver- down."70 The issue had finally been
sion from BOLERO would imperil the decided in favor of the Army.
plans so recently made for the invasion
68
Memo, CofS for President, 4 May 42, no sub, OPD
66
For a full discussion of the London Conference Exec Files.
69
and the planning that followed, see Matloff and Snell, Memo, King for JCS, 4 May 42, sub: Defense of
Strategic Planning, 1941-42, pp. 183-91, passim, and Island Bases, JCS 48, app, to JCS Mins of that date.
70
Leighton and Coakley, Global Logistics and Strategy, Memo, President for Marshall, 6 May 42, no sub;
ch. XIV. CofS for President, same date, sub: Pacific Theater vs
67
Memo, McCrea for JCS, 1 May 42, sub: Aircraft BOLERO, JCS 48, ABC 381 (1-22-42) sec. 2 Pacific
and Troops for Australia, OPD Exec Files. Bases.
Though the President's decision meant States would assume strategic responsi-
that the Navy and General MacArthur bility for the defense of the Fijis. Orders
would have to shelve, temporarily at for the 37th Division were hurriedly
least, their plans for offensive operations changed, and early in June the first de-
and a strong defense in depth, it did not tachment landed at Suva. Since it had
halt the movement of troops and planes proved impossible to collect in so short
to the Pacific. Rather, it speeded up a time the additional troops required
these movements, for the Army, having for a balanced garrison force, the rest of
won the victory, was anxious to meet its the 37th went on to New Zealand where
commitments promptly. "Since we have an Army port detachment had already
won our point," Eisenhower wrote Gen- gone to handle its debarkation.72
eral Arnold on 8 May, "it is my opinion New Zealand's demands had been sat-
we should reach and maintain the isfied without altering the basic strategy
amounts indicated ... as quickly as pos- but there was no way of meeting the
sible." Arnold agreed and listed the num- demands from Australia without aban-
ber of planes he expected to have in the doning or delaying BOLERO. All of Mr.
Pacific by 1 July.71 Curtin's appeals to Washington and Lon-
This determination to bring the forces don, and MacArthur's requests to the
in the Pacific to their authorized strength War Department came up against the
did not solve all the problems that had hard fact that the planners did not be-
been raised during the course of the lieve Australia was in imminent danger
debate. One of these was the defense of of invasion or that the time had come
the Fijis, then garrisoned by New Zea- for offensive operations in that theater.
land troops and an American pursuit The best that Churchill and Roosevelt
squadron. It was General Marshall who could offer was admiration for the ag-
proposed a solution which would meet gressive spirit which prompted the re-
the need for stronger forces in the Fijis quests for troops and assurances of
without requiring additional troops. The support if a real threat developed. Mean-
37th Division, which had been promised while, the President told MacArthur,
to New Zealand in return for the reten- every effort would be made to send him
tion of the Dominion's troops in the "all the air strength we possibly can."
Middle East, could be sent instead to the To do more, as Marshall had pointed
Fijis, Marshall suggested, thus releasing out, would make the Southwest Pacific
almost 10,000 New Zealand troops for the principal theater of operations. Mac-
the defense of the Dominion. Admiral Arthur would have to do with what he
King raised no objections to this pro- had, at least for the present.73
posal and it was quickly adopted by the Though the President's decision of 8
Joint Chiefs and approved by the Presi-
72
dent. The New Zealand Government Mins, JCS Mtg, 4 May 42; Joint Army-Navy Plan
for Fijis, 13 May 42; Memo, COMINCH for N. Z.
accepted this arrangement, too, in re- Minister, 9 May 42, same sub, both in OPD 381 Fiji.
turn for an agreement that the United See also Leighton and Coakley, Global Logistics and
Strategy, p. 178.
71 73
Memos, Eisenhower for Arnold, 8 May 42, no sub, Rad, MacArthur to Marshall, 3 May 42, CM-IN-
OPD 381 case 62; Arnold for Eisenhower, 14 May 42, 0667; Ltr, Marshall to Dill, 22 May 42, OPD Exec
no sub, OPD 381 PTO, case 21. Files; Milner, Victory in Papua, pp. 29-32.
TABLE 4—ARMY STRENGTH IN PACIFIC, APRIL 1942a
a
Excludes strength in Philippines where forces surrendered in May 1942.
Source: Adapted from Chart 2, Matloff and Snell, Strategic Planning, 1941-42.
May, made two days after the Port troops (exclusive of the Philippine gar-
Moresby invasion force had left Rabaul, rison). Ground forces included six di-
had eased temporarily the heavy drain visions and Task Force 6184, soon to be
of the Pacific on Allied resources, it was, organized into the Americal Division,
in a sense, a tribute to the enormous the equivalent of almost three separate
progress made by the Army and Navy infantry regiments, a large number of
under the most adverse conditions in coast and antiaircraft artillery units, and
building up the defenses of the Pacific in service troops of all types. (Table 4)
the short period of five months. At the Each of the island bases had at least one
start of the war, the United States had in pursuit squadron, but most of the air as
the Pacific only two garrisons of any well as the ground strength in the Pacific
size, Hawaii and the Philippines. By the was concentrated in Australia and Ha-
beginning of May, despite defeat and waii. The former had 41 heavy bombers,
disaster and the decision to concentrate 150 light and medium bombers, and
on the war in Europe, Hawaii had been about 475 fighters; the latter about 30
considerably reinforced, the defenses of heavy bombers and considerably fewer
Australia and New Zealand bolstered aircraft of other types. Both were still
with American ground troops and air- short of the authorized goals, especially
craft, and a chain of island bases estab- in heavy bombers. This weakness con-
lished along the line of communications. stituted the main complaint of the Navy
In the area, or scheduled soon to arrive, and was to be one of the chief problems
were over 250,000 Army ground and air in the Pacific in the months to come.
CHAPTER X
The U.S. and Japanese High Commands

An army is of little value in the field unless there are wise counsels at
home. CICERO
During the early months of the war, after Pearl Harbor a mechanism for di-
while the Japanese tide of victory was recting the U.S. war effort that lasted,
flowing strong, the Allies had already with modifications, until the end of the
begun to look to the future. Though the war. For the Pacific, which was to be-
effort to defend the Malay Barrier had come an area of U.S. responsibility, this
failed, the Allies had hurriedly sent re- Washington organization became in effect
inforcements to hold Australia, Hawaii, a supreme command.
and the island chain across the Pacific. The organization of the Japanese mili-
Already, plans were maturing to build tary high command, perfected before the
a base in Australia and to develop air war, was, on the surface, not unlike that
and naval bases along the line of com- of the United States. The commander in
munications. It was still too early to chief of the Japanese armed forces was
predict the course of operations once the the head of the state, the Emperor.
Allies were in a position to take the ini- Under him was Imperial General Head-
tiative, but it was not too soon to prepare quarters with its Army and Navy Sec-
for that time. Thus, while bases were tions—there was no separate air service
being established and forces deployed to —which prepared and co-ordinated the
the Pacific, the Allies began to organize operations of forces in the field. The
for the offensive ahead. Army and Navy Ministers sat in the
The first step in preparing for an Cabinet and civilian agencies directed
offensive was to develop an Allied organ- the war effort on the home front. But
ization to co-ordinate the efforts of the this organization, superficially so similar
Allies, and within this framework to to the American, could not conceal the
devise a mechanism for planning and co- fact that Japan was a military dictator-
ordinating operations on many fronts. ship in which the civilian officials exer-
In this the British had the advantage of cised little real authority and the
an early start, and a combined staff was Emperor was but a symbol.
quickly formed. The American counter-
part of this organization, the Joint Chiefs The Washington Command Post
of Staff, took shape more slowly. Utiliz-
ing existing organizations and staffs, the At the ARCADIA Conference in Wash-
Americans developed during the months ington, it will be recalled, the first steps
had been taken toward establishment of Within the next few months, the
a combined U.S.-British organization membership of the Joint Chiefs, which
for the conduct of the war.1 It had been was established on 9 February, was re-
decided then that the Combined Chiefs examined and took final form. General
of Staff would be located in Washington, Marshall's position was not affected,
where the British Chiefs would be repre- except that as a result of the reorganiza-
sented by a Joint Staff Mission. During tion of the War Department in March
the months that followed the combined 1942 his authority as Chief of Staff, U.S.
organization began to take shape and the Army, was enhanced. General Arnold's
functions of the Combined Chiefs were position as commander of the newly
more clearly delineated. By the early formed semiautonomous Army Air
summer of 1942 this process was largely Forces also increased his stature in the
completed. Joint Chiefs, although he remained Mar-
The American side of the Allied high shall's subordinate and thus not in the
command developed more slowly. The same position in combined councils as
old Joint Board with its Joint Planning the British air chief who was head of a
Committee had neither the authority separate service.
nor the organization to meet the chal- The Navy also underwent reorganiza-
lenges of global war (or of the British tion in March designed to streamline it
committee system), and it gave way for the war ahead. One of the effects of
gradually to the emergent Joint Chiefs this reorganization was to consolidate the
of Staff. Membership in the two bodies, functions of the Chief of Naval Opera-
though similar, was not identical. The tions and Commander in Chief, United
former had consisted of the service chiefs, States Fleet, and at Admiral Stark's
their deputies, and the heads of the War behest Admiral King was placed in
Plans Division and air arms of the two supreme command of all professional
services. Since December 1941, Admiral activities of the Navy.2 This change was
King as commander of the U.S. Fleet, formally recognized in an Executive
though not a member, had also sat with Order of 12 March which assigned King
the Joint Board, whose presiding officer to both commands, designated him as
at the time was the Chief of Naval Op- the principal naval adviser to the Presi-
erations, Admiral Stark. During the dent, and gave him a greater degree of
ARCADIA meeting the term U.S. Chiefs control, over the bureaus than had ever
of Staff, employed to designate a group been exercised by any Chief of Naval
comparable to the British Chiefs, had Operations.3 In addition, he was given
referred to four men—Admiral Stark, two strong assistants, a Vice Chief of
General Marshall, Admiral King, and Naval Operations, and a Deputy
General Arnold. The last two were not Commander for the U.S. Fleet.
chiefs of a service and one of them was not The effects of these moves, though
even a member of the Joint Board, but
their inclusion was considered necessary
2
to balance the British representation. 3
Davis, Origins of JCS and CCS, I, 350-51.
Admiral Stark was relieved as Chief of Naval Op-
erations on 26 March 1942 and appointed Com-
1
See above, pp. 164-66. mander, U.S. Naval Forces, Europe.
THE U.S. AND JAPANESE HIGH COMMANDS 227
they greatly increased the authority of The senior members on the American
the Chiefs within their services, was to side, the Joint Staff Planners (JPS),
reduce the membership of the Joint were Brig. Gen. Leonard T. Gerow and
Chiefs by one. But already a move was Rear Adm. Richmond K. Turner, Chiefs
under way to add another, one who of the Army and Navy War Plans Divi-
would represent the President much as sion—both members of the Joint Board
Maj. Gen. Sir Hastings Ismay represented and, simultaneously, of that agency's
Churchill on the British Chiefs, and Joint Planning Committee. In this latter
because he represented no service, could capacity, they directed the work of the
serve as an impartial chairman. The Joint Strategic Committee, composed of
President, at first cool to the idea, was at least three officers from each of the
finally convinced of the advantages of War Plans Divisions, whose task it was
such an arrangement and on Marshall's to work on joint war plans, and of vari-
suggestion designated Admiral William ous ad hoc committees formed to study
D. Leahy as his own chief of staff.4 No other problems as they arose. It was nat-
appointment could have been better cal- ural that this organization should be
culated to add weight to the Joint Chiefs taken over bodily by the Joint Chiefs,
and to cement relations with the White and for a time it served both bodies
House. Admiral Leahy, after serving as equally.
Chief of Naval Operations, had retired This system had its disadvantages, and
from the Navy in August 1939. Since membership of the Joint Staff Planners
then he had served as Governor of was soon changed. The Navy kept its
Puerto Rico and Ambassador to the chief planner, Admiral Turner, on the
French Government at Vichy. In June committee, but gave him two assistants,
1942, he returned to the United States, one of them an air officer. Probably
and on 18 July was recalled to active because of the heavier burdens of the
duty and designated Chief of Staff to the Chief of the Army's War Plans Division,
Commander in Chief—a post without Gerow's successor, General Eisenhower,
precedent in American history. With designated the head of the division's
this appointment, the membership of the Strategy and Policy Group, Col. Thomas
Joint Chiefs of Staff was fixed for the T. Handy, as the Army member of the
duration of the war. Joint Staff Planners instead of assuming
The charter of the Combined Chiefs the post himself.6 The air representative
approved at ARCADIA had specifically pro-
vided for a planning staff, the Combined ization for planning is based upon Davis, Origins of
Staff Planners, and had even named the JCS and CCS, pp. 324-85, and its sequel, vol. II in
Hist of JCS Organization in World War II, Develop-
officers who would compose that body.5 ment of the JCS Committee Structure, pp. 3861-590;
Ray S. Cline, Washington Command Post: The Oper-
ations Division UNITED STATES ARMY IN
4
For an account of this appointment, see Davis, WORLD WAR II (Washington, 1951), chs. VI and
Origins of JCS and CCS, pp. 378-85; William D. VIII; Craven and Cate, AAF 1, pp. 251-56.
6
Leahy, I Was There (New York: Whittlesey House, Admiral Turner was replaced as chief naval plan-
1950), pp. 96-97; Ltr, Secy of War to President, 20 ner by Rear Adm. Charles M. Cooke, Jr., in June
Mar 42, WDCSA 032. when Turner left to command the South Pacific Am-
5
U.S. ABC-4/CS4, 14 Jan 42, sub: Post-ARCADIA phibious Force. General Handy's successor was Brig.
Collaboration. This description of the joint organ- Gen. Albert C. Wedemeyer.
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF. From left: Admiral King, General Marshall, Admiral Leahy, and
General Arnold.
initially was Maj. Gen. Carl Spaatz, and, ously, the group was too unwieldy and
after the March reorganization of the too diverse in its composition to handle
War Department, the Assistant Chief of all the problems that came before it.
Staff for Plans of the new Army Air Most of its work was farmed out to sub-
Force. Other members were added from ordinate committees, the two senior
time to time—an additional member in members controlling the assignments.
August to even the Army and Navy rep- Most of these subcommittees were ad
resentation, and then seven more mem- hoc, formed for a particular task and
bers with varying status to represent composed of planning officers and staff
logistical interests. Clearly this was not experts drawn from the two services by
a committee of equals. The senior Army the chief Army and Navy planners. Only
and Navy planners were its leading the Joint Strategic Committee, which
members and by virtue of seniority, offi- had been taken over from the Joint
cial position, and access to the chiefs of Board and redesignated the Joint U.S.
their services their views were generally Strategic Committee (JUSSC), had a
binding on the other members of the recognized status and membership as the
committee. working group for the Joint Planners.
The work of the Joint Staff Planners Assigned to it full time were eight senior
was broad and varied, ranging from and highly qualified officers, four each
global strategy to the allocation of minor from the Army and the Navy War Plans
items of supply and encompassing not Divisions. One of the Army representa-
only strategic but also operational, logis- tives was an Air Forces officer and the
tic, and administrative aspects. Obvi- Navy's contingent usually included a
Marine officer. The committee's char- reconstituted JUSSC reporting directly

ter, as defined by the Joint Chiefs, called to the Joint Chiefs and consisting of four
upon it to "prepare such strategical esti- flag or general officers representing the
mates, studies and plans" as the JPS Army, Navy, Army Air Forces, and the
directed, and, in addition, to initiate Navy air arm. Another proposal for uti-
studies at its own discretion.7 It was lizing the JUSSC more effectively in
natural, therefore, for the Joint Staff strategic planning was to reduce its mem-
Planners to rely heavily on the JUSSC, bership to four senior officers with two
especially in the field of broad strategy, assistants for each of its members and
and to invite its members to sit with charge it with responsibility, under the
them from time to time. Joint Staff Planners, for co-ordinating
The role of the JUSSC in planning the preparation of plans in support of
proved to be quite different from that the basic strategy, reviewing these plans,
envisaged by those of its members who and developing recommendations for
placed somewhat more emphasis on their changes in the basic strategy. If neither
strategic responsibilities than did their of these proposals was acceptable, then
superiors. Much of the committee's the JUSSC, said one of its members,
work proved to be routine, concerned ought to be redesignated the "Joint
with relatively minor matters, and so Working Committee" of the JPS in
heavy was the load that it had no time frank recognition of its present function.
left to study problems it considered more The Joint Chiefs considered this prob-
important in the conduct of the war. lem very carefully over a period of several
Moreover, some of its members thought meetings in the fall of 1942. There was
it would be more appropriately and no disagreement with Marshall's assertion
profitably employed in the study of of the need for "an organization, with
future strategy than in routine matters sufficient prestige and disassociated from
of troop deployment, production priori- current operations, which can obtain a
ties shipping schedules, and the like.8 good perspective by being allowed time
There was much merit in this view. for profound deliberations."9 In his
Certainly there was a need for long-range view, an entirely new organization should
studies, for a group of senior and experi- be created to meet this need. The possi-
enced Army and Navy planners, free bility of using the deputy chiefs of the
from the burdens of day-to-day problems, services for this purpose, an arrangement
who would devote their time to the that would permit the Joint Chiefs to
larger issues of the war, to future strategy leave decisions on minor matters to the
and political-military questions. But who new committee, was discussed at some
was best qualified to advise the Joint length. The solution finally adopted
Chiefs on these high-level matters? One represented a combination of the various
view was that this should be done by a proposals. To satisfy the need for a
7 9
JCS 14, 27 Feb 42, sub: Proposed Directive to JIC Quoted in Davis, Development of the JCS Com-
and JUSSC; Mins, JCS Mtg, 9 Mar 42. mittee Structure, p. 553. These discussions are re-
8
Memo, Col. Ray T. Maddocks for Handy, 9 Jul 42, corded in the JCS minutes of 20 and 27 October, 3
sub: The JSSC, ABC 020 (13 Jul 42) sec. 3-J-A. November, 8 and 10 December 1942.
high-level group of planners, the Joint mental bodies where military advice was
Chiefs formed a new committee, called required. The idea of a committee con-
the Joint Strategic Survey Committee sisting of the Deputy Chiefs of Staff,
(JSSC)—not related to the JUSSC—con- originally proposed as an alternative to
sisting of three flag or general officers, the JSSC, seemed an admirable solution
assigned to full time duty. Reporting to this problem. Thus came into exist-
only to the Joint Chiefs, these officers ence the Joint Deputy Chiefs of Staff
would have no duties other than to re- (JDCS) , consisting initially of Lt. Gen.
flect on basic strategy and the long-range Joseph T. McNarney, Vice Adm. Fred-
implications of immediate events and erick J. Home, and Maj. Gen. George
decisions. No sources of information E. Stratemeyer.11
were to be denied them and they could, But the problem of the Joint U.S.
if they desired, attend any meeting of Strategic Committee was still unresolved.
the Joint or Combined Chiefs of Staff and The role the members of the committee
of Joint or Combined Staff Planners.10 had envisaged for themselves had now be-
This was to be truly a committee of come the province of the elder statesmen
"elder statesmen," and the appointments of the Joint Strategic Survey Committee.
made fully bore out this intention of the Moreover, the former had been engaged
Joint Chiefs. Representing the Army since August 1942 on future strategy for
was Lt. Gen. Stanley D. Embick, who the defeat of Japan. In addition, it was
had been associated with strategic plan- directed late in November to prepare a
ning throughout a long and distinguished long-range study for the employment of
career. Vice Adm. Russell Willson rep- United Nations forces for the defeat of
resented the Navy, though he had to be both Germany and Japan, to be co-
relieved of his important duties as Dep- ordinated with British studies on the
uty Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet, to same problem. Since the Joint Strategic
serve on the committee. The Army Air Survey Committee was engaged in simi-
Forces member was Maj. Gen. Muir S. lar studies, the need for a review of the
Fairchild, recognized as an officer of duties of the JUSSC was more urgent
exceptional ability and breadth of view. than ever. Various proposals had been
With this membership, unchanged put forward, but by the end of 1942 no
throughout the war, the Joint Strategic change had been made. When it came
Survey Committee began its existence in in May 1943, it was accompanied by a
November 1942. reorganization of the entire JCS
The creation of the JSSC solved only structure.12
one of the problems facing the Joint The work of the Joint Chiefs was sup-
Chiefs. Still needed was a group that ported by a variety of other committees,
could act for them on minor matters and some of which functioned purely in a
could represent them on various govern- joint capacity and some as the U.S. com-
ponent of committees of the Combined
Chiefs. Intelligence activities were under
10
JCS 149/0, 7 Nov 42, sub: Charter of the JSSC.
The charter authorized four members, two from the
11
Army and two from the Navy, but the Navy never JCS 164/D, 11 Dec 42, sub: Functions of the JDCS.
12
named a fourth member. See below, p. 455.
the purview of the Joint Intelligence lems presented."13 In effect, it was a

Committee (JIC), which had been taken general staff within the general staff.
over from the Joint Board at the same The organization of the Operations
time as the JUSSC. In recognition of Division was tailored closely to its duties
the role of psychological warfare in mod- and the needs of the Chief of Staff.
ern war, a separate committee (JPWC) Under Eisenhower, its chief from Feb-
was formed to advise the Joint Chiefs on ruary to June 1942, it was organized
this subject. The Office of Strategic into three major groups—planning, op-
Services was also a part of the joint com- erations, and logistics—and an Executive
mittee system, directly responsible for Office. The first, called the Strategy and
certain matters to the Joint Chiefs and Policy Group, was the one most inti-
for others to the JIC and the JPWC. mately concerned with joint and com-
Additional committees advised on combined planning, and was responsible for
munications, weather, new weapons matters of general strategy, the prepara-
and equipment, and transportation. tion of studies, plans, and estimates, and
(Chart 3) the issuance of directives for theater and
Within the War Department, strategic task force commanders. Its chief was the
planning and the co-ordination of mili- Army member of the Joint Staff Plan-
tary operations were centered in the ners and from it came the representa-
Operations Division of the General Staff, tives of the JUSSC. It had a section that
successor to the old War Plans Division dealt with future operations only, an-
whose functions it absorbed in March other with strategy, and one with sub-
1942. In a very real sense, the Opera- jects that came up for discussion at the
tions Division was General Marshall's combined level.
command post, the agency through which The co-ordination of operations with-
he exercised control over and co-ordi- in the Operations Division was handled
nated the vast activities of the Army in by the Theater (Operations) -Group.
World War II. All strategic planning in This was the largest of the groups, and
the War Department was done within was organized ultimately into sections
the Operations Division, or tunneled corresponding to the various theaters of
through it, and its officers represented operations and serving in effect as Wash-
the Army on virtually every major com- ington echelons of these theater head-
bined and joint committee. Any matters quarters. It was this group that kept in
that might affect strategy or operations close touch with theater problems, di-
came to it, and its roster included logis- rected the movement of troops overseas,
ticians as well as ground and air officers. and co-ordinated all War Department
So varied were its functions that General activities relating to theater require-
Wedemeyer was able to inform a British ments. For Pacific matters there were
officer of the Joint Staff Mission that two sections, the Pacific and the South-
"your Washington contact agency is now
the Executive Officer, Operations Divi- 13
Ltr, Wedemeyer to Maj E. H. Baume, BJSM, 15
sion, War Department General Staff. He Jun 42, quoted in Cline, Washington Command Post,
p. 122. This account of the Operations Division is
will be able to refer you directly to the drawn very largely from this volume, especially
proper section for solution of any prob- Chapter VIII.
CHART 3—THE WASHINGTON HIGH COMMAND AND THE PACIFIC THEATERS, DECEMBER 1942
Administration and Supply

Composition
west Pacific Theater Sections, headed in which capacity he was the supreme
from mid-1942 to mid-1944 by Cols. commander of all operating forces of the
Carl D. Silverthorne and William L. Navy, Admiral King was responsible for
Ritchie. Both these officers made fre- execution of the plans he helped to
quent trips to the theaters and were con- shape. To meet his dual responsibilities,
stantly called upon by the theater King formed two separate staff organiza-
commanders and by the planners in tions, each of which maintained its own
Washington for assistance and advice on planning office.14
theater problems. In his role as CNO, Admiral King had
In recognition of the intimate relation- ultimately six principal assistants, a Vice
ship between logistics and strategy, and Chief of Naval Operations, a Sub Chief,
the dependence of operations on man- a Deputy for Air Operations, and three
power, weapons, equipment, and trans- assistant chiefs. One of these last officers
portation, the Operations Division had a was Director of the War Plans Division
Logistics Group. This group did not par- and the principal strategic adviser of the
ticipate in logistical planning or in the Chief of Naval Operations. This office,
manifold activities related to supply of comparable in prewar days and in the
Army forces; these were the functions of first months of the war to the Army's
G-4 and of the Army Service Forces under War Plans Division, was responsible for
General Somervell. What it did instead the preparation of basic war plans, and
was to view these matters from the stra- of plans for the development and main-
tegic level in order to advise General tenance of naval forces for war. In pre-
Marshall on their implications when de- war days, its director had been a member
cision by the Chief of Staff became nec- of the Joint Board, and its officers had
essary. It was in a unique position to do represented the Navy on the Joint Plan-
so because of its access to the planners ning Committee, the Aeronautical
and theater experts in the division, and Board, and other joint groups. When
its members represented the Army on a war came most of its strategic planning
variety of committees, both military and functions were assumed by other offices.
civilian. Finally in 1943, it was redesignated the
The Navy Department organization Logistical Plans Division in recognition
for strategic planning and direction of of the fact that its functions were limited
operations was not as highly centralized to logistical planning and co-ordination.
as the War Department organization. Thus, the Navy War Plans Division de-
The reason for this difference lay partly veloped in a way quite different from the
in Admiral King's dual status as Chief Army's War Plans Division and, instead
of Naval Operations (CNO) and Com- of becoming a super general staff, dimin-
mander in Chief, United States Fleet ished in importance to become ultimately
(COMINCH). In the former capacity an office under the Assistant Chief of
he was responsible for "the preparation, Naval Operations for Logistic Plans.
readiness and logistic support of the
14
operating forces" of the Navy—its fleets, This account of naval organization is drawn prin-
cipally from The National Archives, Federal Records
shore establishments, sea frontiers, and of World War II, vol II, Military Agencies
all seagoing forces. But as COMINCH, (Washington, 1951), pp. 571-602.
It was in his role as Commander in naval member of the Joint and Com-
Chief, United States Fleet, that Admiral bined Staff Planners, as was his chief
King performed most of his duties as a planner, usually a naval air officer.
member of the Joint and Combined Other officers in the division sat on the
Chiefs. Thus, it was the fleet staff, under Joint U.S. Strategic Committee and on
a Deputy Commander and Chief of various joint ad hoc committees as they
Staff, that assumed most of the burdens were formed. The division's main task
of strategic planning and direction of was the preparation of estimates, studies,
naval operations. For each of these func- and plans for joint and combined forces,
tions, planning and operations, there but it served also, much as did the Army's
was a separate division—the Plans Divi- Operations Division, as the co-ordinating
sion and the Operations Division. The agency for implementing joint plans and
last, as the name implies, was concerned for liaison with other planning offices in
with the operations of fleets and naval the Navy Department and with the War
forces and kept a constant check on their Department General Staff.
organization, combat readiness, and
movements. Through this division, The Japanese High Command
Admiral King maintained close contact
with his fleet and force commanders, The Japanese high command, cen-
both surface and air, and exercised con- tered in Tokyo, was headed by the
trol over their operations. In general, Emperor. Under the Japanese constitu-
this office performed the same functions tion, the Army and Navy were responsi-
as the Theater Group of the Army's ble solely to the Emperor, and the Chiefs
Operations Division but none of the of Staff of the two services, as imperial
other functions of that division. advisers, had direct access to the throne.
The chief responsibility for strategic The Emperor also received military
planning in the Navy resided in the counsel from two advisory bodies, the
Plans Division, Headquarters, Com- Board of Marshals and Fleet Admirals
mander in Chief, United States Fleet. and the Supreme War Council. But the
Like the Logistic Plans Division, CNO, first exercised little influence and the
it had its origins in the prewar War second was consulted only on adminis-
Plans Division, part of whose functions trative matters. Real authority and con-
were transferred to the fleet staff in Jan- trol lay in the hands of the general staff
uary 1942. When the two offices of CNO and was exercised solely through the
and COMINCH were combined in Chiefs of Staff. They alone were respon-
March 1942, the Plans Division was as- sible for strategy and planning, and for
signed additional responsibilities. Thus, the direction of operations.15
it became the source for current and
long-range strategic plans for the Navy, 15
This section is based on a study prepared for the
and its officers became the chief naval author by Stanley L. Falk, OCMH. The major sources
representatives on the various joint and used in its preparation included: Imperial GHQ
combined committees. It was the director Army High Command Record, Japanese Studies in
World War II, 72; Hattori, The Greater East Asia
of this division, first Admiral Turner War; Japanese Operations in SWPA; Maxon, Control
and then Admiral Cooke, who was the of Japanese Foreign Policy.
The organization of the Army and Staffs, and plans and operations orders
Navy General Staffs, with certain impor- were issued not from Imperial General
tant exceptions, was similar. The Army Headquarters as such but rather from its
staff was the larger, reflecting the greater Army Section or its Navy Section. Joint
power of its Chief of Staff and his con- operations were conducted by means of
trol over training and other activities not agreements between the Army and Navy,
shared by his naval colleague. It was and separate orders were issued to Army
organized into bureaus, the most impor- and Navy commanders. Often Army-
tant of which were the 1st (Operations), Navy disagreement over a proposed joint
2d (Intelligence), 3d (Transportation operation might result in delay or even
and Communications), and General Af- the abandonment of the operation. Even
fairs Bureau. The main Navy staff con- when agreement was reached, the opera-
sisted also of numbered bureaus, but the tion would normally be carried out not
numbers did not correspond to those in by a joint commander, but by separate
the Army. The bureaus of both services, Army and Navy commanders who would
corresponding to G-Sections of Western "co-operate" with each other under the
general staffs, were usually headed by terms of an Army-Navy "agreement."
general and flag officers who exercised On the rare occasions that saw the estab-
considerable influence on strategy and lishment of a joint operational command,
operations. supplies were still delivered through
The conduct of the war was nominally separate service channels, with conse-
in the hands of Imperial General Head- quent duplication, oversights, and
quarters, acting directly under the au- mutual recriminations.
thority of the Emperor. Representing In the absence of any leadership on
the Army and Navy Chiefs of Staff and the part of the Emperor, the Army and
the War and Navy Ministries, Imperial Navy went their separate ways. But the
General Headquarters was divided into Army was clearly the leading service.
the Army and Navy Sections, each acting The position of General Tojo as both
independently. Army Section met in the Premier and War Minister, along with
Army General Staff offices, Navy Section his other Cabinet positions, undoubtedly
in its own offices. At joint meetings, lent the Army increased prestige, and
held about twice a week on the Imperial Admiral Shigetaro Shimada, the Navy
Palace grounds, both Chiefs of Staff pre- Minister during most of the war, fol-
sided. The Emperor occasionally attend- lowed a policy of trying to co-operate
ed these meetings, but rarely those of the with the Army. There was, nevertheless,
individual service staffs. no co-ordinated Army-Navy policy. As
The main weakness of Imperial Gen- one former Navy Minister put it, "As
eral Headquarters was that it was not a far as questions of Army operations are
single joint command, even an imperfect concerned, if the Chief of the Army Gen-
one. Rather it was a facade to cover two eral Staff says that we will do this, that
separate organizations with strong com- is the end of it; and as far as the Navy
peting interests and rivalries. Army and operations are concerned, if the Chief
Navy plans were developed separately in of the Navy General Staff says we will do
the Operations Bureaus of the General this, that fixes it; and should there de-
velop difference of opinion between the of the General Staffs, and the civilian
two chiefs, then nothing can be accom- participants were fully aware of the
plished."16 This division was a major danger of assassination for any one who
weakness in Japan's military establish- raised too strong a voice against the
ment. The Japanese were well aware of plans of the military.
this, and late in the war General Tojo The Liaison Conference usually met
proposed a real merger of Army and twice a week, in a small conference room
Navy Sections, a proposal that came to in one of the Imperial Palace buildings.
naught. There was no presiding officer, but the
The link between Imperial General Premier occupied an armchair at the far
Headquarters and the Cabinet was the end of the room and the others sat
Liaison Conference. This conference, grouped around him. A variety of sub-
initiated briefly in 1937 after the rejects was discussed at these meetings:
establishment of Imperial General Head- war plans, diplomatic moves, the admin-
quarters, was resumed in 1940 and istration of occupied areas, and the as-
continued throughout the war. It had signment of national resources. Once a
no formal status or authority, but was decision was reached at the Liaison Con-
merely a framework for discussions be- ference, it became in effect national
tween the civil government and the policy by virtue of the official position
military authorities. The participants of conference members, though the
were the Chiefs of Staff, the Army and conference itself had no legal status.
Navy Ministers (themselves active duty On the surface the Liaison Conference
officers and largely under the control of appeared to be a meeting of equals. But
the Chiefs of Staff), the Premier, and appearances were deceptive. The mili-
such other ministers as might be neces- tary dominated the conference and dic-
sary. Also present were the Cabinet sec- t a t e d policy. " I m p e r i a l General
retary and the chiefs of the Military Headquarters was in the Liaison Con-
Affairs Bureaus of the Army and Navy ferences," explained General Tojo after
Ministries. These last three functioned as the war, "and after they got through
a secretariat, and by their choice of deciding things, the Cabinet, generally
agenda and their role in briefing the speaking, made no objection. Theoreti-
participants, they exercised a very strong cally, the Cabinet members could have
influence on the outcome of the Liaison disagreed . . . , but, as a practical matter,
Conferences. Their presence, also, meant they agreed and did not say anything."17
that the conference proceedings would Imperial General Headquarters was thus
soon become known to other members the source of Japanese national policy.
"The Cabinet, and hence the civil govern-
16
Adm Mitsuma a Yonai, in USSBS, Interrogations ment," wrote former Premier Konoye in
of Japanese Officials, II, 328. This discussion of IGHQ
is based on Maxon, op. cit., pp. 21, 59-62, 126-27,
17
167-68, 185-86, 189, 191, 255 n. 7; Hattori, op. cit., Quoted in Maxon, op. cit., p. 150. This discussion
pp. 239-40; Japanese Opns in SWPA, p. 52; Tsuruzo of the Liaison Conference is based on ibid., pp. 127-
Akisada, History of Conflicts Between Army and 29, 132, 149-56, 168, 181-83; Imperial GHQ Army
Navy, and Clique Struggles, GHQ FEC, MIS, Hist High Command Record, Japanese Studies in World
Div, Translation of Japanese Documents, III; War II, No. pp. 6-9, and Chart I; Japanese Opns in
Morison, Breaking the Bismarcks Barrier, pp. 15-22. SWPA, p. 52 n. 24.
his memoirs, "were manipulated like extensive field organization. (Chart 4)

puppets by the Supreme Command... ,"18 In theory, field commanders were di-
On extremely important occasions, the rectly responsible to the Emperor, the
Liaison Conference became an Imperial commander in chief of the armed forces,
Conference, or a Conference in the Im- but in fact came under the control of
perial Presence, by adding to its mem- Imperial General Headquarters, acting
bership the Emperor, the President of for the commander in chief. There was
the Privy Council, and other high offi- no direct communication between the
cials. These meetings were much more throne and the field. Basic orders were
formal that the Liaison Conferences. issued to field commanders as Imperial
The participants made set speeches, pre- General Headquarters Army or Navy
viously written and rehearsed, all differ- Section Orders, signed by the appropriate
ences of opinion having been carefully Chief of Staff, "by Imperial Command."
resolved beforehand. The Emperor lis- The detailed instructions necessary for
tened in silence, seated on a raised dais the implementation of these orders,
before a long, rectangular table, where called Imperial General Headquarters
the major participants sat facing each Army or Navy Section Directives, were
other. The three secretaries were issued by the appropriate Chief of Staff
grouped around a small table in the cor- without any reference to the throne.
ner of the room. The Premier presided Recommendations of the field command-
over the meeting, and each participant ers to the throne or request for review
rose in turn, bowed to the Emperor, and of headquarters decisions had to be sub-
stood stiffly in front of his chair while mitted to Imperial General Headquarters
speaking. No one entered or left the through the appropriate Chief of Staff.20
room during the conference. At the con- Unlike the Allies, the Japanese did
clusion of the presentations, the Presi- not ordinarily organize their ground, air,
dent of the Privy Council asked questions and naval forces in the field under a
designed to elicit further information single joint commander. Nor did they
for the Emperor. These questions and establish theaters of operations corres-
answers were unrehearsed, but none of ponding to geographical areas under a
the representatives of the Cabinet dared theater headquarters. Normally, the
deviate from the prearranged conclu- forces of each service in an area were
sions of the group. The Emperor, whose placed under a separate Army or fleet
role was normally a passive one, did not headquarters whose commanders
speak. Only on very rare occasions, such received orders through separate chan-
as at the Imperial Conference on 6 Sep- nels and worked together under the
tember 1941 and the one in August 1945 principle of co-operation. The highest
that led to the Japanese surrender, did Japanese command, equivalent to a U.S.
he venture to exercise his authority.19 Army overseas command or perhaps to
Beneath the military high command 20
Imperial GHQ Army High Command Record,
structure in Tokyo, the Japanese had an p. 2. Examples of Imperial General Headquarters
Army and Navy Orders and Directives are to be found
18
Quoted in Maxon, op. cit., p. 182. in several volumes of these documents prepared by
19
Ibid., pp. 63-64, 66, 156-59, 161-62, 172, 182-83, FEC Mil Hist Sec, copies of which are on file in
204-09; Hattori, op. cit., pp. 243-45. OCMH.
CHART 4—THE JAPANESE HIGH COMMAND
an army group, was the general army, had under its command six numbered
the size of which might vary widely, and fleets, two numbered air fleets, and the
which operated directly under the Army Southern Expeditionary Fleet. The
Section of Imperial General Headquar- numbered fleets, depending on their mis-
ters in Tokyo. There were three such sion, contained surface, submarine, and
armies during the early period of the air units as well as service and support
war: Southern Army, Kwantung Army, elements and base forces. Most of the
and China Expeditionary Army. In each carrier-based air power of the Combined
of these were usually one or more area Fleet was concentrated in the 1st Air
armies, equivalent to U.S. field armies Fleet, which included four of Japan's
and consisting of units equivalent to a five carrier divisions. Land-based naval
U.S. corps but called armies by the Japa- air power was for the most part assigned
nese. There was no unit called a corps to the 11th Air Fleet, submarines to the
in the Japanese Army, Japanese divi- 6th Fleet, and battleships to the 1st
sions, brigades, and other separate units Fleet.21
being assigned directly to armies. (An This was the organization of the Japa-
exception was the South Seas Detach- nese high command during the first year
ment which served directly under Army of the war. As the war progressed, adjust-
Section, Imperial General Headquar- ments were made, old organizations ex-
ters.) Thus, Southern Army, which con- panded and shifted, and new commands
ducted the opening operations of the created to meet the needs of the changing
war, consisted of four armies, two air strategic situation. But the basic struc-
groups, and several smaller units. ture, except for the creation of a Supreme
Unlike the Army, the Japanese Navy Council in August 1944 to take the place
placed most of its combat forces under of the Liaison Conference, remained
a single command, the Combined Fleet, unchanged throughout the war.
which controlled all naval operations in
21
the Pacific area and was roughly com- Imperial GHQ Army High Command Record,
passim; Japanese Opns in SWPA, pp. 52-56; The
parable to the U.S. Pacific Fleet. During Imperial Japanese Navy in World War II, Japanese
the early months of the war, this fleet Studies in World War II, 127, passim.
CHAPTER XI
Organization and Command of the Pacific

The general who advances without coveting fame and retreats without
fearing disgrace, whose only thought is to protect his country and do
good service for his sovereign, is the jewel of the kingdom.
SUN TZU
At the outbreak of war the United of the Army and Navy to command in
States had in the Pacific four major the Pacific. By midsummer of 1942 the
commands, USAFFE and the Asiatic task was substantially completed and
Fleet in the Philippines, the Pacific Fleet the Army and Navy organization in the
and the Hawaiian Department in Ha- Pacific had taken the form it would
waii. All quickly proved inadequate to retain for almost three years of war.
deal with a situation that had not been
anticipated in prewar plans. They had The Problem of Responsibility
no time to do more than improvise,
sending forces where they were most Responsibility for the defense of Allied
urgently needed and establishing bases interests in the Far East and in the vast
and commands as they were required Pacific Ocean was divided at the start
and as troops and shipping became of war among the powers most directly
available. concerned and there was little or no
As American responsibilities in the provision for common action. The Brit-
Pacific were extended and U.S. forces ish held the predominant interest in
there increased, the need for centralized Southeast Asia, China on the Asiatic
direction and control of the scattered mainland, the Dutch in the Indies, Aus-
and often independent garrisons which tralia and New Zealand in the South-
had developed helter-skelter became west and South Pacific, and the United
more urgent. There was no single agency States in the western Pacific and the
in the Pacific to supply these forces, no ocean reaches from the date line to the
plan to unify their efforts, and no single shores of the western hemisphere.
commander to mold them into an effec- Before the war was a month old the
tive force capable of offensive as well as need for co-ordinated effort against the
defensive operations. The fashioning of Japanese had produced agreement, some-
such an organization and the selection what unwillingly on the part of the Aus-
of a commander presented many prob- tralians and the Dutch, for the establish-
lems, not the least of which was the deli- ment of ABDACOM. This agreement
cate adjustment of the conflicting claims was limited to that portion of the
ORGANIZATION AND COMMAND OF THE PACIFIC 241
Pacific and Far East that lay between political and economic influence was
Burma and Australia and in no wise paramount. These thoughts Roosevelt
affected the responsibilities of each na- included in a message to Churchill three
tion for the defense of its own interests days later, with expressions of sympathy
and territory outside the ABDA area. for the loss of Singapore.2
The fall of Singapore on 15 February, The same or similar ideas were ad-
foreshadowing the loss of Sumatra and vanced independently about the same
Java, made virtually certain the split of time in other quarters. The day after
the ABDA area in two. The military Singapore's surrender Admiral King sug-
staffs as well as their political chiefs gested that the east (Australian) flank
began therefore to seek a substitute for of ABDACOM be combined with the
the doomed ABDACOM. With the Jap- ANZAC Area to form a single theater.
anese in control of the Malay Barrier, While admitting that there were other
interposed between the Pacific and ways to solve the problem of organiza-
Indian Oceans, it was evident that the tion, he made it clear that the United
operations of those forces assigned to States had the predominant interest in
the Southwest Pacific and Southeast Asia the area and that the operations of the
could no longer be co-ordinated under a Pacific Fleet required the defense of
single commander. That responsibility Australia and the line of communica-
would now have to be divided.1 tions. The British, he stated, should
There was no disagreement over the assume responsibility for China, Burma,
division of responsibility. Even before and India.
the fall of Singapore it was generally This same idea was advanced also by
accepted that the United States had the the Joint U.S. Strategic Committee on
primary interest in the Pacific Ocean, the 18th. A few days later the Joint
Great Britain in the Indian. China, be- Staff Planners themselves suggested that
cause of political difficulties, was already a separate Australian command, to in-
recognized as a special problem. Talk- clude part of New Guinea, be estab-
ing with Harry Hopkins on the evening lished, and that ANZAC be retained to
of 15 February, President Roosevelt defend the Northeast Area. Finally, on
clearly indicated that the United States 23 February, the British Chiefs in Lon-
should assume responsibility for the re- don, apparently in response to the Presi-
inforcement of Australia and New Zea- dent's message to Churchill, declared in
land, as well as China. The British, he favor of establishing two areas of strate-
thought, were in a better position to gic responsibility: one a United States
support India and Burma where their area to comprise the Pacific Ocean, in-
1
The material in this section is covered in part in cluding Australia and New Zealand, and
Matloff and Snell, Strategic Planning, 1941-42, pp. the other a British area encompassing
164-73; Hayes, The War Against Japan, ch. IV; the Indian Ocean and Southeast Asia.
Leighton and Coakley, Global Logistics and Strategy,
ch. IX; History of U.S. Army Forces in the South Pa- The countries within these areas would
cific Area (USAFISPA), MS prepared by the author
and associates in 1944-45 at Hq USAFISPA, copy in 2
Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, pp. 502-03;
OCMH. Besides using these works as necessary, the Mins of the War Council, 16 Feb 42, Secy War Conf
author has closely examined the sources on which II, WDCSA; Rad, President to Churchill, No. 106,
they were based and has drawn his own conclusions. 18 Feb 42, ABC 323.31 (1-29-42 sec. 1A) POA.
provide for their own defense, but the Acceptance by the Combined Chiefs
United States and Great Britain would of the principle of strategic responsibil-
furnish the forces and exercise strategic ity and of a line separating the Pacific
control "in accordance with the general and Indian Oceans did not in itself
policy agreed between London and constitute formal authority for alloca-
Washington for the conduct of the war tion of areas of responsibility or the
as a whole."3 establishment of new commands. These
Pending formal agreement between measures would have to wait agreement
the British and American Governments, on the political level and formal disso-
the Combined Chiefs in Washington dis- lution of ABDACOM, a step that would
cussed the practical problem of drawing not be taken so long as the Dutch con-
the boundary line between the areas for tinued to fight in Java. In the interim,
which each nation would assume strate- adjustments were made in command to
gic responsibility when the time came. meet the changing situation and pre-
The British Chiefs had suggested on the pare for the reorganization that was cer-
23d a line extending southeast from tain to come. On 22 February General
Singapore through the Java Sea to MacArthur was ordered to Australia to
Timor, then south to Australia, thus command what was euphemistically
placing most of the Malay Barrier in called "a reconstituted ABDA Area" and
the British area. The planners in Wash- three days later Wavell left for India
ington objected to this division on the where Brereton had already gone. At
ground that those islands in the Nether- the same time General Brett returned
lands Indies that were within range of to Australia to command U.S. forces
Australia were vital to its defense and there until MacArthur's arrival.
should be under its control. Moreover, These adjustments had scarcely been
they pointed out, submarine and air made when the news from Java gave
operations along the Malay Barrier could increased urgency to the need for an
be more effectively based on Australia early decision on the establishment of
than on India, where the British Far areas of responsibility and the formation
Eastern Fleet was stationed. The line of a new command in the Pacific. The
they proposed, therefore, placed all of problem was discussed at the White
the Indies except Sumatra, as well as House on 7 March, and on the 9th, the
the Philippines and Australia, within day the Dutch in Java laid down their
the American area, and it was this line, arms, Roosevelt broached the subject to
slightly modified, which was finally ac- Prime Minister Churchill. Starting with
cepted by the Combined Chiefs early the obvious need to replace ABDACOM,
in March.4 the President suggested a three-way divi-
sion of the Allied world into American
3
Rad, BCOS to JSM, 23 Feb 42, ABC 323.31 (1-29- and British areas. In the Pacific, where
42 sec. 1-A) POA; Memo, King for CCS, 17 Feb 42,
sub: Changes in ABDA, ABC 381 (1-12-42) SWPA;
the United States would have responsi-
JUSSC, Review of Strategic Situation, 18 Feb 42, CCS bility, command would be exercised by
381 (1-30-42); Mins, CCS Mtgs, 17, 22, and 23 Feb 42.
4
an American officer responsible to the
CCS 53, Demarkation of New Strategic Areas, 28
Feb 42, CCS 381 (1-24-42 sec. 1); Mins, CPS Mtg, 25
U.S. Joint Chiefs. The British, Roosevelt
Feb 42; CCS Mtg, 3 Mar 42. suggested, should assume similar
responsibility in a "middle area" stretch- While Marshall's memorandum was

ing from Singapore to the Mediterra- making its way upward through official
nean. A third area comprising Europe channels and while the Joint Chiefs were
and the Atlantic would be jointly admin- working out an organization for the
istered by the United States and Great Pacific area, negotiations on the political
Britain through the Combined Chiefs of level continued. On 18 March Churchill
Staff. This body, under Roosevelt's plan, responded to the President's proposal
would also co-ordinate operations in all with a hearty indorsement of the idea
three areas, allocate Allied resources, and for American and British spheres, and
formulate grand strategy.5 of a single American commander for the
Substantially the same proposal was Pacific responsible to the Joint Chiefs.
made the same day by General Marshall, The Combined Chiefs under his and
acting at the President's behest, to the Roosevelt's direction would see to it,
Joint Chiefs of Staff. This step intro- Churchill assumed, that operations in
duced the plan officially into military each theater conformed to a common
channels and placed it ultimately before strategy. Both the Australian and New
the Combined Chiefs. Though it pro- Zealand Governments, to whom
duced no formal agreement, Marshall's Churchill had forwarded the President's
statement to the Joint Chiefs is instruc- proposals, favored the principle of
tive for in it he undertook to clarify the spheres of responsibility also, but had
control of the U.S. and British Chiefs serious objections to the command ar-
over the proposed spheres of responsi- rangements Roosevelt had suggested.
bility. Where strategic responsibility was They were willing, even anxious, to have
assigned to a single nation, he stated, the an American commander but wanted a
government of that nation would make voice in the formulation of strategy and
arrangements with the other govern- a seat on the Combined Chiefs of Staff
ments in the area for its organization when that body deliberated on Pacific
and command, and the Chiefs of Staff matters.7
of that nation would exercise jurisdiction Reasonable as this request seemed, it
over operations and "minor strategy"— was greeted in Washington with the
presumably the strategy relating to that same objections that had been offered
area alone. In those spheres where joint to similar representations when ABDA-
responsibility was established, strategic COM was created. To the Joint Chiefs,
responsibility would devolve on the the adoption of this arrangement, plus
Combined Chiefs.6 some other suggestions made at the same
5
time, was inadvisable because it would
White House Conf, 7 Mar 42, summarized in JCS
19, 9 Mar 42; Mins, JCS Mtg, 9 Mar 42; Memo,
slow up and complicate their work. This
Eisenhower for JCS, 8 Mar 42, sub: Strategic Respon- discussion, like the formal paper on
sibility, JCS 19/1, 9 Mar 42; Rad, President to spheres of responsibility, led nowhere,
Churchill, No. 115, 9 Mar 42, CCS 381 (3-5-42).
6
Memo, Marshall for JCS, 9 Mar 42, sub: Strategic
for already a new organization of the
Responsibility, JCS 19/1; Mins, JCS Mtg, 9 Mar 42,
CCS Mtgs, 17 and 24 Mar 42; CCS 57/2, Strategic
7
Responsibility, 24 Mar 42; Memo, Secy JCS to JCS, Rads, Churchill to President, Nos. 46, 54, and 58,
15 Jul 42, sub: Status of Agreements on Strategic 18, 20, and 24 Mar 42, filed with JCS 19/1 and CCS
Responsibility, CCS 381 (1-24-42 sec. 3). 57/1, ABC 371 (3-5-42) and CCS 381 (1-24-42).
Pacific theater, which the establishment be found who would be acceptable to all.
of areas of responsibility would presum- The outstanding officer in the Pacific
ably authorize, had been created.8 Mili- was General MacArthur, who, if he had
tary exigency had outpaced political the support of the President, the Army,
decision. the American people, and the Austra-
lians, did not have the confidence of the
The Southwest Pacific and Pacific Navy. There was a widespread feeling
Ocean Areas in the Navy that the Pacific was pecul-
iarly its province. Certainly the Navy
In the weeks that had passed since the would never have entrusted the fleet
fall of Singapore, the Army and Navy to MacArthur, or to any Army officer.
planners had been hard at work fashion- Admiral Nimitz, the chief naval candi-
ing an organization in the Pacific that date for the post, had not yet acquired
would satisfy both services as well as the popularity and prestige he later en-
the governments involved. The task was joyed and was, moreover, considerably
a difficult one and resulted finally in a junior to MacArthur in length of serv-
compromise that worked reasonably well ice and seniority. There was no escape
and produced in three years the victories from this impasse except the creation of
which took Allied forces from Austra- two commands.9
lia and Hawaii to the Philippines and As in the discussion over spheres of
Okinawa. responsibility, the decision on organiza-
From the start the discussion over tion would have to await the outcome
organization assumed that two theaters in Java. Suggestions made before that
would be established in the Pacific de- time, though helpful, could receive no
spite the fact that the President evi- official sanction. In that category fell
dently had in mind a single commander Admiral King's proposal to combine
for the entire area and had so stated that portion of the ABDA area still in
in his recent message to the Prime Min- Allied hands with ANZAC into a single
ister. The appointment of a single com- command. The remainder of the Pacific,
mander had so many obvious advantages including the Philippines, King thought,
and was so close to General Marshall's could then be integrated into a separate
belief in the importance of unified com- command and subdivided into three
mand that the failure of the Joint Chiefs areas, a north, south, and central Pacific.
and their planners to consider it is in- His proposal and others were studied by
deed surprising. One can only conclude the planners but never got beyond that
that this omission was deliberate, but the stage.10
record provides no clue to the reason.
The answer may lie in the fact that 9
everyone recognized that no officer could Memo, Turner for King, 19 Mar 42, Office of
Naval Records, cited in Hayes, The War Against
Japan, ch. IV, p. 18.
10
Memo, King for JCS, 16 Feb 42, sub: Changes in
ABDA, ABC 381 (1-12-42) SWPA; Mins, CCS Mtg,
8
Memo, Marshall for Pres, 24 Mar 42, ABC 323.31 17 Feb 42; WPD Notes on Demarcation of New Stra-
(1-29-42 sec. I-B) POA; Mins, JCS Mtg, 23 Mar 42. tegic Areas CPS 19/D and CCS 53, ABC 323.31
See also WDCSA 381 Australia. (1-29-42 sec 1-A) POA; Mins. JCS Mtg, 2 Mar 42.
Meanwhile the Australian and New are acting under instructions from the
Zealand Governments had joined forces War Department."11
to develop plans for their own defense. The Australian and New Zealand pro-
For four days, from 26 February to 1 posal reached Washington on 7 March,
March, their Chiefs of Staff met in Mel- whereupon Marshall advised Brett to do
bourne to discuss this problem as well nothing more until he received fresh in-
as the related problem of organization structions. "The Combined Chiefs of
and command in the Southwest Pacific. Staff," he explained, "are studying the
General Brett was present at these meet- subjects covered . . . which involve far-
ings and reported fully to the War De- reaching readjustments."12 But the Com-
partment, urging at the same time that bined Chiefs, having agreed only a few
the United States take immediate action days before, on 3 March, that if the
to reorganize the area. The Dominion Pacific area was made an American re-
Chiefs of Staff, he told Marshall at the sponsibility, control would be vested in
end of the conference, favored the estab- the U.S. Chiefs of Staff, did not consider
lishment of a new area encompassing the ANZAC proposal at all but passed
their own territory as well as Timor, it on to the Joint Chiefs. There it met
Amboina, and New Guinea, and the serious criticism from Admiral King who
appointment of an American officer to had strong objections to placing Austra-
command it. (Brett was the man they lia and New Zealand in a single theater.
had in mind.) This officer, the Aus- New Zealand, he insisted, was a link in
tralians and New Zealanders thought, the line of communications and an inte-
should be responsible to the U.S. and gral part of the system of island bases
British Chiefs, rather than the U.S. stretching east and north to Hawaii.
Chiefs alone. The defense of this line, King declared,
Though this arrangement differed in was essentially a naval problem and inti-
several important respects from those mately associated with the operations of
already under consideration in Wash- the Pacific Fleet. Australia and its ap-
ington, Marshall seized this fresh oppor- proaches through the Netherlands Indies
tunity to force a decision on the and New Guinea formed a separate stra-
organization of the Pacific. "I should like tegic entity and should, King asserted,
to see the question of command settled be placed under another command.13
quickly and specifically . . . ," he wrote Here was a clear exposition, based on
to Brett, "but the definite proposal to strategic considerations, for a twofold
that effect should be made by the local division of the Pacific.
governments." What he suggested was 11
Rads, Brett to Marshall, Nos. 87 and 467, 27 Feb
that the Australians and New Zealand- and 3 Mar 42, WPD Ready Ref File Australia; Mar-
ers make their recommendations formal- shall to Brett, No. 543, 5 Mar 42, WPD Msg File
ly to the British who would eventually Australia.
12
Rad, Marshall to Brett, No. 589, 8 Mar 42, WPD
forward them to the Combined Chiefs. Msg File Australia; Memo, British COS for JSM, 7
If this was done, he thought "the whole Mar 42, Governmental and Strategical Control, CCS
matter could be settled expeditiously." 57,13323-31 (1-29-42 sec. 1-A) POA.
Comments of Adm King on Hayes, The War
But, he warned Brett, "you must be care- Against Japan, ch. IV, p. 21; JCS 18, Governmental
ful not to give the impression that you and Strategical Control, 8 Mar 42.
The differences between the Army's to be selected by the governments in the

and Navy's views emerged clearly in the area, but it was already understood that
next two days during which the naval he would be an American, probably
staff members, following up King's lead, MacArthur. The North Pacific area,
developed one plan and their Army col- everything north and east of the Philip-
leagues another. The Navy's plan called pines and Samoa, would be commanded
for an Australian area whose western by a naval officer.15
limits followed the line of demarcation The differences between the Army and
between the Pacific and Indian Oceans Navy plans were reconciled by the Joint
accepted by the Combined Chiefs. The Chiefs between 9 and 16 March. In the
eastern boundary, the 160th and 165th 9 March meeting, at which the two plans
meridian east as far as the equator, were first discussed, Admiral King firmly
placed all of the Solomons in the Aus- defended the Navy solution, emphasiz-
tralian area, but excluded the New Heb- ing the need for preserving freedom of
rides, New Caledonia, and New Zealand. action for the fleet. General Marshall,
On the north the area was bounded by apparently convinced by King or unwill-
an irregular line drawn to include New ing to risk a deadlock that would require
Guinea and the Indies, but not the Phil- Presidential action, did not insist on the
ippines. The rest of the Pacific, from adoption of the Army's plan but only
New Zealand and New Caledonia east- that the Philippine Islands, for "psycho-
ward, the naval planners organized into logical reasons," be included in the Aus-
a Pacific Ocean area subdivided into tralia, or Southwest Pacific Area, as it
three parts and placed under the Com- came to be called. To this Admiral King
mander in Chief, Pacific Fleet. Opera- agreed and the Navy's plan, with some
tional control of both the Australian and slight modifications, was approved by the
Pacific Ocean areas, the naval planners Joint Chiefs.16 Curiously enough, this
recommended, should rest with the Joint action, which anticipated American and
Chiefs.14 British approval of the division of the
The Army planners led by General world into spheres of responsibility, had
Eisenhower accepted the twofold division no official basis then or thereafter, for
of the Pacific but not Admiral King's the British Government never took ac-
claim that New Zealand belonged with tion on the proposal to establish these
the line of communications rather than spheres of responsibility. The reason for
Australia. Their arrangement followed this failure is not clear, but there is no
closely the one proposed by the Domin- doubt that the planners of both nations
ions and provided for a Southwest and as well as their military and civilian
North Pacific area. The first would com- chiefs favored the proposal and always
prise all of the Pacific south of the line acted as though it had official sanction.
Philippines-Samoa. The supreme com- Having reached agreement on the
mander for this area, which would in- organization for the Pacific, the Joint
clude New Caledonia, the Fijis, New
15
Guinea, Australia and New Zealand, was Memo, Marshall for JCS, 9 Mar 42, sub: Creation
of SWPA, JCS 18/2.
14 16
JCS 18, Governmental and Strategical Control, Mins JCS Mtgs, 9 and 16 Mar 42; CCS Mtg,
8 Mar 42. 17 Mar 42.
Chiefs proceeded to the task of selecting was the signal for an unusually prompt
the commanders and preparing directives War Department press release announc-
for them. Theoretically this task pre- ing the news of MacArthur's arrival in
sented few difficulties but it was com- Australia and his impending appoint-
plicated by commitments already made ment "in accordance with the request
and instructions previously issued. of the Australian Government." To the
Though MacArthur's name had not British Prime Minister, Roosevelt ex-
been mentioned in the Joint Chiefs' dis- plained that he had authorized this pub-
cussions, he had been virtually promised lic statement to forestall Axis propaganda
the post of supreme commander in the that MacArthur's departure from the
Southwest Pacific Area even before such Philippines meant that the United States
an area had been established. On 10 had abandoned the Filipinos. Mac-
March, while he was still negotiating Arthur's nomination, the President as-
with King on the future organization sured Churchill, would "in no way
of the Pacific, Marshall had instructed interfere with procedure of determining
Brett to notify the Australian Prime strategic areas and spheres of respon-
Minister "within the hour" of Mac- sibility through established channels."18
Arthur's arrival in Australia and of his Whether by design or not, the effect
assumption of command of U.S. forces of Marshall's instructions to Brett, which
there — the post Brett himself held. the President approved, was to present
"You will propose," Marshall further the British with a fait accompli. It also
instructed Brett, "that the Australian made any discussion by the Joint Chiefs
Government nominate General Mac- of a commander for the Southwest Pacific
Arthur as the Supreme Commander of entirely academic. The legal forms were
the Southwest Pacific Area, and will preserved, however, and officially the
recommend that the nomination be sub- Southwest Pacific Area was still to be
mitted as soon as possible to London established and its commander desig-
and Washington simultaneously."17 nated. These actions presumably would
General Brett followed his instructions be completed only after agreement be-
faithfully. When MacArthur's plane tween the United States and Great Brit-
reached Darwin on 17 March, Brett tele- ain on spheres of responsibility. Thus
phoned Prime Minister Curtin and in it was that on 18 March, two days after
the President's name put forward Mac- the Joint Chiefs had agreed on an organ-
Arthur's nomination for the post for ization for the Pacific and the day after
which the Australians had earlier nomi- MacArthur reached Australia, Marshall
nated Brett himself. This was the first dispatched a long message to MacArthur
indication Curtin had of MacArthur's explaining the situation to him and as-
presence and he fell in with Brett's suring him that when the negotiations
suggestion readily and with enthusiasm. with the British and Australians were
That same day he named MacArthur completed his appointment would be
as his government's choice for supreme
18
commander. In Washington this request Milner, Victory in Papua, p. 18; Rads, Brett to
Marshall, No. 736, 17 Mar 42, President to Churchill,
17
Rad, Marshall to Brett, 613, 10 Mar 42, OPD Exec same date, OPD Exec Files; WD Press Release, 17
Files. Mar 42.
made official. Until that time he would ting uninterrupted concentration on

be, for all practical purposes, the supreme combat."20
commander in the Southwest Pacific. Meanwhile the planners in Washing-
As such, Marshall told him, he would ton, spurred on by the necessity of reg-
be ineligible to command directly any ularizing MacArthur's position, were
national force and would therefore have drafting the directives and completing
to relinquish command of U.S. Army their arrangements for the organization
Forces in Australia to Brett from whom of the Pacific theater. Though there
he had taken over only the day before. was no urgency in the Pacific Ocean
Ultimately, Brett would command the air Area, the naval planners wished to estab-
forces, Admiral Leary the naval forces lish both areas simultaneously. Failure
(ANZAC would cease to exist when the to do this, Admiral Turner thought,
new organization went into effect), and might open the way for an Army effort
an Australian officer the ground forces.19 to enlarge the Southwest Pacific at the
MacArthur's position was anomalous. expense of the South Pacific along the
He commanded neither the Southwest lines laid down in the Army plan or
Pacific Area nor U.S. Army Forces in in the ANZAC proposals. The naval
Australia, but only USAFFE, which, planners feared also that the Army might
since Wainwright's assumption of com- raise objections, if the opportunity arose,
mand in the Philippines, consisted only to placing its forces under naval control.
of the handful of officers he had brought Thus, on the 19th, Admiral Turner, the
with him. Until he received official chief naval planner, submitted to King
authority, his control of. the forces in draft directives for the Southwest and
Australia would be difficult and his rela- Pacific Ocean Areas with the recommen-
tionship with the Australian Govern- dation that both be acted on at the same
ment would have to be conducted on an time.21
unofficial and informal basis. Despite At this point Admiral King departed
these handicaps, MacArthur quickly took from the procedure usually followed in
hold. By the end of the month he had such matters and instead of processing
secured Brett's appointment as com- the draft directives through the Joint
mander of the air forces, which he had Chiefs' committees sent them directly to
found "in a most disorganized condi- General Marshall with the explanation
tion," placed American and Australian that he was doing so "in order to save
ground combat forces under an "appro- the time that might be lost through
priate Australian general," and Ameri- possible prolonged discussions of the
can service troops in USAFIA under
General Barnes. This arrangement, he 20
Rads, MacArthur to Marshall, No. 19, 24 Mar
told Marshall, would "free the combat 42; Brett to Marshall, No. 792, 21 Mar 42; Marshall
echelons of all administrative, supply, to MacArthur, No. 791, 21 Mar 42; MacArthur to
Marshall, No. 3, 21 Mar 42; Marshall to MacArthur,
and political considerations, permit- No. 81, 22 Mar 42, all in OPD Exec SWPA—
MacArthur File.
21
Memos, Turner for King, 19 Mar 42; King for
Marshall, same date, sub: Command Areas in Pacific,
19
Rad, Marshall to MacArthur, No. 739, 18 Mar 42, both cited in Hayes, The War Against Japan, ch. IV,
OPD Exec Files. p. 25.
mander (a title he himself changed to

Commander in Chief) of the Southwest
Pacific Area; Admiral Nimitz, Com-
mander in Chief, Pacific Ocean Areas.24
The boundaries of the two areas con-
formed to the earlier agreement: Mac-
Arthur's domain included Australia, the
Philippines, New Guinea, the Solomons,
the Bismarck Archipelago, and all of the
Netherlands Indies except Sumatra. Ad-
miral Nimitz' command, though it had
less land area, was even larger in extent
and encompassed the remainder of the
Pacific except for a broad band of ocean
off the coast of Central and South
America.25 It was divided into three sub-
ordinate areas, two of them, the Central
and North Pacific, under Nimitz' direct
GENERAL MACARTHUR AND ADMIRAL
control, and the third, the South Pacific,
NIMITZ
under a naval officer responsible to Nim-
itz. The dividing line between the first
Planning Staff." He and Marshall, King two was at 42° north, thus placing
suggested, should settle the problem Hawaii, the Gilberts and Marshalls, the
between themselves.22 Apparently the Mandated Islands, and Japan itself in
Army Chief of Staff passed these draft the Central Pacific. The South Pacific
directives to his own planners who found Area, which extended southward from
little to object to and at the next meet- the equator, between the Southwest
ing of the Joint Chiefs on 30 March Pacific and longitude 110° west, included
they were accepted and forwarded to the all-important line of communications.
the White House. Final approval by (Map II)
the President was given on the last day Unlike the ABDA Area, in which each
of the month.23 of the participating powers had equal
The directives thus approved—they responsibility and representation, the
were dated 30 March—established the two areas established by the 30 March
two Pacific areas, set their geographical directives were the exclusive responsi-
limits, named the commanders, and as- bility of the United States. The author-
signed their missions. MacArthur, as ity granted the commanders under this
expected, was appointed Supreme Com- new arrangement was broader than that
22 24
Memo, King for Marshall, 20 Mar 42, sub: Pro- First designated in the singular, Pacific Ocean
posed Directives, cited in Hayes, The War Against Area.
25
Japan, ch. IV, p. 26. This band included the area east of the 110th
23
Memos, Marshall and King for Pres, 30 Mar 42, meridian, and south of latitude 11° north and was
no sub; U.S. Secy CCS for Marshall and King, 1 Apr designated the Southeast Pacific Area. It was under
42, both in ABC 323.31 (1-29-42 sec. 3) POA; Mins, separate command and never became an active
JCS Mtg, 30 Mar 42. theater.
exercised by General Wavell, and they many matters that could well have been
were not bound by many of the restric- resolved by lesser officials.
tions that had limited the authority of Of all the faulty decisions of the war
the ABDA commander. ABDACOM [General MacArthur wrote] perhaps the
had reported to the Combined Chiefs; most unexplainable one was the failure to
MacArthur and Nimitz reported to the unify the command in the Pacific. The
principle involved is perhaps the most fun-
Joint Chiefs, which had jurisdiction over damental one in the doctrine and tradition
operational strategy subject to the grand of command. In this instance it did not
strategy formulated by the Combined involve an international problem. It was
Chiefs. In its relations with the Pacific accepted and entirely successful in the other
commanders, the Joint Chiefs would act great theaters. The failure to do so in the
through the chiefs of each of the services Pacific cannot be defended in logic, in
theory or even in common sense. Other
as executive agents, so that MacArthur motives must be ascribed. It resulted in
would receive his orders from Marshall, divided effort, the waste of diffusion and
Nimitz from King. duplication of force and the consequent
This organization, it should be noted, extension of the war with added casualties
did not establish a unified command for and cost. The generally excellent coopera-
tion between the two commands in the
the Pacific, but rather two separate area Pacific supported by the good will, good
commands. Control over the theater as nature and high professional qualifications
a whole was vested in the Joint Chiefs of the numerous personnel involved was no
of Staff, which became in effect the substitute for the essential unity of direction
directing headquarters for operations in of centralized authority.26
the Pacific. But that body lacked a Though superficially alike, the direc-
single head—except the President him- tives to the Pacific commanders differed
self—and operated under a committee in some fundamental respects. As
rather than a staff system so that even supreme commander in an area that
in Washington command was diffused presumably would include large forces
and decentralized and decisions on strat- of other governments, MacArthur, like
egy and theater-wide problems could be Wavell, was specifically enjoined from
reached only by debate and compromise. directly commanding any national force
Within the theater itself there was no or interfering with its internal adminis-
single authority which could choose be- tration. Nimitz was not thus restricted
tween strategic plans, resolve the conflict- for it was anticipated that his forces
ing claims of MacArthur and Nimitz for would be mostly American and his oper-
troops and supplies, assign priorities, ations more closely related to the fleet.
shift forces from one area to another, Thus, he was permitted to exercise direct
or concentrate the resources of both areas command of the forces in the North and
against a single objective. Such an ar- Central Pacific, and, through a subor-
rangement complicated the problems of dinate commander, those of the South
war in the Pacific. It led to duplication Pacific. Furthermore, he exercised direct
of effort and keen competition for the control of the Pacific Fleet (CINCPAC),
limited supply of ships, landing craft, in which capacity he was directly respon-
and airplanes; and it placed on the Joint 26
Ltr, MacArthur to Maj Gen Albert C. Smith,
Chiefs the heavy burden of decision in Chief, Mil Hist, 5 Mar 1953, OCMH.
sible through naval channels to Admiral and Southwest Pacific Area."28 This
King. Undoubtedly the difference in wording implied that Admiral Nimitz
the authority granted the two men, as would command not only the offensive
well as the wording of the tasks assigned in his own area, but that in MacArthur's
to each, was based partially on the Navy's area as well. And this may well have
conviction that MacArthur had a limited been the intent of the naval planners
conception of the use of naval as well who drafted the directives, for in their
as air power. If he was given command view all amphibious operations — and
of these forces, Turner told King, "I any operation in the Pacific would be
believe that you will find the Supreme amphibious — should be under naval
Commander will tend to use . . . [them] command. But the major offensive when
in a wrong manner, since he has shown it came, the Navy believed, would be
clearly unfamiliarity with proper naval across the Central Pacific along the route
and air functions."27 marked out in the prewar ORANGE plan.
There were significant differences, Presidential approval of the directives
too, in the tasks assigned each of the to MacArthur and Nimitz did not con-
Pacific commanders. MacArthur's mis- stitute authority for assumption of com-
sion was mainly defensive and included mand. The other governments involved
only the injunction to "prepare to take would have to give their consent, too,
the offensive." Combined with the state- and in view of the difference between
ment that he was to "hold the key mili- the present version and the plan the
tary regions of Australia as bases for Australians and New Zealanders had pro-
future offensive action against Japan," posed, that consent might not be read-
it was possible to derive from it, as ily granted. The British and the Dutch
MacArthur quickly did, authorization raised the first objection, but it was a
for offensive operations based on Aus- minor one and was easily met by a
tralia. This does not seem to have been change in wording of the first paragraph
the intention of the Army planners in of the directives. Their approval was
Washington. At the time, they appar- won by the first week of April.
ently had no thought of opening such The objections of the Australians and
an offensive, though the Navy did hope New Zealanders were not so easily met.
to launch operations in the Southwest They were understandably dissatisfied
Pacific, but not from Australia. with the separation of the Dominions
Admiral Nimitz' directive assigned a and reiterated the arguments for a single
defensive mission, too, but it clearly strategic entity incorporating their own
envisaged offensive operations for the territory, the Fijis, and New Caledonia.
future by instructing him to "prepare To this Admiral King replied, in a
for the execution of major amphibious memorandum for the President, that
offensives against positions held by "The defense of Australia is primarily
Japan, the initial offensives to be a land-air problem for which the best
launched from the South Pacific Area possible naval support is a fleet free to
maneuver without restrictions imposed
27 28
Memo, Turner for King, 19 Mar 42, cited in JCS Directive to CINCPOA, 30 Mar 42, ABC
Hayes, The War Against Japan, ch. IV, p. 30. 323.31 (1-29-42 sec. 1 B) POA.
by the local situation." New Zealand's The size of the area under Mac-
defense was primarily a naval problem, Arthur's command after 18 April can
and "has no relation," King insisted, "to perhaps be appreciated by superimpos-
the defense of Australia." Though they ing a map of the United States over one
were not convinced, the Australians and of the Southwest Pacific. Miami would
New Zealanders finally accepted this sep- fall on Townsville and Seattle on Sara-
aration "because of the necessity of an wak in Borneo; San Francisco would fall
immediate decision." 29 in Java and New York on Rabaul.
But the Dominion governments had Thus, the headquarters in Melbourne
other objections to the new organization. would be equivalent to one in South
They found no guarantee in the new America directing operations against
directive, they said, that their forces Boston and New York, and planning
would not be moved out of Australian for an invasion against northwest
and New Zealand territory, or that the Canada.
local commanders would be able to com- The logistical difficulties in a theater
municate freely with their governments, of this size and in this part of the world
as had been the case in ABDACOM. were enormous. The line of communi-
These arguments King answered—Mar- cations to the United States (San Fran-
shall was in London—by pointing out cisco to Sydney), the main source of
that the actions of the Joint Chiefs were supply, was over 4,000 miles long. This
subject to review by the President to fact combined with the scarcity of ships
whom the governments involved had constituted a major problem in the ship-
recourse through diplomatic channels. ment of men and supplies from the
"The interests of the nations whose United States, as well as within the
forces or whose land possessions may be theater. Ports, bases, airfields, and roads
involved in these military operations are had to be carved out of jungle, and
further safeguarded," Admiral King ex- there was rarely enough equipment and
plained, "by the power each nation men to do the job without extraordinary
retains to refuse the use of its forces measures. "Forced risks" and "crisis
for any project which it considers inad- management" were common parlance
visable." This statement apparently among the logisticians in the theater.
settled the fears of the Australians. Ap- Climate, terrain, and tropical diseases
proval of the directives followed not long were an ever-present factor in planning
after and on 18 April General MacArthur and operations, imposing additional
officially assumed command of the burdens on the supply system.
Southwest Pacific Area.30 It would take time to overcome these
difficulties but in the meantime General
29
Memo, King for President, 5 Apr 42, CCS 57/2, MacArthur could begin to organize his
ABC 323.31 (1-29-42 sec. 2) POA; Hayes, The War forces, provide for their administration
Against Japan, ch. IV, p. 331.
30
General Order 1, GHQ SWPA, 18 Apr 42; Rad, and supply, and plan for future opera-
MacArthur to Marshall, No. 327, 18 Apr 42, CM-IN- tions. The Australian commanders had
4719. The correspondence between the Dominion been notified on the 17th that orders
governments and Admiral King, who acted for the
Joint Chiefs in Marshall's absence, is in ABC 323.31 issued by him were to be considered
(1-29-42 sec. 2) POA and CCS 381 (1-24-42 sec. 2). "as emanating from the Commonwealth
two more seasoned divisions from the

Middle East, came under General
Blarney. Similarly, General Brett and his
successor, Maj. Gen. George C. Kenney,
commanded the American, Australian,
and Dutch air elements and Admiral
Leary (soon succeeded by Rear Adm.
Arthur S. Carpender) the naval units
which included four cruisers, destroyers,
submarines, and auxiliary craft.31
MacArthur organized his own head-
quarters, located initially in Melbourne,
along traditional U.S. Army lines.
(Chart 5) There was nothing in his
directive requiring him to appoint offi-
cers of the participating governments,
as General Wavell had been required
to do. General Marshall urged strongly
that he do so and the President indicated
ADMIRAL LEARY that he would like to see Australian and
Dutch officers in high position on the
Government," and MacArthur could Supreme Commander's staff.32 But Mac-
therefore formally establish the three Arthur did not follow these suggestions
commands, Allied Land, Air, and Naval and the staff named on 19 April was
Forces, which, with the existing Ameri- almost entirely American with a few
can commands, USAFIA, USAFFE, and Australian and Dutch officers serving in
Wainwright's USFIP in the Philippines, subordinate posts. The top positions
constituted his entire force. General Sir went to those USAFFE officers who had
Thomas Blarney, recently returned from come from Corregidor; Maj. Gen. Rich-
the Middle East, became Commander, ard K. Sutherland, Chief of Staff; Brig.
Allied Land Forces; General Brett, Al- Gen. Richard J. Marshall, Deputy Chief
lied Air Forces; and Admiral Leary, of Staff; Col. Charles P. Stivers, G-1; Col.
Allied Naval Forces. All American units, Charles A. Willoughby, G-2; Brig. Gen.
with the exception of certain air ele- Spencer B. Akin, Signal Officer; and
ments, were assigned to USAFIA, the Brig. Gen. Hugh J. Casey, Engineer
administrative and service agency for Officer. The others came from the
U.S. Army forces, which on 20 July was USAFIA staff: Brig. Gen. Stephen J.
redesignated the U.S. Army Services of Chamberlin, G-3; Col. Lester J. Whit-
Supply under the command of Brig. Gen.
Richard J. Marshall. But for operation-
al employment, all American ground 31
GO 1, GHQ SWPA, 18 Apr 42; Rads, MacArthur
troops, soon to number two divisions, to Marshall, Nos. 381 and 415, 20 Apr 42, OPD
as well as those of the Australians, who MacArthur
32
File.
Rad, Marshall to MacArthur, No. 1178, 9 Apr 42,
contributed in addition to the militia CM-OUT-1495.
CHART5—COMMANDORGANIZATION IN THE PACIFIC, JULY 1942
lock, G-4; and Col. Burdette M. Fitch, tives or altered their troop dispositions
Adjutant General.33 in such a way as to indicate any funda-
The most serious problem confront- mental change in strategy at that time.
ing MacArthur was the defense of Aus- The change that was made came later,
tralia. The Australian Chiefs of Staff, they claimed, and was made possible
recognizing the impossibility of defend- by the arrival of reinforcements from
ing so vast an area with their small force,the Middle East and the United States.
had in February decided to concentrate All these considerations John Curtin,
their strength in the Brisbane-Melbourne the Australian Prime Minister, called
area, outposting the rest of the country to MacArthur's attention after the press
as well as the Northeast Area.34 This conference of March 1943, but Mac-
concept MacArthur later characterized Arthur again asserted flatly, "It was
as passive and defeatist, strategically un-never my intention to defend Australia
sound and "fatal to every possibility of on the mainland of Australia. That was
ever assuming the offensive."35 Speak- the plan when I arrived, but to which
ing at an off-the-record press conference I never subscribed and which I imme-
just one year after he had reached Aus- diately changed to a plan to defend
tralia, he declared that within three days Australia in New Guinea."37
of his arrival he had decided to scrap Whether the matter was as represented
the Australian concept and to adopt by MacArthur or by Curtin, the fact was
instead an active defense far to the north that the forces required to put into effect
in New Guinea. There at Port Moresby an active defense in New Guinea were
he would wage the battle for Australia simply not available in April 1942. Mac-
on ground of his own choosing and on Arthur's naval force was small and un-
his own terms. This decision, in his view, balanced and lacked aircraft carriers.
"was one of the most decisive as well as The only combat troops he had were the
one of the most radical and difficult 41st U.S. and two Australian divisions
decisions of the war."36 (less two brigades in Ceylon); the 32d
The Australians did not let Mac- Division was not due until May. And
Arthur's characterization of their strat- although he had 17 Australian air squad-
egy or his claim to omnipotence go rons and American units consisting of
unchallenged. Their own plans, they 2 heavy and 2 medium bomber groups
claimed, did make provision for the and 3 fighter groups (not all of them
defense of the forward area in New had yet arrived), his air component was
Guinea and they had reinforced Port below standard in organization and
Moresby to the fullest extent possible. training. But all his efforts to secure
They could find no evidence, either, more at that time were unavailing, and
that MacArthur had issued any direc- it was with this force that MacArthur
33
GO 2, GHQ SWPA, 19 Apr 42.
34 37
Australian Chiefs of Staff, Appreciation, 27 Feb Ltrs, MacArthur to Curtin, 6 Nov 43; Curtin to
42, G-3 Jnl, GHQ SWPA. Blarney, 16 Nov 43; Blarney to Curtin, 28 Jan 44;
35
Ltr, MacArthur to Smith, response to question Rowell to Maj. Gen. Orlando Ward, Chief, Mil Hist,
by the author, 5 Mar 53, OCMH. 6 Apr 51, all in OCMH; Milner, Victory in Papua,
36
Ibid; Ltr, Curtin to Blarney, 16 Nov 43, copy in pp. 24-25; McCarthy, Southwest Pacific Area—First
OCMH. Year, pp. 25-33.
in April made preparations to hold Port well as operations. He was thus answera-
Moresby.38 ble to himself in several capacities and
The organization of the forces of the it was not always clear whether he was
Pacific Ocean Areas, where Admiral acting as area commander, fleet com-
Nimitz assumed command on 8 May, mander, or theater commander responsi-
was far more complicated than in the ble to the Joint Chiefs in Washington.
neighboring theater. Already in the area This fact and the failure to define pre-
was the old prewar Army command, the cisely the relationship between Admiral
Hawaiian Department, whose primary Nimitz and General Emmons led to the
responsibility was the defense of Oahu, numerous misunderstandings that
and especially the Pearl Harbor base of marked Army and Navy operations in
the Pacific Fleet. The unified command that area during the war.
established on 17 December 1941, ten
days after the Japanese attack, was lim- The South Pacific Area
ited to the Hawaiian area and did not
include the chain of islands which had Of the three subordinate areas of
since been garrisoned by Army forces. Admiral Nimitz' command the one whose
In the absence of any other Army com- organization presented the greatest prob-
mand, responsibility for the supply and lem was the South Pacific where the Al-
administration of some of these island lied offensive would come first. Admiral
garrisons had fallen on General Emmons, Ghormley, who was in London when he
the Hawaiian Department commander. received his appointment as Commander,
But he did not have the broad authority South Pacific Area (COMSOPAC), on
that his naval colleagues had at the time 13 April, did not assume command for
for the control of forces along the line of two months although he arrived in
communications. Auckland, New Zealand, the site of his
As Commander in Chief, Pacific new headquarters, on 21 May. On the
Ocean Areas (CINCPOA), Admiral way out, he had stopped in Washington
Nimitz exercised considerably more di- where King told him that his was "a
rect control over his forces than did Gen- most difficult task" and that the offensive
eral MacArthur in the Southwest Pacific. against Japan would probably start from
In addition to his command of the Pa- the South Pacific "possibly this fall."39
cific Fleet, he also commanded directly His next stop was Pearl Harbor, where he
two of the three areas established in the stayed for a week to confer with Nimitz
30 March directives. (Later he relin- and his staff. There he was told again
quished personal command of the North to prepare for an amphibious offensive
Pacific.) Like MacArthur, he was pro- and met his air commander, Rear Adm.
hibited from interfering in the internal John R. McCain. His command, Nimitz
administration of the forces in his thea- told him, would include all the garrisons
ter, but as a fleet commander he remained already in the area (about 60,000 Army
responsible for naval administration as troops plus three fighter and two medium
38
bombardment groups), the remnants of
The Campaigns of MacArthur in the Pacific,
39
SWPA Series, I, p. 40; McCarthy, Southwest Pacific Morison, Coral Sea, Midway and Submarine
Area—First Year, p. 82. Actions, p. 251.
the ANZAC naval force, a marine divi- Zealand, but on his arrival Ghormley
sion already en route to New Zealand, established the Service Squadron, South
plus whatever forces might be allocated Pacific. Charged with responsibility for
by the United Nations. Exempted were the procurement and delivery of all
those forces concerned with the land supplies in the theater, except those
defense of New Zealand, a task that exempted from naval control, this head-
remained a responsibility of the New quarters quickly took charge of the trans-
Zealand Chiefs of Staff.40 portation and base facilities of the Navy
Ghormley's organization closely par- and Marine Corps in the area under a
alleled Admiral Nimitz'. Retaining for logistical plan issued on 15 July. As the
himself control of all naval units in the highest supply agency in the South Pa-
area and of their administration as well, cific, Service Squadron co-ordinated all
he exercised command through a staff service organizations in the theater, con-
that was essentially naval. Of 103 officers trolled all ships and shipping, distributed
assigned in September 1942 only three all supplies obtained locally, designated
wore the Army uniform. Thus his head- ports of call, and established priorities.
quarters became the center for naval The establishment of the South Pacific
administration as well as joint operations coincided with the opening of offensive
and planning. He quickly established operations and made more urgent the
air, amphibious, and service commands, solution of the problems presented by
all under naval officers and predomi- the absence of a comparable Army com-
nantly naval staffs, but not a ground mand. There were Army troops in New
command, as General MacArthur had Zealand, New Caledonia, Efate and
done. Instead, his own headquarters did Espiritu Santo in the New Hebrides, the
the planning for and retained control of Fijis, Tongatabu, and Bora Bora. These
Army and Marine Corps elements in the troops had been rushed out so quickly
theater. that there had been no opportunity to
The amphibious command was organ- perfect arrangements for their support
ized on 18 July and the Navy gave and control. Some commanders, like
Ghormley one of its ablest—and most General Patch, were responsible directly
contentious—officers, Admiral Turner, to the War Department; others, to Gen-
chief of the War Plans Division, to com- eral Emmons in Hawaii. Administration
mand it. All air units in the theater therefore was complicated and command
were under Admiral McCain, soon to be confused. Moreover the supply of these
replaced by Rear Adm. Aubrey W. forces was cumbersome and inefficent
Fitch. His responsibilities included not with responsibility divided among the
only operational control of all aircraft, San Francisco Port of Embarkation,
but training and indoctrination as well. USAFIA, and the Hawaiian Department.
It was this latter responsibility that was Complicating the situation even more
to cause so much difficulty. was the fact that responsibility for the
The first logistical agency for the South airfields along the line of communica-
Pacific was the Service Force in New tions belonged to General Emmons, so
40
Unless otherwise noted this section is based on that a base commander might report
Hist of USAFISPA. directly to the War Department, get his
ADMIRAL GHORMLEY ADMIRAL MCCAIN
supplies from the San Francisco port, Navy lost the argument it did get a
and take his orders for airfield construc- group of heavy bombers—the 11th
tion, possibly his most important task, Bombardment Group—for the South
from General Emmons. Pacific late in June by an arrangement
Allocation of aircraft to the South which established an Hawaiian Mobile
Pacific Area constituted another major Air Force of B-17's that could be used
problem. Admiral King and his naval anywhere in the Pacific subject to
planners had long argued for heavy approval by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
bombers in the area, contending that The assignment of the Army Air
B-17's in Hawaii and Australia could Forces' most precious weapon, the B-17,
not meet the threat of invasion along the to the South Pacific brought into sharp
line of communications. The army and focus the question of control of aircraft.
air planners, backed by Presidential The area command, despite its theoreti-
authority, had firmly resisted demands cally joint character, was naval and the
for a South Pacific heavy bombardment air commander was a naval officer.
force as well as an increase in the air Army aircraft thus came under naval
units already authorized, arguing for the control for operations, a fact that could
same mobility for aircraft that the Navy not be avoided, distasteful as it may
insisted on for warships. Though the have been to the airmen. But when in
ADMIRAL FITCH ADMIRAL TURNER
became apparent that Admiral McCain was becoming more acute. Admiral
would also be responsible for the train- King's proposal on 10 April that a
ing and indoctrination of Army air units, Marine officer be appointed as com-
the air planners expressed strong objec- mander of the South Pacific bases and a
tions. Their forces, they felt, should joint supply organization established to
retain their identity, be assigned appro- take over responsibility for their logistic
priate missions, and execute them under support only precipitated another disa-
their own commanders in accordance greement between the Army and Navy.
with Army Air Forces doctrine. Under The idea of a separate commander for
no circumstances, they insisted, should all the bases was rejected, but the pro-
air units be integrated into a naval force posal for an interservice logistical organ-
and commanded by naval officers.41 ization was the subject of discussions
While this debate was in progress, the throughout April and May. The Navy
problem of administration and supply favored a joint organization to supply all
forces in the South Pacific on the ground
41
Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate, eds., that this arrangement would result in
The Pacific—Guadalcanal to Saipan: August 1942 to the greatest economy in shipping and
July 1944, vol. IV, "The Army Air Forces in World
War II" (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1950), avoid duplication of effort. This organi-
pp. 29-30. zation would function in the theater
under the Service Squadron in the South supply and administration. At the same
Pacific and in San Francisco under a time that the B-17's had been sent to the
comparable naval headquarters. The South Pacific the Army had decided to
Army, fearing naval control over Army appoint an air officer as commander of
supplies, opposed this proposal and in- all Army forces placed under Ghormley.
sisted on parallel Army and Navy supply This arrangement had been worked out,
organizations. "We have so dominant an apparently, between General Eisenhower
interest . . . ," wrote Maj. Gen. Brehon and Maj. Gen. Millard F. Harmon, Chief
B. Somervell, "so clear a responsibility of Air Staff. After certain modifications,
in the supply of our large forces; we Admiral King finally accepted this ar-
must definitely control the means."42 rangement on 2 July and five days later
Agreement proved impossible and all that the new command, U.S. Army Forces
remained of the proposal when the de- in the South Pacific Area, was created.
bate ended was a joint purchasing office Harmon himself was the officer Marshall
for local procurement in New Zealand. selected for this new and difficult
Another solution to the problem of assignment.45
administration and supply was that rec- General Marshall's instructions to
ommended by General Emmons who Harmon were detailed and specific. His
wanted an Army commander for the first task was to take over the administra-
South Pacific, stationed in the Fijis and tion and training of all U.S. ground and
subordinate to him, to co-ordinate the air troops in the South Pacific, and sec-
operations, supply, and maintenance of ondarily to assist Ghormley in the prep-
Army forces in that area.43 A month aration and execution of plans then
later, when the War Department had still under consideration for the employment
failed to act on his proposal, Emmons of Army forces. On his arrival in the
asked for a clarification of his responsi- theater, Marshall instructed, Harmon
bilities, pointing out that confusion was was to inspect the Army bases in the area
resulting from the conflicting requests and submit to Washington recommenda-
he was receiving from the base com- tions for "the rearrangement, reduction
manders. The clarification was not long or augmentation of the personnel and
in coming for already the War Depart- materiel . . . with a view to establishing
ment had decided to establish a separate a balanced, cohesive and efficient Army
Army command in the South Pacific, but contingent."46 This done he would take
along different lines from those suggested over responsibility for the logistic sup-
by Emmons.44 port of the Army bases in the area,
The solution arrived at in Washington utilizing to the full local resources.
was designed as much to meet the prob- Through COMSOPAC he would pro-
lem of the control of Army aircraft as it cure whatever he could from the Joint
was to create a more orderly system of 45
Relevant Papers, all of which the author con-
42
Cited in Leighton and Coakley, Global Logistics sulted, are filed in OPD 384 PTO case 18 and are
and Strategy, p. 189. listed in Matloff and Snell, Strategic Planning
43
Ltr, Emmons to Marshall, 20 May 42, sub: Army 1941-42, p. 265.
46
Com in South Pacific OPD 384 PTO case 18. Ltr, Marshall to Harmon, 7 Jul 42, sub: Instruc-
44
Rad, Emmons to TAG, 27 Jun 42, CM-IN-9002; tion to CG USAFISPA, with amendment dated12
Marshall to Emmons, 4 Jul 42, CM-OUT-1179. Jul 42, OPD 384 PTO case 18.
Purchasing Board, established by Ghorm- Air Force; his supply officer, Col. Robert
ley in June 1942 and consisting of three G. Breene; his operations officers Cols.
American officers—one from each of the Frank F. Everest, Dean C. Strother, and
services. Other supplies, except for Thomas D. Roberts; and his Signal offi-
petroleum products, which were a naval cer, Col. Francis T. Ankenbrandt. On
responsibility, he would procure from 16 July these men left Washington by
the San Francisco port.47 air. After a brief stopover in San Fran-
Unlike Ghormley, General Harmon cisco, where they met General Kenney,
had no operational control over his on his way to Australia to replace Gen-
forces. Though he did later acquire such eral Brett, they reached Hawaii on the
command it was by delegation from 22d and Suva in the Fijis on the 26th.
COMSOPAC, for limited periods and From there Kenney reported to Admiral
for specific purposes. His instructions, Ghormley and assumed command of U.S.
too, limited his authority. They lacked, Army forces in the area by radio. His
he later said, "simplicity and directness," headquarters, he announced, would be
and by particularizing his duties had the in Noumea, capital city of New Caledo-
effect of restricting his command. He nia. Until he could issue further instruc-
had no power over the employment of tions on administration and supply,
Army forces, and could only plead his Harmon told the Army commanders,
instructions to assist COMSOPAC in the they were to handle such matters as
preparation and execution of plans as before.
authority for a voice in the discussions The headquarters in New Caledonia
and decisions involving Army and Air was opened on 29 July. Already Admiral
Force units. So vague was this provision, McCain was established there and
that he commented to a Washington col- Ghormley soon moved his own head-
league later that "anyone could interpret quarters, located aboard the USS Ar-
[it] in any way they desired."48 His own gonne, to the port of Noumea. Thus,
interpretation was as broad as he could the major Army and Navy headquarters
make it, with the result that he played a were quickly brought together so that a
far more active role in operations than close working relationship could be
was ever intended. established. "There has been no sugges-
Many of the officers General Harmon tion of any lack of harmony," General
chose for his staff were highly trained Harmon told Arnold. "Neither Ghorm-
airmen whose selection reflected the War ley or McCain are inclined to demand
Department's intention that the new or suggest tasks beyond the capabilities
headquarters would uphold the Army of our units and freely consult unit com-
Air Forces' interests in this predomi- manders and members of my staff on
nantly naval area. His chief of staff was matters of technique. .. . All commands,
Brig. Gen. Nathan F. Twining, later to forces, and units in this area are working
become commander of the Thirteenth full out, and in full accord to the com-
mon end; and this relationship will be
preserved."49
47
See Leighton and Coakley, Global Logistics and
Strategy, pp. 190-92.
48 49
Ltr, Harmon to Handy, 4 Nov 43, copy in Ltr, Harmon to Arnold, 5 Aug 42, copy in
OCMH. OCMH.
The logistical problems that faced still, and for a long time will be in a
General Harmon were, like those of muddle."51
other commanders in the Pacific, per- It was not until 15 October, about two
haps the most difficult. His command and one-half months after his arrival,
covered a tremendous area, over one that General Harmon assumed responsi-
million square miles, practically all of it bility for supply and administration of
ocean. The most distant bases were 3,000 Army forces in the South Pacific.52 This
miles apart. Unlike a continental thea- responsibility he delegated to a Service
ter of operations with debarkation facili- Command headed by his G-4, Colonel
ties, road nets, and railways, the South Breene, soon to be promoted to brigadier
Pacific had almost no communications general, thus leaving himself free to con-
or developed industrial facilities except centrate on operational matters. All Army
in New Zealand. Harbors and docks commanders were instructed to send
were scarce. In the entire area there were their requisitions as well as all reports
only four ports, Auckland, Wellington, and requests, to the new headquarters,
Suva, and Noumea, with usable terminal soon reorganized and redesignated the
installations, and of these only the first Services of Supply, where they would be
was adequate to support a major military consolidated and forwarded to Washing-
effort. Before any of these ports could ton. In this way central control and
accommodate large shipments of troops standard procedure for all Army units
and supplies it would be necessary to in the area were established for the first
enlarge and improve harbors, docks, and time.
warehouses. Roads and the other re- Harmon's control of Army air units
quirements for a large supply base were in the South Pacific was less direct. From
nonexistent or entirely inadequate. To the outset he insisted, as did his superiors
add to this difficulty, Harmon had to in Washington, that their administra-
impose order on an already complicated tion, supply, and training were his re-
and confusing situation and deal with sponsibility, though Admiral McCain
a naval supply organization which per- exercised operational control. Moreover,
formed many of the functions his own even in operations he did not concede
would. "Our own Army logistic prob- that McCain's control was complete. It
lem," he explained to Marshall, "is was his responsibility, he asserted, to see
sufficiently difficult in itself. The one of that the Army's aircraft were employed
coordination with the Navy to avoid in a way that was consistent with doc-
duplication, economize on transporta- trines and techniques of the Air Forces.
tion and insure availability of surpluses Very early he came to the conclusion
in one service to meet deficiencies of the that this could only be achieved by a
other is doubly so."50 He had been in centralized Army air organization for the
the area only a month when he told a South Pacific. Failure to create such an
Washington colleague that "logistics is organization, he told General Arnold,
would soon place the Army "in the posi-
51
Ltr, Harmon to Brig Gen St. Clair Streett, 27
50
Ltr, Harmon to Marshall, 9 Sep 42, copy in Aug 42, copy in OCMH.
52
OCMH. GO 6F, Hq USAFISPA, 15 Oct 42.
tion of being unable to refute an asser- assignment to operations. In routine

tion to the effect: "You do not have in operations such as patrolling, the air-
the Army any senior officer with opera- craft were to be controlled by the base
tional experience of large Air Forces in commander through his air officer, who
this type of warfare."53 The organiza- might be an Army or Navy officer. But
tion Harmon wanted was finally estab- the missions and objectives were to be
lished in January 1943 when the assigned by McCain. In short, General
Thirteenth Air Force was activated, but Harmon received, in large measure,
already the major issue had been supervision over the administration of
resolved. Army air units as well as control over
Almost the first problem Harmon their employment in normal and routine
raised with Admiral Ghormley when he situations. But he had little to say in
reached Noumea was that of Army con- their assignment, the strategy that dic-
trol over the operations of the B-17's tated their employment, and the organi-
and B-26's based on Efate and Espiritu zation under which they would operate.
Santo. The solution worked out during By the time these problems had been
several conferences with Ghormley and solved and the organization of the South
McCain late in July gave to Harmon Pacific worked out, the forces in the area
responsibility for the training and indoc- were already engaged in offensive opera-
trination of Army air units, but left to tions. These operations had been made
McCain the formulation of doctrine for possible by a series of naval battles
the employment of aircraft and their which had turned the balance in the
53
Ltr, Harmon to Arnold, 12 Oct 42, copy in Pacific and given the initiative for the
OCMH. first time since 7 December to the Allies.
CHAPTER XII
Transition
There are only three principles of warfare—Audacity, Audacity, and
AUDACITY.
GENERAL PATTON
The story of the first four months of During these months the only dark
the war in the Pacific was one of unre- spot in an otherwise brightening scene
lieved tragedy and disaster. Everywhere, was the loss of the Philippines and the
from Hawaii to Burma, the Allies had tragic fate of its gallant defenders. But
suffered humiliation and defeat at the this isolated victory had little strategic
hands of a foe who seemed almost super- significance for the Japanese who in two
human, able to traverse unbelievable brief and bitter months had seen the
distances and impossible terrain on a initiative they had thought so firmly in
handful of rice and quick to take advan- their hands slip away from them. The
tage of every Allied weakness. Only in sunshine-filled days of victory had indeed
the Philippines, where American and been short.
Filipino forces still held out, had the
implacable foe been thwarted, and even The Fall of the Philippines
there the end was clearly in sight.
But the next two months of 1942 When Wainwright moved to Corregi-
would tell a different story. Already the dor to take over MacArthur's post on 21
tide of Japanese victory was receding as March, the lull which had settled over
the Allies recovered from their momen- the Bataan battlefield in mid-February
tary confusion and sought to overcome was already coming to an end. Since
their initial weakness. In April the raid 8 February when he had abandoned his
came against Tokyo, a fitting retaliation fruitless attempts to reduce the Bataan
for Pearl Harbor and the first good news defenses, General Homma had received
the American public had had in four large reinforcements, almost two divi-
months of war. Next month the Allies sions as well as artillery, aircraft, and
struck another blow in the Coral Sea individual replacements. By the end of
to give pause to the overconfident and March his plans were ready and most of
jubilant Japanese. Finally, early in June, his troops in position to attack. But
came the great American naval victory before he gave the signal he offered
off Midway, which marked the turning Wainwright one last chance to surrender,
point of the war and made possible the urging him to be sensible and follow
offensives that followed later in the year. "the defenders of Hongkong, Singapore,
TRANSITION 265
and the Netherlands East Indies in the ly proud of their accomplishment. For
acceptance of an honorable defeat."1 three months they had held off the
Wainright did not even reply to this Japanese, only to be overwhelmed fin-
message, and on 3 April, Good Friday, ally by disease and starvation. In a very
after almost two weeks of intensive air real sense they had suffered "a true
and artillery attacks, the final Japanese medical defeat."2
offensive began. The events that followed General
From the start the attack went well King's surrender present a confused and
for General Homma who, on the basis chaotic story of the disintegration and
of his earlier disappointments, was pre- dissolution of a starved, diseased, and
pared for the worst. The 80,000 Amer- beaten army, a story climaxed by the
icans and Filipinos crowded into the horrors and atrocities of the infamous
southern tip of the Bataan Peninsula Death March. Denied food and water,
were too weak from hunger, their com- robbed of their personal possessions,
bat efficiency too low to withstand the forced to march under the hot sun and
ferocity of the Japanese attack. In short halt in areas where even the most primi-
order Homma's forces pierced the cen- tive sanitary facilities were lacking,
ter of the American line, outflanked the clubbed, beaten, and bayoneted by their
defenders, and forced them back from Japanese conquerors, General King's
the main line of resistance. By the night men made their way into captivity. Gal-
of the 8th, General King's Luzon Force lant foes and brave soldiers, the battling
had virtually disintegrated. Philippine bastards of Bataan had earned the right
Army troops were in complete rout and to be treated with consideration and de-
units were melting away "lock, stock, cency, but their enemies had reserved
and barrel." Headquarters had lost con- for them even greater privations and
tact with the front-line troops and the deeper humiliation than any they had
roads were jammed with soldiers who yet suffered.3
had abandoned arms and equipment in Though the fall of Bataan ended all
their frantic haste to escape. Three organized opposition on Luzon, it did
months of malnutrition, malaria, and not give the Japanese the most valuable
intestinal infections had left the Amer- prize of all, Manila Bay. So long as Cor-
icans and Filipinos weak and disease- regidor and its sister forts lying across
ridden, totally incapable of the sustained the entrance to the bay remained in
physical effort necessary for a successful American hands, the use of the finest
defense. There was nothing for General natural harbor in the Orient was denied
King to do but surrender. them. And before General Homma
The battle for Bataan was ended; the could report to his already impatient
fighting was over. The men who had superiors in Tokyo that he had accom-
survived the long ordeal could feel just-
2
Rpt, Luzon Force Surgeon to CG, Luzon Force,
30 Jun 42, sub: Medical Aspects of the Surrender,
1
The text of the surrender message is in the exhib- copy in OCMH.
3
its of the trial of General Homma, Prosecution ex- For an account of the Death March, see Stanley
hibit 421. This section is based on Morton, Fall of L. Falk, Bataan: The March of Death (New York:
the Philippines, ch. XXIII-XXXII. W. W. Norton & Company, 1962).
plished his mission, he would also have For twenty-seven days, from 9 April
to occupy Mindanao to the south as well to 6 May, this bombardment continued,
as the more important islands in the increasing in intensity as the days went
Visayan group in the central Philippines. by. By the evening of 5 May there was
It took the Japanese another month little left on the island to stop the Japa-
to accomplish these tasks. While his nese. The beach defenses had been
troops were making ready for the as- demolished, the huge seacoast guns si-
sault on Corregidor, General Homma lenced, and the antiaircraft batteries
launched the offensive in the south. On reduced to impotence. All wire com-
19 April a detachment recently arrived munication had been destroyed and ev-
from Borneo took Cebu in the Visayas ery effort to restore it unavailing. "Com-
and next day another from Malaya occu- mand," observed General Moore, "could
pied the neighboring island of Panay. be exercised and intelligence obtained
Both detachments then joined the one only by use of foot messengers."6
at Davao to begin the campaign on Min- Even the topography of the island had
danao. In a concerted drive beginning changed. Where once there had been
on 29 April, the Emperor's birthday, thick woods and dense vegetation only
the Japanese advanced rapidly on all charred stumps remained. The rocky
fronts and within a week had virtually ground had been pulverized into a fine
gained control of the island. "North dust, and the coastal road had been liter-
front in full retreat," reported General ally blown into the bay. Deep craters,
Sharp. "Enemy comes through right empty shell cases, and huge fragments
flank. Nothing further can be done. of concrete pockmarked the landscape.
May sign off any time now."4 Gone were the broad lawns, impressive
Meanwhile the Japanese had turned parade grounds, spacious barracks, and
their attention to Corregidor. With the pleasant shaded clubs and bungalows of
southern tip of Bataan in their posses- peacetime. By 5 May Corregidor lay
sion they could now emplace artillery on "scorched, gaunt, and leafless, covered
the heights of the Mariveles Mountains with the chocolate dust of countless
and along the Manila Bay shore, only explosions."7
two miles across the channel from the By this time the 10,000 men on Cor-
island fortress. By thus massing their regidor—soldiers, marines, and sailors
artillery they were able to pour on Cor- alike—knew that a Japanese assault was
regidor so steady and heavy a volume of imminent. "It took no mental giant,"
fire that the intermittent air attacks of as Wainwright observed, "to figure out
the preceding three months paled into by May 5, 1942, that the enemy was
insignificance. "One day's shelling," re- ready to come against Corregidor."8 And
marked one officer, "did more damage most of the men knew as well as their
than all the bombing put together."5 commander that they stood little chance.
6
Rpt of Harbor Defenses of Manila and Subic
4
Rad, Sharp to MacArthur, 9 May 42 GHQ SWPA Bays, an. 8, USAFFE USFIP Rpt of Opns, p. 72.
7
G-3 Jnl, Phil Is, Opns Rpts. Maude R. Williams, The Last Days of Corregidor,
5
The Siege of Corregidor, Mil Rpts on UN, No. 12, supp. p. 1, typescript diary in OCMH.
8
15 Nov 43, p. 50, MID WD. Wainwright, General Wainwright's Story, p. 114.
TRANSITION 267
There had been six hundred casualties runner from the beach defense com-
since 9 April, and those who escaped in- mand post arrived at Moore's headquar-
jury were beginning to feel the effects ters in Malinta Tunnel with the news
of malnutrition. Men were living on that the Japanese had landed.
nerve alone, and morale was dropping The fight for Corregidor lasted only
rapidly. All hopes for reinforcement ten hours. Though the Japanese suf-
had long since disappeared. There was fered heavy losses during the landing
only enough water to last four more days and came ashore in the wrong place, they
at most and no prospect that the pipes recovered quickly. One group cut across
and pumps for the artesian wells could the tail of the island while the bulk of
be repaired. In any event, the power the Japanese turned west, advancing in
plant on which the Corregidor garrison the darkness along the axis of the island
was entirely dependent would not last toward Malinta Tunnel. At Battery
more than a few weeks. Denver on a ridge near the east entrance
Life in Malinta Tunnel, where those of the tunnel, the Japanese ran into the
who could had taken refuge, had become first serious opposition and it was there
almost unbearable. Dust, dirt, great that most of the fighting took place that
black flies, and vermin were everywhere, night and during the early hours of the
and over everything hung the odor of morning. The defenders threw every-
the hospital and men's bodies. On the thing they had into the battle, including
haggard faces of the men could be seen coast artillery men and a provisional
the effects of the continuous bombard- battalion of 500 sailors, but their efforts
ment. There was a limit to human en- were doomed to failure. Finally, at 0800,
durance and that limit, General Wain- after the Japanese had brought tanks
wright told the President, "has long and artillery ashore for a concerted at-
since been passed."9 tack, General Wainwright committed his
The long-awaited and dreaded attack last reserves.
came late on the night of 5 May, after The final blow came soon after when
a particularly intense artillery concen- the Japanese sent three tanks into the
tration on the tail of the tadpole-shaped action. The first appearance of armor
island. The full moon, "veiled by on the front panicked the defenders and
streaks of heavy black clouds," was just caused some to bolt to the rear. It took
rising when, shortly before midnight, the combined efforts of commissioned
Japanese artillery fire suddenly ceased, and noncommissioned officers to calm
and its bass roar was replaced "by the the troops and prevent a rout. "The ef-
treble chattering of many small arms."10 fect of the tanks," the Japanese noted
Barges were observed approaching the with satisfaction, "was more than had
tail (east) end of the island, and at 2230 been anticipated."11
the order went out to prepare for a By 1000 on the morning of 6 May the
hostile landing. A few minutes later a situation of the American troops on Cor-
9 11
Ibid., pp. 122-23. Statement of Col Yoshida, 9 Feb 50, ATIS Doc
10
Maj John McM. Gulick, Memoirs of Btry C, 91st 62644, Statements of Japanese Officials on World
CA (PS), p. 188, copy in OCMH. War II, GHQ FEC, IV 553-57, OCMH.
regidor was critical. The troops on the

front line, pinned down by machine gun
and artillery fire, could move neither
forward nor back and had no weapons
with which to meet the tanks. Already
between 600 and 800 men had been
killed and about 1,000 more wounded.
All reserves had been committed and
practically all the guns destroyed. The
Japanese were apparently preparing for
another landing at the opposite end of
the island, and, in any case, would reach
Malinta Tunnel with its 1,000 wounded
men in a few hours. When they did
there would be a wholesale slaughter.
It was on this basis that General Wain-
wright made his decision to surrender, to
trade one day of freedom for several
thousand lives. By 1200, all arms larger GENERAL WAINWRIGHT broadcasts sur-
than 45-caliber were destroyed, codes render instructions.
and radio equipment smashed, classified
papers burned, and the surrender mes-
sage broadcast in English and Japanese. loss of face Homma was relieved of com-
At that time, the American flag on Cor- mand and spent the rest of the war on
regidor was lowered and burned and the side lines, as an officer on inactive
the white flag hoisted. "With broken status.
heart and head bowed in sadness but In the context of global war, the
not in shame," Wainwright wrote the Philippines did not in mid-1942 possess
President, "I report. . . that today I must great strategic significance. The Japa-
arrange terms for the surrender of the nese tide had already swept around the
fortified islands of Manila Bay. . . . With islands and over Southeast Asia and the
profound regret and with continued Indies, through the Bismarck Archipel-
pride in my gallant troops, I go to meet ago into the Solomons and New Guinea,
the Japanese commander."12 The five- and eastward across the Pacific as far as
month-long struggle for control of the the Gilbert Islands. Only in the Philip-
Philippine Archipelago was over; the pines had the enemy been halted, and
victory which Homma had hoped to win in this successful though hopeless re-
by the middle of February was finally sistance lay the real importance of the
his, three months later. It was a victory bitter defense. It demonstrated that the
without honor and for this delay and Japanese were not invincible, and that
they could be stopped by determined
12
men, ably led. For an Allied world
Rad, Wainwright to Roosevelt, 6 May 42. A copy surfeited on gloom, defeat, and despair;
of this message is reproduced in Wainwright, General
Wainwright's Story, pp. 122-23. the epic of Bataan and Corregidor was
TRANSITION 269
a symbol of hope and a beacon of success would army bombers be able to take off
for the future. from aircraft carriers?13 Obviously the
Army Air Forces would have to study
The Tokyo Raid the problem.
General Arnold, when the idea was pre-
To balance the bad news of the loss sented to him, was enthusiastic. While
of the Philippines, the American public Capt. Donald B. Duncan, King's air op-
could look back with satisfaction to the erations officer, worked out the naval
recent announcement of the spectacular details of the plan, Arnold's staff studied
raid against Tokyo on 18 April. Con- the air problems presented by this dar-
ceived during the dark days of January ing scheme. The first task was to select
as a retaliation for Pearl Harbor, this an airplane that would meet the require-
bold strike, coming only nine days after ments. Three types were considered and
the surrender of Bataan, was a powerful the planners finally chose the twin-en-
boost to morale at home and a grim gine medium bomber, the B-25. For
warning of American determination to this mission, the planes would have three
carry the war into the enemy's territory. auxiliary fuel tanks and additional gaso-
The idea for the raid is credited vari- line inside for a capacity of 1,141 gallons,
ously to the President, to Stanley K. cameras, a 2,000-pound bomb load, a
Hornbeck of the State Department, and simple bombing device called the Mark
to others. Apparently it was first con- Twain, and two dummy tail guns which,
sidered seriously in the Navy Department it was hoped, would discourage Japanese
by Capt. Francis L. Low, Admiral King's fighters from attacking from the rear.14
operations officer, and King in January The choice of planes, all of which came
1942. The problem, King and Low from the 17th Bombardment Group, de-
agreed, was to get planes within striking termined the choice of crews. Twenty-
distance of Tokyo Bay without putting four were needed and it was decided to
the carriers within range of the enemy's get them all, if possible, from this group.
air and naval defenses. This meant the More than enough volunteered to make
launching position would have to be at up the force required for the assignment.
least 500 miles off the Japanese coast. General Arnold himself chose the leader
Where would the planes put down after of the expedition, Lt. Col. James H.
the attack? Certainly the aircraft carriers Doolittle.
would not be able to await their return.
Vladivostok was only 600 miles from 13
Vice Adm Donald B. Duncan, Account of Tokyo
Tokyo, but the Soviet authorities would Raid Planning, written for Samuel E. Morison, his-
torian of U.S. naval operations. A detailed study of
not provide a haven for the American the Tokyo raid was prepared by Lt. Col. S. L. A. Mar-
fliers for fear of risking hostilities with shall during the war and is on file in OCMH. This
Japan. They would have to land some- study was the basis for the accounts in Morison, The
Rising Sun in the Pacific, pp. 389-98, and Craven
where in eastern China, thus adding and Cate, AAF I, 438-44. This author used these
1,500 miles to the minimum of 500 re- narratives as well as many of the records used by
quired to reach Tokyo. Only the Army Colonel Marshall.
14
The Norden sight was not used because the
Air Forces could provide a plane with planes were to bomb from low altitude and because
the range and bomb load required. But of the danger of enemy capture.
There were many problems, the most posal, was generally unfavorable and
important of which was to train the revealed a complete ignorance of the
pilots in carrier take-offs, still to be project.15
solved. These were worked out during This secrecy extended even to the
March when the crews trained at Eglin Chungking government which would
Field, Florida, on a strip the size of a have to make arrangements for the re-
carrier's deck. Before the month was ception of the crews once they had com-
over all the pilots had taken off twice pleted their mission. Chiang Kai-shek
with fully loaded planes in a distance of and Lt. Gen. Joseph W. Stilwell, com-
700 to 750 feet. There was, unfortun- mander of U.S. Army forces in China,
ately, no time for practice with live Burma, and India, were told only that
bombs or for gunnery training. All the certain fields in eastern China would be
younger pilots, however, were required required for the use of American bomb-
to make an extended Overwater flight ers and that a quantity of aviation gaso-
from Eglin to Houston, Texas. On 24 line and other stores must be available
March, after less than a month's train- by 19 April. Chiang gave his assent on
ing, the entire group was ordered to 28 March without knowing what would
Alameda Naval Air Station in San Fran- happen, and it was not until 2 April,
cisco Bay where the naval task force after the task force had already put to
which would carry the B-25's across the sea, that he was told that at least twenty-
Pacific was already assembling. five B-25's were involved. After that
The plan for the impending raid on date arrangements were quickly made
Tokyo was one of the best kept secrets for the arrival of the planes, the procure-
of the war. Only a handful of men knew ment of personnel and supplies, and for
the entire plan at this time. Neither the communications—no information was
pilots nor the ships' crews had yet to be relayed over Chinese signal chan-
learned their ultimate destination, nels. But already bad weather had set-
though many may have guessed it by tled over eastern China.
then. Not even the highest staff officers Meanwhile Colonel Doolittle and his
in Washington had anything to do with group had arrived at Alameda on 31
the project. This secrecy is strikingly March. There waiting was the carrier
illustrated by the response from the Mili- Hornet, Capt. Marc A. Mitscher com-
tary Intelligence Division of the War manding, with two cruisers, four de-
Department General Staff to the sug- stroyers, and an oiler. Next morning
gestion of an unidentified State Depart- sixteen of the B-25's—all there was
ment official for a surprise blow against room for—were hoisted to the carrier's
Japan on the Emperor's birthday, 29 flight deck and lashed down securely.
April. Except for the date, the State At 1000 of the 2d, under cover of a thick
Department's proposal, forwarded to fog, the Hornet and its escort steamed
General Marshall by Hornbeck, was by
coincidence identical in every respect to
15
the operation already under way. The Ltr, Hornbeck to Marshall, 14 Mar 42; Memo,
Col. Oscar N. Solbert, MI to WPD, 16 Mar 42, sub:
response from Military Intelligence, Possible Double Play in Opns Against Japan, AG
which was asked to comment on the pro- 381 (3-14-42).
TRANSITION 271
days at sea, the Hornet force rendez-

voused with a similar force out of Pearl
Harbor at a point north of Midway at
the date line. Led by Vice Adm. Wil-
liam F. Halsey, Jr., who flew his flag
from the Enterprise, the entire expedi-
tion steamed westward toward Japan at
sixteen knots, the 4 cruisers and 8 de-
stroyers in the van and on the flanks,
Hornet in the center, with the 2 oilers
and the flagship in column behind.
For four days, from 13 to 17 April,
the task force nosed its way silently
through the heavy seas of the North
Pacific.16 Overhead the planes of the
Enterprise maintained constant vigil.
On the 16th the Army bombers were
spotted for the take-off. There was no
space to spare on the crowded flight deck;
COLONEL DOOLITTLE AND CAPTAIN the leading bomber (Doolittle's) had
MITSCHER on the Hornet. 467 feet clearance, the last hung precari-
ously over the edge of the ramp. About
1,000 miles east of Tokyo, on the 17th,
down San Francisco Bay and through the carriers and cruisers refueled and
the Golden Gate. Once away from shore speeded ahead at twenty knots, in the
the loud-speakers announced what the face of winds which had increased to
men already suspected—that the target gale force, toward the Japanese coast.
was Tokyo. "Cheers from every section Barring accident or interception the
of the ship greeted the announcement," Hornet would be in launching position
records the Hornet action report, "and by sundown the next day.
morale reached a new high." Now for Unknown to Halsey and Doolittle,
the first time it was possible to provide there had been a hitch in the plans.
the bomber crews with target data and Fearing Japanese reprisal, Chiang had
other information they would need. urged early in April, when the Hornet
Weather during this first leg of the had already put to sea under radio
voyage was foul. Though the high winds, silence, that the operation be postponed,
heavy seas, and frequent squalls reduced or even canceled, but it was too late for
the danger of detection they also sub- such drastic measures. On the 15th he
jected the B-25's to damage from vibra- gave reluctant assent to the final plans
tion and exposure to the elements. and for the use of the fields in eastern
Hornet's machinists checked the planes
frequently to make certain the lashings
were secure and to repair mechanical 16
Since the task force crossed the date line, it lost
difficulties. On 13 April, after eleven one day on the way out.
China, excepting only the one at Chu- Enemy counteraction could be expected
chow which could not be made ready at any time.
because of bad weather. It was just this Halsey was now faced with the most
field that all the crews had chosen for critical decision of the entire voyage.
their landing, but there was no way to Should he push on toward the Japanese
get the information to the task force coast to bring the B-25's to the position
without giving away its position to the originally planned, withdraw to safety,
enemy. or launch the bombers immediately?
Halsey and Doolittle had changed Whichever course he chose, he would
their plans too. To minimize the dan- have to strike a delicate balance between
ger of interception, the plan originally the risks to his carriers and the risks to
called for a nocturnal attack, launched the Army bombers. Japan was still 670
about 500 miles off the Japanese coast miles away, more than 100 miles further
on the afternoon of the 19th, with Doo- than the air planners had considered safe
little taking off about three hours ahead for the bombing run. It was evident to
of the others to light up Tokyo with in- Halsey that he could take his carriers no
cendiaries. This would bring the crews further without exposing them to attack.
over Chuchow during daylight of the The bombers would have to take off now
20th. But Halsey for some unaccount- or not at all—the carriers must with-
able reason was a day ahead of schedule draw. His decision, made with Colonel
and there was no way to alert the Chinese Doolittle's concurrence, was to launch
so that the fields would be ready. Colo- the bombers and risk attack, though
nel Doolittle was not unduly concerned. Tokyo was still five hours' flight away
The Chinese, he felt certain, would re- and the prospect of the crews reaching
ceive ample notice of his arrival from the fields in China slim. At 0800 Hal-
Radio Tokyo. sey gave his orders: Hornet to turn at
More serious were the developments twenty-two knots into the wind and
of the 18th which forced a change in the prepare to launch; Nashville to sink
hour as well as the day of the attack. the patrol ship sighted fifteen minutes
At 0210 that morning Enterprise picked earlier.
up two ships on its radar screen and Aboard the Hornet the next hour and
altered course. The search flight sent a half was full of excitement and ordered
out at first light confirmed the bad news confusion. The wind was at forty knots
that the task force had apparently struck and the sea so rough that the green
the enemy's first line of patrol ships some waters washed over the carrier's ramps.
two hundred miles further off the coast After a few last-minute instructions the
than expected. Worse than that, one of bomb racks were loaded and the planes
the search planes reported at 0715 that it readied for the take-off. It was 0818
had been sighted. Again course was when Colonel Doolittle began his run
changed, but about a half hour later down the flight deck and then roared
another enemy patrol ship was observed, upward to circle the Hornet once before
this time from the deck of the Hornet. heading west. The rest of the pilots
There could be little doubt that the task followed quickly and without incident
force had been discovered and reported. except for one "who hung on the brink
TRANSITION 273
of a stall until," wrote Admiral Halsey, fully completed their missions. Not a
"we nearly catalogued his effects."17 By single plane had been shot down, but
0924 the entire group was airborne and the last and most dangerous portion of
the task force reversed course and speeded the voyage still lay ahead.
for home at 25 knots, all radios tuned in Behind them the American pilots left
for news from Tokyo. a surprised and confused enemy. By
The flight of the bombers toward later standards damage was slight, but
Tokyo Bay was uneventful, though they the Japanese people could not doubt that
flew over warships and past Japanese air- the enemy had broken through the Em-
craft. Apparently the patrol boat warn- pire's inner defenses to strike at the
ings had not yet been broadcast. In their heart of the homeland. How it had been
favor also was the fact that Tokyo that done the authorities did not yet know.
morning was holding a full-scale air drill The patrol boats had alerted them to the
which was just ending when Colonel presence of the carriers, but they were
Doolittle's plane reached the city, com- puzzled by the fact that the aircraft
ing in from the north at rooftop level, which struck Tokyo had been Army
shortly after noon. Not a shot had been bombers, not the carriers planes. they
fired at his plane when at 1215 (Tokyo expected. The Japanese did not appar-
time) he and Lt. Travis Hoover in the ently associate Doolittle's attack with the
second plane dropped their incendiaries carriers. The bombers, they thought,
and bombs. One antiaircraft battery had come from Midway and they were
answered the attack, apparently on the still expecting a carrier-based attack the
initiative of the gunners, but there was next morning, when the ships reported
as yet no general alarm or understanding by the patrol boats would have come
that an enemy raid was in progress. within launching position. It was some
After this first bombing there was an time before the Japanese accepted the
interlude of about twenty minutes dur- truth that the carriers and the bombers
ing which the air raid warning finally were part of the same force.
sounded. Then at 1240 eleven more The rest of the story of the Tokyo
bombers, which had reached the target raid—the landing of the fliers in China
by different courses, came in over the and their flight to safety—is one of
enemy capital, hitting factories, oil tanks, heroism, suffering, and tragedy. Of the
power plants, and military installations. sixteen crews, fifteen made China with
The remaining three planes, loaded with the help of a providential tail wind; the
incendiaries, hit Nagoya, Yokohoma, the sixteenth landed near Vladivostok and
Yokosuka Navy Yard, and Kobe. Though its crew was interned by the Russians,
all the crews had been cautioned against escaping later to Iran. The planes over
striking nonmilitary targets it was inevi- China, except one which came down
table that they should and for this three along the coast, made their way through
of the fliers later paid with their lives. the darkness and rain until their fuel
Fifteen of the sixteen bombers success- was exhausted without finding the des-
ignated fields. Four of the bombers
"William F. Halsey and Joseph Bryan, Admiral
Halsey's Story (New York: Whittlesey House, 1947), crash-landed and the crews of the re-
p. 103. mainder bailed out. Eight of the men
fell into Japanese hands and 1 of those fixed by the old Army transports carrying
who had parachuted was killed in descent. the South Seas Detachment, was only six
Thus 71 of the 80 men who had started and a half knots. Since these slow ships
on the hazardous journey finally made would expose the convoy to air and naval
their way to safety.18 attack, the Japanese made careful pro-
The naval task force made good its vision to protect their troops. Direct
escape also, evading the planes and ships support would be provided by a naval
the Japanese sent in pursuit and sinking escort force comprising the small carrier
several small vessels in the bargain. Once Shoho, 4 heavy cruisers, and a destroyer
beyond the outer picket line, the voyage squadron. Ranging farther afield, free
home was uneventful, and on 25 April, to strike any Allied air and naval units,
a week after the President had announced was a carrier division comprised of 2
that planes from Shangri-La had bombed large carriers, the Shokaku and Zuikaku,
Tokyo, Halsey led his fleet into Pearl 3 heavy cruisers, and 7 destroyers under
Harbor. All hands were looking for- the command of Vice Adm. Takeo
ward to an extended shore leave, but Takagi. In addition, 2 submarines were
already a new crisis was developing in to take up positions in the Coral Sea and
the Coral Sea. 4 others along the eastern coast of Aus-
tralia to intercept any Allied naval war-
Coral Sea and Midway ships hastening to the scene. Finally,
long-range bombers based at Rabaul
Ever since early March, when the 4th were to strike targets in northeast Aus-
Fleet and the South Seas Detachment tralia and interdict air and naval traffic
had jointly occupied Lae and Salamaua in the Coral Sea and Torres Strait.20
along the northeast coast of New Guinea, For this venture, the Japanese, who
the Japanese had been preparing for a had acquired considerable caution since
seaborne invasion of Port Moresby, a the Allied reaction to the Lae-Salamaua
move that would take them into the landings, left nothing to chance. As a
Coral Sea between Australia and the prelude to the invasion of Port Moresby
New Hebrides. The carriers and cruis- by this sizable force, there would be two
ers required for that operation had finally preliminary operations: first, the occupa-
arrived at Truk on 29 April at which tion of Tulagi in the southern Solomons
time orders for the long-delayed invasion on 3 May; and second, the seizure two
were issued.19 days later of Deboyne Island just off the
The landings at Port Moresby—there east coast of Papua. With these islands
were to be two of them—were to be in their possession, the Japanese would
made at dawn, 10 May, by General 20
This account of the plans and of the action which
Horii's South Seas Detachment and a follows is based on the following sources: Japanese
battalion of special naval landing troops. Opns in SWPA, 125-29; Hist of Army Sec, Imperial
GHQ, pp. 51ff; Hist of South Seas Detachment, pp.
Both units were to leave Rabaul on the 12-14; Southeast Area Naval Opns, I, pp. 2, 4, 15;
4th in a convoy whose maximum speed, Bismarck-Solomons Landing Opns, pp. 36-42; 18th
Army Opns, I, p. 7; ONI Combat Narrative, The
18
Four of the men who were captured by the Battle of the Coral Sea OCMH; Morison, Coral Sea,
Japanese were recovered after the war. Midway and Submarine Actions; Craven and Cate,
19
See above, p. 217. AAF I, pp. 448-50.
TRANSITION 275
be able to provide shore-based air sup- Zuikaku with their cruiser and destroyer
port for the landings at Port Moresby escort in the open waters south of the
and to cover the east flank of the invasion Solomons, off San Cristobal.
force during its approach. The presence of Allied naval forces in
Even before the arrival of the large the Coral Sea was no accident. Ever
carriers at Truk on 29 April, the Jap- since February, reports of Japanese con-
anese had already put the first part of centrations in the Northeast Area and in
this plan into effect. Four days earlier, the mandated islands had been coming
aircraft from Rabaul had begun to bomb into Washington. By mid-April the time
fields in northeast Australia. The Tulagi and place of attack had been fairly well
force moved out of Rabaul a few days determined from intercepted and de-
later and on 2 May stood off the island. coded messages and both Nimitz and
There was no opposition to the landing MacArthur warned to expect a sea-
next day; the small Australian detach- borne invasion of Port Moresby.21 Thus
ment had been warned and after destroy- alerted, both Pacific commanders made
ing what it could had pulled out for preparations to frustrate this fresh Jap-
Efate in the New Hebrides. On the 5th anese venture, which, if successful, would
the Japanese occupied Deboyne Island. prove disastrous to MacArthur's plans
Thus far everything had come off on for the defense of Australia and would
schedule, exactly as planned. create a serious threat to the line of
While these preliminary operations communications.
were in progress, the Port Moresby in- General MacArthur's slender naval
vasion force was moving into position resources were no match for the formi-
for the landing. The South Seas Detach- dable Japanese fleet entering his theater
ment and the special naval troops began but he did what he could. His chief
loading on 2 May and on the 4th sailed weapon was the land-based Allied Air
out of the harbor to meet the naval Forces, and under his direction Brett
escort. That same day the Shokaku and assembled all the planes that he could
Zuikaku, steaming south from Truk, at bases in northeast Australia. From
received reports of an Allied carrier-based there, long-range bombers struck Rabaul,
attack on Tulagi and set course for the Lae, Buka, and Deboyne during the first
island at full speed. week of May while reconnaissance planes
Despite continued reports of Allied kept constant vigil along the sea ap-
naval forces in the Coral Sea, the Port proaches leading into the Coral Sea. It
Moresby convoy, reinforced by the was these aircraft that discovered the
Shoho group, which had supported the Port Moresby invasion force on 6 May
Tulagi landing, continued on its way. in the vicinity of Jomard Passage off the
But on the 7th, when it was clear that coast of Papua.22
the invasion force had been spotted, the
transports and a portion of the escorting 21
JIC Daily Summary, 19 and 24 Feb 42; Rad,
and supporting naval elements were King to Nimitz and Leary, No. 2032, 18 Apr 42, both
ordered back to safety. Remaining to cited in Hayes, The War Against Japan, ch. IV, p. 50.
22
Allied Opns in SWPA, SWPA Series, I, pp. 46-47;
take up position for the impending Rad, MacArthur to Marshall, No. 719, 13 May 42,
battle were the carriers Shokaku and OPD Exec Files.
Most of the naval forces to meet the Halsey could reach the scene, Nimitz
Japanese threat came from Admiral made provision for the two additional
Nimitz' Pacific Fleet and were under his carriers in his plans and ordered Halsey
command. By noon 29 April he had to make ready for the action.
made his plans. These called for the The Japanese landing at Tulagi on
organization of a task force built around 3 May took the Allies by surprise and
the carriers Yorktown and Lexington found Fletcher's force some 500 miles to
and under the command of Rear Adm. the south, still refueling. Immediately,
Frank J. Fletcher to rendezvous west of Admiral Fletcher, who flew his flag from
the New Hebrides and south of the Solo- the Yorktown, made for Tulagi at high
mons. Fletcher's orders were simply to speed. Next morning, he launched his
"operate in the Coral Sea commencing planes against the Japanese in the har-
1 May."23 By that time, his force would bor, crippling a destroyer and sinking
include an attack group of cruisers and some small boats, and then returned
destroyers, a support group of three to join the Lexington. The damage
cruisers—two of them Australian—from wrought by the raid was minor and had
the Southwest Pacific, a search group, little effect on Japanese activities other
and a destroyer screen for the carriers. than to alert them to the presence of
All together Admiral Fletcher would have American carriers and to bring the
in his command 2 carriers, 1 light and Shokaku and Zuikaku down to the area
7 heavy cruisers, 13 destroyers, 2 tankers, at full speed.
and a seaplane tender. The submarines During the next few days, as the Port
were not included in the task force; they Moresby invasion force moved toward
would operate independently and patrol the target, search planes from the Amer-
the coastal waters off northeast Australia ican carriers sought the enemy without
and New Guinea. Thus, while the Jap- success. Early on the morning of 6 May,
anese had a unified command for this when Brett's B-17's finally located a
operation the Allies were divided, with large force approaching Jomard Passage,
the bulk of the naval forces under Nimitz word was flashed to Fletcher who at once
and the submarines and land-based ordered his fleet to set course for the
aviation under MacArthur. enemy. All that day the fleet steamed
This array of Allied naval strength was northwest and the next morning Fletcher
hardly large enough to warrant any great sent in the attack group of cruisers and
optimism over the outcome. But it was destroyers to block the southern end of
the best Nimitz could do at the moment. Jomard Passage through which the Shoho
He had other forces—Halsey's two carrier and the convoy's screen would pass.
groups, each with one carrier, had re- Unknown to Fletcher, the main carrier
turned to Pearl Harbor on the 25th— strength of the Japanese was nowhere
but it would take time to overhaul the near Jomard, but off to the south and
vessels and make the 3,500-mile journey east. Early on the 7th, Japanese scout
to the Coral Sea. On the off-chance that planes spotted two American vessels, a
the battle would be delayed and that tanker and a destroyer, and mistakenly
23
CINCPAC Opn Plan 23-42, 29 Apr 42; Morison,
reported the former as a carrier. The
Coral Sea, Midway and Submarine Actions, p. 16. Shokaku and Zuikaku's bombers moved
TRANSITION 277
in for the attack. Against such easy prey

the Japanese pilots had little difficulty,
sinking the destroyer at once and fatally
damaging the tanker.
Meanwhile American aircraft had
sighted the Shoho group and moved in
for the kill, sinking the Shoho and a
mine layer at 0930 of the 7th. But still
neither side had definitely located the
main force of the other. Throughout
that day and into the night each searched
feverishly for the other without success.
On the morning of the 8th, the op-
posing carriers, about 235 miles apart,
located each other. The Shokaku and
Zuikaku immediately launched their
attack planes which made contact at
0920. At about the same time aircraft
from the Lexington and Yorktown hit
the Japanese in an attack that lasted less EXPLOSION ON THE LEXINGTON during
than two hours. The results seemed to the Coral Sea Battle.
be fairly even. Both the American car-
riers were damaged, the Lexington seri- Admiral Fletcher's problem was more
ously. Only one of the Japanese carriers, serious. The Lexington was burning
the Shokaku, was hurt badly, but the badly and he must try to save it. Shortly
enemy had lost more planes. Of the after noon of the 8th an internal explo-
original complement of almost 100 air- sion rocked the "Lady Lex." Soon there
craft, the Japanese had less than forty. were more explosions and by late after-
Neither side was in condition to continue noon the Lexington's fires were beyond
the fight. control. Fletcher realized that he could
Deprived of carrier protection and no longer hope to save the Lady and
naval escort for the Port Moresby con- made ready to pick up her crew when
voy, which had remained out of the way the time came to abandon ship. All hope
throughout the battle, the Japanese of returning to the battle was already
commander decided to call off the in- gone when he received Nimitz' message
vasion and turn back to Rabaul. From to retire. That night the Lexington
Admiral Yamamoto came swift disap- went down. Not a man was lost, and
proval and an order to resume the fight even the captain's dog was saved.
and "annihilate the remnants of the The loss of the Lexington gave the
enemy fleet."24 But it was too late. For victory to the Japanese, if victory is
two days he tried to re-establish contact, measured in ship losses alone. But the
but finally had to give up. Japanese did not so consider it. Their
plan to take Port Moresby had been
24
Japanese in SWPA, 129. frustrated; strategically the victory be-
longed to the Allies. Coming as it did vasion of Australia which led to the
on 8 May, two days after the gloomy agreement of 28 April. Once again
news of Corregidor's surrender, this vic- Yamamoto turned the powers of his per-
tory gleamed all the more brightly as an suasion on Nagano. Now he had the
augur of the future. Tokyo raid, which the Japanese then
The defeat in the Coral Sea had little thought had originated from Midway, to
immediate effect on Japanese plans. bolster his argument. Unless that island
These plans had originally called for the was occupied, he warned, there might
seizure of strategic positions in New be more American air raids against the
Caledonia, the Fijis, and Samoa once the homeland. Again Admiral Nagano
Port Moresby operation was over.25 But bowed to the wishes of his forceful
the staff at Imperial General Headquar- subordinate.
ters, which approved this plan on 28 Thus, at the beginning of May, the
April, had hardly begun to prepare for Army planners received from their naval
operations against the Allied line of colleagues a plan for operations against
communications when the Navy proposed Midway and the Aleutians. General
instead an attack against Midway and Sugiyama, Chief of the Army General
the western Aleutians. The Aleutians Staff, thought the plan overbold and
strike had already been discussed during opposed it, but the Navy was united.
March and the Army favored it. But Nagano, stoutly backed by Yamamoto,
Admiral Yamamoto who had first raised insisted that Midway must be taken and
the possibility of such an attack against if the Army refused to go along, the Navy
the Aleutians, regarded it as only one would have to act independently. After
part of a larger plan whose main objec- a brief struggle, General Sugiyama finally
tive was Midway. Admiral Nagano, gave in, influenced no doubt by Nagano's
Chief of the Navy General Staff, did not assurance that only a very small Army
raise that aspect of Yamamoto's plans in force, about one regiment, would be re-
the discussions with the Army planners. quired. On 5 May, before the Coral Sea
Apparently he was not convinced at this battle, Imperial General Headquarters
time of the wisdom of an attack against issued orders for the Midway-Aleutians
Midway, but Yamamoto soon brought operation, to take place early in June.
him around to his point of view. On 16 The New Caledonia-Fiji-Samoa opera-
April, Nagano issued orders calling for tion would be postponed until after
a simultaneous attack on Midway and the Midway and the western Aleutians had
Aleutians early in June, followed by the been occupied.26
New Caledonia-Fiji-Samoa operation. The decision of 5 May was, in a real
These orders were merely a statement sense, a victory for Admiral Yamamoto.
of naval intentions and would not be- In the five months since the start of the
come approved war plans until the Army 26
Hist of Army Sec, Imperial GHQ, pp. 48, 50;
gave its consent. But Nagano for some Aleutians Naval Opns, Mar 42-Feb 43, pp. 2, 5-6;
unexplained reason did not mention Midway Opns, pp. 3-5, 27, Japanese Studies in World
Midway during the debate over the in- War II, 53 and 96; Japanese Opns in SWPA, 124-25;
Interrog of Generals Tanaka and Arisue; Statements
of Admiral Tomioka and Colonel Hattori, Statements
25
See above, p. 217. of Japanese Officials, IV, 315, I, 331-32.
TRANSITION 279
war, the Combined Fleet had moved in those areas, establish operational bases
back and forth across the waters of the at Suva and Noumea, gain control of the
Pacific from Pearl Harbor to Ceylon, seas east of Australia, and strive to cut
destroying everything in its path. It had communications between Australia and
sunk 5 of the enemy's battleships, 1 air- the United States."28 Early July was the
craft carrier, 2 cruisers and 7 destroyers; date tentatively selected for the start of
damaged a number of capital ships; and these operations, provided that the fleet
destroyed thousands of tons of merchant was ready.
shipping and fleet auxiliaries. The cost General Hyakutake lost no time in
had been small: 3 of the carriers had lost getting ready. His total force consisted
heavily in planes and skilled pilots; 23 of about nine infantry battalions and
small naval vessels, of which the largest support would be furnished by the 2d
was a destroyer, and about 60 transports Fleet, with attached carriers, and the 11th
and merchant ships had been sunk. The Air Fleet. The South Seas Detachment,
time was ripe, Yamamoto firmly believed, scheduled to take New Caledonia, was
for a decisive blow. Pearl Harbor had to assemble at Rabaul in the latter part
only crippled the U.S. Pacific Fleet; the of June; the two detachments selected to
attack on Midway, by forcing Nimitz seize the Fijis and Samoa were to be
into a fleet engagement, would give the ready at Truk early in July. When these
Japanese an opportunity to destroy it.27 operations were concluded, the Japanese
The Battle of the Coral Sea did not would make a second try for Port
alter Yamamoto's views, though it meant Moresby.29
that the Shokaku and Zuikaku would Meanwhile Admiral Yamamoto had
not be available for the Midway opera- completed his plans for the Midway-
tion and that there would have to be Aleutians campaign. The Aleutians force
another try for Port Moresby. But that was built around the carriers Junyo and
was placed on the bottom of the list, to Ryujo and included, in addition to the
be made after New Caledonia, the Fijis, landing force, submarines to patrol the
and Samoa had been taken. Midway and west coast.30 For the Midway operation,
the Aleutians now had first priority and Yamamoto organized the most formi-
planning for them went forward rapidly. dable force the Japanese had assembled
Concurrently with the planning for since Pearl Harbor. The occupation
Midway and the Aleutians, the Army force numbered about 5,000 Army and
and Navy staff in Tokyo made prepara- Navy troops whose transports would be
tion for the operations which would fol- protected by a strong escort. The main
low, and on 18 May established the 17th body of the fleet with which Yamamoto
Army under Lt. Gen. Haruyoshi Hyaku- hoped to destroy the U.S. Pacific Fleet
take. His orders were to co-operate with comprised a carrier force of 4 large car-
the Combined Fleet in the capture of riers, the Akagi, Kaga, Hiryu, and Soryu,
New Caledonia, the Fijis, and Samoa, in 28
Imperial GHQ Army Order 19, 18 May 42, in
order to "destroy the main enemy bases Japanese Opns in SWPA, 125.
29
17thArmy Opns, I, pp. 4, 6; Statement of
27
Morison, The Rising Sun in the Pacific, pp. 285- Admiral Tomioka.
30
86, and Coral Sea, Midway and Submarine Action, One of the submarines stood off Seattle while one
pp.5. 74-76. of its planes scouted the harbor.
together with battleships, cruisers, de- next Japanese move. The Battle of the
stroyers, and auxiliaries; an attack force Coral Sea had barely closed when these
of 3 battleships, including the 60,000-ton intelligence sources revealed that the
Yamato, flagship of the expedition, a Japanese were collecting a large task
light carrier, tenders, miscellaneous ves- force in home waters for an operation
sels, and a screen of 16 submarines. scheduled for late May or June. Just
Yamamoto's plan was to open the cam- where the attack would come was not yet
paign on 3 June by an attack on Dutch known but Admiral King thought it
Harbor followed by the occupation of might be another attempt at Port Mores-
the western Aleutians. The carriers by or against New Caledonia and the
then would soften up Midway, while the Fijis.32
attack force, led by Yamamoto himself, In support of this view King could
would move in and finish off the Pacific turn to the estimate made by General
Fleet if it challenged the carriers. Finally, MacArthur some days earlier and with-
on the night of 6 June, the landing force out reference to intelligence sources.
would take Midway. But the success of The end of resistance in the Philippines
the plan depended, as Yamamoto well —the message was dated two days after
knew, on the defeat of the American the surrender of Corregidor—and the
fleet. So long as that fleet was intact, British defeat in Burma, MacArthur had
victory at Midway or in the Aleutians written, would probably release Jap-
would at best be a hollow one.31 anese forces for use elsewhere. Unlike
In the last week of May the Japanese the British who feared the Japanese
began moving into position. The Aleu- would move in force into the Indian
tians force left Japan first, followed on Ocean after the strike against Ceylon
27 May by the carriers, led by the same early in April, he thought the enemy
Admiral Nagumo who had commanded would probably strike against New
in the strike on Pearl Harbor. The next Guinea and the line of communications.
day the landing force, which had been Thus far he and King were in agree-
assembled at Saipan, completed loading ment, while the Army planners were
and sailed for the rendezvous point, ac- inclined to minimize the threat in the
companied by the covering cruisers and Pacific and side with the British. The
destroyers. The following morning (0600 Japanese, MacArthur pointed out, had
of the 29th), Admiral Yamamoto left the bases for an offensive in the Pacific
Tokyo Bay with the main body of the but not for large operations against
fleet. India. To guard against the next Jap-
Again, as in the Coral Sea, the Jap- anese attack, therefore, he recommended
anese found the American fleet waiting "adequate security for Australia and the
for them. As before, the warning had Pacific Area . . . followed at the earliest
come from intelligence sources which possible moment by offensive action or
had broken the Japanese codes and thus by at least a sufficiently dangerous initial
acquired advance information on the
32
Rad, Nimitz to King, No. 2347, 10 May 48, cited
in Hayes, The War Against Japan, ch. V, p 51;
31
Morison, Coral Sea, Midway and Submarine Memo, King for Marshall, 12 May 42, sub: Sit in
Actions, pp. 74-79, 87-90. SPA and SWPA, OPD Exec Files.
TRANSITION 281
threat of offensive action to affect the (64 aircraft) and 15 Army B-17's were
enemy's plans and dispositions."33 flown in at the end of May. With other
This estimate, when taken with intelli- reinforcements and exclusive of the
gence of Japanese concentrations, com- Marine air group, the air strength at
bined to produce in Washington a Midway by 3 June consisted of 30 PBY's,
change in plans. At the insistence of 4 B-26's, 17 B-17's, and 6 TBF's.36 In
Admiral King, Generals Marshall and the North Pacific, a task force of four
Arnold finally agreed to an increase in heavy cruisers and eight destroyers was
the air strength of New Caledonia and organized to meet the naval threat and
the Fijis, despite the earlier decision not all air elements in the area, including a
to do so. Heavy and medium bombers few B-17's that were rushed out, were
en route to Australia were to be diverted quickly mobilized for the defense of
to these two garrisons, together with an Alaska and the Aleutians.
antiaircraft regiment for the Fijis, to To meet the threat of the main force
come from the Hawaiian force. Mac- the Japanese fleet off Midway, Admiral
of
Arthur, it was realized, would probably Nimitz had only limited naval forces.
protest this diversion of his heavy bomb- The Lexington was gone, the Yorktown
ers, but Marshall and Arnold decided damaged. All the fleet's battleships were
they would meet that contingency when on the west coast. The Saratoga and
it arose.34 Wasp were on orders for the Pacific, but
Before this program of reinforcement were not scheduled to arrive until late
began, the Cryptanalysts learned that the June. Only the Enterprise and Hornet
enemy objectives would be Midway and (Task Force 16), lately returned from
the Aleutians.35 This information was the South Pacific after the Tokyo raid
immediately passed to Nimitz and Mac- and now commanded by Rear Adm.
Arthur, and orders went out to keep the Raymond A. Spruance during Halsey's
heavy and medium bombers scheduled hospitalization, were ready at Pearl Har-
for New Caledonia and the Fijis in bor on 26 May, the day Nagumo took his
Hawaii. The Marine garrison at Mid- carriers out of the Inland Sea. Next day
way was reinforced and began feverishly Fletcher brought his Yorktown force in
to prepare the ground defenses of the and the repair crews at Pearl performed
island against invasion. The Marine air the miracle of getting it ready for action
group there was brought up to strength in about two days. Thus Nimitz had at
the end of the month a force of 3 carriers,
33
Rad, MacArthur to Marshall, No. 176, 8 May 42, 1 light and 7 heavy cruisers, 13 destroy-
OPD Msg File. ers, and 25 submarines. On 2 June these
34
Memos, King for Marshall, 12 May 42, sub: Sit in
SPA and SWPA; Marshall for Eisenhower, same date, vessels rendezvoused at a point 350 miles
both in OPD Exec Files; Marshall for King, 13 May northeast of Midway, where Admiral
42, sub: Sit in South Pacific, OPD 381 Australia; Rad, Fletcher assumed command of the entire
King to Nimitz, No. 2410, 13 May 42, OPD 381 PTO
sec. 1 case 22. force. Next day the fleet was waiting
35
Rads, Emmons to Marshall, 16 May 42, CM-IN- 200 miles north of Midway for the ap-
5477; Nimitz to King, No. 0639, 14 May 42, ABC 381 pearance of the enemy. Fletcher's orders
(1-22-42 sec. 2) Pacific Bases; Memo, King for
Marshall, 18 May 42, sub: Hawaiian and Alaskan
36
Defenses, OPD Exec Files. Craven and Cate, AAF I, 455-56.
were to avoid a surface engagement with tion since the beginning of the war."40
the more powerful Japanese fleet and to Since the enemy's intentions were known,
seek a decision by air action.37 he thought the "Indian and Atlantic
Meanwhile, the Seventh Air Force in Oceans should be temporarily stripped
Hawaii had been making its own prepa- in order to concentrate in sufficient force
rations for the battle. On the 18th the for this special occasion." Failure to do
air force had been placed on a special this, he warned, might well result in
alert and thereafter intensified its search "such disasters and a crisis of such pro-
missions. In the days that followed, Maj. portions" as the United States had never
Gen. Clarence L. Tinker, commander of before faced.
the Seventh Air Force, received a steady General Marshall was away on an in-
stream of reinforcements and by the end spection of the west coast defenses when
of the month had in commission 44 MacArthur's message came in and it
B-17's, 4 B-18's, and 101 P-40's, with went to Admiral King for reply. Appar-
more planes arriving almost daily.38 ently King saw merit in MacArthur's
But these measures did not satisfy proposal, for he himself suggested next
General MacArthur, who was still con- day that the British Far Eastern Fleet be
cerned over the security of Australia and moved up to Colombo in Ceylon and
asking for reinforcements, including air- that the Pacific Fleet be reinforced with
craft carriers. In justification, Marshall carriers, battleships, cruisers, and de-
carefully explained the reasons for this stroyers from the Atlantic. At the same
concentration at Midway, pointing out time he recommended that the move-
the enemy was "endeavoring to maneuver ment of aircraft to the Pacific be given
our Pacific Fleet out of position... . The priority "even over BOLERO." 41 These
future of Australia will hinge on our proposals struck at the heart of the deci-
preliminary deployment to meet this sion of 6 May to limit Pacific reinforce-
situation and our countermoves." 39 ments to aircraft already authorized,42
Should the Japanese move against Aus- and evoked from the Army planners
tralia instead of Midway, Marshall strong opposition. General McNarney,
assured his former chief, then the rein- acting for Marshall in his absence, imme-
forcements diverted to Hawaii "will diately informed his chief of this newest
immediately be dispatched to your assist- development, but withheld official reply
ance." "Your needs," he went on, "are until Marshall's return on 27 May. The
being given every consideration possible Chief of Staff was willing to support
in light of developing situation." King's plan for naval reinforcements,
MacArthur took quick advantage of but, like McNarney, opposed the alloca-
this opportunity to point out again that tion of additional aircraft to the Pacific,
"lack of seapower in the Pacific is and or, as a matter of fact, any move that
has been the fatal weakness in our posi- would interfere with the build-up for
37
Morison, Coral Sea, Midway and Submarine
40
Actions, pp. 81-82, 97; Ltr, Spruance to Hoover, Rad, MacArthur to Marshall, No. 119, 23 May
17 Jul 59, OCMH. 42, CM-IN-6409.
38 41
Craven and Cate, AAF I, 454-55. Memo, King for Marshall, 24 May 42, sub: Sit
39
Rad, Marshall to MacArthur, No. 109, 22 May in Pacific, WDCSA, SWPA.
42
OPD 381 Gen, sec. 1. See above, p. 222.
TRANSITION 283
BOLERO.43 This answer did not satisfy landings in the western Aleutians, at
Admiral King or meet MacArthur's and Attu and Kiska, on 7 June.44
Nimitz' demands for reinforcements of At Midway the Japanese had met dis-
the Pacific, but there the matter rested aster. Sighted on 3 June by one of the
until the crisis presented by the Japanese Midway search planes, the occupation
move against Midway and the Aleutians force had come under attack from B-17's
had been met. later in the day but had escaped. That
The Japanese, blissfully unaware of night PBY's equipped with radar at-
the reception being prepared for them, tacked again, this time hitting one of the
were meanwhile closing in on their ob- tankers and strafing the transports. But
jectives. Far to the north, under cover of this was only a preliminary to the real
heavy fog and rough weather, the Aleu- battle that came the next day when Ad-
tians force had by the 3d of June reached miral Nagumo's carrier force, which had
a point about 180 miles southwest of already discharged its planes for the
Dutch Harbor, from where the Junyo attack, was discovered to the northwest
and Ryujo sent their planes aloft. of the island. B-17's, B-26's, and
Though alerted the day before when a Marine planes were already aloft and
PBY had spotted the two carriers, the these sped to the scene while the remain-
aircraft at Dutch Harbor had been unable ing aircraft on Midway as well as those
to locate the enemy and forestall the on the three American carriers made
strike that followed. In addition to the ready to take off. When the Japanese
damage to barracks and installations, the aircraft, seventy-two bombers and thirty-
Americans lost about twenty-five men. six fighters, moved in to the attack they
Next day the weather was worse but the met a warm reception. Badly Hit, the
Japanese, now less than 100 miles away, Japanese nevertheless managed to inflict
struck again at Dutch Harbor, this time severe damage before they made their
with more effect. But they did not get escape.45
away unscathed; they lost five planes out Meanwhile, the Japanese carriers had
of twenty-six to P-40's from Umnak. come under heavy attack from the
While the Junyo and Ryujo planes Americans. Bunched together, the Akagi,
were striking Dutch Harbor, American Kaga, and Soryu proved vulnerable tar-
aircraft were groping in the fog and mist gets and all were fatally hit. The Soryu
for the enemy carriers. A PBY sighted was dealt the last blow by the submarine
the Japanese force at 0845 of the 4th, but Nautilus and went down at 1610; the
it was not until midafternoon that any of Kaga joined her a few minutes later, and
the bombers were able to locate the tar- that evening the Akagi, which had been
get. And when they did they had to 44
Craven and Cate, AAF I, 462-70; Morison, Coral
bomb almost blind through the fog. By Sea, Midway and Submarine Actions, pp. 175-85.
45
this time the carriers had completed their The B-17's bombed one of the surfaced Amer-
ican submarines by mistake, but, fortunately, missed
task and were already withdrawing to a the target. General Emmons apologized to Admiral
point from where they could screen the Nimitz for the error and asked him what should
be done. "Have your air commander meet the sub
43
Rad, McNarney to Marshall, No. 1096, 24 May on arrival at Pearl Harbor," replied Admiral Nimitz,
42, AG 381 (5-24-42); Memo, Marshall for King, "and invite the crew to have a drink." Ltr, Emmons
n.d, sub: Sit in Pacific, OPD 381 PTO sec. 1. to Hoover, 10 Jul 59, OCMH.
set afire and was burning fiercely, was take's plans for the seizure, early in July,
abandoned. Nagumo's fourth carrier, the of New Calednoia, the Fijis, and Samoa.
Hiryu, launched its own attack on York- Four days after the battle ended, on 11
town, dealt her a lethal blow, and then June, Imperial General Headquarters
was herself hit by dive bombers from the postponed the operations for two months
other two American carriers. Like the and later canceled them altogther.47 The
Akagi, the Hiryu was set afire and finally capture of Port Moresby was now more
abandoned on the morning of the 5th. urgent than ever to meet the threat of
The fate of the Japanese carriers de- counterattack from Australia. An am-
cided the issue. Yamamoto's vain effort phibious operation was no longer possi-
on the night of the 5th to snatch victory ble, however, and Imperial General
from defeat by an attack against the Headquarters canceled the project at the
island was a measure of desperation and same time it called off the New Caledo-
only resulted in fresh disaster. Two of nia-Fiji-Samoa operation. But it did
his cruisers collided and had to retire, not give up the idea of taking Port
only to be hit the next day by planes Moresby. Instead it directed Hyakutake
from the Enterprise and Hornet. One to make plans for an overland drive from
was sunk and the other badly damaged. the east coast of New Guinea across the
Yamamoto's main body—the battleship towering Owen Stanley Range. On the
division, three destroyer divisions, and basis of this order and a naval survey for
the Aleutians force—was still intact and, airfield sites, General Hyakutake ordered
in a final effort to destroy the Pacific Horii, the South Seas Detachment com-
Fleet, Yamamoto sought to lure Admiral mander, to land at Buna and reconnoiter
Spruance into a trap off Wake Island. the land route for an advance on Port
But Spruance, though tempted, refused Moresby. Finally, on 11 July, a month
to take the bait. By the afternoon of the after it had canceled a seaborne invasion
7th Yamamoto knew his last hope was of Port Moresby, Imperial General Head-
gone and started for home. The sur- quarters gave its blessing to this new
prise he had hoped to achieve had been scheme for an overland attack. Ten days
gained by the enemy instead; he had later the Japanese landed at Buna.48
been outmaneuvered, outsmarted, and, For the period between mid-March,
worst of all, had lost four carriers with the high-water mark of Japanese expan-
their planes and pilots, the main striking sion, and late July the Japanese had
force of the Combined Fleet. It was a precious little to show for their efforts
blow from which the Japanese fleet never other than a victory, already assured, in
fully recovered.48 the Philippines. They had acquired a
This disaster, the full extent of which seaplane base at Tulagi on 3 May and
was concealed from the Japanese public, soon thereafter began building an air-
had a decisive effect on General Hyaku- strip on the neighboring island of Gua-
dalcanal. A month later they had seized
46
For the naval side of the battle, see Morison,
Coral Sea, Midway and Submarine Actions, 101-55; 47
Imperial GHQ, Navy Order 20, 11 Jul 42; Japa-
for the Air Forces account, Craven and Cate, AAF I, nese Opns in SWPA, 129.
48
456-62. The author used these accounts as well as For a full account of these plans and the opera-
many of the sources cited in both works. tions that followed see Milner, Victory in Papua.
TRANSITION 285
BATTLE OF MIDWAY. Japanese heavy cruiser of the Mogami class after being bombed by
carrier-based aircraft.
two islands in the bleak Aleutians, and these losses were replaced and the super-
then a beachhead at Buna from where iority lost at Midway regained, as it
they hoped to launch an attack against never could be in a race against Ameri-
Port Moresby. The cost of these scat- can production, the Japanese would have
tered holdings in planes, trained pilots, to go on the strategic defensive. The
and carriers had been enormous. Until tide of victory had finally turned.
PART THREE
SEIZING THE INITIATIVE
The passage from the defensive to the offensive is one of the most delicate
operations of war.
NAPOLEON, Maxims
In war, the only sure defense is the offense.

GENERAL PATTON
CHAPTER XIII
Planning the Offensive

Strategy is a system of expedients. It is more than knowledge; it is the
application of knowledge to practical life, the art of action under the
most trying circumstances.
VON MOLTKE
Though the decisive and far-reaching tion that could be undertaken with the
effects of the victory at Midway were not limited forces available and within the
immediately apparent, it was clear that accepted strategic concept for the Pacific
the Allies had temporarily gained the but which would produce more enduring
initiative in the Pacific. For the first results than earlier raids and strikes.
time since the outbreak of war, they Availability of forces and the direction
were in a favorable position to take the of the Japanese advance rather than
offensive. abstract strategic calculations ultimately
The prewar decision to concentrate determined the choice of Allied objec-
Allied resources on the defeat of Ger- tives. The Midway victory had ensured
many and to pursue a defensive strategy the security of Hawaii, and, in any case,
in the Pacific—confirmed more than once the fleet was not yet strong enough for
since 7 December—did not preclude of- an advance across the Central Pacific.
fensive action in this secondary theater. So that possibility was ruled out. Simi-
RAINBOW 5 provided for limited offen- larly, an advance by way of the Aleutians,
sives by the Pacific Fleet, and the Navy, where the danger was considered remote
once the shock of Pearl Harbor had and the possibility of strategic gain small,
worn off, showed no inclination to inter- was discarded. Only in the South and
pret the strategic defensive as a mandate Southwest Pacific was the danger real
for inaction. Under the leadership of and imminent. There the Japanese had
King and Nimitz, the Navy sought advanced along the New Guinea coast
eagerly and willingly every opportunity and down the Solomons ladder until in
to strike at the enemy whenever and May they reached Tulagi. And though
wherever possible. Perforce, these oper- frustrated in their attempt to take Port
ations, conducted with small forces, were Moresby, there was little likelihood that
largely hit-and-run affairs which had lit- they would abandon altogether their
tle more than nuisance value. Stronger effort to gain control of Papua, and with
measures were called for if the victory it of the Coral Sea and Torres Strait.
gained at Midway was to be exploited. Should they succeed, and should they
The problem was to settle on an opera- be allowed to retain control of the south-
ern Solomons, then Australia and the The Army planners wanted to establish
line of communications would be in a line that could be held with minimum
jeopardy. Thus, the choice of objectives forces, and generally opposed large rein-
quickly narrowed down to an operation forcements to the defense of this line
in the southern Solomons. The removal unless vital American interests were in-
of the threat there was clearly an volved. Short of such a challenge, they
objective of the first importance. (Map 4) were willing apparently to accept the
Offensive action in the Solomons was loss of territory rather than divert to
attractive for other reasons also. Not the Pacific the resources allocated to the
only was it believed that such an opera- war against Germany.
tion would fall within the capabilities of The naval planners never fully
the Allied forces en route or already in accepted this view, even when it was
the theater, but, more important, that indorsed by the President, and were will-
it would open the path for a drive on ing to risk the delay of BOLERO in order
Rabaul, the major Japanese base in the to hold the Pacific. Firmly and with
South Pacific. The capture or neutrali- conviction they consistently argued that
zation of that base, only 700 miles from until such time as the all-out offensive
Truk and the focal point of the Japa- against Japan could begin, the United
nese advance southward, would make it States must maintain and improve its
possible for the Allies to support a drive strategic position in the Pacific while
later across the Central Pacific and to taking every opportunity to strike at the
initiate an offensive that would bring enemy to prevent him from becoming
the forces of MacArthur and Nimitz so firmly entrenched that it would be
back to the Philippines. Once there extremely difficult to dislodge him.1 It
they could cut the Japanese off from the was this view that prompted Admiral
strategic resources to the south and make King to instruct Nimitz shortly after
ready to storm the citadel of Japan itself, the Pearl Harbor attack to extend his
if that should prove necessary. operations westward toward the Fijis and
to undertake raids and limited offensives
Early Plans wherever possible.2
The desirability of offensive action in
The Navy, with its traditional interest New Guinea and the Solomons became
in the Pacific, took the lead early in the apparent early in February after the
war in the development of plans to meet Japanese began to move southward from
the immediate Japanese threat and en- Rabaul. The necessity for defensive
sure ultimate victory. Like their Army measures was still paramount, but the
colleagues, the naval planners believed Navy, in recommending the establish-
that before an all-out offensive against
Japan could be undertaken it would be 1
necessary to build American defenses in found The clearest statement of the naval view is tobe
in Memo, King for JCS, 4 May 42, sub: Defense
the Pacific and assemble large forces of Island Bases, JCS 48; the Army view in Memo
there. It was in the application of this WPD for CofS, 28 Feb 42, sub: Strategic Conception
principle, in timing and in the alloca- . .2 See. , OPD Exec Files.
above, p. 205; Hayes, The War Against Japan
tion of resources, that differences arose. ch. VI, p. 2.
PLANNING THE OFFENSIVE 291
MAP 4
ment of an outpost at Funafuti in the their approval to the Funafuti project

Ellice Islands, did not fail to point out on 16 March.
that the island could also serve as a base While this project was still under dis-
for future offensive operations. The cussion, Admiral King, it will be re-
Army planners opposed this measure, called, had proposed on 18 February that
arguing that until the United States was bases be established also at Efate in the
ready to open a sustained offensive "our New Hebrides and Tongatabu. Offered
island commitments should be limited primarily as a defensive measure to secure
to those necessary to secure our routes Australia and the line of communica-
to critical areas." Every additional gar- tions, the proposal to establish a base
rison, General Gerow pointed out, at Efate, like that for Funafuti, carried
meant the further diversion of air and clearly the implication of an early offen-
ground forces and the use of critical sive in the area. This implication was
shipping.3 The Joint Chiefs finally gave not lost on the Army planners and was
3
confirmed some weeks later when Admi-
Memo, Gerow for CofS, 10 Feb 42, sub: Advance
Base in Ellice Islands, and related papers in ABC ral King explained, in support of his
81 Ellice Is (2-5-42). proposal, that current naval strategy
included a drive northwest from bases Japanese in the South China Sea. "Such
("strongpoints," he called them) in the a line of operations," King told the Pres-
New Hebrides through the Solomons ident, "will be offensive rather than pas-
and New Guinea to the Bismarck Archi- sive—and will draw Japanese forces
pelago. A garrison at Efate, therefore, there to oppose it, thus relieving pressure
would serve the double purpose of pro- elsewhere."5
tecting the line of communication and This victory for the naval point of
providing a spring-board for a "step-by- view was only one round in the long
step general advance." Marine forces, debate over BOLERO versus Pacific pri-
King thought, would make the landing orities which ended temporarily in early
and capture each position after which May with the President's decision in
Army troops could move in to occupy favor of BOLERO.6 But while this debate
the islands, thus relieving the marines was in progress, the Navy staff continued
for the next step forward.4 to develop plans for an offensive in the
Not only did Admiral King's exposi- Pacific. By 16 April it had produced a
tion of naval strategy fail to evoke any plan which called for an offensive in
objection from the Army planners who four stages or phases. The first, already
had only a short time before expressed in progress, was the one in which the
strong views on the subject, but within Allies would build up their forces and
a few days it received the powerful secure positions in the South and South-
sanction of Presidential approval. At a west Pacific for an offensive, while en-
White House meeting on 5 March deal- gaging in minor action against the enemy
ing, among other matters, with the im- "for purposes of attrition." The next
pending loss of Java and the security phase of the Navy plan consisted of the
of the line of communication to Austra- New Guinea-Solomons operations al-
lia, Roosevelt made it clear that Aus- ready described by Admiral King. Also
tralia and New Zealand would have to called for in this period were "heavy
be held and that the Navy's concept of attrition attacks" against Japanese bases
operations in the Pacific would prevail. in the Carolines and Marshalls, a move
The President's understanding of the that would inaugurate the long-delayed
Navy's concept was based on a memo- Central Pacific offensive envisaged in
randum King had written for him. In the old ORANGE plan. This offensive
it the admiral had repeated substan- would reach more formidable propor-
tially the same points he had made to tions in the third phase of the Navy
Marshall in defense of the Efate pro- plan, when both the Carolines and Mar-
posal—the establishment of strongpoints shalls would be captured and converted
along the line of communications and into advanced naval and air bases. From
an advance into the Solomons and New these newly won positions as well as
Guinea similar to the one made by the those gained in the Bismarck Archipel-
4 5
Memo, King for Marshall, 2 Mar 42, sub: Estab- Memo, King for Pres, 5 Mar 42, no sub, ABC
lishment of Garrisons at Efate and Tongatabu, ABC 323.31 (1-29-42 sec. 1A) POA; See also Mins, White
381 (3-2-42). See also Memo, Marshall for King, 24 House Mtg, 5 Mar 42, CCS 031 (3-5-42); Hayes, The
Feb 42, same sub, OPD Exec Files; JCS Mins, 2 Mar War Against Japan, ch. VI, pp. 7-8; Morison, Coral
42. For the occupation of Efate and Tongatabu, see Sea, Midway and Submarine Actions, pp. 146-47.
6
above, ch. IX. See above, p. 222.
TRAINING ON AUSTRALIAN BEACHES for assault operations.
ago during the second phase, the Allies Such an operation, Nimitz told Mac-
would then advance into the Nether- Arthur, would accomplish two results:
lands Indies or the Philippines, "which- It would throw the enemy off balance
ever offers the most promising and at a moment when he was preparing
enduring results."7 Beyond that point a major blow in a distant area; and it
the naval planners did not go. would blunt his drive southward toward
Nothing was done about this naval the New Hebrides and New Caledonia.8
plan at the time; Coral Sea and Midway With the objectives of this bold
fully occupied the Navy's attention. But, maneuver, General MacArthur was en-
interestingly enough, among the meas- tirely in sympathy. Unfortunately, he
ures proposed to meet the danger at explained, he did not have the forces
Midway was one from Admiral Nimitz to support such a move or to ensure the
to General MacArthur for a landing at permanent occupation of the island,
Tulagi by the 1st Marine Raider Battal- which was in his area, once it was taken.
ion, then in Samoa, supported by the But he did have, he told General Mar-
naval forces of the Southwest Pacific. shall, his own plans for an offensive in
7
the Solomons and suggested that, until
Memo, WPD (Navy) for COMINCH, 16 Apr 42,
8
sub: Pacific Ocean Campaign Plan, cited in Hayes, Rad, Nimitz to MacArthur, No. 0351, 28 May 42,
The War Against Japan, ch. VI, pp. 7-8. cited in Hayes, The War Against Japan, ch. VI, p. 11.
such time as he was ready to put them under MacArthur's direction. "All deci-
into effect, Admiral Nimitz might well sions, including the extent to which you
assist him by using his forces in the South accede to any further proposals by
Pacific for a push northward through the CINCPAC [Nimitz]," he assured his for-
New Hebrides to the Santa Cruz group mer chief on 1 June, "rest with you."11
east of the southern Solomons.9 If this was the case the Navy appar-
Admiral King, too, thought Nimitz' ently did not know it. At the same time
scheme impractical and recommended Marshall was reassuring MacArthur,
that he employ his forces in raids against Admiral Nimitz was telling Ghormley
whatever worthwhile objectives he could that he would continue to control ele-
find in the area. Under no circum- ments of the South Pacific force, even
stances, King warned Nimitz, should he when they were operating in the South-
engage in any operations that would west Pacific Area.12 Thus, the Navy
involve the permanent occupation of a served notice that it would retain con-
base without first getting approval from trol of the forces required for amphibi-
Washington. MacArthur would not ous operations, and therefore of the
even concede the advisability of raids. operations themselves, wherever they oc-
The Japanese, he pointed out, had a curred. The Army for its part made it
full regiment at Tulagi and could, from equally clear that the theater commander
Rabaul, send troops into the southern was the supreme authority in his own
Solomons a good deal faster than the area, and, once an operation was ap-
Americans.10 proved and the forces assigned, would
General Marshall, to whom MacArthur control those forces and command the
had forwarded Nimitz' proposal, agreed operation.
that the time had not yet come for an
offensive. But, he reported to Mac- Strategy and Command
Arthur, the Navy was "impressed with
the possibilities of an early attack" on Plans for an early offensive in the
Tulagi and would try to assemble the Pacific received their greatest impetus
forces required. Though the question from the victory at Midway. The smoke
of command had not been raised, Mar- of battle had scarcely cleared when Gen-
shall assured the Southwest Pacific com- eral MacArthur took the center of the
mander, who might have wondered why stage with an urgent appeal for an imme-
the Navy should be seeking forces for diate offensive to exploit the opportunity
an operation in his area, that if such presented by the Japanese defeat. What
an assault was undertaken, it would be he had in mind was not a raid on little
Tulagi but a full-scale assault against
9
Rads, MacArthur to Nimitz, 29 May 42; Mac- New Britain and New Ireland to gain
Arthur to Marshall, Nos. 840 and 217, 28 May and 2 control of Rabaul and the strategic Bis-
Jun 42, CM-IN-8352 and 0469; Memo, Marshall for
King, 6 Jun 42, sub: Early Attacks on Japanese Bases,
marck Archipelago. If his superiors in
OPD 381 (PTO) case 41.
10 11
Rad, MacArthur to Marshall, No. 217, 2 Jun 42, Rad, Marshall to MacArthur, No. 161, 1 Jun 42,
CM-IN-0469, contains the text of King's message CM-OUT-0095.
12
to Nimitz of 1 June; Rad, King to Nimitz, No. 0100, Instr, Nimitz to Ghormley, 1 Jun 42, copy in
1 Jun 42, WDCSA Files, SWPA (6-3-42). WDCSA files, SWPA (6-1-42).
Washington would give him, in addition the Bismarck Archipelago, the planners
to the three divisions he already had, recognized, would have to be preceded
a division trained for amphibious opera- by intensive air bombardment of the
tions (presumably marines) and the two enemy's bases in New Guinea and the
carriers he had asked for so often, he was Solomons. Only in this way could air
ready, he announced, to move out imme- support for the invasion force, an indis-
diately. With confidence, he predicted pensable condition for success, be as-
he would quickly recapture the Bis- sured. But where would the aircraft
marcks and force the Japanese back to come from: B-17's could reach any tar-
Truk, 700 miles away, thus winning get in the area, but the Allies had no
"manifold strategic advantages both de- fields within fighter range of Rabaul.
fensive and offensive" and making "fur- Carrier aircraft was the answer and the
ther potential exploitation immediately planners asserted that three carriers with
possible."13 necessary escorts would have to be pro-
The initial reaction in Washington to vided, as well as the B-17's from Hawaii.
MacArthur's characteristically bold plan The landing itself, the planners stated,
was favorable. The Navy already had could be made by the amphibiously
plans of its own for operations in the trained 1st Marine Division, which, it
Solomons, which, though more limited was estimated, could be ready in Aus-
in scope, had similar objectives. The tralia by 5 July. Once Rabaul was
Army was also considering an offensive, taken, it could be garrisoned by Army
and General Marshall, only a few days troops already in Australia—the 32d and
earlier, had directed his planners to study 41st U.S. Divisions and the 7th Austral-
the problems posed by operations in the ian—and the area cut off reduced at
New Britain-New Ireland area, assum- leisure. On the touchiest question of
ing the use of a Marine division and two all — command — the planners recom-
carriers.14 Thus, during the days that mended that the operation be placed
followed, the Army and Navy planners under General MacArthur with a naval
to whom was entrusted the task of study- officer in tactical control of the assault
ing MacArthur's proposals were able to force.15
reach substantial agreement on the out- Agreement on the planning level was
lines for an offensive in the Southwest no assurance that Admiral King, who
Pacific. was in favor of an offensive but under
The plan developed in Washington different conditions, would accept this
called, like MacArthur's, for a quick plan. That General Marshall expected
campaign against Rabaul. Landings in opposition is evident in his warning to
MacArthur, in reference to the aircraft
13
Rad, MacArthur to Marshall, No. 913, 8 Jun 42, carriers required for the operation, not
CM-IN-2264. The development of plans for the to take any action until he, Marshall,
offensive after Midway is treated also in Matloff and
Snell, Strategic Planning, 1941-42, pp. 258-267, and had had an opportunity "to break ground
John Miller, jr., Guadalcanal: The First Offensive,
15
UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II Memo, Marshall for King, 12 Jun 42, sub: Opns
(Washington, 1949), pp. 8-21. in SWPA; Memo, Street for Ritchie, 23 Jun 42, sub:
14
Rad, Marshall to MacArthur, 10 Jun 42, CM- Offensive Operations in SWPA, OPD 381 (SWPA)
OUT-2319. case 73 and 80.
with Navy and British. . . ." "I compre- control should be in his headquarters.18
hend fully the extreme delicacy of your The naval position was based on the
position," replied MacArthur, "and the concept that amphibious operations
complex difficulties that you face should be under naval command. But
there."16 behind this view was Admiral King's
Neither the effort to secure aircraft reluctance to give MacArthur any of
carriers for MacArthur from the Navy the Navy's precious aircraft carriers, and
and the British nor the strategic concept with them the battleships, cruisers, de-
of the plan was the main issue in the stroyers, and auxiliaries that would be
debate which ensued. It was the fight needed for their support.19 On that
over command that became the crucial point he was adamant and not once
question. Admiral King struck the first during the war did MacArthur ever have
blow when he remarked to Marshall any large carriers under his command.
almost as soon as he learned about Mac- Although the naval planners, with
Arthur's plan that the forthcoming offen- their Army colleagues, looked with favor
sive would be "primarily of a naval and on MacArthur's plan and thought to
amphibious character"—and therefore, solve the command problem by placing
by implication, should be under naval the operation under a naval task force
command.17 Marshall ignored this re- commander subject to MacArthur's con-
mark. The success of any operation trol, they were unable to win over their
against the Japanese stronghold in the immediate superior, Rear Adm. Charles
Bismarck Archipelago, he asserted, de- M. Cooke, Chief of the Navy War Plans
pended on speed and close co-operation Division, or Admiral King. The plan-
between the Army and Navy forces in- ners, these two believed, had placed too
volved. After enumerating these forces much reliance on air power. The ene-
—including the carriers—he declared my's bases in New Guinea and the Solo-
that a quick decision and unity of commons, both King and Cooke asserted,
mand were the essential prerequisites could not be knocked out entirely by
to success. Further delay might wreck bombing, and until they were it would
the entire project. be foolhardy to send aircraft carriers
Everyone agreed on the desirability of into the area, within the range of Japa-
the operation and the need for speed. nese land-based aircraft. It would be
But MacArthur, staunchly supported by safer, they argued, to go slowly and
the Chief of Staff, insisted that it be by stages up the Solomons to Rabaul,
under Army command; King and his eliminating the enemy's bases and air
senior advisers that it be under naval power as they went along.20
command. MacArthur's argument was When MacArthur learned of the ob-
a geographic one. Since the objectives jections to his proposal he quickly shifted
were in his area, he declared, operational 18
Rad, MacArthur to Marshall, No. 16, 18 Jun 42.
19
Hayes, The War Against Japan, ch. VI, p. 15.
16 20
Rads, Marshall to MacArthur, 10 Jun 42, CM- Memo, Ritchie for Street, 23 Jun 42, sub: Offen-
OUT-2319; MacArthur to Marshall, 11 Jun 42, CM- sive Opns in SWPA, OPD 381 (SWPA) case 80; Rad,
IN-3328. Marshall to MacArthur, No. 277, 23 Jun 42, CM-
17
Memo, King for Marshall, 11 Jun 42, sub: Mac- OUT-5704; Hayes, The War Against Japan, ch. VI,
Arthur Dispatch of 8 Jun 42, WDCSA File (SWPA). pp. 15-16.
ground. Admiral King, he protested, against Rabaul but, with their naval
had misunderstood his plan and was colleagues, had found it entirely accept-
laboring under a misapprehension.21 In able and superior to the much slower
his original message, he said, he had process of attacking successively Tulagi
purposely sketched only the broad out- and other Japanese bases in the Solo-
lines of the plan and deliberately omit- mons and New Guinea before assaulting
ted the preliminary steps of an invasion Rabaul. To do that, the Army planners
of Rabaul. Certainly, he agreed, it would pointed out, would expose Allied forces
be necessary to gain positions in the Solo- to continuous attack from Rabaul during
mons and along the north coast of New each stage of the advance. MacArthur's
Guinea before committing any forces in original plan they thought superior to
the Bismarck area. He had never had King's for it avoided that danger and,
any other idea. in addition, eliminated the necessity for
But on the matter of command Mac- taking many preliminary positions.
Arthur would not yield. Repeating the These, the planners believed, would fall
now-familiar arguments for placing the of their own weight once Rabaul was
operation under his general direction he, seized.23
like General Marshall, contended that Actually, no one had misunderstood
"the very purpose of establishment of MacArthur, as is clear from the detailed
the Southwest Pacific Area was to obtain plans prepared in his headquarters at
unity of command." The point was this time. His objectives were the same
doubly emphasized by his protest, at the as King's, but there were important dif-
same time, to the procedure followed by ferences in emphasis and timing. Mac-
Admiral King in sending instructions on Arthur, it is true, admitted the necessity
operational matters directly to Admiral of capturing intermediate positions in
Leary, the commander of naval forces New Guinea and the Solomons, a step
in the Southwest Pacific. Correct proce- King asserted was an essential condition
dure would have been for King to for- to the advance on Rabaul. But King
ward these instructions to Marshall, as placed much more emphasis than Mac-
executive agent for the Joint Chiefs, who Arthur on the capture of Tulagi and
would in turn send them to MacArthur adjacent positions, and envisaged a much
for Leary. Failure to follow the regular slower advance than did the South-
channels, MacArthur pointed out, made west Pacific commander. MacArthur's
"a mockery" of the concept of unity of TULSA I plan, completed on 27 June,
command, and of the organization estab- three days after his second message, pro-
lished for the Pacific less than three vided for the seizure of Rabaul in about
months earlier.22 two weeks, including the time required
If Admiral King had misunderstood for the occupation of bases along the
his plan, as MacArthur claimed, so, too, way. Obviously this plan, which never
had the Army planners. Not only had went to Washington, could hardly be
they construed it as a quick blow directly characterized as a step-by-step advance
21
such as King had in mind. Even the
Rad, MacArthur to Marshall, No. 248, 24 Jun 42,
23
CM-IN-7976. OPD Memo, 22 Jun 42, sub: Estimate SWPA
22
Ibid. Offensive, 381 OPD (SWPA) sec. 2.
Despite the significant differences be-

tween MacArthur's concept of operations
and that of Admiral King, it was assumed
in Washington that the debate over strat-
egy had been settled. The only issue
remaining was that of command and on
that Admiral Cooke, the Chief of the
Navy War Plans Division, would not
give way. To all appeals from his own
and the Army planners, Cooke turned
a deaf ear. The Navy, he insisted, must
command and the logical solution was
to turn the operation over to Admiral
Ghormley, commander of the South
Pacific Area. Finally, on 24 June, Gen-
eral Handy made one last effort to per-
suade his naval opposite number to go
along with the recommendation of the
planners. But Cooke stood firm and
GENERAL HANDY Handy had to report that he had made
no progress whatever and that the Navy
planning officers on MacArthur's staff would not consent to MacArthur's con-
thought the timing of TULSA too rapid, trol. "Cooke," he told Marshall, "was
and recommended revision. The second very emphatic and stated that he was
draft of the plan, therefore, completed expressing Admiral King's decision as
on 1 July, provided for a slower sched- well as his own view."25 The issue,
ule, but one which hardly met the objec- Handy concluded, would have to be
tion. Rabaul was now to be taken in settled between King and Marshall. He
eighteen days instead of the fourteen could do no more.
originally allocated, and this time the Admiral King had not only made up
plan called for an airborne operation— his mind, but before the day was out
though there were no paratroopers in had taken it on himself to direct Nimitz
Australia—and the seizure of Buna as to make ready for the forthcoming
a staging point for the assault against operations. This alert, sent without con-
Lae and Salamaua. Just how these sulting Marshall and at a time when
places, as well as others, would be taken operations themselves were still under
and developed into forward air bases discussion, took the form of a draft
in time to support the final attack on directive from the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Rabaul—all in less than eighteen days— Though the directive, King explained,
was not explained in the plan. Nor did set forth only "contemplated" arrange-
General Chamberlin, MacArthur's G-3, ments, it made perfectly clear his views
yet know the answer.24
25
Memo, Handy for Marshall, 24 Jun 42, sub: Opns
24
Extracts of TULSA I and II are in OCMH. in SWPA, OPD 381 (SWPA) case 76.
On the assumption that there was no

real difference between MacArthur's and
King's concept of the offensive, Marshall
restricted his comments to the Navy's
arrangements for command. These he
found neither practical nor logical. In
an appeal for a genuine acceptance of
the principle of unity of command he
asked King to reconsider. He appreci-
ated fully, he wrote, the Navy's concern
for the safety of its vessels and the great
difficulty of co-ordinating land, sea, and
air action, but he suggested that these
objections to Army command might be
eliminated if the Joint Chiefs defined
the manner in which naval forces were
employed and the waters in which they
would operate. The "lines drawn on a
map"—the geographical argument for
ADMIRAL COOKE
MacArthur's command—Marshall con-
ceded, should not govern the choice of
on how the offensive should be con- commander, but he felt, nevertheless,
ducted, and by whom. Nimitz would that the operation which "is almost en-
command; that was categorically stated. tirely in the Southwest Pacific Area and
For the offensive he would have not is designed to add to the security of that
only his own and Ghormley's forces, but area," should be entrusted to MacArthur.
also aircraft, ships, and submarines from He and his staff, including Admiral
MacArthur's Southwest Pacific Area. Leary, had been in the Southwest Pacific
The Army, in King's plan, would have for months, Marshall pointed out, dur-
no share in the assault; its role would ing which time they had learned much
be limited to furnishing garrisons for about the islands and the problems in-
the islands taken by the Navy and volved in operations there. To bring in
Marine troops.26 The next day, 25 June, another commander at this time, Mar-
King submitted this draft directive to shall concluded, would be most unfor-
the Joint Chiefs for approval, and with tunate.28 At the same time he told
it a letter to Marshall stressing the need MacArthur, who was growing impatient
for action before the Japanese recovered at the delay, not to concern himself
from the defeat at Midway and this with the question of command. "I am
"golden opportunity" was lost.27 now engaged," he explained, "in nego-
tiations looking to settlement of the
26
Rad, King to Nimitz, 2306, 24 Jun 42, OPD 381
28
(SWPA) case 80. Memo, Marshall for King, 26 Jun 42, sub: Offen-
27
Ltr, King to Marshall, ser. 00544, 25 Jun 42, OPD sive Opns in the South and Southwest Pacific Area,
381 (SWPA) case 80. OPD 381 (SWPA) case 80.
question of unity of command under he would have the use of only naval and
your direction."29 Marine forces.31
Admiral King showed no disposition Resisting his first impulse to reply in
to abandon his claim to naval control kind to King's impolitic note, General
over the operations against Rabaul. The Marshall waited instead for several days
original directive to Nimitz, he pointed to compose a suitable answer. But while
out to Marshall, had authorized him to tempers in Washington cooled, General
"prepare for the execution of amphib- MacArthur found fresh cause for irrita-
ious operations to be launched from the tion. First came a copy of King's mes-
South Pacific Area and Southwest Pacific sage to Admiral Nimitz, then Nimitz'
Area"—just such an operation as was reply setting forth the forces, which in-
then under consideration. He reminded cluded elements of MacArthur's own air
Marshall, too, that he had recommended and naval forces, that he would need for
an Army command for Europe where the operation. Finally, MacArthur found
most of the forces would be ground that King was again corresponding di-
troops. And by the same reasoning, he rectly with Admiral Leary. All these,
observed, the operation in the Solomons, MacArthur saw as clear warning of the
which would involve primarily naval Navy's intentions. To him, it was quite
and amphibious forces, should be under evident, as he told Marshall, that the
naval control. Permanent occupation of Navy intended to assume "general com-
the area could be delegated to the Army, mand control of all operations in the
but the landings and the assault, King Pacific theater." If the Navy succeeded
asserted, would have to be under Nimitz' in this effort, the role of the Army in
direction; indeed, in his view, they could the Pacific, he warned, would become
"not be conducted in any other way." subsidiary and would consist "largely of
MacArthur, he thought, could con- placing its forces at the disposal and
tribute little initially. Bluntly he under the command of Navy or Marine
warned General Marshall that he was officers." This objective, he pointed out,
ready to open the offensive, "even if no was the real purpose of the Navy's insist-
support of Army forces in the Southwest ence on controlling operations in the
Pacific is made available."30 And the Pacific, using marines as the assault force,
next day he gave point to this threat by and relegating the Army to occupation
instructing Admiral Nimitz to go ahead duties. It was all part of a master plan,
with his preparations for the campaign, which he had learned about "acciden-
even though there would probably be tally" when he was Chief of Staff, Mac-
some delay in reaching a decision on the Arthur told Marshall. Under this plan,
extent of the Army's participation. he asserted, the Navy hoped to gain com-
Meanwhile, King wrote, Nimitz could plete control over national defense and
proceed with his plans on the basis that reduce the Army to a training and supply
organization. Having alerted his chief
29
Rad, Marshall for MacArthur, 26 Jun 42, CM- to the far-reaching implications of this
OUT-6596. perfidious scheme, MacArthur pledged
30
Ltr, King to Marshall, ser. 00555, 26 Jun 42, sub:
31
Offensive Opns in South and Southwest Pacific Area, OPD Cover Sheet, 27 Jun 42, sub: Offensive Opns
OPD 381 (SWPA) case 80. Pacific Theater, OPD 381 (PTO) case 64.
that he would take "no steps or action agreement. But neither did he ignore
with reference to any component of my King's scarcely veiled threat of unilateral
command" except under direct orders action by the Navy. The implications
from Marshall.32 of that statement disturbed him greatly
MacArthur's attitude was no more and he told the admiral, in language
helpful in reaching agreement than almost identical to that he had used with
Admiral King's and Marshall made it MacArthur, that "regardless of the final
clear immediately that he was more decision as to command, every available
interested in fighting the Japanese than support must be given to this operation,
the U.S. Navy. Whatever the outcome or any operation against the enemy."
of the negotiations (and he hoped it Finally, he asked King to meet with him
would be in MacArthur's favor), it at his earliest convenience to discuss the
would be necessary, he told the South- problem.34
west Pacific commander, to throw all It was as a result of the meetings
forces, Army and Navy, into the battle. between the two men—they met appar-
MacArthur responded immediately with ently on the 29th and 30th—that a basis
the assurance that he would use all the for compromise on the troublesome
resources at his command against the question of command was finally evolved.
enemy "at all times and under any con- Two solutions were offered by King. The
ditions." Once the decision was made, first was a modified version of the sug-
he declared, he would co-operate to the gestion made earlier by Admiral Cooke,
fullest extent.33 to give command to Admiral Ghormley
who would operate under the control of
Compromise: The 2 July Directive Nimitz. It was King's idea that this
arrangement would hold only for the
By the end of June, it was evident Tulagi operation; thereafter MacArthur
that neither MacArthur nor King would would have control of the rest of the
give in on the question of command. A campaign against Rabaul. While this
compromise had to be found, and it was proposal was being studied, King made
up to Marshall to find one and then another: to give command of the entire
persuade both parties to accept it. He Rabaul offensive to Ghormley, but to
made his first move on 29 June, when he make him responsible directly to the
replied at last to Admiral King's strong Joint Chiefs in Washington rather than
note of the 26th. In a calm and moderate to Nimitz. This move would, in effect,
tone, he observed that at least on the put Ghormley on the same level as
essential thing, the necessity for speedily Nimitz and MacArthur and create a
mounting an operation against the Japa- third command in the Pacific.35
nese and pushing it through to a suc-
cessful conclusion, he and King were in 34
Memo, Marshall for King, 29 Jun 42, no sub,
OPD 381 (SWPA) case 80.
32 35
Rad, MacArthur to Marshall, No. 254, 28 Jun 42, Rad, Marshall to MacArthur, 29 Jun 42, CM-
CM-IN-9329. OUT-7501 with attached informal Memo from Mar-
33
Rads, Marshall to MacArthur, 28 Jun 42, CM- shall to Handy, OPD Exec Files; Memos, Marshall
OUT-7356; MacArthur to Marshall, 29 Jun 42, CM- for King 1 Jul 42, OPD 381 (SWPA) case 80; King
IN-9591. for Marshall, 2 Jul 42, OPD 384 (PTO) sec. 2.
General MacArthur, whose comments about 1 August, at which time the

the Chief of Staff solicited, thought the boundary of MacArthur's area would be
proposal to shift command after Tulagi moved westward one degree to longitude
a poor one from the "standpoint of 159° east to put the southern Solomons
operational application." The entire in the South Pacific, thus meeting the
offensive, he thought, must be consid- objections of the proponents of the geo-
ered as a whole and not in parts. More- graphic argument. As before, the Army
over, its success would depend upon the would furnish the garrison for the island
"complete coordination of the land, sea after it was taken but the forces would
and air components," a condition dif- come from the South, not the Southwest
ficult to attain, he thought, under the Pacific. Task Two called for the seizure
arrangements proposed. To change com- of Lae, Salamaua, and the northeast
mand in the midst of operations, at a coast of New Guinea; Task Three, for
time when it was impossible "to predict the final attack on Rabaul and adjacent
the enemy's reaction and consequent positions. Both would be under General
trend of combat," MacArthur warned, MacArthur's control, but the Joint
"would invite confusion and loss of Chiefs would reserve for themselves the
coordination."36 The conclusion was right to determine when command
obvious. MacArthur should be in com- would pass from Nimitz to MacArthur,
mand from the start and be responsible what forces would be used, and the
for co-ordination through the responsible timing of the tasks.37
air, ground, and naval commanders. Admiral King met this compromise
King's second proposal was not even plan, which Marshall thought the only
sent to MacArthur for comment. Mar- way "we can successfully and immedi-
shall found it unsatisfactory and appar- ately go ahead," in the same spirit in
ently did not consider it seriously as a which it was offered. He still believed
basis for discussion. Instead, he offered that the offensive should be entrusted
King a counterproposal that skillfully to Ghormley under the direct control
combined the first proposal with an of the Joint Chiefs "whose authority
arrangement designed to meet Mac- cannot properly be questioned by either
Arthur's objections to it. The major principal—General MacArthur ... or
feature of this compromise was the divi- Admiral Nimitz." But he was willing to
sion of the offensive into three separate forego this point "to make progress in
tasks whose objective was the seizure and the direction in which we are agreed that
occupation of the New Britain—New Ire- we should go," if Marshall would agree
land area. Task one was the Tulagi to defer a decision on Tasks Two and
assault and would be under the control Three until a later time. Task One,
of Admiral Nimitz; Ghormley was not which favored the Navy, King accepted,
even mentioned but presumably would though he preferred placing it under the
exercise direct command. It would start
37
Memo, Marshall for King, 1 Jul 42, sub: Joint
36
Rad, MacArthur to Marshall, No. 261, 1 Jul 42, Draft Directive for Offensive Opns in SWPA, OPD
CM-IN-0088. (SWPA) Case 80.
Joint Chiefs rather than Nimitz. Mar- These arrangements completed, Admiral
shall refused to accept this change and King set off for San Francisco to meet
later in the day persuaded Admiral King Admiral Nimitz — who was slightly
to accept his original compromise.38 injured in an air accident on the way—
The Joint Chiefs approved the plan to explain personally to him the plans
that same day, 2 July. There was only that had been made and his hopes for
one change. Task Two, which originally the future.
mentioned only the seizure of Lae, Sala- Thus was ended the debate that had
maua, and northeast New Guinea, now consumed much of the time of the Wash-
called for the capture of the "remainder ington and Pacific staffs and their chiefs
of the Solomon Islands" as well.39 Thus, for almost a month. Marshall, who had
MacArthur was made responsible, with- never given up the fight for the principle
out any preliminary notice or discussion, of unity of command, had displayed
for an area which would witness some of throughout a high order of military
the bitterest fighting of the Pacific war. statesmanship. Avoiding the extreme
At the same time that the directive position of both King and MacArthur,
for operations in the Solomons and New he had ably defended the point of view
Guinea was approved, Admiral King of his own service and fashioned a com-
gave his consent to two proposals he had promise that offered an effective instru-
long opposed. The first of these was the ment for the prosecution of the war. His
creation of an Army command for the satisfaction with the outcome was evi-
South Pacific Area, the post which went dent when, on the 3d, he told MacArthur
to General Harmon.40 The second was that "a workable plan has been set up
the Army's plan for the formation of and a unity of command established,
two mobile air forces in the Pacific thea- without previous precedent for an offen-
ter, consisting of heavy bombers and sive operation."42 That there would be
stationed at each end of the line of com- further difficulties he did not doubt, but
munications in Hawaii and Australia. so long as there was the will to co-oper-
For months King had been insisting that ate he was optimistic about the future.
heavy bombers must be stationed along "I wish you to make every conceivable
the line of communications as well as in effort to promote complete accord in
Hawaii and Australia, but he now sud- this affair," he told MacArthur. "There
denly abandoned his position and agreed will be difficulties and irritations inevi-
to the Army's scheme under which the tably, but the end in view demands a
bombers would be available for opera- d e t e r m i n a t i o n to suppress these
tions anywhere in the Pacific "as may manifestations."43
be directed by the U.S. Chiefs of Staff."41 To this plea MacArthur replied with
assurances that he would co-operate
38
Memo, King for Marshall, 2 Jul 42, OPD 384 fully. And as a mark of this co-operative
(PTO) Sec 1.
39
Joint Directive for Offensive Opns in SWPA, 2
Jul 42, OPD 381 (SWPA) case 83.
40
See above, Chap. XI.
41 42
Ltr, King to Marshall, ser. 00580, 2 Jul 42; OPD Rad, Marshall to MacArthur, No. 334, 3 Jul 42,
Memo for record, 4 Jul 42, sub: Pacific Theater Mo- CM-OUT-0677.
43
bile Air Force, both in OPD 384 (PTO) sec. 1. Ibid.
spirit he pointed to his invitation to Tasks Two and Three.44 The prospects
Ghormley and Maj. Gen. Alexander A. of a harmonious relationship between
Vandegrift, commander of the 1st Marine the Army and Navy were never brighter,
Division, to come to Melbourne to but the task of making ready for the
arrange for the co-ordination of their offensive to come would soon create
efforts in the coming operation. Finally, fresh problems and renew their earlier
he suggested that Ghormley, after he disagreements.
completed Task One, should be retained 44
Rad, MacArthur to Marshall, No. C-121, 4 Jul
as commander of forces afloat during 42, CM-IN-1306.
CHAPTER XIV
Preparations and Problems

A plan of campaign should anticipate everything which the enemy can
do, and contain within itself the means of thwarting him. Plans of
campaign may be infinitely modified according to the circumstances, the
genius of the commander, the quality of the troops and the topography
of the theater of war. NAPOLEON, Maxims
In the South Pacific, preparations for ficulties. Only the 5th Marines, division
the coming offensive had begun even headquarters, and miscellaneous ele-
before the Joint Chiefs had given their ments of the 1st Division were actually
approval. Before he left Washington on in the theater. Of the other two infantry
1 May, Admiral Ghormley had been regiments, one, the 1st Marines, was at
alerted to the possibility of operations sea, and the other, the 2d, attached to
and since then had been kept informed the 1st Division for the operation, had
of the discussions between the Army and not yet left San Diego. The division's
Navy planners. Finally, on 25 June, he artillery component, the 11th Marines,
received word through Admiral Nimitz was with the 1st, en route to Wellington,
that the time had come to make his where it was scheduled to arrive on 11
plans. Immediately he called General July. The large fleet of warships, trans-
Vandegrift and his staff from Welling- ports, and cargo vessels required for the
ton, where the 1st Marine Division was operation was scattered from Brisbane
located, to a conference in Auckland. to San Diego.1
It was then that the marines, who had The logistical difficulties facing Gen-
not expected to go into action until the eral Vandegrift were imposing. With
end of the year, learned for the first time the limited dock facilities at Welling-
of the plans to invade the Solomons and ton, it was necessary to combat-load the
of their role in the campaign. They 5th Marines before the 1st and 11th
would have to be ready on 1 August, Marines arrived. These last two, organi-
the tentative date for the landing. There
1
was little time and the division was far This account of preparations is based on a manu-
script history of U.S. Army Forces in the South
from ready, but the marines did the best Pacific prepared by the author during the war and
they could, cloaking their preparations filed in OCMH. See also, Miller, Guadalcanal: The
under the guise of amphibious training. First Offensive, ch. II; Morison, Coral Sea, Midway
and Submarine Actions, ch. XIII; John Zimmerman,
The Guadalcanal Campaign (Washington: Histori-
Logistics and Strategy cal Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps,
1949). The 1st Marine Division at the time consisted
Assembling the troops earmarked for only of two infantry regiments, the 7th having been
detached for service with the 1st Provisional Marine
the landing presented considerable dif- Brigade in Samoa.
zation-loaded before they had left the area and reported by the former planters
United States, would have to be com- and civil servants who had remained
pletely reloaded for combat when they behind to serve in the Coastwatching
reached Wellington. The first task, com- Service of the Australian intelligence.
bat loading the 5th Marines, was accom- But it was not until early July, when the
plished without difficulty, but the second enemy landed troops on Guadalcanal,
proved a nightmare. Plans for handling just south of Tulagi, and began to build
the cargo of the eight vessels carrying the an airfield there at Lunga Point, that the
second echelon of the division could not meaning of this activity became clear.
be made in advance for there were no The news was passed on to Washington
manifests. It was necessary, therefore, on 6 July, where the threat posed by the
to unload, sort the cargo, requisition the new airfield combined with the existence
rations and other supplies needed, and of the seaplane base at Tulagi was fully
combat-load the eight vessels in about appreciated. Additional information on
ten days. The marines themselves, with Japanese shipping in the vicinity and
the help of a few skilled operators and the progress of construction on Guadal-
limited equipment, had to do the job canal did nothing to lessen the fear.
working in 8-hour shifts around the Time was of the essence and obviously
clock. Tired and in poor physical con- Guadalcanal would be as important an
dition after the month-long voyage, the objective of Task One as Tulagi.2
marines had to work under dishearten- It was while this disquieting news was
ing conditions and in a steady cold rain coming in that MacArthur and Ghorm-
—this was the winter season in New ley held their meeting in Melbourne
Zealand—which disintegrated the paper on 8 July. The result was a joint mes-
cartons and spilled cans all over the sage to Marshall and King representing,
docks. In spite of these difficulties the the two Pacific commanders declared,
division was loaded with sixty days' sup- their own opinions "arrived at separately
plies and ready to sail on 22 July. On and confirmed by decision."3 With par-
that day the twelve transports with escort ticular emphasis, they called attention
left Wellington to rendezvous with the to the "marked change in the enemy
remainder of the invasion force coming situation," their own shortage of planes,
from San Diego, Pearl Harbor and the scarcity of shipping to move men
Noumea. and material, and the absence of air-
Long before the 1st Marine Division fields and port facilities. The Japanese,
had completed its preparations, it had they pointed out, were building airfields
become apparent that the task ahead and developing their bases at Kavieng,
would be more difficult than originally Rabaul, Lae, Salamaua, Buka, and Gua-
thought. At the time the Joint Chiefs dalcanal. Both MacArthur and Ghormley
had approved the directive for an offen-
sive in the South and Southwest Pacific, 2
Rad, MacArthur to Marshall, 6 Jul 42, CM-IN-
the Japanese had not yet begun to con- 2068. For an account of the Coastwatching Service,
solidate their positions in the southern see Eric A. Feldt, The Coast Watchers (Melbourne:
Oxford University Press, 1946).
Solomons and New Guinea. Some Japa- 3
Rad, MacArthur and Ghormley to JCS, 1012, 8
nese activity had been observed in the Jul 42, OPD Exec Files.
PREPARATIONS AND PROBLEMS 307
doubted that the Allies with their piti- their positions in the Solomons seemed
fully inadequate resources and lack of to call for speed, not delay. Rather than
airfields would be able to gain and main- wait until all three tasks could be pushed
tain air supremacy in the objective area. through in one continuous movement,
"The successful accomplishment of the they thought that Task One was now
operation," they told the Joint Chiefs, more urgent than ever and that the
"is open to gravest doubts." enemy must be ejected from the south-
Ghormley, like MacArthur, disliked ern Solomons before he could move
the idea of breaking up the operation against the Allied line of communica-
against Rabaul into separate parts and tion. MacArthur, it was admitted, did
joined him in opposing it before the not have the means at hand for Tasks
Joint Chiefs. Once begun, the two men Two and Three, but these, they felt,
argued, the entire offensive should be would have to be provided later by the
carried forward to its conclusion in one Army. Task One must be launched
continuous movement. Failure to do so without delay; planning for the other
would expose the assault forces to coun- two should be completed as soon as
terattack from Rabaul and constitute a possible.
danger of the greatest magnitude. Task General Marshall accepted the Navy
One, therefore, should be postponed, the view without argument and agreed that
Pacific commanders told Marshall and MacArthur would need more aircraft
King, until the means required to exe- and transportation before he could begin
cute all three tasks had been assembled. his own operations. In his reply to the
Admiral Nimitz, in commenting on the Southwest Pacific commander, therefore,
proposal, argued against postponement.4 he held out the promise of additional
The MacArthur-Ghormley message support for Tasks Two and Three, but
created a most unfavorable impression made it clear that even if this support
in Washington. Admiral King expressed was not forthcoming because of condi-
the views of many when he pointed out tions elsewhere he was to push vigorously
that MacArthur, who only a short time the preparations and detailed planning
before was proposing to strike out boldly for these tasks. Task One, King and
and swiftly for Rabaul, "now, confronted Marshall announced, was to proceed as
with the concrete aspects of the prob- planned. They did not, they told Mac-
lem," claimed with Ghormley that even Arthur and Ghormley, "desire to coun-
the much more limited operation against termand operations already under way,"
Tulagi could not be undertaken without but, in recognition of the limited means
considerably more air power and ship- in the Pacific, they asked the two com-
ping.5 To the naval planners, the fact manders to submit requests for the means
that the Japanese were consolidating "absolutely essential to the execution of
Task One."6
4
Ltr, Spruance to Hoover, 17 Jul 59, OCMH.
6
Spruance was chief of staff to Nimitz at the time. Rad, JCS to MacArthur and Ghormley, 2100, 10
5
Memos, King for Marshall, 10 Jul 42, sub: Mac- Jul 42, OPD 381 (PTO) sec 2. The Joint Chiefs
Arthur-Ghormley Dispatch, and Cooke to King, 9 meeting of this date, their 24th, was the first one in
July 42, same sub, both in OPD 381 (PTO) sec. 2. which the coming offensive was discussed.
The Pacific versus Europe sources, and jeopardize both the main
assault in Europe in 1943 (ROUNDUP)
At the same time that the Army and and the American position in the Pacific.
Navy chiefs in Washington were resist- If the British refused to go through with
ing the appeals from their Pacific com- SLEDGEHAMMER, therefore, the United
manders for additional support and a States should, Marshall argued, turn its
more massive offensive, they found them- full attention to Japan. Tearing a page
selves arguing, by a curious twist of from MacArthur's book, he pointed out
circumstances, for a reversal of the that such a move would have many
Europe-first strategy developed before advantages, that it would receive the
the war and confirmed at the ARCADIA strong support of the American people,
Conference in December 1941-January and, after a second front in Europe,
1942. The background of this startling would be the most effective way to
proposal lies in the decision, reaffirmed relieve pressure on Russia.8 The Joint
in June, (a) to invade the European Chiefs, he concluded, should unite in
continent in the fall of 1942 in the r e c o m m e n d i n g this course to the
event the Red Army suffered disastrous President.
reverses (SLEDGEHAMMER) and (b) to Admiral King was more than willing
mount a major invasion of the Conti- to join forces with his Army colleague.
nent in 1943 (ROUNDUP) . BOLERO, the Though he accepted and supported the
concentration of forces in England for strategy which gave priority to the war
the invasion, applied to both operations.7 in Europe, King had always placed
Upon this project General Marshall and greater emphasis than Marshall on the
his staff had put most of their energies importance of holding and maintaining
for months and when early in July the a strong position in the Pacific. More-
British, faced with threats of disaster in over, his conception of a defensive strat-
the Middle East and North Africa, pro- egy in the war against Japan included
posed that plans for the possible invasion active measures and much larger forces
of the Continent in 1942 (SLEDGEHAM- than the Army was willing to put into
MER) be abandoned and North Africa that theater. Early in May, before Coral
be invaded instead, the Chief of Staff Sea and Midway and when the threat
reacted with considerable vigor. He had in the Pacific had loomed so large,
opposed such an invasion earlier and Admiral King had argued unsuccessfully
still did on the ground that it was an against the build-up in Britain. Though
indecisive operation that would scatter that crisis had passed, King, like Mac-
American forces, drain away Allied re- Arthur, saw in the renewed Japanese
7
Though the 1942 operation was contingent on a
activity a fresh threat which would
major Soviet defeat, President Roosevelt had vir- require larger efforts in the Pacific. It
tually promised Molotov at the end of May that the was natural therefore that Admiral
Allies would open a second front that year. The
8
British were far from sanguine about such an opera- Mins, JCS Mtg, 10 Jul 42; Rad, MacArthur to
tion, and there was considerable doubt in the Ameri- Marshall, No. 176, 8 May 42, cited in ch. IX above;
can staff about the feasibility of the operation. Churchill, The Hinge of Fate, p. 434. For a more de-
Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, pp. 568-70, 577; tailed account of these discussions, see Matloff and
Matloff and Snell, Strategic Planning, 1941-42, pp. Snell, Strategic Planning, 1941-42, pp. 187-90,
233-34. 232-49.
King should welcome the strange rever- this unexpected recommendation from
sal of roles that made Marshall champion his chief military and naval advisers for
of the Pacific cause. Readily he accepted, a drastic revision in American strategy
with minor modifications, the memoran- came as a complete surprise. Immedi-
dum Marshall had prepared urging on ately he asked for a detailed and com-
the President a change in the basic prehensive statement of the plans they
strategy of the war if the British per- had made for such a shift, to be ready
sisted in their refusal to undertake "this afternoon"—it was then Sunday,
SLEDGEHAMMER.9 12 July.11 This statement, he directed,
This threat of a shift away from should include estimates of the time
Europe and toward the Pacific, used required to transfer ships, planes, and
later as a strategem in debate with the men to the Pacific and the effect of the
British, was apparently seriously intended move on the war in every theater. The
at this time. The "Hitler-first" strategy request was an impossible one, and
and the build-up of forces in the British perhaps the President knew that. No
Isles for an early invasion of the Conti- one had forseen so sudden and basic a
nent, which General Marshall had con- reversal in strategy and there were no
sistently advocated and defended, was studies of the kind now required.
based on the recognized military prin- Nevertheless, while their staffs worked
ciple of concentration of force. Rather feverishly to produce the information
than violate that principle and open a desired, the Joint Chiefs submitted a
major and costly offensive that could preliminary and hasty study to the Presi-
produce no decisive results against Ger- dent. After outlining the adjustments
many, Marshall was willing to turn tem- that would have to be made and the
porarily to the lesser enemy and the effect of the proposed strategy on the
secondary theater. It was not the course military efforts of the British and
he preferred, but at least it would avoid Russians, the Joint Chiefs recommended
the dispersion of American resources that, after the capture of Rabaul, the
and manpower and would bring about United States should concentrate its
the defeat of one of the Axis Powers. forces in a drive northwest through Truk,
He hoped, he told the President frankly, Guam, and Saipan. As a substitute, or,
that the British would give in rather simultaneously, if conditions were favor-
than see the United States go its own able, they suggested the route through the
way but he was ready, if they did not, Malay Barrier and Borneo to the Philip-
"to turn immediately to the Pacific with pines. This program was admittedly an
strong forces and drive for a decision inadequate response to Roosevelt's re-
against Japan."10 quest for the Pacific alternative, but it
To President Roosevelt at Hyde Park, was the best that could be done in the
short time allotted.12
9
Memo, Marshall and King for Roosevelt, 10 Jul 42,
11
no sub, OPD 381 (Gen) case 73. Tel Msg, President to Marshall and King,
10
Memo, Marshall for Roosevelt, 10 Jul 42, sub: recorded in Memo, Col John R. Deane for King, 12
British Proposal Relative to BOLERO, OPD Exec Files. Jul 42, OPD Exec Files.
12
See also, Stimson and Bundy On Active Service, p. Memo, JCS for President, 12 Jul 42, sub: Pacific
424. Opns, OPD 381 (Gen) case 73.
The merits of the Joint Chief's pro- President would support their efforts to
posal and of the staff studies initiated by gain acceptance of SLEDGEHAMMER but
the President's request were to prove would not tolerate any ultimatum to the
shortly a matter of no consequence. By British. "It is of the utmost importance,"
14 July the President had made up his he told the three delegates, "that we
mind. "I want you to know," he told appreciate that defeat of Japan does not
Marshall then, "that I do not approve defeat Germany and that American con-
the Pacific proposal."13 Instead Marshall centration against Japan this year or in
and King were to go to London with 1943 increases the chance of complete
Hopkins immediately—the 16th was sug- German domination of Europe and
gested—to work out some arrangement Africa."16 The defeat of Germany, on
with the British. A North African in- the other hand, would surely result,
vasion, he gave Marshall to understand, Roosevelt believed, in the defeat of the
was a definite possibility if the British Japanese enemy, "probably without fir-
could not be persuaded to adhere to ing a shot or losing a life." Again, the
SLEDGEHAMMER. basic strategy of the war had been
The next morning, after Roosevelt's confirmed.
return to Washington, Marshall saw the What course would the United States
President at the White House and was have followed in the Pacific had the
left in no doubt about his views. The President accepted the recommendation
proposal to turn to the Pacific, Mr. Roose- of his military advisers in July 1942? No
velt said, was "a red herring" whose definite answer is possible, of course, but
purpose, he implied, was something other in the studies initiated by the President's
than that stated in the Marshall-King request for a comprehensive statement of
memorandum. So strongly did he feel the Pacific alternative can be found a
on this subject that he even suggested clear statement of the strategy contem-
that "the record should be altered so plated. Obsolete before they were com-
that it would not appear in later years pleted on 15 July, these studies are,
that we had proposed what had nevertheless, of interest in revealing the
amounted to the abandonment of the Army planners' views and the estimates
British."14 That night he told Hopkins, on which these views were based.17
"If we cannot strike at SLEDGEHAMMER, First, the planners considered possible
then we must take the second best—and alternatives to BOLERO — North Africa,
that is not the Pacific. There we are Norway, the Middle East, and others—
conducting a successful holding war."15 and dismissed them all for various rea-
Thus, when Marshall and King left sons. The Pacific, they decided, offered
for London with Hopkins they did so the greatest possibilities and in support
with the clear understanding that the of this view they attributed to the Japa-
13
nese a strength that was so far from real-
Tel Msg, Roosevelt to Marshall, 14 Jul 42, WDCSA
16
Files (BOLERO). Churchill's attitude is stated in a Memo, Roosevelt for Hopkins, Marshall, and
letter of 12 July to Field Marshal Dill in Churchill, King, 16 Jul 42, sub: Instrs for London Conf, WDCSA
The Hinge of Fate, p. 438. 381, printed in Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins,
14
Memo, Marshall for King, 15 Jul 42, no sub, pp. 603-05.
17
WDCSA 381 (War Plans). OPD, Statement of Present Basic Strategy, with
15
Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, p. 602. Incls, 15 Jul 42, OPD Exec Files.
ity as to suggest that they had little ap- ciated in these Army studies, however,
preciation of the far-reaching significance and implicit in them was the realization
of the Midway victory. The Japanese, that the diversion of troops and planes
they thought, were capable of extending from Europe would not greatly accele-
their hold in the Aleutians, attacking rate operations in the Pacific where the
eastern Siberia, and seizing British posi- role of the Navy was so decisive. Thus,
tions in India. An attack against Aus- the Army planners were unable to sched-
tralia and the line of communications ule operations in the Central Pacific
they considered a real possibility. Even before April 1943, contingent on the
an all-out assault on Hawaii was not availability of naval forces. Finally, they
ruled out. And if the Japanese were had no plans for operations once the
successful in that, they would, the plan- Philippines were reoccupied. Where to
ners believed, make a determined effort go after that and what measures to take
to drive the United States from the Pa- for the defeat of Japan were problems
cific. "It is possible," the planners con- which none of the planners, Army or
cluded, "that, if undeterred, the enemy Navy, had yet faced seriously. Later,
may consolidate and prepare defenses so these problems would become the focal
effectively that he cannot be defeated by point of the debate over Pacific strategy.
the forces which we will be able to
operate against him." MacArthur Prepares
To avert this disaster, the Army plan-
ners proposed a 5-phase plan to step up Completely unaware of events in
the war against Japan. The first was Washington, the theater commanders con-
Task One, already in preparation. Phase tinued their preparations for the task
2 included Tasks Two and Three which, ahead. Under the Joint Chiefs' directive
with the forces formerly allocated to of 2 July, MacArthur was required to
BOLERO, could begin in November and supply naval reinforcements and land-
be carried through as a continuous oper- based air support for the Solomons
ation under MacArthur. In April 1943, invasion, and to interdict enemy air and
when naval forces would be available, the naval operations in his area. This he
third and fourth phases would begin, the readily agreed to do and during the
former consisting of the seizure of the weeks that followed his Melbourne
Caroline and Marshall Islands, the latter meeting with Ghormley, MacArthur's
of a drive through the Netherlands Indies. staff worked out the details for co-ordi-
Phase 5 called for the reoccupation of the nating the efforts of two theaters with
Philippines at an undetermined date. officers from the South Pacific. From
This 5-phase plan offered little that was his small navy, MacArthur turned over
new and was much like the one developed to Ghormley virtually his entire striking
by the Navy staff in April. Though the force, 4 heavy cruisers (3 of them Aus-
planners overestimated Japanese strength tralian) , 1 light cruiser, and 9 destroyers.
they, like many others, totally underesti- On 14 July these warships sailed from
mated the vigor of the Japanese reaction Brisbane under the flag of Rear Adm.
to the Solomons offensive. American V. A. C. Crutchley, RAN, to join the
weakness in the Pacific was fully appre- South Pacific forces for the coming cam-
GENERAL MACARTHUR AND GENERAL KENNEY
GENERAL EICHELBERGER AND GENERAL BLAMEY

paign. The submarines in the Southwest Arthur had expressed some dissatisfac-
Pacific, though not reassigned, were also tion, underwent a change too, when
to be used in support of the coming General Kenney relieved Brett late in
offensive. Operating out of Brisbane, July. About the same time, Brig. Gen.
the underwater craft would have the Richard J. Marshall, MacArthur's dep-
task of interdicting enemy shipping off uty chief of staff and one of that small
Rabaul. The role of MacArthur's Allied band which had come out of Corregidor
Air Forces was perhaps the most vital of with him, took over the supply head-
supporting operations. Before the land- quarters (designated on 20 July U.S.
ings its planes would reconnoiter eastern Army Services of Supply) from Barnes
New Guinea and the Bismarck Archi- who returned home, like Brett, for reas-
pelago; thereafter they were to patrol signment. That same day, General Mac-
the north and northwest approaches to Arthur moved his headquarters further
the objective area, while making every up the coast of Australia but still far
effort to neutralize enemy aircraft in from the scene of operations. Effective 1
New Guinea and the Solomons.18 August the boundary between the South
While plans were being made to pro- and Southwest Pacific was moved west to
vide support for Task One, responsibility the line agreed upon, longitude 159° east.
for which rested on Admiral Ghormley, (Map 5)
General MacArthur made preparations The Joint Chiefs' directive of 2 July
for the tasks to follow. Airfields in north- made necessary also another revision of
ern Australia and New Guinea were MacArthur's TULSA Plan, last revised on
rushed to completion and planes dis- 1 July. The objectives of the plan were
patched as rapidly as the fields became the same as those of the directive, but
available. These would serve in Task the timing and the forces were different.
One and were needed as quickly as pos- For one thing, MacArthur's planners
sible. To direct the training and later could now assume, somewhat optimisti-
the operations of the two U.S. divisions cally, that they would have the Marine
in his area, General MacArthur asked division, the carriers, and the support of
for and was given a corps headquarters the South Pacific land-based aircraft for
in July. Maj. Gen. Robert C. Richard- their own operations when Task One was
son, Jr., who was in Australia on an in- completed. Also, they would assume that
spection trip for General Marshall, was the Guadalcanal-Tulagi area would be
the first candidate for the post, but be- in Allied hands before their own forces
cause of his strong feelings about serving went into action. There was no need,
under Australian command (Allied however, to revise the scheme of opera-
Land Forces was under General Blarney) tions already developed. As before the
the assignment finally went to Maj. Gen. campaign against Rabaul was envisaged
Robert L. Eichelberger. Command of as a two-pronged advance in five stages
the Allied Air Forces, with which Mac- through the Solomons and along the
northeast coast of New Guinea. The
18
GHQ SWPA Opns Instr No. 14, 26 Jul 42, Hist first three phases, which would take his
Rec Index Cards, OCMH; The Campaigns of Mac-
Arthur in the Pacific, SWPA Series, I, ch. II; Milner, troops as far as Lorengau in the Admir-
Victory in Papua, pp. 47-48. alties and Buka in the northern Solo-
mons, would complete Task Two; the across the Owen Stanley Range. There
next two, which called for the seizure of it would meet a smaller group coming
Kavieng (New Ireland) by the force in by boat and forming a beachhead to
moving up the Solomons and a combined protect the main convoy carrying the
assault by both forces against Rabaul, construction and garrison units.21
would complete the tasks assigned by the The plan had hardly been completed
Joint Chiefs.19 and orders issued when reconnaissance
An important feature of MacArthur's revealed that the Japanese had assembled
TULSA plan from the start was the estab- a large convoy and appeared to be mov-
lishment of airfields at Milne Bay at the ing on Buna. This supposition was
southeast tip of the Papuan Peninsula entirely correct. Frustrated at Coral Sea
and at Buna. These would be required and Midway and forced to cancel opera-
for the assault against Lae and Salamaua, tions against Samoa, New Caledonia, and
and plans for the former were made the Fijis, the Japanese had nevertheless
even before the Joint Chiefs' directive refused to give up their plans to take
of 2 July. Work at Milne Bay began Port Moresby. Since a seaborne invasion
early in July and continued without was no longer possible, Imperial General
interruption from the Japanese who were Headquarters on 11 June had ordered
apparently unaware of the project. the 17th Army commander, General Hya-
When they did learn of it, they landed kutake, to make plans for an overland
troops there late in August and made a assault from the east coast of the Papuan
determined effort to seize the base, but Peninsula, first determining by recon-
it was already too late.20 naissance whether such an operation was
The effort to build an airdrome in the feasible. This task was assigned to the
Buna area developed in a way that was South Seas Detachment, and the starting
entirely unforeseen and involved Gen- point selected was Buna. But when Gen-
eral MacArthur's forces in a long and eral Horii had almost completed his
costly battle at a much earlier date than plans, Imperial General Headquarters
anticipated. Plans for construction of decided that a reconnaissance was not
the airstrip were issued on 15 July after necessary; Port Moresby was to be cap-
a reconnaissance of the area, and a spe- tured by overland assault. Thus, on 18
cial task force was organized for the July the South Seas Detachment was di-
project. The plan was a complicated rected to "speedily land at Buna, push
one. From Port Moresby would come forward on the Buna-Kokoda road, and
one group, mostly Australian infantry, capture Port Moresby and adjacent
traveling to Buna by foot over the airfields."22
Kokoda Trail, the one passable route The final Japanese plan for the Port
Moresby operation called for a landing
19
TULSA II-A, Joint Basic Plan for ... New Brit-
21
ain-New Ireland-Admiralties Area, no date but GHQ SWPA, Instr to Comdrs AAF, ALF, ANF,
probably prepared at the end of July, abstract in Occupation and Construction at Buna Bay, 15 Jul 42,
OCMH. Hist Rec Index Cards, OCMH.
20 22
The Campaigns of MacArthur in the Pacific, Japanese Opns in SWPA, p. 132. This account
SWPA Series II, pp. 50-51, 65-68; Milner, Victory in of the Japanese landing at Buna is based on this
Papua, pp. 77-88. work, pages 132-36, and the sources cited therein.
at Buna on 21 July by a joint force of be contained and that the Allies retain
3,300 men. Support would be provided control of the vital sea lanes in the area.
by planes from Rabaul and a naval force General MacArthur, the naval planners
of two light cruisers and three destroyers. felt, had not displayed any great enthu-
On 20 July the convoy left Rabaul and, siasm for the Joint Chiefs' directive and,
despite air attacks from B-17's which in the absence of any information on his
damaged one of the three transports, activities and plans, they were fearful
reached its destination on schedule, at that he might not appreciate fully the
1900 of the 21st. There was no resistance importance of supporting the Solomons
and by the morning of the 22d the vil- offensive. These anxieties Admiral King
lage of Buna was in Japanese hands. The passed on to Marshall with the sugges-
construction troops and the garrison tion that MacArthur be asked what plans
immediately began to convert Buna into he had to hold the Japanese advance in
an advance base, under steady bombard- New Guinea. The Chief of Staff, though
ment from the planes of the Allied Air he felt that King's assumption that Mac-
Forces. At the same time, about 1,000 Arthur had not taken all measures to
men, the so-called Yokoyama Force, counter the Japanese threat was scarcely
moved out toward Kokoda, which they justified, accepted the suggestion and
occupied on 29 July after defeating an that same day, 31 July, queried
Australian contingent of about equal MacArthur on the subject.23
strength. To General Hyakutake at MacArthur's response was long and
Rabaul they sent back word that the detailed. In it he explained what he had
overland assault against Port Moresby done and was doing to stop the Japanese
was a feasible operation and that firm and outlined his plans for the develop-
plans could now be made. But they had ment of bases in New Guinea. Unfor-
failed to reckon with the difficulties still tunately, he explained, he did not have
to be overcome in the long hard pull enough transports to move the needed
across the Owen Stanley Range. troops forward from Australia as quickly
Beaten to the punch at Buna and faced as he would wish—the 7th Australian
with a new threat to Port Moresby, Gen- Division and three brigades were under
eral MacArthur put aside thoughts of orders for New Guinea—but if the ships
Task Two to concentrate on the job of could be furnished he would speedily
driving the enemy back along the Kokoda regain Buna. The remainder of the mes-
Trail and out of his newly won position sage was devoted to an explanation of
along the coast. Until this was accom- the TULSA plan. Task One, he believed,
plished, he would be unable to begin the would be completed by the time he
assault against Lae and Salamaua and reached Buna—it was, but at a much
inaugurate Task Two of the Joint Chiefs' later date than anyone else had esti-
directive. mated—and he would then start Task
There was concern in Washington also
over this fresh Japanese advance. With
23
the invasion already on its way to the Memos, King for Marshall, 31 Jul 42, sub: Japa-
nese Opns in New Guinea; Marshall for King, 1 Aug
Solomons, the Navy was especially anx- 42, same sub; Rad, MacArthur to Marshall, No. 384,
ious that the Japanese in New Guinea 31 Jul 42, all in OPD 381 (SWPA) case 92.
Two, "if the Marines with their amphib- needed to reinforce those from the South
ious equipment can be used."24 Also Pacific.25
needed, he made clear, would be the The request for garrison forces from
carriers and the land-based bombers of MacArthur's area was turned down flatly,
the South Pacific. With them he was that for antiaircraft units was met by the
confident he could complete Tasks Two offer of a regiment to replace those at
and Three rapidly. Bora Bora and Tongatabu, which would
be moved forward to the Solomons.
Final Preparations Though King had accepted this offer
conditionally before his departure for
The brief crisis brought on by the London with Marshall, it brought strong
British proposal to substitute a North objections from Ghormley and Nimitz,
African invasion for SLEDGEHAMMER, who wanted a steady flow of troops and
coming as it did in the midst of prepara- planes to replace those lost when the
tions for the Solomons offensive, had battle began. Unless this was done,
momentarily held out the possibility of Nimitz wrote, "not only will we be un-
a greatly enlarged effort in the Pacific able to proceed with Tasks Two and
and an end to the Army's reluctance to Three of this campaign, but we may be
commit its forces there. The President's unable even to hold what we have
decision abruptly restored the status quo taken."26 The Army was adamant in its
so far as the claims of the Pacific theater opposition and maintained steadfastly
in relation to the requirements of other that it could not send reinforcements to
theaters were concerned, but left unre- the South Pacific Area without cutting
solved the problem of reinforcements deeply into commitments elsewhere.27
for the offensive ahead. This problem, Actually, nothing done at this time
first raised by MacArthur and Ghormley could have had any immediate effect on
on 8 July and suspended briefly while Admiral Ghormley's plan or on the cam-
the Pacific alternative was under discus- paign ahead; already the forces for the
sion, was reopened by Admiral King on invasion were assembling in the South
14 July when he sent to General Pacific. Ever since his return from Mel-
Marshall a request from Nimitz for three bourne on 9 July, Ghormley and his staff
antiaircraft regiments to be used in the had been perfecting their plans and com-
Solomons. Next day, in the conviction pleting their preparations. On the 10th
that the situation was too serious to per- he had received his orders from Nimitz
mit delay and that the powerful Japa- together with a list of the ground, air,
nese forces assembling at Rabaul spelled and naval forces he would have for the
trouble for the South Pacific commander, 25
Memos, King for Marshall, 15 Jul 42, sub: Gar-
King urged General Marshall to recon- rison Forces for Solomons; 14 Jul 42, sub: AAA Units
sider the Army's decision. In addition in South Pacific, both in WDCSA Files (SWPA).
26
Memo, Vice Adm Russell Willson for Lt Gen
to the antiaircraft regiments he wanted Joseph T. McNarney, (both acting for their chiefs
Marshall to order MacArthur to make in London), 22 Jul 42, sub: Reinforcements for South
additional garrison troops available if Pacific, WDCSA File (SWPA).
27
For the papers dealing with this decision, see
24
Rad, MacArthur to Marshall, Q-147, 2 Aug 42, WDCSA Files (SWPA) and OPD 320.2 (PTO) cases
OPD 381 (SWPA) case 92. 21 and 30.
operation. These included, in addition Navy, Marine, and New Zealand planes
to the 1st Marine Division, three carrier in the area. Organized into seven groups
task groups built around the Saratoga, and scattered throughout the South
Enterprise, and Wasp (the first two were Pacific, this force had the double task of
at Pearl, the Wasp at San Diego), the reconnaissance and bombardment of the
additional B-17's from the Hawaiian objective. Neither General Harmon nor
Mobile Air Force, the land-based aircraft any other Army officer was given any re-
of the South Pacific Area (altogether sponsibility for the operation; the top
291 aircraft of various types), and a command was entirely naval.
large number of warships, transports, Admiral Ghormley divided the opera-
and cargo vessels.28 tion into three phases. In the first, start-
On receipt of Nimitz' order, prepara- ing about 27 July, the Expeditionary
tions for the coming offensive were inten- Force was to rendezvous in the Fiji
sified. The development of airfields in Islands for rehearsal. Phase Two called
the New Hebrides, where the B-17's for the seizure of Tulagi and Guadal-
would base, was given highest priority. canal on 7 August, Ghormley having
By the end of the month two strips, each secured a week's delay in the start of the
5,000 feet long and 150 feet wide, were campaign. The final phase, later can-
almost ready. The one at Efate had been celed, provided for the seizure of Ndeni
built in three weeks; the one at Espiritu in the Santa Cruz group as an air and
Santo in twelve days. Both were within seaplane base. Five submarines of the
striking distance of the objective. Pacific Fleet were to provide support
Meanwhile the planning staff had com- from 22 July through 20 August by
pleted its work and on 16 July Admiral patrolling the waters around Truk, and
Ghormley issued the basic plan for the Allied a i r c r a f t were to cover the
seizure of Guadalcanal and Tulagi. Two approaches and support the operations
major task forces were organized, the once they began.
Expeditionary Force under Admiral In the three weeks remaining after
Fletcher and the Air Force under Ad- receipt of Ghormley's plan, each of the
miral McCain, both responsible directly task force commanders assembled his
to Ghormley. Fletcher's force included force and made his own plans for D-day.
virtually all the ships and troops assigned Admiral Noyes's carriers came by sepa-
to the operation, with responsibility for rate ways. The Wasp had left San
the amphibious forces and the landing Diego on 1 July with the transports
itself going to Admiral Turner who was carrying the 2d Marines. The Saratoga
under Fletcher. The three carrier groups group sailed from Pearl a week later,
were also a part of Fletcher's force but followed shortly after by the Enterprise.
were commanded directly by Rear Adm. That same day, the last of the Marine
Leigh Noyes. Admiral McCain's Air units, the 3d Defense Battalion, left
Force included all land-based Army, Hawaii aboard two transports. On the
21st Admiral Fletcher ordered the Expe-
28
This account of plans and preparations is based ditionary Force to assemble southeast of
on the author's manuscript history of the South
Pacific cited above, as well as Miller, Guadalcanal: the Fijis by 1400 of the 26th for re-
The First Offensive, ch. II. hearsal. The 1st Raider Battalion, which
A-20 skip-bombing an enemy freighter.
had transferred earlier from Samoa to dalcanal. Turner's Amphibious Force, in

New Caledonia, was picked up by four three great concentric circles with the
destroyer-transports and got to the ren- destroyers on the outside, made for Sea-
dezvous in time, but the 3d Defense lark Channel between Tulagi and
Battalion in Hawaii had to join the rest Guadalcanal.
of the force on its way to the objective. As this assembly of ships made its way
From the 28th through the 31st, the slowly toward the still-unsuspecting Jap-
invasion rehearsed off Koro Island in the anese, the land-based aircraft of Admiral
Fijis. It was the first time that the naval, McCain's force went into action. From
air, and ground commanders had met to the hardly completed airstrips at Efate
arrange the details of the operation, but and Espiritu Santo, the Army B-17's of
the rehearsals were unrealistic and Gen- the 11th Bombardment Group, only re-
eral Vandegrift thought them a loss of cently arrived from Hawaii, began their
valuable time. When they were over, daily bombardment of the objective area.
the entire force—eighty-two vessels— Off to the west and north, over New
sailed for the Solomons, the carriers Guinea and the Bismarck Archipelago,
heading for a point southwest of Gua- MacArthur's Allied Air Forces kept close
B-17 heading home from a bomb run over the Solomons.
watch over the Japanese. Any unex- bombardment groups to replace the
pected Japanese move now might well B-17's of the 11th Bombardment Group,
spell the difference between success and which left for the South Pacific on
failure. the 26th of the month. They were badly
To assemble, mount, and support the needed, Nimitz reported, to follow up
invasion force had taken all the re- the invasion of Guadalcanal and, in the
sources of the theater commanders and absence of most of the Pacific Fleet from
left them with precious little to meet an Hawaiian waters, to support the defense
emergency. MacArthur's requests for of that area29
future operations could be deferred, but General Harmon, when he arrived in
the demands from Nimitz and Ghormley the South Pacific on 26 July, also found
for the task at hand were becoming even many deficiencies in his command and
more insistent. And these could not so
easily be put aside. At the end of July, 29
Rad, Emmons to Marshall, 26 Jul 42, CM-IN-
Admiral Nimitz and General Emmons, 9215 and associated papers in OPD 320.2 (Hawaii).
Nimitz' message is attached to Memo, King for Mar-
who had repeatedly asked for more air- shall, 1 Aug 42, sub: Reinforcement of South Pacific,
craft, joined forces to request two heavy OPD 320.2 (PTO) case 37.
added his voice to the growing chorus down the request, to withhold his answer.32
of complaint. His first requests for serv- But Admiral King had no intention
ice and supporting units were turned of letting the matter rest there. Already
down in Washington with the reminder he was preparing a list of needed rein-
that the forces in the South Pacific were forcements for the Pacific that would
to be held to the "minimum consistent" make earlier requests appear modest by
with the defensive role of the theater. comparison. This latest proposal was
Meanwhile his requests for air service based on a report by General Harmon
units and transports were forwarded to after his first inspection of the Army
the Army Air Forces. Arnold was will- bases in the South Pacific and a study of
ing to comply with these requests but, the plans for the forthcoming offensive.
unfortunately, would not be able to The minimum Army ground reinforce-
provide the units until the fall.30 ments needed in the area to comply with
The position taken by the Army on the Joint Chiefs' directive, Harmon had
reinforcements for the Pacific was chal- told Admiral Ghormley, were 2 divisions
lenged strongly by Admiral King on his plus 2 infantry regiments, 4 regiments of
return from London at the end of July. coast artillery (3 antiaircraft and 1 har-
The occasion was furnished by the agree- bor defense), and 2 battalions each of
ment made with the British and by coast artillery and 105-mm. howitzers.
Marshall's own statement that the sub- Air reinforcements, he estimated, should
stitution of the North African operation consist of 6 fighter squadrons (3 with the
(TORCH) for the invasion of the Con- new P-38's), 2 squadrons of heavy, 1 of
tinent would release planes and shipping medium, and 3 of dive bombers. These
for use in the Pacific. Citing Admiral Harmon knew perfectly well were not
Nimitz' need for heavy bombers, Ad- available then or likely to be soon, and
miral King asked Marshall to review the he limited his request for immediate
Army's decision against air reinforce- shipment to 3 squadrons of P-38's and
ments "in the light of recent decisions replacements for heavy bombers lost in
reached in London."31 The Army plan- action and attrition. The remainder, he
ners were all for turning down this fresh added, should be sent as soon as possible.33
demand with the statement that there Admiral Ghormley lost no time in
were no air units available and that it forwarding Harmon's estimate, in which
was impossible to say when any would he heartily concurred, to his chief in
be. But General Marshall held off. It Washington. Taken with MacArthur's
was now 5 August, two days before the most recent statement of his plans, this
invasion and he decided rather than turn estimate seemed to King to represent the
minimum requirements for the comple-
tion of Task One and the initiation of
30
Task Two. He did not expect that so
Rad, Harmon to Marshall, 30 Jul 42, CM-IN-
32
10727. Other relevant papers are filed in OPD 320.2 Informal Memo, Marshall for Handy, undated,
(PTO) case 5. attached to Memo, Handy for Marshall, 5 Aug 42,
31
Memo, King for Marshall, 1 Aug 42, sub: Rein- sub: Reinforcement for South Pacific, OPD 320.2
forcements for the South Pacific, OPD 320.2 (PTO) (PTO) case 37.
33
case 37. The agreement referred to was CCS 94, par. Ltr, Harmon to Ghormley, 4 Aug 42, OCMH;
e, 24 Jul 42. Rad, Harmon to Marshall, 5 Aug 42, CM-IN-1252
large an order could be filled immedi- est and most disastrous naval engage-
ately—shipping was too scarce for that— ments of the war, the Allies lost a total
but 'it would appear prudent," he told of four heavy cruisers, one of them Aus-
Marshall, "to commence assembly and tralian, and suffered other damage which
planning for first, the air reinforcements forced them to retire, leaving the
and second, ground reinforcements in marines stranded on the beaches without
strengths required to execute plans for air or naval support and with only mea-
the immediate future." 34 ger supplies. All of the dire predictions
This time the Army planners could from Admiral King and the commanders
not deny the necessity for reinforcements. in the field had come true; all their esti-
The marines had landed on Guadalcanal mates of what would be needed for the
and Tulagi on the 7th, the day before invasion, made, it should be noted, after
King had penned his note, but already the operation had been decided upon,
the Japanese were gathering forces for a would soon prove to be painfully accu-
determined counterattack. Boldly and rate. The Japanese were evidently de-
quickly they moved down to the threat- termined to hold on to what they had,
ened area and on the night of 8-9 Au- and at Rabaul were the reinforcements
gust, off Savo Island, dealt the invading they needed. Allied reinforcements were
fleet a mortal blow. In one of the brief- still a long way off, and before they
34
could reach the battlefield, there would
Memo, King for Marshall, 8 Aug 42, sub: Mini-
mum Army Reinforcements, OPD 320.2 (PTO) case
be other crises both in the Solomons and
37. New Guinea.
CHAPTER XV
Crisis in the Pacific,

August — November 1942
When a general makes no mistakes in war, it is because he has not been
at it long.
TURENNE
The Allied disaster off Savo Island on Few men in Washington had antici-
the night of 8-9 August created so seri- pated so vigorous a reaction from the
ous a situation that for almost four Japanese. Though every senior com-
months the fate of the Allied offensive mander in the Pacific, with the strong
hung in the balance. The Japanese, support of Admiral King, had warned
though they did not at first grasp the full of trouble ahead if more planes, ships,
meaning of the Marine landings, were and men were not quickly dispatched,
determined to maintain their hold on the Army and air planners had stoutly
the Solomons and New Guinea. Skill- resisted their demands and maintained
fully utilizing every means at their dis- that no more could be spared for what
posal and the advantages of interior lines was, after all, a secondary and defensive
of communication, they sought time and theater of operations. But so strong was
again during these months to oust the the desire to exploit the advantages of
invaders from Guadalcanal. It was not Midway and check the Japanese advance
until mid-November, after a series of toward the Allied line of communica-
fierce aerial and naval battles which tions that the commanders in the field
gave the Allies control of the air and acquiesced in the decision to attack.
sea, that the issue was decided. But the Once the offensive was begun, it was no
Japanese fought on for two more months longer possible to deny the resources
in the vain hope that they might yet needed for victory. Against the argu-
snatch victory from defeat. In the end ments for European (and North African)
they lost, but the six months' campaign priorities for a future offensive were
gave them time to strengthen their posi- now posed the immediate and compel-
tions further up the Solomons ladder, ling demands of the Pacific. The conse-
in the Bismarck Archipelago, and along quences of failure were too serious to
the northeast coast of New Guinea. be accepted and again, despite the oft-
Never again would the Allies underesti- affirmed "Germany first" strategy, the
mate the Japanese will to resist or the proponents of stronger measures and
capacity and skill of the Japanese soldier. larger forces for the Pacific won another
CRISIS IN THE PACIFIC, AUGUST-NOVEMBER 1942 325
round in the never-ending contest for fully only a few days earlier already
the resources of war. seemed in jeopardy.
In Washington there was consternation
Emergency Measures at the unexpected withdrawal of the fleet
and the disastrous consequences of the
Hardly had the 17,000 men of the Battle of Savo Island. From Admiral
1st Marine Division (reinforced) taken Nimitz came an urgent request, strongly
Tulagi and the neighboring small islands supported by King, for more planes, and
and seized the partially completed airstrip from General Harmon came a similar
at Lunga Point (promptly named Hen- request for reinforcements together with
derson Field) on Guadalcanal, than they a pessimistic report on the situation on
found themselves isolated—without air Guadalcanal. "We have seized a stra-
or naval protection and with less than tegic position from which future opera-
half of the supplies they had brought tions against the Bismarcks can be
with them. The aircraft carriers had strongly supported," he wrote. "Can the
gone first. Short of fuel and faced with Marines hold it?" He was doubtful that
the prospect of hostile air attack, Admiral they could. The Japanese, he thought,
Fletcher, on the evening of the 8th, had could assemble their forces quickly and
requested and been given permission by recapture the island before the Allies
Ghormley to withdraw his carriers to could reinforce. Only "the resourceful-
safety the next morning. Admiral ness and determination of our own
Turner, perforce, decided that he would forces," he told Marshall, would be able
have to pull out his amphibious force to "foil this attempt."2
of warships, transports, and cargo vessels The first problem, everyone recog-
also, and so informed General Vande- nized, was to provide the isolated
grift. This decision had hardly been marines with air support. There was
made when the disastrous Battle of Savo no time to collect the planes in the
Island provided additional impetus for United States and ship them out. They
a hasty withdrawal. By evening of the would have to come from resources
9th the amphibious force was steaming already in the theater. But from where?
southward, carrying with it the heavy Admiral Nimitz had the answer: divert
construction equipment needed to com- to the South Pacific the heavy and medi-
plete the airfield at Lunga Point, the um bombers allocated to MacArthur
5-inch guns of the 3d Defense Battalion, and already en route. Marshall accepted
the barbed wire so sorely needed for this proposal immediately and author-
defense, and large quantities of ammuni-
tion and food. Virtually a besieged gar- Struggle for Guadalcanal, August 1942-February
rison, the marines were in a desperate 1943, vol. V, "History of United States Naval Opera-
plight.1 The offensive opened so hope- tions in World War II" (Boston: Little, Brown and
Company, 1950); Craven and Cate, AAF IV, ch. II,
and the Marine Corps account, Zimmerman, The
1
Miller, Guadalcanal: The First Offensive, p. 81. Guadalcanal Campaign.
2
Unless otherwise noted the material in this chapter Ltr, Harmon to Marshall, 11 Aug 42, copy in
dealing with ground operations on Guadalcanal is OCMH; Ltr, King to Marshall, 9 Aug 42; OPD Memo
based on this volume; that dealing with naval and for Record, 10 Aug 42, sub: Aerial Reinforcement of
air operations on Samuel Eliot Morison, The South Pacific. Last two in OPD 452.1 (PTO), case 6.
ized Harmon to retain these planes tem- for victory, made on the eve of the inva-
porarily if he felt they could be used sion, were now strengthened, and he
more effectively in his area than in the used the occasion to impress them once
Southwest Pacific. At the same time, more on his superiors in Washington.
the Chief of Staff urged MacArthur to Admiral King, too, pressed hard for rein-
intensify his own efforts to neutralize forcements, reminding Marshall on the
the enemy's airfields and to make plans 13th that his earlier requests were still
to send a pursuit squadron to Guadal- unanswered and asking for immediate
canal. Marshall was interested, too, in action to meet the demands from Hawaii
the extent of co-ordination between the and the South Pacific.5
South and Southwest Pacific Areas and The real question at issue between
asked MacArthur for a report on that Marshall and King was the disposition
matter as well as the feasibility of the of fifteen of the air groups (including
plan to rush fighters to Henderson three of heavy bombers) originally allo-
Field.3 cated to BOLERO. At the London meet-
MacArthur's reply was both disap- ing with the British Chiefs of Staff in
pointing and reassuring. The plan to July, Marshall had insisted that, since
send fighters to Guadalcanal would be SLEDGEHAMMER had been canceled in
a hazardous undertaking and the chances favor of TORCH, these air groups plus
of success slim. But if Marshall thought the shipping for one division be set aside
the measure necessary he would be will- "for the purpose of furthering offensive
ing to risk it. His report on relations operations in the Pacific." 6 King
with Ghormley was much more encour- accepted this statement at face value and
aging. Co-ordination between the two used it as a basis for his demands on
theaters, he told the Chief of Staff, was the Army. General Marshall, however,
excellent. He had made arrangements apparently never intended that this pro-
with Ghormley, he reported, to provide vision should be interpreted literally.
air support on request, but thus far had "I regarded the list of withdrawals for
received no requests. This was not the the Pacific," he told Eisenhower soon
understanding in Washington, but after his return from London, "as one
Ghormley and Harmon, when queried, which gave us liberty of action though
confirmed MacArthur's assertions of not necessarily to be carried out in full,
harmonious relations.4 and no dates were mentioned."7 One of
Reassuring as such reports were, they the heavy bomber groups, he did admit,
did not lessen the seriousness of the situ- would probably have to be sent to the
ation in the Solomons or diminish the
need for planes and supplies. General
Harmon's estimates of the force needed 5
Ltr, Harmon to Marshall, 11 Aug 42, copy in
OCMH; Memo, King for Marshall, 13 Aug 42, sub:
Reinforcements for South Pacific and Hawaii, OPD
3
Rads, Marshall to Harmon, 9 and 10 Aug 42, 320.2 (PTO), case 37.
6
CM-OUT-2792 and 3043; Rad, Marshall to Mac- CCS Memo, 24 Jul 42, sub: Opns in 1942-43,
Arthur, 10 Aug 42, CM-OUT-3042. CCS 94, ABC 381 (7-25-41), sec. 1.
4 7
Rads, MacArthur to Marshall, 12 and 13 Aug 42, Ltr, Marshall to Eisenhower, 20 Jul 42, cited in
Nos. C-253 and 341; Rad, Harmon to Marshall, 12 Matloff and Snell, Strategic Planning, 1941-42, pp.
Aug 42, No. 768. All in OPD Exec Files. 301-02; Mins, JPS Mtg, 16 Sep 42.
Pacific but the disposition of the others or to make a determined bid for air and
would depend on the situation. Thus, naval supremacy in the days after the
when Admiral King asked for more landing. The recapture of Guadalcanal,
planes on the 13th, Marshall readily the Japanese thought, would therefore
agreed to release one heavy bomber not be too difficult and could be accom-
group, but refused to accede to King's plished while the Port Moresby operation
earlier requests. And he stipulated, was in progress.9
moreover, that the bombers—the 90th If the Tokyo planners misread Allied
Bombardment Group (H) was selected intentions, so, too, did some planners in
—were to go to Hawaii, not to the South Washington apparently misread the aims
Pacific. For the South Pacific, Marshall of the Japanese. Because the enemy had
told King, the Army was readying 44 failed to follow up his victory off Savo
fighters and had already authorized Gen- Island with a large-scale counteroffensive,
eral Harmon to retain for his use any of they concluded that he would make no
the 29 B-17's, 52 B-25's, and 9 B-26's effort to do so and that the battle for
en route to Australia.8 Guadalcanal would soon be over. It
To the commanders in the Pacific, was none too soon, they believed, to
these promised reinforcements—the 90th make plans for Task Two, and within
Bombardment Group was not scheduled a week of the Marine landings, on the
to arrive until mid-September—could basis of MacArthur's TULSA plan, Gen-
hardly be considered adequate. The eral Marshall was proposing to Admiral
position of the marines on Guadalcanal King that .they ask the Pacific command-
was precarious, with the Japanese bom- ers when Task One would be completed
barding the island almost at will, and in and Task Two begun.10 King readily
New Guinea the Australians along the agreed and next day, 15 August, the thea-
Kokoda Trail were still retreating before ter commanders were queried about
the advancing enemy. Instead of chang- their plans for the future.
ing their plans when the marines landed The response from the South Pacific
on Guadalcanal, the Japanese had inten- put to rest any illusions about an early
sified their campaign in New Guinea, end to the battle for Guadalcanal.
bringing in more construction equip- Though the Japanese had not yet made
ment, supplies, and infantry reinforce- an effort to land troops on the island,
ments. These moves were based on the the danger, Admiral Ghormley asserted,
view held in Tokyo, largely by the Army, was still great. If he did not get reinforce-
that the Allied action in the Solomons ments soon, he told Nimitz and King,
was only a reconnaissance in force, a he might lose not only Guadalcanal but
view that was confirmed by the failure other positions in the South Pacific as
of the Allies to reinforce the marines well. Until planes had been based on
Henderson Field, the line of communi-
8
Memo, Handy for Marshall, 15 Aug 42, sub: Rein-
forcements for South Pacific and Hawaii; Memo,
9
Marshall for King, 20 Aug 42, sub: Reinforcements Japanese Opns in SWPA, II, pp. 136-38.
10
for South Pacific and Hawaii. These and other rele- Memo, Marshall for King, 14 Aug 42, sub: Early
vant papers are in OPD 320.2 (PTO), case 37; see Initiation of Limited Task Two, OPD 381 (PTO)
also OPD 370.5 (Hawaii), cases 22-24. case 84.
cations to Guadalcanal restored, and the arrival of the 43d Division in the
men and supplies sent forward, any idea South Pacific — one regimental combat
of further advances, Ghormley warned, team, the 172d, going to Espiritu Santo
was a delusion.11 to defend the heavy bomber base there,
General Harmon concurred in this and the rest of the division to New Zea-
view and filled in the details which made land. Shortly thereafter, the division
it painfully evident that much more was was transferred to New Caledonia at a
needed on Guadalcanal. The Japanese, heavy cost in scarce shipping.
he was certain, would make an effort to The movement of the division to the
retake the island, either by direct assault Pacific, completed in November, was
or infiltration from New Georgia to the not without incident. The President
north. To guard against this contin- Coolidge, which was carrying the 172d
gency he called for large air and ground Regimental Combat Team as well as a
reinforcements and for a determined harbor defense battalion, blundered into
effort to break through with supplies for a mine field at the end of its voyage in
the marines and enough equipment and the harbor of Espiritu Santo and sank,
gasoline to start large-scale air operations taking with it all the desperately needed
at Henderson Field.12 weapons and equipment of the units
Armed with these statements from the aboard. Fortunately, only two lives were
South Pacific commanders, Admiral King lost in this tragic and unexplained
again called on the Army for reinforce- accident.13
ments, as agreed at the London meeting. Long before these reinforcements had
By this time Marshall had decided to reached their destination, the situation
send the 90th Bombardment Group to in the Pacific had taken a turn for the
Hawaii and so informed King. But worse. In the two weeks since the Marine
ground reinforcements in the quantity landings, the Japanese had assembled a
General Harmon had asked for earlier force of about 1,000 men and ferried
in the month, and which Ghormley and them to Guadalcanal, where, on 21
King now requested again, could not be August, they sought to penetrate the
sent without considerably more shipping thin Marine line and overrun the air-
than was available to the Army. Finally, field. This attack was easily repulsed,
after the Army had agreed to provide a but the Japanese had other forces ready
balanced force of about 20,000 men, the at Truk and these they immediately dis-
Navy agreed for its part to contribute patched under naval convoy to Guadal-
enough ships from its own September
and October allotments to transport 13
Lt. Gen. Millard F. Harmon, The Army in the
about half of the force. On this basis South Pacific, pp. 3-4, a narrative prepared by Gen-
plans were made which ultimately saw eral Harmon at the request of his historical officer,
copy in OCMH. Memo, King for Marshall, 20 Aug
42, sub: Early Initiation of Limited Task Two;
Memo, Marshall for King, 24 Aug 42, sub: Early
11
Rad, Ghormley to Nimitz and King, 17 Aug 42, Initiation of Limited Task Two. Both filed with
0230, cited in Miller, Guadalcanal: The First related papers in OPD 370.5 (PTO), cases 9 and 14.
Offensive, pp. 82-83. Memo, King for Marshall, 27 Aug 42, sub: Transpor-
12
COMGENSOPAC Summary of Sit, 20 Aug 42, tation of 13,000 Army Troops, OPD 381 (PTO),
OPD 381 (PTO), sec. 3. case 84.
canal via Rabaul. Alerted in advance to of further Japanese offensives and naval
the presence of a Japanese naval task action still remained.14
force steaming south ahead of the trans- The crisis in the South and Southwest
ports, Admiral Ghormley sent his own Pacific and the clear threat of further
naval forces, including two carriers, to Japanese offensives produced in the last
meet it. In the Battle of the Eastern week of August renewed requests from
Solomons that followed (23-24 August) the theater commanders for air reinforce-
the Japanese lost the carrier Ryujo, a ments. On the day after the Battle of
destroyer, and ninety planes; the Ameri- the Eastern Solomons, Admiral Ghorm-
cans only twenty planes and the services ley asked once again for heavy and medi-
of the Enterprise, which was badly dam- um bombers, pointing to mounting losses
aged. Neither side could claim a victory, and the critical situation in the Solomons
but the Japanese withdrew, only to reas justification. King endorsed this re-
turn a few days later with the Guadal- quest and passed it on to Marshall, who
canal reinforcements. More were already already had a similar message from
on the way and it was clear that the next Harmon before him.15
few weeks would witness bitter fighting Since the 20th, when King had con-
on Guadalcanal and along its sea and cluded, on the basis of Ghormley's and
air approaches. Harmon's estimates, that Task Two
In New Guinea, General MacArthur would have to be deferred and had asked
was having troubles of his own. The for air and ground reinforcements, the
reinforced Japanese garrison at Buna, Army staff had been studying air deploy-
despite attacks from the planes of the ment in the Pacific. Ground reinforce-
Allied Air Forces, was rapidly complet- ments had been made available without
ing the airfield and other installations question once the shipping was found,
there. The South Seas Detachment had but there was strong opposition to send-
meanwhile continued its slow advance ing more planes. General Arnold in
along the Kokoda Trail and by the end particular objected to additional alloca-
of the month had overcome Australian tions of aircraft to the Pacific as a danger-
resistance and begun the long, hard ous "tendency toward ever greater disper-
climb up the Owen Stanley Range. sion of Air Forces throughout the world."
Though faced with some of the worst In his view, American aircraft should be
terrain and weather in the world, the concentrated in the United Kingdom for
Japanese troops pushed on, moving ever the planned bomber offensive against
closer to their goal. Meanwhile, on 25 Germany, not scattered unprofitably
August, another Japanese force had throughout the Pacific. Some 300 Japa-
landed on the north shore of Milne Bay, nese planes in the South and Southwest
at the southeast tip of New Guinea, Pacific, he pointed out, were holding
where a combined Australian-American down over 800 American planes. The
garrison was holding the partially com- 14
This account of the New Guinea campaign is
pleted air base there. This attack, which based on Milner, Victory in Papua, ch. VI; and Allied
was part of the co-ordinated Japanese Opns in SWPA, I, chs. III-IV.
15
Rad, Ghormley to Nimitz and King, 25 Aug 42,
offensive against Port Moresby, was re- 0330, OPD Exec Files; Rad, Harmon to Marshall,
pulsed in less than a week, but the threat 25 Aug 42, CM-IN-9889.
argument was a telling one and was nese Zero. The new twin-engine P-38
endorsed by Admiral Leahy, who had was what he needed, he said, but the
recently joined the Joint Chiefs as the only ones in the Pacific were in Mac-
President's Chief of Staff.16 Arthur's area. Twenty-one had recently
The Army planners, too, had been reached Australia and forty-four more
counting planes in the Pacific. Their were being readied for shipment. If
figures, though differing slightly from Harmon wanted any, Marshall suggested,
Arnold's statistics, constituted an impres- he should negotiate directly with Mac-
sive list, showing a total of 161 heavy, Arthur; none were available in the
98 medium, and 42 light bombers, and United States.18 When the request was
553 fighters in the theater. En route made some days later, MacArthur had to
and being prepared for shipment were 66 refuse because he did not have enough
more heavies, 22 mediums, and 257 fight- for his own operations, but he stood by
ers. Such a computation, combined with his earlier agreement to send thirty
Arnold's cogent argument, confirmed P-39's. "I want to do everything I can to
Marshall in his decision not to allocate help you even to the jeopardy of my
more aircraft to the Pacific. There were own safety," he told Ghormley, "but my
enough planes there to meet the present resources are practically negligible.19
danger, he told King, if the theater By this time, MacArthur had revised
commanders would pool their resources his previous optimistic estimates for an
to get the most effective use out of what early start on Task Two. So serious did
they had. MacArthur had already been the situation in the Pacific seem to him
instructed to provide aid to the South at the end of August that he urged,
Pacific, and Ghormley, Marshall sug- "with greatest reluctance," a complete
gested, should call on him in the event review of the Army's policy on rein-
of an emergency.17 For the moment this forcements. "I beg of you most earn-
ended the matter. estly," he wrote Marshall on 30 August,
The quantity of planes in the Pacific "to have this momentous question re-
was not the only question at issue; pilot viewed by the President and the Chiefs
training, combat fatigue, armament, of Staff lest it become too late."20 In
armor, and performance of different the last two months, he pointed out, the
types of aircraft were other equally situation in the Pacific had changed
pressing problems that had to be solved. drastically. The Japanese had decreased
There was much dissatisfaction with the their forces in China and in the recently
P-400 fighter, the export version of the occupied territories and were concen-
P-39. From Guadalcanal had come re- 18
Rad, Marshall to MacArthur, 30 Aug 42, CM-
ports, through General Harmon, that OUT-9510; OPD Memo for Record, 30 Aug 42, sub:
the P-400 could not climb fast or high Fighter Support for Solomons, OPD 452.1 (PTO),
enough and was no match for the Japa- case 10.
19
Rad, MacArthur to Marshall, 3 Sep 42,
16
Memo, Arnold for Marshall, 21 Aug 42, sub: CM-IN-0944.
20
North African Opns; Memo, Leahy for Marshall, 21 Rad, MacArthur to Marshall, 30 Aug 42, No.
Aug 42. Both in WDCSA (SPA). C-381, GHQ Hist Rec Index Cards, OCMH. Mr.
17
Memo, Marshall for King, 25 Aug 42, sub: Air Curtin sent a similar message to the President and
Reinforcements for South Pacific, OPD 452.1 (PTO), Prime Minister the next day. CCS 660.2 (3-14-42),
case 8. sec. 2.
trating their resources in the South and forcement of the Pacific. "The defense
Southwest Pacific. The "main battle of the Pacific areas, particularly in air
front" in the war with Japan, he asserted, and naval matters," he told Mac Arthur,
had now definitely shifted to New "will depend to a large degree upon the
Guinea and the Solomons. Far from closeness of the cooperation and coor-
planning for further offensives, the Allies, dination of the forces now available to
he thought, should be increasing their you, Nimitz, and Ghormley." There
ground, air, and naval strength in that was no misunderstanding the Chief of
area to match the rapid Japanese Staff's meaning. MacArthur and the
build-up. other Pacific commanders would have to
MacArthur understood entirely even get along with what they had and co-
if he did not agree with the strategy that operate with each other to get the maxi-
assigned to him limited forces and a mum use out of the forces already in the
holding mission, but, he told Marshall, theater. No more would be forthcoming.21
it was doubtful that even this task could Admiral King took a more serious
be accomplished with the forces at hand. view of the situation than Marshall, and,
"Holding areas," he pointed out, must as so often before, sided with the Pacific
have "sufficient forces actually to hold," commanders. Again, on 3 September, he
and their size could only be determined presented the case for Ghormley and
"by a constantly changing accurate ap- Harmon and repeated their requests for
praisal of the enemy's power; an arbitrary more aircraft, including the modern
predetermined strength figure will not P-38. These needs must be met, he in-
insure safety." Failure to review the sisted, even if to do so would interfere
strategic .situation and to meet the chang- with commitments in the Atlantic
ing conditions, he warned, was to invite theater.22
a disaster "similar to those that have suc- Nor did General MacArthur accept
cessively overwhelmed our forces in the Marshall's decision in this matter. In a
Pacific since the beginning of the war." strong response to the Chief of Staff's
In Washington this urgent dispatch, message, he rose to his own defense.
soon supported by a similar if less elo- Pointing to the Japanese advance along
quent warning from Ghormley, received the Kokoda Trail, he emphasized his
immediate attention. One copy went to need for naval forces—practically all of
the President, who discussed it with his had been loaned to Ghormley for the
Marshall, and another to the Joint Chiefs Guadalcanal invasion—and for shipping
of Staff, who turned it and the Ghormley to move ground reinforcements from
message over to their planners for study. Australia to New Guinea. These were
Persuasive as MacArthur was, Marshall essential defense moves, but more than
showed no disposition to change his that was needed. A defensive strategy,
views. In a carefully worded reply, sent he argued, might lead to further defeats
out on the last day of the month, he ex- 21
Rad, Marshall to MacArthur, 31 Aug 42, filed
pressed his understanding and sympathy with JCS 96, Japanese Intentions in the Pacific, same
but made clear his opposition, in the date, ABC 384 (8-31-42) Pac.
22
Memo, King for Marshall, 3 Sep 42, sub: Air
light of "recent decisions involving Reinforcements for South Pacific, WDCSA (9-3-42)
world-wide strategy," to further rein- SWPA.
NEW P-38's being hauled from the port area to the airfield at Noumea, September 1942.
in New Guinea, with disastrous results be sent in time anyhow; and, finally,
for the Allied cause. What was needed that to do so would have a drastic effect
were the means to open an offensive to on the plans for TORCH. Naval forces
clear the northeast coast of New Guinea and shipping, Marshall thought, could
—essentially Task Two, with the addi- be supplied from the South Pacific and
tional burden of taking Buna—as soon Australia, and he suggested to Mac-
as possible.23 Arthur that he refer his requests to
General Marshall was not moved by Ghormley.24
these arguments and appeals. Stoutly he From the Pacific came quick disagree-
maintained, and sought to prove with ment with this estimate of the perform-
the statistics supplied by Arnold, that ance of aircraft and the numbers needed.
there were enough planes in the Pacific Admiral Nimitz pointed out that the
to meet the Japanese threat; that the total figures were misleading. The area
fighters in the theater were adequate for covered was enormous, attrition high,
operations; that more fighters could not
24
Rad, Marshall to MacArthur, 9 Sep 42, CM-
23
Rad, MacArthur to Marshall, 3 Sep 42, CM-IN-
OUT-3025; Memo, Arnold for King, 5 Sep 42, sub:
0944; Rad, MacArthur to Marshall, 6 Sep 42, no Air Reinforcements; Memo, McNarney, DCofS, for
number, GHQ Hist Rec Index Cards, OCMH; Rad, King, 5 Sep 42, same sub. Last two in WDCSA
MacArthur to Marshall, 7 Sep 42, CM-IN-2633. (9-3-42) SWPA.
replacement difficult and slow. More- was evident now that before a decision
over, the dispersion of fighter planes could be reached the Joint Chiefs them-
along the line of communications, dis- selves would have to review the issues.
tant from the scene of operations, ac- It was to this task they turned after the
counted for a large part of the total.25 first week of September.
General Harmon, too, took issue with
his superiors in Washington on the per- The Debate Over Priorities
formance of his fighter planes. It was
discouraging to the pilots, he observed, The decision of late July, affirmed
to watch impotently while the high- during the first week of September, to
altitude Japanese aircraft flew over to launch an offensive in North Africa
drop their bombs. Even two squadrons (TORCH) before the end of the year had
of P-38's in the forward area "would be a profound effect on almost every phase
a God-send." "Do you think it might be of the war. The cost of this venture had
possible," he asked Marshall, "to whittle to be closely calculated, shipping set
just a little bit from BOLERO? I do not aside, troops, planes, and supplies fur-
like to unduly press this, and would not, nished, and plans re-examined. The allo-
but for my conviction that it is of real cation of forces to the various theaters,
and continuing importance in the con- established earlier on the basis of the
duct of the Solomon-Bismarck action."26 ARCADIA Conference and BOLERO, had to
Harmon's comments on attrition and be studied again and new priorities fixed
replacement, and on the need to rest the in terms of the requirements for TORCH.
pilots, gave strong support to Nimitz' And all this had to be done while the
observations, but Harmon also empha- desperate battle for Guadalcanal and
sized, as he had many times before, that northeast New Guinea was raging and
the difficulty in bringing strong air sup- when the need for planes and ships in
port into the Guadalcanal area lay in the the Pacific was most urgent.27
failure to develop the facilities at Hen- Work on these problems began early
derson Field and in the shortages of in August and it soon became evident
heavy equipment and fuel needed for air that, as in previous discussions, there was
operations. a wide difference of opinion between the
Though Marshall followed up these Army and the Navy on the apportion-
and other questions Harmon and Nimitz ment of resources, especially aircraft, to
had raised, the central problem was still the Pacific. The question at issue again
the deployment of aircraft to the Pacific. was the disposition of the fifteen air
Several committees of the Joint Chiefs of groups—actually fourteen since one
Staff had been studying this and related heavy bombardment group was soon to
problems for some weeks but thus far be sent to Hawaii—originally allotted to
had succeeded only in disagreeing. It BOLERO and to become available during
25
Rad, Nimitz to King, 6 Sep 42, 0199, WDCSA the next six or seven months. General
(9-3-42) SWPA.
26 27
Ltr, Harmon to Marshall, 9 Sep 42, copy in For a full account of the cost of TORCH see Mat-
OCMH. See also Rad, Harmon to Marshall, 8 Sep loff and Snell, Strategic Planning, 1941-42, ch. XIV;
42, No. 222, OPD Msg file; Memo, King for Marshall, Leighton and Coakley, Global Logistics and Strategy,
11 Sep 42, sub: Aircraft Sit, OPD 452.1 (PTO) case 19. ch. XVII.
Marshall and General Arnold took the commanders in the Pacific, the Army
view that until the requirements of planners thought, should certainly be
TORCH, the Middle East, and the United able, with a superiority of 1,000 planes,
Kingdom were met, no decision could to carry out their defensive mission.29
be made on the disposition of these This argument by numbers overlooked
planes. Admiral King, while admitting a number of important factors: the per-
the priority of TORCH and even the Mid- formance of American aircraft, the vast
dle East, countered with the argument extent of the Pacific area, the number of
that the planes should go where the need planes immobilized but required in
was greatest. Thus, the debate was really Hawaii, Australia, and along the line of
one of priorities. communications, and the more technical
It was the Joint Staff Planners who problems of replacements, attrition, un-
first reviewed this problem. Responding trained crews, and others which the air
to a suggested order of priority from the officers in the theater were finding so
British Chiefs of Staff, the planners took frustrating.
the position held by their respective Unable to resolve their differences, the
service chiefs. Expanding on the theme planners submitted the dispute to their
propounded by Admiral King, the Navy superiors for a decision on 5 September.
members argued that there was no rea- But the views on which the Army and
son why the United Kingdom should Navy planners had split were held as
have a greater claim on Allied resources strongly by their chiefs, and the discus-
than the Pacific. Against the needs for sion at the next meeting of the JCS
a future offensive from the British base simply reflected and extended the argu-
they placed the urgent requirements of ments of the subordinate committees.30
the South and Southwest Pacific where The Navy members insisted on the lit-
the situation was critical and where eral interpretation of the July agreement
planes might well make the difference relative to the fifteen air groups and
between victory and defeat.28 stressed the urgency of sending air rein-
The Army and Air Force planners forcements to the South Pacific, at the
were equally convinced than an early expense of TORCH if need be. The Army
offensive against Germany with the full refused to accept this view, pointing out
power of Allied ground and air forces that the July agreement "had been re-
was the most effective way to bring about corded only as an agreement for the
the defeat of the Axis. Moreover, they transfer of planes from one jurisdiction
argued, the Pacific would have approxi- to another." On the priority of TORCH
mately 5,000 planes by April 1943, as and the Middle East Marshall refused to
opposed to an estimated total of 4,000 budge, though he was willing, like
for the Japanese. And these 4,000 in-
cluded the air complements of Japan 29
JPS 48, 28 Aug 42, sub: Deployment of Air Forces
itself and the neighboring islands. The in Pacific; OPD Notes on 32d JPS Mtg, 2 Sep 42,
sub: Deployment of Air Forces in Pacific. Both in
ABC 381 (9-25-41), sec. 3.
28 30
Memo, Handy for Marshall, 6 Aug 42, sub: JCS 97, 5 Sep 42, sub: Deployment of Air Forces
TORCH OPD Exec Files; Mins, CPS Mtg, 7 Aug 42; in Pacific, ABC 381 (9-25-41), sec. 3; Mins, JCS
Min, JCS Mtg, 11 Aug 42; Mins, CCS Mtg, 13 Aug 42. Mtg, 8 Sep 42.
Leahy, to reserve judgment on the for the war and would seriously jeopar-
United Kingdom. But, he reiterated, dize the success of the North African
the Atlantic was the area in which the venture. To this King replied that since
United States could get "the greatest TORCH had not yet been launched and
return for the investment of forces."31 the Middle East did not seem to be in
General Arnold took an even stronger danger—a view that Marshall and Leahy
position than his chief. Though ordi- seemed to support—the Pacific ought
narily silent in the deliberations of high not to be relegated to the bottom of the
strategy, he was eloquently articulate on priority list. Finally, after a fruitless dis-
the deployment of aircraft. The build- cussion at the 15 September meeting of
up in Britain of a strong air force with the Joint Chiefs, when Arnold argued
which to bomb Germany out of the war that facilities in the Pacific were hardly
was his chief interest and, in his view, adequate for the planes already in the
took precedence over all other matters. area, much less the reinforcements King
TORCH, he argued, was the beginning of was asking for, Admiral Leahy suggested
the offensive against Germany and was that the matter be dropped until Gen-
closely related to the air offensive from eral Arnold had had an opportunity to
the United Kingdom which would divert inspect these facilities for himself. The
German aircraft from North Africa. suggestion was immediately accepted and
Both, therefore, should have the same the debate over priorities tabled for
priority, General Arnold asserted, and almost two weeks.33
he cited messages from Eisenhower, Meanwhile the joint planners had pro-
Spaatz, Maj. Gen. George S. Patton, Jr., duced another split report. Given Mac-
and Maj. Gen. Mark W. Clark, in sup- Arthur's 30 August warning of disaster
port of this view. The Pacific, he be- and Ghormley's supporting message, the
lieved, had enough planes, if only they planners had been directed to review the
were properly used, and he opposed send- situation in the Pacific and make recom-
ing more until the needs for TORCH, the mendations on the best course to follow.
United Kingdom, and the Middle East The job was handed over to a subcom-
—which bore the same relation to TORCH mittee whose Army members reported a
as the bomber offensive from Britain— week later. Their findings, informally
were met.32 concurred in by Brig. Gen. Albert C.
When challenged by Admiral King, Wedemeyer and Col. Orvil A. Anderson,
Arnold went even further and asserted the chief Army and Air Force planners,
that the diversion of aircraft from TORCH added nothing new to the debate. Mac-
or the United Kingdom constituted a Arthur and Ghormley, they asserted, had
violation of the accepted Allied strategy exaggerated the danger. No additional
forces were needed beyond those already
31
Mins, JCS Mtg, 8 Sep 42; Memo, Admiral Willson
(Deputy for King) for JCS, 7 Sep 42, sub: JCS 97,
33
ABC 381 (9-25-41), sec. 3. Memo, King for Arnold, 5 Sep 42, sub: Aircraft
32
JCS 97/1, 11 Sep 42, sub: TORCH and Air Opns for the Solomons; Memo, Arnold for King, 14 Sep
from the Middle East and United Kingdom, ABC 42, sub: Aircraft for the Solomons. Both atched to
381 (9-25-41), sec. 3. For statement of Arnold's gen- JCS 97/2, 15 Sep 42, ABC 381 (9-25-41), sec 3. Mins,
eral views, see his Global Mission, pp. 337ff. JCS Mtg, 15 Sep 42.
allocated, and if neither commander be- the Pacific was uneconomical and failed
lieved he had sufficient resources to to take advantage of the mobility of the
undertake the operations called for in air arm. All efforts to change his views
Task Two, then these operations ought proved unavailing, and the planners
to be deferred. The Joint Chiefs, they finally decided to refer the matter back
suggested, should explain again to the to the subcommittee for further study.
commanders in the Pacific the strategic There it remained until December de-
policy of the Allies.34 spite attempts to drop it altogether from
The Navy's case was prepared by the the agenda.36
senior naval planner himself, Admiral General Arnold's trip to the Pacific,
Cooke. Squarely he met the argument of at the end of September, though brief,
his Army and Air Force colleagues by gave him an opportunity to observe at
challenging the thesis that preparation first hand the conditions under which
for operations in the European theater the war in the Pacific was being fought
had an overriding priority. He was not and to talk with the commanders. Only
opposed to such measures or to those recently a Japanese counteroffensive on
operations which would contribute to Guadalcanal had been thrown back in
the defeat of Germany, but he felt that the battle of Bloody Ridge and rein-
they should be undertaken only after forcements and supplies were just begin-
steps had been taken to ensure the secur- ning to trickle into the marine perimeter.
ity of the Western Hemisphere, Hawaii, But conditions at Henderson Field were
Alaska, and the line of communications still far from satisfactory and the lack of
to Australia and New Zealand. To ac- fighter planes of modern design to fight
complish the last it would be necessary, off the almost daily attacks from Japa-
Cooke asserted, to send air reinforce- nese bombers was still the most serious
ments, especially fighters, to the South weakness in the South Pacific. Naval
Pacific. What the Pacific commanders forces, too, were considerably reduced.
needed most, he said, was reassurance The carrier Wasp had been sunk on 15
that their area was not forgotten, not an September, and the Saratoga, damaged
explanation of Allied Strategy. And by torpedo action on 31 August, was in
with this reassurance should go, Cooke Pearl Harbor for repair, as was the
concluded, a promise of reinforcements Enterprise. Only the carrier Hornet re-
in the near future.35 mained in action in the South Pacific.
In the discussion that followed, And already coast-watchers and recon-
Wedemeyer moved closer to Cooke's naissance aircraft were reporting large
position, largely because of his opposi- Japanese forces at Rabaul and in the
tion to TORCH. But the Air Force plan- northern Solomons. A major Japanese
ner, Colonel Anderson, continued to effort to retake Guadalcanal was clearly
argue that the employment of aircraft in impending.
During this same period the Japanese
34
Memo, Maj Robert W. Davis for Lt Col R. L. in New Guinea had advanced along the
Vittrup, JPS Secy, 8 Sep 42, sub: Japanese Intention Kakoda Trail until on 16 September
in Pacific.
35
Memo, Cooke for Vittrup, 14 Sep 42, sub: Japa-
36
nese Intention in Pacific. Mins, JPS Mtg, 16 Sep 42.
they had reached a point on the Austra- tend the Noumea conference but the
lian side of the Owen Stanley Range, Southwest Pacific commander declined
only twenty air miles from Port Moresby. because, he said, "pending the comple-
There they halted, worn out by starvation of the operations I am now develop-
tion, disease, and the hardships of an ing in New Guinea I can not leave
incredibly difficult journey, to await re- here."39 Instead he invited Nimitz to
inforcements and supplies and to con- meet him in Brisbane and, on Marshall's
solidate their position for the final suggestion, sent his Chief of Staff and air
assault.37 That assault never came, for commander, Generals Sutherland and
on 23 September 17th Army Headquar- Kenney, to Noumea.40
ters at Rabaul, faced by the more serious The visit to the Pacific and the con-
threat at Guadalcanal and the possibility ference at Noumea did not alter General
of Allied landings on the northeast coast Arnold's belief that the South Pacific
of New Guinea, ordered its troops back already had as many planes as it could
toward Kokoda with orders to secure support and that the solution to the
future offensive key points on the north problem lay in a more effective distribu-
side of the Owen Stanley Range, as well tion, not an increase in the number of
as a strong rear base at Buna. By the end aircraft assigned to the theater. This was
of the month the Japanese were retrac- the position he took on 6 October when
ing the path they had so lately traveled, he reported to the Joint Chiefs, and again
with the Australians in pursuit. It was it was Admiral King who challenged
at this time that two regiments of the him with the oft-repeated arguments
32d Division reached Port Moresby by and with references to the fresh threat
air to join the Australian 7th Division of a Japanese offensive. The only new
and MacArthur issued his plans for a note in the meeting was that interjected
general offensive designed to clear the by Admiral McCain, just returned from
Japanese out of the Papuan Peninsula. the South Pacific, who emphasized some
By accident or design, Arnold's trip to of the practical problems faced by the
the Pacific coincided with a previously air commanders in a theater where main-
scheduled visit by Admiral Nimitz to tenance and spare parts were not always
Noumea. The advantages of a confer- available and where ground crews often
ence of the theater commanders with did not have the equipment to service
Arnold prompted General Marshall to new planes when they arrived. No
suggest to the Air Forces commander closer to agreement than before Arnold's
that he arrange his itinerary so as to be trip, the Joint Chiefs again referred the
present in Noumea on the 27th, the date problem back to their planners, this
when Nimitz would be there. This time with instructions to study the dis-
suggestion Arnold readily accepted.38 tribution of aircraft and the number
Marshall also wanted MacArthur to at- required to reach the "saturation point"
39
37
Msg of Instr to South Seas Detachment, 20 Sep Rad, MacArthur to Marshall, 22 Sep 42, CM-IN-
42, ATIS GHQ SWPA, Current Translation 2. 9515.
38 40
Rad, Marshall to Arnold, 22 Sep 42, CM-OUT- Rad, Marshall to MacArthur, 22 Sep 42, CM-
7355. For Arnold's account of the trip, see his Global OUT-7382; Rad, MacArthur to Marshall, 23 Sep 42,
Mission, pp. 336-50. CM-IN-9987.
GENERAL ARNOLD (center) confers with (from left) General Twining, General Patch,
Admiral McCain, and General Streett at Noumea, September 1942.
of the facilities in the Pacific. This time should be a 50 percent reserve for losses
they were to have the help of General by attrition. Marshall and King approved
Arnold and Admiral McCain.41 the report quickly and the staff began
Within ten days a preliminary report immediately the detailed work required
covering the South Pacific Area was to put it into effect.42
ready. At Guadalcanal and Espiritu The full story of the joint planners,
Santo, where the possibility of "inflicting incorporating the computations of
attrition losses" on the enemy was great- Arnold and McCain, was completed on
est, the planners agreed, the airfields 22 October and approved five days later.
should be kept at the saturation point, As finally revised it provided for in-
with 100 percent replacements at Efate, creases for the South Pacific: 30 heavy
New Caledonia, and the Fijis. In the
42
rear areas, the planners stipulated, there JCS 97/4, 16 Oct 42, sub: Deployment of Air
Forces in Pacific, and related papers filed with it in
ABC 381 (9-25-41), sec. 3. See also OPD 320.2
41
Mins, JCS Mtg, 6 Oct 42. (PTO), case 64.
ADMIRAL NIMITZ discusses the Solomons campaign with (from left, standing) General Patch,
Admiral Ghormley, and General Harmon at Noumea, October 1942.
and 32 medium bombers, 34 fighters, 14 This late October solution to the prob-
Navy patrol and 12 torpedo bombers, lem of air deployment left unanswered
and 24 observation planes. Assignment the basic question: what to do with the
of these planes to specific islands was to air groups remaining from the BOLERO
be made by Admiral Nimitz, and for this commitment. That question had served
purpose he was authorized to deploy and Admiral King well as a lever to raise the
distribute air units within the theater at authorized level of Pacific allocations and
his discretion and without specific per- to gain for the theater commanders a
mission, as had been the case before, portion of the air reinforcements they
from the War and Navy Departments.43 were asking for. Now, when the ques-
tion came up again at the last October
43
JCS 97/5, 22 Oct 42, sub: Deployment of Air meeting of the Joint Chiefs, King agreed
Forces in Pacific; Memo, King for JCS, 6 Nov 42, without argument that the twelve re-
same sub; Memo, Marshall for Deane, 11 Nov 42,
same sub, all in ABC 381 (9-25-41), sec 3; Mins, JCS maining groups, which were not yet
Mtg, 27 Oct 42. available anyhow, should be considered
as part of the U.S. strategic reserve.44 The estimates of the Pacific com-
Thus was ended, temporarily, the debate manders were entirely correct. After
begun almost three months earlier by their initial miscalculation of Allied in-
the cancellation of SLEDGEHAMMER and tentions, the Japanese had quickly re-
the decision to invade North Africa. vised their views and on 31 August
Imperial General Headquarters had
The October Crisis given first priority to the recapture of
Guadalcanal. Both the Army and Navy
The decision in mid-October to send commanders at Rabaul had been ordered
air reinforcements for the South Pacific to assemble the forces required and push
was undoubtedly due, in part at least, to preparations for a general offensive in
the threat of a new and larger Japanese the Solomons. Between 30 August and
assault in the Solomons and New Guinea. 7 September they had put enough troops
The signs of such a threat were too ashore on Guadalcanal to launch their
clear to be mistaken. From intelligence mid-September attack. The failure of
sources had come news of the movement this attack only spurred the Japanese on
of enemy forces from China, the Nether- to greater efforts and convinced them
lands Indies, the Philippines, and Truk that they must defer the Port Moresby
to the South Pacific, and as early as mid- operation and concentrate their forces
September Allied aircraft had reported for a major offensive in the Solomons.
the massing of Japanese ships, planes, It was at this time, it will be recalled,
and troops at Rabaul and in the northern that the troops on the Kokoda Trail in
Solomons. The transfer of these troops the Ioribaiwa area had been ordered
southward to Guadalcanal, by destroyer back to Kokoda and Buna and the rein-
and landing craft, begun in late August, forcements originally intended for New
was by the end of September in full Guinea, plus additional troops allotted by
swing. On the basis of the evidence Ad- Imperial General Headquarters, were
miral Ghormley could not help but con- ordered to Guadalcanal. The new offen-
clude that the enemy would soon make sive was to open on 21 October, later
a major effort to recapture Guadalcanal. postponed to the 23d, and was to be
General Harmon not only agreed but made by one full division and support-
also believed that the Japanese would ing troops, about 20,000 men, and all
probably succeed unless considerable re- the naval forces the Combined Fleet
inforcements were forthcoming and air could spare.46
operations intensified. And from Mac- Allied intelligence sources first thought
Arthur came similar warnings and a plea that this Japanese activity portended an
not to lose this "golden opportunity" to attack against Hawaii, the Aleutians, or
anticipate the enemy and clear the even Siberia, but these possibilities were
northeast coast of New Guinea.45 soon ruled out. New Guinea or the
Solomons, King told Marshall and Leahy
on 3 October, were the probable objec-
44
45
Mins, JCS Mtg, 27 Oct 42. tives, and he recommended "additional
Rad, MacArthur to Marshall, 27 Sep 42, GHQ
Hist Rec Index Cards; Ltr, Harmon to Arnold, 15 Sep
46
42, with entries dated 19 Sep, both in OCMH. Japanese Opns in SWPA, pp. 136, 139, 152.
forces and logistic support ... to meet occasions "radioed his appreciation."
this situation."47 No action was taken Moreover, he was in constant communi-
at the time other than to refer the matter cation with Ghormley, was co-ordinating
to the planners, but within ten days the his air operations with South Pacific re-
Japanese were moving in force down the quirements, and "three times within the
"Slot"—the narrow waters between the week" had sent out bombing missions
double Solomon chain—with large rein- specifically at Ghormley's request.49 Nor
forcements and supplies. Though at- did MacArthur miss the opportunity to
tacked by American aircraft and opposed remind the Chief of Staff that not only
by a naval force of cruisers and destroy- had he been aware of the situation in
ers in the Battle of Cape Esperance (11- the Solomons for some time, but had, in
12 October), the Japanese succeeded in fact, anticipated it. In a reference to his
putting ashore over 3,000 troops and message of 30 August, he reminded the
large quantities of supplies for the Chief of Staff that he had called atten-
attack later in the month. tion to this new Japanese threat some-
With this additional evidence of Japa- time before and "begged review of the
nese intentions, it became clear that the question by the President and the Chiefs
situation in the South Pacific was criti- of Staff lest it become too late."
cal and that emergency measures were Having thus set the record straight,
required. Immediate warning went out MacArthur then went on to provide a
to General MacArthur on the 16th re- picture of the situation in his own area
laying the information picked up from and the disadvantages under which his
intercepts that the Japanese were con- forces were required to operate. Supply,
centrating large naval forces—three car- he pointed out, was the controlling
riers, five or six battleships, together factor, and until he had overcome the
with cruisers and destroyers—in the incredible difficulties of transportation
vicinity of the Shortland Islands, and to and in the battle area, the outcome
asking him again to do everything possi- would remain in doubt.
ble to support operations in the Gua- MacArthur's solution to the crisis in
dalcanal area. Most useful, Marshall the Pacific would require a sweeping re-
told MacArthur, would be air attacks versal of the carefully calculated and
against the Japanese naval forces delicately balanced U.S.-British program
assembling in the northern Solomons.48 for global warfare. Nothing less was
To this call from Washington for as- required, he declared, than that shipping
sistance to the beleaguered marines— "from any source" must be made availa-
one in a long series of similar requests ble to the Pacific; that the Army corps
—MacArthur tartly responded by point- promised him earlier should be "dis-
ing out that he had been supporting the patched immediately"; that all heavy
South Pacific as much as he could and bombers must be "ferried here at once";
that Ghormley had on three separate that his air strength be increased; "im-
mediate action taken" to establish naval
47
Memo, King for Leahy and Marshall, 3 Oct 42, bases along the east coast of Australia;
sub: Mil Sit in Pacific, OPD 381 (PTO), case 102.
48 49
Rad, Marshall to MacArthur, 16 Oct 42, CM- Rad, MacArthur to Marshall, 17 Oct 42, No. C-
OUT-05130. 731, GHQ Hist Rec Index Cards.
and that the British Eastern Fleet should signed them a portion of the defense
be moved to the west coast of that con- perimeter around Henderson Field.
tinent. In short, MacArthur was pro- The day the 164th Infantry reached
posing that the entire resources of the Guadalcanal was the one selected by the
United States and Great Britain should Japanese to begin intensive preparations
be diverted to the Pacific to meet the for the coming offensive. Late that after-
critical situation in the Solomons and noon, thirty-seven Japanese bombers
New Guinea.50 And to make certain that came down to hit Henderson Field, after
his views reached the highest authority which the enemy on the ground opened
he sent a personal message to Secretary up with his 150-mm. howitzers. Finally,
Stimson the next day calling attention shortly before midnight, a Japanese naval
to his message and appealing for a force, including two battleships, stood off
complete review of Pacific strategy.51 the island and leisurely dropped 14-inch
Other commanders, though more mod- shells on the field for over an hour while
est in their demands, were pessimistic a cruiser plane overhead kept the target
also about the prospects. On 6 October, well illuminated. Clearly, this was a prel-
before the Battle of Cape Esperance, ude to the expected offensive, and Ad-
Harmon had declared that it was his per- miral Ghormley asked MacArthur again
sonal conviction that the enemy was to send his bombers against Rabaul and
capable of retaking Guadalcanal and Japanese bases in the northern Solomons
would do so "in the near future" unless in order to relieve the pressure on Gua-
Allied air, ground, and sea forces were dalcanal. And when the Japanese con-
greatly increased. If they arrived in time, tinued their bombing and shelling of
these reinforcements, he thought, would the island, he told Nimitz on the 15th
make a Japanese offensive so costly to the that the big push was on and that he was
enemy that he would not attempt it.52 doubtful whether the marines would be
Among the measures Harmon pro- able to hold out. Air and naval rein-
posed to meet the Japanese threat was forcements were desperately needed, as
the immediate shipment to Guadalcanal was another division in the Fijis, which
of one Army regimental combat team. might well be the next Japanese objective
Admiral Ghormley accepted this recom- if Guadalcanal fell.53
mendation, and on 8 October the 164th If any support was needed for this
Infantry of the Americal Division, formed gloomy prediction it could be found in
in May from Task Force 6184, left New General Harmon's report on the 17th.
Caledonia to reinforce the tiring marines. Japanese activity during the last ten
The move was completed five days later days had strengthened Harmon's convic-
when the Army troops landed at Lunga tion that the enemy would be able to
Point. So great was the need for fresh take Guadalcanal. Like MacArthur, who
troops that Vandegrift immediately as- had stated that the Allies faced disaster
in the Solomons "unless the Navy accepts
50
Ibid. successfully the challenge of the enemy
51
Rad, MacArthur to Stimson, 18 Oct 42, GHQ Hist
53
Rec Card Index. Rad, Harmon to Marshall, 15 Oct 42, CM-IN-
52
Memo, Harmon for Ghormley, 6 Oct 42, sub: 06202, in which Harmon reports Ghormley's message
Occupation of Ndeni, OCMH. to Nimitz.
surface fleet," Harmon asserted that Gua- Southwest Pacific wherever "its employ-
dalcanal could not be held "without ment will be of greater advantage to the
more naval support."54 It was time, he defense of Australia." Final decision on
told Marshall, to consider the conse- the destination of the 25 Division was not
quences of defeat and to strengthen the made until the end of November, when
islands along the line of communications the Joint Chiefs compromised by direct-
to Australia. Fiji, the most important ing the division to Guadalcanal, instead
base on that line, would be most vulner- of the Fijis, to relieve the 1st Marine
able to attack and he recommended to Division for shipment to Australia.
Marshall, as Ghormley had to Nimitz, Thus MacArthur would get a combat-
that another division, in addition to the tested amphibious division, the marines
43d, which was already en route, be sent a well-earned rest, and the South Pacific
there. a fresh Army division.55
The transfer of one of the four divi- Meanwhile Admiral Nimitz was doing
sions in Hawaii had, in fact, already been what he could to help Ghormley. Secur-
discussed and decided upon in Washing- ing permission from Washington to strip
ton. Still pending was the selection of the defenses of the Central Pacific, he
unit and destination. The first was rushed fighters and bombers to the dan-
settled quickly with the choice falling ger zone. And by pushing repairs on the
on Maj. Gen. Lawton Collins' 25th Divi- damaged vessels in Pearl Harbor he found
sion, which was alerted for shipment on naval reinforcements for Ghormley. On
19 October. Fixing its destination pre- 16 October, the carrier Enterprise, re-
sented more serious problems, for at this paired in record time, left for the South
moment the Australian Prime Minister, Pacific in company with the battleship
John Curtin, was pressing for the return South Dakota and nine destroyers. But
of his 9th Division from the Middle East. Nimitz had grave doubts that Admiral
His claim was a strong one, and to satisfy Ghormley was the best man to meet the
him the 25th Division was tentatively crisis in the Solomons. Someone more
earmarked for Australia. The President aggressive, he thought, might do better,
and Joint Chiefs hoped in this way to and, after a meeting with his staff on the
meet Australia's demands and at the evening of the 15th, he asked King for
same time allow General Sir Bernard L. authority to replace Ghormley with Ad-
Montgomery, who was then preparing miral Halsey. Permission was readily
his counteroffensive against El Alamein, granted and on 18 October, when Halsey
to keep the 9th Division under his com- reached Noumea to take over his old
mand. It was with this idea in mind that task force with the Enterprise as his flag-
President Roosevelt told Curtin that he ship, he received orders to take over
was releasing an American division.
55
Carefully avoiding any commitment on Rad, Marshall to Emmons, 19 Oct 42, CM-OUT-
06063; Rads, Curtin to Churchill, 17 Oct 42, and
its destination, Roosevelt said only that Roosevelt to Curtin, 28 Oct 42, filed with Memo,
the division would go to the South or Leahy for Roosevelt, 27 Oct 42, CCS 320.2 (10-22-42)
Australia; OPD Memo for Record, 30 Nov 42, sub:
54
Rad, Harmon to Marshall, 17 Oct 42, CM-IN- Destination of 25th and 1st Marine Division, with
07191; Rad, MacArthur to Marshall, 17 Oct 42, No. other related papers in OPD 370.5 (11-30-42), PTO,
C-731, GHQ Hist Rec Index Cards, OCMH. case 45.
command of the South Pacific area.56 No Marshall and King had their separate
one thereafter had cause to complain replies ready. Both dealt primarily with
about a lack of aggressiveness in the the situation in the South Pacific, out-
South Pacific. lining the forces each service had in the
President Roosevelt, too, was viewing area and the measures being taken to
the situation in the Solomons with in- meet the crisis. Neither could find any
creasing concern. Undoubtedly he had air reinforcements in the continental
followed the debate over priority with United States, where there were barely
keen interest, but it was not until 24 enough planes for tactical training and
October, when the Japanese offensive security. The only practicable source
had already begun, that he took a hand. from which to draw on for the Pacific
"My anxiety about the Southwest Pa- was the United Kingdom or TORCH.
cific," he wrote in an urgent message Shipping, Marshall and King agreed,
jointly to Leahy, King, Marshall, and was the critical problem. In the final
Arnold, "is to make sure that every pos- analysis, reinforcements to the Pacific
sible weapon gets in that area to hold and support of the troops there were
Guadalcanal, and that having held it in limited by the number of cargo vessels
this crisis, that munitions and planes and and transports available. In the next
crews are on the way to take advantage of three months, Marshall pointed out, the
our success." Soon Allied ground troops Army and Navy would be short twenty-
would be engaged in North Africa and five ships a month for the Pacific route.
they, too, Roosevelt reminded his mili- Only by halting troop movements to
tary advisers, would need air support. England, the Middle East, and India,
Matters would have to be so arranged discontinuing the Persian Corridor proj-
that both fronts could be supported ect, and canceling the five-ship allotment
"even though it means delay in our other to Russia for west coast shipments and
commitments, particularly to England." other lend-lease commitments could they
What the President wanted the chiefs to find the ships required to move the
do over the weekend—it was then Satur- needed supplies and equipment to the
day—was to prepare for him a report on Pacific. Another critical shortage was in
the status of all combat aircraft in the ammunition, and that lack, too, Marshall
United States and to check every possible observed, could not be overcome without
source for the temporary diversion of cutting into other commitments. "Re-
munitions."57 gardless of the strength of combat units
This was a large order for a short week- we deploy in the area," he concluded,
end, but by Monday, the 26th, both "we cannot effectively consolidate our
gains unless we secure appropriate
56
Morison, The Struggle for Guadalcanal, p. 183. logistic support."58
Halsey, who was promoted to full admiral soon after
his assumption of command, had had no inkling of
the change when he left Pearl Harbor. Ltr, Spruance
58
to Hoover, 17 Jul 59, OCMH. At the time, Spruance Memo, Marshall for Roosevelt, 26 Oct 42, sub:
noted, Admiral Turner was doubtful of the ability Sit in South Pacific; Memo, King for Roosevelt, 26
of the Allies to hold Guadalcanal. Oct 42, sub: Diversion of Munitions to South Pacific.
57
Memo, Roosevelt for Leahy, King, Marshall, and Both in OPD 381 (PTO), case 107. See also Leighton
Arnold, 24 Oct 42, OPD 381 (PTO), case 107. and Coakley, Global Logistics and Strategy, ch. XV.
Whether or not Roosevelt read these Cruz Islands. Fought at long range by
reports is not clear in the record, but carrier aircraft, this battle, like the one
that afternoon Marshall apparently dis- that preceded it, proved indecisive. The
cussed their contents with Admiral Hornet went down and the Enterprise,
Leahy. The admiral then passed on to South Dakota, and several smaller vessels
Roosevelt the gist of the reports and were damaged. Japanese surface losses
later in the day, on the President's au- were less severe—2 carriers, 1 heavy
thority, Leahy instructed the War Ship- cruiser, and 2 destroyers damaged—but
ping Administration to "provide without their loss of aircraft and trained pilots,
delay twenty additional ships . . . for use combined with the losses at Midway, was
in the South Pacific, not at the expense serious.
of Russia or the new expedition The battle over, Admiral Nagumo
(TORCH)."59 withdrew northward to Truk, not be-
By this time the Japanese offensive on cause he had been defeated but because
Guadalcanal had virtually run its course General Maruyama had failed and there
without disaster for the Allies, and was nothing more he could do until
though the Japanese on the island were another offensive was launched. Behind
still capable of offensive action, the crisis him he left a badly crippled American
was over. The ground offensive had fleet guarding an island on which Ameri-
begun on the night of the 23d. Under can troops still held precarious posses-
the leadership of Lt. Gen. Masao sion of a battered and pock-marked
Maruyama, commander of the 2d Divi- airfield. The immediate crisis on Gua-
sion, the Japanese sought for three days dalcanal was over, but the final battle
to penetrate the line around Henderson for possession of the airstrip and for air
Field. But the marines and Army troops and naval mastery of the southern Sol-
of the 164th Infantry held firm, and on omons was still ahead. "I feel that the
the 26th Maruyama called off the assault, Jap can win now in the Solomons only
having lost at least 2,000 men. by bold aggressive action of heavily su-
Hardly had this threat ended when a perior forces," General Harmon reported
Japanese naval force built around four optimistically on 1 November. "The
carriers and led by Admiral Nagumo picture has materially changed."60
was discovered near the Santa Cruz Is-
lands, southeast of Guadalcanal. The The Shipping Crisis
approach of this formidable fleet had
been noted earlier and preparations The scarcity of shipping, which both
made to meet it. But all Halsey had Marshall and King had stressed in their
were two carriers, Hornet and the re- report to the President on 26 October
cently repaired Enterprise, which had and which the commanders in the Pacific
reached the area on the 24th. It was had complained about frequently, was a
this force which met and engaged the problem of long standing. MacArthur
formidable Japanese fleet on the morn- had attributed most of his difficulties in
ing of the 26th in the Battle of the Santa New Guinea to a total lack of light ship-
60
Ltr, Harmon to Marshall, 1 Nov 42, copy in
59
Memo, Leahy for Deane, 26 Oct 42. OCMH.
SHIPS AT NOUMEA waiting to be unloaded.
ping and made clear that he could not as at Espiritu Santo where the confusion
begin Task Two without assurance of derived from the hasty withdrawal of
continuing logistical support and a se- troops and supplies from Guadalcanal,
cure line of communications. In the of unexpected and unanticipated devel-
South Pacific, supply was only second in opments. But Pacific geography, cli-
importance to air reinforcements. His mate, and the absence of any well-devel-
"most vexing problem," Harmon told oped transportation system, combined
Marshall on 9 September, was logistics. with the shortage of service troops and
"Army, Navy, and Marines all mixed in the waste and duplication of a divided
the jungle, mountains of supplies piling command, aggravated and enlarged the
up on the beach, and a road-stead full of logistical problems. The enormous dis-
ships, bombs and fuel drums scattered tances in an oceanic theater of opera-
through the coffee and cocoa," he wrote, tions almost completely dependent upon
"was a fine picture of war as she is but water transportation created an insati-
not as it should be."61 able demand for ships, the most precious
Much of the difficulty was the result of Allied commodities. And once com-
of the world-wide shipping shortage or, mitted to the Pacific route, with its
primitive or nonexistent ports and dis-
61
Ltr, Harmon to Marshall, 9 Sep 42, copy in charge facilities, a vessel would be a long
OCMH. time returning to home port. More than
twice as many ships, General Somervell The heaviest burden fell on the Free
estimated, would be required to move French port of Noumea where by 23
the same number of troops to Australia September there were eighty-six ships
as to England, and to maintain them in the harbor. Not all the supplies on
there.62 these vessels were earmarked for the
Undertaken on a shoestring despite troops in New Caledonia. Some of the
warnings from MacArthur and Ghormley, ships were destined for Guadalcanal and
the Guadalcanal campaign absorbed other ports in the forward area which
more and more men and equipment. No could not receive them; others were
provision had been made for the receipt naval vessels in need of provisions. With
and storage of the supplies that reached the few berths available in Noumea
the area in response to the urgent re- (shared with French commercial inter-
quests from Army and Navy command- ests) , it is not surprising that unloading
ers. Soon these emergency shipments, could not keep pace with the arrival of
together with those normally required new ships. The situation was hardly im-
for the support of the garrisons in the proved by the lack of co-ordination be-
area, were piling up at the forward bases, tween the Army and Navy, each of which
where the supplies originally scheduled requisitioned separately, had its own
for Guadalcanal were still awaiting shipping, and received its own supplies,
shipment. leaving those not needed aboard ship in
None of the ports in the South Pacific the harbor. Ships thus became, in a
had the docks, labor, equipment, or stor- sense, floating warehouses, a use never
age areas to handle this traffic. Except intended. Moreover, the vessels destined
for Auckland, Suva, Noumea, and one or for Guadalcanal and other advance bases
two others, none of the ports could han- had to remain in the harbor of Noumea
dle large ocean-going vessels, and even until such time as they could sail freely
these were suited more for the normal into the forward area and be unloaded
peacetime conditions of a leisurely sugar promptly. In this way, vessels that could
and copra economy than for the heavy have been used to carry vitally needed
shipments of modern war. There had supplies and reinforcements were immo-
been no time, even if there had been bilized for considerable periods of time,
the will, to build docks, storage areas, thereby aggravating the already critical
and roads, and to bring in the modern world-wide shipping shortage.
equipment and machinery required for So wasteful a system could hardly be
the rapid discharge of large vessels. In tolerated, and emergency measures were
all of the South Pacific there was in July taken to reduce the congestion. General
1942 only one port company. It was Patch, commander of the New Cale-
stationed in New Zealand—far from the donia base as well as of the Americal
scene of battle. Division, was told to add more men to
a provisional port company he had or-
62
Leighton and Coakley, Global Logistics and Stra- ganized earlier, and the Navy considered
tegy, ch. XV. Unless otherwise noted, this section is a proposal to move 600 longshoremen
based to a large extent on this excellent volume, al-
though the author consulted most of the documents
to Noumea by air. In October, General
there cited. Somervell sent his chief planner, Maj.
Gen. Leroy Lutes out to the Pacific to waiting in the harbor. Thus, when the
look into the situation. Appalled at New Caledonia service commander, Brig.
what he saw, Lutes urged Harmon to Gen. Raymond E. S. Williamson, as-
push through plans for a strong, cen- sumed control of port operations on the
tralized supply and service organization, 20th, there were only thirty-seven vessels
and one was formally established under awaiting discharge. This total jumped
Brig. Gen. Robert G. Breene in mid- rapidly during the next month when
November. "General Lutes' visit," Har- the Americal Division was moved to
mon reported to the Chief of Staff, "was Guadalcanal, and the 43d Division plus
a definite help."63 The solution to the New Zealand troops moved in to take its
confusion and waste in the South Pacific, place. These shipments, with the sup-
Lutes believed, lay in the establishment plies destined for the 25th Division, then
of a truly co-ordinated interservice logis- moving from Hawaii directly to Guadal-
tical organization which could control canal, soon crowded the port at Noumea
and supervise all supply activities in the again.
theater. This was the solution he pro- General Williamson met this chal-
posed in general terms to the theater lenge bravely. Utilizing combat troops,
commanders and in specific terms on his Navy longshoremen, native labor, and
return to Washington in November. He experienced civilians from New Zealand,
also impressed on the Washington plan- in addition to the regular port detach-
ners the need for additional service ment, he was able to move the cargoes
troops in the South Pacific, and was suc- much more rapidly. He also had the use
cessful in increasing the allotment.64 of the so-called Nickel Dock—the dock
Though General Lutes' proposal held reserved for the French Nickel Company
out the promise of a more efficient sup- —for three months. During his first
ply system in the future—a joint logis- month of command, sixty of the vessels
tical plan was approved in March 1943— in the harbor were unloaded, leaving a
it did not relieve the congestion at backlog of only twenty-nine. The port
Noumea. That job was done by Halsey was not yet cleared, nor would it be for
and Harmon whose success was, in part, some months to come, but by the end
attributable to the improvement in the of the year there was little likelihood of
tactical situation on Guadalcanal. By 16 a repetition of the September-November
November, when Halsey gave General congestion. The measures already adopt-
Breene's Services of Supply responsibil- ed or under consideration gave promise
ity for loading and discharge at Noumea, of that, and of a more efficient and
the danger from Japanese air and naval coordinated theater-wide logistical
attack had lessened and it was possible program.
to send forward many of the vessels Relieving the congestion in South
Pacific ports was one way of getting more
63
cargo vessels and transports for the Paci-
OCMH. fic run; another was to take the ships
64
For his account of the trip, see Leroy Lutes, from other theaters. During the October
"Supply: World War II." Antiaircraft Journal, Nos.
4 and 5 (July-October 1952); Leighton and Coakley,
crisis, when the need was greatest and
Global Logistics and Strategy, p. 413. congestion at its peak, President Roose-
velt, it will be recalled, had directed the War Shipping Administration suddenly
War Shipping Administration to furnish announced that it had found the vessels
twenty vessels for November sailings to required for the Pacific without cutting
the South and Southwest Pacific with the into British requirements for the Middle
stipulation that they must come from East, thus meeting the minimum ship-
projects other than TORCH and the ping needs for November in the Pacific.67
Soviet aid program.65 The War Ship- But the shortage of cargo vessels was still
ping Administration, unable to find serious and an even more serious short-
twenty commercial vessels, declared that age in personnel carriers was soon to
commitments elsewhere would have to develop.
be cut if Pacific requirements were to be
met. But this was a task for the military, The Crisis Ends
not the War Shipping Administration,
and at the end of October the problem By the time the shipping crisis had
was turned over to the Joint Planners.66 passed, the Guadalcanal campaign had
Within the week the planners had reached its final stage. Having failed in
come up with a solution. Since there October to wrest control of the southern
was no time to divert vessels from the Solomons from the Allies, the Japanese
Atlantic, they left commitments to that were only more determined to succeed
area undisturbed. Six ships, they pro- next time. There were still large Japa-
posed, should be taken from the Hawaii- nese forces on Guadalcanal, and to these
an, Alaskan, and Panamanian runs, and General Hyakutake decided to add the
another six from lend-lease shipments to 38th Division, recently arrived at Ra-
India and the Middle East. A few more baul, for his second attempt. As before,
could be provided by economies in the ground assault would be co-ordinat-
existing schedules. ed with air and naval action, and Ad-
The Joint Chiefs accepted these rec- miral Yamamoto at Truk furnished the
ommendations informally, but the War forces designed to gain undisputed and
Shipping Administration pointed out final mastery of the Solomons. In early
that the cut in lend-lease shipments vio- November these forces assembled at
lated priorities established by the Com- Rabaul and in the northern Solomons
bined Chiefs of Staff. Action by that while destroyers brought in additional
body was a clear prerequisite to approval troops and equipment to Guadalcanal.
of the plan and the matter was therefore Allied intelligence faithfully recorded
referred to one of the combined com- these movements, reporting by 12 No-
mittees for study as a matter of urgency vember the presence of 2 carriers, 4 bat-
—it was already mid-November. But be- tleships, 5 heavy cruisers, 30 destroyers,
fore that committee could meet, the
67
Memo, Deane for Leahy, Marshall, and King,
65
See above, p. 345. 5 Nov 42, sub: Allocation of Twenty-Nine Additional
66
Ltr, Lewis Douglas, WSA, to Leahy, 28 Oct 42, Ships for SWPA; Ltr, Douglas to Leahy, 9 Nov 42;
with Memo, Vice Adm Emory S. Land and Douglas Ltr, Douglas to Leahy, 17 Nov 42. Mins, JCS Mtg,
for Roosevelt, 27 Oct 42, sub: Rqmts for Additional 17 Nov 42; JCS 143 ser. 5, 16, and 19 Nov 42; Leighton
Tonnage. These and other relevant papers in CCS and Coakley, Global Logistics and Strategy, pp. 396-
540 (10-26-42) SWPA. 98.
and a large number of transports and withdrew, leaving four of their trans-
cargo ships in the northern Solomons. ports to be destroyed at leisure the next
To meet this threat Admiral Halsey had day. The Battle of Guadalcanal was
24 submarines, which had been tem- over; the Japanese had made their last
porarily assigned to the South Pacific major effort to retake the island and had
during the October crisis, the carrier lost. Air and naval mastery of the south-
Enterprise, 2 battleships, 3 heavy cruis- ern Solomons was now in Allied hands
ers, plus some light cruisers and more and though the grinding task of destroy-
than 20 destroyers. On Guadalcanal it- ing the Japanese on the island continued
self, reinforcements brought in since for almost two more months, the final
the October crisis included artillery, a outcome was no longer in doubt. In
Marine regiment, and on 12 November, their pidgin English, the natives summed
when the battle opened, another regi- up the general feeling in a song with the
ment, the 184th Infantry, of the Americal refrain "Me laugh along Japani, ha,
Division. ha!" 68
The naval and air engagements be- The Allied situation in New Guinea
tween 12 and 15 November, known col- had also improved considerably by mid-
lectively as the Battle of Guadalcanal, November. Since the end of September
decided the issue. They began with a the Australian 7th Division had pursued
simultaneous effort by the Americans the Japanese back across the Owen
and Japanese to reinforce their troops Stanley Range through Kokoda and on
on the island. In the van of the Japanese toward Buna. By this time two regi-
convoy was a strong battleship force with ments of the U.S. 32d Division had
orders to neutralize Henderson Field moved into the area and stood ready
arid clear the way for the landing to fol- with the Australians to begin a co-or-
low. Guarding the American transports dinated attack against the Buna beach-
unloading the 184th Infantry was a naval head. The Japanese offensive in New
task force of five cruisers and eight de- Guinea, begun so hopefully four months
stroyers under Rear Adm. Daniel J. before, was clearly marked for disaster.
Callaghan, a friend and former aide of Virtually cut off by Allied air and sea
the President. It was this force that met power from their base at Rabaul and
the Japanese battleships off Savo Island pinned down along a narrow strip with
on the night of 12-13 November and in the sea at their backs and with Allied
one of the wildest naval engagements in troops pressing in on them, the Japanese
modern times drove back the superior in Buna, like their fellows on Guadal-
enemy force and foiled the Japanese canal, were indeed in desperate straits.
plan. Losses on both sides were severe. Not only in the Pacific but elsewhere
On the 14th, the Japanese, freshened also fortune favored the Allied cause.
and reinforced, came in again, but this At Stalingrad the Germans had been
time they were met by two battleships
and destroyer escort. The ensuing bat-
68
tle, fought at long range by radar, was Among Those Present, Official Story of the Pa-
cific Islands at War, prepared for the Colonial Office
a clear victory for the Americans. The by the Central Office of Information (London: His
Japanese lost one battleship and then Majesty's Stationery Office, 1946), p. 37.
checked and the great Russian winter Algiers, and Casablanca. "It would
offensive was already beginning to seem," said President Roosevelt, "that
u n f o l d ; i n N o r t h A f r i c a General the turning point in this war has at last
Montgomery had defeated Rommel at been reached." 69
El Alamein and was in full pursuit of 69
Address to the New York Herald-Tribune Forum,
Rommel's army when, on 8 November, 17 Nov 42, quoted in Sherwood, Roosevelt and
U.S. and British troops landed at Oran, Hopkins, p. 656.
CHAPTER XVI
Command and Co-operation
Nothing is more important in war than unity in command.
NAPOLEON, Maxims
The Guadalcanal campaign provided Army-Navy Relations in the

the first real test of the organization South Pacific
established at the end of March 1942
for the conduct of joint operations in In the South Pacific, the most serious
the Pacific. Though the troops on Gua- disagreements between the Army and
dalcanal had survived each crisis and Navy commanders arose from differing
were, by the end of the year, in sight of views on the role of the air arm and the
final victory, the margin of safety had proper utilization of Army aircraft. Op-
been too narrow, the moments when the erational control of all aircraft in the
issue seemed in doubt too numerous to theater was in the hands of naval officers,
permit a repetition of those grueling and first Admiral McCain and then Admiral
heartbreaking six months. Haste, inex- Fitch. General Harmon, himself a sen-
perience, a failure to assess accurately ior air officer with a staff of experienced
the enemy's reaction and the forces re- airmen headed by General Twining, had
quired for speedy victory undoubtedly little or nothing to say about how his
accounted for much of the difficulty and planes would be employed. Through
would be corrected in the future. But Admiral Ghormley he could make rec-
from the reports of commanders in the ommendations and suggestions, which
field and observers sent out from Wash- might or might not be accepted, but his
ington it was evident that these facts did authority extended little further than
not account for all that had gone wrong. his personal influence. And though his
Misunderstandings and disagreements relationship with Ghormley and the air
between the services had had an impor- commander was cordial and even friend-
tant effect upon the conduct of the cam- ly, it could not overcome the differences
paign and would, unless quickly resolved between Air Forces and Navy doctrine.
or removed, continue to plague opera- From the first Harmon felt that not
tions and hinder the effectiveness of enough emphasis had been given to air
future offensives against Japan. power. In his report to Marshall on the
COMMAND AND CO-OPERATION 353
Guadalcanal landing he called attention would be "out of the thick woods."

to the fact that no air construction units Within the week Harmon's mood had
had been included in the invasion force, changed. In a note to General Arnold
and that even when Henderson Field dated 15 September he recited a long
was completed it would be impossible list of grievances. Henderson Field was
to base bombers there until fighter and still not usable by medium or heavy
antiaircraft protection was provided. bombers, and by fighters only in dry
Since the prospect for the early comple- weather. The steel mats required for
tion of the field was slim, he did not construction had not arrived and there
push the matter. More urgent was the was only enough fuel to last four more
need for airfield construction personnel days. He was sending more P-400's and
and equipment, ground crews, fuel, P-39's up to Guadalcanal, but wanted
bombs, and ammunition. Only if the Arnold to know that "they simply can-
Navy could send these up to Guadal- not function at the altitude at which Jap
canal, together with Marine fighter and bombers operate, and are of limited
scout bombers, Harmon told Marshall, value as medium altitude fighters."3
would he be able to send in his own Without criticizing Ghormley — "no
bombers. "If all this were done," he man could have more conscientiously
wrote, "I believe the position can be endeavored to carry out a most difficult
held. It is the procedure I propose to directive" — Harmon made it perfectly
recommend to Admiral Ghormley."1 clear that the Navy's failure to give first
On Harmon's recommendation priority to airfield construction on Gua-
Ghormley did make the effort to send dalcanal was the most serious error of
forward construction equipment, but the campaign and the reason why the
progress was disappointingly slow. Still situation there was so critical. From the
Harmon was optimistic and felt that very beginning he and his staff had
Ghormley was doing all he could. So stressed that point, he said, and he was
gratifying was the naval effort that Har- beginning to wonder "if the Navy really
mon reported to General Marshall on and fully appreciated this necessity in
9 September that he was very pleased the beginning. They seemed to as we
and that he was getting along fine with talked to them but the positive action
the Navy. "My Chief of Staff [Twining] was not taken. . . . The point is that it
and I," he wrote, "confer with Admiral was not the consuming thought in every
Ghormley and his Staff almost every day Naval Commander's mind and the plan
and decisions are made and action taken did not have as its first and immediate
without delay."2 Once the field on objective the seizure and development
Guadalcanal was made suitable for "con- of Cactus [Guadalcanal] as an Air base"4
tinuous, effective bomber operations on The Navy's failure to appreciate the
a reasonable scale"—which he then ex- importance of airfield construction was,
pected to be by the 15th—he felt he in Harmon's view, a reflection of the
Navy's concept of air power as a sup-
1
Ltr,Harmon to Marshall, 11 Aug 42, copy in
3
OCMH. Ltr, Harmon to Arnold, 15 Sep 42, copy in
2
Ltr, Harmon to Marshall, 9 Sep 42, copy in OCMH.
4
OCMH. Ibid.
porting arm for naval and ground forces. defense, regardless of the strategic role
To Harmon, and he assumed to Arnold assigned the Pacific in global strategy.
as well, air power was the dominant ele- Although General Harmon's criticism
ment in the war, surface and ground of the Navy's failure to appreciate the
forces the supporting elements. More- importance of air power or to employ its
over, it was the land-based, not carrier- surface forces offensively left much to
based aircraft, that would have to make be said on the other side, it did make
the main effort. strikingly clear his strong dissatisfaction
Even the Navy's conduct of its own with the conduct of the campaign. Gen-
naval operations, Harmon felt, was open eral Arnold, to whom these comments
to criticism. Though he protested that were directed, soon had the opportunity
he found it difficult "to charge lack of to judge for himself the truth of
aggressiveness," he made it evident that Harmon's assertions. His voyage to the
he held no high opinion of the Navy's Pacific later in September took him to
accomplishments in the South Pacific. Noumea where he conferred with
"Boats go in, start to unload and then G h o r m l e y and N i m i t z as well as
run out on threat of attack," he observed. Harmon. His conclusions, presented to
"No naval surface forces have been in General Marshall on his return to Wash-
the Cactus-Ringbolt area [Guadalcanal- ington, were, first, "that the Navy had
Tulagi] since Turner departed with not demonstrated its ability to properly
what was left of his outfit after the conduct air operations," and, second,
'battle' of Savo Island, August 9th." 5 that the Navy's failure to appreciate the
Overcaution and a defensive spirit importance of logistics had led to a
dominated the Navy's operations, Har- shortage of the supplies required to
mon believed. He appreciated the neces- support military operations.7
sity for "a line of action tempered with The Navy had some criticisms of its
reasonable caution," but pointed out at own. Especially disappointing to it was
the same time that most of the Navy's the performance of the Army's heavy
surface losses had come when it was bomber, the B-17, which, the Navy con-
operating "in a role other than offen- tended, bombed from too high an alti-
sive." As an example he cited the case tude to be effective against shipping and
of the Wasp sunk by torpedoes while on surface craft, the prime naval targets.
patrol south of the Solomons. Assigning General Harmon readily agreed that his
a patrol mission to the carrier and the B-17's were having trouble in this re-
surface forces required to protect it did spect, but attributed it to the green
not impress him as sound doctrine. "I crews and the fact that the strikes were
may be entirely wrong," he wrote, "but often made at extreme range. He hoped
if I owned any CVs I would surely leave to do better, he told his naval colleagues,
them safely tucked away a thousand or but despite his insistence on low-altitude
more miles back or I would use them on bombing the performance of the B-17
a deliberate offensive thrust."6 Vigorous against maneuvering surface targets con-
offensive action he insisted was the best
5 7
Ibid. Memo, Arnold for Marshall, 6 Oct 42, sub: One
6
Ibid. Comdr for Pacific, OPD 384 (4-3-42).
DAMAGE TO SUPPLIES caused by improper packing, dunnage, and handling.
tinued to be disappointing. There was proper loading, and the failure to expand
no getting around the fact that the B-17 the airfield facilities sufficiently to sup-
was not the ideal plane for such port heavy bomber operations. In the
missions.8 latter part of September, these officers
Logistical matters, too, provided cause reported, supplies on Guadalcanal had
for dissatisfaction, and on this subject been so scarce that had it not been for
Marshall received numerous reports the captured Japanese rations and gaso-
which supported the complaints from line, the lot of the troops would have
General Harmon and the conclusions of been "extremely desperate." Their con-
General Arnold. A resume of the infor- clusion, after reviewing other effects of
mation supplied by four Army officers the supply shortages, was that 'long
recently returned from the Solomons range supply planning for the operation
listed as the major shortcomings in the could have been improved upon," and
campaign there the supply system, im- they suggested that the logistical organi-
8
zation established in Australia be used
Craven and Cate, AAF IV, pp. 63-70; Ltr, Harmon
to Marshall, 9 Sep 42, copy in OCMH. Memo, Mar- as a model. These comments, edited to
shall for Handy, 8 Sep 42, OPD 452.1 (PTO), case 13. remove any statements that might unnec-
essarily offend the Navy, Marshall passed

on to Admiral King "for whatever the
information may be worth to your
people."9
Admiral Halsey's assumption of com-
mand in mid-October and the offensive
spirit that marked operations thereafter
brought warm approval from Harmon.
The two men worked well together and
Halsey's insistence on the "one force"
principle did much to eliminate misun-
derstanding, as did his willingness to
give the Army more responsibility and
a greater share in the conduct of opera-
tions. This attitude was apparent almost
immediately when General Harmon,
whose opposition to the seizure of Ndeni
in the Santa Cruz Islands Ghormley had
overruled, recommended to the new
commander that the operation be can-
celed and the forces earmarked for Santa HENDERSON FIELD in November 1942.
Cruz be sent to Guadalcanal instead.
Halsey accepted this proposal with the not adequate to support medium and
result that the Army's 147th Infantry heavy bombers. Harmon was optimistic
from Tongatabu landed at Guadalcanal about the future but had to confess that
the following month. "Where disposi- the failure to develop the airdrome at
tion of Army forces is involved," Har- Lunga Point was "one of the biggest
man told General Marshall, "the Com- disappointments of this campaign."11
mander South Pacific makes his decision Nor had the performance of the B-17
only after conference with me."10 against surface targets improved. Hal-
D e s p i t e t h e improved r e l a t i o n s sey, himself an airman, understood the
between the two commanders in the difficulties and appreciated the fact that
Pacific—Harmon was pleased to report the B-17 was most effective in high-
that Halsey was establishing his head- altitude mass bombing against fixed
quarters ashore at Noumea, close to his targets, but so long as the Japanese con-
—there was little improvement in the tinued to send their ships into the south-
airfield at Guadalcanal. By the middle ern Solomons he had to employ the
of November the field there was still bombers against them.12 Necessity here
9
overrode doctrine and Harmon, while
Memo, Marshall for Somervell, 16 Oct 42, no sub;
Memo, Marshall for King, 20 Oct 42, no sub. Both in suggesting more profitable targets, did
WDCSA (Solomons).
10 11
Ltr, Harmon to Marshall, 1 Nov 42; Memo, Har- Ltr, Harmon to Streett, 16 Nov 42, copy in
mon for Ghormley, 6 Oct 42, sub: Occupation of OCMH.
12
Ndeni; Harmon, Army in the South Pacific, p. 3. Ltrs, Harmon to Halsey, 22 Oct and 20 Nov 42,
All in OCMH. cited in Craven and Cate, AAF IV, pp. 63-64.
General Marshall who reported that the

bombardiers "could not hit anything
from any altitude principally because
they lacked necessary training."13 But
these difficulties, MacArthur believed,
would be overcome soon and better re-
sults against Japanese shipping achieved
under the newly arrived air commander,
General Kenney.
Another disturbing factor in the rela-
tionship between the Army and Navy
in the Pacific was the co-operation, or
lack of it, between the South and South-
west Pacific Areas. General Marshall's
frequent references to this problem are
a measure of the importance he attached
to it, and, perhaps, of his doubts about
assurances of harmonious relations. He
had raised this question very early in
the campaign, apparently on the basis
ADMIRAL HALSEY AND GENERAL HARMON of unofficial reports, and had received
from MacArthur, Ghormley, and
his best to better the B-17 score in Harmon strong denials of any differences.
attacks against shipping. Yet, at the end of August, Harmon told
General Arnold that he was doing his
The Southwest and Central Pacific best to co-ordinate the air effort of the
two areas. "It is a rather delicate assign-
MacArthur's use of the heavy bombers ment," he wrote. "Bring it up in con-
also came under criticism from the Navy, ference every few days and once in a
but for a different reason. He was while hand Ghormley a message sug-
employing his B-17's primarily against gesting he might want to send it to
enemy airfields rather than shipping, as MacArthur. He usually does."14
the Navy desired. When queried about There is little doubt that MacArthur
this, General MacArthur explained that provided support to the South Pacific
it was necessary to gain air superiority when asked to do so. Usually this sup-
in New Guinea and that he had, in fact, port took the form of bomber strikes
achieved this objective. Moreover, it was against Rabaul and the northern Solo-
this superiority that enabled him to sup- mons, and more than once he alluded
port Ghormley's operations in the Solo- 13
mons. His earlier efforts to bomb surface See Rad, Ritchie to Marshall, 21 Sep 42, CM-IN 9230.
also Memo, King for Marshall, 11 Sep 42, sub:
craft, he pointed out, had proved dis- Aircraft Sit, OPD 452.1 (PTO), case 19; Rad,
appointing because of the training and MacArthur to Marshall, 16 Sep 42, CM-IN 6695; Rad,
leadership of his air forces. This was Marshall
14
to MacArthur, 14 Sep 42, CM-OUT 4694.
Ltr, Harmon to Arnold, 28 Aug 42, copy in
the view also of an observer sent out by OCMH.
to grateful acknowledgements from Marshall's efforts to secure the co-ordi-

Admiral Ghormley for this assistance. nation of forces in the South and South-
Still the rumors of a lack of co-operation west Pacific during the Guadalcanal
persisted and as late as 19 October, in campaign seemed to the Army planners
response to a query from the White in Washington to have had little effect.
House, General Marshall had to assure The same officer who had served as the
the President that MacArthur was doing Chief of Staff's observer in MacArthur's
all he could to support the Guadalcanal area, and who had been given the task
campaign.15 of briefing Brig. Gen. Walter Krueger
But MacArthur also had his hands before his departure for Australia,
full, and with justice complained that summed up the difficulties ahead as
his own operations were considerably follows:
hampered by the lack of naval forces.
The problem most urgently in need of
Since these had been loaned to Ghormley immediate solution is that of unity of com-
for the Guadalcanal invasion MacArthur mand of the forces now operating from the
asked late in August that the South Southwest and South Pacific Areas against
Pacific commander be given the addi- the same enemy force based on Rabaul.
tional responsibility of covering the sea . . . The operations of two large and power-
approaches to the Milne Bay area where ful forces are being conducted concurrently
with no coordination other than lateral liai-
the Japanese had recently landed. Appar- son. As long as this continues it is allowing
ently Ghormley and Nimitz opposed this the enemy to take fullest advantage of his
suggestion, but Marshall was able with unity of control and interior lines. A solu-
King's help to arrange for the return tion to this problem would also help in sim-
of the Southwest Pacific naval units to plifying some of the logistical complications
now existent in the support of these separate
MacArthur.16 This transfer had hardly forces.18
been effected when another crisis on
Guadalcanal brought from Nimitz a re- In the Central Pacific Area, which
quest that the submarines in the South- Nimitz commanded as a part of his larger
west Pacific be placed under his control. Pacific Ocean Areas, relations between
Feeling possibly that the co-operation the Army and Navy commands also
between the two theaters was a one-sided caused some concern in Washington.
affair, MacArthur rejected the proposal, Fortunately, since the area was not yet
only to find late the following month the scene of active operations, the dis-
that the Joint Chiefs had assigned twelve agreements there had no serious conse-
of his submarines to the South Pacific.17 quences. But some of these differences
15
dated from prewar days and their persist-
Memo, Capt John L. McCrea (Naval Aide to
President) for Marshall, 14 Oct 42, OPD Exec Files;
ence was not a hopeful sign for co-opera-
Memo, Marshall for Roosevelt, 19 Oct 42, WDCSA tion in the future. In July, for example,
(SPA).
16
the Navy expressed concern over the lat-
Rad, MacArthur to Marshall, 28 Aug 42, No. C-
367, GHQ Hist Rec Index Cards, OCMH; Rad, Mar-
est Army defense plan because it failed
shall to MacArthur, 31 Aug 42, OPD Exec Files. to make provision for certain important
17
Memo, King for Roosevelt, 26 Oct 42, sub: Di-
version of Munitions to South Pacific, OPD 381
18
(PTO), case 107; Rad, MacArthur to Marshall, 16 Ritchie, Notes for Krueger, 20 Jan 43, cited in
Sep 42, No. C-504, OPD Msg File. Draft MS Hist of OPD, OCMH.
naval installations. Rather than order Another example of a lack of single-

General Emmons to alter the plan, ness of purpose in the Central Pacific
Admiral Nimitz referred the matter to was the difficulty in establishing a joint
Washington with the request that his re- Army-Navy command post. This project
sponsibility for assignment of defense dated from October 1941 when the pro-
missions be clarified. King took the view posal was made by the Chief of Naval
that Nimitz had that right under the Operations. General Short opposed the
principle of unity of command, and Gen- scheme vigorously but his successor, on
eral Marshall agreed with him. But orders from the War Department, gave
Marshall made the distinction between his consent. The Navy drew up plans
the assignment of a mission and the em- for the command post in January, re-
ployment of forces for its accomplish- vised them to meet the wishes of the
ment. The former was the responsibility Army headquarters, and then submitted
of the theater commander, the latter of revised plans. These elicited further ob-
the service commander.19 The distinc- jections, and six months passed without
tion was a fine one, not always under- any visible progress. It was apparent by
stood, and the problem became the now that the entire matter would have
subject of dispute again at a later date. to be referred to a joint board for a deci-
sion on the location of the proposed
command post. Such a board was finally
19
Hist, USAFMIDPAC and Predecessor Commands appointed in September, but its mem-
in World War II, pt. IV, pp. 839-40, copy in OCMH. bers could reach no agreement. It was
General Emmons, when he read this volume in not until December 1942, more than a
manuscript, commented that he did not recall any
differences of opinion between Admiral Nimitz and year after the initial proposal had been
himself, except in the case of Canton Island, a made, that a site was finally selected.
refueling point for aircraft. His account of this The building itself was still in process
incident is worth noting:
The defense of this small coral reef [Emmons of construction at the end of the war.20
wrote], with an exposed width of from 50' to 400',
was simple. I believed it impossible to invade it Joint Staffs
from the sea and a very difficult operation to invade
from the air. We had approximately 2,000 troops
on Canton including one pursuit squadron with Long aware of the differences in doc-
another quickly available from Xmas Island and trine and training between Army and
some AA artillery. Furthermore, there was another
route via Xmas Island and still another to the east.
Navy officers, General Marshall sought
The defense of Canton Island was my responsibility. in various ways to overcome the obstacles
We had plenty of troops available in Hawaii but to genuine unity of command. Con-
they were being trained for offensive combat stantly he impressed on his staff and on
operations.
Admiral Nimitz threatened to order me to send
more troops to Canton. I told him that, if he did,
I would have to appeal to the Chief of Staff. A day 20
Hist, USAFMIDPAC and Predecessor Commands
or two later I sent a few additional men to Canton in World War II, pt. IV, pp. 806-09, copy in OCMH.
to prevent further argument and informed Admiral Emmons recalled later that the site was in the rear
Nimitz of my action. He seemed happy about that of the Army command post and that when he left
and I thought that was the end of the matter. The in June 1943 the tunneling work had been largely
Japs reconnoitered Canton early in the war, dropped completed. Work was apparently discontinued after
a few bombs that caused no damage, and never his departure. Ltr, Emmons to Hoover, 10 Jul 59,
returned. Ltr, Emmons to Hoover, 10 Jul 59, OCMH. OCMH.
Army commanders in the field the neces- matters and was on board today getting
sity for subordinating service interests to some problems of supply coordinated."
the larger interests of the war. Conces- At Espiritu Santo were other officers
sion and compromise were the principles "practically serving on McCain's staff." 21
that guided his relations with Admiral In Hawaii there was no comparable
King, and co-operation was a recurring co-ordination between the Army and
theme in the messages he sent to his Navy commanders, none of the fre-
subordinates. quent and informal exchanges of views
One of the major obstacles to a unified which marked the relationship between
command, General Marshall recognized Harmon and Ghormley. When General
early, was the service point of view, the Emmons complained that the Navy did
inevitable result of a lifetime spent in not appreciate the importance of logis-
learning the business of being a soldier tics, Marshall suggested as a means of
or a sailor or an airman. Since there was overcoming the difficulty, the assignment
no way of eliminating this obstacle short of Army officers to Admiral Nimitz' staff.
of an extended period of training, "I am inclined to believe," he told
Marshall sought to diminish its effect Emmons, "that the constant presence of
by placing Army officers on the staff of a capable Army staff officer in a G-4
Naval commanders and sponsoring the capacity with a naval staff would have
appointment of Naval officers to staffs rapidly tended to correct such lack of
headed by Army commanders. This realization." In Marshall's view, liaison
exchange, he felt, would result in a bet- between the commanders was not a sat-
ter understanding by each of the services isfactory substitute for a joint staff that
of the others' problems and practices and would assure the commander of compe-
alert the commanders to potential areas tent and disinterested advice. "Higher
of disagreement. commanders talk things over in generali-
It was this thought that prompted ties. Staff officers plan in intimacy over
Marshall, when the South Pacific Area long periods." To this assertion he added
was established, to secure the assignment General Arnold's view that "until Naval
of two Army officers to Admiral commanders of joint forces have quali-
Ghormley's staff. With the formation of fied Army officers as working members of
an Army headquarters in the area some their staffs the maximum effectiveness of
months later and General Harmon's the combined arms cannot be secured." 22
arrival in Noumea, there seemed to be During the next few days Marshall
little need for Army representation on discussed this problem with Admiral
Ghormley's staff and both officers were King. The admiral quickly accepted
reassigned. Instead Harmon himself and his colleague's suggestion that Army offi-
the senior members of his staff consulted cers be assigned to the staff of a naval
frequently with their naval colleagues. officer exercising unity of command and
"Twining and myself are on board [the
Argonne, Ghormley's headquarters] al-
21
most daily," Harmon reported to Gen- Ltr, Harmon to Arnold, 28 Aug 42, copy in
OCMH.
eral Arnold. "Breene has been contacting 22
Rad, Marshall to Emmons, 15 Oct 42, WDCSA
Admiral Turner and his staff on logistic (10-15-42) SWPA.
proposed that General Marshall should Forces view that Army aircraft under
select the officers for such assignment. naval control were not being employed
On his part, Marshall proposed that effectively. Only by establishing a single
King detail naval officers to Army com- command for the entire theater and
mands to ensure the close co-operation placing an Army officer in charge could
"we have both striven constantly to these problems be resolved, Arnold as-
attain." 23 Both men thereupon informed serted. That there would be powerful
the designated theater commanders — opposition to such a move, he readily
MacArthur was not included — of their conceded. As a matter of fact, he
decision and proceeded to select officers thought a "Presidential decree" would
for these assignments. be required to bring about the change.
In the South Pacific, this move was And for General Marshall's information,
not greeted with much enthusiasm. he nominated three officers for the post:
Harmon thought his method of working General MacArthur, Lt. Gen. Joseph T.
with Halsey entirely adequate, but when McNarney, and Lt. Gen. Lesley J.
Marshall directed him to name an air McNair, all of whom he thought
officer for assignment to Halsey's staff "perfectly capable of conducting the
he did so promptly. Other officers were combined operations ... in this area."26
similarly assigned later under urging What General Marshall thought of
from Washington, but in the fall of Arnold's suggestion we do not know.
1943, there were only six Army officers All he did was pass it on to the Opera-
on Halsey's staff.24 Their value, Harmon tions Division without comment, at least
thought, was questionable. "As good and none that was recorded. There it was
possibly better results would have been studied by General Streett, an air offi-
obtained," he wrote, "had planning activ- cer, and General Wedemeyer, each of
ities continued on the initial basis of close whom prepared a separate memorandum
daily association of opposite numbers on on the subject. Streett, who had appar-
the Army and Navy staffs." 25 ently drafted Arnold's paper in the first
instance, naturally approved of the whole
A Unified Command for the Pacific idea and thought that Marshall would
support it, "regardless of the difficulties."
One other solution to the difficulties What he and Wedemeyer ought to do
in the Pacific was to place the entire now, he declared, was to draft a study
theater under one command. This pro- on the subject for General Marshall, one
posal was first put forward by General that "will not be entirely unpalatable
Arnold on his return from the Pacific for the Navy nor do violence to our
early in October and reflected the Air feelings." The problem would come in
selecting a commander; that task, Streett
23
thought, ought to be done by the
Memo, Marshall for King, 22 Oct 42, sub: De-
tail of Officers to Duty on Staffs of Naval and Army President himself.27
Officers; Memo, King for Marshall, 18 Oct 42, same
26
sub. Both in WDCSA 210.72 (10-22-42). Memo, Arnold for Marshall, 6 Oct 42, sub: One
24
Hist of USAFISPA, pt. II, p. 293. Comdr for Pacific Theater, OPD 384 (4-3-42).
25 27
Harmon, The Army in the South Pacific, p. 19, Memo, Streett for Wedemeyer, 9 Oct 42, sub: One
OCMH. Comdr in Pacific Theater, OPD 384 (4-3-42).
Though he was more cautious about country-boy dumb," he could not help
taking action, General Wedemeyer sup- feeling that the major obstacle to a "sane
ported the idea of a single commander military solution" of the problem was
for the Pacific. The present organization General MacArthur himself. Only with
with its "divided responsibility and MacArthur out of the picture would it
chopped-up areas" he agreed was waste- be possible to establish a sound organi-
ful and inefficient. The consolidation of zation in the area. Streett appreciated
the theater would make possible the con- fully the political implications of remov-
centration of resources where they were ing MacArthur, but thought it could be
most needed. In his opinion, command done safely if the general were given
should be vested in the Air Forces, the some high post such as the ambassador-
service that would exercise the strongest ship to Russia, "a big enough job for
influence in the Pacific. On this basis, anyone." Then, depending on whether
Wedemeyer recommended as his first the Navy or the Air Forces was consid-
choice General Arnold, McNarney as ered to have the dominant role in the
his second.28 war, the post of supreme commander in
That General Marshall saw these stud- the Pacific could be given either to
ies is doubtful; nor is there any evidence Admiral Nimitz or General McNarney.
that either Wedemeyer or Streett ever The South and Southwest Pacific, Streett
discussed the subject with him. But when thought, should be combined under Gen-
the President on 24 October inquired eral Eichelberger, I Corps commander,
about the situation in the Solomons, with Brig. Gen. Patrick J. Hurley, for-
Marshall took the occasion to list, under mer Secretary of War, as his "Chief of
"measures to be taken," the need "for Civilian Affairs." The organization of
a further unification of command in the the remainder of the theater could be
entire Pacific Theater," especially in the left to the supreme commander who
South and Southwest Pacific Areas. "The -would "draw his own lines, designate
present complications in the employment subordinates, and select his own com-
of air in the Pacific," he concluded, mand post."30 General Handy's com-
"emphasize this necessity."29 When the ments on this proposal, if he made any,
President failed to respond to this are not recorded. Streett left the Oper-
suggestion, Marshall dropped the matter. ations Division about a month later and
The postscript was written by General ultimately became one of MacArthur's
Streett five days later when he outlined senior air commanders.
for his chief, General Handy, his views The problems arising from the organ-
on command in the Pacific. "At the risk ization of the Pacific into two major
of being considered naive and just plain commands (one predominantly Army,
the other predominantly Navy) contin-
28
ued to be a major concern of the Joint
Memo, Wedemeyer for Streett, 11 Oct 42, sub:
Supreme Comdr in Pacific Theater, OPD 384 (4-
Chiefs and the basis for misunderstand-
3-42). ing and disagreement between the serv-
29
Memo, Marshall for Roosevelt, 26 Oct 42, sub:
Sit in South Pacific, OPD 381 (PTO), case 107. Gen-
30
eral Streett prepared the draft of this memorandum Memo, Streett for Handy, 31 Oct 42, sub: Comd
for the Chief of Staff. in the Pacific, OPD 384 (PTO), sec. 2.
ices. The fact that they had little effect As a matter of fact while these problems were al-
ways here present, and were not lacking in other
on operations and the vigor and speed theaters, the war against the Japs was won and the
with which the war against Japan was fighting men were not too disturbed or delayed by
conducted is a tribute to the determi- matters of high command. It is a matter of great
question whether this part of the war would have
nation of all concerned to make common been better prosecuted under a single supreme com-
cause against the enemy.31 mander. Certainly both MacArthur and Nimitz prof-
31 ited by the wise decisions of the JCS, and if one or
In this connection, it is worth noting the reaction the other had been SC, there would still have been
of Vice Adm. Bernhard H. Bieri, one of the wartime those decisions to make, and by the JCS. As to admin-
naval planners, to this chapter when he read it in istration, perfection in war was hardly attained
manuscript: anywhere under any system.
By its stress on the divergence of the services on On the whole there was great cooperation and
command, one would get the impression from reading without this even a unified command is not effective.
this history that all the services did was fight each
other and not the Japs! Ltr, Bieri to Hoover, 17 Jul 59, OCMH.
CHAPTER XVII
Japanese and American Plans
The blow, wherever struck, must, to be successful, be sudden and heavy.

GENERAL ROBERT E. LEE
In late November 1942, when the tide The Japanese Regroup

of battle in the southern Solomons and
the Papuan Peninsula turned in favor Although the mid-November air and
of the Allies, the Joint Chiefs of Staff naval battles virtually assured an Allied
in Washington and the American com- victory on Guadalcanal, the Japanese
manders in the South and Southwest were not yet ready to admit defeat.
Pacific began to consider once more how With a full recognition of the serious-
best to continue the offensive against ness of their situation in the Solomons
Rabaul. The offensive inaugurated by and New Guinea—which together they
the Joint Chiefs' directive of 2 July 1942, designated as the Southeast Area—the
it will be recalled, consisted of three Japanese made preparations to recoup
tasks. The first of these, the seizure of their losses and to repulse any further
Guadalcanal and Tulagi, was now al- Allied offensives. Their first step was
most completed. With its completion to establish on 18 November a more
and the seizure of Buna the Allies would effective command in the area. The 17th
have forward bases in the Solomons and Army, which had hitherto been respon-
New Guinea from which to launch the sible for operations in the Solomons and
operations required by Tasks Two and New Guinea, was restricted by order of
Three: the conquest of the remainder Imperial General Headquarters to the
of the Solomons, of the northeast coast Solomons alone. At the same time a new
of New Guinea, and, finally, of New headquarters, 18th Army, was established
Ireland and New Britain in the Bis- for operations in New Guinea, with Lt.
marck Archipelago. It was essential, if Gen. Hatazo Adachi, chief of staff of the
the impetus of the Allied drive was to North China Area Army, in command.
be maintained, that plans for the execu- In addition, the 8th Area Army, a thea-
tion of these two tasks be made quickly. ter command comprising the two armies,
The Japanese would not stand idly by was created, and Lt. Gen. Hitoshi
if the Allies did not follow up their Imamura, commander in Java, was or-
advantage. Already they were making dered to Rabaul to take over the new
plans of their own. post. These arrangements, which the
JAPANESE AND AMERICAN PLANS 365
Navy paralleled by placing the 11th Air for the capture of Port Moresby. . . ."3
Fleet and the 8th Fleet under a South- (Chart 6)
east Area Fleet, were to go into effect To carry out these tasks, Imperial
on 26 November.1 General Headquarters gave to Imamura
Orders from Tokyo to Imamura and strong ground and air reinforcements.
to Admiral Yamamoto, commander of The former included three divisions and
the Combined Fleet at Truk, made it as many brigades. Air reinforcements
clear that the high command was deter- consisted of the 12th Air Brigade and
mined to maintain and reinforce the the 76th Squadron, which, with air units
Japanese position in the Southeast Area. already in the area, were placed under
In the Solomons, both commanders were the newly established 6th Air Division
instructed to strengthen air bases and to provide support for both the 17th
intensify air operations against Allied and 18th Armies. On activation late in
shipping and ground forces. At the same November, the air division had fifty-
time they were to reinforce the troops four light bombers, eighty-four fighters,
on Guadalcanal who would meanwhile and some reconnaissance planes, but it
"secure key positions in preparation for did not begin active operations until a
offensive operations, while recovering month later.
their strength."2 Once these measures After a hasty journey by air from
had been completed, then the Army and Tokyo via Truk, where he conferred with
Navy commanders would unite their Admiral Yamamoto, General Imamura
forces in a joint offensive to retake Hen- reached Rabaul on 22 November 1942,
derson Field, Tulagi, and other key just a few days before Adachi, the 18th
positions in the Solomons. Army commander, arrived from China.
The program Imperial General Head- On the 26th, Imamura formally assumed
quarters laid out for its forces in New command of the 8th Area Army, estab-
Guinea was as ambitious as its plans for lished his headquarters, and issued his
the Solomons. Buna, which had not yet first directive governing operations of
been taken by MacArthur, was to be the two armies under him. Based on the
strengthened, as were the bases at Lae Imperial General Headquarters order of
and Salamaua. In addition, Japanese 18 November, this directive required the
forces were to occupy Madang, Wewak, 17th Army to recapture Guadalcanal
and other unspecified strategic areas in and the 18th, in co-operation with naval
New Guinea. "Preparations for future forces, to hold and consolidate its posi-
operations . . . ," decreed the high com- tion at Buna while preparing for future
mand, "will embrace every possible plan operations, presumably against Port
1
This section is based on Japanese Opns in SWPA,
Moresby. Operations in the Solomons
158-90, and the following monographs in the series, were given first priority and for this
Japanese Studies in World War II: Southeast Area purpose Imamura assigned his main
Air Opns, 1942-44, No. 38; 17 Army Opns, vols. I
and II, Nos. 39 and 40; 18th Army Opns I, No. 41;
strength to the Guadalcanal operation,
Southeast Area Naval Opns, vol. I, No. 48; Southeast which would begin about the middle of
Area Opns, pt. IV (rev.); 8th Area Army, No. 110. January. With these orders went a mes-
All in OCMH.
2
Imperial GHQ Navy Directive 159, 18 Nov 42,
OCMH. 3
Ibid.
CHART 6—ORGANIZATION OF JAPANESE FORCES, SOLOMONS-NEW GUINEA AREA, JANUARY 1943
Source: Southeast Area Operations, pt. IV, Japanese Studies in World War II, 127, pp. 12-14; Imperial
Japanese Navy Organization, Japanese Studies in World War II, 116.
sage of sympathy for those who had sur- January MacArthur announced that the
vived the "hard and painful battle" and campaign for Papua was over, and on
an injunction to the officers and men, 9 February General Patch made a similar
whose bravery was "enough to make announcement for Guadalcanal. Thus
even the gods weep," to "set His Majes- ended the 6-month campaign to halt the
ty's heart at ease" by winning through Japanese drive toward Port Moresby and
to victory.4 the South Pacific. The Allied line of
These orders for offensive operations, communications to Australia and New
issued at a time when Allied air and Zealand was finally secure.
naval forces had gained control in the The decision to withdraw from Gua-
battle area and when Allied ground dalcanal and Buna did not signify that
forces had seized the initiative and were the Japanese intended to abandon the
pressing the Japanese on every side, Solomons and New Guinea. It empha-
proved entirely unrealistic. Buna fell sized rather their determination to retain
early in January, after Adachi had their hold in the Southeast Area and was
ordered his troops to withdraw up the the prelude to a regrouping of forces and
coast a short distance to Sanananda. On the strengthening of defenses. "Here-
Guadalcanal, where the American Divi- after," read the 4 January order from
sion commander, General Patch, had Imperial General Headquarters, "the
assumed control of operations on 9 Bismarck Archipelago and the Solomons
December, the Americans were already Islands north of New Georgia and Santa
making plans for a final offensive. The Isabel will be secured . . . , operational
signs of a Japanese defeat were too clear bases such as Lae, Salamaua, Madang
to be ignored even by the optimistic and Wewak will be strengthened at once
planners in Tokyo, and at the end of and strategic points north of the Owen
December, scarcely more than a month Stanley Range in northeast New Guinea
after it had ordered the offensive Impe- will be occupied and secured."6
rial General Headquarters decided the Even before he received these instruc-
time had come to withdraw Japanese tions, General Imamura had begun to
forces from Guadalcanal and the Buna strengthen his position in the Southeast
area.5 Area. His orders when he assumed com-
The Japanese decision, conveyed per- mand had called for such a program, and
sonally to Rabaul by one of the senior one of his first official acts had been to
Army officers in Imperial General Head- initiate plans for the occupation of
quarters, reached Imamura on 4 January. Madang and Wewak. This task he had
Immediately he made plans for the evac- assigned to the 18th Army, and General
uation of those troops that could still Adachi had occupied both places in mid-
be saved and during the next few weeks December with three infantry battalions
Japanese destroyers under cover of dark- recently arrived from the Netherlands
ness brought out large numbers of men Indies. Work on airstrips and roads
from Guadalcanal undetected. On 23 began immediately. About the same
4
time a special naval landing force moved
Order is quoted in Southeast Area Opns, pt. IV,
8th Area Army, p. 14.
5 6
Ibid., p. 17. Ibid.
GENERAL ADACHI GENERAL HYAKUTAKE
into Finschhafen, off the tip of the Huon did succeed during January and Febru-
Peninsula, opposite New Britain. ary in putting ashore at Wewak the bulk
The garrisons at Lae and Salamaua of the 20th and 41st Divisions. But so
were reinforced early in January by the effective was the Allied air blockade that
Okabe Detachment, a reinforced regi- the Japanese had to make their way by
ment of the 51st Division stationed at land and small boats to Madang where
Rabaul. It was Adachi's plan to bring they sought to open up a land route to
the entire division to Lae, where he the base at Lae.
planned to establish his headquarters, Japanese defenses in the Solomons
and to put the 20th and 41st Divisions were also considerably strengthened
at Madang and Wewak, thus making during this period. The airfield at
both areas strong enough to meet the Munda in New Georgia, originally
expected Allied attack. The plan went intended as a base from which to sup-
awry, however, thanks largely to the port operations on Guadalcanal, was
activity of Allied bombers. The convoy completed on 15 December, when work
carrying the 51st Division was attacked was begun on a new airstrip at Vila
and almost destroyed by Kenney's Allied on nearby Kolombangara. Other bases
Air Forces in the Battle of the Bismarck further up the Solomons ladder, in the
Sea between 1 and 3 March, and the Shortlands, on Bougainville, and on
division virtually annihilated. Adachi Buka, were strengthened and additional
ADMIRAL YAMAMOTO GENERAL IMAMURA
troops brought in to replace the deci- they had sacrificed about 900 naval
mated units evacuated from Guadal- planes, one-third of them carrier-based.
canal. On Bougainville, where General At the end of February 1943, they had
Hyakutake had his 17th Army head- only 200 Navy and 100 Army combat
quarters, was the 6th Division, and on aircraft of modern design, mostly Zero
New Britain was the 38th, reorganized fighters and twin-engine land-based
after its experience on Guadalcanal. bombers. Three months later, after
The three infantry battalions in New every plane that could be spared had
Georgia and Santa Isabel, now the most been sent to the Southeast Area, the
forward Japanese positions in the Solo- strength of the 6th Air Division num-
mons and by agreement between Ima- bered 217 aircraft — 77 bombers, 114
mura and Yamamoto an area of naval fighters, and 26 reconnaissance planes.7
responsibility, were reinforced in Feb- With the Navy's 11th Air Fleet, number-
ruary and March with naval troops and ing about 200 operational planes, and
in April with two infantry regiments. with the 200 carrier-based planes of the
In air power, which had been so criti- 3d Fleet at Truk, this total represented
cal a factor for both sides in the cam- the peak strength in aircraft of the Japa-
paigns just ended, the Japanese had nese command in the Southeast Area in
clearly lost the lead to the Allies. Dur- 7 Southeast Area Opns, pt. IV, 8th Area Army,
ing the struggle for Guadalcanal alone p. 25.
the period before the Allies resumed the command in the Pacific, disguised at
offensive. first as a discussion of strategy. The
initial reaction of the naval planners to
Tasks Two and Three: The the draft directive was favorable, but
Indivisibility of Strategy and Command Admiral King, who had for some time
been pressing for a revision of the July
American planning for operations 1942 directive, did not give his consent
against Rabaul began almost immedi- so readily. He had other ideas that he
ately after the last threat of a successful thought might make Tasks Two and
Japanese counterattack against Guadal- Three unnecessary and give to the Navy
canal had ended. The spark was pro- control of the offensive against Rabaul.
vided by General Marshall who, on 1 Why continue up the Solomons and
December, sent Admiral King for com- assault the Japanese bastion frontally,
ment the draft of a directive for the he asked? On the basis of the Guadal-
theater commanders telling them to go canal experience it would take years to
ahead with Tasks Two and Three. Sub- reach Rabaul that way. Instead, why not
stantially the same as the Joint Chiefs' outflank the Japanese by seizing the
directive of 2 July 1942, which had Admiralties, northwest of Rabaul, and
inaugurated the Allied offensive, Mar- bypass the Solomons altogether?9
shall's draft specified that the forces Nimitz and Halsey showed no enthu-
required would come from those already siasm for this idea when King put it up
assigned to the South and Southwest to them. To the former the relative
Pacific Areas, subject to the approval of merits of a frontal versus a flanking
the Joint Chiefs. Fully aware of Admiral assault against Rabaul seemed academic.
King's concern for the mobility of the In his view, Task One would not be
fleet, Marshall also reserved to the Joint finished until air and naval bases had
Chiefs the right to withdraw naval units been established on Guadalcanal and
in the event of an emergency. Like the the area firmly secured. Moreover, it
original plan, this new directive gave to was impossible to start on Task Two
MacArthur strategic direction of the until Washington made larger forces
campaign against Rabaul during Tasks available. Those in the theater were not
Two and Three but specified that direct adequate to do the job. And when the
control of the naval and amphibious offensive was resumed it should be
phases of the campaign would be exer- directed by Halsey, not MacArthur,
cised by a naval officer. MacArthur, declared Admiral Nimitz, giving as his
thus, would have the authority to select reason the fact that since operations in
the objectives, allocate the forces, and the Solomons would require most of the
fix the timing and sequence of the surface forces of the Pacific Fleet, com-
operations.8 mand should be vested in a flag officer.
With this proposal, Marshall precipi- "Any change of command of those forces
tated anew the long-standing debate over which Halsey has welded into a working
8 9
Memo, Marshall for King, 1 Dec 42, sub: Pro- Rads, King to Nimitz and Halsey, 1915, 30 Nov
posed Joint Directive . . . , OPD 381 (SWPA), 42, cited in Hayes, The War Against Japan, ch. X,
case 83. p. 32.
organization," he told King, "would be much to aid MacArthur's advance along

most unwise."10 the northeast coast of New Guinea. "To
These views Admiral Nimitz expanded send surface forces into the western areas
in a letter to King a week later. In it of the Solomons Sea with the Jap air as
he met his chief's proposal for a flanking heavily entrenched as it is," he told
operation against Rabaul by way of the Marshall, "would be taking a risk beyond
Admiralties with the argument that the the gain to be anticipated even with the
capture of the Japanese bastion would best of fortune."12
not give the Allies control of the Solo- It was primarily to meet the danger
mons. The enemy's bases there and in of Japanese air attack on Allied surface
New Britain and New Ireland, he forces as well as to support naval opera-
pointed out, were mutually supporting tions in the Solomons that Admiral
and there was no assurance that the Halsey conceived the idea of seizing
seizure of Rabaul would reduce their Woodlark Island between New Guinea
effectiveness or induce the garrisons to and the Solomons as the site for an air
surrender. Moreover, if the Japanese base. That island, as well as the neigh-
retained control of the straits and seas boring Trobriand group, lay outside the
south and east of Rabaul, the Allies bad weather belt. Its possession would
would only expose their flanks to attack provide the Allies with a fighter and
if they bypassed the bases in that region. medium bomber base site within range
Thus, Nimitz concluded, the planners of Rabaul as well as a staging point for
would have to accept a step-by-step aircraft midway between the South and
frontal attack up the Solomons, with the Southwest Pacific. Since Woodlark lay
next objective the Munda air base on in MacArthur's area, Halsey suggested
New Georgia or Buin on the southeast to him in mid-December that it be seized,
coast of Bougainville. The choice would offering at the same time to furnish some
depend on the size of the force provided of the troops required. Although Mac-
and the state of Japanese defenses. And Arthur did not take up the suggestion
again he urged that Halsey be given com- then, Admiral King, who had received
mand of operations in the Solomons.11 a copy of Halsey's message, apparently
In the South Pacific, both Admiral looked on the proposal with favor and
Halsey and General Harmon fully sub- asked Halsey to consider also the possi-
scribed to the concept of a progressive bility of taking Kiriwina and other is-
step-by-step advance up the Solomons lands in the Trobriand group. There the
ladder as a prerequisite to the seizure matter rested for the time.13
of Rabaul. "To be able to attack the Bis- Though he was willing to shelve
marcks simultaneously from New Guinea Admiral Halsey's suggestion temporar-
and the Solomons," wrote Harmon, ily, King thought Nimitz' ideas impor-
"would be ideal." But he did not tant enough to pass on to Marshall and
believe that the South Pacific could do
12
10
Rad, Nimitz to King and Halsey, 0235, 2 Dec 42, OCMH.
13
cited in Hayes, The War Against Japan, ch. X, p. 33. Rads, Halsey to MacArthur and King, No. 0510,
11
Ltr, Nimitz to King, 8 Dec 42, sub: Future Opns 17 Dec 42; King to Halsey, No. 2159, 18 Dec 42, cited
in Solomons, OPD Exec Files. in Hayes, The War Against Japan, ch. XI, p. 11.
Leahy. Only Marshall's comments are they could achieve the most decisive
on record. The admiral, Marshall results.
pointed out, had failed to include in his With Nimitz' contention that Admiral
calculations the forces of the Southwest Halsey's command in the South Pacific
Pacific, whose air component would be should not be disturbed, General
"a most important factor in whatever Marshall agreed. He did not intend that
plan is adopted." This failure, as well it should. The plan he had in mind, he
as the absence of information in the pointed out, would leave to Halsey the
War Department on Navy and Marine tactical control of his forces and would
aircraft, observed the Army Chief of not affect the efficiency of his command.
Staff, constituted "the most compelling All that he wanted to do, Marshall told
argument against the continuance of King, was to give MacArthur strategic
divided command for future operations control of Tasks Two and Three. More-
in the Solomon Islands — Bismarck over, he reminded the Chief of Naval
Archipelago."14 Operations, the projected operations
The arguments that Nimitz had pre- against Rabaul would all take place in
sented in favor of a step-by-step advance MacArthur's Southwest Pacific Area and
up the Solomons under Halsey's com- should therefore be under the control
mand Marshall used to support a unified of the area commander.
command under General MacArthur. Admiral King, who had not yet replied
The Japanese positions in the Solomons to Marshall's initial proposal of 1 Decem-
and New Guinea, he pointed out, resem- ber, delayed two more weeks after receiv-
bled an inverted V with the point at ing this new note. In the meantime the
Rabaul. Against each leg of the V the Army and Navy planners continued to
Allies had placed two strong but separate discuss the matter in the hope of reach-
forces, one controlled from MacArthur's ing a settlement acceptable to their
headquarters and the other from Nimitz', chiefs. On 23 December, two days after
thousands of miles away, and each inde- they had received Marshall's memoran-
pendent of the other. "Skillful strategic dum, the Navy planners had the draft
direction, coordinating the employment of a reply ready. They accepted the
of the two strong Allied forces available," principle of unified command without
Marshall insisted, "appears mandatory argument but expressed doubts about
to offset the Japanese advantages of posi- the advisability of turning over to Mac-
tion and direction." Only in this way Arthur the direction of operations in
could the Allies exploit quickly success the Solomons at that time. To them,
against either leg of the V and at the command was inseparable from control
same time use their forces, especially the of the Pacific Fleet. The Navy, they
bombers with their strategic mobility, argued, could not discharge its responsi-
where they were most needed and where bilities unless the fleet commander was
free to shift his forces from one area to
another as the situation changed and in
14
Memos, Marshall for King, 21 Dec 42, sub: Stra- accordance with naval doctrine. What
tegic Direction of Opns in SWPA; Comdr Victor D.
Long to Marshall, Leahy, et al, 15 Dec 42, same sub, the naval planners feared was the im-
with copy of Nimitz' letter, OPD Exec Files. proper employment of the fleet by an
Army commander or the loss of its accept Marshall's proposal, which would
mobility by assignment to a limited thea- not only speed up operations against
ter of operations, a point Marshall had Rabaul but would constitute also "a
made in connection with the employ- positive step toward eventual unifica-
ment of bombardment aviation. "If the tion."16 Nor did Handy miss the oppor-
Pacific Fleet is seriously weakened," they tunity to point out that the principle
asserted, "the whole Pacific campaign of strategic flexibility applied equally to
will collapse. We must therefore be the Air Forces and that ground troops,
careful to insure that the Fleet is not so too, played a vital role in the Pacific
handled as to risk serious loss without war. "The Fleet," he observed tartly,
commensurate damage to the enemy."15 "would be as helpless without air and
Though the Navy planners opposed land forces as the latter would be
giving to MacArthur strategic direction without the Fleet."
of the campaign against Rabaul on the General Handy's appeal for quick
terms proposed by the Army, they were action left the naval planners unmoved.
willing to do it if Nimitz was appointed Several times during the next week they
the supreme commander for the entire prepared rebuttals to the Army argu-
Pacific theater. Nimitz, thus, would be ment and restatements of their own case,
MacArthur's superior and the guardian but never sent them. Finally, on 6 Janu-
of the Navy's interests in the Pacific. ary, Admiral King took the matter into
It was an offer to trade, a quid pro quo his own hands and made formal reply to
arrangement by which the naval plan- General Marshall. Stressing, as his plan-
ners offered the Army command over ners had, the vital role of the Pacific
operations against Rabaul in return for Fleet and Nimitz' broad responsibilities,
control of the Pacific, or, as they put it, Admiral King argued that it was impos-
for an arrangement that would guaran- sible to divorce these from control of the
tee "the strategic flexibility" of the immediate task at hand. "The nature of
Pacific Fleet. these Pacific tasks," he declared, "is so
The Army planners refused to trade vital and so compelling I feel that they
on this basis. All that Marshall had must be given precedence over lesser
proposed, commented General Handy, considerations that may be in conflict."17
was a unified command for operations Despite this strong stand, Admiral
already projected in the Solomons and King showed more disposition to com-
New Guinea. That question could be promise than his planners. What he
settled quickly by action of the Joint proposed was a continuation of the com-
Chiefs of Staff. The larger problem of mand established for Task One, with
command for the entire Pacific had MacArthur and Halsey each directing
"political, international, and organiza- operations in his own sphere while co-
tional implications" that would make a ordinating their efforts and supporting
solution much more difficult. For this each other when required. Only when
reason alone Handy urged that the Navy Rabaul itself became the objective would
15 16
Draft Memo, King for Marshall, 23 Dec 42, sub: Memo, Handy for Capt Richard L. Conolly, USN,
Strategic Direction of Opns in SWPA, OPD Exec 24 Dec 42, no sub, OPD 384 (PTO) case 43.
17
Files. Ltr, King to Marshall, 6 Jan 43, OPD Exec Files.
a single command be required. At that them, as King wanted to do, would be

time, King suggested, MacArthur could foolhardy. But he was willing to accept
be given strategic direction of the opera- other features of the admiral's plan, so
tions against Rabaul, provided that, first, he suggested a compromise along the
Nimitz' control was extended to include following lines:
the waters of the Southwest Pacific, and 1. That MacArthur exercise strategic
second, that the naval forces involved control of the operations against Rabaul
remained under Nimitz' "general com- from the start.
mand" so that he could meet any sudden 2. That Halsey exercise direct com-
emergency. Though he thought it "psy- mand of the naval forces.
chologically undesirable," King sug- 3. That Nimitz retain sufficient gen-
gested also that the boundary line be- eral control of the Pacific Fleet elements
tween the South and Southwest Pacific assigned to the operation so that he
might be moved to solve this troublesome could withdraw them when necessary
problem of command. for use in another area.
General Marshall apparently thought 4. That the Joint Chiefs themselves
as little of this last solution as did King exercise control over the strategic move-
and in his rejoinder made no mention ment of air forces.
of it. Following the line laid down by This latest proposal by General Mar-
General Handy the Army Chief of Staff shall did not differ in any essential
drew a sharp distinction between unified respect from his first proposal made
command for the Pacific theater and "the more than a month before. Clearly,
immediate and urgent problem of uni- General Marshall intended to stand firm
fied control" of current operations.18 and King must have recognized that
The first, he agreed, was desirable if not further efforts to persuade him to accept
imperative but could hardly be attained the Navy view would be fruitless. He
by merely extending Nimitz' authority. therefore dodged the issue by observing
The "international and organizational that until more was known about how
implications" Handy had referred to Tasks Two and Three were to be carried
would first have to be carefully consid- out it would be impossible to reach a
ered and the solution finally adopted decision on command. MacArthur
"based fundamentally more upon the should be directed to get in touch with
selection of the commander as an indi- Nimitz and Halsey and then submit his
vidual rather than upon his specific detailed plans to Washington. "I will
military or naval qualifications." agree with your likely comment that I
The second problem, that of estab- should have made the above point
lishing unified control for the operations months ago," he observed wryly, "—
against Rabaul, could not, in Marshall's however, I make it now." 19
opinion, be left for the future. The Marshall readily acceded to this request
Guadalcanal campaign had demonstrated as he had to King's request the day
only too clearly the shortcomings of the before for MacArthur's views on the
existing arrangements. To continue desirability of making the Admiralties
18
Memo, Marshall for King, 8 Jan 43, sub: Strategic
19
Direction of Opns in SWPA, OPD 384 (PTO) case 43. Ltr, King to Marshall, 8 Jan 43, OPD Exec Files.
rather than Rabaul the main objective.20 because it would have to be undertaken
MacArthur's reply, copies of which went without land-based air support.21
to Nimitz and Halsey, presented vir- This reply was far from satisfactory.
tually the same scheme of operations he What Marshall and King wanted now
and Ghormley had submitted the pre- were detailed plans based upon a com-
vious July, after their meeting in Mel- plete exchange of views among the
bourne. His plan then and now was to Pacific commanders, not a concept of
advance progressively in five successive operations. They therefore pressed Mac-
phases under cover of land-based aircraft Arthur to get in touch with Nimitz and
through the Solomons and up the north- Halsey and submit something more con-
east coast of New Guinea until his concrete which the Joint Chiefs could use
verging forces had isolated Rabaul. Only as the basis for a directive covering such
then would he make the final assault, matters as target dates, command, and
which, he thought, would require long logistics.22 Before General MacArthur
preparations and great resources "and could meet this new request the Joint
might well prove to be the decisive Chiefs and the President had already
action of the Pacific war." King's sug- left for Casablanca in French Morocco
gestion that naval action against the to meet with the British.
Admiralties be substituted for the assault
21
against Rabaul he found unacceptable Rad, MacArthur to Marshall, 10 Jan 43, CM-IN
20
4574.
22
Rads, Marshall to MacArthur, Nos. 164 and 192, Rad, Marshall for MacArthur, 11 Jan 43, CM-
7 and 8 Jan 43, CM-OUT 2273 and 2833. OUT 3664.
CHAPTER XVIII
The Pacific in Grand Strategy

A great country cannot wage a little war.
DUKE OF WELLINGTON
The victories that had given a new increase in Allied resources and trained
urgency to plans for the Pacific, together troops during the past year, there was
with the Soviet stand at Stalingrad and not enough for all theaters and for every
the landings in North Africa, signaled a purpose. It was time to take a new look
radical alteration in the relative position at strategy and reach the decisions that
of the Allies and the Axis. The days of would provide a guide for the future.
crisis, of shortages in critical war mate-
rials were past; the initiative throughout Strategic Concepts
the world was passing into Allied hands.
New and important questions had to be Efforts to produce a long-range plan
answered. Where should the Allies for victory as a realistic basis for the
strike next? How could they best use allocation of resources between Europe
their advantage? How should they and the Pacific had been under way
distribute their resources? since mid-1942. The cancellation of
Almost everyone agreed that Germany SLEDGEHAMMER (the plan for an emer-
was the main enemy and its defeat the gency operation in Europe in 1942),
key to victory, but that broad principle which had the effect of abandoning the
did not provide the answer to the prob- principle of concentration in the British
lems ahead. It was neither a plan for Isles in favor of the invasion of North
victory nor a working basis for the many Africa, combined with additional com-
decisions that had to be made from day mitments to the Pacific to meet the Gua-
to day. Allied forces, engaged with the dalcanal emergency, had virtually voided
enemy in the Pacific and in the Medi- these early efforts. One of the more in-
terranean, were competing with each teresting of these, in the light of the
other for aircraft and munitions. The cancellation of SLEDGEHAMMER, was the
Soviet Union and China had to be sup- study made to determine what effect the
plied and the Middle East reinforced. collapse of Soviet resistance would have
And, most important of all, a decision on Allied strategy. The conclusion, ac-
had to be made on the cross-Channel cepted by the Joint Chiefs, was that in
invasion, deferred in July 1942 for the such an event the United States would
landings in North Africa. Despite the have to reverse its strategy and go on
THE PACIFIC IN GRAND STRATEGY 377
the defensive in Europe.1 After the vic- sis on the bomber offensive against
tory at Stalingrad this possibility became Germany, and General Marshall heartily
so remote that the subject retained only approved the goal of a 1943 cross-Chan-
an academic interest. nel assault. Admiral King accepted the
The search for a strategic concept on emphasis on operations in Europe with-
which to base long-range plans continued out question but objected to the role
throughout the fall of 1942. Finally, assigned the Pacific. The term "offensive-
late in November, the problem was re- defensive," he pointed out, was subject
ferred to the Joint Strategic Survey Com- to varying interpretations, and he pro-
mittee, which, it will be recalled, posed, in a clear reference to the British,
consisted of three distinguished senior that it be changed to "offensive" so that
officers, one each from the Army, Navy, there would be no misunderstanding the
and Army Air Forces, whose function it intention of the United States to exert
was to advise the Joint Chiefs of Staff on constant and steady pressure in the Pa-
matters relating to global strategy and cific. Only in this way, he argued, could
national policy.2 The solution of the the Japanese be prevented from consoli-
elder statesmen of the joint committee, dating their position and the war in the
submitted on 11 December, was to make Pacific brought to an early close. He
more flexible the "Beat Germany First" thought, too, that the strategists had
concept by specifying that though "max- failed to give sufficient weight to the fact
imum forces" would be employed for that stronger forces than those already
the offensive in Europe, the size of these allocated would be required in the Pa-
forces would be limited by whatever cific during the coming year. A fixed
"offensive-defensive operations" might percentage of the resources of the Allies,
be required in the Pacific and elsewhere. 25 or 30 percent, King suggested, should
As the strategists viewed it, the primary be set aside for the war in the Pacific.4
effort was to be made against Germany, Just how King arrived at these figures
first by air bombardment and then by a and how he expected them to be used in
co-ordinated large-scale invasion to be allocating Allied resources is impossible
launched in 1943. Operations in the to determine. But they did serve to
Pacific they limited to those required for dramatize his plea for the Pacific war,
the security of Australia, New Zealand, and to set some limits to the priority of
Hawaii, Alaska, and the line of Europe and the Mediterranean.
communications.3 Instructed by these views, the three
The response of the Joint Chiefs was, members of the Joint Strategic Survey
on the whole, favorable. Maj. Gen. Committee retired for further study and
George E. Stratemeyer, substituting for discussion. Nine days later, on 20 De-
General Arnold, could find nothing to cember, they presented to the Joint
quarrel with in the committee's empha- Chiefs the fruit of their labors. The
1
JCS 85, 24 Aug 42, JUSSC Rpt, Strategic Policy strategic concept outlined earlier re-
of UN and U.S. on Collapse of Russia.
2 4
See above, p. 230. The JCS minutes of this meeting, 15 December,
3
JCS 167, 11 Dec 42, JSSC Rpt, Basic Strategic Con- went to the JSSC and are not on file. This account is
cept for 1943. The revisions of this study described derived from Hayes, The War Against Japan, ch. X,
below are located in the same file. pp. 19-21.
mained unchanged, except for the phrase Joint Strategy Survey Committee was
"offensive-defensive" to which King had approved by the Joint Chiefs, who then
objected. In the new version it became passed it on to the British Chiefs of
"offensive and defensive."5 The com- Staffs for comment.7
mittee had also taken to heart King's The British planners meanwhile had
animadversions on the Pacific and now worked out their own ideas on strategy.
stipulated that "until such time as Like the Americans, they favored the
major offensive operations can be under- early defeat of Germany, but their con-
taken against Japan, we must prevent ception was closer to the formula adopted
her from consolidating and exploiting at the ARCADIA meeting, and they gave
her conquests." Thus, the committee rec- to the war against Germany a priority
ommended that in the Pacific the United on Allied resources much greater than
States conduct those "offensive and de- that allowed by the Americans. In rec-
fensive operations necessary for the se- ognition of Germany's strength on the
curity of Alaska, Hawaii, New Zealand, Continent they favored an intensive air
Australia, and the line of communica- campaign against the Nazis before in-
tions, as well as those required to main- vasion and thought that the main effort
tain the initiative in the Solomons and in 1943 ought to be devoted to opera-
New Guinea and inflict heavy losses on tions in the Mediterranean. All Allied
the enemy. resources, except the minimum necessary
The Joint Chiefs subjected this new to safeguard "interests in the East,"
statement to the same searching scrutiny should be devoted to this primary
it had given its predecessor. First it objective.
modified the committee's statement on Only after the defeat of Germany, the
the war in Europe by limiting the forces British contended, should the Allies turn
there to those "consistent with maintain- to Japan. In support of this position
ing the accepted strategic concept in they pointed to the logistical advantages
other theaters." Indicative, perhaps, of of fighting in Europe as compared to the
the changed role of the Pacific in global Pacific war and to the superiority of the
strategy is the fact that the term "stra- Soviet Union over China as an ally. Nor
tegic defensive," though it was applied did they fail to observe that once Ger-
to other areas, was not once used in con- many was defeated the Soviet Union
nection with the Pacific. Instead, the might well be persuaded to join the
Joint Chiefs accepted Admiral King's Allies in their war against Japan.8
statement calling for offensive and de- Though they minimized the signifi-
fensive operations there and in Burma. cance of the Pacific in global strategy,
In other theaters, not specific, operations the British planners were not blind to
would be limited to those required to their imperial obligations. Starting from
maintain "the strategic defensive."6 the same premise as the Americans—
With these changes, the report of the 7
CCS 135, 26 Dec 42, Basic Strategic Concept for
5
1943.
8
JCS 167/1, 20 Dec 42, JSSC Rpt, Basic Strategic Ltr, Dill to King, 7 Nov 42, with incl entitled,
Concept for 1943. American-British Strategy. See also, Memo, Handy
6
JCS Mtg, 22 Dec 42; draft of suggested changes for Marshall, 8 Nov 42, same sub, ABC 381 (9-25-41),
in JCS 167/1, 22 Dec 42. sec. 3.
that Allied bases and the line of com- greement between the Allies, and the
munications in the Pacific must be made British included a statement to this effect
secure—they concluded that offensive in both versions of their study on
action against Japan should be limited strategy.
to those operations that would "contain The reaction of the American strate-
the Japanese forces and so prevent her gists to this study and to the British
liquidating China or successfully attack- comments on their own report was, so
ing the Western Coast of America, far as the Pacific was concerned, unfavor-
Russia, India, Australia, or New Zea- able.10 The difference over Pacific strate-
land." No mention was made of opera- egy, they told the Joint Chiefs, was
tions then in progress or projected in the fundamental, and they recommended
Solomons and New Guinea. that the problem be studied anew. This
Aware that their formula for the Pa- recommendation the Joint Chiefs ac-
cific, first advanced in November, had cepted after a discussion in which Gen-
been sharply though informally criti- eral Marshall again expressed his feelings
cized by the Americans, the British plan- about operations in the Mediterranean,
ners had a modified version ready when and Admiral King urged once more that
the Joint Strategic Survey Committee's the Pacific be allotted a fixed percentage
report reached them late in December. of the total resources of the Allies.11
Still asserting that the Japanese were in- With the Casablanca meeting only a
capable of expanding their war effort week away, the American planners had
significantly or becoming unbeatable, as little time to re-examine their own ideas
Germany could if left alone, the British and seek to reconcile them with those of
reiterated their preference for limited the British. Two groups worked on the
and containing actions against Japan. problem and both came to the same con-
But they expressed this idea in more clusion: that the British had underesti-
general terms and gave less emphasis to mated the Japanese. There were other
purely British interests in the hope, ap- differences between the Allies, deriving
parently, that their strategic concept mostly from the different emphasis given
"would be acceptable to the Americans. by each to operations in the Mediterra-
Omitting their earlier references to the nean and to the build-up of forces in
necessity for action to hold India, Aus- England for the cross-Channel assault.12
tralia, and New Zealand, they proposed Before firm plans could be made, pro-
instead that operations in the Pacific be duction schedules fixed, and Allied re-
on a limited scale, "sufficient only to con- sources allocated for the coming year,
tain the bulk of the Japanese forces in the U.S. and British heads of state and
that area."9 On the necessity of keep- their military advisers would have to
ing China in the war and conducting op-
10
erations in Burma to keep open the line JCS 167/3, 5 Jan 43, JSSC Rpt, Basic Strategic
Concept for 1943.
of communications, there was no disa- 11
Mins, JCS Mtg, 5 Jan 43. King claimed at this
point that only 10 percent of Allied resources were
9
CCS 135/2, 3 Jan 43, American-British Strategy being used against Japan; later he raised this to 15
in 1943. This paper, like the others in this series, percent.
12
deals primarily with the war against Germany and JCS 167/5, 10 Jan 43, Rpt of JSSC, Basic Strategic
Italy. Concept for 1943; JPS 106, 7 Jan 43, same sub.
reconcile these basic differences and the inevitable clash with the main body
reach agreement on a long-range strate- of the German Army.
gic plan for the defeat of the Axis in The British, poorer than their allies in
Europe and Asia. It was at the Casa- manpower, natural resources and pro-
blanca Conference that the Allies sought ductive capacity, were understandably
to solve these momentous problems. less anxious to formulate a long-range
strategy or to invade the Continent and
The Casablanca Conference take on the Wehrmacht. They wanted
first to so weaken Germany that the
Second of the great wartime U.S.- struggle would not leave England in an
British meetings that marked the most exhausted state. By conducting offen-
successful coalition in the history of sives on the periphery of Fortress Europe
modern warfare, the Casablanca Con- and striking at the heart of Germany
ference resolved only imperfectly the from the air, they hoped to make the
differences between the Allies and failed final blow less costly and perhaps un-
to produce the blueprint for victory the necessary. Thus, they argued for an
Americans had hoped for. In the ten extension of operations in the Mediter-
days between 14 and 23 January, the ranean to knock Italy out of the war and
political and military chiefs of both to force Hitler to scatter his forces. From
nations found themselves separated—as this basic difference with the Americans
they had been a year earlier at the stemmed other differences and the vary-
ARCADIA Conference in Washington—by ing emphasis each side placed on the
national interest, outlook, and divergent problems before it.13
strategic concepts. That they resolved The solution reached was in large
these differences even imperfectly and measure a victory for the Mediterranean
agreed upon a common program was cause, which the President had always
evidence of a mutual confidence and found more attractive than did his mili-
singleness of purpose that their enemies tary advisers. Sicily was to be the Allied
never achieved. objective in Europe in 1943. Meanwhile,
Pacific strategy occupied a subsidiary preparations for the cross-Channel attack
place in the discussions at Casablanca; would continue. Ground forces and
the major problem was how to defeat landing craft would be assembled in the
Germany and where to strike after North United Kingdom during the next year
Africa had been secured. Both sides were and a combined staff formed to plan for
agreed on the goal but each wished to the invasion. Until that time, Germany's
reach it by a different path. The Amer- industrial and economic system was to be
icans, led by General Marshall, argued progressively destroyed, and the morale
strongly for the concentration of Allied
13
air and ground forces on a cross-Channel The records of the conference are bound in a
separate volume entitled Casablanca Conference:
invasion to defeat Germany at the earli- Papers and Minutes of Meetings. See also, Sherwood,
est possible moment. Any diversion from Roosevelt and Hopkins, ch. 27; Churchill, The Hinge
this program Marshall likened to a suc- of Fate, pp. 674-96; Matloff, Strategic Planning for
Coalition Warfare, 1943-44, UNITED STATES
tion pump siphoning away the resources ARMY IN WORLD WAR II (Washington, 1959),
needed for the main effort and delaying ch. I.
of its people undermined "to a point gentleman, the President assured him,
where their capacity for armed resistance was enough for the American people.
is fatally weakened," by a combined Though reassured about the future,
bomber offensive from the United the U.S. Chiefs of Staff could find little
Kingdom.14 cause for present satisfaction. Certainly
It is in the context of the cross- the Prime Minister's statement did not
Channel debate that the Casablanca represent any change in the British view
discussions of Pacific strategy and the of Pacific strategy. That view the Amer-
decisions reached there must be read. icans could not accept. It would impose
Unwilling to tie their hands in Europe on the nation a passive role in a part of
by adopting a long-range strategic pro- the world the American people consid-
gram for the defeat of Germany, the ered peculiarly their own and in which
British were even more reluctant to national interest and tradition dictated
commit themselves to a broad plan for a positive and active program. National
the defeat of the secondary enemy, Japan. pride and sentiment also colored the
Until Germany was defeated the Allies American view. Pearl Harbor, Bataan,
should limit themselves in the Pacific, Midway, and Guadalcanal were symbols
they argued, to the defense of a fixed line that stirred the imagination, and the one
in front of those positions that must be great American hero to emerge thus far
held. To do otherwise, the British from the war was General MacArthur,
feared, might involve the Allies in a whose name was inseparably linked with
major effort against Japan and thus cur- the Pacific. There were other more prac-
tail or make impossible the concentration tical considerations that the Joint Chiefs
of forces against Germany. Such argu- had to weigh. The Pacific was an area of
ments, they knew, might well raise some U.S. military responsibility where Amer-
doubt in the minds of the Americans ican forces were already engaged. To do
about the intentions of the British to as the British wanted might make the
participate in the war against Japan once final effort more costly and stretch the
the war in Europe was over. It was to war out indefinitely, a contingency that
allay this suspicion that Churchill offered, neither the American people nor their
"for the effect on the people of the political and military leaders would
United States," to enter into a treaty accept.
committing his government to turn all There were strategic reasons, too, why
its resources and effort toward the defeat the course proposed by the British was
of Japan, "if and when Hitler breaks unacceptable. Japan was now on the de-
down." 15 The word of a great English fensive and sound strategy dictated con-
tinued offensives to keep the enemy off
balance and retain the initiative. Con-
14
CCS 166/1/D, 21 Jan 43, The Bomber Offensive stant pressure must be exerted on the
from the U.S.; Mins, 65th CCS Mtg, 21 Jan 43. See
also Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate, eds., Japanese to keep them from consoli-
Europe: Torch to Pointblank: August 1942 to Decem- dating their hold over the territory so
ber 1943, vol II, "The Army Air Forces in World recently captured. Moreover, the U.S.
War II" (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1949), pp. 277-93.
Chiefs argued, there were already in the
15
Mins, CCS Mtg, 18 Jan 43. Pacific large air, naval, and ground
forces. To allow them to remain idle going to the Pacific. No proposal could
while the war raged on other fronts was have been better calculated to bring out
unthinkable, a shameful waste of Allied sharply the fundamental difference be-
resources and manpower. Nor did the tween the two sides. But the British
Americans take as lightly as the British shied away from the issue then, and at
the possibility of Japanese attack. The the next meeting sought to avoid it by
enemy, in their view, was still capable asking for a review of the situation in
of limited offensive action and, given the the Pacific. This gave Admiral King an
opportunity, could be expected to do opportunity to explain American strategy
his best to improve his position. in concrete terms and to present his own
It was at the Casablanca Conference views. The operations in the Solomons
that the Americans first used the Pacific and New Guinea, he reminded the
as a counterbalance to the Mediterra- British, were designed to protect Austra-
nean. Both bore somewhat the same lia and its lines of communication. That
relationship to global strategy. The task could not be considered complete
British considered the Pacific, the Amer- until Rabaul, "the key to the situation,"
icans the Mediterranean, as the theater was taken. Where to go after that was a
that threatened to drain away from the problem the U.S. Chiefs had not yet
area of primary interest the resources of considered but King thought the Phil-
both allies. General Marshall was well ippines rather than the Netherlands
aware of this and deliberately linked the Indies should be the next objective. Of
two when he warned the British that the the three avenues of approach to the
threat of "another Bataan" in the Pacific Islands—North, Central, and South
"would necessitate the United States Pacific—he favored the middle one by
regretfully withdrawing from the com- way of the Marshalls, Marianas, and
mitments in the European theater."16 Carolines.
In doing so he served notice on the This review—and preview—con-
British that proposals for further offen- cluded, Admiral King returned to the
sives in the Mediterranean would be met issue Marshall had raised earlier. Only
with similar proposals for the Pacific. 15 percent of the resources of the Allies,
Thus used, Pacific strategy became a King estimated, was going to the Pacific,
lever by which the Americans could barely enough to hold the present line.
exert pressure on the British to bring Another 15 percent would be required
them back to the cross-Channel assault. to continue the offensive. General Mar-
The debate over the Pacific at Casa- shall, who took the floor next, gave point
blanca began at the very first meeting of to King's remarks by describing the
the military chiefs. General Marshall status of American forces in the Pacific.
led off with the suggestion, first advanced The only way to defeat the Japanese, he
by Admiral King at meetings of the told the British, was to keep them off
Joint Chiefs, that Allied resources be balance, force them to fight without
divided between Europe and the Pacific, pause or rest.
on a fixed percentage basis, 30 percent The British could no longer evade the
issue, which by now had merged with
16
Mins, CCS Mtg, 17 Jan 43. the plan for an offensive in Burma to
open the supply line to China. Rather of Rabaul, followed by an advance across
than oppose directly the American pro- the Central Pacific as far as Truk and up
posals, however, the British Chiefs sought the New Guinea coast to the border of
to limit them by stressing the difficulties the Dutch portion of the island. All this,
and problems while expressing appre- as well as the capture of Kiska in the
hension over the diversion of Allied Aleutians, was to be accomplished in
resources. Their position on an offensive 1943.
in Burma, which lay within their own The British planners played the role
theater, was no more encouraging and of critics, disposing of the American
was conditioned as much by political as proposals. Guided by the rule that any
by military considerations. Not only did project that might prejudice the defeat
they fear that it would affect operations of Germany at the earliest possible
in Europe, despite King's assurance that moment was unacceptable, they reduced
the resources required would come from the American program to two offensives:
the 30 percent requested, but they were the capture of Rabaul and limited opera-
concerned also over the effect of a Burma tions in Burma. Hoping, perhaps, to
offensive on the fate of India. Nor did soften their criticism, they suggested that
they share the American view on the later, if additional operations proved
importance of China as an ally. So trying necessary or desirable, the Americans
was this British lack of enthusiasm that might submit detailed plans to the Com-
Admiral King was moved to ask, some- bined Chiefs for a decision "as to the
what unfairly, "on whom would fall the right course of action." 19
principal burden of defeating Japan once This last statement, with its assump-
Germany had been knocked out."17 tion that the Americans had to submit
Obviously, nothing was to be gained by their plans for the Pacific to the British
continuing the discussion and the whole for approval, had an effect quite different
matter was turned over to the planners from that intended. The Pacific theater
with instructions to report "what situa- was an area of American responsibility,
tion ... we wish to establish in the as India-Burma was British, and by
Eastern Theater in 1943, and what agreement was understood to be under
forces will be necessary to establish that the exclusive jurisdiction of the U.S.
situation." 18 Joint Chiefs, subject to the Combined
The planners were no more able to Chiefs (that is, the Americans acting
agree than their chiefs, and though they with the British) only in matters of
did narrow down the area of disagree- grand strategy and therefore not a matter
ment, each side presented its own report. for discussion with the British. In a sense,
The Americans laid out an ambitious this argument was an evasion. The basic
program, which, in addition to the oper- question was the division of resources
ations in Burma, called for the capture between the Atlantic and Pacific theaters,
and the British were certainly within
17
Mins, CCS Mtg, 14 Jan 43. For a full account of their rights in objecting to operations
the role of Burma in these discussions, see Romanus
19
and Sunderland, Stilwell's Mission to China, pp. CCS 153, 17 Jan 43, Situation To Be Created in
269-74. Eastern Theater; CCS 153/1 (British), same date and
18
Mins, CCS Mtg, 15 Jan 43. subject.
PLENARY SESSION AT CASABLANCA. From left, standing: unidentified British officer, General
Ismay, Lord Louis Mountbatten, General Deane, Field Marshal Dill, Air Chief Marshal Sir
Charles Portal, Harry Hopkins. Seated, General Arnold, Admiral King, Prime Minister
Churchill, President Roosevelt, General Sir Alan Brooke, Admiral of the Fleet Sir Dudley
Pound, General Marshall.
that would, in their judgment, divert the main effort against Germany, Ad-
resources from the main effort. By miral King finally asserted flatly that the
taking the position they did, the Amer- Combined Chiefs' authority extended
icans reserved to themselves the right to only to the broad issue of deciding on
decide what commitments they, would "the balance between the effort to be
undertake in the Pacific, and thereby put against Germany and against
limit the resources available for the war Japan."20 The U.S. Chiefs themselves
against Germany. would determine where and when to
These sentiments, expressed at a sep- use their forces in the Pacific.
arate meeting of the U.S. Chiefs on 18 This was plain talk, and if the meeting
January, did not make the discussions was inconclusive it at least cleared the air
with the British which followed any and removed some misunderstanding.
easier. Opposed at every turn and re- By the time the Combined Chiefs met
minded repeatedly that no offensive
must be undertaken that would prejudice 20
Mins, CCS Mtg, 18 Jan 43.
with the President and Prime Minister would consist of, who would furnish
in plenary session that evening, 18 Janu- them, and at what time. And still un-
ary, the planners had worked out a resolved was the problem of dividing
tentative agreement, phrased in the most Allied resources between the two major
general terms, fixing Allied objectives theaters which Marshall and King had
in all theaters for 1943. Accepted by raised at the start of the conference.
Roosevelt and Churchill, this agreement But the Americans had to be satisfied
became the basis for the general plans with what they could get and on 22
developed for the Pacific theater in the January presented their plans for the
remaining days of the conference.21 Pacific together with a very general
statement of how they expected to defeat
Strategy for 1943 Japan. 22 This last they hoped to accom-
plish by blockade, bombardment, and
In several important respects this assault by sea—"measures which greatly
broad statement of objectives was most resemble those which would be effective
disappointing. It contained no clue as against the British Isles." But assault
to how Japan was to be defeated but from the sea, that is, the invasion of the
merely stated that the object of opera- Japanese home islands, was a contingency
tions in the Pacific and Far East would the Americans hoped might ultimately
be to attain "a position of readiness"— prove unnecessary. And it was too early
left undefined—for the all-out offensive to make plans for this contingency in any
to come after Germany's downfall. More- event.
over, these operations—the capture of It was the second of these measures,
Rabaul, an offensive in the Marshall and air bombardment, that appealed most to
Caroline Islands "if time and resources the Joint Chiefs as a guide to planning in
allow," and the capture of Burma—were the immediate future. The problem as
to be undertaken only if, in the opinion they saw it was to secure bases within
of the Combined Chiefs, they did not reach of the enemy and their plans for
"jeopardize the capacity of the United 1943 were designed with that end in
Nations to take advantage of any favor- view—"to work toward positions from
able opportunity that may present itself which land-based air can attack Japan."
for the decisive defeat of Germany in Just what these positions were they did
1943." The Americans could not quarrel not yet know. Admiral King spoke of the
with this restriction but might very well Philippines; General Arnold of China
disagree with the British on what con- and the B-29's still in production. Nor
stituted a "favorable opportunity." would they know until they had settled
The general terms in which the agree- on a long-range plan for the defeat of
ment was couched made it subject to Japan.
different interpretations and promised 22
CCS 168, 22 Jan 43, Conduct of the War in the
to lead to disagreements in the future. Pacific Theater in 1943. No approval was requested
"Adequate forces" were to be provided of the British; the CCS merely "took notice" of the
but no word was said about what they paper and included it in the report submitted next
day to the President and Prime Minister. Mins, CCS
21
CGS 155/1, 19 Jan 43, Conduct of the War in Mtg, Mtg, 22 Jan 43; CCS 170/1, 23 Jan 43. Rpt to
1943; Mins, CCS Mtg, same date. President and Prime Minister.
Lacking such a long-range plan and sion of their right to participate in the
ultimate objectives, the Joint Chiefs detailed planning for an area of U.S.
could not afford to overlook any possi- responsibility and opened up the possi-
bilities or ignore any route of advance. bility of prolonged debate. Such matters
Moreover, their forces in the theater were for the Joint Chiefs to decide and
were not concentrated but divided would be settled in American councils.
among the several areas and under sep- Though the effect of this move was to
arate command. None could be per- shut the British out of any voice in the
mitted to remain idle. With all this in allocation of resources to the Pacific,
mind and after a comprehensive review they accepted the American plan without
of Japanese capabilities, the Joint Chiefs recorded dissent. Next day, 23 January,
decided on three separate offensives for both sides presented this plan together
1943: in the North Pacific to move into with the plan for operations in Europe,
the Aleutians, in the South and South- to the President and Prime Minister.
west Pacific to capture Rabaul, and in The heads of state accepted the two
the Central Pacific to gain the line plans almost without question and the
Truk-Guam. But under the restrictions conference came to an official close. The
imposed by the Combined Chiefs, the military chiefs on both sides could take
advance in the Central Pacific was made considerable satisfaction in their accom-
subject to the requirements for Burma plishments, and in Churchill's extrava-
and contingent on the release of forces gant praise of their work, unsurpassed
after the Rabaul offensive. Everyone in its "professional examination of the
assumed, despite the experience of whole scene of the world in its military,
Guadalcanal and the pessimistic esti- its armament production and its eco-
mates of MacArthur and Nimitz, that nomic aspects."23 They had, at least,
Rabaul would be captured by May of compromised their differences and pro-
1943. duced a program for the next twelve
Precise as this plan was about objec- months. But this agreement was an
tives, it was pointedly silent on several illusion, achieved by semantic means and
important matters. There was in it no by an overcommitment in Burma, in the
mention of the dates on which these Pacific, and in Europe. The differences
operations would occur or their se- remained, hidden behind a cloak of
quence; nor did it contain any estimates generalities. The very first test would
of the forces that would be required. tear it apart and reveal the failures of
These omissions were deliberate. To Casablanca.
have submitted this information to the 23
Quoted in Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, p.
British would have been a tacit admis- 684.
CHAPTER XIX
Means and Ends: The March 1943 Directive

When two people ride the same horse, one must sit behind.
ANONYMOUS
Hardly had the U.S. Chiefs of Staff Halsey, by personal conference if possi-
returned to Washington than the united ble, or, failing that, by staff conversations.
front they had presented to the British MacArthur's plan, when it came, proved
at Casablanca fell apart. The family to be virtually a restatement of earlier
quarrels they had put aside for the visitproposals and a request for many more
they resumed in the privacy of their own men and planes. Nor had he discussed
chambers, picking up the dispute over these proposals with Nimitz and Halsey,
command and strategy where they had as the Joint Chiefs had requested, but
left it some weeks before. But now the instead had sent copies to each. On the
problem was complicated by agreements basis of their replies—which he had not
made with the British at Casablanca and yet received—he and the two naval com-
by new and unexpected demands from manders, he explained, would make
the Pacific. Spurred on by the necessity their decision. Staff officers could then
of maintaining the offensive against arrange the details. "Meanwhile," he
Japan, the Joint Chiefs finally reached told Marshall, "I am continuing with the
agreement on the course to follow, but itdevelopment of detailed plans." 1
fell far short of the goal set at Casa- MacArthur's proposals hardly pro-
blanca and was, like almost all other vided the basis for decision in Washing-
arrangements made for the Pacific, a ton. To Admiral King they seemed to
compromise that neither side accepted as constitute more a concept than a plan
final. and gave no concrete idea of what Mac-
Arthur intended to do, "how he expects
Theater Plans to do it or what the command set-up is
to be." If the Joint Chiefs could not get
Before leaving for Casablanca, this information King recommended they
Marshall and King had agreed to sus- ask Nimitz and Halsey to furnish their
pend their discussion of command for own plans for the Solomons. The Joint
Tasks Two and Three pending the re- Chiefs themselves could then co-ordinate
ceipt of detailed plans from MacArthur.
These plans, they had told him, were to 1
Rad, MacArthur to Marshall, 27 Jan 43, CM-IN
be co-ordinated with Admirals Nimitz and 12553.
these plans with those MacArthur made disturbed the cordial relations between
for New Guinea.2 MacArthur and Halsey. Both had by
Admiral King's dissatisfaction with the now virtually completed their plans and
lack of co-ordination in the Pacific was were ready to arrange the final details.
further increased when MacArthur failed Halsey's next operation, the occupation
to respond to a request from the South of the Russell Islands between Guadal-
Pacific for air reinforcements early in canal and New Georgia, was scheduled
February. Mistaking increased air activ- for 21 February, and the forces assigned
ity and a concentration of Japanese ves- for the invasion were already assembling
sels formed to evacuate troops from at Guadalcanal. Authorized by Admiral
Guadalcanal as the prelude to another Nimitz on 29 January, the Russells oper-
attack, Admiral Halsey asked MacArthur ation was really an extension of Task
for the loan of some heavy bombers to One and designed to gain an advance
meet the emergency, while initiating base for later operations against New
action from Washington toward the Georgia. The 43d Division, with at-
same end. MacArthur, concerned with tached Marine troops, would make the
the security of his own area, refused the landing and construction troops would
request but promised to give what aid he follow closely to put in the air and naval
could by support missions if Halsey facilities. No support was requested
would give him more information. "I from General MacArthur and none was
am in complete ignorance of what you needed, for the Japanese had abandoned
contemplate," he told Admiral Halsey, the island and the operation was
adding that until he had such knowl- concluded without bloodshed.5
edge he could not justify the diversion of Even before the seizure of the Russells,
his air forces or the dislocation of his Halsey had apparently decided upon
plans. "Moreover," he concluded, "ef- New Georgia as his next objective.
fective support can only be given if Nimitz had suggested earlier the possi-
sufficient information is available to me bility of bypassing New Georgia and
to permit coordination."3 Despite inter- going directly to Bougainville, but this
cession from Washington, Halsey did not was clearly out of the question now.
receive any bombers from MacArthur Japanese preparations to defend New
and the matter was dropped when the Georgia and the construction of airfields
Japanese threat failed to materialize.4 there, fully reported by the coast watch-
Although this incident seemed to con- ers, and by air reconnaissance, made its
firm the worst fears of those in Washing- capture an essential step in the advance
ton who were concerned over the lack of on Rabaul. On this assumption Halsey's
co-ordination in the Pacific, it hardly staff had drawn up plans for the seizure
of New Georgia, with the tentative target
2
Memo, King for Marshall, 6 Feb 43, sub: Opns date of 1 April.
in SWPA for Prosecution of Rabaul Campaign, OPD
381 (PTO) sec. 3; Draft Memo (not sent), Marshall
It was these plans that Rear Adm.
for King, 13 Feb 43, same sub, OPD Exec Files. Theodore S. Wilkinson, Halsey's deputy,
3
Paraphrase of Msg in Rad, MacArthur to Mar- carried to Brisbane on 11 February.
shall, 9 Feb 43, CM-IN 4996.
4 5
For material on the Washington side, see the Miller, Guadalcanal: The First Offensive, pp.
WDCSA 452.1 (SPA) file and messages. 351-56.
MEANS AND ENDS: THE MARCH 1943 DIRECTIVE 389
Rather than reply to MacArthur's pro- way for the final stage, a combined effort
posals by radio, the South Pacific com- by both theaters against Rabaul.7
mander had chosen this means to ELKTON provided no dates. In Mac-
co-ordinate his plans with those of the Arthur's view it would be unrealistic to
Southwest Pacific. Agreement was put them in until he knew what forces
reached almost immediately, for that he would have. The South Pacific, he
same day MacArthur reported to Gen- contended, had sufficient strength to
eral Marshall that co-ordination had carry out its part of the plan, but he
been arranged and that he and Halsey, could not even undertake the campaign
according to Wilkinson, were in com- against Lae without reinforcements.
plete agreement on the execution of Four of his six divisions—three were
Tasks Two and Three.6 Australian—were worn out by the recent
By this time MacArthur had virtually campaign in Papua, his naval forces were
completed the detailed plan so persis- weak, and his air strength was far below
tently requested by the Joint Chiefs. the minimum required for the offensive.
Dated 12 February and called ELKTON I To put ELKTON into effect he would
to distinguish it from the revised versions need, he estimated, 1,800 more planes,
that followed, this plan was basically the five divisions, and more cruisers,
same as the earlier TULSA and the one destroyers, and PT boats.
submitted with Ghormley in July of the In view of the Joint Chiefs' desire to
previous year. As before, the offensive conduct the offensive with forces already
against Rabaul was divided into five allocated to the Pacific and their assump-
stages with the forces in the Solomons tion that Rabaul would be taken in 1943,
and New Guinea converging on the final it was, perhaps, well that MacArthur de-
objective. Each stage represented a sepa- cided to send his chief of staff, General
rate operation or series of operations de- Sutherland, and other members of his
signed to gain a strategic position for staff to Washington with the plan to
further advances under cover of fighter explain it. These officers, he told
aircraft. In the first, MacArthur's forces Marshall, could leave at the end of Feb-
would take Lae by a combined airborne, ruary and on the return journey stop off
ground, and amphibious assault, then at Pearl Harbor and Noumea to see
Finschhafen and other bases in the Huon Nimitz and Halsey. From this sugges-
Gulf-Vitiaz Strait area, and, finally, Ma- tion grew the idea of a full-scale confer-
dang, to seal off the waters north of the ence in Washington. On 16 February
strait. The South Pacific Force was to invitations went out to the Pacific com-
follow up with the capture of New Geor- manders. Each was asked to send repre-
gia and then, simultaneously with the sentatives to the conference and each
Southwest Pacific assault on New Britain, agreed. By early March a high-ranking
would move into Bougainville. The
seizure of Kavieng, the fourth step in the 7
ELKTON I, 12 Feb 43, Photostat in OCMH; GHQ
plan, would isolate Rabaul and pave the SPWA, Studies in the History of SWPA, (4 vols), II,
New Guinea and Bismarck Campaign, 29-32, Hist
Sec, G-3; John Miller, jr., CARTWHEEL: The Re-
6
Rad, MacArthur to Marshall, 11 Feb 43, CM-IN duction of Rabaul, UNITED STATES ARMY IN
5610. WORLD WAR II (Washington, 1959), ch. II.
group including Sutherland, Kenney, the session was devoted to a reading of

Harmon, Emmons, Spruance, and MacArthur's long-awaited plan, now re-
Twining, was on its way.8 vised and bearing the title of ELKTON II.
Before the delegates could assemble to The concept and scheme of maneuver
settle Pacific affairs, Admiral King made were unchanged, but the number of
one more last effort to gain for the Navy forces required had been raised since the
control of operations in the Solomons. original plan had been completed. Now
This time he sought to accomplish his MacArthur would require for himself
purpose by "modifying" the boundaries and Halsey—he assumed the two tasks
between the South and Southwest Pacific would be under his control—a total of
so as to place Bougainville and the New twenty-two and two-thirds divisions,
Georgia Group in Halsey's area. Such a forty-five air groups, and whatever war-
modification, he assured Marshall, would ships the Joint Chiefs could furnish. He
"clarify the military situation." The did not specify the cargo ships, troop
Army Chief of Staff refused even to con- transports, landing craft, supplies, and
sider the proposal, responding briefly replacements that he would need, but
that it was not advisable to change the there was no doubt that they would reach
boundaries "in this critical area prior to imposing proportions. All this was to
the conference." 9 At this point King left be supplied in advance of the first step.10
for the west coast to meet Admiral The Washington planners were com-
N i m i t z but was back before the pletely unprepared for such large de-
conference began. mands. Though a secondary theater in
their view, the Pacific had larger Ameri-
The Pacific Military Conference can forces than any other theater of oper-
ations. Army strength alone, exclusive
The Pacific Military Conference of Alaska, amounted to 374,000 men as
opened on 12 March with an imposing compared to 298,000 in the Mediterra-
array of admirals and generals in at- nean and 107,000 in the United King-
tendance. Admiral King led off with a dom. But this proportion was expected
brief summary of the Casablanca deci- to change rapidly in the course of the
sions, followed by General McNarney, year as operations in Europe expanded.
acting for Marshall. The remainder of Even without close study it was evident
8
to those who heard General Sutherland
Rads, MacArthur to Marshall, 15 Feb 43, CM-IN
7418; Marshall to MacArthur to Emmons for Nimitz;
read MacArthur's requirements for the
Marshall to Harmon for Halsey, 16 Feb 43, CM-OUT capture of Rabaul that some serious ad-
5656-60. Also included in the delegation were Brig. justments would have to be made in
Gen. Stephen J. Chamberlin, G-3, GHQ SWPA; their plans or his. It is little wonder,
Brig. Gen. Dewitt Peck (USMC) and Capt. Miles R.
Browning (USN), Halsey's war plans officer and then, that Admiral Cooke, who presided
chief of staff; and Capt. Forrest P. Sherman (USN) over the conference, adjourned the meet-
of Nimitz' staff. General Wedemeyer, who had been ing until the next day to give the plan-
to Casablanca and was en route from China to Bris-
bane to explain the Casablanca decisions to Mac-
Arthur, accompanied the group.
9 10
Memos, King for Marshall, 18 Feb 43, sub: Devel- ELKTON II, 28 Feb 43, ABC 370.26 (6-8-42), sec.
opment of Opns in South-Southwest Pacific; Marshall 2. The minutes of the conference are separately
for King, 19 Feb 43, same sub, OPD 381 (PTO) sec. 3. bound and located in section 4 of the same file.
ners time to recover and to make some craft in the South Pacific at the end of
rapid calculations.11 the year than there were at the time of
Next morning the Army planners had the conference. The difference, then,
their figures ready. MacArthur, they had between MacArthur's requirements for
found, was scheduled to receive during the capture of Rabaul and what the War
the coming year only 2 more divisions Department was ready to give him and
(which would give him a total of 17) and Halsey amounted to a total of five and
enough additional aircraft to bring his two-thirds divisions and 24 air groups.
strength up to 18 groups or 982 planes. Actually these differences were not as
Exclusive of Halsey's requirement, this great as they seemed. Both MacArthur
was about half of what he wanted. Actu- and Halsey had other forces than those
ally, these figures were somewhat mis- allocated by the War Department. Of
leading as to the strength of the the 1,000 aircraft MacArthur had in
Southwest Pacific. Of the total number March, only 750 were American, the
of aircraft only 144 would be heavy rest were Australian. And John Curtin,
bombers, the only planes capable then the Australian Prime Minister, was
of striking Rabaul and targets in the pressing for more on his own account.
northern Solomons. The count of divi- The figures for the South Pacific are
sions was also misleading, for it included much more revealing. There the Army
11 Australian divisions only 3 of which had only about 700 planes and no in-
were trained and equipped for offensive tention of sending many more during
operations. In any case and regardless the year. But when the number of
of these deficiencies, MacArthur would Navy and Marine land-based aircraft to
be short at the end of the year, under be sent was added, the total would
existing plans, three and two-thirds amount to almost 1,800. Despite these
divisions and 15 air groups.12 adjustments, there would still be a
The prospects for the South Pacific shortage of heavy bombers in both areas,
were no better. It would get only 1 more and neither the Army nor the Navy
division in 1943. With the 1 New Zea- could provide the forces needed for all
land, 2 Marine and 4 Army divisions five stages of ELKTON at the start of the
already in the theater, Halsey would offensive.13
have a total of 8, 2 less than the number With the presentation of both sets of
called for in ELKTON. And instead of figures—those in ELKTON and those in
the recommended 15 air groups, he the Washington schedules—the task of
would have only 6, including 72 heavy the conference became clear: provide
bombers. With the reduction in fighter MacArthur the forces he required, per-
strength envisaged by the War Depart- suade him to lower his estimates, or
ment, there would be fewer Army air- cancel the decision to take Rabaul in
1943 and substitute a less ambitious
11
Mins, 2d Mtg, Pacific Mil Conf, 12 Mar 43. program.
Strength figures are from Matloff, Strategic Planning
13
for Coalition Warfare, 1943-44, p. 92. For estimates of Navy and Marine aircraft, see
12
Memo, Handy for Pacific Conferees, 13 Mar 43, Memo, Cooke for Pacific Conferees, 13 Mar 43, sub:
sub: Deployment of Forces, OPD Exec Files; Mins, Availability of Navy Forces, Incl, to Mins, 4th Mtg,
3d Mtg, Pacific Mil Conf, 13 Mar 43. Pacific Mil Conf, 15 Mar 43.
For two days the alternatives were position taken by the Air Forces repre-
debated. The Pacific delegates, Army sentative, Brig. Gen. Orvil A. Anderson,
and Navy alike, insisted that ELKTON was that the combined bomber offensive
represented the absolute minimum re- against Germany had been given the
quired to accomplish Tasks Two and highest priority at Casablanca and that,
Three and that all of the forces requested therefore, the requirements for Europe
would have to be made available before would have to be filled first. The Pacific
the campaign could begin. Admitting commanders would have to be satisfied
that they could seize their initial objec- with what was left. Admiral Cooke, the
tives with what they had—or, in the chief naval planner, challenged this in-
case of the Southwest Pacific, with what terpretation sharply. The Casablanca
they would have by September—the agreement, he pointed out, called also
theater planners maintained that it for the capture of Rabaul and for "ade-
would be unwise to do so without the quate forces" to maintain the offensive
means to follow up. To do otherwise, against Japan. Germany, he admitted,
declared General Harmon, would create was the main enemy and its defeat was
a "very delicate situation." Speaking for the first aim of the Allies. But require-
the South Pacific delegation, he joined ments elsewhere had to be met and it
with Sutherland in asserting "that the was the job of the planners to allocate
estimate of forces required as shown in their resources—notably shipping and
the ELKTON plan cannot be reduced."14 aircraft—in such a way as to carry out
The Washington planners, though all the tasks agreed upon at Casablanca
they could see no way of meeting the unless it could be clearly established
ELKTON requirements, were not nearly as that they would jeopardize the capacity
united as the theater representatives. of the Allies to seize any unexpected
There was no disagreement about ground opportunity to defeat Germany in 1943.
forces; the shortages could be met from The exchange that followed is one of
reserves in the United States. The prob- the few debates recorded fully in the
lem was to find the ships to transport the record. While the Pacific representatives
additional troops and to keep them sup- sat by silently and General Wedemeyer
plied once they reached their destination. sought vainly to steer the proceeding
Shipping affected also the number of into calmer waters, Admiral Cooke pro-
aircraft that could be sent to the Pacific, ceeded, in a series of pointed questions
but the real disagreement arose over the directed at Anderson, to challenge the
interpretation of the Casablanca decision Air Forces allocations to Europe and to
and its application to the Pacific. The demonstrate that it was not meeting its
obligations in the Pacific. What was the
purpose of the combined bomber offen-
14
sive, he asked? Were the results "an ef-
Memo, Sutherland and Harmon for Joint Plan-
ners, 14 Mar 43, no sub, ann. A to Mins, 4th Mtg, Pac fective contribution to the war effort?"
Mil Conf, 15 Mar 43. The South Pacific planners How many planes did the Air Forces
also took into account naval and Marine forces, but estimate would be needed for the bomb-
they still needed twenty-four heavy bombers and
additional fighters, half of which, they said, should ings? Had the requirements of the
be P-38's. of the South and Southwest Pacific been
considered when these estimates were (Harmon had been his chief of staff), also
made? Did the Air Forces base its allo- found themselves aligned with the Navy.
cations to the Pacific on what was left General Wedemeyer's position was in
after European allotments had been between. He recognized the priority of
made? Or did it believe that the air operations against Germany, but he also
offensive could be increased if it gave less appreciated the necessity for providing
planes to the Pacific? How many planes the forces required to meet commitments
were needed in Europe, in the Pacific? in the Pacific. "The position of the War
Several of these questions Anderson Department representatives," he told
answered by simply citing the Casablanca Marshall, "has been rather difficult. ..."
decision calling for "the heaviest possible The theater delegates, he added tartly,
bomber offensive against the German were determined to get all they could
war effort." Several went unanswered. and the Navy, "for obvious reasons,"
But throughout General Anderson main- was lending its support.16
tained that it was not his job to make Although the conferees had failed
estimates or to deploy aircraft. The first thus far to reach agreement they had at
was the responsibility of the theater com- least succeeded in defining the areas of
manders, the second of the Joint Chiefs disagreement. There was no recourse
of Staff. All he was concerned with was now but to place the problem before the
availability, and he had given the Pacific Joint Chiefs and this Cooke and
what was available "after aircraft had Wedemeyer did on 16 March. There
been otherwise allotted" on the basis of was enough shipping, they told their
the Air Forces' interpretation of the superiors, to warrant an increase in the
Casablanca decision.15 scheduled allocations to the Pacific, but
With this exchange the Navy placed not enough to meet the ELKTON require-
itself squarely on the side of the Pacific ments. The Joint Chiefs themselves
delegates, an alliance that illustrates would have to decide just how much
nicely that curious contradiction in the could be spared without jeopardizing the
relationship between the services. When effort in Europe. Neither Wedemeyer
the needs of the Pacific were balanced nor Cooke believed that Rabaul could
against those of Europe and North Af- be taken in 1943 unless the forces re-
rica the Army and Navy commanders quested by MacArthur were furnished,
in the Pacific, supported by King and the and they recommended therefore that
naval planners in Washington, stood to- the objectives of the South and South-
gether in a formidable alliance. But west Pacific for the year be fixed in terms
when the time came to decide on the of what could be achieved with the
use of the forces in the Pacific and the forces available rather than in terms of
role to be assigned to the Army and the Casablanca agreement.17
Navy, the alliance fell apart. Interest- The Joint Chiefs had no sooner begun
ingly enough, Generals Harmon and
Kenney, both senior air officers and long- 16
Memo, Wedemeyer for Marshall, 16 Mar 43, sub:
time associates of General Arnold Conf 17
on Opns in Pacific, ABC 370.26 (7-28-42) sec. 4.
Memo, Cooke and Wedemeyer for JCS, 16 Mar 43,
sub: Plan for Opns for Solomons-New Guinea-New
15
Mins, 4th Mtg, Pacific Mil Conf, 15 Mar 43. Ireland Area, JCS 238.
to consider the problem when they too some disposition to modify their require-
were faced with the necessity of inter- ments, the Joint Staff Planners found
preting and applying the decisions made that the shipping available by October
at Casablanca. And they succeeded no would indeed permit an increase in the
better. Admiral King took the same forces sent to the Pacific. But they were
position as Cooke—too literal an inter- still far from agreement on what these
pretation of the European provisions of forces should consist of, so they submit-
the Casablanca agreement would leave ted two plans. The first, which reflected
nothing for any other theater and make the Army's concentration on the war
impossible the operations envisaged in against Germany, provided for the ship-
the Pacific and Far East. Marshall's ap- ment of two divisions to the Southwest
proach was based not on principle but Pacific and one to the South Pacific and
on practical considerations. First, he a "modest increase" in air units to both
said, the Joint Chiefs should find out areas. A variant of the plan, based on
what forces were in the theater and how Harmon and Kenney's willingness to do
they could be used. When this was done with fewer service units, provided for
they would then be able to determine 25 percent more planes. The second
what other forces would be needed. plan, which embodied the Navy's view,
Stratemeyer, acting for General Arnold, used the shipping space allotted to the
insisted t h a t any r e d u c t i o n of the South Pacific division for additional air-
bomber offensive was contrary to the craft for both theaters. Since neither
Casablanca agreement. The Pacific dele- would provide the forces MacArthur esti-
gates, he thought, should be told what mated would be required to take Rabaul,
they could have and make their plans the planners joined in recommending
on that basis. Admiral Leahy's view was that his instructions be changed.19
broader and he refused, like King, to The choice was now up to the Joint
consider the bomber offensive except in Chiefs. The Army's preference for the
relation to operations elsewhere. Ameri- first plan was clear. That plan was con-
can forces and interests in other areas, he sistent with the Casablanca agreement to
observed, must be considered equally. make the major effort against Germany
Thus, no matter how they approached and at the same time furnish "adequate
the problem, the Joint Chiefs always forces" to the Pacific. True, these forces
came back to the same question: What were not adequate to capture Rabaul,
was the intent of the Casablanca agree- but they would suffice to retain the ini-
ment? Unable to answer it they directed tiative. Adoption of the second plan, the
the planners to investigate further the Army planners pointed out, would result
possibility of sending more to the Pacific in "an unwarranted weakening of the
than was then allotted and to come up bomber offensive against Germany with-
with concrete proposals on how this out producing the compensating advan-
could be done.18 tage of taking Rabaul." 20 This last point
After discussion with the theater rep-
resentatives, who by now were showing 19
JCS 238/1, 18 Mar 43, Plan for Opns for Solo-
mons-New Guinea-New Ireland Area.
18 20
Mins, JCS Mtg, 16 Mar 43. Ibid.
was disputed by the naval planners who of the theater delegates, with the under-
doubted that the diversion of aircraft standing that the Pacific commanders
from Europe would be large enough to themselves would not be committed
affect seriously the strategy adopted at thereby.23
Casablanca. It was the preference of the As always throughout the conference,
representatives from the Pacific that the officers from the Pacific, regardless of
finally prevailed. If it came to a choice service or area, displayed an astonishing
between aircraft and ground troops there unanimity. With the three chiefs of staff,
was no doubt which they would take. Sutherland, Spruance, and Capt. Miles
And it was on this basis that the Joint R. Browning, as their spokesmen they
Chiefs, except for General Stratemeyer, agreed that, with the forces allotted, only
voted for the second plan. "The confer- Task Two could be carried out in 1943.
ence," observed an unidentified naval The completion of that task, which cor-
officer, "was satisfactory from the Navy responded roughly to the first three stages
viewpoint." 21 of ELKTON, would place MacArthur's
The acceptance of the Navy's plan by forces at Cape Gloucester in New Britain
the Joint Chiefs brought the theater dele- and Halsey's in Bougainville.
gates much closer to their goal. What But there were significant differences
it meant in concrete terms was two more between this limited plan and ELKTON.
divisions, additional heavy bombers, The seizure of New Georgia, which
plus six and one-half Army air groups. everyone at the conference knew was
This was far less than the ELKTON plan already scheduled as the next move by
called for but more than the Air Forces South Pacific forces, was conspicuously
had been willing to grant initially. With absent from the new plan. Instead the
what they already had and the Navy's plan now called for the occupation by
allotments to the South Pacific, Mac- the Southwest Pacific of Woodlark and
Arthur and Halsey together would have Kiriwina, a move Admiral Halsey had
2,500 planes, of which 240 would be suggested some months earlier and which
heavy bombers.22 had been incorporated in the first draft
The decision of the Joint Chiefs had of ELKTON but not in the version
settled the question of forces, or means, presented to the conference.24
for the South and Southwest Pacific. The Joint Chiefs readily accepted on
Still to be decided were the objectives, 21 March the judgment of the theater
or ends, to be achieved in 1943 with representatives that operations in 1943
these means. Before making that deci- would have to be limited to Task Two,
sion the Joint Chiefs solicited the views a view that had been expressed a month
earlier by some of the Washington plan-
ners. They approved also the Woodlark
21
Outline History of the Pacific Military Confer- and Kiriwina operation when Sutherland
ence, cited in Hayes, The War Against Japan, ch. XI,
p. 38; Mins, JCS Mtg, 19 Mar 43. See also George C.
Kenney, General Kenney Reports (New York: Duell,
23
Sloan and Pearce, 1949), pp. 215-16, which implies Mins, JCS Mtg, 19 Mar 43.
24
that the President exercised some influence on the Memo, Sutherland, Spruance, Browning for JCS,
final decision. 20 Mar 43, sub: Offensive Opns in South and SWPA.
22
Miller, CARTWHEEL, MS ch. II, p. 19. JCS 238/2.
explained that the War Department's Joint Chiefs notified them officially Of
inability to furnish the heavy bombers the decision made in Washington. "Pre-
called for in ELKTON made it necessary vailing opinion here," they were told,
to seize these islands, which lay within "indicates desirability of deferring pro-
medium bomber range of targets in the jected Munda operation . . . until after
northern Solomons, for use as air bases. establishment of air base on Woodlark
The fact that their possession would give and possibly after seizure of Lae and
the South and Southwest Pacific "a step- Huon Peninsula."27 Comments were
ping stone for the interchange of air requested from all three.
units" was undoubtedly a strong argu- MacArthur's response was a vigorous
ment also in favor of the operations.25 support of the position taken by Suther-
General Sutherland's explanation of land. The two areas, he asserted, must
the sequence of operations in the plan, be regarded, "for operational purposes,"
and of the minor role given to the forces as a single unit and since neither was
of the South Pacific, was not so readily strong enough for independent action,
accepted by the Joint Chiefs. Harmon neither should undertake "divergent ac-
had remonstrated mildly, but since the tion" simultaneously. He was, he told
other delegates seemed to find the ar- Marshall, already committed to the cam-
rangement satisfactory he had acquiesced. paign in New Guinea, which had been
Not so Admiral King. He had no inten- "temporarily suspended because of a
tion of immobilizing the strong naval lack of resources," and ought to be al-
forces in the South Pacific and thus lowed to complete it as soon as possible
freeing the Japanese Fleet for operations to provide a "defensive cover" for north-
elsewhere. If Halsey's fleet was not to be east Australia. Until that was accom-
used in the Solomons for many months plished and Huon Gulf, Madang, and
yet, then it might be employed with Vitiaz Strait secured, he said, operations
profit, he felt, against the Gilberts and against New Georgia should be
Marshalls in the Central Pacific. Both postponed.28
Spruance and Browning opposed this Admiral Halsey, like his chief of staff,
suggestion, thus demonstrating again the accepted the postponement of the New
unity of the theater representatives. Georgia operation, which he had planned
After a lengthy discussion the Joint to start early in April. The seizure of
Chiefs went into closed session from Woodlark and Kiriwina, he conceded,
which they emerged with agreement in could come first. But he would not ac-
principle to the theater plan and instruc- cept a purely passive role. His statement
tions to their own planners to prepare a that he would continue to exert pressure
new directive to the Pacific commanders.26 against the enemy and to hit him when-
Still to be heard from were the com- ever and wherever he could was the
manders themselves. Presumably they reassurance Admiral King needed. More-
had been kept informed of the progress
of the meetings but on 23 March the
27
Rad, Marshall to MacArthur, No. 2226, 23 Mar
43, OPD Log.
25 28
Mins, JCS Mtg, 21 Mar 43. Rad, MacArthur to Marshall, C-1162, 25 Mar 43,
26
Mins, JCS Mtg, 21 Mar 43. CM-IN 13827.
over, said Halsey, he would seize any The Army refused to budge from the
position in New Georgia or Bougainville position it had taken earlier, that stra-
that he could if such action would not tegic direction of the campaign against
involve him in a major struggle.29 Rabaul should go to MacArthur, as pro-
Before a directive could be drafted vided in the directive of July 1942. The
for the theater commanders one more Navy mustered all the old arguments as
problem, that of command, had yet to well as some new ones, but without
be solved. It was perhaps the most diffi- success. This repeated rejection of all
cult of all and by common consent had attempts at a compromise finally moved
been avoided officially during the dis- Admiral Cooke to remark:
cussions over means and ends. But it When commands were set up in England
had not been forgotten and now that for operations in France and for the in-
all other major questions had been set- vasion of North Africa . . . the Navy recog-
tled the planners returned to the debate nized that, this was an Army matter and
that had marked their first discussions accorded unified command to the Army
upon its own initiative. . . . The Pacific
over Pacific strategy.30 ... is and will continue to be a naval
Admiral King opened the final round problem as a whole. If, to meet this prob-
in this debate with the now familiar pro- lem we are to have unified command . . . ,
posal to adjust the boundaries so as to it is, in my opinion, up to the War Depart-
place the Solomons in Halsey's area, ment to take the steps necessary to set it up
leaving to the Joint Chiefs the co-ordina- as a unified Naval command.32
tion of operations in the two areas. Cooke's plea produced no results. The
When this effort met the same fate as Army planners studying the problem of
had similar schemes, Admiral Cooke command in the Pacific had already come
suggested a complicated arrangement by to the conclusion that all the proposals
which Halsey would command opera- and arguments could be summed up in
tions in the Solomons and co-ordinate three propositions: (a) give command
all naval operations in the area while to MacArthur, (b) give it to Nimitz or
MacArthur would direct the operations his representative, or (c) provide for
in New Guinea and co-ordinate the air separate commands and the co-ordination
effort. Cooke revised this plan almost of operations by co-operation between
immediately, after a conversation with the two commanders. On this basis the
General Handy, but the revision dealt Army planners had drafted three sep-
only with the method of securing co- arate plans, each embodying one of the
ordination and still left to Halsey con- alternative solutions, which they now
trol of the operations in the Solomons.31 passed on to the Navy. Meanwhile, on
26 March, General Marshall formally
submitted to the Joint Chiefs in the form
29
30
Miller, CARTWHEEL, p. 18. of a draft directive the plan that would
Though the official records contain no mention
of command problems during the meeting of the
Pacific Conference, General Kenney states that there ments, ABC 370.26 (7-28-42) sec. 4; Cooke for Wede-
were heated discussions about it with the delegates. meyer, 22 Mar 43, no sub, and Cooke for Handy,
Kenney, General Kenney Reports, p. 213. same date, no sub, both in OPD Exec Files.
31 32
Memo, King for Marshall, 19 Mar 43, sub: Offen- Memo, Cooke for Handy, 23 Mar 43, sub: Comd
sive Opns in Solomons-New Guinea Area, with com- in Pacific, OPD Exec Files.
give MacArthur command. In addition give Nimitz control of those forces in the
to outlining the tasks already agreed Pacific Ocean Areas not specifically as-
upon, the draft directive specified that signed to the offensive by the Joint
Halsey, under MacArthur's general Chiefs of Staff. But King found no sup-
direction, would command operations port, either from his colleagues in the
in the Solomons and that the naval Joint Chiefs or from Admiral Halsey,
units assigned to these operations would for his proposal enjoining MacArthur
remain under Nimitz' control.33 not to delay operations in the Solomons.
It was the last provision that disturbed These matters settled, the Joint Chiefs
the Navy most. Sensitive to any limita- formally approved General Marshall's
tions on the control or strategic mobility directive and next day sent copies by
of the fleet, Admiral King saw in Mar- radio to the Army and Navy commanders
shall's proposed directive a restriction on in the Pacific. Written in crisp and sim-
Admiral Nimitz' freedom to use naval ple language, the directive that had
units wherever they were most needed. taken four months to complete con-
He preferred for that reason to give sisted of six brief paragraphs. First it
command to Nimitz instead of Mac- canceled the previous directive of 2 July
Arthur but did not press the point, of- 1942 which called for the capture of
fering instead a revision of the statement Rabaul, and then it outlined the com-
relating to naval units. He did insist, mand arrangements under which opera-
however, that operations in the Solomons tions would be conducted. Other than
should not be postponed until after the the statement that forces would be pro-
landing in New Britain and proposed vided by the Joint Chiefs, there was no
that a statement to that effect be added reference to the means required to carry
to the directive.34 out the tasks, listed as follows:
These differences were thrashed out in 1. The establishment of airfields on
a special meeting of the Joint Chiefs on Kiriwina and Woodlark.
28 March. This time King, for reasons 2. The seizure of Lae, Salamaua, Finsch-
that can only be guessed at, did not even hafen, Madang, and western New Britain
raise the question of command. The dis- (Cape Gloucester).
cussion, therefore, was confined to the 3. The seizure of the Solomon Islands
wording of the directive. On this basis, "to include the southern portion of Bou-
Marshall was perfectly willing to give gainville."
ground and the differences were amica- The objectives of these operations
bly settled by revising the directive to were, in general, the same as those fixed
at Casablanca: "to inflict losses on Japa-
nese forces, to deny these areas to Japan,
33
Memos, Marshall for JCS, 26 Mar 43; Handy for to contain Japanese forces in the Pacific
Cooke, 25 Mar 43, both in OPD Exec Files; Deane by maintaining the initiative." To them
for King and Marshall, 27 Mar 43, sub: Directive for
Opns in South and Southwest Pacific; Handy for was added the further objective of pre-
Marshall, same date and subject, ABC 370.26 paring for the "ultimate seizure of the
(7-28-42) sec. 1. Bismarck Archipelago." Finally, Mac-
34
JCS 238/4, 27 Mar 43, Opns For Seizure of Solo-
mons-New Guinea-New Britain-New Ireland, ABC
Arthur was to submit to the Joint Chiefs
370.26 (7-28-42) sec 1. his general plans "including composition
of task forces, sequence, and timing of about-face lies, perhaps, in the following
major offensive operations.35 observation, written by an unidentified
Thus, almost anticlimactically, was naval officer:
ended the debate begun on 1 December I have come to the conclusion that Ad-
1942 when General Marshall first pro- miral King considers his relations with
posed a directive, which in all essential General Marshall on such a successful plane
respects was similar to the one approved . . . that there are some matters in which he
on 28 March. For four months Admiral will not proceed to their logical accomplish-
ment believing that even if he succeeded he
King and the naval planners had opposed would damage the relationship mentioned
it strongly and sometimes bitterly. At beyond repair. One of these items is the
the end they finally accepted it, almost unification of command in CINCPAC, in-
without question. The key to this strange cluding the efforts of General MacArthur
35
up the New Guinea coast.36
JCS 238/5/D, 28 Mar 43, Opns for Seizure of
36
Solomons-New Guinea-New Ireland Area; Rads, Outline History of the Pacific Military Confer-
JCS to MacArthur, Nimitz, and Halsey, 29 Mar 43, ence, cited in Hayes, The War Against Japan, ch. XI,
CM-OUT 11091-92-93; Mins, JCS Mtg, 28 Mar 43. p. 52.
CHAPTER XX
CARTWHEEL and the I-GO Operation

Secrecy and celerity are the life of dispatch in all military operations.
FRANCIS BACON
The Joint Chiefs' directive gave to come depended the fate of the plans then
the planning in the Pacific a new urgency being prepared.
and an immediate goal that had been
absent before. Until agreement on forces CARTWHEEL
and objectives had been reached in
Washington the plans developed in the Although much work had been done
theater had of necessity been tentative. by both the South and Southwest Pacific
Now, for the first time since July of the staffs on plans for the operations called
previous year, realistic plans with specific for in the new directive, it was more than
targets, forces, and dates could be made, a month before this task was completed
and it was to this task that the Pacific and two months more before the first
planners turned in the spring of 1943. operation began. Drafting the over-all
Meanwhile, the Japanese had not been plan was not difficult. All that was re-
idle. Determined to retain Rabaul, they quired was to revise ELKTON to bring it
spared no effort to strengthen their bases into line with the forces made available
in the Solomons and New Guinea. If and the objectives set by the Joint Chiefs.
they could not hold the outposts to The chief problem before the theater
Fortress Rabaul, at least they could make planners was still the co-ordination of
every Allied advance a costly and time- operations in the Solomons with those
consuming task. While they did what in New Guinea. So far as the Solomons
they could to disrupt Allied prepara- were concerned the directive called only
tions, they sought to improve their posi- for the occupation of southern Bougain-
tion in the threatened area. When these ville, but, as Harmon later wrote, "it was
efforts failed, the Japanese assembled all obvious that ... a long jump could not
their resources for an ambitious and des- be made from Guadalcanal and the Rus-
perate attempt to smash Allied air power sells into Bougainville."1 An interme-
and cut the enemy's line of communica- diate base within fighter range of Bou-
tions. Thus, even before the offensive gainville would have to be secured first,
called for by the Joint Chiefs began, the and for the South Pacific planners this
Solomons-New Guinea area became the
scene of violent air attacks on whose out- 1
Harmon, Army in the South Pacific, p. 6, OCMH.
CARTWHEEL AND THE I-GO OPERATION 401
meant the seizure of New Georgia and meeting he remarked that this arrange-
the Munda airstrip. True, Admiral Hal- ment was both "sensible and satisfac-
sey had accepted the ELKTON timetable tory." Nor did he later have reason to
but had made it clear that he intended change his mind, for as the war pro-
to take advantage of any opportunity to gressed his relationship with MacArthur
seize favorable positions in the central grew ever more friendly. "Not once did
Solomons. Thus, despite MacArthur's he, my superior officer, ever force his
assertion that the forces of the South decisions upon me," he wrote later. "On
Pacific could move directly into Bou- the few occasions when I disagreed with
gainville once MacArthur had landed him, I told him so, and we discussed the
at Cape Gloucester, Halsey and Harmon issue until one of us changed his mind." 3
still clung to their belief that New This problem settled, the planners
Georgia would have to be taken. Their completed their work and on 26 April
job was to convince MacArthur they ELKTON III was issued. Known by the
were right. code name CARTWHEEL, this plan called
That task fell to Halsey and early in for thirteen separate operations in a
April he flew to Brisbane to talk with period of eight months during which the
MacArthur. It was their first meeting, forces of the South and Southwest Pacific
but five minutes after he had reported, would advance by successive stages, al-
Halsey later wrote, "I felt as if we were ways in support of each other and under
life long friends."2 Perhaps MacArthur cover by land-based fighters, to positions
felt so, too, for the admiral seems to have from which they could converge on
had little difficulty in persuading him of Rabaul. The operations fell into two
the necessity of seizing New Georgia and groups: those along the western or New
of doing it as quickly as possible. Before Guinea axis and those in the Solomons
the meeting was over MacArthur had not along the eastern axis. (Map III) In the
only given his consent to the New Geor- first place the Southwest Pacific would
gia plan but had agreed that the opera- occupy Woodlark and Kiriwina (with
tion be conducted simultaneously with Halsey furnishing the garrison troops for
the occupation of Woodlark and Kiri- the former), while forces from the South
wina, the first objectives of the southwest Pacific moved into the New Georgia
Pacific. group. While this last was still in prog-
This meeting between the two com- ress MacArthur's forces would embark
manders was the first test of the command on the second phase: the capture of Lae,
arrangement so recently established by Salamaua, Finschhafen, and Madang. By
the Joint Chiefs. So far as Halsey was the time Madang was taken, Halsey
concerned, his new assignment gave him would have captured Faisi in the Short-
two "hats," one as a subordinate to lands and Buin in southern Bougain-
Nimitz who controlled his forces and ville. The third and final phase of
the other as a subordinate to MacArthur CARTWHEEL would see the landing at
who dictated his strategy. But after the Cape Gloucester in western New Brit-
ain, the capture of Kieta on the east
2
Halsey and Bryan, Admiral Halsey's Story, pp.
3
154-55. Ibid.
coast of Bougainville, and the neutrali- would require almost 170,000 air and
zation of Buka, a small island off the ground troops. South Pacific require-
northern tip of Bougainville.4 ments, though not as great, would call
The timetable for this complicated for the utilization of all the resources of
series of operations was carefully worked that theater in the coming year.
out so that the final objective would be Such large requirements called for the
won by the end of the year. The first closest co-operation between the two
phase would begin in June, one month areas and the most effective and econom-
being allotted for the occupation of ical use of their forces. Thus, Halsey
Woodlark and Kiriwina Islands and five would furnish the garrison and construc-
for New Georgia. By the time New tion troops for Woodlark, while support-
Georgia was taken in October, Mac- ing that operation with his naval and air
Arthur's forces in the Southwest Pacific forces. During the second and third
would have seized Lae, Salamaua, and phase of CARTWHEEL, he would continue
Finschhafen and begun the offensive to provide air and naval support to
against Madang. Meanwhile, the forces of MacArthur's forces in their drive along
the South Pacific would have gone on to the New Guinea coast. At the same
take Buin and Faisi, and then Bougain- time, South Pacific aircraft would assist
ville in January 1944. By that time South- in the neutralization of Rabaul, freeing
west Pacific forces would have concluded a portion of MacArthur's air forces for
operations on New Britain. But care- tactical missions in New Guinea. In ad-
fully as this sequence of operations was dition, the two areas would share intelli-
worked out, everyone recognized it was gence information, exchange operational
only tentative and subject to change, de- summaries, link radio communications,
pending, as MacArthur remarked, on the and pool their resources for air
"fluctuation of tactical circumstances." 5 reconnaissance.
The forces for each of these operations Profiting from the experience of Gua-
were as carefully computed as the timing. dalcanal and Buna and in anticipation
In the first phase MacArthur would use of the tasks ahead, both MacArthur and
two regimental combat teams, in the Halsey had tightened their organization,
second, five Australian divisions and one created new headquarters, and adopted
tank regiment, and in the third, one more effective methods for planning and
Marine division. With service and sup- controlling their operations. The South
porting troops, reserves, and naval and Pacific's plans for New Georgia, for ex-
air forces, this schedule would place a ample, were worked out by a planning
heavy drain on MacArthur's resources. committee consisting of Army, Navy,
Phase Two alone, MacArthur estimated, and Marine commanders. It was they
who reviewed with Halsey's chief plan-
4
ELKTON III, 26 Apr 43, Plan for Seizure of Lae- ning officers the tactical plans for the
Salamaua-Madang-New Britain-Solomons Area,
OCMH. For an account of the detailed planning
campaign in a series of conferences dur-
and execution of these operations, see Miller, CART- ing the latter part of May and resolved
WHEEL. This work has been used freely in the the numerous tactical and organizational
present chapter.
5
Rad, MacArthur to Marshall, 5 May 43, CM-IN
problems that arose in the days that
3409. followed.
The forces of the South Pacific also The organization of MacArthur's com-
underwent reorganization during this mand conformed more closely to the
period.6 (Charts 7-9) No single ground familiar Army pattern, with an Allied
commander was appointed, as in the headquarters (GHQ) on top of the
Southwest Pacific, though Halsey had structure and air, ground, and naval
demonstrated during the Guadalcanal forces under separate operational com-
campaign his willingness to give the mands directly beneath it. Administra-
Army commander tactical control even tive control was exercised by each
though that officer had no tactical mis- national force through its own head-
sion. But the air organization had been quarters. Thus, the American Fifth Air
considerably modified since August 1942 Force and Sixth Army were under one
on the basis of experience in the Gua- of the three major tactical commands for
dalcanal campaign. Air Command, Sol- operations and training, but in matters
omons, had been established to exercise of administration and supply reported
operational control, under the Com- to USAFFE, re-established in February
mander, Aircraft (land-based), South 1943, with MacArthur in command, as
Pacific Force (COMAIRSOPAC), over the highest American headquarters in
aircraft in the forward area and in Janu- the area. The U.S. Army Services of
ary the Thirteenth Air Force had been Supply (USASOS), commanded by Maj.
activated with General Twining in com- Gen. Richard J. Marshall, continued to
mand, to provide administrative control serve as the logistical agency for Army
over Army air units. Naval forces in the forces under USAFFE, controlling the
area were placed under the Third Fleet various supply bases in Australia and
organized in March, at the same time New Guinea. American naval forces in
that the Seventh Fleet was created for the area were under the operational con-
the Southwest Pacific. Halsey himself trol of Allied Naval Forces and the ad-
was named commander of the Third ministrative control of the Seventh
Fleet, which had no organic naval units Fleet, which, like the Third Fleet, was a
but consisted of whatever warships were part of Nimitz' Pacific Fleet. Both
assigned from time to time by Admiral General Kenney and Vice Adm. Arthur
Nimitz. Supply in the area remained, as S. Carpender, commanders of the Fifth
before, under Service Squadron, South Air Force and Seventh Fleet respectively,
Pacific, but the Army's Services of Supply functioned as national and Allied force
created in November 1942 and headed commanders.
by General Breene was assuming ever The organization of the ground forces
larger responsibilities. The South Pacific was somewhat more complicated. Under
Amphibious Force, under Admiral the Australian General Sir Thomas A.
Turner, retained its importance as the Blarney, who also commanded the Aus-
directing tactical headquarters for land- tralian military forces, Allied Land
ing operations, which meant, in effect, Forces was to exercise tactical control
all operations in the area. through task forces created for each oper-
ation. Thus, in the Papuan campaign
6
For a description of the South Pacific command, Australian and American troops had
see above, chapter XI. been under a predominantly Australian
CHART 7—COMMAND ORGANIZATION, SOUTH PACIFIC FORCES, AUGUST 1943
Administration
CHART 8—ORGANIZATION FOR ADMINISTRATION AND SUPPLY, U.S. ARMY FORCES, SOUTH PACIFIC AREA, JULY 1943
Supply
CHART 9—ORGANIZATION OF SOUTH PACIFIC AIR FORCES, SOLOMON ISLANDS, JULY 1943
Administration
CONFERENCE AT ALAMO HEADQUARTERS. From left, Generals Chamberlain, Krueger, and

MacArthur, Brig. Gen. Edwin D. Patrick, Rear Adm. Thomas C. Kinkaid, and Maj. Gen.
Ennis C. Whitehead.
headquarters called New Guinea Force, 7 February 1943. When he assumed command of
Sixth Army ten days later, it consisted of the follow-
which was, in turn, under Allied Land ing units, all of which were already in the area:
Forces. But conditions had changed Headquarters, 1 Corps at Rockhampton
since this arrangement had been adopted. 32d Division, in Australia near Brisbane
41st Division, Dobodura area, New Guinea
Throughout the winter of 1942-43, U.S. 1st Marine Division (under Army operational con-
Army combat troops had reached the trol only), Melbourne
theater in larger numbers and more were 158th Infantry Regiment, Port Moresby, New
Guinea
expected. A corps headquarters under 503d Paratroop Infantry Regiment, near Brisbane
General Eichelberger had been formed 40th Antiaircraft Brigade, New Guinea
in Australia in September, and in Febru- 41st Antiaircraft Brigade, Queensland
98th Field Artillery Battalion (Pack), Port Moresby
ary 1943 the first echelon of Lt. Gen. 2d Engineer Special Brigade, Australia
Walter Krueger's Sixth Army headquar- The second echelon of Sixth Army headquarters ar-
ters reached Australia.7 MacArthur rived in Brisbane by ship on 17 April 1943. The
24th Infantry and 1st Cavalry Divisions were assigned
7
General Krueger arrived in Brisbane with his to Sixth Army when they arrived in Australia in May
chief of staff and a few other staff officers by air on and July of the year.
therefore created for CARTWHEEL an in- to their functions as commanders they oper-
dependent task force called first New ate, in effect, as a planning staff to the
Britain Force and then ALAMO Force, CinC. When operating in forward areas
the same conditions exist.
which was to operate under the control The personal relationships established
of GHQ rather than Allied Land Forces. and the physical location of subordinate
Consisting entirely of American troops, headquarters makes possible a constant
ALAMO Force was virtually identical daily participation of the staffs in all details
with Sixth Army and was commanded by of planning and operations. Appropriate
members of GHQ are in intimate daily
General Krueger. New Guinea Force contact with members of the three lower
remained under Blarney but became al- headquarters.. . .
most exclusively an Australian command GHQ is, in spirit, a headquarters for
with U.S. troops attached only for spe- planning and executing operations each of
cial purposes. The practical result of which demands effective combinations of
land, sea, and air power. ... It is only the
this arrangement was to remove Ameri- determination that GHQ shall act as a
can forces from Blamey's control and to GHQ rather than as the headquarters of a
make Allied Land Forces a paper single service that will produce the unani-
organization.8 mity of action and singleness of purpose
All of the headquarters involved par- that is essential for the successful conduct
of combined operations.9
ticipated in the planning for CARTWHEEL,
with GHQ providing a centralized di- While MacArthur and Halsey were
rection and co-ordination, in marked making the detailed plans called for by
contrast to the system used in the South the Joint Chiefs' directive, Admiral King
Pacific. (Charts 10 and 11) There the in Washington was growing increasingly
commander of the force charged with restive at the apparent delay. MacArthur
responsibility for the operation rather sent few reports of his plans during this
than Halsey's headquarters co-ordinated time, even when ELKTON III was com-
the activities of the units involved. Mac- pleted, and though Halsey informed his
Arthur described his own organization to superiors of his own plans it seemed to
General Marshall in this way: King that nothing was being done except
to hold conferences and exchange mes-
Complete and thorough integration of
ground, air, and naval headquarters with sages. Requests from the Southwest
GHQ is the method followed with marked Pacific for additional naval units only
success in the SWPA. . . . Naval, air com- increased his concern and on 2 May he
manders and their staffs are in the same finally expressed his impatience to Gen-
building with GHQ. The land commander eral Marshall. The Pacific theater, he
and his staff are nearby. These comman-
ders confer frequently with the CinC and observed, had been inactive for two
principal members of GHQ. In addition months and still MacArthur had not
submitted the "general plans" asked for
8
In this connection, see the report by General in the directive of 28 March. The Joint
Richardson of his inspection of the Southwest Pacific
Area in June 1942, much of which dealt with the
Chiefs, he felt, should not wait any
status of U.S. Army combat forces under Australian longer but should prod MacArthur im-
command. Memo, Richardson for CofS, 9 Jul 42, mediately. Marshall had no objections
sub: Australia, OPD Exec Files, SWPA, IV. This
9
same file contains records of the discussions of Rich- Rad, MacArthur to Marshall, No. C-4369, 31 Jul
ardson's report. 43, GHQ Hist Records Index Cards, OCMH.
CHART 10—COMMAND ORGANIZATION, SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA, JULY 1943
Source: Allied Operations in Southwest Pacific Area, GHQ, SWPA, Hist ser. I, p. 106.
CHART 11—ORGANIZATION FOR ADMINISTRATION AND SUPPLY, U.S. ARMY FORCES, SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA, JULY 1943
Liaison
1
Formerly Base Sections 5 and 6.
2
Base Sections were redesignated and moved forward as the war in the Southwest Pacific progressed. Thus, the numbers and locations varied for different periods.
and next day a message asking large part of the 51st Division was vir-
MacArthur for his plans went out.10 tually destroyed, neither General Ima-
The reply put an end to any fears mura, the 8th Area Army commander
that time had been wasted. MacArthur at Rabaul, nor his superiors in Tokyo
explained CARTWHEEL in some detail could deny any longer the seriousness
and gave the sequence and timing of of the Allied threat. It was time, the
the major operations for the coming Japanese planners concluded, for a fresh
year. The offensive, he told Marshall, look at their strategy and for renewed
would start about 15 June and would efforts in the Southeast Area.
continue thereafter in rapid order for The discussions that took place in
the next six months until his forces and Tokyo in mid-March brought out clearly
those of Admiral Halsey converged for the differing points of view of the Army
the final assault on Rabaul. But with and Navy. The former considered the
the exception of the opening date, the New Guinea area as the more impor-
dates listed, he cautioned the Chief of tant, first because it was vital to the
Staff, were still tentative. Within three defense of the Philippines and the Neth-
weeks he had changed even the first date erlands Indies, and second because it
and set the occupation of Woodlark and was more suitable for large-scale Army
Kiriwina and the invasion of New operations than the smaller islands of
Georgia for the end instead of the middle the Solomons. The Navy, interested
of June.11 Already the men and supplies primarily in the security of the Com-
were moving into the forward area, to bined Fleet base at Truk, wished to con-
the southern Solomons and the Papuan centrate on the Solomons approach to
Peninsula, for the first phase of Fortress Rabaul for that avenue seemed
CARTWHEEL. to them to lead naturally to their
position in the Caroline Islands. The
The I-GO Operation Solomon Islands, moreover, offered ad-
vantageous sites for naval bases and lent
By coincidence, Imperial General themselves to operations for which the
Headquarters in Tokyo was reviewing Navy was best suited.
its own strategy for the Southeast Area The reconciliation of these views was
at the same time that the Americans the task of the Tokyo planners. Neither
were discussing this question. The side would give way though the Army
American debate was sparked by the brought in Imamura's chief of staff, Lt.
victory at Guadalcanal and Buna; the Gen. Rinpei Kato, and several of his
Japanese review by defeat and the in- assistants, who were in Tokyo to get
creasing effectiveness of Allied air and more planes for their area, to bolster its
sea operations. After the Battle of the case. The naval planners were not im-
Bismarck Sea early in March, when a pressed but the Army had its way in
the end, for the issue was decided not
10
Memo, King for Marshall, 2 May 43, OPD 381 on its merits but on the influence of
(Security) case 109; Rad, Marshall to MacArthur, 3 the contending parties. The decision,
May 43, CM-OUT 1108.
11
Rads, MacArthur to Marshall, 5 and 27 May 43,
embodied in an Army-Navy Central
CM-IN 3409 and 17166. Agreement issued to Imamura and Yam-
amoto on 25 March, was a clear victory Santa Isabel. The Bismarck area was
for the Army. First priority thereafter a joint responsibility, and special empha-
would go to operations in New Guinea. sis was given to strengthening the west-
The Army-Navy Central Agreement, a ern sector of New Britain, facing the
Japanese euphemism for strategic direc- Huon Peninsula. Offensive operations
tive, called for a major effort by the in the Solomons, as in New Guinea, were
two services, "working together as a to be conducted largely by the Navy,
single body," to extend and consolidate which, in addition to its aircraft, was
their operating bases in New Guinea to employ submarines to check the flow
while securing their position in the of enemy supplies and reinforcements.
Solomons and in the Bismarck Archi- The Japanese had only limited re-
pelago.12 Operations in New Guinea sources with which to achieve this ambi-
would consist of strengthening the bases tious design. General Imamura's Army
at Lae and Salamaua and maintaining air forces at this time consisted of about
control over New Guinea and western 170 planes, of which 74 were fighters,
New Britain. Airfields and roads were 54 light bombers, and half that number
to be built, units reinforced, supplies heavy bombers. By September, Imperial
stockpiled, and every measure taken to General Headquarters promised Ima-
repulse the expected Allied offensive mura, he would have another 150 air-
when it came. The only offensive mis- craft, but September was a long way off.
sion assigned was the destruction of The Navy was in better shape. It had
enemy air power in order to disrupt 240 planes and was scheduled to receive
the obvious Allied preparations for the another 100 sometime during the sum-
attack and to protect the Japanese sup- mer. In addition, Vice Adm. Jinishi
ply routes. This task under the new Kusaka, commander of the Southeast
directive would fall largely on the Navy Area Fleet, could also expect reinforce-
whose air arm was not only to interdict ments if they were needed from the
the enemy's shipping but also "to wage carriers of the Combined Fleet.
aerial annihilation operations in concert In establishing a command for the
with the Army."13 area, the Japanese faced the same prob-
The burden of defending the Solo- lems as did the Americans. (Chart 12)
mons was divided between the Army Unlike their enemies, however, they
and the Navy, the former taking respon- were never able to establish a unified
sibility for the northern portion of the command even for a limited period of
area and the latter for New Georgia and time. As senior Army commander in
12
the area, General Imamura had under
8th Area Army Opns, pt. IV of Southeast Area
Opns Record, rev. ed., Japanese Studies in World him the 17th and 18th Armies and the
War II, 127, p. 23, OCMH. This section is based on 6th Air Division but exercised no con-
this source and on the following: Southeast Area trol over naval forces. These included
Naval Opns, pt. II, Japanese Studies in World War
II, 49; Southeast Area Naval Air Opns, pt. III, Japa- the 8th Fleet and the 11th Air Fleet,
nese Studies in World War II, 122, pp. 34-36; Japa- both of which were under Admiral
nese Opns in World War II, GHQ SWPA Series II, Kusaka's control as commander of the
pp. 188-90; Hattori, The Greater East Asia War, II,
pt. 5, pp. 4-12. Southeast Area Fleet. Kusaka in turn
13
8th Area Army Opns, pt. IV, p. 25. reported to Admiral Yamamoto, the
Combined Fleet commander at Truk. from 5 to 10 April in the Solomons and

Other than to direct the services to the second from 11 to 20 April in New
"act in concert"—an injunction that Guinea. That it was to be a major
was largely ignored—Imperial General effort was evident by Yamamoto's trans-
Headquarters made no effort to estab- fer of about 150 carrier-based planes
lish a unified command for the Southeast from the 3d Fleet to the Southeast Area
Area. Only when Army and Navy forces and his own voyage to Rabaul with the
operated together in ground operations, 3d Fleet commander on 3 April to take
would there be a single commander "for personal charge of the operation.15
purely operational purposes" and the After a preliminary and unprofitable
choice then would be made entirely on attack against the Russells on 1 April,
the basis of seniority.14 Yamamoto launched the I-GO Operation
On receipt of the Army-Navy Central on the 7th with an attack against Guadal-
Agreement, both General Imamura and canal. The target was a tempting one
Admiral Yamamoto issued fresh instruc- for in the vicinity were about a dozen
tions to their commands. The Army's warships, fourteen transports, and about
instructions, issued on 12 April, simply forty smaller vessels. Ashore were large
assigned the tasks set out by Imperial quantities of supplies stored for the com-
General Headquarters to the various ing invasion of New Georgia. With the
forces in the area: the 18th Army was 224 fighters and bombers he assigned to
to strengthen and defend Japanese bases this strike—the largest since Pearl Har-
in New Guinea; the 17th Army was to bor—Yamamoto expected great results.
do the same in the northern Solomons, The reports of vast damage brought back
and the 6th Air Division, while shifting by his pilots justified his hopes but were
base from Rabaul to New Guinea, was actually far from the truth. The Allies,
to conduct reconnaissance, cover the alerted by the coast watchers, had sent
movement of supplies, support ground 76 fighters, all that were available at
operations if required, and co-operate Henderson Field, to meet the Japanese
with naval air forces in the destruction and had succeeded in knocking down
of Allied air power. Aside from this 21 planes. Their own loss was seven
last provision, Imamura's program did fighters and a few small vessels.
not hold any great threat for the Allies On 11 April, Admiral Yamamoto
who by this time had acquired aerial turned his attention to New Guinea, the
supremacy in eastern New Guinea. second phase of the I-GO Operation, with
Admiral Yamamoto's plan was much an attack by 71 fighters and 216 bombers
more ambitious and potentially more against Allied shipping in Oro Bay,
dangerous for the Allies. His orders south of Buna. Next day he sent 124
from Tokyo were to destroy Allied air fighters and 43 bombers over Port Mores-
power in New Guinea and the Solomons, by, and on the 14th delivered the final
and he made plans to accomplish just
that. The operation, designated I-GO,
15
was to be in two parts, the first lasting For accounts of the I-GO Operation, see, in
addition to the sources cited above, Miller, CART-
WHEEL, pp. 42-45, and Morison, Breaking the Bis-
14
8th Area Army, pt. IV, p. 27. marcks Barrier, pp. 117-29.
CHART 12—ORGANIZATION OF JAPANESE FORCES, SOUTHEAST AREA, JULY 1943
Source: Miller, CARTWHEEL, p. 33.

attack of the I-GO Operation with a 196- "a great disaster took place."16 The
plane strike against shipping in Milne P-38's came in low, concentrating on
Bay. The reports that reached Yama- the bombers, and in a matter of minutes
moto of the damage inflicted on the had disposed of both of them. One
Allies in all these attacks were highly crashed into the dense Bougainville
gratifying and it was with the conviction jungle carrying Yamamoto and several
that I-GO had proved a great success of his staff to their deaths; the other
that the Combined Fleet commander landed in the sea close by, fortunately
called off the operation and sent the for the chief of staff who survived.
carrier-based planes of the 3d Fleet back The death of Admiral Yamamoto,
to Truk. author of the Pearl Harbor plan and
The success of the I-GO Operation perhaps the ablest officer in the Impe-
was an illusion based on greatly exag- rial Japanese Navy, was a major victory
gerated claims of damages by the Japa- for the Allies. It was a source of partic-
nese fliers, a bitter truth that Admiral ular satisfaction for those who remem-
Yamamoto did not live long enough to bered the admiral as author of the boast
learn. His undoing was the work of that he would dictate peace in the White
American Cryptanalysts who learned House, a statement he never made. To
that he was planning to visit the Buin the Japanese the loss was "an almost un-
area in southern Bougainville with his bearable blow," and they showed their
chief of staff and several other officers grief in the full-dress public funeral they
on 18 April to inspect the naval air bases gave the admiral's ashes in Tokyo on
there and congratulate those who had 5 June. Less than three weeks later the
taken part in the I-GO Operation. The Allied offensive Yamamoto had sought
visit of so august a personage prompted to forestall began. Between 23 and 25
a rash of messages between Buin and June MacArthur's forces seized Wood-
Rabaul which gave the American Crypt- lark and Kiriwina Islands without oppo-
analysts all the details of the journey— sition and on the last day of the month
the exact time of departure and arrival, another force seized a beachhead in
the course, and the number and type Nassau Bay, only about ten miles south
of planes in the entourage. Thus, when of Salamaua. Simultaneously, Halsey's
the two bombers carrying Yamamoto forces landed at Rendova across the
and his party approached Buin and as channel from Munda airfield on New
the nine accompanying fighters started Georgia. CARTWHEEL was on.
to leave, a flight of eighteen P-38's from
Guadalcanal appeared on the scene. "All 16
Hattori, The Greater East Asia War, II, pt. 5,
of a sudden," says one Japanese writer, p. 11.
PART FOUR
EMERGING PATTERNS
Now the general who wins a battle makes many calculations in his temple
ere the battle is fought. The general who loses a battle makes but few
calculations beforehand. Thus do many calculations lead to victory and
few calculations to defeat.
SUN Tzu
CHAPTER XXI
The North Pacific and the Soviet Union

Generals with their armies and admirals with their fleets are mere weapons
wielded by the hand of the statesman. It is for him to decide when to
strike, where to strike, and how to strike.
SIR JOHN FORTESCUE
American interest in the North Pacific air attacks would relieve the pressure on
as a potential theater of operations in a Russia, the Army planners replied that
war against Japan antedated Pearl Har- the Soviet Union would benefit more if
bor. Based originally on the hope of the Allies undertook an offensive in the
gaining air bases in the Soviet Maritime South Pacific. Such action, they thought,
Provinces within easy reach of Japan, would have the effect of containing Jap-
this interest was reinforced later by the anese forces, thus removing the danger
desire for an air ferry route to facilitate of a Japanese attack against Siberia.2
the delivery of lend-lease planes. But This was a view that General Mac-
those pushing for air operations based Arthur could support warmly. Writing
on Soviet territory made little headway from Australia in May 1942, he argued
against Stalin's determination to main- that the Soviet Union could best be
tain a neutral position in the Far East.1 helped by opening a second front, but
Moreover, the requirements from other that the second front should be in the
parts of the Pacific and the plans for an Pacific. An offensive there would relieve
offensive in Europe left little for an area Japanese pressure on Siberia, he argued,
that was not in urgent need and where and permit Marshal Stalin "either to uti-
operations did not hold out the promise lize the Siberian resources in direct sup-
of decisive results. port of his European front or to join
his allies in the Pacific attack."3 But
Strategic Background since Stalin had no intention of getting
involved in the Far East or permitting
By the spring of 1942 the Army U.S. aircraft to base in the Maritime
planners in Washington, despite strong Provinces, this entire discussion was aca-
arguments from the commanders in the demic. Without the active co-operation
theater and from the Army Air Forces, of the Soviet Union a North Pacific offen-
were beginning to view the idea of bomb-
ing Japan from Siberia with increasing 2
Memo, Capt John H. Caughey for Eisenhower, 11
skepticism. To the argument that such Mar 42, sub: Assistance to Russia, JPS 19/D, ABC
381 (1-23-42).
3
Rad, MacArthur to Marshall, No. 176, 8 May 42,
1
Seeabove, pp. 154-56. GHQ, SWPA Hist Rec Index.
sive against Japan was out of the ques- In these circumstances the first and
tion at this time and General Marshall, most pressing need was to strengthen
on 18 March 1942, restricted the role the Alaskan defenses and measures were
of Army forces in Alaska to the strategic immediately taken to that end. The sec-
defensive. And at the end of the month, ond and almost equally urgent matter
he and the other members of the Joint requiring attention was to provide for
Chiefs agreed to discontinue planning co-ordination between U.S. and Soviet
for operations in the north until arrange- operations in the event of a Japanese
ments could be made with Russia for "a attack. But no plans could be made until
more complete military collaboration." 4 agreement with the Soviet Union was
Though the President took no action reached on the political level, a step that
at that time, he did act early in June the Joint Chiefs had recommended in
when information pointing to a Japanese March and now urged again. This time
attack on Siberia was received in Wash- the President acted upon the recommen-
ington. The seizure of Attu and Kiska dations of his military advisers and on
on 6 and 7 June, combined with the 17 June appealed personally to Marshal
movement of Japanese air forces to Para- Stalin for "an immediate exchange of
mushiro in the Kurils, seemed ample detailed information" on military facili-
confirmation of this information. More- ties in Siberia and Alaska. "We are pre-
over, it was feared that as a preliminary pared to come to your assistance with
step in their invasion of the Maritime our air power," Roosevelt told the Soviet
Provinces the Japanese would seize addi- leader, "provided suitable landing fields
tional positions in the North Pacific in are available in Siberia." Secret military
order to cut the line of communications staff conversations, the President added,
between Siberia and Alaska. To this were essential to the common interest
fear was added the real concern felt by and ought to be initiated at once.6
officers in the theater and in Washington Roosevelt's personal intervention
and by the American people that Japan accomplished its purpose and Stalin
would use its newly acquired bases in consented, somewhat reluctantly, to
the Aleutians as a springboard for inva- U.S.-Soviet staff conversations to be held
sion of the United States. Thus, the in Moscow. Maj. Gen. Follett Bradley
planners had to anticipate the possibility was chosen for the assignment and in July
of additional operations in Alaska as well left for Russia on a mission that would
as a Japanese attack on Siberia, a step prove both barren and frustrating so far
that would bring the Soviet Union into as acquiring information about Siberian
the war against Japan.5 bases and concerting plans for action
against Japan were concerned. The Rus-
sians were more interested in securing
4
Mins, JCS Mtg; 30 Mar 42, Memos, Marshall and
King for Roosevelt, 30 Mar 42; Marshall for WPD, 18
6
Mar 42; both in ABC 381 (1-23-42); JCS 16/1, 29 Rad, Roosevelt to Stalin, 17 Jun 42, OPD Exec
Mar 42, sub: UN Action in Case of War Between Files; Mins, JCS Mtg, 15 Jun 42; JCS 61, 14 Jun 42,
Russia and Japan. sub: Estimate of Sit in North Pacific. For the meas-
5
Memo, G-2 for OPD, 21 May 42, OPD 381 Japan ures taken to defend Alaska, see Conn, Engelman,
(3-7-42), sec. 1, and related papers in this file; JCS and Fairchild, Guarding the United States and Its
61, 14 Jun 42, sub: Estimate of Sit in North Pacific. Outposts, ch. X.
THE NORTH PACIFIC AND THE SOVIET UNION 421
lend-lease aircraft than in military turn, was a part of Lt. Gen. John L.
collaboration.7 DeWitt's Western Defense Command.
At the time of Midway the Alaska garri-
The Aleutians son consisted of about 30,000 men—
more than half in antiaircraft units—
Though the fear of a Japanese offen- and the Eleventh Air Force (Brig. Gen.
sive in the north—a fear the Russians, William O. Butler), all together almost
judging from their actions, apparently 51,000 troops. Admiral Theobald's au-
did not share—ultimately proved ground- thority extended only to operations, but
less, the task of expelling the Japanese for this purpose the planes of the Elev-
from the Aleutians remained. Opera- enth Air Force came under his control,
tions in this area promised to be ex- a situation that led to considerable
tremely difficult. The islands seemed, difficulty.
on the map, to provide an easy route Planning for active operations against
across the Pacific to the Kurils and Japan, the Japanese in the Aleutians began in
but in actuality this region was one of mid-June, within a week of the occu-
the most forbidding in the world. (Map pation of Attu and Kiska. At that time
6) Sustained air and naval operations General DeWitt proposed to Marshall
would be impossible during certain sea- that he be given additional troops to
sons of the year and difficult even at retake the islands as the first step in
more favorable times. There were few a counteroffensive aimed at reaching
developed areas suitable as bases, the Japan through the North Pacific. But
distances between them were great, and the Army planners in Washington saw
almost all supplies would have to be little profit in such an undertaking,
brought from the United States.8 especially when the resources of the
Command of the Aleutians, which fell Allies were already being strained to the
within the North Pacific Area, was as- utmost. They therefore vetoed Dewitt's
signed to Admiral Nimitz who exercised suggestion but did approve his request
his responsibility through his representa- for additional air and ground forces for
tive, Rear Adm. Robert A. Theobald. the defense of Alaska.9
But the situation was complicated by the Not easily discouraged, General
fact that the bulk of the forces in the DeWitt continued to press for an offen-
region were Army troops assigned to the sive in the North Pacific, submitting to
Alaskan Defense Command, under Maj. General Marshall various plans to drive
Gen. Simon B. Buckner, Jr., which, in the enemy from the Aleutians. All of
7
these proposals, coming in the midst of
For an account of the Bradley mission, see Matloff
and Snell, Strategic Planning, 1941-42, pp. 343-46. preparations for the Guadalcanal and
8
In the preparation of this section, the author used North African invasions, were rejected.
freely the following works: Conn, Engelman, and A more modest plan, submitted by
Fairchild, Guarding the United States and Its Out-
posts, chs. IX and X; Matloff, Strategic Planning for DeWitt on 18 July, did meet a favor-
Coalition Warfare, 1943-44; Craven and Cate AAF I, able response. According to this plan,
ch. 8, and AAF IV, ch. 11; Hayes, The War Against
9
Japan. In most cases, however, the author has con- Rads, DeWitt for Marshall, 8 and 15 Jun 42, Nos.
sulted the source materials and drawn his own con- 583 and 630, OPD 381 (Alaska), case 24; Notes on
clusions. War Council, 15 Jun 42; Gen Council Mins, 16 Jun 42.
MAP 6
Tanaga Island, about 160 miles from said, was naval support, and he asked
Kiska, would be occupied and converted that he be allowed to arrange for that
into an air base, thus neutralizing the with Admiral Nimitz. "Urge details of
Japanese base at Kiska. General DeWitt operation be left to me and I be given
had already conducted a reconnaissance freedom of action," he wrote. "Early
and was able to assure the Chief of Staff decision essential to success of this
that the island possessed adequate air- operation."11
field sites and harbor facilities to make This request for naval support led to
the scheme practicable.10 complications DeWitt had not foreseen.
What impressed the Washington plan- To secure the naval support he required,
ners most was DeWitt's assertion that he it was necessary to gain the Navy's
could accomplish this task with troops approval of the project and to issue a
already under his command (3,000 for joint directive to DeWitt and to the
the assault and 5,000 for the garrison), naval commander in the area, Admiral
and with resources available on the west Theobald. Almost immediately the plan
coast and in Alaska. All he needed, he ran into trouble. In proposing the proj-
ect to the Navy, the Army planners men-
10
Ltr, DeWitt to Marshall, 16 Jul 42; Rad, Marshall
to DeWitt, 18 Jul 42, CM-OUT 5106; Memo, OPD
11
for Marshall, 27 Jul 42, sub: Plans for Opns in Rad, DeWitt for Marshall, 19 Jul 42, OPD 381
Alaska, OPD 381 (Alaska), case 24. (Alaska), case 25.
tioned Adak, a small island near Tanaga, With far more important operations
as an alternative but expressed a prefer- in progress or in prospect, the Army
ence for Tanaga. This created the first planners were not inclined to take a
obstacle, for the Navy decided it would strong stand on so relatively unimpor-
first have to conduct its own reconnais- tant a matter. They therefore counseled
sance. It appeared also that approval General Marshall to accept King's pro-
would have to await Admiral Theobald's posal, with the proviso that Tanaga
return from a brief journey. And finally, might be taken at a later time. Marshall
naval officers in Alaska were reporting accepted this solution and so informed
that the naval support needed for the General DeWitt. On 30 August Army
operation would not be available until troops from Alaska occupied Adak and
September.12 The Navy, therefore, while two weeks later the first Adak-based
approving the plan in principle, asked planes hit Kiska.13
that a decision be deferred. Although the Tanaga-Adak debate had
Though General DeWitt protested finally been settled and the operation
this delay, there was little to be done. successfully concluded, relations between
His difficulties were increased when the Army and Navy officers in the area
Admiral Theobald, on his return, ex- were such that there was grave doubt
pressed opposition to the Tanaga project in Washington that joint operations in
because of navigational hazards. Adak, he the theater would be conducted with
thought, would be preferable on account the degree of co-operation required for
of its harbor facilities. DeWitt and Gen- success. Many factors contributed to this
eral Buckner continued to favor Tanaga lack of harmony, not the least of which
for its advantageous airfield sites. The was the personality of some of the senior
Joint Chiefs' approval on 5 August of commanders. Unified command, difficult
the Tanaga project failed to bring the to attain under ideal conditions, was
field commanders into agreement and impossible without a determination on
finally in mid-August the dispute was the part of all commanders to subordi-
referred to Washington for settlement. nate their individual convictions to the
The compromise worked out in Wash- common good. As viewed from Wash-
ington was a victory for the naval point ington, this "predisposition to agree" was
of view. Admiral King not only stood not evident among the commanders in
solidly behind Theobald but also with- the Alaskan theater and by August had
drew his earlier approval of the seizure produced such strong feelings as to bring
of Tanaga, substituting Adak Island in from General Handy a recommendation
its stead. If this substitution was not that the War and Navy Departments
acceptable to the Army, he told Marshall, inform the senior officers in the theater
then the entire project should be
dropped. 13
JCS 42/D, 5 Aug 42, sub: Japanese Capabilities
in Aleutians; Memos, King for Marshall, 18 Aug
12
Memos, Actg CofS for CNO, 23 Jul 42, sub: Occu- 42, sub: Tanaga Island Development, OPD Exec
pation of Tanaga or Adak; CNO for Actg CofS, 25 Files; OPD for Marshall, and Marshall for King, same
Jul 42, same sub, OPD 580.82 (Alaska), case 13. See date and sub, OPD 580.82 (Alaska), case 15; Rads,
other papers in this file for additional correspon- DeWitt to Marshall, 20 and 31 Aug 42, CM-IN 7583
dence on this matter. and 12123.
that there could be no excuse "for with- and Admiral King decided to make no
holding whole-hearted support of the change in command at that time.16
Service or the Commander exercising Less than a year later, after the test
unity of command." "Strong notice of of active operations and after the relief
this conviction . . .," he believed, "would of Admiral Theobald, King wrote:
do much to force essential co-operation In the North Pacific Area no complete
and reduce much fruitless controversy unified command has been established.
between the two Services."14 Naval Forces, amphibious operations, and
When the situation did not improve a portion of the Army Air Forces have been
the following month, the Army pro- placed under the Commander North Pacific,
to operate under the principle of mutual
posed a separate Alaskan Department cooperation with the ground forces and
independent of General DeWitt and other Air Forces. The Commander North
headed by an air officer. This arrange- Pacific has carried out operations under
ment would also make it possible to shift joint directives not directly from the Joint
the three top commanders in Alaska— Chiefs of Staff, but from the Commander in
Chief, Pacific Ocean Areas, and the Com-
Theobald, Buckner, and Butler — to manding General, Western Defense Com-
other assignments quietly and without mand. This arrangement, made last year,
any unpleasantness. But even while this has, for the ADAK, AMCHITKA, ATTU,
proposal was under discussion, DeWitt and the prospective KISKA operations,
and Theobald were involved in a dis- worked extremely well in practice, largely
due to excellent cooperation between the
pute over a small garrison in the Pribilof responsible commanders concerned. I have
Islands. "What is it," General Marshall not seen fit to press for a change in this set-
was moved to remark when he learned up, nor do I wish to do so now. In fact, it
of this new conflict, "that produces so is working so well that I believe a change
many complete misunderstandings?"15 would be a mistake.17
If he was seeking an answer he failed Meanwhile General DeWitt, far from
to receive one then, but since the imme- abandoning his original proposal for the
diate disagreement was soon settled, he occupation of Tanaga, had begun again
to urge the seizure of that island. But
14
with Adak in American hands, the plan-
Memo, Handy for McNarney, 8 Aug 42, sub:
Army-Navy Co-operation in Alaska, OPD 384
ners in Washington could see no advan-
(WDC), case 9. In commenting on this chapter in tage in occupying Tanaga and suggested
manuscript, General DeWitt wrote: "Too much Amchitka Island, only fifty miles from
emphasis is being placed on an incident that had
no appreciable effect on operations as far as local
Kiska, as the next objective. DeWitt did
commanders were concerned. It seems to have ap- not favor this plan. Pointing to the in-
peared more serious on paper than it actually was. conclusive findings of a reconnaissance
There was a personality clash between Admiral
Theobald and General Buckner, but it was super-
16
ficial and had no lasting effect on the mutual co- Memo, Marshall for King, 22 Sep 42, sub: Comd
operation that followed. It was forgotten after in Alaska, WDCSA (Alaska). See also correspondence
Admiral Theobald was relieved and General between Marshall and DeWitt in this file and in
Buckner promoted." (Comments of DeWitt, July "GCM" Personal File.
17
1959, OCMH.) Memo, King for Marshall, 19 Jul 43, sub: Relief
15
Memo, Marshall for Handy, 8 Sep 42, no sub, by Army Troops of Marine Corps Ground and Avia-
OPD Exec Files; Ltr, Marshall to DeWitt, 3 Sep 42; tion Units now on Garrison and Defense Duty at
Memo, Marshall for King, 3 Sep 42, last two in Tutuila, Wallis, Upolu, and Palmyra, OPD 384
WDCSA (Alaska). PTO, case 55.
made at the end of September, he empha- the Army begin training a force capable
sized the difficulties of constructing an of doing the job.19
airfield on the island. Moreover, the Here was strong support indeed for
seizure of Amchitka would require larger Dewitt, who had long been pushing for
naval forces than would be available, in an offensive against Kiska, and he lost
view of an impending transfer of destroy- no time sending to Marshall a plan for
ers and other ships from the North the seizure of the island. This plan
Pacific to Guadalcanal. Operations called for the use of troops already in
against Amchitka, DeWitt asserted, were Alaska and accustomed to the climate,
impractical, and unless otherwise di- their place to be taken by additional
rected he intended, he told Marshall on troops provided by the War Department.
17 October, to go ahead with the Tanaga In this way, DeWitt pointed out, the
project. If the Joint Chiefs approved, troops for the invasion could be assem-
he hoped to go on to Kiska, then possibly bled quickly in one place for training
to Attu and finally to Amchitka.18 and equipped there for the coming as-
The Kiska plan to which DeWitt sault. But, if this plan was not accept-
referred in his message to Marshall was able, DeWitt expressed a willingness to
one he had submitted almost two weeks employ troops from the United States.
earlier. The occasion for this new move In either case, the equivalent of a
to open up the question of a general division, trained and equipped for am-
offensive in the North Pacific had been phibious operations, would be required.
provided by Admiral Nimitz. As com- These same troops, DeWitt added, could
mander of the Pacific Ocean Area (which be employed later for operations against
included the North Pacific), Nimitz was Attu and Amchitka.20
legitimately concerned over the fact that There was no disagreement in Wash-
a portion of his naval strength was being ington about the desirability of driving
immobilized in North Pacific waters the enemy from the Aleutians. President
without any visible effect on Japanese Roosevelt had even suggested, during a
operations at Kiska and Attu. This visit to the west coast, that old battleships
strength, Nimitz felt, could profitably be used "to blast the Japs out of Kiska."
be employed elsewhere in the Pacific But Admiral King, when this suggestion
where it was badly needed. He did not reached him, saw little merit in the Pres-
believe, either, that the newly con- ident's idea. Like Nimitz and DeWitt,
structed base at Adak would achieve he thought the job could be done only
decisive results, or that the Japanese by amphibious troops. And he agreed
could be driven from the Aleutians by also with DeWitt's scheme to use troops
air power alone. Nothing less than the already in Alaska for the landing. But
seizure of both Japanese-held islands by he did not agree with DeWitt's opti-
American troops could accomplish that,
said Nimitz, and he recommended that 19
Ltr, Nimitz to King, 24 Sep 42, sub: Amphibious
Training for Opns in Kiska, WDCSA (Alaska).
18 20
Rads, DeWitt to Marshall, 20 Aug 42, CM-IN Ltr, DeWitt to Marshall, 5 Oct 42, WDCSA
7583; Marshall to DeWitt, 15 Oct 42, CM-OUT 5161; (Alaska); Memo, DeWitt for Marshall, 12 Oct 42,
DeWitt to Marshall, 17 Oct 42; Memo, Streett for sub: Plans for Reduction and Occupation of
Handy, 9 Sep 42, OPD 381 (ADC), case 38. BOODLE (Kiska), OPD 320.2 (WDC), case 194.
mistic estimates of what he would need vinced as he was of the possibility of

to capture Kiska. This matter, King felt, a Japanese offensive in the Aleutians he
needed further study, and since the trans- could not agree that there was time to
ports required for the operation could train the troops in the United States. He
not be made available until January or wanted the troops quickly for use in an
February of 1943 no time would be lost emergency, and he wanted them readily
by looking into the matter further.21 available. "I appreciate the heavy respon-
General Marshall also felt no purpose sibility and pressure under which you
would be served by haste since weather are working . . . ," he told Marshall,
in the fog-swept Aleutians was most diffi- "but I hope you will find time to con-
cult during the winter months. The sider its [the Kiska plan] broader aspects
spring of 1943, he thought, was the ear- and direct a favorable decision." 23
liest date when an offensive could be This plea had no observable effect on
launched in the North Pacific. He saw Marshall's conviction that there was no
no necessity, therefore, for using troops real danger from the Japanese at Kiska,
already in Alaska, as DeWitt had sug- and therefore no pressing need to send
gested. There was ample time to select troops to a theater whose mission was
the troops needed and to train them primarily defensive. Requirements else-
in the United States where facilities where, in the Solomons, in New Guinea,
for amphibious training already existed. in North Africa, and in Burma, were far
For these reasons, plus the fact there more urgent and important.24 More-
was not then available or likely soon over, the Navy had by mid-November
to be the assault shipping required for concluded that the most favorable tar-
operations against Kiska, General Mar- get date for the seizure of Kiska would
shall thought it best to tell DeWitt his be 15 May 1943. If this date was accept-
plan was not "favorably considered" at able, Admiral King proposed that the
this time. And on the basis of reports theater commanders be directed to pre-
on Amchitka, he suggested that another pare for the operation. On this basis,
reconnaissance be made of the island to General Marshall was willing to agree
determine its suitability as an air base.22 tentatively to the Kiska invasion in mid-
General DeWitt did not accept this May. A final decision, he maintained,
decision without protest. Though he should not be made until March when
ordered the reconnaissance Marshall re- he and King would be in a better posi-
quested he again asserted his objections tion to determine what troops and assault
to the occupation of Amchitka as a prel- shipping were needed and whether they
ude to the seizure of Kiska. And con- could be spared. Admiral King accepted
this condition without demur on 23
21
Ltr, DeWitt to Marshall, 29 Sep 42; Memos, King November, thus settling the problem
for Marshall, 5 and 12 Oct 42, sub: Amphibious Opns temporarily for the Washington plan-
Against Kiska, WDCSA (Alaska).
22
Memos, Marshall for King, 17 Oct 42, sub: Am-
phibious Opns Against Kiska; OPD for Marshall, 15
23
Oct 42, same sub: Ltr, Marshall to DeWitt, 29 Oct 42, Ltr, DeWitt to Marshall, 5 Nov 42, WDCSA
Memo, OPD for Marshall, same date, sub: DeWitt's (Alaska).
24
letters of 19 and 23 Oct 42, all in OPD 381 (ADC) For expressions of this view, see the papers filed
case 36. in OPD 381 (ADC), cases 36 and 44.
ners but leaving the theater command- Aleutians. As a result of this discussion,
ers in doubt as to whether an offensive DeWitt agreed to cancel his long-
against Kiska would ultimately be cherished design for occupying Tanaga
launched.25 and to use the troops already assembled
The temporary shelving of the Kiska for that purpose to seize Amchitka
offensive left unsettled the question of Island instead. Both Admirals King and
Amchitka. On receipt of Marshall's re- Nimitz, who were in San Francisco at
quest for a new reconnaissance, General the time, immediately gave their con-
Buckner and Admiral Theobald had sent to the cancellation of Tanaga.27
organized a survey party, but had delayed Substitution of Amchitka would have
its departure because of the weather and to await formal approval by the Joint
the reported presence of Japanese on Chiefs.
the island. So concerned was Admiral Steps to gain this approval were ini-
Nimitz over this report that he recom- tiated by Admiral King on his return
mended on 22 November, the day before to Washington. By 15 December he had
King and Marshall had reached agree- already prepared and sent to General
ment on Kiska, that an Army force be Marshall a proposed directive for the
sent immediately to Amchitka to prevent occupation of Amchitka, which he ex-
the Japanese from constructing an air plained, was intended as preliminary to
base there.26 This was a step the Air the expulsion of the Japanese "from
Forces planners had already urged but Kiska and all of the Aleutians." At the
which DeWitt continued to oppose same time, King suggested that the tar-
persistently. get date for Kiska be advanced to 1
Under Rear Adm. Thomas C. Kinkaid, March and that Admiral Nimitz be in-
Theobald's successor and an experienced structed to submit detailed plans for the
carrier commander who had fought the seizure of both Amchitka and Kiska as
Japanese in the South Pacific, relations well as an estimate of the forces required
between the Army and Navy improved for both operations. Left to Nimitz also
greatly. En route to his new assignment was the selection of a date for the
as commander of the North Pacific Area, occupation of Amchitka.28
he stopped off at Pearl Harbor to talk General Marshall and the Army plan-
with Nimitz, who undoubtedly impressed ners accepted this revised plan, but with
on him the necessity for occupying two important reservations. First, they
Amchitka. He then went on to San would not agree to the occupation of
Francisco where on 12 December he met Amchitka until the results of the recon-
General DeWitt and had a long talk naissance ordered in November were
with him about the situation in the in; and second, they refused to commit
themselves to any target date for the
25
Kiska invasion. This refusal was based,
Memos, King for Marshall, 15 Nov 42, sub: Am-
phibious Opns Against Kiska, WDCSA (Alaska) SS;
OPD for Marshall, 17 Nov 42 and Marshall for King,
27
23 Nov 42, same sub, both in OPD 381 (ADC), Rad, Nimitz to Theobald, No. 2112, 17 Dec 42,
case 45. OPD 381 (ADC), case 4.
26 28
Rad, Nimitz to King, No. 1041, 22 Nov 42, OPD Memo, King for Marshall, 15 Dec 42, sub: Direc-
381 (ADC), case 47. tive to occupy Amchitka, OPD 381 (ADC), case 50.
This was the signal DeWitt was waiting

for and he now acted with vigor and
speed. By mid-January 1943, American
troops had landed on Amchitka, occu-
pied the island without resistance, and
begun the construction of an airfield.
Before the end of February, fighter
planes based on the island were flying
over Kiska as often as the foul weather
permitted.30
Planning for the occupation of Kiska
had meanwhile run a checkered course
and come to a standstill. The Joint
Chiefs directive, though it failed to set
a target date for the operation, called
for plans and these General DeWitt
hastened to supply. Immediately on re-
ceipt of the directive he conferred with
Nimitz, Kinkaid, and others about the
Army's participation in the campaign
and on 19 December forwarded to Wash-
ington an estimate of what he would
need. Included was one division, two
GENERAL DEWITT infantry regiments, and service and sup-
port troops, all together 25,000 men.
Marshall explained, on "our serious Though this estimate was less than
logistical shortage" in the South and Admiral Nimitz' by one division, it still
Southwest Pacific and on the possibility called for more troops than Marshall
that once air forces were established on was ready to commit to the Aleutians.
Amchitka the invasion of Kiska might He was willing to give DeWitt the divi-
prove unnecessary.29 sion, but no additional infantry strength
Admiral King made no objection to beyond that. And to be certain that
the Army's conditions and the proposed there was no misunderstanding he re-
directive authorizing the Amchitka and minded DeWitt that the final decision
Kiska operations was quickly revised and on Kiska was still to be made. But the
approved by the Joint Chiefs on 17 assurance of one division was enough
December. Within a few days the first for DeWitt and on that basis he made
condition set by the Army was met his plans. These were approved by
when the reconnaissance group returned Admiral Nimitz on 9 January, when
from Amchitka and reported that there
were favorable airfield sites on the island. 30
Memo, Conolly for Handy, 18 Dec 42; Ltr, Mar-
shall to DeWitt, 17 Dec 42; Rpt of OPD Observer
29
Memo, Marshall for King, 16 Dec 42, sub: Direc- on Amchitka Opn, all in OPD 381 (ADC), cases 50
tive To Occupy Amchitka; OPD Memo for Record, and 61; Rads, DeWitt to Marshall, 20 and 25 Dec 42,
same date and sub, OPD 381 (ADC) case 50. CM-IN 8656, 8937, 11265.
preparations for the operation began in

earnest.31
Selected to lead the assault was Rear
Adm. Francis W. Rockwell, who had
come out of the Philippines with Gen-
eral MacArthur. With Army and Navy
officers assigned to the operation, Rock-
well formed a joint planning staff at
San Diego, site of the Marine Corps
Amphibious Training Center and in
close proximity to the major forces and
headquarters that would participate.
While this group developed its plans,
the 7th Division, selected to make the
assault, was reorganized, brought up to
full strength, and put through an inten-
sive training program. In its amphibious
phase, this program was directed by
Marine officers. At the same time, the
Eleventh Air Force stepped up its oper-
ations against Kiska, bombing the island
as often as weather permitted.
These preparations did not change
General Marshall's views on Kiska. ADMIRAL KINKAID
Never enthusiastic about a North Pacific
offensive unless the Soviet Union entered forces available. Though the change was
the war against Japan and fearful of made ostensibly to allay British fears of
its effect on other more important areas, large-scale operations in the North
he had given reluctant consent to the Pacific, there was never real danger of
invasion of Kiska. At the same time, he such operations in the light of Marshall's
sought to keep to a minimum the forces conviction.32
required for the operation while hoping The limitations placed on the North
that ultimately it would prove unneces- Pacific offensive by General Marshall
sary. Thus, at the Casablanca Confer- and confirmed at Casablanca led ulti-
ence in January 1943 he had taken the mately to a change in the plans for Kiska.
lead in modifying the original statement By early March, when these plans were
of U.S. intentions in the Aleutians — already far advanced, it had become
seizure and occupation of the western apparent to Admiral Kinkaid that he
Aleutians — to the milder "make the would not be able to get the ships he
Aleutians as secure as may be" with the needed or to launch the planned air
offensive against Kiska in time to mount
31
Rads, Marshall to DeWitt, 20 Dec 42, CM-OUT
32
7134; DeWitt to Marshall, 19 and 21 Dec 42, 11 Jan Mins, JCS Mtg, 22 Jan 43; CCS 168, 22 Jan 43,
43, CM-IN 8228, 9548, 5161; Nimitz to CTF 3 and sub: Conduct of the War in Pacific in 1943; CCS 170,
8, No. 0342, 9 Jan 43. 23 Jan 43, Rpt to President and Prime Minister.
the operation before the pea-soup fogs mended that the Joint Chiefs give Nim-
of the summer season set in. After con- itz and DeWitt the green light on Attu.
sultation with DeWitt and Buckner, he On the understanding that no additional
proposed, therefore, a less ambitious forces would be required, Marshall con-
undertaking against Attu, which, he sented and the same day, 22 March, King
believed, could be carried off with the issued, in the name of the Joint Chiefs
forces and shipping already available. of Staff, the joint directive for the seizure
The Joint Chiefs readily agreed to this of Attu.34
change, but Admiral King made it clear Preparations for the coming invasion
to both Nimitz and DeWitt that this now moved forward rapidly. Detailed
acceptance did not constitute a directive plans were drawn up by Rockwell's staff
for the operation but only authorization and by the troop commanders. On 31
to plan and train for it. Final approval March, Admiral Nimitz and General
would wait the outcome of the Pacific DeWitt jointly issued the operational
Military Conference, then only two days directive outlining the tasks—seizure of
away.33 Attu and Shemya Islands—and setting
While Pacific strategy was being the date for the assault as 7 May. Kin-
debated in Washington, Admiral Rock- kaid, as commander of the North Pacific,
well's joint staff in San Diego started was to command the entire operation;
to plan for the seizure of Attu, the new Admiral Rockwell, the amphibious
but still unapproved objective. On 17 phase. Once the troops were established
March General DeWitt, hoping perhaps ashore, command was to pass to the 7th
to force a decision, submitted to Nimitz Division commander, Maj. Gen. Albert
a draft directive setting 7 May as the E. Brown. The relationship between the
target date for the invasion. No action Army and Navy commanders, DeWitt
followed this recommendation, but a assured General Marshall on 1 April,
few days later word reached Washington was excellent and all the officers con-
that the Japanese were building an air- cerned were showing a commendable
field on Attu. "If they are allowed to unity of purpose. Preparations were
complete this, and go further in the being completed rapidly and he expected,
consolidation of their position there by he told Marshall, that his greatest enemy
establishment of airfields on Shemya and would be the weather and not the
Agattu," wrote Admiral King, "our even- Japanese.35
tual recapture of these areas will be ren- This easy assumption proved less than
dered very much more difficult." Since accurate for almost immediately on land-
by that time the Pacific Military Con- ing the troops ran into all sorts of
ference had reached the conclusion that
operations in the South and Southwest 34
Memos, King for Marshall, 22 Mar 43, sub: Opns
Pacific during 1943 would have to be Against Attu; Handy for King, same date and sub;
Rad, DeWitt to Nimitz, No. 2239, 19 Mar 43, all in
limited to Task Two, King recom- OPD 381, case 54 and 39; Rad, King to Nimitz, No.
1939, 22 Mar 43, OPD Exec Files.
33 35
Rads, Kinkaid to Nimitz, Nos. 0103 and 0115, Rads, Nimitz to Kinkaid and Rockwell, No. 1839,
7 Mar 43; King to Nimitz and DeWitt, No. 1221, 1 Apr 43; Kinkaid to Nimitz, No. 0323, 31 Mar 43,
10 Mar 43, OPD 381, case 39. For an account of the OPD 381, case 54; Ltr, DeWitt to Marshall, 1 Apr 43,
Pacific Military Conference, see above, ch XIX. WDCSA (Alaska).
difficulties. By 12 May it was evident approval, they tried again at the end of
that the reduction of the Japanese de- the month. This time they furnished a
fenses would be a longer and tougher job detailed operational plan and moved
than anyone had anticipated. As the the target date up to 15 August, in
campaign dragged on the Navy became accordance with Admiral King's wishes.37
increasingly apprehensive over the safety While the Navy supported the Kiska
of the naval supporting force and on 16 project, the Army planners continued to
May Admiral Kinkaid, after consulta- express doubts about the advisability of
tion with DeWitt and Buckner, relieved the operation. Some were concerned
General Brown, the ground commander, over the diversion of critical resources to
and appointed Maj. Gen. Eugene M. this indecisive area; others thought a war
Landrum in his stead. Fortunately, this of attrition in the Aleutians might pay
drastic move did not impair the harmony better dividends than outright seizure of
between the services, but neither did it the island. Finally, Nimitz and DeWitt
accomplish the miracle of ending the were authorized to prepare for the
stalemate ashore. It was not until two invasion, but permission to make the
weeks later that the island was secured assault was withheld.38
and construction begun on an airfield. The second week of June saw the
By that time a small force had landed on resolution of the differences over Kiska.
Shemya Island, thirty-five miles to the On the heels of a study by the Army
east, to begin work on an airfield there.36 planners, General Marshall expressed a
Still on the docket was the seizure of willingness to leave the decision to the
Kiska, deferred in favor of Attu because Navy. But Admiral King refused to act
of the lack of shipping and other re- on this suggestion and recommended
sources. Thought to be the main Jap- instead that they turn the problem over
anese stronghold in the Aleutians and to the Joint Staff Planners. Marshall
garrisoned by a force of about 10,000 agreed, and during the next few days the
men, this island had always been De- planners reviewed the entire project.
Witt's preferred objective. Now there Their recommendation, made on 11
was no further reason for delay and June, was that Nimitz and DeWitt be
even before the Attu campaign was over authorized to invade Kiska at a date to
DeWitt joined with Admiral Nimitz be chosen by themselves. August, the
in urging the Joint Chiefs to give planners pointed out, was the best
their consent to the invasion of Kiska month of the year for operations in the
early in September. Failing to receive Aleutians. Moreover, the force required
36
for the invasion—five regimental combat
For General Brown's account of his relief, see
his account of the operation entitled "The Attu
37
Operation," undated but written after the war, in Rads, DeWitt to Nimitz, No. 2345, 19 May 43;
OCMH. See also Samuel Eliot Morison, Aleutians, Nimitz to King, No. 0247, 21 May 43; DeWitt and
Gilberts and Marshalls, June 1942-April 1944, vol Nimitz to JCS, 30 May 43, CM-IN 19422; Memos,
VII, "History of United States Naval Operations in King for Marshall, 23 May 43, no sub; OPD for Mar-
World War II" (Boston: Little, Brown and Com- shall, 22 May 43, sub: Reduction of Kiska, all in OPD
pany, 1951), pp. 47-49; ONI Combat Narrative, The 381, case 132.
38
Aleutians Campaign, pp. 83ff; Conn, Engelman, and The various papers dealing with this discussion
Fairchild, Guarding the United States and Its Out- are filed in OPD 381, case 132, and ABC 381, Japan
posts, ch. XI. (5-31-42).
PLANNING THE KISKA OPERATION. From left, seated: Admiral Rockwell, Admiral Kinkaid,
Maj. Gen. Charles H. Corlett, General Buckner, General Butler, and Maj. Gen. G. R. Pearkes
of the Canadian Army Pacific Command; standing: Commander Dennison, Captain Colclough,
Colonel Jones, General Ready, General Post.
teams, a specially equipped and trained The next two months were busy ones
U.S.-Canadian force of regimental size, for the commanders in Alaska. While
and an artillery battalion—was available, final preparations were being made, the
or would be by 15 August, the planners Eleventh Air Force in July stepped up
observed. There was, therefore, in their its operations, to drop a total of 424 tons
opinion no reason to delay, especially of bombs on Kiska. During the same
since the operation would have a favor- month the Navy hit the island with an
able psychological effect on the Amer- additional 330 tons of explosives. On 2
ican people. The Joint Chiefs accepted August, a joint air and naval force struck
this recommendation and gave their Kiska with devastating blows, followed
approval immediately, despite the fear two days later by the heaviest air raid to
that the operation would be a costly one date. Thereafter the island was sub-
and the island once taken would require jected to daily bombings, with increased
a large garrison. Three days later the intensity until D-day, 15 August.
theater commanders were notified of the The absence of strong enemy opposi-
decision.39 tion to these attacks had been noted, but
no one had put the correct interpretation
39
Supp Mins, JCS Mtg, 8 Jun 43; OPD Brief,
8 Jun 43, sub: Notes on JCS 91st Mtg, JCS 346, ABC Aleutian operations, see Col. Stanley W. Dziuban,
381 Japan (5-31-42); JCS 346/2, 11 Jun 43, sub: Military Relations Between the United States and
JPS Rpt Opn Cottage; Rad, JCS to DeWitt, 14 Jun Canada, 1939-1945, UNITED STATES ARMY IN
43, CM-OUT 5847. For Canadian participation in WORLD WAR II (Washington, 1960).
on this fact. Actually there had been no The withdrawal of the troops on Attu
enemy opposition at all after July. The proved an impossible task, though at
Japanese garrison had evacuated under least one submarine made the attempt.
cover of fog and mist. But despite this But on Kiska, the evacuation went for-
fact, pilots and observers had continued ward smoothly under an elaborate and
to report antiaircraft fire and Japanese detailed plan. Thirteen submarines
activity. It was only when the troops assigned to the task first took off the sick
landed on 15 August fully expecting to and wounded and then the civilians
meet strong resistance that the Allies early in June. The loss of two of the
learned there were no Japanese on the submarines led to a change in plan. A
island. For almost three weeks Allied naval task force of the 5th Fleet was to
air and naval forces had been pounding move in and take off the entire garrison,
an empty island. If this fact was em- with its supplies and equipment, in one
barrassing to those entrusted with the operation. Delayed by bad weather, the
direction of the campaign, it was none task force (consisting of three cruisers
the less welcome to the foot soldier on and eleven other warships) finally an-
whom would have fallen the nasty job chored in Kiska Harbor at 1340 on 29
of wiping out the Japanese garrison. July. It took only fifty-five minutes to
The decision by the Japanese to with- embark over 5,000 men and by 1 August
draw the Kiska garrison of almost 6,000 the force was back in the Kurils (Para-
men had been made shortly after the mushiro) after a calm and safe voyage.40
Attu landing in May. The first reaction Though the anticlimax at Kiska rang
of Imperial General Headquarters to the down the curtain on the campaign to
American invasion had been to order expel the Japanese from the Aleutians,
Army and Navy forces in the area to rush it did not end consideration of the use
to the scene and "annihilate the enemy," of these bleak islands for further offen-
a favorite Japanese phrase. Mature sec- sives against Japan. Rather it increased
ond judgment dictated another course the urgency of the problem for there
and within a week these orders were were now in the Alaska-Aleutians area
countermanded. The Aleutians, almost 150,000 troops. Until a decision
Imperial General Headquarters now de- was reached, these troops would remain
cided, could not be defended with the idle.
forces available. These forces, it reasoned,
could be employed more effectively in the
Kurils and Hokkaido and on 21 May 40
The Aleutians Island Campaign; Naval Opns in
Imperial General Headquarters issued the Northern Area; Northern Area Monthly Combat
Reports; Naval Opns, Mar 42-Feb 43, all in Japanese
orders for the evacuation of both Attu Studies in World War II, Nos. 51-54; Hattori, The
and Kiska. Greater East Asia War, II, pt. 5, 51-57.
CHAPTER XXII
The Revival of ORANGE

You don't kill men with guns you're not using.
GENERAL MATTHEW B. RIDGWAY
After mid-1942 and throughout most are tiny islands, numbering over 1,000
of 1943, while American naval, air, and and clustered into four major groups
ground forces were engaging the Japa- whose total land area is about 1,200
nese in desperate battle in the Solomons, square miles. (Map 7) Most easterly of
in New Guinea, and in the Aleutians, the groups are the Gilberts, low-lying
relative calm reigned over the Central coral atolls located just west of the date
Pacific. In this region, stretching west- line and almost on the equator. To the
ward across the ocean from the Hawaiian northwest are the Marshall Islands, a
Islands to the Philippines, Japanese double chain of atolls, reefs, and islets,
fleets and merchant vessels roamed freely, none of which rises more than a few feet
subject only to the attacks of Pacific above sea level. Stretching almost due
Fleet submarines, which were taking west from the Marshalls, in a long irreg-
an ever-increasing toll of enemy ships. ular string about 2,000 miles in length,
Scattered Japanese garrisons leisurely are the 550 islands of the Caroline group.
built airstrips and prepared their de- In the center of the group lies Truk and
fenses, scarcely aware of the war that at the western extremity is Palau, point-
raged to the north and south. But even ing a finger at the Philippines. The
while these battles were being fought, Marianas, fourth of the island groups of
plans were being laid at Pearl Harbor Micronesia, lie above the Carolines and
and in Washington for an offensive that extend for more than 400 miles from
would ultimately reach the coast of Guam in the south to within 500 miles
Japan itself. Before the year 1943 was of Iwo Jima.1
out the Central Pacific would see some Strategically located across the main
of the bitterest fighting of the war. sea lanes between the United States and
the Philippines and dominating the most
The Central Pacific War direct avenue of approach to the western
Pacific, the islands of Micronesia played
The scene of impending conflict was a vital role in Japanese war plans.
Micronesia, an ocean area larger than Forehandedly, the Japanese had gained
the continental United States. Scattered 1
Seethe Introduction, above, for a description of
throughout this vast expanse of ocean these islands.
THE REVIVAL OF ORANGE 435
MAP7
control of most of these islands before Midway kept them from pushing on to
the war. The Carolines, Marshalls, and Samoa and the Fijis, as they had every
Marianas (except for Guam), they had intention of doing.2
seized from Germany during World War Vital as the Central Pacific was to the
I and held under a mandate from the Japanese in the defense of the home
League of Nations. The rest—Guam, islands, it was equally important to
the Gilberts, and the two phosphate the Americans, who recognized it as a
islands, Ocean and Nauru—they occu- separate area of responsibility under
pied shortly after Pearl Harbor, thus Admiral Nimitz' direct command. Along
extending the outer perimeter of the it lay the line of communications to the
empire's defenses almost to the date line Philippines and the traditional path of
and placing Japanese forces in position 2
See Chapter XII, above, for an account of Japa-
to cut the Allied line of communications nese planning for this move and the effect of the
in the South Pacific. Only the disaster at Midway defeat.
advance against Japan marked out in the Guam, Wake, and the Philippines lay
ORANGE plans of the 1920's and 1930's.3 beyond reach and all hopes for an early
According to these plans, the Pacific offensive into the Mandates lay at the
Fleet with troop-carrying transports bottom of the bay with the battleships
would venture from Pearl Harbor at the of the Pacific Fleet. Until this loss was
start of war and sail westward into the replaced and the Pacific Fleet strength-
Mandates. The advance of this force was ened, the Navy would have to husband
to be a progressive, step-by-step affair in its resources and fight a defensive war.
which selected islands would be seized The adoption of a defensive strategy
and developed as forward bases before did not mean inaction and from the start
the next move began. Thus would the the Pacific Fleet struck at the enemy
United States project its naval strength whenever and wherever it could with the
ever westward until the Philippines were meager forces available. Thus in the
reached. period from February through March
In prewar plans, the Philippine garri- 1942, task forces built around the three
son had been assigned the mission of carriers, fortunately absent from Pearl
holding Manila Bay for an indefinite Harbor at the time of the attack, raided
period, presumed to be six months. Japanese-held islands in a vain effort to
Though few responsible officers believed divert Japanese forces in their drive
the fleet could fight its way through to southward. In April came the carrier-
Manila Bay in that time, the ORANGE borne strike against Tokyo and in August
plans made no provision for any other the premature raid on Makin by the
contingency, such as the recapture of the 2d Marine Raider Battalion led by
Philippines. Thus, according to these Lt. Col. Evans F. Carlson. But perhaps
old plans, when the fleet reached Manila the most profitable operations of the
Bay with its reinforcements it would fleet during this period were those of
find the bay in friendly hands, available the submarines, which in the first four
as a base for further operations. months of the war sank 300,000 tons of
It was this plan, modified and placed Japanese shipping.5
in the context of a global struggle in Spectacular as these miscellaneous
which Germany was the main enemy operations and hit-and-run raids were,
and Europe the main theater, that was they did not end the Japanese threat to
in effect on the morning of 7 December.4 Hawaii or ensure the security of the
But the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor line of communications across the South
altered completely the balance of forces Pacific. It was the victory at Midway
in the Pacific and rendered obsolete the that accomplished the first and opened
ORANGE concept of a Central Pacific 5
The Makin raid is described in full in Philip A.
offensive. The Navy would have enough Crowl and Edmund G. Love, Seizure of the Gilberts
to do defending the Hawaiian outpost and Marshalls, UNITED STATES ARMY IN
WORLD WAR II (Washington, 1955), ch. IV, and
and the west coast of the United States. by Morison, who also covers submarine operations,
in Coral Sea, Midway, and Submarine Actions, chs.
3
For an account of prewar ORANGE planning, see X and XI. Early naval raids are covered in Morison,
above, Chapters I and III. Rising Sun in the Pacific, ch. XIII, and ONI, Com-
4
This plan, RAINBOW 5, is described above, in bat Narrative, Early Raids in the Pacific Ocean. For
Chapter III. an account of the Tokyo raid, see above, Chapter XII.
the way for an offensive designed to school. As students at the Army and
achieve the second. That offensive Navy War Colleges and during their
opened with the landing of the marines tours in the Pacific and in Washington
on Guadalcanal in August 1942 and with they had developed theoretical exercises
the first encounters between Allied and and solved theoretical problems on the
Japanese troops on the heights overlook- basis of the ORANGE assumptions. Now,
ing Port Moresby. Both campaigns as senior officers in wartime, they faced
proved more difficult and costly than the cold reality of defeating an actual
anticipated and consumed all the re- enemy. It is not surprising, therefore,
sources that could be spared for the that their first wartime planning for an
Pacific. For four months the issue hung offensive in the Central Pacific should
in the balance, but by the end of the year follow the familiar pattern of the time-
victory seemed assured. The time had tested, Philippine-oriented ORANGE plan.
come to plan the next move in the drive This pattern was clearly evident at the
on Rabaul; perhaps there would be Casablanca Conference in January 1943.
enough left over to open the long- There, for the first time in Allied coun-
delayed offensive in the Central Pacific. cils, the concept of a progressive advance
across the Central Pacific was resurrected
The Philippines in and an effort made to co-ordinate such
Central Pacific Strategy an advance with the offensive already
under way in the South and Southwest
All prewar plans for war with Japan, Pacific and in the Aleutians.7 There was
whether alone or in concert with other no thought of initiating a Central Pacific
powers, had been conditioned largely by offensive immediately or substituting it
the almost impossible task of defending for the drive on Rabaul, an objective
the Philippines. It was this problem never foreseen in prewar planning. Nor
rather than the defeat of Japan that did the plans developed at Casablanca
preoccupied the planners and produced envisage operations beyond the Philip-
the ORANGE concept for an advance pines. In this sense Pacific strategy after
across the Central Pacific and the succes- a year of war was still closely tied to the
sive capture of positions in the mandated prewar ORANGE concept. The only dif-
islands. The objective of these opera- ference was that the enemy had forced
tions, essentially naval in character, was on the Allies a different route of advance.
the reinforcement of the Philippines. The objective was still the Philippines.
Japan would be defeated later by opera- The spokesman for the Central Pacific
tions vaguely described in ORANGE as at Casablanca was Admiral King. That
"military and economic pressure made he should speak out first was natural in
progressively more severe." 6 If these did view of the predominantly naval char-
not produce the desired result, other
means would be devised. 7
For an account of the Casablanca Conference and
A whole generation of officers had Pacific strategy, see above, Chapter XVIII. See also
learned their lessons in the ORANGE John Miller, jr., "The Casablanca Conference and
Pacific Strategy," Military Affairs, XIII (Winter,
6
Ltr, JPC to JB, 27 Dec 37, sub: Joint Basic War 1949) 209-15, and Crowl and Love, Seizure of the
Plan ORANGE, JB 325, ser. 618. Gilberts and Marshalls, pp. 7-10.
acter of the area and the traditional of the Central Pacific. Though he did
interest of the Navy in this route of not commit himself at Casablanca to this
advance. His advocacy of a Central route, he made it clear that he preferred
Pacific offensive, however, did not imply it to the two other alternate approaches.
any lessening of the effort in the South The one in the south, he pointed out,
and Southwest Pacific. Operations there was outflanked by enemy bases in the
were essential, he believed, for the Mandates and unsuitable for large fleet
security of Australia and the line of engagements; the one to the north, start-
communications. But once that cam- ing from the Aleutians, he apparently
paign was over and Rabaul captured, never considered seriously. The advan-
where would the Allies go next, King tages were clearly all on the side of a
asked. He found his answer in ORANGE, direct thrust across the Pacific. It was
his objective in the Philippines. shorter than the southern route; it
In choosing the Philippines, Admiral would take American forces along a path
King did not rule out offensives else- familiar to most naval officers from their
where, in the North Pacific and on the studies at the Naval War College; and
Asiatic mainland. Nor did he overlook it would approach the Philippines from
the Netherlands Indies as an alternative the flank by way of the Marshalls, Truk,
objective to the Philippines. The Japa- and the Marianas.
nese had gone to war primarily to obtain General MacArthur would not have
the rich natural resources of the Indies agreed with this reasoning. Writing in
and were largely dependent on these retrospect ten years after the war, he
islands for the prosecution of the war. explained his view toward the Central
Their loss would be a crippling blow for Pacific as follows:
the Japanese and any effort by the Allies
to seize them would meet with deter- The so-called "Central Pacific Concept,"
mined and desperate resistance. More- as finally embodied in the Orange War
Plans, had in mind the relief of the Philip-
over, as Admiral King pointed out, an pines before those Islands fell to the Japa-
operation against the Japanese in the nese in the event of attack. This necessitated
Indies would constitute, in effect, a securing the lines of communication and
frontal assault on a strongly held posi- supply between the Philippines and the
tion, a costly and difficult venture in any United States which were threatened so
long as Japan continued to hold and occupy
case. The Philippines, King asserted, the flanking Central Pacific Islands man-
could be taken with far less effort and dated to her following World War I. The
at much lower cost. And from these "Central Pacific Concept" consequently lost
islands, which lay along the main Japa- its validity when it was abandoned in favor
nese line of communications, the Allies of a "Europe First" policy as the Japanese
actually struck the Philippines. That was
would be able to cut off the vital flow of the time which presented the golden oppor-
oil and other resources to Japan as tunity, both in strategy and logic, for a
effectively as from the Indies.8 Central Pacific drive by our combined fleets
To Admiral King, the most feasible aimed at engaging and destroying Japan's
approach to the Philippines was by way naval power on the Pacific. Had we reacted
in this manner as always theretofore in-
tended we would have brought the war to
8
Mins, CCS Mtg, 14 Jan 43. a speedy and victorious close and saved the
Philippines and other areas on the Pacific operations in the Central Pacific as far
from the long travail of enemy occupation, as Truk before the final blow in Europe,
while at the same time sparing our own but on this question King maintained a
nation the terrible sacrifice exacted during
the ensuing years of conflict. discreet silence.
Apologists for the "Europe First" concept During the next few days, while the
point to our Pearl Harbor losses as having American and British Chiefs discussed
so weakened the Navy as to prevent such a other matters, their planners worked out
Central Pacific drive. This argument has a program for the Pacific for the year
little or no validity for the diversion of the
naval power engaged in the relatively un- ahead. Included in the ambitious plan
productive North African campaign could submitted on 17 January10 was the
have enabled the massing of a combined seizure of the Gilberts, Marshalls, and
fleet capable of overpowering any combina- Caroline Islands, including Truk, as
tion of naval strength the axis powers were preparatory steps in the recapture of the
able to mount in the Pacific. This evalua-
tion flows from the facts that the enemy Philippines. These operations were to
European fleets by that time had been begin after the capture of Rabaul, also
reduced to little more than a nuisance scheduled for that year, but at least one
value, the German threat to the middle east of the planners—Admiral Cooke—
had been eliminated by Rommel's defeat at
El Alamein, the German offensive in Russia thought the advance in the Central
had been stopped at Stalingrad and the Pacific might open even earlier.11
great Russian ground counter-offensive had To the British this plan, which in-
been successfully launched. Having missed cluded also the recapture of Burma,
this initial opportunity, the belated Central seemed more extensive than was war-
Pacific drive toward the Marianas in July
1944 could at best produce local tactical ranted by the resources available for the
successes without bringing to bear any de- Pacific in 1943. Once begun, they feared
cisive influence upon the course of the war.9 these operations might divert Allied
strength from the main effort in Europe.
For different reasons than MacArthur They sought, therefore, to restrict Pacific
might have advanced had he attended operations and suggested that the Allies
the Casablanca Conference, the British limit themselves in 1943 to Rabaul and
were doubtful of the virtues of an Burma. Admiral King thought this
advance across the Central Pacific to the restriction entirely unnecessary. The
Philippines. As a matter of fact, they proposed drive into the Central Pacific,
were opposed in principle to any Pacific he declared, was not a commitment on
venture that might threaten the primary Allied resources but a desirable course of
effort against Germany. But when action that would utilize whatever forces
Admiral King readily agreed, at least in were available. It might include only
principle, that the recapture of the action in the Marshalls during the year
Philippines should come after Germany or it might extend as far as Truk, de-
was defeated, the British did not pursue pending upon events that could not then
the subject. They doubted also the be foreseen. If Rabaul was taken in May
advisability of scheduling preliminary
10
For the other provisions of this plan, see above,
9
Ltr, MacArthur to Maj Gen A. C. Smith, Chief, Chapter XVIII.
11
Mil Hist, 7 Jan 55, OCMH. Mins, JCS Mtg, 17 Jan 43.
then the drive into the Mandates might With agreement on the broad outline
make considerable progress before the of Pacific strategy, the Americans at
opening date of the Burma offensive in Casablanca were free to consider in more
November. Certainly, King argued, it detail Pacific prospects for the coming
would be unwise to limit the Pacific year. So far as the Central Pacific was
program to Rabaul and Burma alone. concerned, the outlook was bright.
Such a restriction might well have the Japan, it was true, might launch an
effect of imposing on Allied troops in offensive of its own from bases in the
the Pacific an enforced idleness for a Mandates, either by way of Midway
period of months and was contrary to against Hawaii or by way of New Cale-
the Allied aim of keeping the Japanese donia, Fiji, and Samoa against the vital
under "continual pressure." line of communications to Australia.
The British actually had little choice The first the Japanese had already at-
but to accept the American assurance tempted, without success, and the Joint
that the Central Pacific would not drain Chiefs thought another attempt would
off resources intended for Europe. also fail. The second line of action, a
Whether they actually believed this is drive toward the line of communications,
doubtful; they were fully aware that had been partially forestalled by the
operations once begun generate demands Allied invasion of the Solomons, but
for additional resources. But to argue there still remained the possibility, the
on this basis would raise questions about Joint Chiefs believed, of a Japanese
their own operations. Once this position attack against Samoa from the Gilbert
had been reached, agreement came and Ellice Islands. Such a move, if suc-
quickly. If all the Americans wanted cessful, would expose the Fijis to direct
was to ensure the fullest use of available invasion and cut the South Pacific line
forces and to be ready to exploit any as effectively as the earlier Japanese
opportunity that arose, the British were drive southward through the Solomons
willing to accept General Marshall's sug- had threatened to do.
gestion that the matter be settled by To counter these potential Japanese
specifying that if any operations were moves in the Central Pacific, the Ameri-
launched in the Central Pacific in 1943 cans considered two possible courses:
they would be made "with the resources an advance westward from Midway by
available in the theater." 12 This quali- way of Wake and the Marshalls to the
fication, taken with the proviso that such Truk-Guam line; or northwest from
operations would not be undertaken Samoa through the Ellice and Gilbert
until Rabaul had been reduced or at Islands into the Marshalls. Both would
the expense of the Burma campaign, serve the purpose of forestalling an en-
gave adequate assurance that operations emy attack, would keep the Japanese off
in the Pacific would not jeopardize the balance, and divert their forces away
Allied effort in Europe. from Rabaul, where the Allies expected
to make their major effort. In addition,
12
the second course would ensure the secu-
Mins, CCS Mtg, 18 Jan 43. The final wording of
the plan is in CCS 155/1, 19 Jan 43, sub: Conduct
rity of the Fiji-Samoa portion of the line
of the War in 1943. of communication. If this course was
adopted, it would be possible to advance he wanted now to take up the slack in

to the Truk-Guam line by way of Rabaul Pacific operations with an offensive in
once that bastion was reduced, either in the Central Pacific. In this way, he
concert with a drive from the east or thought, the Allies would be able to
alone.13 retain the initiative while, at the same
These were the courses open in Janu- time, diverting Japanese forces from the
ary 1943, but it was still too early to defense of Rabaul.
make a choice that might prove unnec- Before presenting this proposal to his
essarily restrictive at a later date. The colleagues on the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
decision of the Joint Chiefs, therefore, Admiral King sounded his chief naval
was one calculated to leave them free to subordinates in the Pacific, Admirals
seize any opportunity that might arise. Nimitz and Halsey. The response was
It called for an advance west from Mid- anything but encouraging.16 Admiral
way "as practicable," northwest from Halsey, who was then preparing for fur-
Samoa, and north from Rabaul — the ther operations in the Solomons, thought
last to be undertaken only if there were he had enough to do without taking on
sufficient forces at hand to occupy and another job. Far from supporting his
exploit the Truk-Guam line. The Brit- operations in the South Pacific, this new
ish, it will be recalled, accepted this task would drain away forces from the
statement of U.S. intentions without central effort and make Task Two more
comment and on 23 January it was difficult and time-consuming. All the
adopted as part of the final report of forces available should be thrown into
the conference.14 the Solomons, he told King, for the Jap-
With the sanction of the Casablanca anese were consolidating their positions
decision, Admiral King set his staff to there and delay might well prove costly.
work in February 1943 on plans for an In this view he was strongly supported
early assault against the Ellice and Gil- by his superior, Admiral Nimitz, who
bert Islands, followed, perhaps, by the felt that until the Americans gained a
seizure of the Marshalls.15 Undoubtedly marked superiority over the Japanese
influenced by the delay in getting Task in naval and air strength, it would not
Two of the Rabaul offensive under way, be advisable to strike out in the Central
Pacific.
13 Admiral King was not convinced by
JCS Memo, 22 Jan 43, sub: Conduct of the War
in Pacific Theater in 1943, CCS 168; Mins, CCS Mtg, these arguments and thought his two
22 Jan 43. most experienced commanders, each pre-
14
CCS 170/1, 23 Jan 43, sub: Final Rpt to President occupied with his own problems, had
and Prime Minister. The discussions at Casablanca
are discussed more fully above in Chapter XVIII. missed the point. An offensive in the
15
Funafuti in the Ellice group, it will be recalled, Central Pacific, conducted simultane-
had been occupied early in October 1942 by marines ously with the offensive in the South,
from Samoa, but this fact was a closely guarded
secret, even in the Navy. Morison, Aleutians, Gil-
berts, and Marshalls, pp. 78-79. The Marshalls plan,
16
dated 12 February 1943, contemplated the occupa- Rads, King to Halsey, 9 Feb 43; Halsey to King,
tion of Kwajalein, Wotje, and Maloelap. CNO info Nimitz, 11 Feb 43; Nimitz to King, 11 Feb 43,
(WPD) File Marshall Islands Plan, case 183, cited all in Navy files. Cited in Hayes, The War Against
in Hayes, The War Against Japan, ch. II, p. 4. Japan, ch. XI, pp. 12-13.
would, he believed, support that effort raised the possibility of an offensive in

and at the same time draw strength from the Central Pacific.20 The plan pro-
it. What he had in mind, he explained, posed, he pointed out, would immobi-
was to "whipsaw" the Japanese to prevent lize naval forces in the South Pacific for
them from concentrating their forces in some time and he suggested that they
one area.17 be used during this interval in the Cen-
But Halsey persisted in his opposition tral Pacific, specifically in the Gilberts
to the scheme. While recognizing the and Marshalls. Why he preferred the
advantages of mutually supporting oper- Marshalls to the Ellice Islands, he did
ations in two separate areas, he thought not say.
an attack such as King was proposing Again the main opposition came from
would be both unprofitable and costly. naval officers in the Pacific. Vice Adm.
It would constitute a frontal assault, Raymond A. Spruance, Nimitz' repre-
and, even if successful, would gain for sentative at the conference, agreed that
the Allies no important objective. On naval forces could not be allowed to
the other hand, the islands, once seized, remain idle while MacArthur advanced
would prove a continuing drain on up the New Guinea coast to New Brit-
Allied resources and virtually require ain, but he did not believe the time was
further advances in the same direction, yet ripe for an attack against the Gilberts
which may have been precisely what and Marshalls. It would be necessary,
Admiral King wanted. To Halsey, first, to seize advance positions from
Rabaul was the prime objective, the key which to support such an attack; and,
to the Japanese defenses, and he was all second, to assemble a large enough force
for striking at it as soon as possible and to continue the advance across the Cen-
with everything he had and could get.18 tral Pacific after the islands were cap-
At this stage, General MacArthur indi- tured. Like Halsey, he did not think
cated his readiness to discuss plans for the Gilberts and Marshalls a sufficiently
the capture of Rabaul, and the planners, important objective to warrant attack
meeting with Nimitz' and Halsey's rep- unless it was followed up. So far as the
resentatives in Washington at the Pacific fleet was concerned, Spruance thought
Military Conference, devoted almost the it might best be employed, if not needed
entire month of March to this problem.19 in the South Pacific, in the Aleutians and
But even during this period Admiral in the Hawaiian area.
King did not abandon altogether his Captain Browning, Halsey's chief of
hopes for an early drive against the staff and the officer most directly con-
Ellice and Gilbert Islands. At one point cerned, was not even willing to grant
in the conference, when General Suth- that the naval forces of the South Pacific,
erland, MacArthur's chief of staff, pre- even if temporarily idle, should be trans-
sented the plan agreed upon by the ferred to another area. The South
theater representatives, King again Pacific, he pointed out, was the decisive
17 20
Rad, King to Nimitz, info Halsey, 13 Feb 43. Mins, JCS Mtg, 21 Mar 43; Memo, Sutherland,
18
Rad, Halsey to King, 17 Feb 43. Spruance, and Browning for JCS, 20 Mar, 43, sub:
19
For an account of the Pacific Military Confer- Opns in South and SWP Areas During 1943, JCS
ence, see above, Chapter XIX. 238/2.
theater of operations for the Japanese Arthur's strong ties in the Philippines
and Halsey's warships constituted the and his dramatic promise in March 1942
greatest menace to their lines of com- to return, it was unlikely he would agree
munication southward from Rabaul. So to any plan that did not permit him to
long as the Allies maintained a naval keep his pledge. In his eyes, the libera-
striking force there, the Japanese would tion of the Philippines was a personal
be forced, Browning asserted, to keep as well as a national obligation. He
a strong naval force of their own in the would not yield the privilege of fulfilling
vicinity. Thus, the mere existence of that obligation to any other.
a South Pacific fleet would, in a measure, But MacArthur did not base his RENO
ensure the security of Hawaii. It should plan on these political and personal
therefore remain where it was, Browning grounds—valid as they may have been.
concluded, unless its employment else- He had sound military reasons for the
where would contribute to the main course he advocated. The Philippine
offensive mission of the theater, the Islands, he contended, were the most
capture of Rabaul. important strategic objective in his thea-
At this point in the conference Admi- ter, promising results far more decisive
ral King dropped the subject. With his than any that could be achieved by the
two top commanders in the Pacific and capture of Rabaul. This importance the
their representatives in Washington—all islands derived from their position
senior naval officers—arrayed in opposi- athwart the major sea routes linking
tion to his plan, King must have realized Japan with the vital oil and raw mate-
that he had no chance of success. Clearly rials to the south. Control of the islands,
the weight of opinion was against him. therefore, would enable him to sever
The Central Pacific offensive would have "the main artery of supply to Japan's
to await the capture of Rabaul, post- factories" and so reduce her capacity
poned by the Pacific Military Conference to wage war as to make her vulnerable
to 1944, or an increase in the forces to direct assault. Thus far, he and King
available and projected for the Pacific. were in agreement.
By his decision to abandon tempo- It was on the choice of routes to the
rarily the proposal for a Central Pacific objective that they parted company. To
offensive, Admiral King unknowingly MacArthur looking northward from Aus-
avoided a head-on conflict with General tralia there seemed to be four possible
MacArthur over basic strategy. For Mac- approaches to the Philippines:
Arthur, too, had a plan, appropriately 1. Westward from Hawaii through the
called RENO, for divorcing the Japanese Central Pacific by way of the Marshalls
from their Philippine prize but by a and Carolines.
route altogether different from that fa- 2. Northwest from Australia along the
vored by King.21 And in view of Mac- north coast of New Guinea to Halma-
21
Estimate of the Situation and Rough Draft, hera and then to Mindanao.
RENO Plan, 28 Feb 43, GHQ SWPA, Hist Rec Index 3. Due north through the Netherlands
Cards. The plan was under constant revision, each Indies by way of the Banda Sea and
succeeding version receiving a higher Roman nu-
meral for identification. The last was RENO V, 15 Molucca Passage.
June 1944. 4. Westward from Australia to Macas-
sar Strait or the South China Sea, then ward from Hawaii would require "a
north. re-orientation of front" in the Pacific.
Of these four routes, MacArthur fa- There was little doubt that in his view
vored the second. For him it was the such a change would represent a basic
shortest, and the one that most effec- shift in strategy and vitally affect his own
tively utilized the power of land-based plans for recapturing the Philippines.
aircraft, exploited the enemy's principal With these convictions, it was certain
weakness, and took full advantage of the that MacArthur would oppose the con-
positions won in the advance on Rabaul. cept of a Central Pacific offensive. That
The danger of attack from the flanks to he did not at this time was due simply
which his forces would be exposed when to the fact that he was not officially
they reached the tip of New Guinea informed of King's plans. Nor, for that
could be obviated, MacArthur believed, matter, was King or any other member
by the neutralization or occupation of of the Joint Chiefs aware of RENO. At
Palau to the north by Nimitz' forces the Pacific Military Conference General
and of Ambon in the Netherlands Indies Sutherland had presented only the
by his own forces. One great advantage ELKTON plan for the recapture of Rabaul;
of this route that MacArthur stressed he had made no mention of RENO al-
was the fact that it led directly to Min- though he was present during King's
danao, where there were excellent air- discussion with Spruance and Browning.
field sites and where Allied operations So long as others were able to postpone
would be supported by a strong guerrilla the Central Pacific offensive, Sutherland
force and by heavy and medium bomb- apparently saw no need to reveal Mac-
ers based on northwest Australia and Arthur's plans. But the question was
New Guinea. The advance to Luzon, not yet settled and would not be until
the ultimate objective, would follow the MacArthur had presented his case. That
occupation of Mindanao. time was not far off.
In MacArthur's opinion none of the
other routes offered comparable advan- The Japanese
tages. Both routes through the Indies
(Nos. 3 and 4) would meet major Japa- The development by the Japanese of
nese ground forces, would be exposed an integrated and mutually supporting
to flanking attacks, and would fail to defensive system in the Central Pacific
utilize the full strength of Allied forces. dates from the spectacular raid on Makin
The Central Pacific route (No. 1) so by Colonel Carlson's marines in August
strongly favored by Admiral King,, was 1942. Heroic and daring as it was, the
subject to even more serious criticism, raid had consequences never foreseen by
MacArthur thought. It was the longest those who proposed it. It had been de-
of the four routes, would require large signed to confuse the enemy, divert his
naval forces, and would have to be made forces from Guadalcanal, and gain infor-
without the support of land-based air mation and prisoners. All these it accom-
power. But perhaps the most telling plished, but it also demonstrated to the
argument against the Central Pacific Japanese suddenly and dramatically how
route was the fact that an offensive west- weak were their defenses in the Central
Pacific. More than any other single event of the newly activated Yokosuka 6th Spe-
it alerted them to the danger of attack cial Landing Force, bringing the strength
in an area they considered secure and of the Makin garrison to 500.23
because of it they committed far heavier These reinforcements were only part
forces there than they had originally of a general program by the Japanese to
intended. In this sense, the Makin raid strengthen their position in the Gilberts.
proved a costly venture and made the On 25 August they occupied Nauru and
task for those who followed much more the next day Ocean Island, both to the
difficult.22 west of the Gilbert chain. During the
Up to the time of Makin, the Japanese first week of September they took over
paid scant attention to their Central Apamama in the central Gilberts and in
Pacific outposts. Though the Navy, the middle of the month they landed in
which had responsibility for the area, force on Tarawa.
fully appreciated the strategic value of The promptness of the Japanese reac-
these islands, it consistently overesti- tion can be surmised from the fact that
mated their defensive strength and as- the unit that occupied Tarawa on 15
signed to them only token garrisons. September, the Yokosuka 6th Special
Thus, it entrusted the safety of the sea- Naval Landing Force, had come directly
plane base at Makin to a detachment from Japan. Consisting of about 1,500
consisting of less than fifty men and officers and men, the 6th Special Naval
commanded by a warrant officer. To its Landing Force took over responsibility
other outposts in the Gilberts, the Navy for all of the Gilberts, sending detach-
sent garrisons of comparable size, secure ments to Apamama and Makin. With
in the belief that the islands were safe two additional companies that had mean-
so long as Japanese planes and ships con- while reached Ocean and Nauru from
trolled the skies and seas of the Central the Carolines, the Japanese had almost
Pacific. 2,000 troops in the Gilberts at the end
Their illusions of safety shattered by of September.
the Makin raid, the Japanese moved with Though the islands had been aban-
vigor and speed to overcome their ear- doned months earlier by the Allies, they
lier neglect. From Jaluit in the Mar- were not yet entirely clear of their for-
shalls, headquarters of the 6th Defense mer white residents. Those who re-
Force, came a company-sized unit, part mained, mostly Australians and New
of it flown into Makin on 20 August and Zealanders, had fled to the small islets
the rest following by ship. It was rein- and atolls in the southern Gilberts where
forced on 15 September by a company they could observe and report Japanese
air and surface movements throughout
the group.
22
This section is based on Hattori, The Greater The removal of this embryo intelli-
East Asia War, II, pt. V, ch. 3, and Crowl and Love,
Seizure of the Gilberts and Marshalls, ch. IV. Admiral gence net was the first task the Japanese
Turner as Chief of the Navy War Plans Division had
rejected a proposal before the war to place a defense
23
battalion at Makin, an action he later regretted. Inner South Sea Islands Area Naval Opns, pt. I,
Comments of Rear Adm. Charles J. Moore, Jul 59, Gilbert Islands Opns, p. 9, Japanese Studies in World
OCMH. War II, 161.
turned to once they had sufficient troops in February and March led to a changed
in the area. On 26 September a detach- concept of operations emphasizing land
ment from Tarawa landed on Beru Atoll defenses and co-ordinating air and
and destroyed the radio station there, ground operations with those of the fleet.
thus depriving the coast watchers of their This concept was approved on the high-
vital link with the outside world. Next est levels in Tokyo and promulgated in
day the detachment moved on to the orders issued on 25 March 1943. "The
neighboring atoll, Tamana, where it defense of strategic points," these orders
found additional radio equipment, a directed, "will be strengthened promptly,
radio operator, and two Allied soldiers. and in the event of an enemy attack, the
Raids on other atolls netted more equip- first [Japanese] attack will be launched
ment and prisoners. By 6 October the ... to destroy the enemy in close co-
job was completed and the Japanese ordination with surface and air forces."
could report the Gilberts cleared of the At the same time the Combined Fleet
enemy. commander was instructed to keep the
The next task the Japanese turned main body of his carrier forces in the
to was the construction of airfields and Pacific and "to annihilate the enemy
ground defenses. In October they began fleet with interception operations." 25
building air bases on Nauru and Tarawa. On the basis of this revised strategy,
The strips were completed by the end the Japanese proceeded during the
of January 1943, and in late March, spring and summer of 1943 to strengthen
when adequate ground defenses and sup- their position in the Gilberts and Mar-
porting installations were put in, a por- shalls. The naval ground forces in the
tion of the 22d Air Flotilla from the Gilberts were reorganized and designated
Marshalls flew in to take over the air the 3d Special Base Force, additional
defense of the area. units and laborers were brought in, and
If the Makin raid had alerted the Jap- ground and antiaircraft defenses ex-
anese to the threat of a Central Pacific panded. Interception areas were marked
offensive, the experience on Guadalcanal out to provide a defense in depth, and
convinced them that their defenses in arrangements made to bring reinforce-
the area were still inadequate. Certainly ments from Truk and Rabaul in the
the garrisons so recently established in event of attack. The Army contributed
the Gilberts could scarcely hope to with- to the defense of the area also by organ-
stand a determined assault such as the izing special garrison units built around
Allies had launched in the Solomons. an infantry battalion and artillery battery
"The Navy," one former Japanese officer for duty in the Central Pacific. One of
noted, "lost confidence in the ability of these went to Wake, another to Marcus,
the local air base to maintain air supe- but the one earmarked for the Gilbert
riority, and it realized that the defense Islands met disaster at sea. A fourth unit
of the islands was far weaker than it had was thereupon organized to replace it,
expected."24 A review of the situation
25
Imperial Navy Opns Plan in Third Phase of the
Greater East Asia War, 25 Mar 43; Opnl Policy To
24
Hattori, The Greater East Asia War, II, pt. V, Be Followed by the Combined Fleet. Both cited in
42-43. ibid., p. 43.
but the need in the Solomons proved tee recognized frankly and apparently
greater and it was diverted to Bougain- for the first time that to achieve the
ville. The unit finally sent was a objective of unconditional surrender set
regiment of the 65th Brigade in the at Casablanca it might prove necessary
Philippines, but it got no further than to invade the Japanese home islands.
the Marshalls, thus leaving the defense How this would be done and what would
of the Gilberts in the hands of the Navy. be required, it was still too early to say.
But the planners did hold out the hope
The Central Pacific in Long-Range that the Japanese might capitulate under
Strategy other circumstances: (a) if they lost con-
trol of the sea lanes in the Far East and
In the spring of 1943, American plan- therefore the ability to wage war, or
ning for the Central Pacific assumed a (b) if their centers of production were
new and broader meaning in the strat- destroyed and their will to resist broken
egy of the war against Japan. Through- by "a sustained, systematic, and large-
out 1942, Central Pacific strategy had scale air offensive." In any case, control
been narrowly conceived in terms of of the sea and the intensive air bombard-
the prewar ORANGE plan as the route ment of Japan were indispensable pre-
to the Philippines. But as the tide of requisites to an invasion of the home
war turned, the planners in Washington islands.
began to look further into the future in To the planners of the JUSSC, the
search of a strategy by which to defeat key to Pacific strategy lay in the air
Japan. The immediate objectives— offensive against Japan, for the choice
Rabaul, the Truk-Guam line, and Burma of an area from which to launch this
—remained the same, but the objectives offensive would largely determine the
beyond changed. Scrutinized in terms direction of the advance and the selec-
of a broader frame of reference than tion of objectives. Siberia, the Kurils,
envisaged in ORANGE, the recapture of and Formosa were considered but the
the Philippines seemed to be less urgent planners finally chose China as the best
than it was before. Within this context, base for the air offensive. It met the
the role of the Central Pacific acquired requirements of proximity to the target,
a significance it had never had in the provided areas for widely dispersed air-
prewar period. fields, could be used to mount an inva-
Work on a long-range plan for the sion of Japan if one proved necessary,
defeat of Japan had begun in August and contained friendly forces with a
1942 but it was not until April of the potential for offensive action. As Admi-
following year that the Joint U.S. Strate- ral King remarked, "China's geographi-
gic Committee, which had responsibility cal position and manpower were vital
for the task, submitted its plan to the to the defeat of Japan and must be used.
Joint Staff Planners.26 In it the commit- A collapse of China would vastly prolong
26
JUSSC 40/2 Apr 43, and JPS 67/4, 28 Apr 43, existence on 24 April 1943 and was succeeded by the
Strategic Plan for the Defeat of Japan. The Joint Joint War Plans Committee (JWPC). See above,
U.S. Strategic Committee (not to be confused with Chapter X, for a description of these committees,
the Joint Strategic Survey Committee) went out of and below, Chapter XXIII.
the war and vitally affect the whole ebes Sea: one by way of Pearl Harbor
situation vis-a-vis Japan."27 through the Mandates to Mindanao in
The choice of China created certain the Philippines, the other by way of the
problems. Airfields would have to be Solomons and New Guinea to Halma-
developed, equipment and supplies in hera. Which should they choose? After
large quantities brought in, and a large considerable deliberation the Joint Staff
American force maintained in China. Planners finally decided that both routes
The Chinese were incapable of doing should be followed, but the Central
the job and the existing land and air Pacific route, they thought, would pro-
supply lines were clearly inadequate to duce more decisive results and they there-
support so great an effort. What was fore recommended that the main effort
needed, the planners concluded, was a be made there.28
port such as Hong Kong on the east In their analysis of the most favorable
coast of China. With Hong Kong in route to the Celebes Sea, the planners
Allied hands, it would be possible to weighed carefully the relative merits of
ship directly to China from the United the approaches through the Central and
States all the men, supplies, and equip- the South-Southwest Pacific Areas. The
ment required to launch the air offen- first, they thought, was more desirable
sive and, if necessary, invade Japan. for a variety of reasons. It was shorter
Here for the first time was a clear state- and more direct, and therefore would
ment of the concept behind the China be logistically more economical. Also,
coast strategy, which became so persist- the Allies would encounter fewer prob-
ent a theme in American planning for lems in maintaining troops and develop-
the war against Japan. ing air bases on the islands and coral
The logic of their reasoning now took atolls of the Central Pacific than in the
the planners step by step back across the damp, malaria-infested jungles of New
Pacific. If the capture of Hong Kong Guinea and the Solomons.
was necessary to mount the air offensive But more important than these were
against Japan, the Allies would have to the strategic advantages of the Central
gain control of the South China Sea. Pacific. There the Allies would be able
The best way for American forces to to strike the Japanese on their vulner-
reach this body of water, the planners able eastern flank, at points where the
thought, was through the Sulu Sea, lying Japanese could bring to bear only such
between the Philippines and Borneo. limited air and ground forces as they
And the Sulu Sea, in turn, was best
28
approached by way of the Celebes Sea, One of the naval planners, Capt. Charles J.
Moore, disagreed with this recommendation on the
a route that could have the advantage ground that "the relative merits" of the two routes
of cutting off Japan from the supplies had been compared "with primary consideration of
in the Netherlands Indies. relative position only . . . " Memo, Moore for JSP,
27 Apr 43, sub: Strategic Plan for the Defeat of Japan,
At this point the problem became ABC 381 (8-27-42) Japan. In commenting on the
more practical. There were two routes present manuscript, Admiral Moore explained that
that might be followed to reach the Cel- his objection may have been based on his long-stand-
ing opposition to the capture of Truk, at this time
27
Mins, 84th CCS Mtg, 14 May 43, Trident Con- an integral part of the Central Pacific concept.
ference Book, p. 349. Comments of Admiral Moore, Jul 59, OCMH.
could base on the small and widely sepa- in service by the end of 1943. Carrier
rated islands in that region. Against strength, which on 7 December 1941 con-
such forces the Allies could concentrate sisted of 7 first-line vessels and 1 escort,
the full power of their rapidly growing increased in the same period to 50 car-
naval and naval air strength. In amphib- riers of all types. Most of these were
ious operations, the Allies could expect escort carriers but among the new ships
by their concentration of power to over- commissioned were 7 carriers of the
come the disadvantages imposed by the Essex class as well as 9 light carriers.
great distances in the area and the lim- Warships of other types in correspond-
ited opportunities they would have to ing numbers reached completion during
utilize land-based aircraft. And finally, the year 1943, including landing craft
U.S. naval power in the Central Pacific, and auxiliary vessels. Of these last, per-
if employed successfully against the main haps the most important for amphibious
body of the Japanese fleet, might open operations were the attack transports and
up the way for an attack against Japan cargo vessels.30
itself. The promise of this large fleet of carri-
One of the most persuasive reasons ers, battleships, cruisers, and destroyers,
for emphasizing the Central Pacific as many already completed or close to com-
the planners did was the huge shipbuild- pletion in the spring of 1943, created its
ing program in the United States. This own pressure for a strategy that would
construction program dated from July exploit to the full this potential naval
1940, when Congress had passed the so- superiority. Only in the open waters
called Two-Ocean Navy Bill authorizing of the Central Pacific could the United
an expansion of about 70 percent in com- States employ such a fleet to its fullest
bat tonnage. Thus, when the Japanese extent. There it could be used as an
attack on Pearl Harbor came, the con- offensive weapon to seek out and destroy
struction of naval shipbuilding facilities the enemy fleet and to support amphibi-
required to meet the exigencies of war ous operations that would not only bring
was already under way. Thereafter, ex- U.S. forces closer to Japan but would
pansion continued at an accelerated rate also create situations that would bring
and by the early part of 1943 had reached the enemy's fleet into action. No other
full production capacity.29 Other prob- areas in the Pacific offered similar oppor-
lems remained, and the shifting tides of tunities, and if U.S. strategy failed to
war created new demands and priorities
but these were largely solved as they 30
Ibid., pp. 488-94. Major combatant ships added
arose. By the spring of 1943, the ships to the U.S. Fleet between December 1941 and Decem-
ber 1943 were as follows:
whose hulls had been laid in 1940 and Battleships ( B B ) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
1941 were reaching completion. Of the Heavy Cruisers ( C A ) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
10 battleships authorized in 1940, 6 were Light Cruisers ( C L ) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Destroyers ( D D ) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 207
Destroyer Escorts ( D E ) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 199
29
Admiral King's First Report, 1 Mar 44, in The Aircraft Carriers ( C V ) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
War Reports of General of the Army George C. Mar- Light Aircraft Carriers ( C V L ) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
shall, General of the Army H. H. Arnold, and Fleet Escort Carriers ( C V E ) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
Admiral Ernest J. King (Philadelphia and New Submarines ( S S ) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
York: J. B. Lippincott Company, 1947), pp. 484-85. Ibid., pp. 738-63, app. B.
seize them, then how, asked the plan- islands of the South Pacific, were already
ners, could they justify the costly naval engaged with the enemy. To shift them
construction program already approved. now to the Central Pacific would free
In comparing the southern with the large enemy forces for use elsewhere and
central route, the planners of the Joint impose a considerable strain on the lo-
U.S. Strategic Committee noted that an gistical organization in the theater. So
advance from the east by strong Ameri- great would be the loss of time and the
can naval and air forces in the Central waste of shipping required to shift front
Pacific would outflank Japanese positions in the Pacific that the planners doubted
on the north coast of New Guinea and there would be any saving in the long
sever Japan's line to the Indies. On the run.
other hand, a drive northward by Mac- General MacArthur, though he was
Arthur's forces up the north coast to not consulted at this time, could have
New Guinea, would have no effect on advanced additional advantages for the
the Japanese in the Central Pacific whose Southwest Pacific route. Comparing it
position rested on local air and naval with the Central Pacific, he wrote in
superiority and an unchallenged line of 1955:
communications to the home islands. As The main distinction between the con-
a matter of fact, the planners observed, cept underlying Southwest Pacific opera-
the Japanese in the Central Pacific would tions and the Central Pacific Concept was
be able to attack MacArthur on his flank that the former embodied a series of flank-
and rear as he advanced northward, an ing movements around enemy held strong
ability they would not possess if the Allies points leaving them impotent with the sev-
erence of their supply lines to the north,
elected to make their drive from the east. while the latter envisioned the reduction of
Moreover, the southern route followed enemy strong points across the Central
a longer and more circuitous course than Pacific by costly frontal assaults. The rela-
the central route and would require the tivity in the casualty rate historically speaks
seizure of Japanese positions whose for itself.
Under our strategic conception in the
strength, unlike those in the Mandates, Southwest Pacific we sought as we advanced
was limited only by the availability of north to maintain land based air support
troops and shipping. And in contrast to for our operations—the drive across the
the widely separated Japanese garrisons Central Pacific was, on the other hand, de-
in the Central Pacific, the Japanese in pendent upon support from carrier based
aircraft. The limited potential of carrier
the South and Southwest Pacific had bases due to non-continuous operations,
established a system of mutually support- occasioned by the necessity for periodic re-
ing bases providing defense in great turn to land bases for resupply and mainte-
depth. nance, was demonstrated when for the first
Though the central route was clearly and only time the Southwest Pacific com-
mand departed from the principle against
preferred by the planners, they saw many out-distancing its land based air support in
reasons why the road up through the the attack upon Leyte. Then we placed our
Solomons and New Guinea merited dependence for air support upon carriers
consideration. MacArthur's forces, sup- whose limitations threatened to a dangerous
ported by an extensive system of bases degree the success of the operations.31
stretching back to Australia and the 31
Ltr, MacArthur to Smith, 7 Jan 55, OCMH.
Though MacArthur did not refer to while exploiting fully their own advan-
them, political considerations also argued tages. Strategically off balance, the Japa-
against abandonment of the southern nese would have to guard every point
route. Australia and New Zealand could in their vast perimeter, from the Aleu-
not be expected to look with favor on tians to the Indies. The Allies, under
any strategy that relegated them to a no such compulsion, would be free
secondary role in an area where they to move their forces freely and to
had a primary interest. Undoubtedly concentrate at the point of attack.
they would feel that they had been aban- On the basis of this reasoning, the
doned by their American allies after Joint U.S. Strategic Committee envis-
bearing the brunt of the enemy's attack aged the defeat of Japan in a series of
during the dark days of 1942. Such an operations divided into five broad phases.
attitude might well cancel out the mili- Assuming the co-operation of the British
tary advantages of a greater effort in the and Chinese, Allied forces in Southeast
Central Pacific. Nor could the planners Asia would recapture Burma and the
ignore the great potential oil reserves Burma Road during the first phase. In
on the Vogelkop Peninsula, the birdlike the Pacific, operations during this phase
head of the monster-shaped island of would be directed toward opening the
New Guinea. In any advance from the line of communications to the Celebes
south these could be expected ultimately Sea. These were to be exclusively Amer-
to fall into Allied hands.32 ican operations utilizing both Mac-
It was for these reasons that the plan- Arthur's and Nimitz' forces, but making
ners, while emphasizing the decisive the main effort in the Central Pacific.
advantages of the Central Pacific route, In the second phase, U.S. forces would
recommended that the southern route recapture the Philippines while British
also be used. They did not fail to note, forces in Southeast Asia sought to wrest
moreover, that a simultaneous advance control of Indochina from the Japanese.
toward the Sulu Sea along both routes The capture of Hong Kong was to be
would give the Allies important advan- accomplished by Chinese forces in the
tages. The two forces, as they converged third phase, after the British and Ameri-
on the objective, would be able to sup- cans had gained control of the South
port each other by air and naval opera- China Sea. Thereafter, the three nations
tions. Each would keep the enemy in would seize such airfields in China as
its area pinned down, uncertain where would be required in the final air offen-
the next blow would fall and unable sive against Japan (Phase IV), with China
to shift his forces. By timing their blows taking the major role in ground opera-
skillfully and selecting their objectives tions. The bombing of Japan (Phase V)
carefully, the Allies could neutralize the would be primarily an American effort,
advantages the Japanese possessed in but no provision was made in this gen-
their interior lines of communication eral scheme to follow up the air
bombardment with the invasion of the
32
On this last point, see Robert Ross Smith, The enemy's home islands. Though the plan-
Approach to the Philippines, UNITED STATES
ARMY IN WORLD WAR II (Washington, 1953), ners recognized that to secure Japan's
pp. 426-27. surrender it might prove necessary to
invade, that decision had yet to be made. of Task Two (CARTWHEEL) by Mac-
The discussions that followed the sub- Arthur's forces, followed the next year
mission of this ambitious and long-range by the capture of the Bismarck Archi-
plan in April produced no significant pelago and Manus Island in the Ad-
change in the fundamental strategy out- miralties. The only operation the war
lined in the plan. The Joint War Plans planners scheduled for the Central Pacific
Committee, which succeeded the Joint during this same period was the capture
U.S. Strategic Committee as the working of the Marshall Islands.
group of the Joint Staff Planners, was Limited resources in the Pacific dic-
the first to review the plan. In general, tated the strategy behind this program.
the committee accepted both the reason- At the Pacific Military Conference in
ing and conclusions of the JUSSC, and March 1943, it had been agreed that
its own plan, submitted on 5 May, was MacArthur could not take Rabaul that
largely based on the earlier one. The year with the forces available and
war planners, however, placed less em- projected. The war planners therefore
phasis on the air offensive against Japan limited his future tasks to what they
than had their predecessors and more estimated he could accomplish with these
on control of the seas as a means of resources. Their selection of objectives
securing the unconditional surrender of was clearly designed to place MacArthur
Japan.33 In addition, they added to the in position to project his air and naval
earlier plan a sixth phase providing for power into the Central Pacific to support
the invasion of Japan and gave to U.S. the advance there. Thus, the reduction
forces the primary role in this last of Rabaul would give him air supremacy
operation. The idea of a simultaneous in the New Ireland—Admiralties area;
offensive in the Central and in the the occupation of Manus, airfields and
South-Southwest Pacific, with the major a naval base within striking range of the
effort in the former area, the war planners western Carolines. Operations in the
accepted without question. Three days Central Pacific, the planners pointed out,
later, the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved were dependent upon resources already
this plan with minor modification.34 committed elsewhere. These, they esti-
At the same time that they submitted mated, would not be available until
their strategic plan for the defeat of April 1944 and the Central Pacific offen-
Japan, the joint war planners recom- sive would therefore have to be delayed
mended specific objectives that should until that date. Thus, though they had
be taken in 1943-1944 to achieve the established the strategical primacy of
long-range aims set forth in the strategic the Central Pacific, the planners were
plan.35 For the Pacific, these objectives forced by practical considerations to
would include the completion in 1943 recommend that the main effort during
33
the remainder of 1943 and during the
JWPC 15, 5 May 43, sub: Strategic Plan for the
Defeat of Japan. early part of 1944 be made in the South-
34
JCS 287 and 287/1, 7 and 8 May 43, Strategic Southwest Pacific.
Plan for the Defeat of Japan; Mins, JCS Mtg, 8 Before this proposed plan reached the
May 43.
35
JWPC 9/1, 5 May 43, sub: Opns in Pacific and
Joint Chiefs, a broader program dealing
Far East in 1943-44. with operations throughout the world
was approved.36 Prepared by a different months and would be followed by the

team of planners from the Joint War invasion of the Caroline Islands—first
Plans Committee, this study called for a Ponape, then Truk, and finally the west-
more ambitious program in the Pacific ern islands in the group. With a main
during 1943 and 1944 than was envisaged fleet base at Truk and airfields at stra-
in the first study. To MacArthur was tegic points in the area, the forces in
assigned the task of capturing Japanese- the Central Pacific would be in position
held New Guinea, as well as the Solomons to move west toward the Philippines and
and the Bismarck Archipelago. And dur- the Celebes Sea or north via the Marianas
ing the same period, according to this to Japan.
plan, Admiral Nimitz' forces in the Cen- Carefully, the planners avoided fixing
tral Pacific would go on to take the a timetable or any established order of
Caroline Islands after they occupied operations. Thus far, they reminded the
the Marshalls. Additional objectives in Joint Chiefs of Staff, it had committed
the war against Japan included the itself only to CARTWHEEL, which would
Aleutians, Burma, and the bombardment carry MacArthur's forces as far as western
of Japan from bases in China. New Britain. Thereafter the schedule
On the basis of this world-wide study, was flexible and the Joint Chiefs might
the Joint War Plans Committee reviewed adopt any or all of the operations sug-
its own schedule of operations for the gested. They could even cancel opera-
Pacific and on 12 May 1943 submitted tions in the Bismarck Archipelago, the
a revised and more detailed plan.37 planners observed, if they thought the
MacArthur, the war planners now esti- capture of Rabaul was no longer neces-
mated, would not be able to complete sary and go directly into the Marshalls.
operations in the Bismarck Archipelago In that case, the resources in the Pacific
before 1 April 1944. He could then could be concentrated on the drive west-
proceed to the Celebes Sea by way of ward across the Central Pacific and
the north coast of New Guinea, or up operations in New Guinea relegated to
from Darwin by way of Timor, Ceram, a secondary place in line with the stra-
and the island of Celebes, a route that tegic concept of making the main effort
was not seriously considered. in the Central Pacific. The decision was
Operations in the Central Pacific would up to the Joint Chiefs and it would have
begin, under this new plan, with the to be made before CARTWHEEL was over.
occupation of the Marshalls on a date But first it would be necessary to re-
the planners purposely left open. This examine the long-range strategic aims of
job, they estimated, would require six the Allies and to review the decisions
made at Casablanca. In recognition of
36
this necessity, another meeting of the
JCS 290, 7 May 43, Conduct of the War in
1943-44.
U.S. and British political and military
37
JWPC 9/2, 11 May 43, sub: Opns in Pacific and chiefs had been scheduled, and already
Far East in 1943-44; JCS 304, 12 May 43, same sub. the British delegates were gathering in
This study was not discussed by the Joint Chiefs of
Staff at this time, but was placed on the agenda for Washington, for the third of the wartime
the TRIDENT Conference, which began that morning. international conferences.
CHAPTER XXIII
Central Pacific Timetable
By maritime strategy we mean the principles which govern a war in which

the sea is a substantial factor. . . . The paramount concern, then, of
maritime strategy is to determine the mutual relations of your army and
navy in a plan of war.
JULIAN CORBETT, Some Principles of Maritime Strategy
The spring of 1943 had seen a compre- The TRIDENT Conference

hensive review of Pacific strategy and a
growing conviction among many that the The third formal U.S.-British confer-
time had come to open up an offensive ence of the war, known by the code name
in the Central Pacific. Still ahead was TRIDENT, opened in Washington on 12
the task of translating this conviction May 1943 with a full-scale meeting of
into a firm decision and clearcut direc- the political and military chiefs of the
tive upon which the commanders in the two nations.1 On the American side, the
field could act. preparations for this conference had been
But before this decision could be made more thorough and comprehensive than
and the appropriate orders issued, it for any of the preceding meetings.
would be necessary to calculate the effect Thirty-one different studies covering a
of this new offensive upon global strat- wide variety of subjects, including the
egy and on operations already scheduled strategic plan for the defeat of Japan,
in the Pacific and elsewhere. Resources had been produced by the American
were limited and ends, as always, would planners in the three weeks preceding
have to be fitted to means. Differences the conference. This time the Americans
of opinion, in Washington and in the were determined not to be caught unpre-
theater, would have to be considered, pared as at Casablanca, where Admiral
and, if possible, reconciled. The end King remarked that "the British had a
result was bound to leave many dissatis- 1
Harry Hopkins attended this and other meetings.
fied. But dissatisfaction was better than General Arnold was ill during the conference and
inaction, and during the early summer Lt. Gen. Joseph T. McNarney, Marshall's deputy and
of 1943 the Joint Chiefs of Staff and their an air officer, substituted for him. Minutes of the
conference and the papers approved at the meetings
planners moved slowly but surely toward are in the printed and bound volume entitled
a solution and a plan. TRIDENT Conference, May 1943.
CENTRAL PACIFIC TIMETABLE 455
paper ready" on every subject raised for before it was sharply reduced by the
discussion.2 establishment of additional committees.
The thorough staff work that preceded The most important of these was the
the TRIDENT Conference was undoubt- Joint Administrative Committee, later
edly due in large measure to the recalled the Joint Logistics Committee,
organization of the joint staff. The need which was given purview over logistical
for this reform had been evident for some matters but had to channel its studies
time, and in January 1943, immediately for the Joint Chiefs through the JPS.
after the meetings at Casablanca, a spe- This provision applied to other joint
cial committee was established to study committees as well, and was designed to
the problem.3 The 60-page report of ensure the co-ordination of all activities
this committee, submitted on 8 March and plans with basic strategic concepts.
1943, provided the basis for a thorough The reorganization of May 1943
review of the entire JCS committee solved the problem of the JUSSC by
structure and the reorganization that abolishing that body and creating the
followed. With respect to strategic plan- Joint War Plans Committee (JWPC).
ning, the chief weakness of the system, Unlike the JUSSC, this new group was
it was recognized, was the burden of not charged with responsibility for broad
responsibility placed on the Joint Staff strategy or future planning—that func-
Planners, who not only represented the tion was now assigned to the Joint
United States on the combined level but Strategic Survey Committee—but only
also directed all planning activities on for the preparation of joint war plans.
the joint level while occupying positions Membership in the JWPC was large, to
of responsibility within their own serv- give it an adequate staff to do the job
ices. The problem of the Joint U.S. assigned. Three senior members repre-
Strategic Committee had never been senting the Army, Navy, and Army Air
solved either, and its members were still Forces, controlled the committee and
dissatisfied with the role assigned them. assigned the work to planning teams
The organization that finally emerged designated by color, the Red Team
in May 1943—preliminary measures had handling all Pacific and Far East matters.
been adopted earlier—greatly increased The work of the teams was reviewed
the efficiency of planning on the joint by the senior members who, in turn,
level and made U.S. representation on reported directly to the Joint Staff
the combined level much more effective Planners.
than it had been. The membership of As part of the preparation for the
the Joint Staff Planners was reduced to TRIDENT Conference, the "elder states-
four, two each from the Army and Navy, men" of the Joint Strategic Survey Com-
and the number of issues that came mittee had considered carefully the
question of conference tactics and the
2
Mins, JCS Mtg, 8 May 43. basic position the Joint Chiefs should
3
For a full account of the work of this committee take in their meetings with the British.
and the discussions that followed, see Davis, Devel- The British, they thought, would seek
opment of the JCS Committee Structure, pp. 590-
683. A shorter, more general account can be found
to increase the Allied effort in the
in Cline, Washington Command Post, pp. 235-39. Mediterranean, possibly to the east of
Sicily. Such action, the strategists con- that the United States would have to
tended, would divert from the main "expand and intensify its operations in
effort against Germany and they recom- the Pacific, in order to counteract the
mended that the U.S. Joint Chiefs oppose advantage which Japan gains by Allied
it as contrary to sound strategy. If the failure adequately to support China."5
British wished to undertake operations Though the Joint Chiefs did not for-
in the eastern Mediterranean, then, said mally approve these recommendations,
the strategic planners, the U.S. Chiefs it was evident throughout the conference
should take the position that the United that they had taken the advice of their
States could not support its allies there strategic committee seriously. In his
but would instead commit additional opening remarks to the Combined Chiefs
resources to the Pacific. An effort in the on the morning of 13 May, Admiral
western Mediterranean would be less Leahy, reading from a paper prepared by
objectionable, the strategists believed the committee, stressed the global aspects
and could be supported if the British of the war and the relationship of Euro-
agreed to mount the air offensive against pean and Pacific strategy. Referring to
Germany in 1943 and the cross-Channel the matters the Joint Chiefs considered
attack the next year.4 most essential—the cross-Channel attack
In the view of the senior officers on the and the role of China—the admiral
Joint Strategic Survey Committee, strat- pointedly observed that the decision on
egy in the Pacific and Far East could not operations to be undertaken during the
be divorced from the strategy in Europe. next eighteen months should be based
They recommended, therefore, that at on the contribution of each to the early
the forthcoming conference the U.S. defeat of both enemies.6 To give added
Joint Chiefs should establish the inter- point to this emphasis on the Pacific,
relationship of the two, and, while up- Leahy proposed that the strategic aims
holding the priority of the war against of the Allies include the maintenance
Germany, emphasize American interest and extension of "unremitting pressure"
in the early defeat of Japan. By taking against Japan while the war against Ger-
this position at the start, the strategists many was still in progress. To the British,
pointed out, the U.S. Chiefs would be the addition of the word extension—
able to counter the anticipated insistence used here for the first time—to the
of the British on Mediterranean opera- accepted formula to "maintain unremit-
tions, and their reluctance to undertake ting pressure" against Japan seemed to
the cross-Channel invasion, with the re- give the war in the Far East an unjusti-
quirements of the Pacific theater. More- fied "pride of place" and to open the way
over, if the British refused to support for extensive operations in the Pacific.
the campaign in Burma in furtherance These operations, they feared, might
of the Allied effort to keep China in the divert resources from the main effort
war, a cardinal principle of American against Germany by creating "a vacuum
strategy, the Joint Chiefs could argue
5
Ibid.
4 6
JCS 286, 6 May 43, sub: Recommended Line of Mins, CCS Mtg, 13 May 43, an. A, JCS Memo,
Action at Coming Conf. same date, sub: Global Strategy of the War.
into which forces would have to be virtually settled and the way cleared for
poured."7 discussion of American plans in the
Admiral Leahy's emphasis on the Pacific.
Pacific and Far East as a foil to the The strategic plan for the defeat of
British preoccupation with the Mediter- Japan was considered first. Revised to
ranean was a recurrent theme of the incorporate the concept of extending as
conference. Marshall, for example, ex- well as maintaining "unremitting pres-
pressed this view frankly on the 13th at sure" against Japan and to emphasize
a meeting with the British. At a separate the importance of China, the plan pre-
meeting next day, the Joint Chiefs agreed sented by the U.S. Chiefs was basically
that if the British would not commit the same 6-phase plan they had approved
themselves to the cross-Channel invasion on 8 May.11
in 1944, then the United States as a "last The British reaction was lukewarm.
resort," should increase its efforts in the They thought the American proposals
Pacific.8 Three days later, Admiral Leahy somewhat vague and general and felt
told the British Chiefs that under certain the alternative courses of action should
circumstances, U.S. interests might re- be analyzed more carefully. Since there
quire an "extension of effort against was no need for an immediate decision,
Japan, if necessary, even at the expense the U.S. Chiefs agreed to refer the prob-
of the European Theater." 9 This clear lem to a combined committee of Amer-
threat was made even more explicit when ican and British planners for further
the Americans declared the Germany- study. Before the conference closed,
first strategy might have to be reversed arrangements were made for an exchange
if it seemed "that the war as a whole can of visits between London and Wash-
be brought more quickly to a successful ington by the planners working on the
conclusion by the earlier mounting of problem.12
a major offensive against Japan." 10 The more pressing problem of decid-
These statements, revealing as they ing upon a schedule of operations for the
were of the American attitude, were but Pacific during the coming year was not so
the prelude to the discussion of Pacific easily settled. On the morning of the
problems, which began on 20 May, a 21st, Admiral King explained the Amer-
week after the conference had opened. ican program in some detail. After out-
By that time, the two most troublesome lining the situation in the Pacific and
and pressing matters before the Com- the alternate routes of advance, King
bined Chiefs of Staff—operations in the referred to the traditional interest of
Mediterranean and in Burma—had been American planners in the Pacific. Ever
7
Mins, CCS Mtg, 14 May 43. Leahy's proposal was since the acquisition of the Philippines,
first submitted to the British as a JSSC study, JCS he said, they had studied intensively the
243/3. 9 Apr 43. sub: Survey of Present Strategic
Sit. The British commented in CCS 199, 13 Apr 43,
11
same sub; Memo by British COS, 23 Apr 43, same CGS 220, 19 May 43, sub: Strategic Plan for Defeat
sub; CCS Supp Mins, 23 Apr 43. of Japan. The 8 May plan was JCS 28771 and bore
8
Mins, CCS Mtg, 13 May, and JCS Mtg, 14 May 43. the same title. See above, ch. XXII.
9 12
Mins, CCS Mtg, 17 May 43. Mins, CCS Mtg, 20 May 43; CCS 251/1, CPS
10
CCS 220, 19 May 43, sub: Strategic Plan for Memo, 25 May 43, sub: Proposals for Improving
Defeat of Japan. Combined Planning.
problems involved in reinforcing and attainment of positions of readiness" for

reconquering the islands in the event of the final assault on Japan.15
a Japanese attack. The results of these The British Chiefs accepted the Amer-
studies showed, King maintained, that ican plan without discussion, and the
no matter which route was followed the remaining days of the conference were
essential conditions for success in the devoted to a careful study of the re-
Pacific were, first, control of the lines of sources required to carry out this pro-
communication, and second, recapture of gram. Seven divisions, it was estimated,
the Philippines. Essential to both were would be needed to capture the Bismarck
decisive action against the Japanese fleet Archipelago and 2 more for the Mar-
and seizure of the Marianas. This last, shalls, in addition to large air and naval
in King's opinion, was the key to the situ- forces. But if Rabaul could be neutral-
ation because of the islands' location on ized by air bombardment, the number
the Japanese line of communications." 13 of divisions would be reduced by 2. An
The plan Admiral King presented to operation against the Carolines, which
the Combined Chiefs was virtually the would involve the capture of Truk and
same as that developed by the American Ponape, would require 3 more divisions,
planners earlier in the month. Com- as well as additional heavy bombers,
pleted on 12 May, the day the meeting aircraft carriers, battleships, cruisers, and
opened, the plan had never been ap- other warships. There were enough sur-
proved by the U.S. Chiefs, and probably face forces in the Pacific to meet these
not all of them had had an opportunity requirements, but 4 more divisions, 2
to study it.14 For the Pacific theater, the Army and 2 Marine, would be required
plan had set as objectives for 1943 and to carry out the operations scheduled for
1944 seizure of the Marshalls and Caro- the coming year.16
lines, capture of the Solomon Islands, the The final report of the conference,
Bismarck Archipelago, and Japanese- approved by Roosevelt and Churchill on
held New Guinea, and ejection of the 25 May, reaffirmed the determination of
Japanese from the Aleutians. To these the Allies, in co-operation with the Soviet
Admiral King had added "the intensifi- Union, to concentrate their resources
cation of operations against the Japanese against Germany in order to secure the
line of communications." He was most surrender of the Axis in Europe as soon
emphatic also about the necessity of as possible. This effort would not pre-
maintaining and extending "unremitting clude operations against Japan for, at
pressure" against the enemy during the the insistence of the Americans, the final
year ahead and suggested that, in decid- report provided that sufficient resources
ing on any operation, the Chiefs ask would be made available to the Pacific
themselves whether it would "further and Far East commanders to maintain
threaten or cut the Japanese line of and extend "unremitting pressure"
communication" and "contribute to the against Japan. Once Germany was de-
feated, the Allies, aided possibly by the
13
Mins, CCS Mtg, 21 May 43.
14 15
CCS 239, 20 May 43, sub: Opns in Pacific and Mins, CCS Mtg, 21 May 43.
16
Far East in 1943-44. For earlier action on the plan, CCS 239/1, sub: Opns in Pacific and Far East in
see above, ch. XXII. 1943-44, 21 May 43.
Soviet Union, would turn their full time to meet the requirements of this
attention to Japan and seek to force her program. Under existing deployment
unconditional surrender at the earliest schedules, General MacArthur would
possible date. have 5 U.S. Army, 1 Marine, and 3 Aus-
Specific operations in the Pacific dur- tralian divisions available for offensive
ing 1943-1944 were designed to support operations by January 1944; Halsey in
this broad strategic concept by: (a) se- the South Pacific, 5 Army, 2 Marine, and
curing positions from which to force 1 New Zealand divisions; and Nimitz,
the ultimate surrender of Japan; (b) 3 Army and 1 Marine divisions. Still
keeping China in the war; and (c) hold- needed for the Central Pacific offensive
ing the lines of communication. Thus, were 2 divisions for the Marshalls and 2
the final report of the conference em- for the Carolines, and these, the Com-
bodied the 5-point program developed bined Chiefs declared, could be made
by the American planners before the available from resources within the
meeting and called for: United States without cutting into the
1. Air operations in and from China. requirements of other areas.18
2. Ejection of the Japanese from the With the approval of the final report,
Aleutians. the TRIDENT Conference came to an end.
3. Seizure of the Marshall and Caro- Much had been accomplished during
line Islands. these two weeks, and the prospects ahead
4. Seizure of the Solomons, the Bis- were brighter than they had ever been.
marck Archipelago, and that portion of The Allies had agreed on a strategic con-
New Guinea held by the Japanese. cept for the conduct of the war and on
5. Intensification of operations against the general objectives to support this
the Japanese line of communications. strategy. Considerable progress had been
No special significance or order of made also in reaching agreement on a
priority was intended by this listing of broad plan designed to secure the early
operations. The accomplishment of all defeat of the Axis Powers, and another
five, it was agreed, was essential to the meeting had been scheduled for August
defeat of Japan, and any "conflict of to complete the task begun in May. But
interest" between them and other opera- the acceptance at TRIDENT of a cross-
tions would be resolved by the Combined Channel attack, with a tentative target
Chiefs.17 date of May 1944, and of the combined
This ambitious program, which would bomber offensive from the United King-
witness the opening of a new front in the dom put the planning for the defeat of
Pacific, seemed to the Combined Chiefs Germany on a firm basis. And while
to be well within the capabilities of the these plans matured, the offensive in the
Allies. Unless the rate of losses increased Mediterranean would continue, it was
sharply, they told the President and agreed at TRIDENT, with an invasion of
Prime Minister, there would be enough the Italian boot to come after the sched-
troops and supplies in the theater in uled capture of Sicily.
18
CCS 224/1, Implementation . . . for Conduct of
17
CCS 242/6, Final Rpt to President and Prime the War in 1943-44, 25 May 43; Mins, CCS Plenary
Minister, 25 May 43. Session, 25 May 43.
On the Pacific side, the TRIDENT deci- By 10 June, the joint war planners had
sions reflected an increased emphasis on done their job. The plan they submitted
the importance of operations against called for the invasion and seizure of the
Japan. On the basis of the agreements Marshalls in three steps: first, the simul-
reached at the conference, the Americans taneous seizure of the central atolls,
could proceed confidently with their Kwajalein, Wotje, and Maloelap; second,
plans to open an offensive in the Central the occupation of the outpost atolls,
Pacific. The course for the year ahead Eniwetok to the north and Kusaie to the
had been charted, and with the opera- south; and third, the reduction or neu-
tions in the Solomons, New Guinea, and tralization of the remaining islands in
the Aleutians already in progress, the the area, including Wake and those in
Joint Chiefs could turn to the task of the Gilbert group.20 In this way, the in-
opening the long-deferred Central Pa- vading forces would strike suddenly at
cific drive. Meanwhile, American and the enemy's stronghold before he could
British planners, working together, would disperse his forces, thereby avoiding a
seek to develop a long-range strategy for costly and slow step-by-step advance
the defeat of Japan in time for the next through the atolls of the Gilberts and
meeting of the two allies in August. Marshalls. The success of the attack, the
planners believed, would be further en-
The Marshalls Plan hanced if it was made at the end of
October, during the dark of the moon
Hardly had the TRIDENT Conference and just a few days before the opening of
ended than the Navy, anxious to employ the Burma offensive.
the growing naval strength of the Pacific The forces required for the execution
Fleet, began to press for early action in of this plan raised serious problems. For
the Central Pacific. Though the confer- the first time American troops would
ence had not fixed any timetable for have to assault a strongly defended coral
Pacific operations, earlier plans had atoll. Because of what the planners
clearly implied, if they had not stated, called "the serious implications of fail-
that the offensive through the Mandates ure" and because this experience would
would begin only after the capture of serve as a guide for later atoll operations
Rabaul, presumably in the spring of in the Pacific, it was "almost imperative,"
1944. But now the naval planners could the planners declared, that only am-
see no reason to wait, and on 27 May, at phibiously trained, battle-tested "shock
Admiral Cooke's suggestion, the Joint troops" should be used for this first ven-
Staff Planners directed the War Plans ture into the Japanese Mandated Islands.
Committee to study the requirements A corps of two reinforced divisions, they
for an invasion of the Marshall Islands estimated, would be required, in addi-
and to prepare an outline plan for the tion to assault shipping, amphibian trac-
operation, with recommended target
dates.19 submit a report by 5 June. JWPC 39/D, 28 May 43,
sub: Opns Against Marshalls, both in ABC 384
19
Memo, JPS for JWPC, 27 May 43, sub: Examina- Marshall Islands (6-10-43),sec.1.
20
tion into Pacific Theater. The JWPC in turn dele- JPS 205, Preliminary Rpt by JWPC, 10 Jun 43,
gated the task to its RAINBOW Team, which was to sub: Opns Against Marshalls.
tors capable of hurdling the coral reefs, definite timetable for operations in the
and two bomber groups (one heavy and Central Pacific, starting with the Mar-
one medium) for garrison duty. shalls invasion on 1 November; (b) get
There was only one way to meet these from General MacArthur a list of the
requirements and that was to draw upon operations he planned, with "firm dates";
the resources allocated to MacArthur and and (c) give to Admiral Nimitz the au-
Halsey for CARTWHEEL. The two divi- thority to co-ordinate and schedule all
sions which most closely met the criteria offensive operations in the Pacific. This
set by the planners were the 1st and 2d last, he suggested, could be accomplished
Marine Divisions, both blooded on by adding to the original directive given
Guadalcanal and scheduled for employ- Nimitz in March 1942 the mission to
ment in New Guinea and the Solomons "coordinate the timing, under the gen-
later in the year. Less experienced but eral direction of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of
possible substitutes were the Army's 7th Staff, of major amphibious offensives
Division, still in the Aleutians, and the throughout the Pacific Theater."21 And
unseasoned 3d Marine Division in the in an accompanying note to General
South Pacific. The planners, however, Marshall, King added: "I now feel that
preferred the more experienced Marine the urgency of these problems will per-
divisions and recommended their use in mit of no further delay in the taking of
the Marshalls invasion. They did this effective action to solve them."
with a full awareness of the effect of such Admiral King's proposal to give Nimitz
a move on CARTWHEEL. Deprived of co-ordinating authority in the Pacific
their battle-tested amphibious troops was, in effect, a device to make that officer
and assault craft, MacArthur and Halsey the supreme commander in the theater,
would virtually have to abandon their for co-ordination and timing of opera-
drive toward Rabaul almost before it had tions were clearly the prerogatives of
begun—"not later than late July 1943" command. So controversial an issue could
the planners estimated. By that time the hardly be discussed without further study
two commanders would presumably have and the Joint Chiefs therefore referred it
occupied Kiriwina and Woodlark Islands, to the Joint Staff Planners, who already
infiltrated New Georgia, and captured had the Marshalls invasion plan of their
the Lae-Salamaua-Finschhafen-Madang War Plans Committee, with instructions
area of New Guinea. There they would to report by 14 June. At the same time
have to stand, if the recommendations of Marshall sent an inquiry to MacArthur
the joint war planners were accepted, asking for more specific information on
until the Marshalls were taken. his plans. MacArthur's response hardly
Damaging as this proposal would added much to what was already known
have been to MacArthur's plans, it was in Washington—Kiriwina and Wood-
not as drastic as one made by Admiral lark would be invaded on 30 June, Lae
King at the same time. Anxious to end and Salamaua on 1 September. Any esti-
the inactivity of American forces in the
Pacific and ensure their most effective 21
Memo, King for Marshall, 11 Jun 43, sub: Future
utilization, King recommended to the Campaign Opns in Pacific Ocean Areas, ser. 001150,
OPD 381 Security, case 163. Circulated as JCS 353,
Joint Chiefs that they (a) establish a same date and title.
mates about the operations to follow, apart. Both sides could agree at least
MacArthur declared, would be "pure that a Central Pacific offensive was de-
guess work," and would depend to a sirable, that it should begin as soon as
large degree on Japanese reaction to the possible, and that it should not be made
initial attacks.22 at the expense of operations in the South
The deliberations of the Joint Staff and Southwest Pacific. On that basis,
Planners were somewhat more produc- they recommended to the Joint Chiefs
tive. Meeting on 13 June to consider the of Staff that the Marshall Islands should
Marshall Islands invasion plans and Ad- be invaded about 1 November and that
miral King's recommendations on com- Admiral Nimitz be directed to submit
mand, the planners quickly divided his plans for the operation. At the same
along service lines. From the Army time, they instructed the Joint War Plans
point of view, an offensive in the Central Committee to prepare a new plan based
Pacific was certainly desirable, provided on a target date of 1 November or 1
it had a reasonable chance of success and December and on the assumption that
would not prejudice MacArthur's CART- there would be no interruption to CART-
WHEEL operations. On this last point, WHEEL. The Joint Chiefs, the planners
the Army was adamant and stood ready further recommended, should direct
to back its position with strong political General MacArthur to furnish "without
and military arguments.23 The Navy delay" specific information, including
planners felt just as strongly about the targets, dates, and forces, on the opera-
Central Pacific, the area where the grow- tions he planned to conduct in his area.
ing strength of the fleet could be most These recommendations the Joint Chiefs
profitably employed. It was unthinkable, accepted without question at their meet-
they said, that the fleet should remain ing of 15 June and the necessary instruc-
relatively idle until CARTWHEEL was tions were quickly drafted.24
over. There had been too many delays But on the question of command
and postponements already, said Admiral raised by Admiral King, the Army and
Cooke, and the time had come to open Navy planners were unable to reach
the Central Pacific offensive. He pro- agreement and presented the Chiefs with
posed, therefore, that the Marshalls oper- a split report. The Army maintained it
ation be scheduled for about 1 Novem- would be inadvisable for the Joint Chiefs
ber. And he was confident, moreover, to delegate their control over coordina-
that it could be carried out without tion and timing of operations in the
disrupting MacArthur's schedule. Pacific to Admiral Nimitz. The proper
Despite the seeming disparity in their exercise of this function, they argued,
views, the planners were not too far required a global viewpoint that no thea-
ter commander could be expected to
22
Rads, Marshall to MacArthur, 11 Jun 43, CM- possess. More important was the fact
OUT 4580; MacArthur to Marshall, 12 Jun 43, CM-
IN 7367. MacArthur's estimate was essentially the
that the authority to co-ordinate clearly
same as that he had submitted on 27 May. See above,
24
ch. XXII. JCS 353/1, 14 Jun 43, sub: Future Campaign
23
Mins, JPS Mtg, 13 Jun 43; OPD Brief, Notes on Opns in Pacific Ocean Area; JWPC 54/1/D, 14 Jun
Preliminary Rpt by JWPC . . . , JPS 205, in ABC 43, sub: Sequence of Certain Pacific Opns; Mins,
384 Marshall Islands (6-10-43),sec.1. JCS Mtg, 15 Jun 43.
implied control over the assignment and shall Islands, including forces, shipping,
movement of forces in the area and there- and target dates.27
fore supreme command of the Pacific.
The Navy denied that this was neces- Alternate Proposals
sarily the case and argued the need for
co-ordinating amphibious operations The task now facing the joint war
with the Pacific Fleet's responsibility for planners was a difficult one. What they
holding the line of communications, but had to do was produce a plan for the
the Army insisted that acceptance of invasion of the Marshall Islands on 1
King's proposal was tantamount to mak- December that would not curtail Mac-
ing Admiral Nimitz supreme commander Arthur's CARTWHEEL operation. But
in the Pacific. This they could not accept they could see no better way of seizing
and the Joint Chiefs therefore decided the Marshalls than by direct invasion
to table the matter.25 and this, they were convinced, would
The disagreement over command had require trained and experienced com-
no effect on the development of plans bat troops. Since such troops would have
for the Central Pacific offensive. On the to come from the South and Southwest
15th a message went out to MacArthur Pacific, the planners did not see how the
informing him of the tentative plan for operation could be mounted by 1 Decem-
an invasion of the Marshall Islands on ber without affecting MacArthur's plans.
about 15 November by forces drawn Thus, their first solution to the problem
largely from his and Admiral Halsey's was not a solution at all but a restate-
areas. These forces, the Joint Chiefs told ment of the original plan in which the
him, included the 1st Marine Division, effect on CARTWHEEL was implied rather
then in Australia, and the 2d Marine than stated.28
Division in the South Pacific, together Realizing full well that they had failed
with their assault transports, cargo to solve the problem, the planners tried
vessels, and the major part of Halsey's a completely different approach and on
fleet. "Urgently needed for immediate 18 June submitted a new plan. There
planning purposes," the Joint Chiefs were, they said, three alternate courses
wrote, "is an outline of operations in the of action to a direct invasion of the
South and Southwest Pacific Areas giving Marshalls, which they still preferred if
dates that may affect present basis of the forces could be found. The first
planning for Central Pacific opera- alternative was to approach the Mar-
tions."26 The next day the Joint Chiefs shalls from the north through Wake
directed Admiral Nimitz to submit to Island; the second, from the east by way
them his plan for the seizure of the Mar- of the islands in the eastern chain of
the Marshalls group; the third, from the
25
Mins, JPS Mtg, 13 Jun 43; JCS 353/1, 14 Jun 43, south by way of Nauru and the Gilberts.
sub: Future Campaign Opns in Pacific Ocean Area;
Mins, JCS Mtg, 15 Jun 43. The first two the planners rejected as
26
Rad, JCS to MacArthur, No. 4769, 15 Jun 43, unsatisfactory; the third they thought
CM-OUT 6093. Copies went to Nimitz and Halsey
27
through the Army commanders in each area, Gen- Rad, King to Nimitz, 16 Jun 43, CM-IN 9883.
28
erals Richardson in the Central Pacific and Harmon JPS 205/1, 17 Jun 43, sub: Opns Against the
in the South Pacific. Marshalls.
was a feasible plan though "definitely "When we get the Gilberts, we still do
inferior" to the 3-phase assault on the not have the Marshalls."30 The truth
Marshalls they had recommended was that no one was enthusiastic about
earlier.29 an operation in the Gilberts. But the
The Gilberts-Nauru plan, as presented Navy apparently felt that something had
by the Joint War Plans Committee, to be done with the fleet and that an
called first for the establishment of ad- invasion of the Gilberts was better than
vance air bases and fleet anchorages in no action at all. "There seems to have
the Ellice group and on Howland Island grown up in our Navy," wrote one of
east of the Gilberts for reconnaissance the Army planners, "the fixation that
and air support. This phase completed, any action by the Fleet must acquire
the assault forces, consisting of one territory." 31
Marine division and one regimental The Army, approaching the problem
combat team mounted from the South from a different point of view, refused
Pacific, would land simultaneously on to be stampeded into any course not
Nauru Island and on Tarawa and Makin based on a thorough study of the entire
in the Gilberts under the cover of situation in the Pacific. The Marshalls
carrier-based aircraft. These and other operation, it found, was unsound and
islands in the group would then be entirely unacceptable if it resulted in
developed into air bases from which the postponement of CARTWHEEL; the
Allied planes could bomb the Marshalls Gilberts plan it thought feasible. But
and reconnoiter the Carolines. Finally, the wisest course, the Army believed,
after the Gilberts-Nauru position had would be to "analyze all possible opera-
been consolidated, garrison units would tions in the Pacific, east of the Philippine-
move into the area to relieve the assault Honshu line, select the desirable ones,
force. In addition to the Marine division determine the sequence, and set dates for
and regimental combat team, the oper- planning purposes." If the Navy felt it
ation would require 2 or 3 amphibian must employ its fleet offensively then it
tractor battalions and supporting units, should seek purely naval engagements.32
5 heavy bombardment squadrons, and Still to be heard from was General
1 fighter group during the combat phase. MacArthur. Informed on the 15th of
To garrison the islands another division the operations projected in the Central
with support and service elements, and Pacific, at the same time he was asked
an air component of 2 bomber and 2 for specific information about his own
fighter groups would be needed. plans, MacArthur's response five days
This new plan no more met the re- later left no doubt about his position.
quirements laid down by the Joint Staff As a matter of fact, he told the Chief
Planners than either of the earlier plans.
30
Moreover, the Joint War Plans Com- Memo, Col William W. Bessell, Jr., for Col
Roberts, 18 Jun 43, sub: Opns Against Marshalls,
mittee was itself lukewarm about the JPS 205/2, in OPD Exec Files.
plan, as the Army member remarked, 31
Ibid.
32
OPD Brief, no date, Summation of Memos on
Opns in Central Pacific; JCS 115/1, 23 Jun 43, sub:
29
JPS 205/2, 18 Jun 43, sub: Opns Against Mar- Opns in Central Pacific, ABC 384 Marshall Islands
shalls. (6-10-43), sec. 1.
of Staff, he found the news most "dis- a shift he assumed was made at TRIDENT.
turbing" and expressed great concern "I am entirely in ignorance regarding
over the effect of an invasion of the the discussions and decisions of the re-
Marshalls on his and Admiral Halsey's cent Washington Conference," he told
CARTWHEEL operations. These, he re- Marshall, "and request that I be advised
minded his Washington superiors, were in this respect insofar as it affects the
only preliminary to the final assault on broad concept of operations in this
Rabaul, the great strategic prize toward theater."35
which South and Southwest Pacific forces As MacArthur saw it, the main effort
had been driving since August 1942. To in the Pacific was the drive northward
withdraw either the 2d Marine Division through the Solomons and New Guinea.
from the South Pacific or the 1st, which An invasion of the Marshalls was there-
was scheduled to invade New Britain on fore "a diversionary attack," which, he
1 December, would not only rule out admitted, would be helpful in making
any campaign against Rabaul in the near the main effort, provided the troops
future, MacArthur asserted, but would came from the United States. To draw
also jeopardize the success of CARTWHEEL them from his and Halsey's theater, he
itself.33 Two days later, he backed up declared, would only weaken the main
this contention with Halsey's statement attack "to an extent that may result in
that the loss of the 2d Marine Division its collapse."
with its assault craft and shipping would Though MacArthur had not been in-
deprive him of a strategic reserve of formed of the TRIDENT decision to ini-
manpower to meet any sudden emer- tiate an offensive in the Central Pacific,
gencies and put a "severe strain" on it must have been perfectly apparent to
logistics in the South Pacific.34 him that the Marshalls invasion could
There were other reasons why, in Mac- presage nothing else. He took the occa-
Arthur's view, the withdrawal of the two sion, therefore, to present his own views
Marine divisions would be unfortunate. on strategy to the Chief of Staff. He was
First, it would have, as he put it, "pro- convinced that "from the broad strategic
found political repercussions," presum- viewpoint" the drive northward from
ably on Australia's relations with the Australia through New Guinea to Min-
United States. Second, it would be waste- danao offered the greatest advantages for
ful of shipping to transfer forces from the Allies. It would place them most
advanced bases in the South and South- quickly in position to cut the Japanese
west Pacific back to Hawaii. And finally, line of communications southward while
it seemed to represent a radical shift in permitting them to support their own
the strategy of the war in the Pacific, advance with land-based aircraft. "By
contrast," MacArthur declared, "a move-
33
Rad, MacArthur to Marshall, C-3302, 20 Jun 43, ment through the mandated islands will
CM-IN 13149.
34
Rad, MacArthur to Marshall, 22 Jun 43, 13605. be a series of amphibious attacks with the
For the views of the air commanders, see Rads, support of carrier-based aircraft against
Arnold to Kenney and Harmon, 22 Jun 43, CM-OUT objectives defended by naval units and
9340 and CM-OUT 9341; MacArthur to Marshall,
24 Jun 43, CM-IN 15013; Harmon to Arnold, 25
35
Jun 43, CM-IN 15655. Rad, MacArthur to Marshall, 20 Jun 43.
ground troops supported by land-based This forthright statement of strategy

aviation." This type of operation he and vigorous protest against the Central
thought was the most difficult and haz- Pacific advance, though it did not reverse
ardous, and he cited the Japanese the decision to launch an offensive west-
experience at Midway to make his point. ward from Hawaii, did have some effect
The Central Pacific route, in Mac- in Washington. About a week earlier,
Arthur's view, suffered from the further Admiral King had proposed to Marshall
disadvantage of not offering any vital that the 1st Marine Division be trans-
strategic objective. An offensive west- ferred from Australia to the Central
ward across the Pacific, therefore, would Pacific. Marshall had postponed his re-
require a series of hazardous "amphib- ply, and now, on the basis of information
ious frontal attacks" against islands of from MacArthur, he turned down the
limited value. Only when the drive request firmly. To accede to it, he
reached Mindanao would the forces of told King would seriously affect the
the Central Pacific be in position to make operational schedule established in
any large strategic gains, and this objec- CARTWHEEL. 36
tive, MacArthur believed, he could reach MacArthur's views also supported the
more quickly and with less cost by way Army's case for a more careful approach
of New Guinea. to the Central Pacific offensive and a
The fact that the Central Pacific thorough study of the alternatives. Thus,
advance had the sanction of the prewar when the Joint Staff Planners met on
ORANGE plan did not impress General 23 June to discuss the two plans sub-
MacArthur. He had worked on this mitted by their Joint War Plans Com-
plan and understood it thoroughly. But mittee the Army member proposed and
he did not believe it was applicable in the group accepted the suggestion that
the present situation. The Japanese con- the committee be directed to restudy the
quest of Malaya and the Netherlands problem along broader lines, taking into
Indies, he observed, had partially invali- consideration the views of General Mac-
dated the assumptions of ORANGE and Arthur and Admiral Halsey. As inter-
made its execution impracticable. More preted by the joint war planners, this
important was the fact that ORANGE had new directive called for "determination
assumed that Hawaii would constitute of the most suitable and feasible opera-
the only advanced base in a war against tions in the Pacific, whether they ap-
Japan once the Philippines were lost. ply to the Marshalls-Gilberts or not."37
The possibility that Australia might be They were also authorized under their
used had not been foreseen, and its avail- new instructions to consider the possi-
ability now, MacArthur asserted, altered bility of seizing a position in the Admi-
the situation completely. A blind adher-
36
ence to an outdated prewar plan whose Memos, King for Marshall, 14 Jun 43, sub: With-
drawal of 1st Marine Div, JCS 238/1; Marshall for
assumptions were no longer entirely valid King, 23 Jun 43, same sub, WDCSA South Pacific
did not seem to MacArthur to justify a Area.
37
strategy that would involve U.S. forces JWPC 58/D, 24 Jun 43, sub: Opns in Central
Pacific, Incl B; Incl A, JPS Directive, both in ABC
in costly and time-consuming operations 384 Marshall Islands (6-10-43), sec. 1; Mins, JPS
for objectives of little strategic value. Mtg, 23 Jun 43.
rallies instead of trying to take Rabaul Southwest Pacific, support the defense
and Kavieng, and to neutralize these last of Australia, and contribute to "the sev-
two strongholds by air bombardment. eral objectives of the South and South-
"By these means," it was thought, "the west Pacific campaigns as now con-
Bismarcks could be controlled instead of ceived." Among these was undoubtedly
captured, our progress accelerated, and the opening of the Celebes Sea to Allied
forces made available for the Central forces, a goal the strategists believed
Pacific."38 would be greatly enhanced by the sei-
The planners of the Joint War Plans zure of the Marshalls and Gilberts in
Committee had hardly settled down to 1943.
work on 28 June, when the elder states- Though this argument had been ad-
men of the Joint Strategic Survey Com- vanced earlier in connection with the
mittee, on their own initiative, presented strategic plan for the defeat of Japan
the Joint Chiefs with a new set of recom- and approved as the basis for discussion
mendations for the Pacific.39 As they saw with the British at TRIDENT, the Joint
it, the Allied strategy in the South and Chiefs as a group were not willing at
Southwest Pacific was the same strategy this time to give the Central Pacific
in reverse that the Japanese had followed priority over operations in MacArthur's
during the first six months of the war, area. Admiral King was the only mem-
less the advantages of surprise and supe- ber who favored such a policy and he
riority the Japanese had enjoyed. Such proposed a full-scale strategic review on
a strategy, they thought, held small prom- the basis of these recommendations. But
ise of any striking success in view of the none of the others agreed and the mat-
enemy's strong position in the area. Far ter was disposed of by sending it to the
more promising, now that the United Joint Staff Planners "for examination."40
States had recovered from its initial set- The Army's reaction to the proposal
back and restored the naval balance in of the Joint Strategic Survey Committee
the Pacific, was the Central Pacific offen- would have greatly encouraged Mac-
sive. This line of advance and not the Arthur, the champion of the southern
advance northward from Australia, said over the central route of advance. To
the Joint Strategic Survey Committee, the Army planners, the selection of one
should constitute the main effort and route over any other at this time seemed
be given the highest priority. Not only premature. How could anyone say which
would operations along this axis prove was the best route, they asked, until a
most remunerative, but they would also plan for the defeat of Japan had been
make possible the most effective use of developed? Even then, the effect of any
American naval strength and, perhaps, operation in the Pacific on operations
bring on a decisive engagement with the elsewhere would have to be studied be-
Japanese fleet. Further, an advance fore it would be possible to decide which
through the Mandates would shorten was the best course. Moreover, the Army
the long line of communications to the planners did not believe it would be
38
Incl. B, cited above.
39 40
JCS 386, 28 Jun 43, sub: Strategy in Pacific. Mins, JCS Mtg, 29 Jun 43.
possible to bypass western New Guinea ter the enemy's land-based aircraft in the
by following the Central Pacific route Marshalls.42
to Mindanao, and doubted that such an Admiral Nimitz' plan, like the other
advance would bring on a decisive fleet proposals made for a Central Pacific
engagement. The Japanese, they thought, offensive, was referred ultimately to the
would only risk such an action if a vital War Plans Committee of the Joint Staff
area was threatened or if their fleet had Planners. Certainly the joint war plan-
the advantage. As to the first, the planners could not complain for lack of guid-
ners thought that only a threat to the ance or suggestion, their instructions
Japanese home islands and the sea ap- were clear and their authority broad.
proaches to the South China Sea would They had their own earlier studies on
bring out the Japanese Combined Fleet. the Marshalls and Gilberts, General Mac-
It might well accept action also during an Arthur's and Admiral Halsey's views,
invasion of the Marshalls and Carolines, the recommendations of the Joint Stra-
but in these areas, the Army planners tegic Survey Committee, and now Admi-
pointed out, the Japanese with land-based ral Nimitz' plan. It was up to them to
aviation would hold the advantage.41 produce a plan acceptable to all parties
On about 4 July there arrived in concerned.
Washington still another plan for the
Central Pacific, this one prepared at The Gilberts-Nauru Plan
Pearl Harbor by Admiral Nimitz' staff.
Directed by the Joint Chiefs on 15 June By 10 July the planners had come up
to prepare a plan for the invasion of the with their answer. They liked best, it
Marshalls about 1 November, Admiral seemed, their own plan for an invasion
Nimitz had come up with a scheme that of the Gilberts, which they thought "the
differed from any thus far proposed most suitable, feasible, and acceptable
though it resembled the Gilberts plan of those that can be undertaken with
in its requirement for air bases in the the forces and shipping available" by
Ellice group. The initial landings were 1 December 1943.43 In reaching this
to be made on Tarawa in the Gilberts conclusion, the planners reviewed the
and on Jaluit and Mille in the southern three other courses already proposed—
Marshalls. The remaining important direct invasion of the Marshalls, the
atolls in the Marshalls—Maloelap, Wotje, approach via Wake, and Nimitz' plan
Kwajalein, Eniwetok, and Kusaie— —but rejected them for tactical reasons
would have to be seized later, Nimitz or because sufficient forces were not
declared, for the forces required to take available. The preferred plan, too, would
them in the initial assault were not then require forces not then available in the
available. Under this concept, carrier- Pacific, but the committee planners
based air cover would be needed not hoped to get them from the South and
only for the initial assault, but also for
the later phases of the campaign to coun- 42
The information on this plan, which the author
has not seen, is based on Hayes, The War Against
Japan, ch. XVII, pp. 14-15.
43
JPS 205/3, 10 Jul 43, sub: Opns Against Mar-
41
OPD Brief, 29 Jun 43, Strategy of Pacific, JCS shalls-Gilberts.
Southwest. This could be accomplished, could be reduced more effectively by

they pointed out, by eliminating in the operations in the Marshalls than by other
final phase of CARTWHEEL the seizure means. Thus, when the Joint Staff Plan-
of western New Britain, thus freeing ners met on 14 July, Admiral Cooke had
the 1st Marine Division. And if Rabaul ready a proposed directive for Nimitz
was neutralized by air action rather than to proceed with the capture of Nauru
assaulted, then the 2d Marine Division and the Gilberts on 1 December. And
also would become available. These in anticipation of the Army's—and Mac-
changes, the planners believed, would Arthur's—objections to cancellation of
give MacArthur control of the Bismarck the western New Britain operation and
Archipelago earlier and at less cost than the withdrawal of the 1st Marine Divi-
under the existing plans. sion, he proposed instead that Halsey's
To the planners on the Army General southern Bougainville operation be can-
Staff, this reasoning had some obvious celed and that only the 2d Marine Divi-
flaws. It provided for the capture of sion be transferred to the Central Pacific.
the Gilberts but made no provision for This the Army countered with a proposal
seizure of more important objectives in to invade Wake Island alone on 15
the Marshalls or Carolines. Nor did they November, an operation that would re-
believe that so limited an objective as quire neither the 1st nor the 2d Marine
the Gilberts justified the withdrawal of Division, and to postpone other Central
two divisions from the South and South- Pacific operations until the forces could
west Pacific and the radical alteration be made available without interrupting
of MacArthur's plans. The result, they CARTWHEEL. 46
thought, would be to leave the forces in The task of reconciling these views
both areas "in an exposed position with- did not present any great difficulty.
out either having achieved a decisive Meeting informally during the next few
objective and without resources to ad- days, the planners agreed that provision
vance further for some time." 44 As Col. should be made for subsequent opera-
Frank N. Roberts, the Army member tions into the Marshalls and Carolines
of the Joint Staff Planners, remarked, and that both the western New Britain
"To go into the Gilberts at the expense and Bougainville operations should be
of pressure on Rabaul was not acceptable retained in CARTWHEEL. 47 With these
to the Army." 45 points settled, the Joint Staff Planners
The Navy planners did not view the were able to reach agreement on a course
problem in this light. Though they had of action they could submit to the Joint
no specific plans for continuing into the Chiefs. This they did on 19 July, recom-
Marshalls or Carolines, they had no in- mending the seizure of Nauru and the
tention either of stopping with the Gil-
berts operation. Rabaul, they argued, 46
Ibid.; Draft Memos, JPS for JCS, 12 Jul 43, sub:
Strategy in Pacific; Reply to Cooke, 14 Jul 43, both
in OPD 381 Security case 195.
44 47
OPD Brief, no date, Opns Against Marshalls- Draft Memo by JPS, 19 Jul 43, sub: Strategy in
Gilberts, JWPC 58/2, filed with JPS 205/3, ABC Pacific, with attached informal Memo, Roberts for
384 Marshall Islands (6-10-43),sec.1. Handy, filed with JPS 219/D, ABC 384 Pacific (6-
45
Mins, JPS Mtg, 14 Jul 43. 28-43).
Gilberts, target date 1 December 1943, the Ellice group through which to stage
followed promptly by invasion of the aircraft into the Gilberts.
Marshalls about 1 February 1944.48 The planners did not foresee any great
In support of this recommendation, difficulty in supplying the forces required
the planners reviewed carefully and fully for the Gilberts operation. The South
the entire situation in the Pacific. The Pacific would provide shipping, combat
Japanese, they pointed out, were rela- vessels, and the 2d Marine Division as
tively strong in the Solomons and New the assault force. Later, if the Joint
Guinea, and with their network of air- Chiefs decided to go through with the
fields were capable of strong resistance capture of Rabaul, they could send Hal-
despite the difficulty of supplying these sey another division. Meanwhile, for the
garrisons. To relieve the pressure on the Gilberts, the Central Pacific could pro-
Japanese in this area by discontinuing vide an Army division to back the Marine
CARTWHEEL would permit the enemy to troops in the assault or as a garrison,
deploy his strength, especially in aircraft, and the North Pacific could furnish addi-
to other areas where Allied forces were tional forces after the scheduled invasion
not as strong. Operations in the South of Kiska. Air forces for the operation
and Southwest Pacific, therefore, should would come from the Navy, the Central
be carried out as scheduled, the plan- Pacific's Seventh Air Force, and from
ners concluded, whether the final objec- the North Pacific. These should provide
tive was the capture or the neutralization enough, the planners thought, to make
of Rabaul. it unnecessary to draw on MacArthur's
Any advance westward from Hawaii or Halsey's air strength.
into the Japanese positions in the Cen- On the subject of the Marshalls inva-
tral Pacific would not only support the sion, the planners were somewhat vague.
drive northward from Australia but They did not doubt that the forces re-
would also employ American naval quired would be available by 1 February,
strength most effectively. Faced by this and mentioned specifically the assault
double threat, the Japanese would have units of the Gilberts operation. Addi-
to disperse their air forces and defend tional air units would be required, but
a greatly expanded front under disad- where these would come from the plan-
vantageous conditions. The Americans, ners did not say. Apparently they were
on the other hand, could support opera- satisfied to leave the solution of this
tions in either area with their naval problem for a later date.
forces and, once the Gilberts were taken, The Joint Chiefs of Staff, meeting on
would be able to advance further into 20 July, received the report of its plan-
the Central Pacific, thereby shortening ners with favor. General Marshall rec-
and making more secure the lines of ognized the risk of withdrawing the 2d
communication to the Southwest Pacific. Marine Division from the South Pacific
But first it would be necessary, the plan- in the event it was decided to capture
ners observed, to secure an air base in Rabaul, but agreed with his staff advisers
that the risk was worth taking. He
agreed also that the Gilberts invasion
48
JCS 386/1, 19 Jul 43, sub: Strategy in Pacific. would support CARTWHEEL, and should
therefore be approved. 49 General By this time the idea that it might

Arnold, too, supported the plan and prove unnecessary to capture Rabaul had
thought the Army Air Forces could taken firm root in Washington. The
provide the four additional squadrons prospect of avoiding the long and costly
needed to ensure the success of this effort that would be required to reduce
"important operation."50 These state- this Japanese bastion was certainly at-
ments reassured Admiral Leahy, who tractive enough, the planners thought,
had expressed concern lest the proposed to warrant serious consideration. Among
operations interfere with MacArthur's the recommendations they made to the
operations, and he also gave his consent. Joint Chiefs on 19 July, therefore, was
And Admiral King went even further one authorizing them to undertake such
than the planners. The target date for a study "with a view to gaining control
the Gilberts invasion, he suggested, of the Bismarck Archipelago through the
should be moved up to 15 November, seizure of Manus Island, Kavieng, and
that for the Marshalls to 1 January, Wewak."53 The inclusion of this seem-
in order to profit from the operations ingly irrelevant matter in a study dealing
scheduled under CARTWHEEL.51 The with the Central Pacific was a natural
Joint Chiefs accepted this amendment one, for the planners could not avoid
and that same day sent Admiral Nimitz the fact that there was an intimate re-
a formal directive to open the Central lationship between MacArthur's opera-
Pacific offensive. In it they outlined the tions and those in the Central Pacific.
concept and purpose of the projected If forces were not needed for Rabaul,
invasion, listed the forces he would have, they could certainly be used in the Mar-
and instructed him to accomplish the shalls. And, in any case, operations in
following: both areas would have to be co-ordinated
1. Organize and train forces for am- and mutually supporting.
phibious operations in the Ellice and MacArthur's views on this subject were
Gilbert groups and against Nauru. still unknown. As a matter of fact, the
2. Occupy and develop for use as air first indication he had that the cancel-
bases those islands required for support lation of the Rabaul operation was being
of the invasion. considered in Washington came on 21
3. Capture, occupy, defend, and de- July on the heels of the Nimitz direc-
velop bases on Nauru and in the Gilberts. tive, when Marshall told him of the
4. Prepare by 1 September plans and proposal to take Kavieng, Manus, and
a detailed estimate of forces required Wewak, thus isolating Rabaul and mak-
for the invasion of the Marshalls.52 ing its capture unnecessary. "If you con-
cur in this conception," wrote Marshall,
"outline plans to cover these operations
49
Mins, JCS Mtg, 20 Jul 43; OPD Brief, 20 Jul 43, . . . are desired before 1 September for
Strategy in Pacific, JCS 386/1, ABC 384 Pacific (6-
28-43.
50
Mins, JCS Mtg, 20 Jul 43.
51
Memo by King, 20 Jul 43, sub: Strategy in Pacific, MacArthur and Halsey. The directive as prepared
JCS 386/2. by the JPS included as app. A in JCS 386/1, 19 Jul
52
Rad, JCS to Nimitz, No. 202204, 20 Jul 43, CM- 43, sub: Strategy in Pacific.
53
IN 14465. Information copies of the message went to JCS 386/1, 19 Jul 43, sub: Strategy in Pacific.
Joint Chiefs of Staff consideration."54 however, to solicit his views in the mat-
MacArthur, most emphatically, did ter. The request was based solely on a
not concur. The capture of Wewak he desire to avoid "mixed forces" and on
considered so difficult that he had pur- the presumed unique qualifications of
posely planned to bypass it. He expected, the marines for island warfare. General
moreover, that his advances north and Marshall refused the request on more
west through the Solomons and along substantial grounds. "However desirable
the New Guinea coast would be opposed from the Navy point of view to employ
by strong enemy naval forces. To meet only Marine divisions in the operation,"
these he would have to have the sup- he observed, "it is my opinion that both
port of South Pacific fleet units and an the undoubtedly bad effect on the CART-
advance naval base from which they WHEEL operation and the waste of ship-
could operate. Only Rabaul met the ping far outweigh the anticipated
requirements for such a base, and its advantages."56 Instead, he offered King
capture, he told Marshall, "is a prereq- the 27th Division, then in Hawaii, for
uisite to a move in force along the north use in the Gilberts campaign, an offer
coast of New Guinea."55 that was promptly accepted.57 Thus, by
With these views, it was hardly likely the end of July, the Joint Chiefs had
that MacArthur would look with favor done all they could to launch the Cen-
on the projected withdrawal of the 2d tral Pacific offensive at the earliest pos-
Marine Division. His reaction, there- sible date without sacrificing any of the
fore, to Admiral King's request at this operations in the South and Southwest
moment for the 1st and 3d Marine Divi- Pacific. Admiral Nimitz had his instruc-
sions — the latter then in the South tions and the forces with which to carry
Pacific — for use in the Gilberts, may them out. The rest was up to him.
well be imagined. There was no need, 56
Memo, Marshall for King, 29 Jul 43, sub: Release
of 1st and 3d Mar Divs; Ltr, King to Marshall, 22 Jul
54
Rad, Marshall to MacArthur, 21 Jul 43, CM- 43, both in OPD 381 Security, case 196.
57
OUT 8604. Memo, Vice Adm Richard S. Edwards for Mar-
55
Rad, MacArthur to Marshall, No. C-4183, 23 shall, 31 Jul 43, sub: Designation of 27th Div to Gil-
Jul 43, CM-IN 16419. berts Opn, OPD 381 Security, case 196.
CHAPTER XXIV
Organizing for the Offensive

Whereas the Success of this Expedition will very much depend upon an
entire Good Understanding between Our Land and Sea Officers, We do
hereby strictly enjoin and require you, on your part, to maintain and
cultivate such a good Understanding and Agreement ... as the Com-
mander-in-chief of our Squadron is instructed, on his part, to entertain
and cultivate the same good Understanding and Agreement.
Royal Instruction to General Wolfe, 1759
The decision to open the Central Often the solutions represented compro-
Pacific offensive initiated in the Hawai- mises that no one thought entirely satis-
ian area, where the major theater Army factory; the Army had one way of doing
and Navy commands were located, a things, the Navy another. But at no
a burst of activity that had not been time did the commanders permit their
seen since before the Battle of Midway. differences to delay or hazard the suc-
Up to now, the mission of the Central cess of the offensive. On one thing all
Pacific Area had been largely defensive. were agreed. The main job was to meet
Operations in the southern Solomons the enemy and defeat him with the least
and in the Aleutians, it is true, were possible loss of life. Under the acid test
nominally under Admiral Nimitz' com- of combat, most differences could be
mand, but the staff officers of the Cen- quickly resolved.
tral Pacific had played little or no part
in the planning and conduct of these The Problem
operations. They had no sooner begun
to plan for active operations, therefore, Foremost among the problems facing
than they ran into the familiar organi- Admiral Nimitz in preparing for the
zational and logistical problems that had coming offensive was the organization
beset the South Pacific staff during the of his forces. Nimitz' role as commander
Guadalcanal Campaign. Some had been of the Pacific Ocean Areas was clear, but
anticipated and an effort made to solve his additional positions as Commander
them in advance. Others developed dur- in Chief, Pacific Fleet, and Commander
ing the planning period and had to be of the Central Pacific Area created some
resolved by the Army commander on confusion. Moreover, he used virtually
the spot as best he could, or referred the same staff while acting in all three
to higher headquarters for arbitration. capacities, and Army ground and air
officers justifiably felt that their point unity of command and responsibility
of view could not be adequately repre- had been established. . . ."1 Developed
sented on a staff consisting almost en- largely in response to conditions in the
tirely of naval officers and functioning South Pacific, the plan had as its objec-
largely as a fleet staff. tive the most effective and economic
The customary naval task force organ- utilization of trans-Pacific shipping and
ization created further difficulties, for by of the supply and service elements of
placing ground and air units under each of the services in the theater. The
task force or group commanders, usually joint commander, it stipulated, would
naval officers, it obfuscated the lines of determine the requirements of his thea-
authority in areas where the Army nor- ter for personnel and supplies and
mally retained control. These and other prepare a consolidated list, indicating
problems consumed much of Admiral shipping priorities. Presumably he
Nimitz' time, but their importance fully would take into account the wishes of
warranted the effort. On their successful the major service commanders in his
solution, he knew, depended the rela- area, but the final decision would be his.
tionship between Army and Navy com- The organization for supply in his thea-
manders in the area and the effective ter was clearly the responsibility of the
utilization of his forces in the operations joint commander also, but under the
to come. Basic Logistical Plan he was to establish
The problems that now faced Admiral a unified system either through a joint
Nimitz had long plagued his superiors in logistical staff or through joint planning
Washington. So long as the Central by separate staffs.
Pacific theater remained quiescent, dis- Though the plan was generally sound,
cussion of these problems could be its execution left much to be desired.
deferred. But by the summer of 1943, In both the South and Central Pacific
as plans for the offensive began to take Areas, where its provisions were most
shape, the Army planners in Washington directly applicable, few changes were
had apparently become convinced that made immediately. Neither Nimitz nor
the time had come to clarify Admiral Halsey established a unified logistical
Nimitz' status and to create a truly joint system, electing instead to set up joint
theater staff in which the Army would logistical boards. Because of the urgency
have representation commensurate with of operational requirements, consider-
its responsibilities and the size of its able progress was made toward co-ordi-
forces in the area. nation of supply activities in the South
Two efforts had been made earlier in Pacific. But in the Central Pacific, where
the year to meet some of the problems the services had long maintained separate
raised by joint operations of the Army supply systems, very little had been
and Navy in the Pacific. The first of accomplished in development of an effec-
these was the Basic Logistical Plan of
March 1943, designed "to insure co- 1
Basic Logistical Plan for Command Areas Involv-
ordinated logistical effort and procedure ing Joint Operations, 7 Mar 43, AG 381 (3-5-43).
For a full discussion of the background and devel-
in each command area . . . involving opment of the plan, see Leighton and Coakley,
joint Army-Navy operations in which Global Logistics and Strategy, p. 656-60.
ORGANIZING FOR THE OFFENSIVE 475
tive and unified logistical system by the arid embodied in a Joint Chiefs of Staff
summer of 1943. directive entitled Unified Command for
Even more important than the Basic U.S. Joint Operations.4 It was a brief
Logistical Plan was the effort in April document about a page in length, which,
1943 to define the principles of unified in clear concise language, defined unified
command in joint operations and to command, fixed the limits of the com-
lay down the rules under which such mander's authority and responsibility,
command would be exercised.2 The only told him what he could and could not do
existing guide was the Joint Action of in general terms, and specified how he
the Army and Navy, published in 1935, would organize his forces and exercise
supplemented by the separate directives his command.
issued to theater commanders on their As defined in the JCS directive, a uni-
appointment. This system had obvious fied command was one "in which a force
shortcomings and as early as the fall of composed of units of the Army and Navy
1942 the Army planners had begun to operates as a single command unit under
study the problem. By the beginning of an officer specifically assigned by higher
1943, after the experience of operations authority." In choosing the commander,
in the South and Southwest Pacific and the Joint Chiefs indicated they would be
the prospect of additional operations in guided by the nature of the projected
both areas and in the Central Pacific as operations—air, ground, or surface—and
well, it was apparent that unless some the objectives sought. Whatever his
guide rules were established the conduct service, the officer selected would be re-
of joint Army-Navy forces in future sponsible to the Joint Chiefs alone and
operations might be adversely affected. 3 would exercise his command of Army
Agreement on a set of rules for com- and Navy forces assigned to his area
mand of joint operations was not easily through the commanders of these forces.
obtained. There were fundamental dif- In operations, this authority would or-
ferences between the Army and Navy in dinarily be limited to the assignment of
doctrine and training. The nature of the missions to these forces, tactics and tech-
forces each utilized and the way in which niques being the province of the force
the Army and Navy organized and em- commanders. Administrative matters the
ployed these forces differed also. It was joint commander was to leave as far
natural, therefore, that each service as possible to others, keeping his own
should have its own concept of joint participation to a minimum and exer-
operations. Despite these differences, cising discipline through the commanders
agreement was reached on 20 April 1943 of the separate services.
Perhaps the most significant provisions
of the JCS directive on unified command
2
The principle of unified command in combined were those relating to organization. A
operations had been established earlier by agree-
ment with the British at Casablanca. System of joint commander, it specified, was not to
Command for Combined U.S. British Operations,11 assume command of any component of
Feb 43, JCS 215. his force "unless so directed by the Joint
3
For an account of early planning on this problem,
see Matloff, Strategic Planning for Coalition War-
4
fare, 1943-44, pp. 102-05. JCS 263/2/D, 20 Apr 43.
Chiefs." To this prohibition against felt, should be divorced and Nimitz, like
acting in a dual capacity was linked the MacArthur, should function only as com-
injunction to establish a joint staff con- mander of the theater.
sisting of representatives of the compo- General MacArthur, it will be re-
nent parts of his force "in such a man- called, had been specifically enjoined
ner as to insure an understanding of when he assumed command of the South-
their several capabilities, needs, and west Pacific Area from commanding
limitations, together with the knowledge directly any component of his force, but
essential to maximum efficiency in inte- Nimitz had not been so restricted. At
gration of their efforts." 5 that time — April 1942 — it had been
The directive for unified command assumed that operations in the Central
in joint operations met its first real test Pacific would be primarily naval. Com-
late in June 1943 when Admiral King bining of the area and the fleet, therefore,
proposed to General Marshall that Army had seemed both logical and natural.7 It
troops replace marines on garrison duty in was logical also that the staff serving
rear areas of the Pacific. Marshall refused. Nimitz while he was wearing his naval
The assignment of troops in the Pacific, cap should also serve him when he
he told King, was but one phase of the donned his other hat. Thus had devel-
broader problem of co-ordination within oped an organization which had served
the theater. The Joint Chiefs had given well for over a year but which the Army
Nimitz authority and the means to carry now thought inadequate for the opera-
out his mission; it should not, he de- tions ahead and inconsistent with the
clared, tell him where to assign his forces concept and practice of joint command.
as well. What Nimitz did need, Mar- Admiral King did not agree. He had
shall claimed, was "an adequate joint hoped, he said, that his proposal to re-
operational staff, as provided in the di- lease the marines could be considered
rective for unified command," to advise by itself "to help get on with the war in
him as to the most effective use of his the Pacific," and he regretted the neces-
forces. The existing staff he character- sity for a review of the command arrange-
ized as "an excrescency" superimposed ments in that area. But now that the
on the Pacific Fleet staff.6 problem had been raised he met it head
As General Marshall saw it, the crea- on. He acknowledged readily that the
tion of a truly joint staff with adequate projected offensive would impose greater
Army representation was only a partial demands on Nimitz' headquarters but
remedy for the "lack of coordination and stoutly denied any lack of co-ordination
consequent inefficient use of all available or inefficiency in the theater. "Without
means in the Pacific Area." The basic doubt," he told the Army Chief of Staff,
difficulty, he thought, stemmed from "we are in accord as to the objectives to
Nimitz' position as theater, area, and be attained and as to the general prin-
fleet commander. These jobs, Marshall ciples of command." 8 He was glad, he
said, to have Marshall's views, but
5
Ibid.
6 7
Memos, Marshall for King, 13 Jul 43, sub: Relief See above, ch. XI.
8
by Army Troops . . . ; King for Marshall, 24 Jun 43, Memo, King for Marshall, 19 Jul 43, sub: Relief
same sub, both in OPD 370.5, case 240. by Army Troops . . . , OPD 370.5, case 240.
pointed out that he himself had only under a Theater Commander" for this
recently taken steps to increase both the would in effect remove it from the
Army and Navy membership on Nimitz' direct control of Admiral King in his
joint staff. 9 And at present, he added, capacity as Commander in Chief, U.S.
he was "exploring the practical aspects Fleet. Rather than limit Nimitz' opera-
of making changes in the Pacific that will tional control as fleet commander, the
produce the best results, not only in the Navy Department, the Army planners
immediate but in the more distant fu- believed, would seek to extend his—and
ture. . . ." Marshall, he promised, would thereby King's—authority to include the
be kept informed "of these explorations" surface elements in MacArthur's area,
as they progressed. on the ground that it was essential for
On the matter of Nimitz' multiple the "maximum mobility" of the fleet.11
command, King made no concessions It did not seem to Admiral King,
whatever. Though he admitted that it either, that Nimitz' multiple command
might become necessary at a later date violated the current doctrines on joint
to relieve Admiral Nimitz from his command, as Marshall had charged. Un-
duties as Pacific Fleet commander, he derlining the final clauses of the passage
asserted that the present arrangement cited by Marshall—"unless so directed
had worked well for the past 18 months by the Joint Chiefs of Staff"—he argued
and had "utilized our talents to the best that since the Joint Chiefs had estab-
advantage." But the possibility that lished the Pacific Ocean Areas "with full
King would turn over fleet command to cognizance" that Admiral Nimitz was
one of Nimitz' subordinates was most already the Commander in Chief, Pa-
unlikely in view of his statement that in cific Fleet, it followed that the Chiefs had
the future "more or less the entire Navy in effect given their consent to this ar-
will become incorporated in the Pacific rangement.12
Fleet." 10 Whatever the merits of King's argu-
That the Navy would enter into dis- ment, it was evident to the Army plan-
cussions with the Army on so important ners that if Admiral Nimitz was divested
a post in the naval hierarchy as the Pa- of his fleet command his relationship to
cific Fleet command, or assign to that Admiral King would be significantly
command any but its senior representa- altered. Functioning solely as the com-
tive in the theater, seemed most doubt- mander of an active theater of operations
ful. As Army planners noted at the under the Joint Chiefs of Staff, he would
time, after discussion with their naval no longer be responsible directly to
colleagues, the Navy would be most re- King through naval channels for the
luctant to make the Pacific Fleet "a unit operations and administration of the Pa-
cific Fleet. In these circumstances, King's
9
King was referring here to his request of 25 June relationship to Nimitz would be limited
for the assignment of two Army officers to the staff
of the Pacific Fleet and two more to the staff of the
to King's position as a member of the
projected Central Pacific Force. No mention was
11
made of a joint staff. Memo, King for Marshall, 25 OPD Memo For Record, 19 Jul 43, no sub, OPD
Jun 43, sub: Assignment of Army Officers, OPD 370.5, case 240.
12
210.31, case 50. Memo, King for Marshall, 19 Jul 43, sub: Relief
10
Ibid. by Army Troops . . . , OPD 370.5, case 240.
Joint Chiefs of Staff. And as executive replacement of Marine garrisons by

agent for that body, King would have no Army units in the first place.
authority other than that granted by it Admiral Nimitz' authority as theater
to direct Nimitz on the employment of commander was limited in other ways.
the fleet, which would become a sub- Under the original directive establish-
ordinate force under the control of the ing the Pacific Ocean Areas, Nimitz was
theater commander. Thus, the authority required to exercise command of the
King exercised over the Pacific Fleet and South Pacific Area through a designated
over Admiral Nimitz as its commander representative—first Admiral Ghormley
by virtue of his position as Commander and then Admiral Halsey—who func-
in Chief of the U.S. Fleet would in large tioned virtually as a theater commander.
measure be lost if the Army's proposal to Thus, in the South Pacific, Nimitz did
separate the theater and fleet commands not have full command responsibility,
was adopted.13 and, as a matter of fact, did not wish to
In one respect, General Marshall's exercise such responsibility.15
criticism of Nimitz had been unjustified. The situation in the North Pacific
Marshall had declared that the matter Area was different. There, no real uni-
of shifting troops from one base to an- fied command had been established. The
other should be left to Admiral Nimitz commander of the area, a naval officer,
as theater commander exercising unity acted under directives from both Ad-
of command. His failure to do so had miral Nimitz and the Commanding Gen-
seemed to Marshall to indicate a lack eral, Western Defense Command, and
of co-ordination in the theater stemming his relations with the air and ground
from the absence of an adequate joint commanders were governed by the prin-
staff. What Marshall and his advisors ciple of mutual co-operation. This ar-
seem to have overlooked was that in May rangement had worked so well that King
1942 the Joint Chiefs of Staff had pro- believed "a change would be a mistake."16
hibited commanders vested with unity Command arrangements in the Cen-
of command from permanently transfer- tral Pacific were unlike those established
ring units of a service to which they did for the other two areas of Nimitz' Pacific
not belong from one station to another Ocean Areas. There was in the Central
without approval from the appropriate Pacific no designated commander and no
department in Washington.14 Admiral separate area headquarters. Nimitz him-
Nimitz, therefore, did not have the self acted as Central Pacific commander
authority to transfer Army units in his when necessary, using the same staff that
area, and it was for this reason, King served him in his other capacities. Army
pointed out to Marshall, that he, King, forces in the area were under the old
had requested Marshall's consent to the prewar Hawaiian Department whose
13
commander served also as Military Gov-
Memo for Record, 9 Nov 43, sub: Designation of
CPA as a Theater of Opns, OPD 384 (PTO) sec. 2,
15
case 54. OPD, Memo for Record, 19 Jul 43, no sub, OPD
14
Rad, JCS to CINCPAC et al., 041819, 4 May 42, 370.5, case 240.
16
copy in OPD 370.5, case 240. This directive was modi- Memo, King for Marshall, 19 Jul 43, sub: Relief
fied so far as AAF units were concerned on 30 October by Army Troops . . . , OPD 370.5, case 240. See
1942. above, ch. XXI.
ernor of Hawaii. Though under Nimitz tral Pacific, but only "coincident with
in most matters, this officer functioned assumption by CINCPAC of the role of
also as independent commander in cer- Theater Commander" with full responsi-
tain specific fields, including military bility for the two areas. The larger ques-
government, a situation that did nothing tions, he thought, should await the out-
to ease the difficulties of unified com- come of King's own investigations and
mand.17 Even in operational matters, of a joint study then in progress on the
Nimitz did not exercise full control over roles of the Army and Navy.19
Army forces. Under a Joint Chiefs di- Curiously enough, the question of a
rective of April 1942, when a situation supreme commander for the entire Pa-
calling for a "fleet-opposed invasion" cific was not raised at this time by either
arose, the Navy would exercise unity of the Army or Navy. Heretofore in al-
command. But when a state of "Army- most every debate over command, one
opposed invasion" was declared, unity of side or the other had proposed this
command was to be exercised by the solution to the problem at hand. The
Army commander. As interpreted by the advantages of a single command were
Army planners, this meant that in an conceded by both sides, but it was impos-
"Army-opposed invasion" of Hawaii, sible to reach agreement on a commander.
responsibility for the defense of the is- Clearly, the Navy would not agree to a
lands would rest with the commander of solution that placed Nimitz under Gen-
the Hawaiian Department, regardless of eral MacArthur. And just as clearly, the
the disposition or movement of the Pa- Army would not accept a solution which
cific Fleet.18 made MacArthur subordinate to the
These restrictions on Nimitz' author- Pacific Fleet commander. Various com-
ity greatly complicated the problem of promise candidates had been proposed—
command in the Pacific Ocean Areas. Arnold, McNair, McNarney—but none
Clearly, it would be no simple matter to of these apparently had sufficient stature
relieve him of his command of the Pa- to overcome the Navy's claim to supreme
cific Fleet, as Marshall had suggested, command.20
and make him a theater commander with In none of the discussions over com-
full responsibility for all three areas of mand had the Army put forward the one
his jurisdiction. General Marshall quick- candidate who might conceivably have
ly realized this and did not press the been acceptable to the Navy as supreme
matter further. He was willing, he told commander in the Pacific. That man
King, to send Army troops to relieve the was George C. Marshall, the Army Chief
marines on garrison duty. He was also of Staff, and in the fall of 1943 the pos-
willing to revoke the May 1942 directive sibility of his assignment to the Pacific
so far as it applied to the South and Cen- was considered for the first time. The
17
occasion was provided by a study of the
For an account of these difficulties, see History
of United States Army Forces, Middle Pacific and
more important problem of command
Predecessor Commands During World War II, pt. IV,
19
Army-Navy Joint Action, OCMH. Memo, Marshall for King, 12 Aug 43, sub: Relief
18
Rad, JCS to Comdrs Coastal and Sea Frontiers, of Army Troops . . . , OPD 370.5, case 240.
20
191630, 19 Apr 42; OPD Memo for Record, 19 Jul 43, For an earlier discussion of this problem, see
no sub, both in OPD 370.5, case 240. above, Chapter XVI.
in Europe for the projected invasion of might well affect the situation in the
the Continent. General Marshall was other. And so long as General Marshall
the obvious choice for this assignment, was the most likely candidate for the
and the task before the planners was to European command, his staff wished to
present an organization that would meet defer decision in the Pacific until the
the political and military requirements shape of the war against Germany be-
of the situation and at the same time came clear. What would be Marshall's
ensure the fullest utilization of General position, for example, if Germany sur-
Marshall's services in the Allied war rendered shortly after the Chief of Staff's
effort.21 relief and reassignment, leaving him
This problem was studied with the "with the form and not the substance of
greatest care in the War Department command?" Would the President call
during September 1943, and on 5 Octo- him back to Washington to replace a
ber General Handy submitted to Mar- newly appointed Chief of Staff? Would
shall the views of the Army planners on he be available for duty in the Pacific?
command in Europe. On the assumption These and other questions lay behind
that Marshall would exercise this com- the staff's desire to move slowly in the
mand—he had already been tentatively matter of Pacific command while keep-
selected—Handy argued that the ar- ing the arrangements for command in
rangements made at the forthcoming Europe as flexible as possible.
Cairo Conference should provide for Further discussion threw no addi-
Marshall's continued membership on the tional light on this subject. Thus, as the
Combined Chiefs of Staff, at least in re- Cairo Conference drew near, the Army
gard to matters relating to Europe. It recommended that the question of a
was also desirable, Handy pointed out, supreme commander for the Pacific not
to leave in abeyance the problem of a be raised at the conference lest it compli-
supreme commander in the Pacific. His cate the problem of selecting the com-
reason, he stated frankly, was that "at mander for Europe. In support of this
some time in the future, when the Euro- position, Handy pointed out that to do
pean war is rapidly drawing to a success- so would give the British a vote in the
ful conclusion, the availability of Gen- choice of commander in an area that was
eral Marshall might offer a solution, "almost 100 percent American."23 Fur-
which would not be highly controversial, thermore, there was no necessity for a
for an over-all Pacific commander."22 decision in the Pacific, Handy said, until
What Handy was saying, of course, a plan for the defeat of Japan had been
was that command in Europe and com- developed. In the meantime, operations
mand in the Pacific were intimately in the area were going well and co-
related and that a solution in one area ordination between the two commanders
21
appeared to be satisfactory. In any case,
For an exposition of the political and military
considerations involved, see Forrest C. Pogue, The
the selection of a supreme commander
Supreme Command, UNITED STATES ARMY IN at this time, observed Handy, would
WORLD WAR II (Washington, 1954), pp. 23-28.
22 23
Memo, Handy for Marshall, 5 Oct 43, sub: Comdr Memo, Handy for Marshall, 10 Nov 43, sub:
and System of Comd for War in Germany, tab A, Problem of Over-all Comd, OPD Exec 5, item 15,
OPD 384, case 15. folder 3.
force a choice between MacArthur and and the command of the three areas that
Nimitz, a choice, Handy observed, that comprised it.25
would be both unpalatable and "politi- Admiral Nimitz could see little advan-
cally impracticable." This was the view tage in a separation of his functions or
ultimately accepted by the Joint Chiefs the division of his staff. As a matter of
of Staff, and on 19 November, aboard fact, he thought that for the forthcoming
the Iowa, the President agreed not to offensive his control of the fleet should
bring up the matter of a supreme com- be tightened rather than weakened. This
mander for the Pacific at the forthcoming he hoped to achieve, he told King, by
meeting with the British at Cairo.24 consolidating elements of the fleet into
task forces under separate commanders,
Theater Organization thus decreasing the number of coequal
subordinates reporting directly to him.
Admiral Nimitz' views on the subject Specifically, he had in mind a Central
of command were, of course, of primary Pacific Force for use in the Gilberts
importance in any decision relating to campaign and so recommended to Ad-
the organization of his theater. On him miral King.26 He wanted also to expand
rested the responsibility for operations his planning staff, but opposed the crea-
in the Pacific Ocean Areas. He, there- tion of two separate staffs. The net effect
fore, had the greatest stake in perfecting of such a move, he thought, would be to
an organization for the most effective slow down business and create a demand
employment of his forces. Thus, Ad- for more and more staff officers, files, and
miral King had requested Nimitz' ideas space. Inevitably, each of the headquar-
on command even before the Army had ters would grow in size and ultimately
raised the question. On 2 July he had become an organization less manageable
suggested to Nimitz that perhaps the and efficient than the small headquarters
time had come to take a close look at his he now maintained.
own position and the organization of his Though Nimitz' response temporarily
theater. In view of the projected offen- discouraged further efforts to create a
sives in the Central Pacific, did Nimitz joint staff, it held out the promise of a
think, King asked, that a change would reorganization of the forces in the Cen-
be desirable? Specifically, he wanted to tral Pacific to meet the demands of the
know what Nimitz thought about the projected offensive. This reorganization
idea of distinguishing between his func- was not long in coming. On 20 July
tions as area commander and as naval Admiral Nimitz received the directive
commander, and whether such a distinc- from the Joint Chiefs to seize the Gilberts
tion ought to be extended to the staff and to plan for the Marshalls invasion.
that served him in both capacities. And About two weeks later, on 5 August, he
he was interested further in Nimitz' established a Central Pacific Force to
recommendations on the relationship be-
tween the Pacific Ocean Areas command 25
Rad, King to Nimitz, 021437, 2 Jul 43, cited in
Hayes, The War Against Japan, ch. XIX, p. 16.
26
Ltr, Nimitz to King, 12 Jul 43, sub: CINCPAC
24
Mins, JCS Informal Mtg, 19 Nov 43, 1500, OPD Comd and Staff Organization for POA, in Hayes, The
Exec 2, item 11. War Against Japan, ch. XIX.
plan and conduct these operations, and Army, Marine, and Navy—assigned to
appointed as its commander Admiral the operation. Consisting of more than
Spruance, his chief of staff.27 300 planes and organized into four
The Central Pacific Force was an oper- groups, Hoover's force was to conduct
ational headquarters. Its job was to plan search and photo reconnaissance mis-
for the operations ahead, supervise and sions, develop and defend U.S. air bases
coordinate the plans and preparations in the forward area, and attack enemy
of the forces assigned, and carry out the bases and shipping before, during, and
operation at the appointed time. Nimitz after the landings.
himself retained control over the admin- The third and last major component
istration and supply of the naval and of the Central Pacific Force was the Fast
Marine units of the Central Pacific Carrier Force led by Rear Adm. Charles
Force; the commander of the Hawaiian A. Pownall. Consisting of six large and
Department, of the Army ground and five small carriers with supporting battle-
air elements. ships, cruisers, and destroyers, this force
Within the Central Pacific Force had the twofold mission of providing
were three major commands, the Fifth long-range protection for the invasion
Amphibious Force, the Carrier Force, force and direct support during the
and the Defense and Shore-Based Air operation itself.
Force. The first was established on 24 At the same time that Nimitz was
August with Rear Adm. Richmond organizing his forces for the offensive
Kelly Turner, who had led the inva- ahead, the Army commander in the area
sion of Guadalcanal, in command. His —Lt. Gen. Robert C. Richardson, Jr.—
job was to conduct the landing opera- was also reorganizing his forces. General
tions, and for this purpose he was given Richardson had arrived in Hawaii to
ultimately all the assault forces as well relieve General Emmons on 26 May
as the transports, cargo vessels, landing 1943, but he was even then no stranger
craft, and supporting warships. These to the problems of the Pacific. A year
Turner organized into two attack forces. earlier he had made an extended tour
A separate ground headquarters, V Am- of inspection of the theater as the per-
phibious Corps, was created on 4 Sep- sonal representative of the Chief of Staff
tember. Commanded by Maj. Gen. and talked at length with all the major
Holland M. Smith, USMC, this head- commanders in the area.28 Though the
quarters was to direct the training and situation had changed greatly since that
control the operations not only of the time, the familiarity with Pacific prob-
troops assigned for the Gilberts inva- lems he had acquired then stood Rich-
sion, but also for those that followed. ardson in good stead now. On 1 June
(Chart 13) he formally assumed command of the
The Defense and Shore-Based Air Hawaiian Department, becoming simul-
Force under Rear Adm. John H. Hoover taneously the Military Governor of Ha-
included all the shore-based aircraft— waii. Almost immediately, he appointed
27
a board of officers to make a study of
Morison, Aleutians, Gilberts and Marshalls, p. 86;
Crowl and Love, Seizure of the Gilberts and Marshalls,
28
p. 25. General Richardson's Trip, OPD 333, case 15.
CHART 13—COMMAND ORGANIZATION, PACIFIC OCEAN AREAS, OCTOBER 1943
Source: Derived from Chart prepared by Navy and filed in 323.3 POA (1-29-42).
ADMIRAL SPRUANCE GENERAL RICHARDSON
the existing organization of the Depart- organization of his command, placing the
ment. "It can be foreseen . . . ," he told major air and ground forces in the area
the senior officer of the board, "that under seven major commands, all under
as the war against the Japanese develops his direct control. In recognition of the
the Hawaiian Islands and particularly importance of shipping in an oceanic
the Island of Oahu will assume greater theater, he abolished the old Service
and greater importance. It is essential Forces and created instead an Army
that this command be prepared and have Port and Service Command. A Hawaiian
foreseen the facilities which will be Artillery Command was also established,
required in the operation of a large and a Department Reserve designated.
advance base." 29 All the combat divisions in the area, as
On the basis of the report and recom- well as those expected, were placed under
mendations of this board, General Rich- separate command and a task force head-
ardson on 29 July modified radically the quarters was formed in anticipation of
future needs. Finally Richardson ap-
29
pointed a deputy chief of staff for oper-
Ltr, Richardson to Col. Ray E. Blount, 2 Jun 43,
sub: Ltr of Instrs, copy in USAFMIDPAC Hist, pt.
ations, who became in effect a War Plans
III, app. I to ch. II. officer since the Hawaiian Department
GENERAL SMITH ADMIRAL HOOVER
did not have then or later acquire an need for a comparable Army organiza-
operational mission.30 tion encompassing all troops within the
Though this reorganization increased geographical limits of the Central Pacific
the efficiency and flexibility of the Army Area. At Admiral Nimitz' suggestion,
organization in the Central Pacific and therefore, Richardson recommended to
went far toward meeting the require- General Marshall that he be designated
ments for the expanding role of Army commander of all Army ground and air
forces in the area, it did not take into elements in the area "so that Army troops
account the fact that Richardson's respon- used in the forthcoming operations will
sibilities would soon extend far beyond have a commander toward whom they
the territorial limits of the prewar can look for supply, administration, and
Hawaiian Department. The establish- assistance."31 At the same time, in re-
ment of the Central Pacific Force on 5 sponse to Nimitz' request that the Army
August, by bringing all troops involved construct and defend a bomber base on
in the Gilberts operation under one Baker Island, he asked for authority to
headquarters, further emphasized the shift his forces within the theater with-
31
Rad, Richardson to Marshall, No. 4907, 6 Aug 43,
30
USAFMIDPAC Hist, pt. III, pp. 296-301, 362. CM-IN 3916.
out first requesting permission from the cial notification of this decision and on
War Department. This authority, he that day assumed the title Command-
explained, was necessary to meet Admi- ing General, U.S. Army Forces, Cen-
ral Nimitz' operational requirements. tral Pacific Area "by direction of the
In Washington, Admiral King, no President."33
doubt prompted by Nimitz, supported The geographical extent of General
Richardson's request on the ground that Richardson's authority under this direc-
his appointment as commander of Army tive, as distinguished from his Hawaiian
forces in the Central Pacific Area would Department command, corresponded to
create an organization similar to that the area delineated as the Central Pacific
in the South Pacific. Under such an in Nimitz' original directive. It encom-
arrangement, he pointed out, General passed therefore all the land and sea
Richardson's position vis-a-vis Nimitz areas of the Pacific between the equator
would parallel the relationship between (but including Canton Island) and the
Harmon and Halsey. Richardson's ap- 42d parallel to the north, except for that
pointment was desirable also, King told portion of MacArthur's Southwest Pacific
Marshal], "to insure co-ordination and Area that lay north of the equator and
effectiveness in the area for the forth- a small strip off the coast of South Amer-
coming offensive," and he asked there- ica. Within this vast region, only a small
fore that the change be made as soon portion of which was as yet in American
as possible.32 hands, Richardson was responsible for
Actually the War Department plan- the administration and training of all
ners were already studying the problems U.S. Army troops, whether ground or
of General Richardson's status and au- air. This responsibility included also
thority. With the exception of certain supply, but the precise nature of these
War Department restrictions relating to duties was left undefined pending his
island garrisons (which the planners now recommendations. And like Harmon,
recommended be removed) and an addi- General Richardson had no responsibil-
tional restriction on the use of aircraft ity for operations other than to assist
imposed by Admiral Nimitz, they found "in the preparation and execution of
that Richardson had full authority to plans" involving Army forces in the
employ the forces under his command, area, "subject to the direction of the
subject to agreement with Nimitz, as Commander-in-chief, Pacific Ocean
he wished. They saw no difficulty either Area." 34
in designating the Hawaiian Department In designating Richardson Command-
commander as Army commander in the ing General, U.S. Army Forces, Central
Central Pacific and recommended that Pacific Area, the War Department had
this be done. Marshall quickly approved said nothing about his duties as Hawai-
these recommendations, at the same time 33
OPD Memo For Record, 12 Aug 43, sub: Desig-
informing Admiral King that action was nation of CG Hawaiian Department as CG U.S. Army
being taken to meet his request. Finally, Forces in Central Pacific; Memo, Marshall for King,
on 14 August, Richardson received offi- same date and sub, OPD 384 (PTO) case 54; Rad,
Marshall to Richardson, 14 Aug 43, CM-OUT 5372.
32 34
Memo, King for Marshall, ser. 001594, 9 Aug 43, Rad, Marshall to Richardson, 14 Aug 43,
no sub, OPD 384 (PTO) case 54. CM-OUT 5372.
ian Department commander. Actually in the theater were beginning to affect

his responsibilities for both were about planning for the forthcoming operations.
the same, but the older command, which In the task force organization established
carried certain additional legal responsi- by Nimitz in August all land-based air-
bilities, had been established by Congress craft, whether Army, Navy, or Marine,
and could be altered only by that body. had been placed under Admiral Hoover,
Did Richardson still retain those func- a naval air officer. Since this arrange-
tions unique to the Hawaiian Depart- ment placed virtually all the Army's
ment or had the new directive superseded combat air units in the Central Pacific
the old? This confusion was settled under naval command, General Rich-
quickly when the War Department on ardson proposed that the senior Army
18 September affirmed the continued air officer in the area, Maj. Gen. Willis
existence of the Hawaiian Department H. Hale, be given this command, subject
under Richardson and stated explicitly to Hoover's control. Nimitz opposed
what had been left implicit before— this suggestion and insisted that, "in view
that its instructions to Richardson were of the over-all naval aspect of the
not intended to affect the status of the operation," Admiral Hoover continue to
Hawaiian Department or to impair his exercise direct command over such shore-
authority as commander of a territorial based aviation as was assigned to the
division as defined in regulations and Central Pacific Force. But if Richardson
in the Articles of War.35 desired, Nimitz was willing to assign
With regard to supply, General Rich- General Hale to Hoover's staff.37
ardson recommended that his authority This proposal hardly met Richardson's
should be the same as that normally objections. What he wanted was an Army
exercised by any overseas commander headquarters in close juxtaposition to
and should extend to all Army forces Hoover's, not representation on the staff.
in the Central Pacific Area as well as General Hale, he insisted, should com-
Navy and Marine forces for certain mand directly the Army air units in the
classes of supply. (Chart 14) This author- invasion of the Gilberts as a subordinate
ity, granted him on 25 October, con- to Hoover. In this way Hoover would
firmed an arrangement already in exercise control through Hale, who
existence in the theater, for, under would be in a position to ensure the
directives issued by Nimitz, Richardson's proper and effective employment of
headquarters had become virtually the Army aircraft in accordance with Army
logistical agency for the support of the Air Forces doctrines. This argument,
projected offensive.36 which was similar to the one General
By this time, differences of opinion Harmon had successfully impressed on
over the division of responsibility be- Halsey during the Guadalcanal Cam-
tween the Army and Navy commands paign, apparently convinced Admiral
35
USAFMIDPAC Hist, pt. II, Structural and Nimitz and on 25 October he agreed
Functional Development of the Army Command, to appoint Hale commander, under
p. 363.
37
36
Ibid., pp. 366-67; Rads, Ft. Shafter to WAR, No. CINCPOA ser. 001299, 13 Oct 43, sub: Organi-
W-6410, 17 Oct 43, CM-IN 10104; WAR to CG zation of Comd for GALVANIC, cited in USAFMIDPAC
USAFCPA, 25 Oct 43, CM-OUT 12232. Hist, pt. IV, p. 844.
CHART 14—ORGANIZATION FOR ADMINISTRATION AND SUPPLY, U.S. ARMY FORCES, CENTRAL PACIFIC AREA, DECEMBER 1943
Co-ordination
Hoover, of a task group composed of

Army air units.38
Control of the 27th Division, sched-
uled to make the assault on Makin,
and of other Army troops assigned to
the Gilberts operation also created a
problem during the period of planning
and preparation. The V Amphibious
Corps, established on 4 September as a
permanent theater organization headed
by a Marine officer, General Holland
Smith, had responsibility for the amphib-
ious training of all troops in the theater.
But in addition, General Smith com-
manded the expeditionary forces for the
Gilberts operation. In this latter capac-
ity, Smith's responsibility for training
Army troops was not clearly defined and
his relationship to Admiral Turner, the
assault force commander, was somewhat
confusing. His control also over Army
combat troops, who were attached to his
corps in October while it was still in
process of organization, raised some
questions. GENERAL HALE
The 27th Division, under Maj. Gen.
Ralph Smith, had been assigned to the for the administration and training of
Central Pacific Force for the Gilberts all U.S. Army ground and air forces in
invasion early in September. Since that the Central Pacific. He was aware also
time it had remained under Richardson's of the confusion over command between
headquarters for planning and training Turner and Holland Smith, and sought
while co-ordinating these activities with enlightenment from Admiral Nimitz.
Spruance's headquarters. The interpo- Who, he asked, would control Army
sition of V Amphibious Corps headquar- ground troops during the invasion?
ters in the chain of command in the Nimitz' reply did not clarify the situ-
midst of preparations for the coming ation. The 27th Division, the admiral
invasion seemed to General Richardson explained, was a part of the V Amphib-
a cumbersome and unnecessary arrange- ious Corps, the theater organization
ment, especially since he had responsi- formed to train troops for amphibious
bility, under the directive of 14 August, operations. But it was also a part of
the Gilberts expeditionary force, and
38
Ltr, Richardson to Nimitz, 20 Oct 43, sub: Organ- thus under Holland Smith in both his
ization of Comd for GALVANIC; CINCPOA ser. 00207,
25 Oct 43, same sub, both cited in USAFMIDPAC
capacities. This explanation left Rich-
Hist, pt. IV, pp. 844-45. ardson with no recourse but to seek
from his superiors in Washington a clar- tion of Army troops in forthcoming

ification of his earlier instructions with operations." 40
regard to his responsibility for admin- Though he gave these assurances,
istration and training. The reply, re- Richardson was not convinced of the
ceived on 3 November, outlined the War need for a corps headquarters in the
Department's conception of his authority type of operations envisaged in the Cen-
as follows: tral Pacific. To him it was just another
echelon to deal with, for amphibious
In the fullest coordination with
CINCPAC, you will continue the training training, as he pointed out to General
of forces to the extent that time and facil- Handy, was conducted by Admiral
ities are available or are made available to Turner's amphibious force. The elimi-
you. Troops earmarked for specific opera- nation of the V Amphibious Corps, in
tions s h o u l d pass to the c o m m a n d of Richardson's opinion, would not affect
CINCPAC, Central Pacific Force, Fifth Am-
phibious Force, V Amphibious Corps, . . . the situation in any way. As a matter
at the t i m e w h e n , at the d i s c r e t i o n of of fact, he remarked, "this Marine Corps
CINCPAC, they are required for specific headquarters gives me the impression of
operational training or rehearsal under the wanting to justify itself by extending
Force, Corps, Task Force commander in its control to the maximum." 41 But this
preparation for eventual utilization. The
exact determination as to when such train- matter was Nimitz' responsibility, not
ing responsibilities will pass from you to the War Department's, and Brig. Gen.
CINCPAC or his appropriate subordinate John E. Hull, acting for Handy, sug-
commander must, in all cases, be decided gested to Richardson that he take it up
by CINCPAC after consultation with you with the admiral "in the interest of con-
as his Army adviser.39
servation of manpower, a problem most
General Richardson could find little vital at this stage of our war effort." 42
solace in this fresh statement of his By this time the problem had become
responsibility. It gave him no authority academic so far as immediate operations
he did not already have and confirmed were concerned, for already Army and
the action taken by Nimitz. But he ac- Marine forces had invaded the Gilberts.
cepted the decision gracefully and assured At a later stage in the war, during the
the Chief of Staff that "your conception Saipan campaign, this problem of com-
of my responsibility for administration mand and interservice relations would
and training has been in effect continu- arise again, in a more acute form.
ously." His relations with Admiral Nim-
itz were excellent and there was, he The Joint Staff
further assured General Marshall, the
"closest cooperation" between his office The proposal to establish a theater
and that of CINCPAC, "with whom," joint staff for the Pacific Ocean Areas,
he said, "I discuss daily the participa- a proposal the Army had temporarily
39 40
Rad, Marshall to Richardson, 2 Nov 43, CM- USAFMIDPAC Hist, pt. II, p. 364.
41
OUT 480. See also Ltr, USAFICPA, 17 Oct 43, sub: Ltr, Richardson to Handy, 5 Nov 43, OPD 384
Clarification of Comd of 27th Division, CINCPOA (PTO) sec. 2, case 54.
42
ser. 00249, 25 Oct 43, same sub, both cited in Ltr, Hull to Richardson, 17 Nov 43, OPD 384
USAFMIDPAC Hist, pt. IV, pp. 842-43. (PTO) sec. 2, case 54.
dropped in mid-July, had meanwhile logistic picture," he told General Somer-

been revived by General Marshall. The vell, "if I were directly on Admiral Nim-
spark that kindled anew the interest in itz' staff, and expect to so report to
this project was a letter written by Brig. Admiral Calhoun and Admiral Nimitz
Gen. Edmond H. Leavey, one of Somer- on my return to Pearl Harbor."
vell's ablest assistants and recently as- "Complete and coordinated" opera-
signed to the staff of Vice Adm. William tions in the Pacific could be achieved,
L. Calhoun, Commander, Service Force, General Leavey believed, only by estab-
Pacific Fleet. In it, General Leavey lishing what he called a GHQ type of
recorded for his former chief, General theater headquarters. The staff of such
Somervell, his impressions of the Navy's a headquarters should consist of naval,
organization in the Pacific. His purpose, air, and ground officers with adequate
he declared, was to inform Somervell, representation of the essential supply
in advance, of "the general nature of services. Thus, the staff would be quali-
the situation" in case the official report fied to co-ordinate tactical and logistical
he submitted later to Admiral Calhoun planning while exercising the necessary
"causes any particular reaction in Naval supervision over day-to-day operations in
circles." 43 both fields. Leavey also believed that
The picture Leavey painted of naval the area commanders under Nimitz
organization constituted a strong indict- should have similar joint staffs, and he
ment and justified fully the general's recommended that separate commanders
concern about the reaction in "naval be appointed for the Central and North
circles." So far as he could discern there Pacific, as had been done for the South
was not even any theater staff in the area. Pacific.
Admiral Nimitz' headquarters, Leavey General Leavey's views surprised no
charged, was not a theater staff at all one in Somervell's headquarters. They
but merely a fleet staff for operations in were much the same as those expressed
the Central Pacific. Moreover, there was about eight months earlier by General
no section or officer in Nimitz' head- Lutes after a trip to the Pacific. As
quarters or elsewhere, "either designed Somervell's operations officer, Lutes now
for, or capable of, co-ordinating and gave strong support to Leavey's report,
controlling the Service of Supply activi- noting that he had himself recommended
ties in the theater." Admiral Calhoun's virtually the same reforms proposed by
responsibility as Service Force com- Leavey. Moreover, Lutes told his chief,
mander, declared Leavey, was for fleet Admiral Nimitz had agreed "to initiate
supply only, and even in this field did a modified organization to provide for
not include Halsey's fleet in the South theater staff supervision of logistic sup-
Pacific. For this reason Leavey believed ply matters in the entire Pacific area." 44
his own assignment to Calhoun's staff It was to assist in putting this plan into
was a mistake. "I would be in a much effect and to "sell" it to the Navy that
better position to help clear up the Leavey had been sent to the Pacific in
44
Memo, Lutes for Somervell, 11 Aug 43, sub:
43
Ltr, Leavey to Somervell, 29 Jul 43, OPD 384 Attached Ltr from Brig Gen Leavey, OPD 384 (PTO)
(PTO) sec. 2, case 55. sec. 2, case 55. (Underlining is by Lutes.)
the first place, Lutes reminded Somer- an even better illustration, General Lutes
vell. But in view of Leavey's report thought, of the defects of the organiza-
Lutes had his doubts that the Navy tion of the Central Pacific. The Navy
would proceed as planned. staff, he found, had only a "very limited
A week after writing this letter, Gen- knowledge" of the Army's logistical re-
eral Lutes himself was in Hawaii. If sources in the area and of the number
anything, his own report of conditions of service units that could be made avail-
there was even more critical than Lea- able for future operations. This last was
vey's. He found no arrangements for a particularly sore point with the War
logistical control in the theater head- Department's supply experts, for they
quarters, as provided in the Basic had continually to fight for a larger share
Logistical Plan of March 1943, and no of the Army's manpower. "If we could
machinery for resolving differences get the backing of Admiral Nimitz on
within the Army-Navy Logistical Board, such matters as Army Service Units,"
which correlated supply matters common Lutes told General Somervell, with ref-
to both services. More serious was his erence to the South Pacific, "we might
contention that there was little exchange have more luck with our own General
of information between the Army and Staff in obtaining such units. . . ."47
Navy staffs. Richardson's staff, he noted, Both Leavey's and Lutes's reports ulti-
had to "solicit" from the Navy the infor- mately reached General Marshall, who
mation it needed, and even then did not had a deep and abiding conviction in
learn enough "to plan supply and other the necessity for a representative joint
logistical requirements" for future staff. Leavey's report, which he described
operations.45 as "a rather intimate picture of the logis-
As evidence of the need for a joint tical side of the Pacific theater as viewed
staff to control and co-ordinate planning from Army eyes," he passed on to Admi-
and operations on the theater level, Gen- ral King on 10 August in the hope that
eral Lutes pointed to the dual standard the Navy chief would give the matter
of living of the Army and Navy. In some his "personal consideration."48 More
instances soldiers and sailors stationed than two weeks went by without reply
almost within a few yards of each other and on the 26th Marshall forwarded
lived entirely differently. Where the Lutes's report to King. This time he
Army had built temporary shelters for wrote a much stronger endorsement.
reasons of economy, the Navy had Both reports, he declared, pointed clearly
constructed much better facilities to "the urgent necessity of establishing
for its men. This difference, declared a joint staff for the theater and he could
Lutes, had created "a serious morale see no reason why this matter "should
situation." 46 not be an immediate proposition." Cer-
Planning for the projected offensive tainly "in view of the coming events" in
in the Gilberts and Marshalls provided the Central Pacific, the creation of such
45
Memo, Marshall for King, 26 Aug 43, no sub,
47
OPD 384 (PTO) sec. 2, case 55. (Underlining is by Ibid.
48
Lutes.) Memo, Marshall for King, 16 Aug 43, no sub,
46
Ibid. OPD 384 (PTO) sec. 2, case 55.
a staff was, in Marshall's judgment, "an will help to promote the unity of action
absolute requirement." 49 which you and I are attempting to bring
Admiral King's response to this appeal about." 51
was a strong protest against the action King's protest, it will be noted, did
of both Leavey and Lutes in send- not deal at all with the substantive ques-
ing their reports directly through Army tions raised by the two officers involved.
channels. First, he doubted that either He ignored these questions also in a
officer was qualified to comment on the second communication of the same date
organization of the Central Pacific. They in which he examined General Eisen-
had had only a limited opportunity to hower's organization in North Africa
observe "the overall situation," and, ac- with reference to its applicability in
cording to members of Nimitz' staff, Nimitz' area. This possibility had first
General Lutes at least was not "com- been raised by one of the naval plan-
pletely and accurately informed on the ners and the Army had obligingly asked
matters which he discusses." 50 both Eisenhower and MacArthur to de-
A more serious indictment was Ad- scribe the organization of their head-
miral King's criticism of the procedure quarters.52 MacArthur's reply, which
followed by the two Army officers in King did not comment upon, empha-
presenting their views. General Leavey, sized the importance of "complete and
he contended, had violated the first prin- thorough integration" of ground, air,
ciple of the staff officer—loyalty to the and naval elements, close personal rela-
commander and to the organization he tionships, and the close physical location
served. As a member of Admiral Cal- of the various headquarters. All these,
houn's staff, Leavey should have made he claimed, made possible "a constant
"a forthright report through his respon- daily participation of the staffs in all
sible superior." By writing directly to details of planning and operations" and
General Somervell, King charged, "an attitude that is without service bias."
Leavey had "violated proper, correct, But, he cautioned, the mere assembly of
and required military procedure." an approximately equal number of offi-
Lutes's error was not as clear. He did cers from the various services would not
not know, King said, for what purpose in itself produce an effective joint staff.53
Lutes had been sent to the Pacific. But General Eisenhower's response was
if it was "to observe and report" on fuller and to the point. Like MacArthur,
Admiral Nimitz' organization and com- he occupied a dual position as com-
mand, then Nimitz should have been mander of an Allied theater of opera-
informed in advance. "I do not believe," tions and as the commander of U.S.
King told Marshall, "that actions of this forces in that theater. In the latter
kind, even though they may be steps capacity, Eisenhower exercised his func-
toward the formation of a joint staff, tions, which consisted largely of supply,
51
Ibid.
49 52
Memo, Marshall for King, 26 Aug 43, no sub, Rads, Marshall to MacArthur to Eisenhower, 26
OPD 384 (PTO) sec. 2, case 55. Jul 43, CM-OUT 10477 and 10478.
50 53
Memo, King for Marshall, 30 Aug 43, no sub, Rad, MacArthur to Marshall, 31 Jul 43, No.
ser. 001801, OPD 384 (PTO) sec. 2, case 55. C-4369, CM-IN 22577.
personnel, and discipline, through a dep- subordinate commanders at least once a

uty theater commander, much as Mac- week, and "in periods of operational
Arthur did through a deputy chief of activity" more often.55 Furthermore, his
staff. And like MacArthur, he had or- chief of staff met three times a week
ganized his air and naval elements into with the senior American and British
separate forces with their own command- administrative and supply officers to
ers and exercised command through co-ordinate nonoperational matters.
them rather than through his own head- Co-ordination was achieved also, Eisen-
quarters. However, instead of appoint- hower pointed out, through the joint
ing a single ground commander as planning staff, a separate joint intelli-
MacArthur had done in the case of gence committee and daily G-3 confer-
Allied Land Forces, Eisenhower exer- ences with representatives of the air and
cised this control himself through his naval staffs.
senior ground officer, the British com- One further agency established by
mander of the 15th Army Group, and Eisenhower to secure co-ordination and
when necessary, through the commanders co-operation of the forces under his
of separate task forces or units. Later, command was the so-called Chief of Staff
the 15th Army Group commander be- Conference. This body consisted of his
came the deputy commander for ground own chief of staff, G-2, and G-3, and
operations.54 the corresponding officers of the air and
To the heads of the major staff divi- naval headquarters. Meeting daily, this
sions of his headquarters, Eisenhower group exchanged information on the
entrusted the task of co-ordinating and activities and intentions of each of the
supervising the corresponding staff divi- headquarters with particular reference
sions of the air and naval headquarters to the effect of operations by one service
in the Mediterranean theater. In addi- on those of the others. "This confer-
tion, he had a joint planning staff, which ence," Eisenhower explained, "is ex-
paralleled closely that of the Combined pected to develop points of friction or
Chiefs in "organization, membership, malcoordination in the details of opera-
and duties." This small staff was actu- tions," thus providing assurance for him
ally a part of the G-3 Section of Allied and for the major force commanders that
Force Headquarters and made its rec- "operational co-ordination exists in
ommendations to G-3 rather than to details as well as in policy." 56
Eisenhower directly. In the organization of his headquar-
Conferences between the officers of the ters, Eisenhower had followed in general
various staffs were held frequently and the pattern he knew best, the U.S. Army
on a regular basis. He himself, Eisen- staff organization, with such modifica-
hower explained, met with his major tions as were necessary to meet conditions
54
peculiar to the Mediterranean theater.
Rad, Eisenhower to Marshall, W-6285, 1 Aug 43,
CM-IN 814. It should be noted that this difference
55
between MacArthur's and Eisenhower's control over Memo, Silverthorne for Capt Charles T. Joy,
ground operations was more apparent than real, for USN, 21 Oct 43, sub: Staff Organization in NATO,
General Blarney, the Allied Land Forces Commander Incl, p. 3, OPD 384 (PTO) sec. 2, case 55.
56
in the Southwest Pacific Area, did not actually Rad, Eisenhower to Marshall, W-6710, 7 Aug 43,
function in that capacity. See above, ch. XX. CM-IN 5102.
One important difference was in the terranean theater did not seem appli-
composition of the staff. His was an cable to the Pacific, where the situation
Allied command consisting of U.S. and was quite different. He noted, for ex-
British forces, and the British were fully ample, that co-ordination of air, ground,
represented on the staff of Allied Force and naval plans and operations in the
Headquarters. In addition, Eisenhower Mediterranean was effected through the
had two deputy chiefs of staff, both commanders concerned rather than
British, one for operations and one for through the staff of Allied Force Head-
supply. The first was charged with "the quarters. As a matter of fact, King
general co-ordination" of the G-2 and pointed out, Eisenhower did not have a
G-3 Sections of the headquarters. G-1 joint staff at all but an Allied staff of
and G-4 were under the second deputy American and British officers, with little
chief of staff, who, after January 1943, or no air or naval representation. Was
was also the British Chief Administrative this the kind of organization General
Officer in the theater. As such he re- Marshall wanted for the Pacific Ocean
ported directly to the War Office in Areas, he asked? "If it is not," he told
London, and held a position similar to the Chief of Staff, "I would welcome a
that of the deputy theater commander, more or less specific outline of what you
an American officer, through whom have in mind." 58 And, in what appeared
Eisenhower exercised his functions as to be an oblique reference to General
commander of U.S. forces in the theater. Leavey, he again reminded Marshall that
Other problems unique to the Medi- the effectiveness of any organization "is
terranean theater, such as military bound to depend upon the personalities
government and French rearmament, and the loyal cooperation of those
were handled by special staff sections involved."
which then had no counterpart in the The task of outlining specifically the
War Department. In sections such as kind of organization the Army wished
these and where specialized knowledge to recommend for the Pacific Ocean
was required, assignment was on the Areas was assigned to the Operations
basis of qualification rather than nation- Division of the General Staff. Even here
ality and rank. Furthermore, in those there was no unanimity of opinion.59
sections dealing with administrative and But the necessity for reaching agreement
supply matters there was a duplication was largely obviated when Admiral
of function and personnel that would Nimitz on 6 September announced the
not have been tolerated in the War formation of a joint staff. This staff, he
Department. This was necessary, Eisen- told General Richardson, would consist
hower explained, because of the Allied of Army and Navy officers and would
nature of his command, "since the Amer- be organized into four sections—Plans,
ican channel goes back to Washington
and the British channel to London."57 58
Ltr, King to Marshall, sec. 001800, 30 Aug 43,
To Admiral King, the organization OPD 384 (PTO) sec. 2, case 53.
59
established by Eisenhower for the Medi- Memos, Wedemeyer for Hull, 3 Sep 43, sub:
Changes in Theater Boundaries and Comd Setup-
57
Rad, Eisenhower to Marshall, W-6285, 1 Aug 43, Pacific; Ritchie for Handy, 28 Aug 43, same sub, OPD
CM-IN 814. 370.5, sec. 7, case 240.
Operations, Intelligence, and Logistics. hammer" technique, had "undoubtedly

The first two would be headed by naval been instrumental in securing Admiral
officers from the fleet staff; General Nimitz' consent to the creation of the
Leavey would take the post of chief of joint staff." 62
the Logistics Section and another Army Thus, by the end of August, both the
officer—to be recommended by Richard- theater and the Washington staffs,
son—that of chief of Intelligence. "Have spurred on by Admiral King who was
discussed this organization thoroughly himself being pressed by General Mar-
with Admiral Nimitz and his advisers," shall, were working hard on the problem.
Richardson reported with evident satis- On 6 September, the same day that
faction to Marshall. "Both Admiral Admiral Nimitz announced the forma-
Nimitz and I are in full accord to solve tion of the joint staff in Pearl Harbor,
in advance as many operational and Admiral King had sent him a proposed
logistic problems as possible." 60 organization for the Pacific Ocean Areas.
Admiral Nimitz' decision to establish General Marshall, he explained, had
a joint staff, just as discussions in Wash- been urging him for some months to
ington were approaching a climax, was separate the fleet and area commands in
not a sudden one. (Chart 15) Early in the Pacific and to establish in Hawaii a
July, it will be recalled, King had sug- joint staff with greater Army representa-
gested to him that in view of the coming tion. On the first issue, King had no
offensive in the Central Pacific it might intention of giving way. "I plan," he
be desirable to reorganize his staff. At assured Nimitz, "to keep command of
that time Nimitz had seen no need for the Pacific Fleet and the command of the
a change. But the Navy planners in Pacific Ocean Areas vested in one person
Washington had nevertheless continued —you." 63 But in the matter of a joint
to study the problem, and it was for this staff he was apparently willing to make
purpose that they had in late July asked adjustments. These, he told Nimitz,
their Army colleagues for information were incorporated in the draft plan,
about Eisenhower's and MacArthur's which, in his view, represented the best
staff.61 The results of these studies, as efforts of the naval planners "to com-
well as the Army's criticism of Pacific promise the conflicting aspects of this
organization, were passed on to Admiral problem."
Nimitz, who presumably had continued Admiral Nimitz responded to this pro-
to give the matter his attention. General posed reorganization by describing the
Richardson, too, had been exerting his system he had already put into effect.
influence on behalf of the joint staff, and The new joint staff, he claimed, showed
it was General Somervell's opinion that "a thorough appreciation of the neces-
the Hawaiian commander, by the use of sity of amalgamating the interest" of the
a "tack hammer" rather than a "sledge Army "with our own," and provided the
machinery required to put into effect
60
Rad, Richardson to Marshall, No. 5498, 7 Sep 43,
62
CM-IN 5272. Memo, Somervell for Marshall, 12 Sep 43, OPD
61
Memo for Record, 26 Jul 43, sub: Staff Organiza- 384 (PTO) sec. 2, case 55.
63
tion in NATO and SWPA, OPD 384 (PTO) sec. 2, Ltr, King to Nimitz, ser. 001889, 6 Sep 43, cited
case 53. in Hayes, The War Against Japan, ch. II, pp. 90-91.
CHART15—HEADQUARTERSORGANIZATION, CINCPOA-CINCPACFLEET, OCTOBER 1943
Co-ordination
the principles of joint action.64 The staff the "still nebulous" command problem
was to be headed by a Deputy Comman- in the Pacific nor make any clearer the
der, Pacific Ocean Areas, a vice admiral, "rather tenuous and ill-defined" relation-
and would consist of officers from both ships between the various commanders
services. But some of these officers, and staffs. 66 There was no question that
Nimitz pointed out, would serve in a Nimitz was the theater commander and
dual capacity on the fleet or Army staff that Richardson, as Army commander,
and on the joint staff, a provision that was his subordinate. The fact that this
was to cause considerable dissatisfaction relationship was clear and that the work-
later. ing arrangements between these two
In view of the Army's criticism of the officers and their staffs were "of the best"
organization for supply in the area and did not mean, Somervell pointed out,
the failure to meet the requirements that the same was true elsewhere in the
of the Basic Logistical Plan, Admiral Pacific. It was not true, he declared, of
Nimitz called special attention to the the relationship between the area com-
Logistics Section of the new staff. mands (the North, Central, and South
Headed by General Leavey, this section Pacific) and the theater command,
would establish priorities and supervise which, Somervell observed, was marked
theater transportation, fuel supply, med- by a "lack of uniformity." And within
ical services, and the advance base sec- each of the areas there were wide varia-
tions. This last was a function hitherto tions in organization, in the responsi-
assigned to the Service Force, Pacific bility of the commanders, and in methods
Fleet, and likely to assume increasing of operation. Thus, supply and logistics
importance as the Central Pacific offen- followed "a different pattern" in Hawaii
sive pushed westward into the Mandates. than elsewhere.
With logistical responsibility thus cen- Nimitz' command of the Central
tralized Nimitz felt that his staff would Pacific Area and of the fleet created an
be able to give "full and undivided additional problem. By retaining both
consideration to joint logistical mat- commands, Somervell declared, Admiral
ters," and at the same time ensure that Nimitz had become so involved in details
the Army's needs would be fully and so preoccupied with the local situa-
represented.65 tion that he had lost sight of "the general
Admiral Nimitz' optimistic view of picture" and thereby reduced his
the benefits that would result from this effectiveness as theater commander.
organization were not fully shared by General Somervell's solution to the
General Somervell, who was in Hawaii command problem in the Pacific Ocean
from the 8th to the 12th of September. Areas was similar to that proposed earlier
As he saw it, the formation of a joint by General Marshall. First, he would
staff, promising as it was, would not solve separate the fleet and Central Pacific
commands, appoint separate command-
64
Ltr, Nimitz to King, ser. 00168, 9 Sep 43, sub: ers for each of the areas, and establish in
Comd Relationships and Staff of CinCPOA and
66
Pacific Fleet—Reorganization of, OPD 384 (PTO) Memo, Somervell for Marshall, 12 Sep 43, OPD
sec. 2, case 53. 384 (PTO) sec. 2, case 55. See also Memo, Somervell
65
Ibid. for Nimitz, 22 Sep 43, no sub, OPD 384, case 17.
each an organization parallel to that of of Leavey and Lutes, it furnished the

the theater command. In addition, he basis for a comprehensive review on 20
would establish a base area comprising September of command arrangements in
Hawaii and "perhaps a few of the islands the Pacific Ocean Areas as seen through
immediately to the south." Because of Army eyes. The Army's spokesman in
the importance of these islands in the this case was General Handy, chief of
coming offensive, Somervell would make the Operations Division. Addressing his
the commander of this area responsible naval counterpart, Admiral Cooke,
for "the operation of supply and admin- Handy expressed concern over Nimitz'
istrative system" and coequal with the apparent concentration on Central Pa-
other area commanders. With such an cific affairs. In the opinion of the Army,
organization, said Somervell, Admiral he said, the time had come for Nimitz to
Nimitz would be free from "the multi- assume the functions of theater com-
tudinous problems which arise in any of mander and, with the aid of a joint
the three sectors or with the details of operational staff, exercise his responsi-
handling the supply lines, the training bility equally in all three areas of his
of troops sent into the base area prior to command.68 The present organization,
their commitment to more active thea- he admitted, was entirely adequate for
ters, or the defense of the base area." the operations of the Pacific Fleet, but,
Relieved of these heavy burdens and asked General Handy, "was it adequate"
aided by an effective joint operating to handle the operational and logistical
staff, Nimitz would be able, Somervell planning essential to successful utiliza-
concluded, to give his full attention to tion of not only the Pacific Fleet afloat,
theater-wide problems and to the but of its shore-based installations, and
prosecution of the war against Japan. all of the Army forces—both combat and
Meanwhile in Washington, the Army services—totaling over 300,000 in the
planners had continued to study the Pacific Ocean Areas?
problem of Pacific command. As yet, The question was rhetorical. Clearly,
they had not received any more informa- the Army planners had already answered
tion about Nimitz' reorganization than the question in the negative. And, while
that contained in General Richardson's disclaiming any desire "to force on Ad-
message of 7 September. All they knew, miral Nimitz" their ideas as to how he
therefore, was that the Pacific Ocean should organize his staff, they had a
Areas commander had initiated action to number of specific suggestions to make.
establish a joint staff and that this staff These Handy now presented to Admiral
would consist of four sections. That Cooke in the hope they might prove
much, they thought, was "a most fortu- helpful. Without argument, the Army
nate step for Admiral Nimitz to take." 67 planners conceded that Eisenhower's
General Somervell's report to the Chief organization was not "the ideal organiza-
of Staff arrived in Washington while tion" for the Pacific. They also thought
these discussions over command were Nimitz' division of the joint staff into
still in progress. With the earlier reports four sections "quite proper," as was the
67
Memo, Handy for Cooke, 20 Sep 43, sub: Joint
68
Staff for Adm Nimitz, OPD 384 (PTO) sec. 2, case 55. Ibid.
selection by Nimitz of his own chief of of the Nimitz directive and a letter prais-
staff. There was little doubt in the ing it—and the admiral—highly.69 The
minds of the Army planners that Nimitz new joint staff, the Hawaiian commander
should choose a naval officer as his chief told General Marshall, was already prov-
of staff, but they expressed concern lest ing "most helpful" in furnishing infor-
this officer become bogged down in mation required for planning. In this
detail. To avoid this unhappy condition respect, declared Richardson, Admiral
they proposed that Nimitz, like Eisen- Nimitz had been extremely co-operative,
hower, have two deputy chiefs of staff, thus sparing the Army "the embarrass-
one a flag officer, the other an Army ment of being confronted with a
general. Each could then co-ordinate readymade plan."
"routine matters pertaining to his own The second copy of the Nimitz direc-
service," while performing any other tive came from Admiral King on 22
tasks the chief of staff might assign. September, the day he and Admiral
Tied to this proposal was the sugges- Cooke left for Pearl Harbor to confer
tion that Nimitz appoint to his joint with the Pacific commander. Scribbled
staff representatives from the Army and hastily on a piece of paper attached to
Navy administrative and supply services, the directive was the comment, "It
thus giving him, in effect, a special staff would seem that we are in a fair way to
consisting of medical, signal, ordnance, setting up an adequate staff organization
engineer, quartermaster, transportation, out there." 70 General Marshall agreed,
civil affairs, and other sections. Each of but with reservations. The objective
these, while an integral part of the joint toward which he and his staff had been
staff, would be supervised by one of the striving for months was a reorganization
four main sections, but the job of coin which Nimitz would function solely
ordinating the work of all would fall on as a theater commander, divorced from
the two deputy chiefs of staff. Theirs his area and fleet commands. The estab-
would be the responsibility of seeing to lishment of a joint staff was "definitely a
it "that the many angles of joint opera- step" toward that goal, but in Marshall's
tions" received full consideration in view, there was still room for improve-
planning and in operations. "With such ment.71 And lest King still had any
a staff as outlined herein," concluded doubt as to what the Army had in
General Handy, "Admiral Nimitz would mind, Marshall referred him to General
be in a much better position than he is Handy's recommendations on the sub-
at present to direct over-all planning and ject. These he declared were "directly
operations" for the entire theater. in accord" with his own views "as to a
At the time General Handy made these desirable organization of this staff and
recommendations, the Army planners
69
had not yet received a specific and de- Ltr, Richardson to Marshall, 19 Sep 43, OPD 384
(PTO) sec. 2, case 53.
tailed description of the actual organi- 70
Penciled Note, King for Marshall, 22 Sep 43,
zation put into effect by Nimitz on the attached to Ltr, Nimitz to King, 9 Sep 43, sub: Comd
6th. This lack was remedied almost Relationship, ser. 00168, OPD 384 (PTO) sec. 2,
case 53.
immediately from two different sources. 71
Memo, Marshall for King, 24 Sep 43, no sub,
From General Richardson came a copy OPD 384 (PTO) sec. 2, case 55.
as to a delineation of its responsibilities joint staff. Though this reform fell far
and relationships to other commands short of the initial aim, it was apparently
and staffs in the Pacific Ocean Theater." as far as the Navy was willing to go to
This statement by General Marshall meet the Army's criticism. Summarizing
was apparently made more for the record the situation for General Handy, one of
than for the purpose of persuading King the Army planners predicted on 9 Octo-
to make further changes in the organiza- ber that Admiral Nimitz would make no
tion of the Pacific Ocean Areas. The effort to bring the South Pacific any
Admiral had conceded as much as he more closely under his control or "that
intended to, and the date for the Gilberts any conclusion can be had as to where
assault was rapidly approaching. Unless the over-all command responsibility is
the Army planners wished to broaden going to rest" until the operations then
the problem and relate it to matters of scheduled were concluded.72 His advice
more immediate importance, they would to the general, therefore, was that the
have to accept the fact that the debate Army should make no further atempt at
over Pacific command had reached a that time to alter command relationships
stalemate. in the Pacific. There the matter rested
What had begun in early July as an for the next six months.
effort by the Army to bring the organi-
zation of the Pacific Ocean Areas into
72
line with its concept of joint command Memo, Silverthorne for Handy, 9 Oct 43, sub:
Observations on Organizations, OPD 384, case 17.
had finally resulted, after two months of Nimitz did, however, order Halsey to establish a
discussion, in the establishment of a joint staff in the South Pacific.
CHAPTER XXV
Operations and Plans, Summer 1943

The art of war is simple enough. Find out where your enemy is. Get at
him as soon as you can. Strike at him as hard as you can, and keep
moving on.
GENERAL GRANT
The intensive activity that marked objectives MacArthur assigned to Gen-

the preparations of the Central Pacific eral Krueger's newly formed ALAMO
Area during the summer and early fall Force, Allied Air and Naval Forces fur-
of 1943 for the projected offensive into nishing support as required. This was
the Gilberts and Marshalls had little or the first amphibious operation in the
no effect initially on operations in the Southwest Pacific Area and the planning
Solomons and New Guinea. There the was careful and complete. The VII Am-
forces of General MacArthur and Ad- phibious Force under Rear Adm. Daniel
miral Halsey, operating under CART- E. Barbey provided the ships to transport
WHEEL, had gone into action at the end and land the assault troops; Allied Naval
of June. The objective was the line Force, the vessels to clear the sea lanes
Lae-Salamaua-Finschhafen-western and protect the invasion force from
New Britain-southern Bougainville, to enemy surface attack. General Kenney's
be reached in eight months. From there, Allied Air Force undertook to neutralize
the Allies would be in position finally distant air bases and furnish close air
to drive on Rabaul and gain control of support. The ground troops were or-
the Bismarck Archipelago. ganized into two separate task forces,
each of regimental size, one to take
CARTWHEEL Begins Woodlark, the other Kiriwina.2
Preparations for the landings were
The Southwest Pacific thorough, and May and June were busy
months at Milne Bay and Townsville,
The first phase of CARTWHEEL, the staging points for the operation. Re-
occupation of Woodlark and of Kiriwina 2
The Woodlark Force consisted of the dismounted
in the Trobriands, Nassau Bay, and New 2-squadron 112th Cavalry, the 134th Field Artillery
Georgia, began on the last day of June Battalion (105-mm. howitzers), a naval construction
unit (Seabees), the 12th Marine Defense Battalion,
1943.1 (Map III) Seizure of the first two plus service units; the Kiriwina Force, of the
158th Infantry (less the 2d Battalion), the 148th
1
For a description of the CARTWHEEL plan, see Field Artillery Battalion (105-mm. howitzers), and
above, Chapter XX. The JCS directive of 28 March additional supporting and service elements. An
1943 that fixed the objectives and command for account of this operation can be found in Miller,
CARTWHEEL is described in Chapter XIX. CARTWHEEL: The Reduction of Rabaul, Chapter V.
OPERATIONS AND PLANS, SUMMER 1943 503
hearsals were held during the last days Arthur a base from which to mount and
of June, though it was already known support further advances up the New
that there were no Japanese on either Guinea coast; and, if made at the same
Woodlark or Kiriwina. As a matter of time as the Woodlark and Kiriwina
fact, advance parties landed at both landings, would serve to confuse the
places before D-day and began to pre- enemy. The drive to Salamaua from
pare for the arrival of the main body. Nassau Bay would mask also the more
The actual landings on 30 June, there- important Allied drive against Lae,
fore, came as an anticlimax, and, aside further up the New Guinea coast.
from the confusion caused by the dark- The operation itself, though it was
ness and the unfamiliar waters, were unique in some respects, presented few
made without difficulty. difficulties. 3 A force known as the Mac-
As events turned out, the seizure of Kechnie Force and consisting of the 1st
Woodlark and Kiriwina was unnecessary. Battalion, 162d Infantry, augmented by
Intended originally to provide the South- support and service troops, was organ-
west Pacific forces with advance fighter ized for the landing under the control of
and medium bomber bases within range New Guinea Force.4 Staging out of
of Japanese airfields in the northern Morobe, about forty miles south of Nas-
Solomons and in the Rabaul area, these sau Bay, the 1,000 men of the Mac-
islands were never really utilized for that Kechnie Force made the run to their
purpose. Other sites captured during the objective in PT boats and landing craft
Allied drive provided better bases when on the night of 29 June. Despite the
the time came. But the operation was confusion created by rain and darkness,
of value in another way, for it provided most of the men were ashore and ready
the forces in MacArthur's area with for the enemy by daybreak of the 30th.
training and experience in amphibious The slight Japanese opposition that de-
operations they had not had before. veloped later was easily overcome and
The landing at Nassau Bay, made by 2 July the beachhead was secure and
simultaneously with the occupation of contact made with the Australians from
Woodlark and Kiriwina, was also unop- Wau. The drive against Salamaua, about
posed. Situated on the New Guinea coast twenty miles to the north, could now
a short distance below the Japanese begin in earnest.
strongholds at Salamaua and Lae, Nassau
Bay offered logistical advantages too South Pacific
good to miss. In Allied hands, it would
open a water route along which supplies Simultaneously with the landings at
could be brought to the Australian troops Nassau Bay and in the Trobriands, the
then pushing forward from Wau, about forces of the South Pacific made their
twenty-five miles inland, toward Sala- 3
For an account of the operation, see Miller,
maua. Hitherto supplied by air and CARTWHEEL, ch. V; Morison, Breaking the
native carriers, the Australians had pro- Bismarcks Barrier, pp. 134-37.
4
gressed slowly, building roads as they Col. Archibald R. MacKechnie, Commanding
Officer, 162d Infantry, 41st U.S. Infantry Division,
went. An operation against Nassau Bay commanded the force and gave it its name, a practice
had other advantages: it would give Mac- that the Japanese frequently followed.
(less two battalions), a 155-mm. howit-

zer battalion and a Marine defense bat-
talion, Fijian commandos, antiaircraft,
construction, and service units, all or-
ganized into the New Georgia Occupa-
tion Force under Maj. Gen. John H.
Hester, commander of the 43d Division.
Hester, therefore, functioned in a dual
capacity, as did most of the members of
his staff—an arrangement that seemed to
General Harmon to bode trouble for the
future. 5
The plan of operations for the con-
quest of New Georgia, designated TOE-
NAILS, was dictated in part by geography
and in part by enemy strength and dis-
positions. Composed of about a dozen
comparatively large and hundreds of tiny
islands extending in a northwest-
FIJIAN COMMANDOS with their New Zea- southeast direction for 130 miles, the
land leader. New Georgia group presents major prob-
lems for an invasion force. It is partially
first move into the New Georgia group surrounded by a coral barrier, inside of
in the central Solomons. This was by which are large lagoons with shallow bot-
far the most ambitious undertaking toms and dangerous coral outcroppings.
of the first phase of CARTWHEEL and Entrance into the group from the south
the forces allocated to the operation is limited generally to narrow passages
by Admiral Halsey were proportionately and channels calling for expert naviga-
larger. Organized in accordance with tion. Munda Point on New Georgia
the naval practice predominating in the Island, the largest of the group, is inac-
South Pacific, these forces included cessible to large vessels, but to the south,
Aubrey W. Fitch's Aircraft, South Pa- across Blanche Channel, lies Rendova
cific; submarines of the Seventh Fleet and a sheltered harbor. To the north-
on loan from MacArthur's area; a naval east, extending the chain toward Bou-
covering force of carriers, battleships, gainville, are Kolombangara and Vella
cruisers, and destroyers commanded by Lavella.
Halsey himself; and, finally, the Attack Defending the central Solomons were
Force, led by Admiral Turner and com- about 10,000 Japanese Army and Navy
prising all the ships, landing craft, sup- troops, organized into two separate com-
plies, and troops required for the initial mands and operating under the direct
landings. control of Navy headquarters on Rabaul.
The troops allotted to Admiral Turner 5
Miller, CARTWHEEL, ch. VI. See also, Ltr,
for the invasion included the Army's Harmon to Handy, 15 Jul 43, OPD 319.1 (PTO)
43d Division, a Marine Raider regiment sec. 3, case 146.
Army forces under Maj. Gen. Noboru airfield near Enogai Inlet in Kula Gulf,
Sasaki consisted of troops drawn largely a move designed to cut the Japanese line
from the 6th and 38th Divisions; naval of communications. Once Munda was
forces, led by Rear Adm. Minoru Ota, captured, South Pacific forces would mop
of the Kure 6th and Yokosuka 7th Spe- up and secure the island, then move on
cial Naval Landing Forces. Formed into up the New Georgia chain to Vila air-
scattered detachments these troops were field on Kolombangara in preparation
strategically placed to repel any enemy for the later invasion of southern
attempt to seize the airfields and harbors Bougainville.
in the area.6 With the experience of Guadalcanal
Admiral Halsey's plan for gaining con- still fresh in mind, Halsey and his staff
trol of this complex of islands and reefs took every precaution to ensure adequate
was a complicated one, but precise and supplies for the invasion force and the
detailed in all respects. Since the island prompt development of logistical facili-
of New Georgia could not be invaded ties. Virtually every agency in the South
directly, Halsey decided to gain first a Pacific contributed to this effort, appro-
foothold in the islands, from which he priately designated DRY GOODS. During
could mount and support the main as- the months preceding the invasion, sup-
sault. Rendova filled these requirements plies poured into Guadalcanal, there to
admirably and became the major objec- be stockpiled for the day they would be
tive of the preliminary landings to be needed. Despite the shortage of service
made on D-day, 30 June. But it was not troops and port facilities and the destruc-
the only objective, for that same day tion caused by a severe tropical storm,
South Pacific forces were to occupy three thousands of tons were unloaded across
other positions in the New Georgia the Guadalcanal beaches by the end of
group—Segi Point, Wickham Anchor- June in an effort characterized by heroic
age, and Viru Harbor. The first was in- improvisations and effective use of the
tended for use later as a fighter base, the newly developed 2½-ton amphibian
last two as staging areas for supplies and truck, the Dukw. Guadalcanal also
reinforcements. (Map 8) served as the staging area for part of the
The invasion of New Georgia Island assault force, and the location of the
was scheduled to come four days after 37th Division, elements of which were
the preliminary landings. It was to be to stand by as area reserve for the
mounted from Rendova, in landing craft operation.
and small boats brought up for the pur- Detailed and exact as these plans were,
pose from Tulagi and Guadalcanal. The they had to be revised at the last moment.
main force would land in the south and Unexpectedly, the Japanese sent rein-
strike out for Munda, while a secondary forcements toward Segi Point, one of the
force landed on the opposite side of the four preliminary landing sites of the
6
For an account of Japanese plans and operations, Allied invasion earmarked for use as an
see, in addition to the sources cited, Japanese Opns advanced fighter strip. To avert the loss
in SWPA, vol. II, ch. VII; Hattori, The Greater East of this potential base, Halsey quickly
Asia War, vol. II, pt. V, ch. 5, pp. 57-63; Southeast
Area Operations Record, pt. II, 17th Army Opera- altered his plans, moving up the date of
tions, vol. II, Japanese Studies in World War II, 40. the landing and substituting elements of
MAP8
the 4th Marine Raider Battalion for the troops started to land on the wrong
original landing force. No time was lost. beach and had to re-embark. On the
By the night of 20 June, the marines second try, the small boats heading
were on their way toward Segi Point in blindly toward shore were scattered by
two fast destroyer-transports. Next morn- larger craft. Six were lost on the reef.
ing they landed without opposition, The landing, when it was made, came at
beating out the Japanese. the wrong beaches and was marked by
The remainder of the plan for the pre- an "impressive disorganization." Fortu-
liminary landings on 30 June, with one nately, there were no Japanese on hand
exception, was carried out as scheduled, and the troops were able to re-form be-
but not without considerable confusion fore the shooting began. By 4 July
and unexpected difficulties. The night Wickham Anchorage was secure.
was dark, the weather foul, and the sea The Viru landing was not made at all.
rough. At Wickham Anchorage, the The Japanese were already in posses-
sion, and the assault force, after waiting loss of the flagship McCawley. But the
outside the harbor for the Marines from Americans gave as much as they got and
Segi to take the place by overland assault, knocked down most of the attacking
finally disembarked at the latter site, aircraft.
twelve miles away. The next morning, The chief obstacle to the landing came
Viru Harbor was in American hands. not from the Japanese but from the reefs,
At Rendova, where the bulk of the shallow waters, and soft red clay roads
troops were to land, the weather and of Rendova. These combined to impede
darkness also had their effect. One ship unloading operations and to create utter
ran aground on a reef, and the specially confusion on shore, where heavy mud-
trained "Barracudas"—C and G Com- bound trucks clogged all routes to the
panies, 172d Infantry—who were to supply dumps. Soaked radios, poor
cover the major landing came ashore packaging, and inadequately marked con-
some miles from their destination at tainers added further to the troubles of
Rendova Harbor. Thus, when the first the beach masters. Finally General
boats of the main assault force moved Hester was forced to call a halt to the
toward the beaches in the first light of unloading of vehicles until the supply
dawn, they carried with them Turner's situation ashore was cleared up. But this
admonition, "You are the first to land— measure proved inadequate and ulti-
expect opposition."7 But the warning mately the supply experts revised their
proved unnecessary. The 120-man Japa- plans for a supply base at Rendova.
nese garrison, taken by surprise, offered The main landing on the southern
only desultory opposition and by 0800 coast of New Georgia, west of Munda
the assault force was safely ashore. The Point, came 2 July, after several false
operation, remarked General Harmon, starts. Three days later, a second force
who was present during the landing, came ashore on the west coast of the
"was splendidly executed and reflects island at Rice Anchorage. While this
great credit on Admiral Turner and his force worked its way into position to cut
Staff and Commanders. . . ."8 off the Japanese defenders from their
Though the Rendova garrison offered line of supply and reinforcements—a
little opposition on the ground, Japa- mission it never actually accomplished—
nese air and artillery went into action the Army troops to the southeast began
promptly once the enemy realized what their arduous march through the jungles
was happening. Coastal defense guns toward the Munda airfield.
from Munda Point and from Baanga From the start, the campaign went
Island opened fire on Turner's naval badly. Heat, tangled undergrowth, and
escort, scoring a hit on the destroyer the determined opposition of the enemy
Gwin. At 1100 came the first of several slowed the advance and brought heavy
air attacks, one of which resulted in the casualties to the inexperienced troops of
7
CTF War Diary, entry of 30 Jun 43, quoted in
the 43d Division. On 7 July, elements
Miller, CARTWHEEL, p. 87. of the 37th Division on Guadalcanal
8
Memo, Harmon for Halsey, 11 Jul 43, sub: Narra- were ordered forward, and three days
tive Report of Observations on First Day of TOENAILS
Operation, OPD 319.1 (PTO) sec. 3, case 146, Incl 1.
later, in a vain effort to inject fresh spirit
Harmon came ashore with the second wave. into the worst-hit of his two front-line
RENDOVA COMMANDERS. From left, Brig. Gen. Leonard F. Wing, Admirals Wilkinson and
Turner, and General Hester.
RENDOVA LANDING FORCES being carried to their objective in Higgins boats.

regiments, General Hester relieved its Admiral Turner, commander of the

commander and most of the regimental entire New Georgia assault force and
staff. Despite these efforts, the offensive therefore Hester's immediate superior,
ground slowly to a halt. was "in violent disagreement" with this
If General Hester was concerned with proposal. It was Harmon's belief that
the speed of his advance, so also were the admiral "was inclined more and more
his superiors. Harmon's misgivings that to take active control of land operations,"
Hester "did not have enough command and he saw little hope of reaching agree-
and staff ... to watch the whole show as ment with him. He therefore appealed
well as keep a close hold on his Division" directly to Halsey, who, on 6 July, de-
had led him, before D-day, to instruct cided in favor of the Army commander.
Maj. Gen. Oscar W. Griswold, XIV The relief of Hester as commander of
Corps commander on Guadalcanal, to be the New Georgia Occupation Force—
ready to take over if necessary. "Thought there was no thought of relieving him of
I would watch the operation," he later his division—would be decided later.12
explained to General Handy, "and if it But Turner was not content to leave
didn't go properly throw in Griswold the matter there and presented his case
and the advance echelon of XIV Corps directly to Halsey, as he had every right
staff." 9 Hester's conduct of the Rendova to do. Regretting the necessity for dis-
operation gave Harmon no reason to be- agreeing with Harmon, Turner never-
lieve that such a change would soon be theless argued strongly for the retention
necessary. As a matter of fact, he had of Hester as commander of the Occupa-
nothing but praise for the New Georgia tion Force. To replace him with
Occupation Force commander.10 Griswold, Turner contended, would deal
By 5 July, after the drive to Munda "a severe blow" to the morale of troops
began, Harmon had apparently revised on New Georgia. Moreover, he could
his views. Though he did not at that see no reason for a change, in view of
time feel that Hester should be replaced, Hester's admirable conduct of operations.
he did believe that the New Georgia Harmon disagreed, and it was on his
commander needed more staff officers so advise that Halsey acted. Thus, on 10
that he could devote his time to opera- July, General Griswold received orders
tions. He recommended to Halsey, to go to New Georgia and at a date to
therefore, that the forward echelon of be specified later—presumably after the
the XIV Corps staff should move up to capture of Munda, assume command of
New Georgia about 8 July and that the Occupation Force. Turner would
Griswold should take over the Occupa- continue to support the operation but
tion Force after the capture of Munda.11 would no longer have authority over the
ground forces.13
9 12
Ltr. Harmon to Handy, 15 Jul 43, OPD 319.1 Ltr, Harmon to Handy, 15 Jul 43, cited above;
(PTO) sec. 3, case 146. Rad, Halsey to Harmon, 6 Jul 43; COMSOPAC War
10
Memo, Harmon for Halsey, 11 Jul 43, sub: Nar- Diary, same date, both cited in Miller, CART-
rative Report . . . , OPD 319.1 (PTO) sec. 3, case WHEEL, p. 123.
13
146, Incl 1. Rads, Turner to Halsey, 7 Jul 43; Halsey to
11
Rad, Harmon to Halsey, 5 Jul 43, cited in Miller, Turner, 9 Jul 43; Harmon to Griswold, 10 Jul 43;
CARTWHEEL, p. 123. cited in Miller, CARTWHEEL, pp. 123-24.
This matter decided, Harmon re- This was the second time that Halsey
mained at his headquarters in Noumea had thus expressed his confidence in the
to await the capture of Munda. On the Army commander by making him vir-
morning of the 13th, he dictated a letter tually his deputy for ground operations,17
to General Handy in Washington. His and Harmon assumed his new duties
mood was optimistic and he forecast with dispatch and in a confident spirit.
early success. "Hester," he reported, "is First he ordered Griswold to be ready to
close to Lambeti Point and generally assume command "on prompt notice,"
closing in on Munda. Liversedge [com- and to prepare plans for resuming the
mander of the force that had landed at offensive. The reinforcements he needed,
Rice Anchorage] holds Enogai Inlet and Harmon assured him, would be avail-
is astride the junction of the Munda- able at the proper time. Then at about
Bairoko-Enogai trails." 14 The letter was noon of the 14th, Harmon left by plane
never sent, for that same morning for Guadalcanal, from where he could
brought alarming news from Griswold, oversee the movement of reinforcements
recently arrived in New Georgia. The and reach the front lines in short order.
operation, Griswold reported, was going That same day, a regimental combat
badly, with the 43d Division about team of the 25th Division was alerted
ready "to fold up." In his opinion, the for movement to New Georgia on twelve
division would "never take Munda," hours' notice.18
and he advised that the 25th Division The next move was Halsey's. On 15
and the remainder of the 37th be sent July, he relieved Admiral Turner of
quickly to New Georgia "if this opera- command in the South Pacific and trans-
tion is to be successful." 15 ferred him to the Central Pacific, where
The promptness with which higher he was to head the amphibious forces in
headquarters acted on receipt of this the coming offensive. This transfer,
news is a mark of the efficiency of the based on orders from Nimitz and seem-
South Pacific command and the close ingly unrelated to events in New Geor-
co-operation between the Army and gia, effectively removed from the scene
Navy commanders in the area. Harmon the chief architect of the New Georgia
and Halsey went into conference imme- plan and Hester's most effective cham-
diately, and before the meeting was over pion. His successor, Rear Adm. Theodore
Halsey had made his decision. Harmon S. Wilkinson, assumed command that
was to assume complete control of same day.
ground operations in New Georgia with
full authority "to take whatever steps of the South Pacific Campaign, p. 7. These accounts
by the two South Pacific commanders were prepared
were deemed necessary to facilitate the before they left the theater in mid-1944. Copies in
capture of the airfield." 16 OCMH.
17
The first occasion was in December 1942, during
14
Ltr, Harmon to Handy, 13 Jul 43, cited in MS the Guadalcanal Campaign. See above, ch. XVI. As
History of the New Georgia Campaign, I, ch. III, p. commander of U.S. Army Forces in the South Pacific,
37, OCMH. General Harmon had only administrative and supply
15
Rad, Griswold to Harmon, 13 Jul 43, cited in responsibilities.
18
Hist of New Georgia Campaign, I, ch III, 39, OCMH. Rad, Harmon to Griswold, 14 Jul 43, cited in
16
Harmon, The Army in the South Pacific, p. 8; Hist of New Georgia Campaign, I, ch. III, 40; Miller,
Admiral William F. Halsey, Jr., Narrative Account CARTWHEEL, p. 124.
General Hester's relief as commander commander and staff were necessary." 19

of the New Georgia Occupation Force The relief of Hester coincided with
followed only a few hours later. Even the Japanese decision to pull back to
before Turner's departure, Griswold had their final line in front of the airfield.
his orders to assume command of the Thereafter the advance of the American
Occupation Force at 2400, 15 July. At troops was more rapid, and Harmon was
that time, Griswold formally took over able to report to Halsey on 1 August
control of ground operations on New that "there is no presently valid reason
Georgia under Harmon. Hester's com- for doubting its success." 20 But he still
mand of the 43d Division was not affected expected to meet strong opposition and
by this change. doubted that the fight would be over
The shift in command of the New "in time for tea tomorrow." 21
Georgia operation accomplished no mir- The end was closer than Harmon
acles. The jungle remained as impene- thought, for the Japanese were at the
trable as ever, the heat as intense, and end of their rope. By 3 August, the
the Japanese as determined as before to Americans had reached the edge of the
hold Munda airfield. It took time to Munda airfield and circled it on the
bring in reinforcements and reorganize north. On the 4th they overran the field.
the troops for a fresh assault. By 25 July, "Open season in Nips today . . . ,"
General Griswold was ready to resume Harmon wrote. "All are determined
the offensive. The attack opened on the that tomorrow's action spells bad news
morning of the 25th when air and naval for Tojo. The sun shines brightly." 22
forces went into action and Army artil- Next day, despite the rain, the last enemy
lery battered the Japanese in their dug- resistance was overcome. At 1410, Munda
outs. When the artillery lifted, the was in American hands.
ground troops, after throwing back a The one great lesson of the New Geor-
Japanese counterattack that penetrated gia campaign was that it demonstrated
to the 43d Division command post, made strikingly the consequences of a failure
their way forward slowly through the to adhere to the principles of unity of
jungle. The going was tough and 43d command in joint operations. The relief
Division troops, already tired, failed to of General Hester was the culmination
keep pace with the advance. Finally, on of a series of events that had their origin
29 July, Harmon sent in Brig. Gen. in faulty command arrangements. Ad-
John R. Hodge, Assistant Division Com- miral Turner, as commander of the
mander, 25th, to replace Hester. The Attack Force, exercised his control of the
general, he felt, was tired—"had lost too ground forces in an active manner and
much sap." He had carried too much of showed no disposition to relinquish this
a load from the start of the campaign control even after the troops were estab-
and had lost touch with his own troops. 19
Ltr, Harmon to Brig Gen Allison J. Barnett, 28
For that Harmon was willing to take Jul 43, quoted in Hist of New Georgia Campaign, I,
most of the blame. He had failed to see, ch. V, 34.
20
he confided to his chief of staff, that one Ltr, Harmon to Halsey, 1 Aug 43, quoted in ibid.,
p. 40.
man could not handle both the division 21
Ltr, Harmon to Stratemeyer, 1 Aug 43, ibid.
and Occupation Force, "that a Corps 22
Rad, Harmon to Halsey, 4 Aug 43, ibid., p. 43.
MUNDA AIRFIELD fell to American forces on 4 August 1943.
lished ashore. And not only were the Strategic Forecast, August 1943
43d Division commander and his staff
improperly used, but ground units were As American troops were making their
shuffled in a manner that no experienced way slowly through the jungles of New
Army commander would have tolerated. Georgia toward Munda airfield, the
"This incident," wrote General Hull planners in Washington were preparing
some years after the event, "demonstrates for their next full-scale conference with
the fallacy of placing forces of one serv- the British, to be held in Quebec in mid-
ice under the immediate control of an August. The chief problems facing the
officer of another service who is not
trained in the organization and tactics in- Army troops would not again serve under General
Holland Smith; and they didn't thereafter." Ltr,
volved in the operation of that service." 23 Hull to Hoover, Jul 59. The relief of Maj. Gen.
Ralph Smith, commander of the Army 27th Division,
23
A similar failure, Hull added, was later respon- by Lt. Gen. Holland Smith, USMC, is described in
sible for the Smith versus Smith controversy on Philip A. Crowl, Campaign in the Marianas;
Saipan. As a result of this controversy, according UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II
to General Hull, "General Marshall decided that (Washington, 1960), ch. X.
ON NEW GEORGIA. Generals Twining (left), Harmon, Griswold, and Breene, and Brig.
Gen. Dean C. Strother.
Americans were those connected with the and produced numerous valuable studies
war in Europe; the time had come it in the process, they did so with a recogni-
seemed to them for a final decision on tion that final agreement on such a plan
the cross-Channel attack. would probably have to await the settle-
But the war in the Pacific also required ment of numerous unresolved problems,
attention. There was as yet no approved not the least of which was the future role
long-range plan for the defeat of Japan, of the Soviet Union and China in the
no clear decision on the area where the war against Japan.
main effort would be made, or even Though handicapped by the lack of a
whether the invasion of Japan would be long-range strategy into which to fit their
necessary. However important these mat- plans for the immediate future, the plan-
ters may have been, they were not, in the ners proceeded as best they could to out-
summer of 1943, urgent except insofar as line a pattern of operations to be followed
they affected plans for the immediate in the Pacific during the next eighteen
future. Thus, though the planners con- months, utilizing the studies already
tinued their search for a long-range plan made and tentatively approved as the
basis for planning. Central Pacific strat- Vogelkop Peninsula, head of the New
egy, at least through the seizure of the Guinea dragon.
Marshalls, was clear, but there was some During the next two phases of RENO,
doubt as to where Nimitz' forces would for which MacArthur set no dates, forces
go after that. CARTWHEEL also set out a of the Southwest Pacific would continue
firm schedule for MacArthur and Halsey, their advance along the Netherlands
but doubts had recently been expressed Indies axis to seize the islands between
on the necessity for the capture of Ra- New Guinea and the Philippines, there-
baul. To clear up these and other mat- by gaining control of the Celebes Sea.
ters, the planners turned to MacArthur At the same time the Palau group in the
for his advice.24 western Carolines was to be captured,
MacArthur's answer came early in either by MacArthur or Nimitz, to pro-
August in the form of a revision of his tect the right flank of the advance into
RENO plan outlining the steps by which Mindanao, the final phase of RENO II.
he intended to return to the Philip- In its general features, RENO II
pines.25 These steps, or operations, were clearly reflected MacArthur's strategic
divided into six phases, the first of which and tactical concepts and his view of the
was identical with CARTWHEEL. By importance of the Philippines in the war
March 1944, according to RENO II, forces against Japan. It called for the capture
of the Southwest Pacific would have se- of Rabaul as a necessary preliminary to
cured the objectives outlined in Phase control of the Bismarck Archipelago,
I—control of the Bismarck Archipelago, and for bypassing Wewak, whose capture
including the capture of Rabaul, and of General Marshall had suggested in July.
eastern New Guinea. Phase II, which Implicit in the plan was the view that
would begin on 1 August, would carry the New Guinea route was superior to
the advance into the Hollandia area of the Central Pacific, and that the step-by-
Dutch New Guinea, bypassing Wewak. step advance under cover of land-based
This move was to be accompanied by aircraft was the safest course to follow.
the invasion of the Kai, Aroe, and Tan- And it repeated the familiar arguments
imbar Islands in the Netherlands Indies for the concentration of Pacific resources
off the southwest coast of New Guinea, on the drive up the New Guinea coast
a move designed to guard the left flank as the most effective way to exploit the
of the main drive up the northwest coast Allied advantages in that area and to
of the dragon-shaped island. The re- speed up the tempo of the war.
mainder of 1944 and the early months Though MacArthur's schedule of op-
of 1945 would be devoted to Phase III erations for 1943 and 1944 was generally
operations in northwest New Guinea and acceptable in Washington, his views on
would culminate in the capture of the broad Pacific strategy found little sup-
port. Not only had the Joint Chiefs of
Staff and their planners become con-
24
Rad, Marshall to MacArthur, 19 Jul 43, CM- vinced of the desirability of the Central
OUT 7555. Pacific route, but they had also appar-
25
RENO II, 3 Aug 43, Outline Plan for Operations
of the Southwest Pacific Area, copy in OPD 381, case ently made up their minds about Rabaul.
214. For discussion of RENO I, See above, ch. XXII. Thus, the program drawn up by the
planners for the remainder of 1943 and dering success doubtful." 27 Finally, they
1944 gave full weight to the Central Pa- omitted altogether the operations Mac-
cific offensive and called for the neutrali- Arthur had scheduled in the Netherland
zation rather than the capture of Rabaul. East Indies to protect the left flank of his
The reconciliation of this program with advance along the New Guinea coast.28
MacArthur's promised to be a difficult The similarity of the Washington and
task. RENO plans was more marked than the
In the opinion of the planners, Ad- differences. In both, MacArthur's and
miral Nimitz' forces, after they had com- Halsey's forces were to complete CART-
pleted the operations already scheduled WHEEL; next, they were to gain control
in the Gilberts and Marshalls, should con- of the Bismarck Archipelago. This last
tinue westward into the Carolines, taking they were to accomplish, under the
first Ponape, then Truk, "the key Japa- Washington plan, in three phases: first,
nese position in the Central Pacific," and
seizure of the islands along the eastern
finally Yap and the Palau Islands.26 border of the Archipelago (New Ireland,
From there, at some indefinite day, the New Hanover, and St. Matthias); second,
forces of the Central Pacific would move capture of the Admiralty Islands to the
into the Philippines. Though no opera- north and west; and, finally, occupation
tions were scheduled for the Marianas, of the New Guinea coast line as far west
the planners indicated their intention ofas Wewak. These tasks completed, Mac-
preparing an outline plan for the Arthur was to continue along the north-
recapture of Guam in the near future. west coast of New Guinea in a series of
The strategic objective of the programamphibious and airborne operations that
developed in Washington early in August would take him to the Vogelkop Penin-
was the line Palaus-Vogelkop Penin- sula by the end of 1944.29 Or so the
sula. This aim fitted in perfectly with planners believed.
MacArthur's RENO plan, though the The timetable for this ambitious pro-
operations envisaged in Washington were gram—which also included operations
not identical with those outlined by in the China-Burma-India Theater—was
MacArthur. For one thing, the Wash- carefully worked out to exploit the ad-
ington planners ruled out the capture of vantages inherent in an advance along
Rabaul as an unnecessary move and "an two widely separate routes. (Table 5)
intolerable drain" on resources and man- Thus, while Nimitz prepared for the Gil-
power. For another, they included in berts invasion in November 1943, Mac-
their program the seizure of Wewak, Arthur and Halsey were to continue their
despite MacArthur's assertion that the own offensives in New Guinea and the
operation "would involve hazards ren- northern Solomons. In January 1944
Nimitz would go into the Marshalls and
26
JPS 235, 31 Jul 43, sub: Opns Against the Caro-
lines; JPS 236, same date, sub: Opns Against the 27 Rad, MacArthur to Marshall, 23 July 43, CM-IN
Palau Islands. These and other outline plans pre- 16419.
28
pared by the Joint War Plans Committee became JPS 243, 5 Aug 43, sub: Opns in the New Guinea-
the basis for the over-all plans, JPS 245, 5 Aug 43, Bismarck Archipelago-Admiralty Islands Area Sub-
sub: Opns in the Pacific and Far East in 1943-1944. sequent to CARTWHEEL.
29
This plan was submitted to the Joint Chiefs on 6 JCS 446, 6 Aug 43, sub: Specific Opns in Pacific
August as JCS 446. and Far East in 1943-1944.
TABLE 5—TIMETABLE OF PACIFIC OPERATIONS, AUGUST 1943
the next month MacArthur would assault not to commit themselves in advance to
Wewak. These operations concluded, such transfers or to any single theater,
Halsey would occupy Kavieng in New agreeing only that if there were any con-
Ireland in May, and then in June the flicts "due weight should be given to the
forces of all three would go into action fact that operations in the Central Pa-
simultaneously against Ponape, Manus, cific" promised a more rapid advance
and Hollandia. When Nimitz moved that operations elsewhere.
out against Truk in September, Mac- On 7 August, just one week before the
Arthur was to start his advance toward scheduled Quebec Conference, the Joint
the Vogelkop Peninsula. By the end of Chiefs met to discuss, among other things,
the year, if all went well, both com- the program outlined by the planners.30
manders would have reached their ob- On the whole, they thought it a sound
jectives and would be standing on the plan and accepted most of it without
Palaus-Vogelkop line. question. The one important point re-
The planners were entirely confident lating to the Pacific that came up during
that the resources required to carry out the discussion was Admiral King's sug-
this program could be made available in gestion for greater flexibility in the
time. They expected also that if forces Central Pacific so that Nimitz could ad-
were idle in one area they could be trans- vance north from the Carolines, toward
ferred to the other so that the momen- Japan as well as west toward the Philip-
tum of the drive would not be lost. But
the Washington authorities were careful 30
Mins, JCS Mtg, 7 Aug 43.
pines. What he had in mind was the did not have for the British. Moreover,
possibility of moving into the Marianas, strategic plans in one theater were
either in conjunction with or instead of bound to affect plans in the other. As
the seizure of the Palaus. General Marshall observed early in the
Capture of the Marianas was a project conference, "it was essential to link Pa-
King had long favored. At the Casa- cific and European strategy." And Ad-
blanca Conference, seven months before, miral King did not fail to point out that
he had described these islands as "the the inability of the Allies to take Rabaul
key to the situation because of their loca- in 1943, as originally planned, was a
tion on the Japanese line of communica- direct result of the failure at Casablanca
tion."31 By the time of the TRIDENT to consider the requirements of the
Conference in May, he had found addi- Pacific war in relation to the war in
tional reasons for going into the Marianas Europe.34
but the program then approved had not It was not until 17 August, after they
included any operations for their cap- had discussed the war in Europe at
ture.32 Now, in August, he again em- length, that the Combined Chiefs turned
phasized the importance of these islands. to the American program for operations
This time he secured from his colleagues against Japan in 1943-44.35 The debate
their assent to inclusion in the approved that followed dealt largely with the situa-
program for 1943-1944—the statement tion in Southeast Asia, the area in which
that "it may be found desirable or neces- American and British views differed
sary to seize Guam and the Japanese most markedly. On the Pacific side,
Marianas, possibly the Bonins" after cap- recognized by now as virtually an Amer-
ture of Truk. Such a move, it was ican domain, harmony prevailed. Only
asserted, "would have profound effects one important point did the British raise.
on the Japanese because of its serious Would it not be advisable, they asked, to
threat to the homeland."33 These and curtail operations in New Guinea and
other minor changes were quickly made make the main effort through the Cen-
and on 9 August the Joint Chiefs gave tral Pacific rather than advance equally
their approval to the program. Soon up both fronts? The forces thus released,
after, the American delegation left for they suggested, could then be used in the
Quebec. cross-Channel attack for which the
The main business of the conference Americans were pushing so hard.36
at Quebec was the war in Europe. The
British, as a matter of fact, had momen- 34
Mins, CCS Mtg, 14 Aug 43. Minutes of the Que-
tarily hoped to avoid altogether any dis- bec Conference are bound separately, with all the
papers there approved, in the volume titled
cussion of Japan, but the Americans QUADRANT, code name of the conference.
would not let them do so. The war in 35
CCS 288/3, 14 Aug 43, sub: Agenda. The order of
the Pacific had an urgency for them it business for discussions of the war against Japan was
(1) the long-range plan for the defeat of Japan, (2)
operations in the Pacific and Far East, and (3) oper-
31
Mins, CCS Mtg, 14 Jan 43. ations and command in the China-Burma-India
32
Mins, CCS Mtg, 21 May 43. Theater.
33
The revised version of JCS 446 was issued as CCS 36
Mins, CCS Mtg, 17 Aug 43; Churchill, Closing
301, 9 Aug 43, sub: Opns in the Pacific and Far East, the Ring (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1951),
1943-1944; Supp Mins, JCS, 9 Aug 43. pp. 86-87.
AMERICAN STRATEGIC PLANNERS at the Quadrant Conference. From left: Generals Handy,
Wedemeyer, and Fairchild, and Admiral Willson.
The idea that the main effort should Marianas. Furthermore, Marshall ob-
be made in the Central Pacific was not a served, the Japanese were losing heavily
new one. The Americans had discussed in New Guinea.37
it frequently among themselves and there The British suggestion that the savings
were many, especially in the Navy, who effected by limiting operations in New
favored it. King himself would have pre- Guinea be applied to OVERLORD held no
ferred such a strategy, but before the appeal for the Americans, despite their
British he hewed firmly to the party line desire to secure a commitment for the
and championed the cause of the South- cross-Channel attack. The advocates of
west Pacific. The dual advance, he de- the Central Pacific strategy saw it as an
clared, was more advantageous than an opportunity to speed up the tempo of
advance along one route. Each comple- the war by concentrating on the area
mented the other; together, they pro- that promised the most decisive results,
duced greater results than could either not as a means of providing additional
alone and opened up additional areas of forces for Europe. If the allocations to
exploitation. Thus the two forces could MacArthur were cut back, then these
converge on the Philippines or, one
could go north from Truk into the 37
Mins, CCS Mtg, 17 Aug 43.
THE COMBINED CHIEFS AT QUEBEC. From left foreground: Lord Louis Mountbatten,
Admiral Pound, General Brooke, Air Chief Marshal Portal, Field Marshal Dill, General
Ismay, Brigadier Harold Redmond, Comdr. R. D. Coleridge, Generals Deane, Arnold, and
Marshall, Admirals Leahy and King, and Captain Royal.
resources, declared King, should go to Guinea should be discontinued. All they

Admiral Nimitz for the advance across had in mind was to limit MacArthur's
the Central Pacific. Moreover, General forces to a holding role and to assure
Marshall pointed out, most of the forces themselves that the Americans did not
required for MacArthur's advance in intend to recapture all of New Guinea.
New Guinea were already in or en route With this latter point, MacArthur him-
to the theater and, in any case, could not self would have agreed; but certainly not
be employed in Europe. To curtail with the former. Neither his plans nor
MacArthur's operations, therefore, would those of the Washington planners con-
not produce additional forces for templated such a role for the Southwest
OVERLORD. 38 Pacific. But since the British did not
Having stirred up this brief tempest, pursue the question further at this time,
the British backed off. They did not the discussion was dropped.
mean, they said, that operations in New Only one other time during the confer-
ence did the British seek to limit opera-
38
Ibid. tions in New Guinea and that was when
the Combined Chiefs were considering further discussion of the Pacific pro-
their interim report to the President gram for 1943-1944. The Combined
and Prime Minister on 21 August. This Chiefs of Staff accepted the American
time the British approached the matter plan in toto and incorporated it in the
from another angle. They had no objec- final report that the President and Prime
tion to the American program in the Minister approved on the last day of the
Pacific for 1943-1944, they declared, but conference.40 This action, in effect,
thought it should include a statement placed the seal of approval on the specific
requiring the review of operations in operations outlined in the broad pro-
New Guinea "to ensure that the results gram. For the Central Pacific, this meant
likely to be obtained are commensurate the seizure of the Gilberts, the Marshalls,
with the effort involved." 39 There was Ponape and Truk in the Carolines, and,
little reason for such a request since the finally, either the Palaus or the Mari-
Joint Chiefs, as a matter of course, anas, or both. For MacArthur, the
kept all American operations under con- decision of the Combined Chiefs meant
stant review. Moreover, such a statement the disapproval of his plans to take
might easily be interpreted as an expres- Rabaul. But it was also an assurance
sion of a lack of confidence in General that he would not be limited to a hold-
MacArthur. Already, the Americans ing mission and that operations in his
pointed out, MacArthur had been disap- theater would not be curtailed. Spe-
pointed by the refusal to provide him cifically, his task for the next sixteen
with forces he had asked for. The British months would be to complete CART-
suggestion could serve only to add to WHEEL, gain control of the Bismarck
his disappointment and to have "a dis- Archipelago, neutralize Rabaul, capture
heartening effect upon him." When this Kavieng, the Admiralties, and Wewak,
was pointed out, the British promptly then advance along the northwest coast
withdrew their suggestion, explaining of New Guinea to the Vogelkop Penin-
that they had had "no idea" that the sula in a series of "airborne-waterborne"
final report would be sent to General operations. Nothing was said about the
MacArthur. Philippines, but presumably sometime
Though the war against Japan con- in 1945 he could launch his invasion of
tinued to take up much of the time of the islands, in conjunction with a drive
the conferees at Quebec, there was no from the Central Pacific.
39
Memo, British COS, 21 Apr 43, sub: Progress Rpt
40
to President and Prime Minister; Mins, CCS Mtg, 21 CCS 319/5, 24 Aug 43, sub: Final Rpt to President
Aug 43. and Prime Minister.
CHAPTER XXVI
Review and Adjustment
Strategy decides where to act; logistics brings the troops to this point; grand
tactics decides the manner of execution and the employment of troops.
BARON DE JOMINI, The Art of War
No sooner had the program for the the coming year had been adopted.1
Pacific been approved on the highest The one item about which there was
level than it had to be adjusted to meet some doubt was shipping. Certainly
changed conditions. The stresses and there was ample evidence that the day
strains created by limited resources as of plenty had not yet arrived and that
well as the conflicting interests and com- the chronic shortage of ships that had
peting requirements of the theater com- so plagued the Pacific commanders in
manders dictated other changes. Thus, the past would continue to affect plan-
in the period between August and ning. As a matter of fact, on the day
December 1943, the plans so recently the conference opened, General Mac-
made were reviewed once more and re- Arthur had submitted to Washington
vised as necessary. There was nothing his estimate of the shipping he would
unique or unusual in this fact. Plan- need during the coming months to meet
ning was a continuous process and up to the requirements of CARTWHEEL. The
the moment of execution no plan was total came to seventy-one Liberty ships
ever considered so firm that it could and ten freighters to move 150,000 men
not be challenged and changed to attain with their equipment. 2 In view of the
a given objective more effectively or at requirements of other theaters, this was
less cost. a big order to fill. But by permitting
MacArthur to retain seventy-one Liberty
Ships and Plans ships for intratheater movements and
providing some but not all of the troop
The men and means required to carry transports requested, the Washington
out the series of operations planned for authorities were able to promise Mac-
the Pacific in 1943 and 1944 had been
carefully computed at Quebec. The re-
1
port of the planners had been optimistic, CCS 239/2, 26 Aug 43, sub: Implementation of
. . . Specific Opns for Conduct of War, 1943-1944.
and it was partially on this basis that 2
Rad, MacArthur to Somervell, 14 Aug 43, CM-IN
the ambitious program mapped out for 10721.
Arthur that he would get most of what The information received at Pearl
he needed.3 Harbor as a result of this aerial recon-
In the Central Pacific, where plans naissance, and from other sources, raised
were being matured for the invasion of some doubts in the minds of the theater
Nauru and the Gilberts in November planners. The seizure of Nauru, it now
and of the Marshalls in January 1944, appeared, would be a more formidable
there were other problems.4 At the time task than had been thought. The island's
the directive had been issued for the coast line was generally precipitous and
seizure of these islands, little was actu- the terrain favorable for defense. Cer-
ally known about them. They had been tainly the 27th Division, which had the
selected as the initial objectives largely task of taking the island, would find it
because of their location. It had been no easy job and could expect heavy
assumed that they could be seized with losses.
the forces available, but with the under- There were other reasons why the
standing that the commanders in the Nauru operation did not appeal to Nim-
field would require more information itz' planners. The island lay about 450
about the targets before the invasion. statute miles west of Tarawa, where the
It was for this reason that the Washing- 2d Marine Division was to land. To
ton planners had emphasized the impor- assault both islands simultaneously
tance of preliminary operations to oc- would require splitting the supporting
cupy and develop air bases in the Ellice naval forces and create a situation favor-
group and elsewhere for reconnaissance able to Japanese counterattack against
as well as support. Thus, among the either of the supporting elements.
first steps taken in the theater to pre- Under these conditions, the dispersal of
pare for the Gilberts-Nauru invasion the fleet represented a risk the naval
was the occupation of Baker Island, 480 commanders had no wish to assume.
miles east of the Gilberts, and of two Moreover, an assault against two widely
additional islands in the Ellice group. separated targets would require more
Airfields were quickly built and by early transports and cargo vessels than would
September aircraft from these and other otherwise be needed, and shipping facili-
nearby islands were flying over the ties in the theater were already being
targets.5 strained to the utmost. Any plan that
3
Rads, Hull to Handy and Somervell, 15 Aug the Gilberts and Marshalls was received at Pearl
43, CM-OUT 6054; Somervell to MacArthur, 18 Harbor—he was then Nimitz' chief of staff—no one
Aug 43, CM-IN 13773; MacArthur to Marshall, 19 really knew how difficult the capture of a fortified
Aug 43, CM-IN 14061; Marshall to MacArthur, atoll would be or what the Japanese had in the
24 Aug 43, CM-OUT 18280. For a full discussion of islands. At a conference in Nimitz' office, Spruance
this problem, see Richard M. Leighton and Robert writes, "I strongly urged the necessity of an advance
W. Coakley, Global Logistics and Strategy: 1943- from our Hawaii-South Pacific line of communica-
1945, MS ch. XX, "Shipping in the Pacific War." tions through the Ellice and Gilbert Islands in order
This is a forthcoming volume in the series UNITED to establish air bases (and where possible bases for
STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II. ships) as a necessary preliminary to the conquest of
4
See above, ch. XXII. the Marshalls. Capt. Forrest Sherman, then Chief of
5
For an account of the occupation and develop- Staff to COMAIRPAC, supported me as to the neces-
ment of these islands see Crowl and Love, Seizure of sity for preliminary reconnaissance, except that he
the Gilberts and Marshalls, pp. 52-56. Admiral preferred Wake rather than positions to the south-
Spruance later recalled that when the directive for ward." Ltr, Spruance to Hoover, 17 Jul 59, OCMH.
REVIEW AND ADJUSTMENT 523
would result in a saving of precious "similar to that of Kiska after our capture
shipping space was always welcome. of Attu."
Fortunately, the theater planners had Admiral Spruance, then Nimitz' chief
an alternative target that would solve of staff and commander-designate of the
all these problems. Why not take Makin forces assigned to capture the Gilberts,
Atoll, about 100 miles north of Tarawa, later described the decision to substitute
instead of Nauru? It was close enough Makin for Nauru as follows:
to Tarawa to permit naval forces to
support both operations from one area, Nauru was an uplifted circular atoll with
no lagoon, no protection except on the lee
and to effect economy in shipping. From side, a narrow beach and inshore of that a
the strategic point of view, it would cliff about 100 ft. high. It lay about 380
serve as well as or better than Nauru [nautical] miles west of Tarawa toward
as a base for future operations against Truk. The operation called for would have
the Marshalls; tactically, it would pre- divided our fleet into two parts, out of sup-
porting distance of each other, each one
sent fewer problems. It was neither as engaged in conducting a difficult amphibi-
well defended by the Japanese nor as ous operation. The Japanese Fleet at Truk
difficult to assault as Nauru. 6 was about equal to our own in strength,
The arguments for the substitution and, except for our submarines, we had no
of Makin for Nauru convinced Admiral means of knowing what it was doing. I pro-
tested against this situation, but got no
Nimitz of the need for a change. He change. The more we studied the problem
discussed the problem about 25 Septem- of how to capture Nauru, the less we liked
ber with Admiral King, who was then it. Finally, Gen. Holland Smith wrote a
at Pearl Harbor, and King, too, thought letter recommending we not take Nauru.
the idea a good one. The next day Nim- Admiral Turner and I both added our en-
itz formally requested the Joint Chiefs dorsements concurring, and I handed it to
Admiral Nimitz at his morning conference,
to authorize the change on the grounds at which Admiral King and Admiral C. M.
that the occupation of Nauru "will in- Cooke were present (about 25 Sept). Ad-
volve losses of personnel and material, miral King read the letter and then asked
and a logistic burden which outweigh me what I proposed to take instead of
advantages." 7 Seizure of Makin, he as- Nauru. I replied "Makin," and said that
Makin was in the direction we were going
serted, was well within the theater capa- and would be of much more value to us
bilities in shipping and logistics and than Nauru, that Nauru had been of value
would reduce expected losses "to accept- to the Japanese, but it would not be after
able figures." And to allay any concern we took the Gilberts. After some discussion
in Washington about the Japanese on Admiral King agreed to the change, and
recommended it to the JCS.8
Nauru, he explained that he planned
to neutralize that island during the Gil- There was little objection to Nimitz'
berts and Marshalls operations. There- proposal. In view of Admiral King's
after, its position would be, as he put it, advance approval, there was no comment
at all from the Navy. The Army plan-
ners reviewed the problem briefly and
6
Crowl and Love, Seizure of the Gilberts and Mar- concluded that on the whole Makin was
shalls, p. 26.
7
Rad, Nimitz to King, No. 260439, 26 Sep 43, CM-
8
IN 20329. Ltr, Spruance to Hoover, 17 Jul 59, OCMH.
a more desirable objective than Nauru. Marshalls atolls—Kwajalein, Wotje, and

As a matter of fact, they pointed out, Maloelap—and the neutralization of
they would have included it in the orig- Jaluit and Mille. Forces for the opera-
inal plan themselves, "but for limitation tion—the 7th Infantry Division, the 4th
of resources." 9 The only aspect of the Marine Division, and the 22d Marines
problem that concerned the Air Forces reinforced—were to be mounted from
was the fact that Makin had no air the Hawaiian Islands and bases in the
facilities and would require extensive South Pacific, with the Ellice Islands
development before it could be used by and the Gilberts as staging points.
the Americans. Nauru, on the other Reconnaissance and air bombardment
hand, had been developed by the Japa- would precede the landings. Assuming
nese and its capture would provide the the successful completion of the Gilberts
Americans with a ready-made air base. operation, Nimitz thought he could
But having expressed this concern, Gen- launch the invasion of the Marshalls on
eral Arnold raised no objection to the 1 January 1944, the date set by the Joint
substitution and on 27 September the Chiefs of Staff.
Joint Chiefs gave their formal consent. This plan was all right as far as it
A week later, Nimitz formally directed went, but the Washington planners did
Admiral Spruance to seize Makin, not think it went far enough. The goals
Tarawa, and Apamama—target date, 20 set at Quebec called for a more ambi-
November 1943.10 tious plan that would place American
By the time this change was made the forces in position to move next into the
plan for the invasion of the Marshalls Carolines and, perhaps, into the Mari-
had also been reviewed and adjusted. anas. The objectives Nimitz had set
Directed by the Joint Chiefs to have himself would take him only into the
ready by 1 September an outline plan eastern and central Marshalls. Eniwetok
and an estimate of the forces required and Kusaie in the western Marshalls and
for the Marshalls operation, Admiral Wake Island to the north were the goals
Nimitz had wasted no time. The plan Nimitz should strive for, the planners
was ready on 20 August and when the thought. Not only would the seizure
Joint Chiefs returned from Quebec it of these islands consolidate U.S. control
was waiting for them. With it was a of the Marshalls, but the islands would
proposed directive for the operation and also provide the bases for rapid advance
a request for a firm planning date.11 westward or northward.12
The plan proposed by Nimitz called When the planners sought to broaden
for the simultaneous seizure of the three the scope of Nimitz' plan, they ran up
9
Memo, Col Frank N. Roberts for Handy, 27 Sep
against the shortage of shipping—the
43, sub: Substitution of Makin for Nauru . . . . perennial problem of Pacific planning.
OPD Exec Files (2, item 1b).
10
Ultimately the shortage was reduced to
Memo, Marshall for King, 27 Sep 43, sub: Substi-
12
tution of Makin for Nauru, OPD Exec Files (2, item Mins, JPS Mtg, 27 Aug 43, JPS 262, 28 Aug 43,
1b); Rad, King to Nimitz, 271805, 27 Sep 43, CM-IN sub: Seizure of Marshalls; JCS 461, 30 Aug 43, same
19285; CINCPAC-CINCPOA Opns Plan 13-43, 5 sub. See also CCS 319/5, 24 Aug 43, sub: Final Rpt
Oct 43. The original target date was 19 November. to President and Prime Minister, QUADRANT; and
11
Ltr, Nimitz to King, ser. 00151, 20 Aug 43, sub: Crowl and Love, Seizure of the Gilberts and Mar-
Seizure of Marshalls, OPD Exec Files. shalls, pp. 167-69.
nine transports and ten cargo vessels. tember retained the target date of 1 Jan-
If the planners wanted Nimitz to include uary while adding the additional mission
Eniwetok, Kusaie, and Wake in the Mar- of taking Wake, Eniwetok, and Kusaie.
shalls operation and still retain the 1 Though Marshall overruled his plan-
January target date, they would have to ners on the date of the invasion, he was
find these additional vessels for him. as determined as they that operations in
The shipping experts, though they con- the South and Southwest Pacific should
firmed the shortage, thought it could not be sacrificed to the Central Pacific
be done. There was a chance that some drive. He insisted, therefore, that Nim-
ships from the Atlantic or from the itz be told that operations currently
South and Southwest Pacific might be planned under CARTWHEEL would con-
available, or that other types of vessels tinue and that post-CARTWHEEL opera-
could be used for the operations. This tions in New Guinea, New Ireland, and
was enough for the Navy planners. the Admiralties would begin about Feb-
Admiral Nimitz, they declared, should ruary 1944. The Joint Chiefs accepted
be directed to take the three additional this condition and it was included in the
objectives concurrently with or imme- final directive sent to Nimitz.14
diately after the seizure of Kwajalein, Agreement on a plan and target date
Wotje, and Maloelap.13 for the invasion of the Marshalls did not
The Army planners also favored a signify that there was no further reason
broader Marshalls plan, but were less for concern over shipping. Rather it
optimistic about the shipping prospects. raised the possibility of new shortages,
They feared also that it might provide for, as General Marshall noted, Nimitz'
a justification for taking from the South- plan called for more shipping than had
west Pacific the additional ships required been used to transport the 34,000 troops
by Nimitz and thus adversely affect of Patton's force in the North African
CARTWHEEL. As a safeguard against this invasion. If Central Pacific operations
danger, therefore, they proposed that the continued to consume such vast quan-
target date of 1 January be made con- tities of ships, there was indeed reason
tingent on the availability of shipping. for apprehension, Marshall thought. He
In effect, this provision would introduce therefore asked that Central Pacific
all sorts of possibilities for change and shipping requirements be studied more
might well affect the long-range schedule closely to see what effect they would
for operations in the Central Pacific. have on operations in other theaters, and
For this reason, and because he wished whether they could be reduced. The
to meet Admiral Nimitz' request for a other Chiefs gave their assent to this
firm planning date, General Marshall proposal and on 6 September the plan-
sided with the Navy planners. Thus, the ners were directed to make the survey.15
directive that went to Nimitz on 1 Sep- 14
Rad, JCS to Nimitz, 2 Sep 43, CM-IN 1123; JCS
461, 30 Aug 43, sub: Seizure of Marshalls; Mins, JCS
13
Leighton and Coakley, Global Logistics and Strat- Mtg, 31 Aug 43.
15
egy: 1943-1945, MS ch. XX, "Shipping in the Pacific Memo by CofS, USA, 6 Sep 43, sub: Pacific Opns
War," p. 15; Memo, Deputy Chief, Planning Div and Availability of Shipping. This memo was pre-
OCT, for Somervell, 31 Aug 43, sub: Shipping for pared by General Somervell. JCS 471; Mins, JCS Mtg,
Seizure of Marshalls, Hq ASF Folder Trans SOS 1943. 7 Sep 43.
The results were distinctly encourag- able. General Harmon's request for an
ing. There would be ample cargo space Army division early in November was
to meet all requirements, the planners turned down because of the shortage of
reported. Moreover, the shortage in shipping, and Richardson was told by
troop carriers created by the allocation General Handy, when he complained
to Nimitz of nine additional ships could about the lack of ships, that "the ex-
be met by converting freighters to trans- tremely critical shipping situation" was
ports. By June of 1944, the planners not confined to the Pacific. Allocations
estimated, the deficit of 33,900 spaces to the Central Pacific, he was told, had
would have been converted to a surplus been made only after careful consider-
of 86,000 spaces for Pacific personnel. ation of the ships available and opera-
Thus, the planners concluded, the oper- tional requirements. It was "in no sense,"
ations projected for 1943-1944 could go added Handy, "a hit-and-miss guess
forward as scheduled, if all else went which fails to consider the needs of each
well.16 The outlook for the future, so far area." 18
as shipping was concerned, was brighter Meanwhile, the date for the Marshalls
than it had ever been. invasion, which apparently had been
This optimistic forecast did not mean firmly fixed on 1 September, had come
there were enough vessels of all types under re-examination. The theater
to take care of immediate needs. Assault planners in Hawaii had tried to produce
ships such as the LST and other landing a plan that would meet the specifications
craft were still in short supply and would laid down by the Joint Chiefs, but finally
continue to affect operations in all thea- had to admit their failure. With the
ters, especially as the date for OVERLORD Gilberts campaign looming so close, they
approached. To provide MacArthur with did not see how they could train the
sufficient craft of this type for CART- troops, reconnoiter the Marshalls, repair
WHEEL, for example, it was necessary damage to vessels, and complete construc-
to authorize exchange between his and tion in the Gilberts—all in time to meet
Halsey's area, and one War Department the scheduled date of 1 January. The
observer thought the speed of the New only solution seemed to be to delay the
Guinea advance would be increased if invasion and on 25 October Admiral
MacArthur had more shipping.17 Nimitz so recommended, "with consid-
Nor were there sufficient ships in the erable regret." The new date, he pro-
fall of 1943 to enable the War Depart- posed, should be 31 January. He would
ment to send to the Pacific the additional make every effort "to anticipate this
units requested by the theater command- date," he promised, but at the same time
ers, even if these units had been avail- he warned Admiral King that if damage
to ships during the Gilberts operations
16
proved excessive it might be necessary
JCS 471/1, 23 Sep 43, sub: Pacific Opns and Avail-
ability of Shipping; Mins, JCS Mtg, 28 Sep 43. For a
further discussion of this problem, see Leighton and
18
Coakley, Global Logistics and Strategy: 1943-1945, Ltrs, Handy to Richardson, 28 Oct 43, sub: Cen-
MS ch. XX, "Shipping in the Pacific War." tral Pacific Opns and Deployment, OPD 381, case 257;
17
Rads, Ritchie to Handy, 27 Sep 43, CM-IN 18992; Handy to Harmon, 8 Nov 43, no sub, OPD 381,
Marshall to MacArthur, 8 Oct 43, CM-OUT 3401. case 261.
to postpone the Marshalls invasion still up training and other preparations, and
further. 19 thus get on with the war."22
Short of providing Nimitz with addi-
tional ships and trained troops, neither Strategic Role of the North Pacific
of which were available, there was noth-
ing to be done but accept Nimitz' recom- The role of the North Pacific in the
mendation and urge him to move as fast strategy of the war against Japan had,
as possible. The joint planners, after by the fall of 1943, been studied exhaus-
studying the matter, concluded hopefully tively. From the outset, it had been
that the advantages of more thorough apparent that the resolution of this ques-
preparation outweighed the disadvan- tion was largely dependent upon the
tages occasioned by the delay. And they role of the Soviet Union in the Far East
discovered unexpected benefit in the fact and its willingness to co-operate with the
that a delay in the Marshalls invasion United States, at least to the extent of
would place it close to MacArthur's making available bomber bases in the
scheduled attack against Wewak on 1 Maritime Provinces. Thus, the first stud-
February. The two operations coming ies of a possible offensive in the North
so close together, the planners reasoned, Pacific had been sparked by the fear that
would work to the advantage of both.20 Japanese troops would move into Siberia
All of the Joint Chiefs except General and bring Russia into the war under dis-
Marshall seemed ready to accept this view advantageous circumstances. Combined
and approve the delay without question. with this threat was the strong desire of
Theater commanders were always the Air Forces to utilize Siberian bases
making such recommendations, General for air attacks against the Japanese home
Marshall pointed out, and it was up to islands at such time as Russia entered
the Joint Chiefs, in considering these the war. In the face of Stalin's deter-
matters, "to decide the relation between mination to maintain a scrupulous but
urgency and perfection."21 Reminded armed neutrality in the Far East and
thus of their responsibilities, the Joint avoid a two-front war, the first overtures
Chiefs reviewed the matter more care- for co-operation in the North Pacific had
fully, and on Admiral King's suggestion come to nought.
approved the delay but with the proviso The occupation of Adak at the end
that the date of the invasion should not of August 1942 raised again the question
be later than 31 January. "You will of a North Pacific offensive.23 Though
spare no effort," King wrote in a sepa- the means for such an offensive were
rate communication to Nimitz, "to speed not then available, the possibility of a
Japanese attack against the Soviet Union
19
Ltr, Nimitz to King, ser. 00247, 25 Oct 43; Crowl could not be discounted. To prepare
and Love, Seizure of the Gilberts and Marshalls, p. for such a contingency Admiral King
168; Robert D. Heinl, Jr., and John A. Crown, The
Marshalls: Increasing the Tempo (Washington: U.S. proposed on 21 September that plans be
Marine Corps Historical Branch, 1954), pp. 9-11.
20 22
JPS 205/5, 30 Oct 43, sub: Opns in Central Paci- Rad, JCS to Nimitz, 4 Nov 43; King to Nimitz,
fic; Mins, JPS Mtg, same date: JCS 559, 1 November ser. 002415, 4 Nov 43, sub: Delay in FLINTLOCK, cited
43, sub: Opns in Central Pacific. in Hayes, The War Against Japan, II, 86.
21 23
Mins, JCS Mtg, 2 Nov 43. See above, ch. XXI.
made not only to aid Russia but also to Aleutians be cleared; and that plans be
use Soviet territory—which would pre- made for the operations outlined.25
sumably be available in case of a Japa- There were numerous objections to
nese attack. The whole problem of the this ambitious program. Not only would
North Pacific, King urged, should be it immobilize a division, divert resources
carefully studied to determine "the po- to Alaska, and initiate operations pre-
tentialities of a campaign against Japan maturely, but it was also based on the
via Alaska, the Aleutians, and the Bering doubtful assumption that the Soviet
Strait into the Kamchatka Peninsula via Union would co-operate with the United
northeast Siberia." 24 States in the execution of these plans.
The special committee of Army, Navy, Despite these objections, the committee
and Marine officers formed to make this finally submitted virtually the same rec-
study, spent more than two months on ommendations to the joint planners. It
the job. Its massive report, boiled down did, however, stress the need for co-
to essentials, called first for the expulsion ordination with the Soviets and for
of the Japanese from the Aleutians in obtaining information from them on the
order to build forward air bases there strength and disposition of their forces,
and to secure the line of communications the logistical support they could be ex-
to Siberia—a project already under way; pected to provide in case of operations
second, the establishment of a supply and in the Kurils or on Kamchatka, and the
air base at Petropavlovsk on the Kam- status of airfields, communications, and
chatka Peninsula; and third, the capture transportation in the area. These rec-
of Paramushiro and Shimushu in the ommendations the joint planners passed
Kurils. These operations, and others, the on without modification to the Joint
committee made clear, were contingent Chiefs on 30 December. They in turn
upon the entry of the Soviet Union into approved the recommendations, but only
the war and its willingness to permit as a basis for further planning.26
U.S. forces the use of its territory. But Though each of the services could and
even under these conditions, the com- did prepare to carry out its share of this
mittee believed, it would not be possible program, it was impossible to make any
to mount large-scale operations against realistic plans involving the use of Soviet
the Kurils or on the Asiatic mainland territory or combined action with Soviet
for some time. The committee recom- forces until additional information was
mended, therefore, that a division be secured. The prospects for getting this
readied for the occupation of Petropav- information seemed bright at the time.
lovsk, whose retention it considered Maj. Gen. Follett Bradley, who had gone
essential for U.S.-Soviet co-operation;
that air facilities in Alaska and the Aleu- 25
JPS 67/1, 30 Nov 42, sub: Campaign Against
tians be expanded; that small naval craft Japan via the Northern Route, summarized in OPD
Memo for Handy, 1 Dec 42, sub: Brief on JPS 67/1,
(two squadrons of PT boats) be ear- ABC 381 Japan (5-31-42), sec. 1.
marked for dispatch to Siberia; that the 26
Mins, JCS Mtg, 30 Dec 42 and 5 Jan 43; OPD
Brief, Notes on JPS Mtg, 2 Dec 42, sub: Campaign
24
Memo, King for JCS, 21 Sep 42, sub: Campaign against Japan via the Northern Route, JPS 67/1,
Against Japan via the Northern Route, ABC 381 ABC 381 Japan (5-31-42), sec. 1; JCS 182, 1 Jan 43,
Japan (5-31-42), sec. 1. same sub.
to Moscow in July 1942, had only lately his consent, Bradley began to make his
arrived in Washington. Stalin, Bradley preparations for the survey.
was convinced, would not agree to any It was at this point that the recommen-
action that could be interpreted as hos- dations made by the committee studying
tile to Japan so long as the Soviet Union North Pacific strategy reached the Joint
was at war with Germany. But if Japan Chiefs. There seemed every reason then
attacked the Soviet Union, Bradley to believe that the information needed
believed that Stalin would permit the to carry out these recommendations
United States to base its planes in Soviet would be forthcoming. But within a few
territory. As a matter of fact, Stalin had days this optimism had given way to a
agreed in October to permit the Ameri- growing pessimism, for Stalin had inter-
cans to conduct a survey of Eastern Sibe- preted the message as an outright offer
ria, but Bradley had preferred to wait. of 100 bombers, thereby giving to the
He still thought it better to wait and American proposal a meaning never in-
not press the Russians for information tended. He would be delighted, he said,
until the United States was ready to to get these planes, but he needed them
make a definite commitment of aircraft on the German front, not in Siberia.
to the Russians. Such a procedure, he If the first message had been misunder-
told General Marshall, would allay stood, Roosevelt's second could not have
Stalin's suspicions and demonstrate been. This time Stalin's reply made it
America's resolution to stand firmly by perfectly clear that he wanted no Ameri-
its Russian ally if Japan attacked.27 can planes in Siberia. More than that,
On the basis of Bradley's report, and he had changed his mind about permit-
on Marshall's recommendation, the Joint ting Bradley to make the survey. "It
Chiefs agreed that Stalin should be as- would seem obvious," he told the Presi-
sured by the President that he would dent, "that Russian military objects can
receive American support in case of a be inspected only by Russian inspectors."
Japanese attack. This support, they fur- Nor did he think any purpose would
ther agreed, should consist of three heavy be served by having General Marshall
bombardment groups (105 planes), which come to Moscow, a suggestion Roosevelt
Arnold was directed to provide. The had made earlier.29
Russians, in return, were to provide the With this exchange, the correspond-
airfields and certain items of supply, and ence ended. And with it died the hope
permit General Bradley to make the sur- for any immediate arrangements with
vey already authorized. The President Stalin for concerted action in the Far
approved the recommendations and on East, a hope that for a brief moment
30 December sent Stalin a personal mes- had flickered so brightly. The Soviet
sage covering these points.28 Meanwhile, Union, it was clear, wanted planes for
on the assumption that Stalin would give the German front, not closer collabo-
27
JCS 180, 27 Dec 42, sub: Bradley Mission, ABC
ration with the United States in the Far
334.8; Ltr, Bradley to Marshall, 14 Dec 42, sub: Rpt East. Thus, when the joint planners
of Bradley Mission to Russia, OPD Bradley Folder.
28 29
Memo, Leahy for President, 30 Dec 42, sub: Sur- Rads, Stalin to Roosevelt, 13 Jan 43; Roosevelt
vey of Air Force Facilities in Far East, filed with JCS to Stalin, 8 Jan 43; Stalin to Roosevelt, 5 Jan 43, all
180 in ABC 334.8 Bradley Mission. filed with JCS 180.
were reviewing Pacific strategy in May be followed by operations against the

1943, they rejected the idea of an offen- Japanese home islands themselves. To
sive against Japan from the Aleutians accept DeWitt's proposal, therefore, the
on the ground that such an offensive War Department would have to be pre-
would have to await Soviet entry into pared to commit forces of such size as
the war.30 to affect all other operations in the
Though the Russians in the months Pacific, and probably those in Europe
that followed the Roosevelt-Stalin ex- as well, and to follow up with a major
change gave no sign of any change in assault against the enemy's last citadel.32
their attitude, the American planners But there were solid advantages to
were forced by events to turn once again the proposal for an offensive across the
to a consideration of the role of the North Pacific. For one thing, it would
North Pacific. Early in August 1943, provide employment for the large ground
General DeWitt forwarded to Washing- and air forces already in the area. The
ton a plan for the invasion of Paramu- very existence of such forces created a
shiro and Shimushu in the Kurils, one demand for their use. And few could
of the projects proposed eight months dispute the strategic importance of the
earlier by the planners. If the War Aleutians. This importance derived from
Department would increase his ground the position of the islands in the narrow
forces and strengthen the bomber seas between the American continent
components of the Eleventh Air Force, and Asia, a position that affected the
DeWitt wrote, he stood ready to launch Soviet Union as well as the United States
the invasion of the Kurils in the spring and Japan. Except for China, the Aleu-
of 1944.31 tians provided the only bases then in
DeWitt's optimism was not shared American hands from which the new
by Admiral Nimitz or the planners in long-range B-29 bombers—still in the
Washington. The Pacific Fleet was fully production stage — could reach Japan.
engaged in the South Pacific and neither Thus, when the proposal for an inva-
Nimitz nor King saw any possibility of sion of the Kurils by way of Paramu-
making available the surface forces re- shiro came up for discussion in August
quired for such an operation. Finding 1943 it was not rejected but referred
the troops and planes needed for the to one of the planning committees for
offensive DeWitt had in mind would be further study.
difficult enough, but even more difficult Before the committee had finished its
would be the task of finding the ships work, General Marshall reopened the
and building the bases from which to whole problem of the North Pacific early
mount and support a Kurils invasion. in September by proposing to the Joint
Moreover, such an operation, if it was Chiefs that they reduce the size of the
to prove of real value, would have to garrison there during the next year to
30
JWPC 9/1, 5 May 43, sub: Opns in Pacific and
32
Far East in 1943-44. Ltr, Nimitz to King, 18 Aug 43; Memo, King for
31
Ltr, DeWitt to Marshall, 2 Aug 43, with attached Marshall, 30 Aug 43, both in WDCSA 381, sec. 2. For
plan for offensive operations in the Northwest Pacific, Army planners' view see OPD 370.5, case 264, and
dated 30 Jul 43, CCS 381 NWPac (7-30-43). OPD 381, case 206.
about 80,000 men. There was little ob- was but part of a larger scheme which
jection to this reduction but it raised envisaged operations later against the
inevitably the question of the future role Japanese home islands. Only in this way
of the forces in the North Pacific. Would could decisive results be achieved. And
they be required later to move into the once the offensive gained momentum,
Kurils? If so, then the garrison might the Russians, Buckner believed, would
later have to be increased. If not, then join the other Allies fighting Japan,
perhaps greater reductions were justified. thereby bringing the war to an early
At any rate, it was time, the Joint Chiefs close.34
decided, to get an answer to these ques- Though the planners were not pre-
tions. The joint planners were the ones pared to accept entirely the recommen-
who got the job. It was up to them to dations of the theater commanders, it
come up with the answers on the size was not because of a failure to appreci-
of the Alaska garrison and "whether it ate the enormous strategic significance
would be preferable to keep large forces of the North Pacific for the future as
in the Aleutians and mount operations well as the present. With prophetic
against Paramushiro from there, or insight, they pointed to Russia's tradi-
whether such operations should be tional interest in the region and the
mounted from the United States."33 uncertainty of "the pattern of future
Before making their recommendations, relationships." Aside from every other
the planners solicited the views of the consideration, they believed that com-
theater's senior officers at a conference mon sense and the interests of the United
held in Washington. Present at the meet- States dictated "that we properly organ-
ing, which began on 15 September, were ize this area for defense and for offense,
General Buckner, the Army commander and at the earliest practicable date."35
in Alaska, Rear Adm. John W. Reeves, On this basis the planners readily sup-
his naval opposite, and Capt. Oswald S. ported the development of a large supply
Colclough, Admiral Kinkaid's represent- base at Adak, the construction of air-
ative. Buckner took the lead in present- fields suitable for the B-29's, and the
ing the case for an increase in the shipment of two groups of these bomb-
theater's forces and an offensive toward ers "if operational and available" to the
Japan. Emphasizing the logistical prob- Aleutians. These projects, they pointed
lem in the area and the difficulty of air out, would be useful in the future "come
and naval operations he estimated he what may during or after the war."
would need 2 amphibiously trained divi- On the more immediate questions—
sions, in addition to the 2 he already had, operations against Paramushiro and the
plus 4 heavy bombardment squadrons and size of the force to be assigned to the
a chain of air bases. With these reinforce- area — the planners had some doubts.
ments, Buckner believed (and the others Though the final answers would depend
supported him) that offensive operations upon studies then in progress, they
against Paramushiro could begin in the thought it unlikely that operations
spring of 1944. This move, in his view,
34
Mins, JPS Mtgs, 15 and 20 Sep 43.
33 35
Mins, JCS Mtg, 7 Sep 43. JCS 474-1, 21 Sep 43, sub: Garrisons in Alaska.
against Paramushiro could be initiated tion of B-29's, then scheduled for

until the spring of 1945 and that the completion in the spring of 1944.38
strength in the theater should therefore The Joints Chiefs found these recom-
be reduced to 80,000 men, as General mendations generally acceptable, differ-
Marshall had suggested. But if it was ing with the planners only in minor
decided to open the offensive a year matters. At General Arnold's request
earlier, as the theater representatives the number of B-29 groups that would
urged, then the garrison would have to be sent to the theater was not specified,
be maintained as its existing strength.36 and all concurred in the general state-
The "elder statesmen" of the Joint ment that the reduction of troop strength
Strategic Survey Committee — Admiral in the theater should be accomplished
Willson and Generals Embick and Fair- as soon as possible. Admiral King ob-
child—were in substantial agreement jected mildly to the category of defense
with the planners. Having recently reassigned the Aleutians, maintaining that
viewed the "categories of defense" as- the Japanese were still capable of an
signed to Alaska and the Aleutians and offensive in the area. None of the others
found them too high, the committee agreed with this "concession of super-
strongly supported the reduction of the human powers to the Japanese" and
garrison to a size commensurate with when General Handy pointed out that
the mission assigned and the possibility a failure to make the change in defense
of attack.37 Like the Joint Staff Planners, status would justify the retention of
the Strategic Survey Committee thought forces in the theater adequate to meet
there was little chance of mounting an a major attack, Admiral King withdrew
operation against Paramushiro before his objections.39 The Joint Chiefs there-
the spring of 1945 and therefore no upon gave their approval on 5 October
necessity for retaining more than 80,000 1943 to the recommendation of the
men in the area. But the committee planners to reduce the size of the Aleu-
differed with the joint planners in the tians garrison while preparing the base
matter of base development. Construc- facilities and airfields for a future offen-
tion, they believed, should be limited to sive in the Kurils, if one should be de-
those facilities necessary to support the cided upon. Though that decision was
assault on Paramushiro and the opera- left for the future, the theater com-
manders were directed to prepare for
36
Ibid.
the Paramushiro operation, with the
37
Categories of Defense are denned in Joint Action tentative target date set for the spring
of the Army and the Navy (1935) as the degree of of 1945.40
preparation required to defend specific areas under
specified circumstances. There are six such categories
designated alphabetically A through F. Continental
38
Alaska, which had been in Category B, defined as an JCS 474/2, 21 Sep 43 sub: Garrisons in Alaska;
area in which minor attacks were possible, the JSSC JCS 474/3, 25 Sep 43, same sub.
39
placed in Category A—attack unlikely but provided Mins, JCS Mtgs, 28 Sep and 5 Oct 43; JCS 474/5,
with nominal defenses for "political reasons." Other 5 Oct 43, sub: Change in Category of Defense in
portions of the Alaska Theater were to be similarly Hawaiian and Aleutian Is.
40
downgraded for defense purposes, Adak from D Memo, King for Marshall, 5 Nov 43; Rad, Mar-
(major attack possible) to C (minor attack probable) shall to Buckner, 8 Nov 43, both in WDCSA 381
and Unalaska from D to B. (1942-43).
If the Alaskan commanders could no trol to the remaining islands in the New
longer look forward to strong reinforce- Georgia group, after which they would
ments and offensive operations in 1944, move into the southern Bougainville
they had at least a fair chance of getting area, seizing the Shortland Islands, Bal-
two or more groups of the coveted B-29's lale, Faisi, Buin, Kahili, and Tonolei
as things stood. They had been instructed Harbor. The program MacArthur had
to have ready by the spring of the year laid out for himself in CARTWHEEL was
airfields on which to base the long-range no less ambitious and included the cap-
bombers when they came, and the com- ture of Lae, Salamaua, Finschhafen, and
manders turned to this task with zeal. western New Britain.
But all their efforts to secure a definite Planning for these moves began in
commitment from Washington on the the summer of 1943 when MacArthur
number of planes they would receive ordered Admiral Halsey to prepare for
and the date of arrival were unavailing. the invasion of southern Bougainville
Plans for the use of the B-29's were only and the commander of the New Guinea
then being considered in Washington, Force to make plans for the capture of
and the Aleutians was but one—and the the Markham Valley-Huon Peninsula
least important—of several possible thea- area of New Guinea.42 This latter task
ters for B-29 operations.41 The problem fell to General Blarney, who arrived at
was an important one. closely related to Port Moresby and assumed command of
the strategy for the defeat of Japan, and New Guinea Force on 20 August. Plans
no decision was reached until well into for the capture of Lae, Salamaua, and
1944. But even before then it was clear Finschhafen were by that time already
that no B-29's would be sent to the well under way. The American and
Aleutians before the spring of 1945, if Australian troops in the vicinity of Sal-
then. By that time the war against amaua were to continue to press the
Japan had progressed so far that there attack against that objective as a cover
was little or no prospect of active for the invasion of Lae. The 9th Aus-
operations in the North Pacific. tralian Division was to take Lae, landing
a few miles to the east on 4 September.
CARTWHEEL and RENO The next day, the 503d U.S. Parachute
Infantry Regiment was to drop on Nad-
In the Southwest Pacific, General zab in the Markham Valley, seize and
MacArthur, like Admiral Nimitz, was develop the airstrip, and block enemy
also revising his plans "to get on with movements overland from Wewak to
the war." The Trobriands, Nassau Bay, Lae. Australian troops, including even-
and Munda airfield had been captured tually the 7th Division, would be flown
by early August, but much remained to up to Nadzab and from there advance
be done to complete CARTWHEEL. Hal- eastward down the Markham Valley
sey's forces had still to extend their con- toward Lae at the mouth of the Mark-
41 42
JPS 288, 4 Oct 43, sub: Plans for Defeat of Japan GHQ SWPA Operating Instrs 13 Jun 43. For a
Within Twelve Months After Defeat of Germany; comprehensive account of the plans and operations
JPS 320, 9 Nov 43, sub: Early Sustained Bombing of under CARTWHEEL, see Miller, CARTWHEEL, chs.
Japan. XI and XII.
ham River in conjunction with the 9th on the basis of reconnaissance, whether
Australian Division drive up the valley. a landing on Bougainville itself was
Meanwhile, other Australian troops were necessary. From the Treasuries, he
to consolidate Allied control of the Mark- pointed out, he could move to Empress
ham Valley and secure additional air- Augusta Bay on the west side of the
strips by seizing other important sites in island; from Choiseul, to Kieta on the
the area. The move to the north shore east coast.44
of the Huon Peninsula would begin Halsey's new plan, which Rear Adm.
with the assault on Finschhafen, set for Robert B. Carney, South Pacific chief of
mid-October. staff, carried to Brisbane on 10 Septem-
Halsey's plans for the capture of south- ber, did not meet with MacArthur's
ern Bougainville and the small islands approval. The most important objection
immediately to the south were based to it was that it would not place Halsey's
originally on the availability of the 3d fighter aircraft in position to strike
Marine and 25th Infantry Divisions. Rabaul in time to cover the Southwest
But the commitment of the 25th to New Pacific advance to Cape Gloucester at
Georgia and the cancellation of the the end of December. To do that, said
Rabaul campaign altered the situation MacArthur, Halsey would have to seize
radically. Experience in New Georgia airfield sites on the island of Bougain-
also dictated adjustments in the initial ville, specifically at Empress Augusta
concept of the Bougainville operation. Bay, on 1 November. The Treasuries
At the end of July, therefore, Admiral and Choiseul could be taken between
Halsey proposed to MacArthur that the 20 and 25 October to provide PT bases
original plan be modified to relieve him and radar sites. A week later, at a meet-
of the necessity of taking Buin, Kahili, ing attended by General Harmon, Mac-
and Tonolei Harbor on the island of Arthur reiterated these points but left
Bougainville itself. The major objec- the decision on where the Bougainville
tives of the operation could be achieved, landing would take place to Admiral
he declared, by seizing the Shortlands Halsey.45
and Ballale in the straits south of Halsey had his orders; the only ques-
Bougainville.43 tion he now had to decide was where on
With MacArthur's approval, planning Bougainville he would land. The Wash-
proceeded on this basis for more than ington planners had studied the change
a month. Then, early in September, and recommended to the Joint Chiefs
Halsey came up with another idea—take that they take no action. MacArthur
the Treasury Islands and Choiseul south was within his rights and the operation
of the Shortlands, and there establish
bases from which to neutralize the in- 44
Ltr, Halsey to MacArthur, 9 Sep 43, sub:
creasingly strong Japanese positions in ELKTON III—Bougainville Objectives, Miller, CART-
WHEEL, p. 227.
the southern Bougainville area. After 45
Halsey, Narrative Account of the South Pacific
that he and MacArthur could decide, Campaign, p. 8; Harmon, The Army in the South
Pacific, p. 9; Ltr, MacArthur to Halsey, 11 Sep 43,
no sub: Notes for Memo on Conf Between Repre-
43
Ltr, Halsey to MacArthur, 26 Jul 43, sub: sentatives of South and Southwest Pacific; Miller,
Bougainville Opn; Miller, CARTWHEEL, p. 226. CARTWHEEL, pp. 227-28.
within the terms of his directive.46 By tive of Southwest Pacific forces at the
the end of September Halsey had made Vogelkop Peninsula; there was nothing
his choice. The landing would be made in it about what would come after that.
over the heavy surf at Empress Augusta In view of the importance attached to
Bay, 215 miles southwest of Rabaul, on the Central Pacific offensive by the Wash-
1 November 1943. "Enthusiasm for the ington planners, MacArthur apparently
plan," he later wrote, "was far from felt he could not discount altogether the
unanimous, even in the South Pacific, possibility that he would be pinched out
but, the decision having been made, all of the war when the New Guinea Cam-
hands were told to 'Get going.' "47 paign was over. The recapture of the
Behind MacArthur's insistence on Philippines and the final defeat of Japan
speeding up the pace of the advance was would then fall to Nimitz' forces and
an apparent concern for the fate of his the Navy. This failure to define the role
cherished plan to return to the Philip- of the Southwest Pacific once the Vogel-
pines. On 17 September, a general staff kop Peninsula had been reached, Mac-
officer from Washington, Col. William L. Arthur felt, would not only have an ad-
Ritchie, had arrived in Brisbane with verse effect upon his own staff, but
copies of the deliberations and decisions might well lead to a "let down" in the
of the U.S. and British Chiefs at Que- Australian war effort.50
bec.48 Colonel Ritchie, Marshall ex- Colonel Ritchie's efforts to allay Mac-
plained to MacArthur, would brief him Arthur's fears for the future were un-
on the conference, deliver to him the availing and he finally called on General
conference documents relating to the Marshall for help. What was needed, he
war against Japan, and explain fully the said, was a statement of long-range ob-
Joints Chiefs' plans for operations in the jectives for Southwest Pacific forces that
Pacific during the coming year. At the MacArthur could use as a basis for plan-
same time, Marshall asked MacArthur ning and show to the Australians. Act-
to forward to Washington by 1 Novem- ing for the Joint Chiefs, Marshall did
ber his plans for the neutralization of his best to reassure the Southwest Pacific
Rabaul, the capture of Kavieng and the commander. The Quebec decision, he
Admiralties, and the subsequent advance explained, had not projected operations
to the Vogelkop Peninsula—all approved beyond 1944 because there was not suffi-
at the Quebec meeting.49 cient information to plan past that date
MacArthur's reaction to the Quebec and because much would depend on what
decisions was not reassuring. The pro- the Japanese did in the interval. Mean-
gram approved there had set the objec- time, said Marshall, the Joint Chiefs
intended to apply "unremitting pres-
46
JPS 275, 18 Sep 43, sub: Opns in the South-South- sure"—a phrase that was used with in-
west Pacific Area; JPS 725/1, 21 Sep 43, same sub. creasing frequency—against Japan from
47
Halsey, Narrative Account of the South Pacific
Campaign, p. 8; Rads, Halsey to MacArthur, 1 Oct every side, from Asia as well as the
43, MacArthur to Halsey, same date; Miller, CART- Pacific. If an advance toward Japan from
WHEEL, p. 229. the North Pacific seemed profitable, then
48
Rad, Ritchie to Handy, 18 Sep 43, CM-IN 13521.
49 50
Rad, Marshall to MacArthur, 18 Sep 43, CM- Rad, Ritchie to Marshall, 28 Sept 43, CM-IN
OUT 9252. 19656.
the Joint Chiefs might adopt a strategy ble, strongpoints would be bypassed and
directed toward that end. Certainly, they enemy airfields and supply bases neutral-
would utilize to the full the naval ized as the Allied bomb-line moved
strength of the Central Pacific, a major forward.
asset in the war against Japan. It might The schedule of operations outlined
even prove most advantageous ultimate- in RENO III was similar to that in the
ly, Marshall pointed out, to place the previous plans except where changes
main effort in that theater. Only time were required by the program approved
could tell. at Quebec. Thus, Rabaul was to be
Having thus reminded MacArthur neutralized rather than captured during
gently that the Joint Chiefs intended to Phase I, and the entire timetable was
retain their freedom of action, Marshall accelerated to permit the invasion of
told him that Mindanao in the southern Mindanao in February 1945. But Mac-
Philippines would probably be the next Arthur evidently still intended to cap-
objective after Vogelkop. Would he, ture Rabaul at a later date, though he
therefore, draw up plans as quickly as did not specify when or with what forces.
possible for the move into the Philip- Phase I, MacArthur estimated, would
pines? This was good news to MacArthur, start on 1 February 1944 and would
but even more encouraging were the carry him through the Bismarck Archi-
two assumptions Marshall gave him to pelago and Hansa Bay by the spring of
guide him in his planning; first, that the the year. From there he would launch
main effort in the drive toward the Phil- the Phase II attack in the Humboldt
ippines would be made from the South- Bay area of New Guinea (Hollandia)
west Pacific; and, second, that Southwest and in the Arafura Sea in June and
Pacific forces would be increased at the August of the year. As before, Wewak
existing rate.51 was to bypassed. Phase III operations
MacArthur had long anticipated the would begin in mid-August with the
drive to the Philippines and had a plan advance to Geelvink Bay, to be followed
ready in his files. As RENO II, he had in October with the capture of the
submitted it to Marshall in August; all Vogelkop Peninsula. In December,
he had to do now was bring it up to Southwest Pacific forces would move on
date. By 20 October RENO III was to Halmahera, the Celebes, possibly the
ready.52 Like earlier versions of the plan, Palaus (Phase IV), and finally on 1
RENO III called for the successive ad- February 1945, to Mindanao.53
vance westward along the north coast of The forces needed for these operations
New Guinea in a series of amphibious were carefully listed. Phase I—the cap-
and airborne assaults made under cover ture of Hansa Bay, Kavieng, and the
of land-based aircraft. Wherever possi- Admiralties—would require 7 infantry
divisions, 2 parachute regiments, and 59
51
Rad, Marshall (for JCS) to MacArthur, 2 Oct 43, air groups. Ten divisions would be
CM-OUT 630. Drafts of the message and concur- needed for garrison duty. In the next
rence by the Navy are filed in OPD 381, case 192.
52
RENO III, 20 Oct 43 sub: Outline Plan for Opns
53
of SWPA to Re-Occupy Southern Philippines, ABC Cf. RENO I and RENO II, chs. XXII and XXV
384 Pacific, sec. 8-A. above.
two phases, MacArthur intended to tion, in view of the priority of Europe,

employ 6 divisions and 1 parachute that the Army had a total of 826,672 men
regiment in the assault, supported by 77 deployed in the Pacific and 92,929 in
air groups and 13 divisions for garrison. China-Burma-India as against 1,464,216
No estimates were made for the final in the European, Mediterranean, and
two phases of the advance. They were North African theaters in December
still more than a year away, and there 1943. More significant, perhaps, is the
was time enough, if the plan was adopted, fact that the 13 Army and three and a
to assemble the forces, shipping, and half Marine divisions in the Pacific
supplies that would be needed. That equaled the total number in Europe and
these would be considerable was already the Mediterranean at that time. Of the
clear, for in the first three phases alone, Army divisions, MacArthur had 4 (1st
even assuming his retention of South Cavalry, 24th, 32d, and 41st); Halsey, 4
Pacific forces, MacArthur would need (25th, 37th, 43d, and Americal); and
6 more divisions, 18 air groups, and a Nimitz 5 (6th, 7th, 27th, 33d, and 40th).
large number of warships ranging in size The number of air groups in Europe was
from escort carriers to landing craft. double the 34 groups available for oper-
Against these requirements the plan- ations against Japan. But to get an accu-
ners in Washington had to place those of rate picture of the American effort in the
other commanders. Europe, of course, two theaters, it is necessary to add to the
had first priority. Would there be Army forces in the Pacific, the Pacific
enough left over to provide MacArthur Fleet, comprising the bulk of U.S. naval
with what he needed under the scheme forces; Marine Corps ground forces, in-
outlined in RENO III and at the same cluding three divisions; and the air
time carry out the program already ap- forces, shore and carrier-based, of the
proved for the Central Pacific? Admiral Navy and the Marine Corps.55 (Tables
Nimitz' estimate of assault and garrison 6-8)
forces was large. In or en route to his By the time MacArthur's RENO III plan
theater in September 1943 were 5 Army reached Washington—it was brought by
divisions, but only 2 of them would his chief of staff, General Sutherland, on
remain there. Army strength in the 4 November—the joint planners were in
Central Pacific at this time was about the midst of preparations for the coming
130,000, with over 100,000 more sched- conference at Cairo and Tehran. As a
uled for shipment by June 1944. Total matter of fact, MacArthur had been
Army requirements for operational and asked on 27 October to submit his sum-
garrison forces to that date, Richardson mary of the situation and a report on his
estimated, would come to 285,420 men, plans in time for the scheduled confer-
an excess of about 50,000 over current ence. These Sutherland brought with
and allocated strength.54
It is interesting to note in this connec- 55
Rad, Marshall to MacArthur, 4 Nov 43, CM-
OUT 1289; Matloff, Strategic Planning for Coalition
Warfare, 1943-1944, Table 3, presents a comparison
54
Ltr, Nimitz to JCS 30 Sep 43, sub: Garrison of Army forces deployed overseas on 31 December
Rqmts in Central Pacific Area; USAFMIDPAC Hist, 1942 with those deployed on 31 December 1943 in
pt I, vol. I, p. 115. all theaters.
TABLE 6—STRENGTH, U.S. FORCES IN THE PACIFIC, 31 DECEMBER 1943a

(Compared to European and Mediterranean Theaters)
a
Figures are approximate and are derived not from statistical reports but from estimates of the Joint Staff Planners developed for
planning purposes; actual strength of Army commands in Pacific areas was 818,482; in the European theater, 768,274; and in the
Mediterranean-North African theater, 597,658.
Source: JCS 521/3, 4 Feb 44, sub: Strategic Deployment of U.S. Forces to 31 December 1944.
him together with full authority to speak of New Guinea.57 Since the planners had
for MacArthur and a request that he be evidently seen RENO III, these omissions
allowed to present his views personally could not have stemmed from ignorance
before the Joint and Combined Chiefs of of MacArthur's intentions. Rather, they
Staff.56 were based on the considered judgment
About 8 November, Sutherland met of the planners that these operations
with the joint planners. By this time, were neither feasible nor desirable, and
the planners had received from the Joint that the resources required to carry them
War Plans Committee a revised schedule out could not be available in time.
for Pacific operations in 1944. For the General Sutherland did his best to
Central Pacific this schedule included change this view. He reviewed the situ-
operations as far as the Palaus and even ation in the Pacific in some detail and
the still-tentative Marianas, but it took dwelt on the enemy's deployment during
the forces of the Southwest Pacific only the past months, his capabilities and his
as far as the Vogelkop Peninsula; sched- intentions. The most profitable target
uled for invasion in August. The last two for the Allies and the one that would
phases of RENO III it omitted entirely. best accomplish the objectives set at
Omitted also were the operations Mac- Quebec, he asserted, was the Philippines.
Arthur had recommended in the Arafura Repeating the by now familiar argu-
and the Celebes Seas to protect the left ments advanced by MacArthur for a
flank of his advance along the north coast return to the islands, Sutherland made a
56 57
Rad, MacArthur to Marshall, 31 Oct 43, CM-IN JWPC 115/1, Rpt by JWPC, 7 Nov 43, sub: Spe-
18860; Marshall to MacArthur, 27 Oct 43, 12164. cific Opns for Defeat of Japan, 1944.
REVIEW AND ADJUSTMENT
TABLE 7—MAJOR U.S. COMBAT FORCES IN THE PACIFIC, 31 DECEMBER 1943a
a Figures are approximate, developed for planning purposes by the Joint Staff Planners.
b
The term new applies to vessels constructed after 1936.
539
TABLE 8—MAJOR U.S. COMBAT AND AIR FORCES IN PACIFIC AND EUROPEAN AREAS, 31 DECEMBER 1943a
540
STRATEGY AND COMMAND: THE FIRST TWO YEARS
a
Figures are approximate and represent informed estimates for planning purposes.
b
Shore-based naval aircraft on Atlantic bases excluded; data not shown in source document.
strong plea for the invasion of Mindanao. ability to make war was based on the
Its capture, he pointed out, might force China-Philippines-Borneo-Netherlands
the Japanese into a decisive fleet engage- Indies littoral. "All the rest of her hold-
ment, would place the Allies in a favor- ings are merely outposts," and their cap-
able position to strike a decisive blow at ture would not, he believed, reduce
Japanese shipping, and permit them to Japan's capacity to fight.
move their land-based air strength in Sutherland admitted that the Central
position to apply "maximum pressure" Pacific advance would exploit America's
against the Japanese. "We thereby attack growing naval power. But he qualified
the enemy," he concluded, "in each of this endorsement by pointing out that
his four major points of weakness: oil, such an advance would fail to utilize the
naval and merchant shipping, and the equally important strength of land-based
air." 58 aircraft or employ decisively and in effec-
The best way to reach the Philippines tive combination Allied land, sea, and
was by way of the Southwest Pacific air power. In short, the route across the
Area. No other route, said Sutherland, Pacific, in Sutherland's view, would in-
offered the same advantages. System- volve the Allies in a frontal assault and
atically he considered the approaches a war of attrition without promise of
through Southeast Asia and across the great strategic results.
Pacific. The first, which no one seriously The use of all avenues of approach to
favored, he considered undesirable both Japan's inner citadel in the Philippines
tactically and logistically. The Central was obviously the most desirable course.
Pacific route was more difficult to dis- Were the forces for such a course avail-
count, but it, too, Sutherland found able, then it should by all means be
undesirable as "a succession of indepen- adopted, said Sutherland—provided, of
dent seaborne attacks, supported by course, that the offensive along one axis
carrier-based aviation, against islands of advance did not require a lessened
that are thoroughly organized for defense effort in the other. But until Germany
and supported by land-based aviation was defeated, there was little likelihood
as well as by the carrier-based air of that the Pacific commanders would have
the Japanese Fleet." Such attacks, he the forces needed for two or more simul-
declared, were not only "the most haz- taneous and equally powerful drives to
ardous" of military operations but also the Philippines. "To attempt a major
of little value in maintaining "unrelent- effort along each axis," Sutherland de-
ing pressure" against the Japanese. Each clared, "would result in weakness every-
operation would be independent, would where in violation of cardinal principles
contribute little to the next, and would of war, and ... in failure to reach the
not materially weaken the enemy whose vital strategic objective at the earliest
possible date, thus prolonging the war."
For the present, he argued, a single
58
General MacArthur's Estimate of Pacific Sit and strong attack along one axis, supported
Concept of Over-all Plans for Defeat of Japan, no by forces in the other areas, was the only
date, filed in folder labeled Notes on Particular
Points that may be discussed in SW, S, and CP Areas, possible course. The Southwest Pacific
OPD Exec Files. was the route to follow; RENO III, the
plan. All the Joint Chiefs had to do, as they did his hope of ultimately cap-
concluded Sutherland, was approve the turing Rabaul.60 And faced by the in-
plan and provide the forces.59 evitable question of deciding which of
The joint planners were apparently the two theaters should have the priority
not convinced by Sutherland's arguments in a conflict, the planners fell back on
that all available resources be concen- the formula that in such an event "due
trated in the Southwest Pacific for the weight should be accorded to the fact
drive on the Philippines. Instead, they that operations in the Central Pacific
accepted the schedule of their planning promise a more rapid advance toward
committee and recommended to the Japan." 61 The final decision on the
Joint Chiefs a continuation of the exist- drive to the Philippines as well as on
ing strategy: concurrent and mutually the objectives for 1944 was still to be
supporting operations along both axes made. The coming conference at Cairo
of advance, with the transfer of forces would provide the answer.
from one area to the other when re- 60
Shortly after the Cairo Conference, General Suth-
quired. MacArthur's plan for operations erland stated to the Joint Chiefs, according to the
in the Netherlands Indies they rejected, memory of Admiral Bieri who was present, that
MacArthur believed the decision to bypass Rabaul
59
General Sutherland in commenting on the pres- "would go down in history as one of time's greatest
ent volume in manuscript form, stated that a more military mistakes." Ltr, Bieri to Hoover, 17 Jul 59,
correct reflection of his position at the time would OCMH.
61
be "to combine the effect of converging forces from JCS 581, 9 Nov 43, sub: Specific Opns for Defeat
the Southwest Pacific, South Pacific, and Central of Japan, 1944; Memo, Col. George A. Lincoln for
Pacific along an axis to the Philippines." Sutherland Chief, Strategy Sec, OPD, 8 Nov 43, sub: RENO III,
Comments, Jul 59, OCMH. ABC 381 Strategy Sec (7 Jan 43).
CHAPTER XXVII
The Japanese Revise Their Strategy
In war something must be allowed to chance and fortune, seeing it is in

its nature hazardous and an option of difficulties.
GENERAL JAMES WOLFE, 1757
Viewed from Tokyo, the war by Sep- and in July they had been forced to evac-
tember 1943 had reached a critical stage. uate Kiska. Though there were no signs
The defeat at Midway in June 1942 of an early offensive from the Aleutians,
followed by the loss of Guadalcanal and this was a possibility the Japanese could
Papua early in 1943 had been serious not overlook. The threat from the east,
but not fatal blows. More serious had across the Central Pacific, was more im-
been the loss of ships and pilots, and mediate. American fast carriers had
these, it was hoped, would ultimately be recently struck Marcus Island, Wake,
replaced. But MacArthur's and Halsey's and Japanese bases in the Marshalls, and
victories in the Solomons and New American forces had occupied islands in
Guinea during the summer of 1943 cast the Ellice group, south of the Gilberts.
a more serious light on the situation. All this activity, the Japanese reasoned
Obviously the Allies were making a de- correctly, could only mean the Allies
termined assault on the Solomons, east- were preparing to launch an offensive in
ern New Guinea, and the Bismarck the Central Pacific in the near future.
Archipelago, which the Japanese called Clearly, the time had come for a reassess-
the Southeast Area. Failure to hold the ment of Japan's military and political
outposts in New Guinea and the Solo- situation and a realistic appraisal of her
mons, they recognized, could have disas- prospects for the future.
trous consequences and might well be
the prelude to an Allied advance toward The New Operational Policy
Truk and the Philippines.
The Allied drive from the south was The review of Japan's position in
not all the Japanese had to worry about; mid-war was sparked by Imperial Gen-
danger lay also to the north and to the eral Headquarters early in September
east. In May 1943 they had lost Attu with a comprehensive "Estimate of the
Enemy Situation."1 The Allied offen- concert with the offensive against Ra-
sive, the Japanese planners believed, baul. The Allies could be expected also,
would increase in intensity rather than if the opportunity offered, to invade the
diminish in the days ahead, and could Kurils and the Netherlands Indies, to
be expected to reach its peak probably disrupt Japanese sea communications,
by the early summer of 1944. During and to bomb the occupied areas and even
the remainder of 1943 and through 1944, Japan itself.
the Allies, they thought, would make a The situation on the Asiatic mainland
concentrated effort to capture Rabaul was no better. On review, the Japanese
and other strategic positions in the South planners could discern no reason to be-
and Southwest Pacific, while opening of- lieve that the Soviet Union would change
fensives in Burma, Sumatra, and the its policy toward Japan and join the
Indian Ocean area. If the Allies suc- Allies in the Far Eastern war. But they
ceeded in taking Rabaul, they would did think Stalin might permit the United
almost certainly drive next for the Phil- States to use air bases in Eastern Siberia.
ippines and the Mandated Islands, the For this reason the planners held that
Japanese believed. Oddly enough, they Japan would have to maintain strong
did not expect a "large-scale enemy of- forces in Manchuria as well as in China,
fensive" in the Central Pacific, at least where there was every prospect of
in 1943, because of the weakness in increased Allied air activity.
carrier strength. In this, situation, Imperial General
Just what the Japanese meant by a Headquarters found little cause for opti-
"large-scale" offensive is not clear. Cer- mism. The enemy had gained aerial
tainly it did not mean operations against supremacy in the Solomons and eastern
the Gilberts, Nauru, Wake, or Marcus, New Guinea, and, despite the courageous
for these were definitely considered pos- efforts of Japanese troops in the area, was
sible Allied moves to be undertaken in continuing to advance. Elsewhere, the
outlook was no brighter; everywhere the
1
This chapter, except where otherwise noted, is Japanese turned they faced the prospect
based on the following Japanese sources: Hattori, of actual or potential Allied offensives.
The Greater East Asia War, III, 1-34, 45-50; Japa-
nese Opns in SWPA, chs. VII and VIII; the following "In short," the Deputy Chief of the
Japanese Studies in World War II: Imperial GHQ Army General Staff predicted gloomily,
Army High Command Record (No. 72), pp. 91-113; "the situation will develop steadily to-
Hist of the Southern Army (No. 21) pp. 52-57; Hist
of the 8th Area Army (No. 37), pp. 32-46; Southeast ward the decisive stage and we are rap-
Area Opns Record, pt. IV, 8th Area Army Opns No. idly approaching a crucial stage which
no), pp. 85-136; Hist of 2d Area Army (No. 31), pp. may well decide the fate of our country." 2
1-26; Operations in the Central Pacific (No. 55) pp.
8-11; and Imperial GHQ Navy Directives 280, 284, Japanese estimates of Allied strength
287; Imperial GHQ Army Directives 1652, 1653, 1699, were fairly accurate. Ground and air
1701, all in OCMH. An excellent summary of the forces arrayed against them they placed
Japanese situation for part of this period may be
found in Robert Ross Smith, The Approach to the
at 23 divisions and 2,500 planes of all
Philippines, UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD types. This was only "front-line"
WAR II (Washington, 1953), pp. 84-92; Miller, strength; total strength, including re-
CARTWHEEL, pp. 212-14; and Crowl and Love,
2
Seizure of the Gilberts and Marshalls, pp. 63-70, Quoted in Hattori, The Greater East Asia War,
206-12. III, 12.
THE JAPANESE REVISE THEIR STRATEGY 545
serves, the planners at Imperial General responsible for the bulk of their shipping
Headquarters placed at 6,000 aircraft losses, the Japanese estimated at about
and 70 to 80 divisions. The rate of in- 100. Of these, by far the greatest num-
crease of these forces depended, the Japa- ber, about 80, were believed to be Ameri-
nese recognized, on a variety of factors: can; the remainder, British. Operating
the situation in Europe, shipping, and bases for the underwater craft were cor-
U.S. production. But even assuming the rectly located in Hawaii, Dutch Harbor,
Allies gave first priority to the war against Alaska, and Ceylon. No mention was
Germany, the Tokyo planners reckoned made of the Australian submarine base.
that the Allies would have 4,000 aircraft This estimate of the enemy's inten-
and 35 divisions available for operations tions and capabilities did not hold out
against Japan at the end of 1943. A year much promise for the future. And when
later, this total would have jumped to the Japanese considered their own re-
7,000 aircraft and 60 divisions, assuming sources, the picture became even darker.
a shipping capacity of four to five million Their great weaknesses, they recognized,
tons. were in aircraft and in shipping. With-
The main naval strength of the Allies, out an adequate supply of both, Japan
the Japanese knew, was concentrated in could not hope to halt the Allied drive,
the U.S. Pacific Fleet operating out of much less open an offensive of its own.
Pearl Harbor. The nucleus of this fleet, The total number of aircraft that would
they estimated correctly as consisting of be required by the Army and Navy dur-
about 6 large aircraft carriers, 15 battle- ing 1944, it was estimated, was 55,000, an
ships, and 15 cruisers, organized into sev- impossible figure in view of the fact that
eral forces.3 Separate task forces, includ- total Japanese aircraft production in
ing 10 converted aircraft carriers, were August 1943 was only 1,360 and in Sep-
believed to be operating in the Alaska- tember 1,470. And even if the Japanese
Aleutians area and in the waters off Aus- could produce as many as 55,000 planes,
tralia. Allied submarines, which were the effort would so strain the economy
of the nation that it would be impossible
3 to try to match American and British
Admiral Nimitz' Pacific Fleet included the forces
designated for the Central Pacific operations, naval forces, build up ground strength
Admiral Halsey's South Pacific Force, and the North to a level adequate to meet a possible
Pacific Force. In the Central Pacific Force alone, threat from the Soviet Union, or initiate
there were, in November 1943, 6 heavy carriers (CV)
and 5 light carriers (CVL). The Essex had joined large-scale offensive operations in China.
the fleet in June 1943, followed a month later by the But these goals the Japanese were appar-
Yorktown and Lexington, both heavy carriers, and ently willing to sacrifice for air power,
the light carriers Independence, Belleau Wood, and
Princeton. The fast battleship Alabama joined in the Navy planners insisting only that
August, and during the next few months Nimitz they had to have special attack and anti-
received 5 new battleships, 7 old ones, 10 fast carriers, submarine craft.
7 escorts, 8 heavy and 4 light cruisers, 66 destroyers,
27 attack transports and cargo carriers, and 9 mer- The shipping problem was no less
chant vessels suitable for transport. Samuel Eliot serious than the shortage of aircraft. In
Morison, New Guinea and the Marianas, March a period of less than two years 445 vessels
1944-August 1944, vol. VIII, History of United
States Naval Operations" (Boston: Little, Brown and totaling 1,754,000 tons had been sunk
Company, 1953) pp. 85-86. and another 414 (2,109,800 tons) dam-
TABLE 9—JAPANESE SHIPPING LOSSES, 7 DECEMBER 1941-20 SEPTEMBER 1943a
a
Only ships with a gross tonnage of more than 500 are included.
Source: Hattori, The Greater East Asia War, III, 16.
aged. By far the largest toll, over two ommended that a new line encompassing
million tons, had been taken by Allied the "absolute national defense sphere"5
submarines; the action of Allied aircraft be established. Beyond this line there
accounted for another 840,000 tons. would be no retreat; along it would be
(Table 9) And there was every reason to built impregnable defenses. And while
expect that the number of sinkings would the Allies fought their way to this line,
increase sharply unless drastic measures the Japanese could repair their losses in
were taken. At the present rate, the aircraft and shipping in preparation for
Japanese estimated, shipping losses from a great counteroffensive.
Allied submarines alone would total The selection of a new defense line was
100,000 tons a month by the end of the based on the most careful calculation of
year.4 Only a major effort to increase Japan's resources and Allied capabilities.
greatly the number of escort vessels and Extending from the Kuril Islands south-
antisubmarine aircraft could avert this ward through the Bonms, Marianas,
disaster. and Carolines, thence south and west to
The production of aircraft and ships western New Guinea, the Sunda Islands
would take time. The problem facing in the Netherlands Indies, and finally to
the Japanese, therefore, was to gain the Burma, this line comprised the minimum
maximum time with the minimum loss, area considered essential for the attain-
to trade space for time. The solution ment of Japan's war aims. Possession of
proposed by the planners at Imperial this area would give Japan the advantage
General Headquarters was embodied in of interior lines and the raw materials
the "New Operational Policy." Con- and food needed to meet military and
vinced that the line eastern New Guinea- civilian requirements. Since it corre-
northern Solomons-Marshall and Gil- sponded also to the Greater East Asia
bert Islands could not be held, and was, Co-Prosperity Sphere, its security was an
indeed, on the verge of collapse, they rec- essential prerequisite to the political and
economic control of the nations included
4
During 1943, U.S. submarines sank 22 Japanese
naval vessels of all types and 296 merchant ships,
5
at a loss of 15 submarines. Morison, New Guinea and The term the Japanese used was "Zettai Kokubo
the Marianas, p. 16. Ken-I."
within the Japanese orbit. Any reduc- 3. All-out defense in the Southwest Area,
tion of the area, or the acquisition by the the Japanese designation for the region ex-
Allies of bases from which to strike im- tending from the Banda Sea to Burma.
This area was part of the absolute national
portant political and industrial targets defense sphere; therefore the complete de-
within it, was bound to affect seriously struction of any enemy forces seeking to
Japan's political position and capacity to invade the region was absolutely essential
wage war. to Japan's successful prosecution of the war.
Based on these considerations, the 4. P r e s e r v a t i o n of the status quo in
China, while increasing pressure against the
Japanese planners formulated a strategy enemy to destroy his will to fight. In North
whose primary objective was the defense China, preparations would be made to meet
of this vital area. First, in recognition of the contingency of Soviet-American coop-
Japan's inability to hold the existing line eration, but no step would be taken that
in the Southeast Area, the Japanese might bring the Soviet Union into the war.
would take a long backward step and 5. Strengthening the defenses of the home
islands, the oil regions of the East Indies
establish a more restricted perimeter ex- and the shipping lanes to Japan. These
tending from the Carolines to western measures were vital to the conduct of the
New Guinea. Next, they would erect an war and the execution of the new opera-
"undefeatable strategic position" along tional policy.
this new line, establishing advance bases 6. Raiding operations deep behind enemy
in front of it to keep Allied air power at lines in every area.
7. All possible measures of operations
a safe distance and safeguard the line of that would bring into full play the com-
communications. Finally, they would bined fighting power of the air, ground,
build up Japanese power within the ab- and naval forces; in short, any operation
solute defense area, with special emphasis that promised success.6
on air power. By utilizing the geographic
advantages of this new line and of inte- The Decision Is Made
rior lines of communications, the Japa-
nese hoped they would be able to repulse Japan's military leaders had proposed
any large-scale enemy offensive and ulti- a new operational policy, a strategy de-
mately to launch a counteroffensive of signed to trade space for time; her politi-
their own. (Map 9) cal leaders now put forward a foreign
In concrete terms, as enunciated by policy to match. First among the objec-
the Army Section of Imperial General tives of the Foreign Ministry was the
Headquarters on 15 September 1943, preservation of peace with the Soviet
this new strategy or "operational policy" Union. This was to be achieved in three
would require the following: ways: first, by maintaining Japanese mil-
1. Close cooperation with the Navy. itary strength and, if possible, by winning
2. Strong delaying action in the Southeast military victories over the United States
Area. Allied forces advancing in this crit- and Great Britain; second, by adopting
ical region were to be resisted fiercely, and positive measures designed to improve
delayed as long as possible. The time thus friendly relations with the USSR; and
gained was to be used to build up the de-
fenses along the new line from the Banda
third, by exercising restraint but resolu-
Sea to the Caroline Islands and to marshal 6
Imperial GHQ Army High Command Record,
the forces for a counteroffensive. Japanese Studies in World War II, 72, pp. 94-96.
MAP 9
tion in dealing with the Soviet Union move in with an offer of mediation. The
over controversial matters.7 timing of this offer was considered of the
The possibility that Germany and the utmost importance by the experts in
Soviet Union might suddenly conclude Japan's Foreign Ministry. It should co-
a separate peace treaty was a contingency incide, they said, with military success in
the Japanese could not ignore. Such a the field, either by Germany or Japan,
move, they recognized, would undoubt- or with the successful completion of
edly have a profound effect on Japan's negotiations for a settlement of the
situation. Therefore, to ensure that the China incident.
effect was favorable and the dangers Co-operation with Germany was a
minimized, the Japanese agreed that they political rather than a military objective
must follow the situation closely and be for the Japanese. Thus, the measures
prepared at the first sign of peace to proposed were limited to exchange of
views and information, visits of digni-
7
For a full discussion of the political aspects of the taries, and joint declarations of common
Japanese situation at this time, see Morton, "Japa-
nese Strategy and Policy in Mid-War," United States aims and objectives in the war against
Naval Institute Proceedings, (February, 1959). the Allies. What the Japanese wanted
most from Germany were war materials ment were ready to go before the
and technical information. For these Emperor. His assent would seal the deci-
they were willing to exert their "utmost sions already made and give them the
effort" to promote co-operation and even powerful sanction of imperial decree.8
to hold out the possibility of German The Imperial Conference that fixed
participation in the economic develop- the course Japan would attempt to fol-
ment of the Greater East Asia low during the next year and a half
Co-Prosperity Sphere. opened at 10 o'clock on the morning of
To cope with the political offensive 30 September 1943. Assembled for this
being waged by the Anglo-American meeting with the Emperor, the "August
Allies in East Asia, the Japanese decided Mind" of Japan, were the highest offi-
they must take stronger measures to con- cials of the government — the Premier
vince the peoples of Asia that their des- and War Minister, Hideki Tojo; the
tiny lay with Japan. The most effective Navy, Foreign Affairs, Finance, Agricul-
argument, of course, was military vic- ture, and Commerce Ministers; the
tory, but the Japanese could not rely on Chiefs and Deputy Chiefs of the Army
that. They proposed therefore to secure and Navy General Staffs; the President
the "voluntary" co-operation of the Asi- of the Privy Council, Director of the
atic people by fair and just treatment of Cabinet Planning Board, and Minister
the occupied nations and by propaganda for Greater East Asia Affairs; and the
emphasizing the evils of colonialism. The heads of various government depart-
weakness in their argument, the Japa- ments. In accordance with custom
nese realized, was the Japanese Army in Premier Tojo presided.
China. Resistance by the Chungking For most if not all those present at the
government would by example encour- Imperial Conference, the proceedings
age opposition to the Japanese every- offered nothing new. The purpose of
where in Asia. A primary aim of Japanese the conference was to secure the Em-
foreign policy, therefore, must be the peror's sanction for decisions already
settlement of the China incident. made, not to present various proposals
The political program proposed by the and policies for his decision. The Japa-
Foreign Ministry was reviewed and ac- nese constitutional system did not assign
cepted without dispute on 25 September the role of policy-maker to the Emperor.
at a meeting of the Liaison Conference, As the personification of national unity
which, it will be recalled, consisted of and the supreme symbol of Japanese life
the service chiefs and the Cabinet and and thought, the Emperor stood above
served as a link between Imperial Gen- party, and faction. Ancient tradition
eral Headquarters and the government. limited his action to approval of the
At this same meeting of 25 September decisions of his ministers; precedent dic-
the assembled political and military tated silence. But by his presence alone,
chiefs approved the strategic policy pre- he set upon these decisions a finality and
sented by Imperial General Headquar- authority that could be achieved in no
ters. With agreement on the basic
problems of political and military strat- 8
For a discussion of the proceedings of this meet-
egy, the leaders of the Japanese Govern- ing, see ibid.
other way. Thereafter, there was no General Headquarters sent to the com-
turning back; only another Imperial manders in the field specific instructions
Conference could alter or reverse the on the course they were to follow in
course approved by the Emperor. This attaining these objectives. For the army
was the significance of the meeting of commanders these instructions came
30 September; it witnessed, in solemn from the Army Section of Imperial Gen-
and historic fashion, a major shift in eral Headquarters in the form of a GHQ
Japanese policy and strategy for the numbered order. The Navy Section
conduct of the war. issued its own order to the fleet com-
General Tojo opened the conference manders, a procedure that led to different
with a reading of the political estimate interpretations of the central agreement
adopted at the Liaison Conference of and left to the separate commanders
25 September. The Emperor listened responsibility for making arrangements
gravely; there was no discussion. Next, for co-ordination and concerted action
the secretary read the proposed "Gen- of joint forces.9
eral Outline of the War Direction Pol- The central agreement promulgated
icy." Each of the more important officials after the Imperial Conference differed
then stood up in turn, with Tojo leading in no essential respect from the policy
off, to elaborate on the program and formulated by Imperial General Head-
explain to Emperor Hirohito how his quarters on 15 September. In general
department expected to achieve the goals terms it called for the "utmost endeavor"
set out in the new program. The Presi- by the Army and Navy, acting in close
dent of the Privy Council asked several co-operation, to delay the enemy drive
penetrating questions and when these in the strategic Southeast and Central
were answered to his satisfaction Tojo Pacific Areas as long as possible while
closed the conference at 3:30 p.m., with preparing for a large-scale counteroffen-
a brief statement announcing that since sive that would end the Allied threat
there was no objection, the new policy from the south and east. Preparations
was adopted unanimously. There is no for this counteroffensive would include
record that the Emperor spoke once airfield and base development, concen-
during the meeting. tration of forces in the threatened area,
stockpiling of munitions and critical sup-
The New Strategy in Action plies, and active operations to cut the
Allied line of communications and keep
Once the stamp of Imperial approval the Allies off balance. Six months were
had been secured, the Army and Navy to be allowed for these preparations on
lost no time putting into effect the new the assumption that the main Allied
strategy. In accordance with established drive would begin in the spring or
practice, the basic strategy was embodied summer of 1944.
in an "Army-Navy Central Agreement,"
the Japanese equivalent of a U.S. Joint
9
Chiefs of Staff directive. With this cen- Army-Navy Central Agreement on Operations in
Central and South Pacific Areas, 30 Sep 43; Imperial
tral agreement outlining the major ob- GHQ Army Directive 1653, same date; Imperial
jectives of the new policy, Imperial GHQ Navy Directive 280, same date. All in OCMH.
The task of putting this plan into

effect in the Southeast Area, which was
outside the absolute national defense
line, fell on the commander of the 8th
Area Army, General Imamura, and his
naval colleague, Admiral Kusaka, com-
mander of the Southeast Area Fleet. The
first was to make every effort to hold the
Bismarck Archipelago and Bougainville,
in anticipation of an Allied drive on
Rabaul. At the same time he was to
support the forces on the New Guinea
side of the Bismarck barrier to fend off
the Allied offensive as long as possible.
In this he was to have the help of the
Southeast Area Fleet, whose air and
naval forces were to attack Allied con-
voys, in co-operation with Army aircraft,
and keep open the supply lines to Japa-
nese forces in New Guinea and the
Solomons.10
General Imamura's plans were based ADMIRAL KUSAKA
on the estimate that the Allied offensive
in New Guinea and the Solomons was der, though not in the combat area, he
directed at the capture of Rabaul. The considered available for operations
attack, he thought, would come in Feb- should the need arise. Of the 3,000
ruary or March 1944, after the Allies planes credited to MacArthur and Hal-
had gained control of Bougainville, and sey, the Japanese commander thought
of Dampier Strait between New Guinea only about half were located in the for-
and New Britain. Imamura considered ward areas—700 in New Guinea and 600
the possibility of an Allied encirclement in the Solomons.
of Rabaul by the seizure of the Admiral- On the basis of this estimate and his
ties and New Ireland, but finally decided new mission, General Imamura saw his
that MacArthur would try to take Rabaul task as one of delaying the enemy drive.
by direct assault, as, indeed. MacArthur His main effort clearly would have to
wished to do. Enemy ground strength be directed toward holding Bougainville
Imamura estimated at 19 to 22 divisions, and the Dampier Strait area (Cape Glou-
four of which he placed in the Solomons cester in New Britain and the Huon
and three in New Guinea; the remain- Peninsula in New Guinea) as long as
possible. This concept was much like
the one he was already following, and
10
Hist of 8th Area Army, Japanese Studies in Imamura's new plan differed from the
World War II, 37, pp. 32ff; Southeast Area Opns
Record, pt. IV, 8th Area Army Operations, Japanese old only in the emphasis it placed on
Studies in World War II, 110, pp. 85-88. the critical areas.
To carry out this plan, General Ima- force operated chiefly in eastern New
mura had 2 armies, the 17th and 18th, Guinea and western New Britain, in
2 independent divisions, some nondivi- defense of Dampier Strait. Air support
sional units, support and service troops, for the Bismarck Archipelago and the
and an air army. The 18th Army, with northern Solomons was furnished largely
headquarters at Madang, was responsible by shore-based naval aircraft of the 11th
for the defense of eastern New Guinea Air Fleet based at Rabaul and in
and had assigned to it 3 divisions, the southern Bougainville.
20th, 41st, and 51st. The 17th Army in On 7 October 1943, General Imamura
the Solomons had only 1 division, the issued the revised plan for operations
6th, located on Bougainville, but a non- in the Southeast Area. The 18th Army
divisional strength consisting of the 4th in New Guinea was to occupy and de-
South Seas Garrison Unit, plus 1 artil- fend the coastal region along Dampier
lery and 4 infantry battalions. To this Strait, particularly Finschhafen, and the
17th Army strength must be added the Ramu Valley in the interior. To the
naval ground units in the central and 17th Army in the Solomons, Imamura
northern Solomons, which constituted a assigned the task of holding Bougain-
fairly large body of well-trained combat ville, and to the 65th Brigade on New
troops. Britain the eastern shore of Dampier
Troops in the Bismarck Archipelago, Strait. The 4th Air Army was to provide
on New Britain, New Ireland and the support as required, with the primary
Admiralties, were under the direct con- mission of destroying any enemy forces
trol of 8th Area Army. The largest attempting to land in the Dampier Strait
strength was concentrated on New Brit- region. If this proved impossible and if
ain at whose eastern end stood Rabaul, the enemy established a foothold on Bou-
the last stronghold of the Southeast Area. gainville or in the critical Dampier
Guarding this critical area as well as Strait area, then all Japanese troops un-
western New Ireland was the Rabaul der his command, ruled General Ima-
Defense Unit, composed of the 38th mura, would "trade position for time,
Division and attached elements. The to the end that the enemy offensive will
western end of New Britain, facing Dam- be crushed as far forward as possible
pier Strait, was held by the 65th Brigade, under the accumulation of losses."11
while the central portion was reserved The main burden of holding the Cen-
for the 17th Division, scheduled to arrive tral Pacific rested on Admiral Mineichi
shortly from Shanghai. In the Admiral- Koga, Combined Fleet commander at
ties, with its strength concentrated on Truk. Directed to push preparations
Los Negros, was the 51st Transport for holding the Carolines and the Mari-
Regiment. anas, both of which were included in
The Army air strength of the South- the absolute national defense sphere,
east Area, consisting of the 6th and 7th Admiral Koga had to rely largely on
Air Divisions, was organized into the
4th Air Army. Except for one air bri- 11
Southeast Area Opns Record, pt. IV, 8th Area
gade assigned to the support of the 19th Army Opns, Japanese Studies in World War II, 110,
Army in the Banda Sea area, this air p. 95.
Army reinforcements to fortify the bases jurisdiction had been gradually restricted
in his area. All together, Imperial Gen- as new commands were formed in the
eral Headquarters allotted for this Solomons and New Guinea to meet the
purpose approximately forty infantry Allied offensive in 1942 and 1943. It
battalions, as well as tanks, artillery and was time, Imperial General Headquar-
other support.12 (Table 10) But many ters decided in October 1943, to carve
of these forces were lost at sea as a result out another piece from Terauchi's do-
of Allied submarine attacks and never main. This piece, which extended from
reached their destination. Those that the 8th Area Army boundary at longi-
did, Koga used to reinforce the Gilberts tude 140° east westward to Makassar
and Marshalls, thereby weakening his Strait and from latitude 5° north south-
defenses in the Marianas and Carolines. ward to Australia, included most of
From the Army point of view, the Dutch New Guinea, Halmahera, the
assignment of troops intended for the Celebes, Timor, and the Lesser Sunda
Marianas and the Carolines to outlying Islands. In the view of Imperial General
positions in the Marshalls was a serious Headquarters, this area had now assumed
error. But even more serious, many a critical importance as the pivotal point
Army officers believed, was the fact that for the projected counteroffensive. More
the Navy Section of Imperial General important, perhaps, was the fact that the
Headquarters, by emphasizing the naval area included the sea approaches to the
mission to meet and engage the enemy Celebes and South China Seas—objec-
fleet, failed to impress on Admiral Koga tives of the Allied drive across the Cen-
the necessity for husbanding his strength tral Pacific—and covered the route to
along the vital national defense line. the Philippines favored by General
Koga, the Army held, had not been given MacArthur.13
proper guidance, with the result that the Prompted by these considerations, the
new operational policy was never prop- planners in Tokyo took steps to reorgan-
erly carried out in the Central Pacific. ize the defenses of this area. In a series
Among the orders issued by Imperial of orders dated 29 October, they estab-
General Headquarters on 30 September lished a separate command under the
were those to the commander of the direct control of Imperial General Head-
Southern Army, Field Marshal Hisaichi quarters, organized an area army head-
Terauchi, directing him to expedite quarters to direct operations, and assigned
preparations for the expected counter- to it an additional army and three more
offensive. Originally, the Southern Army divisions. (Chart 16) The headquarters
headquarters had controlled Japanese designated for the area was General
operations in the entire Southern Area Korechika Anami's 2d Area Army, then
from Malaya to Guadalcanal, but its in Manchuria. Under it would be the
12 13
Operations in the Central Pacific, Japanese Imperial GHQ Army High Command Record,
Studies in World War II, 55, pp. 10-13; Imperial Japanese Studies in World War II, 72, pp. 98-100,
GHQ Army High Command Record, Japanese 102-104; Hist of Southern Army, 1941-45, Japanese
Studies in World War II, 72, pp. 100-102; Crowl Studies in World War II, 21, pp. 52-60; Hist of 2d
and Love, Seizure of the Gilberts and Marshalls, pp. Area Army, Japanese Studies in World War II, 31,
64-66, 209-10. pp. 4ff; Japanese Opns in SWPA, II, ch. VIII, passim.
TABLE 10—JAPANESE ARMY REINFORCEMENTS, CENTRAL PACIFIC,

SEPTEMBER 1943-JANUARY 1944
Source: Hattori, Greater East Asia War, III, 52.

19th Army, already in the area, and the If General Anami had reason to com-
2d Army, which, like the 2d Area Army, plain about the shortage of ground
was to be transferred from Manchuria. forces, he had even more reason to fear
To the former was assigned an addi- for his air defenses. His only air unit
tional division, the 46th from Japan; to was the 7th Air Division, then recuperat-
the latter the 3d and 36th Divisions, ing at Ambon from the heavy blows it
then stationed in China. With the ar- had suffered in eastern New Guinea
rival of these units, and others, General during the summer and early fall. When
Anami would have under his control Anami assumed control of the division
two armies and a total of five battle- it had only about fifty planes operational,
tested and fresh divisions, one of which, and virtually all these were involved in
the 36th, was organized and equipped local defense and escort missions in the
for amphibious operations.14 Already 19th Army area. There were none to
in the area, was the 7th Air Division. spare for the 2d Army, and, in view of
The wholesale shifting of forces and the critical shortage of planes everywhere,
supplies required by these orders placed little prospect of getting more.
a serious strain on the already overbur- Nor could General Anami expect
dened Japanese shipping facilities. It much help from his naval colleague,
was almost a month before General commander of the newly formed 4th
Anami established a provisional head- Expeditionary Fleet. This force was a
quarters at Davao in the southern Phil- fleet only in name, consisting largely of
ippines and only on 1 December did he several naval special base units and some
assume operational control. At the time, special landing troops, scattered through-
2d Army had no combat units at all and out the area. There was a navy air unit
the 19th Army, for which reinforcements at Kendari in the Celebes, but it, too,
would not arrive until February 1944, had only about fifty planes and most of
had only two divisions whose elements its experienced pilots had been moved
were scattered among the islands west to Rabaul. The real strength of the
of New Guinea. Even if shipping had Japanese Navy in this region lay in the
been available, it would have been im- Southwest Area Fleet, with headquarters
possible to concentrate forces for a sud- at Surabaya. In the event of a naval
den emergency. The arrival of the 36th threat from the south by way of the
Division on 25 December and its subse- Indian Ocean, it was this organization
quent assignment to the Geelvink Bay rather than the 4th Expeditionary Fleet
area made it possible at least to provide that would go into action. Any threat
protection for what was considered the from the east would presumably be met
most important strategic position in by the Combined Fleet at Truk.
the 2d Army zone. But this still left Even without the strong protests from
the northeast New Guinea coast from the field, the high command in Tokyo
Wewak to Sarmi virtually undefended. could not have failed to see how weak
were the defenses of western New Guinea
and the Central Pacific. There was no
14
The 3d Division orders were changed, and the shortage of troops or munitions; Anami
5th, also in China, was transferred, instead. was promised reinforcements that would
CHART 16—ORGANIZATION OF JAPANESE FORCES IN PACIFIC AND SOUTHEAST ASIA, NOVEMBER 1943
Navy Command
Co-ordination
have given 2d Area Army a total strength shipments to the 2d Area Army were vir-
of 320,000 men. Nor could Admiral tually discontinued during February
Koga complain that Imperial General and March 1944, even though an addi-
Headquarters refused to send him troops tional 300,000 tons of shipping was
when he asked for them. The trouble allocated to the armed forces in that
was shipping. At the Imperial Confer- period.
ence of 30 September, the Army and The Japanese were having trouble
Navy had asked for additional ships to also meeting the goals set for aircraft
move the troops and supplies needed to production. By the end of the year it
carry out the new operational policy.15 was evident these ambitious goals,
They had received only 250,000 addi- though successively reduced, would not
tional tons, barely enough as it turned be met, partly because Japanese industry
out to meet the losses from enemy action. was not equal to the task and partly be-
The rest had been allocated to civilian cause of the shortage of shipping and
agencies for the war production pro- shipping losses. Thus, instead of the
gram. Under these circumstances, the 4,000 planes that should have come off
monthly requirements of 2d Area Army the assembly lines each month, Japanese
for 450,000 gross tons of large and medi- military forces received during the first
um-sized transports and 150,000 gross quarter of 1944 only about half that
tons of smaller ships for a period of number.
four months proved too heavy a drain Essential also to the success of the
on the resources of Imperial General new strategy adopted at the end of Sep-
Headquarters. tember was the airfield construction pro-
The shortage of shipping was not an gram designed to furnish bases from
absolute shortage; 2d Area Army's re- which to meet the Allied threat and sup-
quirements might still have been met port the planned counteroffensive in the
had it not been for the competing spring of 1944. In General Anami's area
demands of other theaters and the unex- alone, 100 new airfields, echeloned in
pectedly heavy losses from Allied sub- depth and mutually supporting, were to
marines. From November on, the be built. The task was a gigantic one
Central Pacific was regarded as the more and impossible of execution even though
critical area and enjoyed a higher prior- combat units were put to work as labor
ity than the Southeast Area. But the troops. The shortages of critical mate-
ship losses there proved most serious. rials, and lack of mechanized equipment,
In December, the total was 300,000 gross labor, and engineering skill, combined
tons, and during the first month of the with the difficulties of transportation
new year, the figure rose to 460,000 brought the construction program to a
(including ships heavily damaged) —the grinding halt almost before it had got
highest yet recorded since the start of the started. As a result, few of the projected
war. It was largely for this reason that air bases were ever completed.
In the final analysis, the success or
15
As of September 1943, the Army and Navy were failure of the plans so hopefully made
allocated 2,842,000 gross tons of shipping; about
2,500,000 had been allocated for nonmilitary use.
in September depended on the ability
Japanese Opns in SWPA, ch. VIII, p. 5. of the Japanese forces in New Guinea,
the Solomons, and the Central Pacific to were being drawn and the forces re-
halt the Allied drive, or at least hold quired moved into the critical areas,
long enough to permit the assembly of General MacArthur, Admiral Nimitz,
troops and supplies needed for an effec- and Admiral Halsey had begun to push
tive defense, and, ultimately, a counter- against the outposts of the absolute
offensive. But even while these plans national defense line.
CHAPTER XXVIII
The Execution of Strategy: Pacific

Operations, August - December 1943
The conduct of war resembles the workings of an intricate machine with
tremendous friction, so that combinations which are easily planned on
paper can be executed only with great effort.
CLAUSEWITZ
While plans for the future were being Georgia campaign.1 There were still a
made in Tokyo and Washington, the large number of Japanese on New
war in the Pacific went forward rapidly Georgia Island and they would have to
on every front. Between the summer of be tracked down and captured or killed
1943 and the end of the year, Allied before the island could be considered
forces in the Pacific hit the enemy from secure. Then the remaining islands in
every direction in a bewildering variety the group — Arundel, Baanga, Gizo,
of operations that set the pattern of Kolombangara, and Vella Lavella —
Pacific warfare. These operations were would have to be occupied or neutral-
everywhere marked by the employment ized. Only then would the campaign
of air, ground, and naval forces— be ended and the forces of the South
American, Australian, and New Zealand Pacific free to move on into the northern
—under a unified command and a time- Solomons.
table that called for the most careful Even before Munda had fallen, Gen-
planning and co-ordination. Whatever eral Griswold, XIV Corps commander,
differences existed between the services had taken steps to prevent the escape
or among the Allies, operations against of the Japanese on New Georgia. Patrols
the enemy were conducted in a spirit of had gone out to encircle the airfield and
co-operation and mutual good will. to cut all routes of escape. Following
them had come stronger forces. Leaving
New Georgia the 43d Division to guard the airfield,
Griswold had sent elements of the 25th
Capture of the Munda airfield by Division north along the inland trail
Admiral Halsey's forces on 5 August had from Munda to Bairoko Harbor, where
signified the end of only one phase,
though an important one, of the New 1
See above, ch. XXV.
a mixed force of Marine and Army small Japanese force left behind by
troops had been trying unsuccessfully to Sasaki on New Georgia. (Map 10) By
overcome a small Japanese garrison. A that time, mid-August, all Japanese
second column, consisting of elements hopes for a counteroffensive had disap-
of the 37th Division, Griswold sent along peared. The reinforcements sent by
the west coast of the island toward Zieta.2 higher headquarters at Rabaul, about
The Japanese were not so easily 1,500 Army and Navy troops, had been
trapped. Having withdrawn successfully intercepted in Vella Gulf on the night
from Munda on 3 August, the Army and of 6-7 August and virtually destroyed.
Navy commanders in the central Solo- Only about 300 men had survived to
mons, General Sasaki and Admiral Ota, reach Vella Lavella. Next had come
now decided they could no longer hold orders to withdraw from Baanga, where
New Georgia with the troops at their the Americans had already landed, and
disposal. Leaving a small force to harass to cancel all plans for counterattack.
the Americans and maintain a foothold Sasaki's mission now was to hold out as
on the island against the day of their long as possible to give the Japanese in
return, they transferred their remaining the northern Solomons time to make
troops to other islands in the group: to ready for the next Allied advance. No
Baanga, which lay within artillery range more reinforcements would be forth-
of Munda; to Arundel, covering the coming; Sasaki would have to do the
narrow water route northward from job with what he had—a mixed force of
Munda; and to Kolombangara, where about 11,000 men, most of whom were
Sasaki established his headquarters. Re- concentrated on Kolombangara.
inforcements had been promised from Meantime, Admiral Halsey had revised
Rabaul, and with these Sasaki and Ota his own plans. The prospect of "another
hoped ultimately to launch a counter- slugging match" such as the one at
offensive and drive the enemy from New Munda to capture the airfield at Vila on
Georgia.3 Kolombangara, the objective set in the
The Americans required more than original plans, was not an attractive one.4
two weeks of hard fighting to clear the No one wanted to do it, but how could
it be avoided? With the advantage of
2
For a full account of operations covered in this hindsight, the answer seems simple
section, see Miller, CARTWHEEL, ch. IX; Maj. John enough—bypass it, neutralize it, and go
N. Rentz, USMC, Marines in the Central Solomons
Historical Branch, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps on to Bougainville. The planners on
(Washington, 1952); Morison, Breaking the Bismarcks Halsey's staff were thoroughly aware of
Barrier, chs. XII-XIII; Craven and Cate, AAF IV, the advantages of bypassing enemy
ch. VII. The author was assigned as Historical Officer
in the South Pacific from 1943 to 1945 and directed strongpoints. Though not yet publicized
the preparation of histories covering the opera- by that name, the maneuver was a well-
tions in the theater. These have been used in the understood military principle. As Gen-
preparation of this and other chapters.
3
Japanese plans and operations described in this
eral MacArthur wrote: "The system is
chapter are based on the following: Hattori, The as old as war itself. It is merely a new
Greater East Asia War, III, 53-83; Japanese Opns in
SWPA, vol. II, ch. VII; Southeast Area Opns Records,
pt. III, 18th Army Opns, pt. II, Japanese Studies in
4
World War II, 42. Halsey and Bryan, Admiral Halsey's Story, p. 170.
THE EXECUTION OF STRATEGY: PACIFIC OPERATIONS 561
MAP 10
name, dictated by new conditions, given next objective, Bougainville, than a

to the ancient principle of envelopment. landing at Kolombangara. Halsey liked
... It has always proved the ideal the idea when it was proposed to him
method for success by inferior in number in July, but before he would buy it he
but faster moving forces." 5 wanted the answer to certain questions.
The idea of bypassing Kolombangara, Could fighter aircraft be based there to
therefore, was a natural one. The obvi- support the invasion of Bougainville?
ous alternative was Vella Lavella, fifteen Could the Japanese field at Vila be inter-
miles to the northwest and defended by dicted by artillery during the landing
only a handful of Japanese. A landing and could Sasaki's line of supply be cut
there would certainly be easier, if intelli- so that the Kolombangara garrison could
gence estimates were correct, and would safely be left "to die on the vine"?6
have the further advantage of placing
South Pacific forces even closer to their
6
Rad, Halsey to Turner and Fitch, 11 Jul 43, cited
in Miller, CARTWHEEL, Chap. X, p. 13; Ltr, Halsey
5
Ltr, MacArthur to Gen Smith, Chief Mil Hist, to Gen Ward, Chief, Mil Hist, 27 May and 27 Aug 52,
response to questions by author, 5 Mar 53, OCMH. OCMH.
The answers were provided by a vance party left Rendova to mark the
reconnaissance party, which reported at beaches at the landing site. News had
the end of July that a field could be also come from the Australian coast
built near Barakoma at the south end of watcher there that about forty Japanese
the island. Also reassuring, though in- had been taken prisoner by the natives,
correct, was the news that there were and the advance party was given the
no Japanese in the area. On the basis additional task of collecting these pris-
of this information and the recommen- oners. It later developed that the Japa-
dation of Admiral Wilkinson, Turner's nese, whose number had increased to
successor, Halsey issued orders for the about 300, had not been captured at all.
capture of Vella Lavella on 11 August. Despite this disturbing news, the ad-
The invasion force would consist of a vance party held the beachhead for the
regimental combat team from the 25th main invasion force, capturing seven
Division, plus supporting and service Japanese in the process.
troops, under Brig. Gen. Robert B. D-day was a complete success. The
McClure. Army and Navy construction assault troops landed without interfer-
troops would go in shortly after the ence, and supplies were unloaded with
invasion to build the airfield and a small a minimum of confusion. Ground oper-
naval base.7 Three separate naval forces, ations thereafter consisted largely of
including aircraft carriers and subma- mopping up small groups of Japanese,
rines, would provide close support for an activity that occupied the troops until
the landing and stand ready to head off almost the end of September. By that
any Japanese attempt to interfere with time Arundel had fallen to Griswold's
the invasion. Aircraft from New Georgia troops after a long and unexpectedly
would cover the landing also and in difficult fight by the small Japanese gar-
addition strike Japanese bases in the rison. But the major Japanese resistance
Shortlands and on Bougainville. Gris- came from the air, and for almost a
wold's contribution to the operation month Allied and Japanese planes fought
would consist of the capture of Arundel it out over the central Solomons.
Island, immediately to the south of While this battle was in progress, Gen-
Kolombangara. With artillery emplaced eral Sasaki began to make plans for his
there he could take Vila airfield under escape. He had accomplished his mis-
direct fire and render it useless for the sion and could now give up the central
period of the campaign. Solomons to the enemy. But to get his
D-day for the Vella Lavella invasion men through to southern Bougainville
was 15 August, and on the 12th an ad- where they were needed to fight again
was no easy task. The evacuation of
Kolombangara began on 28 September.
7
By transport, barge, landing craft, and
The landing force consisted of Army—35th Infan-
try, 64th Field Artillery Battalion (105-mm. howit- other types of vessels, the Japanese troops
zers); Company C, 65th Engineer Battalion, 25th made their way northward under cover
Cavalry Reconnaissance Troops, plus other elements of darkness. Of the 11,000 men Sasaki
of the 25th Division; Marines—4th Defense Battalion;
Navy—58th Naval Construction Battalion and a had gathered at Kolombangara, more
naval base group. than 9,000 made good their escape.
Finally, on the night of 6 October a available for the defense of the Lae-
strong destroyer force came down with Salamaua area.8
transports to pick up the last survivors. Operations against Lae began even
A small group of American destroyers, before Salamaua had fallen. Allied Air
outnumbered three to one, intercepted Forces planes began the preassault bom-
the Japanese, but suffered heavy losses bardment on 1 September, while con-
and was unable to prevent the rescue. tinuing to neutralize Japanese fields in
With this engagement, known as the New Guinea and New Britain. On the
Battle of Vella Lavella, the New Georgia morning of the 4th, troops of the 9th
campaign came to an end. It had lasted Australian Division came ashore in the
more than four months and had required vicinity of Lae, one brigade landing six-
far larger forces than had been esti- teen miles east of the town and another
mated. But at its conclusion, the forces four miles closer in. A Japanese effort
of the South Pacific were at the thresh- to break up the landing with an air
old of Bougainville, whose invasion was attack proved unsuccessful and by
less than a month away. evening of D-day the Australians had
secured the beachheads and begun the
Salamaua to Sio drive westward toward Lae.
Nadzab was captured the next day,
While Halsey was thrusting forward 5 September, by the 503d Parachute
the right leg of the Allied advance to- Infantry Regiment in the first Allied
ward the Bismarcks deep into enemy airborne operation of the Pacific war.
territory, MacArthur was pushing the Flown in from Port Moresby in ninety-
left leg forward into the Huon Penin- six C-47's, accompanied by over 200
sula. (Map III) During July and August, bombers, fighters, and other aircraft, the
when fighting raged the fiercest in the paratroopers reached Nadzab without
Solomons, Australian and American mishaps. At 1020 the jump began, and
troops advanced slowly toward Salamaua. within five minutes the entire regiment
This was only a diversionary move, in- was dropping gently toward the ground.
tended to deceive the enemy. Lae was Three men were killed and thirty-three
the real objective and Allied Air and injured during the drop, but once on
Naval Forces operations during this land there were no further casualties.
period were directed as much toward its The Japanese had been taken completely
seizure as to support of the Salamaua by surprise, and had failed to provide
campaign. Thus, by the time Salamaua any reception whatever.
was captured on 12 September, General With the strip at Nadzab in his pos-
Kenney's air forces had struck a heavy session, General MacArthur sent in the
blow at Japanese air power, and Admiral airfield engineers and then the 7th
Kinkaid's destroyers and PT boats had Australian Division. On the 10th, this
cut deeply into the enemy's thin line of division began its advance eastward
communications. Ground troops, too,
had taken a heavy toll, for General Ima- 8
For an account of operations in the Markham
mura, determined to hold Salamaua, had Valley and Huon Peninsula, see Miller, CART-
WHEEL, ch. XI; Morison, Breaking the Bismarcks
placed there the bulk of the 10,000 men Barrier, ch. XIV; Craven and Cate, AAF IV, ch. VI.
AUSTRALIAN TROOPS GO ASHORE NEAR LAE
down the Markham Valley toward Lae, of Vitiaz and Dampier Straits, separating
in concert with the westward drive of the Huon Peninsula and New Britain.
the 9th Australian Division along the The capture of Finschhafen was only one
coast. Lae was now virtually cut off, and step toward this goal; Madang, the Jap-
the Japanese wisely decided to pull out anese stronghold on the north shore of
and make their way overland as best they the peninsula, and Cape Gloucester in
could to the north shore of the Huon western New Britain would have to be
Peninsula. Thus, the Australians met no taken also to gain control of these stra-
strong organized resistance and on 15 tegic straits. The problem, therefore,
September entered Lae, only to find the was how to exploit the gains at Lae and
Japanese gone. Salamaua to achieve the final objective
The rapid seizure of Lae put Mac- more rapidly.
Arthur about a month ahead of the In a sense, it was the Japanese who
original CARTWHEEL schedule, which answered this question by drawing the
had set a mid-October target date for the absolute national defense line from the
Finschhafen operation. But before tak- Marianas through the Carolines to
ing advantage of this stroke of good western New Guinea, thereby placing
fortune, MacArthur ordered a compre- the Solomons, Rabaul, eastern New
hensive review of the Allied situation in Guinea, and the Gilberts and Marshalls
New Guinea. The objective was control in the category of areas whose retention
AIRBORNE OPERATIONS AT NADZAB
was not essential to Japanese victory.9 nese strengthened the defenses of Bou-
But this decision by Imperial General gainville in an effort to stem the Allied
Headquarters did not mean that those drive up the Solomons, and reinforced
areas forward of the line were to be Rabaul and the Cape Gloucester garri-
abandoned. Rather, Japanese positions son in western New Britain to hold the
there were to be strengthened and held east side of the straits.
as long as possible, and commanders in The key position on the New Guinea
the field were enjoined to exert their flank was Finschhafen, an airfield site
utmost efforts to delay the enemy's drive and staging point for men and supplies.
toward the absolute defense line. No one knew better than Lt. Gen.
It was on the basis of these orders Hatazo Adachi, 18th Army commander
and the reinforcements sent by Imperial in New Guinea, that the 1,000-man gar-
General Headquarters that the Japanese rison at Finschhafen was inadequate, but,
commanders in the Solomons and New lacking the troops, there was nothing he
Guinea made their plans for defense. could do to reinforce it. The Allied
An essential aspect of these plans, it will invasion of Lae changed the situation
be remembered, was control of Dampier and led to a change in plans that freed
and Vitiaz Straits. To this end the Japa- the 20th Division from its current
assignment. One element of the division
9
See above, ch. XXVII. Adachi ordered inland to Kaiapit, stra-
tegically situated near the source of the The advance up the Markham Valley
Markham and Ramu Rivers, to prevent began almost immediately. On 19 Sep-
the Allies from advancing down the tember a company of Australian infan-
Ramu Valley to Madang. The main try, flown by transport planes to a point
body of the division, then located at about eight miles from Kaiapit, seized
Bogadjim about 25 miles south of that strategic village at the head of the
Madang, he ordered to Finschhafen, 200 valley. (Map 11) There it was joined
miles away. two days later by elements of the 7th
When the 20th Division left Bogad- Division from Nadzab. The drive down
jim on 10 September, five days before the Ramu Valley began soon after and
the Australian occupation of Lae, Allied by 6 October Dumpu was in Allied
plans for the next advance had been hands.
laid. Estimating correctly that the Japa- The landing at Finschhafen came on
nese would stubbornly resist the Allied 22 September, and was made by a bri-
drive along the Huon Peninsula, it was gade of the 9th Australian Division.
agreed that General Blamey's New After a week of hard fighting, the Aus-
Guinea Force should advance simulta- tralians captured the town and nearby
neously along the coast to Finschhafen airfield on 2 October. But the victory
and Saidor and inland to Kaiapit, then was, in a sense, a hollow one, for the
down the Ramu Valley to Dumpu, in bulk of the Japanese garrison, 4,000 men,
conjunction with the invasion of west- had retreated to the 3,240-foot-high Sat-
ern New Britain by General Krueger's elberg, a peak that dominated Finsch-
Alamo Force. The probable target date, hafen and the surrounding area. There
it was then estimated, would be 1 it was joined by the 20th Division and
December 1943. on 16 October, the Japanese launched
This plan and the target date was set a co-ordinated ground and seaborne
at a conference in Port Moresby on 3 counterattack. This effort failed, but
September, before the Lae invasion and the Japanese kept trying until the end
before the 20th Division had begun its of October. Thereafter they went on
move toward Finschhafen. The absence the defensive. The Australians had now
of opposition at Lae combined with received reinforcements and it was their
information on the enemy's movements turn to take the offensive. But a month
forced a rapid change in the timetable. of difficult fighting was still required
Now the Allies much reach Finschhafen to drive the Japanese off Satelberg.
before the 20th Division. MacArthur The Australians did not stop once
waited only for the first troops to reach they had taken the peak. Their orders
Lae. When they did, on 15 September, were to take Sio, about fifty miles up
he ordered General Blarney to start the the coast, so they pushed on, driving
drive up the Markham Valley. Two the remnants of the 20th Division before
days later, he issued his orders for the them. On 15 January 1944, they reached
seizure of Finschhafen. The Madang their objective and seized the town,
operation was temporarily postponed in thereby bringing under Allied control
the hope that it might ultimately prove a 60-mile-stretch of coast line extending
unnecessary. from Finschhafen to Sio. Except for
MAP 11
isolated centers of resistance, the New thus launching the long delayed offen-
Guinea Force campaign in the Huon sive westward across the vast ocean
Gulf area was over. reaches of the Central Pacific.
For this operation, Nimitz had the
The Gilbert Islands10 bulk of the Pacific Fleet, the Fleet
Marine Force, the Army's Seventh Air
While MacArthur and Halsey were Force, and the combat and logistical
taking turns hitting the Japanese, Admi- elements of General Richardson's com-
ral Nimitz had moved into the Gilberts, mand. All of these contributed to or
directly participated in the Gilberts in-
10
For an account of operations in the Gilberts, see vasion.11 The role of the Army was to
Crowl and Love, Seizure of the Gilberts and Marshalls; furnish the assault element for Makin,
Morison, Aleutians, Gilberts and Marshalls; Capt. land-based aircraft for Admiral Hoover's
James R. Stockman, USMC, The Battle for Tarawa,
Historical Section, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps
(Washington, 1947); Craven and Cate, AAF IV, ch.
IX; Jeter A. Isely and Philip A. Crowl, The U.S.
11
Marines and Amphibious War (Princeton, N.J.: For the organization of these forces, see above,
Princeton University Press, 1951), ch. VI. ch. XXIV.
MAP 12
Defense and Shore-Based Air Force, lo- needed for the assault and subsequent
gistical support, and part of the garrison occupation of the islands assembled.
force. The task had not been easy. This
Preparations for the invasion of the was the first offensive effort in the Cen-
Gilberts had begun in August 1943, tral Pacific Area and the transition from
when Nimitz received the directive for a defensive to an offensive role required
the operation from the Joint Chiefs of many adjustments in organization and
Staff. Since that time, the forces had outlook. Preparations were complicated
been selected and trained, an organiza- also by the problems of interservice rela-
tion established under Spruance for the tions and the fact that the major assault
conduct of this and succeeding amphibi- units were not only from different
ous operations, a joint staff provided for services and accustomed to operate in
Nimitz, and the equipment and supplies different ways but also were scattered
throughout the Central and South Pacific New Georgia campaigns, the LVT rates
Areas. The 27th Division, scheduled to as one of the great contributions of
take Makin, was in Hawaii; the 2d World War II to the art of amphibious
Marine Division, which was to seize warfare. Both were truly amphibious
Tarawa, was in New Zealand; and the weapons of the most modern design and
three defense battalions were at Wallis, played a vital role in making possible
Samoa, and Pearl Harbor. To assemble, the efficiency and success that marked
train, and rehearse these forces and bring amphibious operations in the Pacific
them into position before the objective during World War II.
at the exact moment and in the right At an early stage in the planning for
order was a complex and difficult task. the Gilberts campaign it was realized
An additional factor that affected all that LVT's would be required both at
preparations for the Gilberts invasion Tarawa and Makin. (Maps 12 and 13)
was that they had to be done concur- Especially at Tarawa, where the water
rently with the planning for the Mar- over the fringing coral reefs was ex-
shalls. There was simply not enough of tremely shallow and the beach defenses
everything to go around. Many of the especially strong, was there need for the
vessels used for the first operation would amphibian tractor. Since most of the
have to be used again in the Marshalls amphtracs the 2d Marine Division had
two months later. But expendable sup- were of the early unarmored type, sub-
plies could not be reused, nor could the ject to mechanical failures and clearly
assault forces for the Gilberts be em- inadequate for the job, the division re-
ployed again in so short a time. Thus, quested 100 of the latest models, LVT(2).
two separate task forces, complete with The request was granted but because
all the equipment and supplies needed of a shipping shortage, the division re-
for amphibious warfare had to be assem- ceived only 50. This gave the Marines
bled simultaneously. It was a job of the a total of about 125 of the vehicles,
first magnitude for a headquarters enough for the first three waves of the
that had not yet conducted a single assault. The 27th Infantry Division,
amphibious attack. which would face less formidable ob-
One of the chief tactical problems of stacles at Makin, had 48 of the amph-
the Gilberts invasion as well as subse- tracs, but received them only at the end
quent operations against coral atolls was of October, thirteen days before it
to carry the assault troops and their embarked for the invasion.
supplies across the fringing reefs that The movement to the objective was
encircled the objective and constituted itself a masterpiece of logistical planning.
a major hazard in the landing. To trav- On 31 October, part of the garrison force
erse this obstacle and to take the troops left Oahu in six LST's with destroyer
across the defended beaches, the assault escort; five days later three more LST's
forces had the shallow-draft amphibian carrying the amphibian tractors and spe-
tractors, officially designated LVT but cial landing forces for the Makin inva-
more often called the amphtrac or Alli- sion sailed for the Gilbert Islands. The
gator. With the 2½-ton amphibian truck first group, traveling more slowly and by
(the Dukw), used first in the Sicily and a longer route, would reach its destina-
MAP 13
tion later than the second, which was Harbor on 10 November in the company
scheduled to arrive at the same time as of the Carrier Interceptor Group. The
the main body of Admiral Turner's carriers sailed a course parallel to and
Northern Attack Force. This last, con- 350 miles northwest of the landing force
sisting of the Makin assault troops and until they were 800 miles from the tar-
the expeditionary force, loaded in attack get. There the carriers struck out in
transports, and a carrier group under different directions to their assigned sta-
Rear Adm. Arthur W. Radford left Pearl tions and the landing force turned south
to meet Rear Adm. Harry W. Hill's ports took their assigned stations and
Southern Attack Force. On 18 Novem- prepared to debark the troops. The
ber, Hill and Turner rendezvoused at a invasion of the Gilberts had begun; four
point about 600 miles southeast of Makin months of planning and preparation
and traveled toward the objective along were now to reach fruition.
a parallel course. The Japanese had offered compara-
The elements constituting the South- tively little opposition to the approach
ern Attack Force, scheduled for the of these various task forces from all parts
Tarawa invasion, came from the South of the Pacific. Some land-based planes
Pacific. From New Zealand the 2d Ma- had come out to strike at one of the
rine Division went to Efate in the New LST groups, but without much effect.
Hebrides for rehearsal and from there The Combined Fleet at Truk had not
sailed in attack transports for the Gilberts stirred. Twice before, once in Septem-
on 13 November. Next day it was joined ber and again in October, when a fast,
by the Southern Carrier Group from carrier force under Rear Adm. Charles
Espiritu Santo, and a few days later by A. Pownall had struck the Gilberts and
a small force of light cruisers from Wake, Admiral Koga had sallied forth
Bougainville. 12 Just south of Funafuti, to give battle. Both times he had failed
the carriers parted company with Admi- to find Pownall's elusive carriers and had
ral Hill who headed for his rendezvous returned to Truk empty-handed. Appar-
with Turner. The Relief Carrier Group ently convinced by the Bougainville
under Admiral Sherman, which had sup- landing that the Americans would not
ported Halsey in the Bougainville oper- strike now in the Central Pacific, Koga
ation, fueled at Espiritu Santo and sailed had sent 173 of his carrier-based planes
north to Nauru, hit it on the 19th, then and a strong force of heavy cruisers to
provided cover for the Makin and Rabaul at the beginning of November.
Tarawa garrisons en route to the objec- The result was disastrous. Without his
tive. From Wallis Island, west of Samoa, cruisers and the carrier planes, Koga
came the garrison force for Apamama, dared not venture out of Truk. Help-
and from Samoa came the LST's carry- less, he had to stand by idly as the huge
ing the fifty new amphtracs for the 2d American fleet converged on the Gil-
Marine Division. berts. The one chance he had sought
Late on the night of 19 November, for a showdown with the Pacific Fleet
the two attack forces and the vast armada was lost.
of warships, cargo vessels, transports, and Though the main striking force of
other craft were in their assigned posi- the Combined Fleet was immobilized at
tions. During the early morning hours this critical juncture, the Japanese were
of the 20th, as the battleships and heavy by no means defenseless. Despite the
cruisers moved into position for the attacks of Admiral Pownall's fast carrier
opening bombardment and the carriers force, Japanese aircraft in the Gilberts-
sent their planes off the flight decks to Marshalls area were still capable of in-
bomb and strafe the beaches, the trans- flicting damage. And at Truk were sub-
12
For an account of the operations at Bougainville,
marines that could strike heavy blows if
beginning 1 November, see below, pp. 575-78. they could get within reach of the Allied
LVT's AT TARAWA
invasion force. These Koga sent out as ments. Gun emplacements and rifle pits,
soon as he heard of the landing and one so placed as to provide mutual support
of them sank the escort carrier Liscome and interlocking fields of fire, guarded
Bay on 24 November. Koga also sent the approaches to these barriers and
ground and air reinforcements to offered additional protection against as-
Tarawa, but they got only as far as sault from the ocean side of the island.
the southern Marshalls. By that time These were not formidable defenses, nor
Tarawa had fallen and the troops were Avas the defending force large, but so
used to bolster the defenses of Kwajalein narrow and restricted was the area of
instead. operations that the greatly outnumbered
The defense plans of the local garri- Japanese fully expected to give a good
sons at Makin and Tarawa were little account of themselves.
affected by events at Rabaul and Truk. On Tarawa, the defenders were not
Ma.kin had the smaller force, about 700 only more numerous but enjoyed also
men, and most of these were labor and the advantage of strong fortifications.
service troops. Effective combat strength The total force numbered about 4,800
was probably no more than 300. Light men, more than half of them effective
defenses had been constructed along the combat troops. The island itself had
lagoon side, and across the island were been converted into a fortress, ringed
two tank barrier systems surrounded by with beach defenses whose 13-mm. and
ditches, pill boxes, and wire entangle- 7.7-mm. machine guns were carefully
positioned to drive off the invaders. Oh length of time it took the 27th Division
the fringing reef were log and concrete to capture Makin, the 2d Marine Divi-
obstacles to channelize approaching sion stormed the heavily fortified beaches
boats. In the water and on the beaches of Tarawa, reduced its cement and steel
were additional obstacles and double- emplacements one by one, and killed
apron low-wire fences along which the virtually every Japanese soldier on the
defenders could lay down a barrage of island. The cost was terrific—3,301 cas-
antiboat fire calculated to halt the in- ualties, of whom over 1,000 were killed
vaders before they could step ashore. in action or died later of wounds.
Inland from the beaches were bombproof Was the island worth the price? Gen-
shelters of concrete and coconut logs for eral Holland Smith, Marine commander
weapons and men alike, connected by of the expeditionary force, thought not.
a system of ditches and tunnels. A large Tarawa, he declared later, had "no par-
array of guns ranging in size from 8-inch ticular strategic importance" and should
to 13-mm., and seven tanks fringed the have been bypassed and neutralized from
armament of the Japanese defenders. bases to the east and south. Its capture,
Of all the beaches assaulted in World he charged, was "a terrible waste of life
War II, only Iwo Jima was more strongly and effort." 14 Few of General Smith's
fortified or more stubbornly defended colleagues agreed with this judgment.
than Tarawa. Strategically and tactically, they held,
The capture of Makin took three days the campaign in the Gilberts proved of
and cost more in naval casualties than great value. Without advance bases in
in ground troops. Despite its great supe- the Gilberts, operations against the Mar-
riority in men and weapons, the 27th shalls would have been enormously diffi-
Division had considerable difficulty over- cult and infinitely more complicated and
coming the 700 defenders. Combat cas- hazardous. Moreover, the lessons learned
ualties numbered 218 (66 killed and 152 at Tarawa—one officer compiled a list
wounded), as compared to an estimated of one hundred mistakes made during
395 Japanese killed in action, a ratio of the operation—were of inestimable value
6 to 1. When the American losses in- in subsequent assaults. The most impor-
curred in the sinking of the Liscome Bay tant of these was the conclusive proof
are added to this total, however, the bal- it offered, as Admiral Hill wrote, that
ance is on the other side. With the 642 naval task forces "had the power to move
men that went down with the car- into an area, obtain complete naval air
rier, American casualties exceeded the control of that area, and remain there
strength of the entire Japanese garrison with acceptable losses throughout the
on Makin. entire assault and preliminary consoli-
If Makin had been, as one naval his- dation phases." 15 Had this fact not been
torian wrote, "a pushover for the ground demonstrated—and up to this time it
troops," 13 Tarawa was a grim and deadly had not been—the entire Central Pacific
struggle, probably the toughest fight thus
14
far in Marine Corps history. In the same Smith, Coral and Brass, pp. 111-12; Crowl and
Love, Seizure of the Gilberts and Marshalls, p. 157.
15
Ltr, Adm Hill to Maj Gen Harry J. Malony,
13
Morison, Aleutians, Gilberts and Marshalls, p. 120. Chief, Mil Hist, 14 Feb 49, OCMH.
LANDING CRAFT MOVING IN ON BUTARITARI ISLAND. Note LST's standing offshore at top,
and reef side of island at bottom.
offensive might well have ended before the "absolute national defense line."
it began. Originator of the plan was Admiral
Koga, Yamamoto's successor, who hoped
CARTWHEEL Completed that by concentrating all available naval,
land, and carrier air forces at Rabaul
General MacArthur and Admiral Hal- he could cut the Allied line of commu-
sey, meanwhile, had been pushing for- nications and thus retain control of the
ward in New Guinea and the Solomons. straits between New Guinea and New
Having taken Lae and Finschhafen, and Britain. It was admittedly a risky
begun his drive up the Markham Valley, scheme, for without their aircraft the
MacArthur had still to gain control of carriers were useless and without the
the Vitiaz and Dampier Straits before he carriers the Combined Fleet was helpless
could breach the Bismarcks barrier. On to stop the U.S. Pacific Fleet. But Koga,
his part, Halsey was to move into the having satisfied himself that Nimitz did
northern Solomons from where he would not intend to move into the Marshalls,
be in position to unite with MacArthur took the risk. He had failed in his
in the final phase of CARTWHEEL. attempt to catch the U.S. Fleet in the
Before the New Georgia fighting was Wake area and now was determined to
over, South Pacific aircraft had begun an catch it in the northern Solomons. It was
intensified campaign to neutralize Japa- a bad gamble and Koga lost not only
nese airfields in southern Bougainville his planes but also his chance to stop
and in the Shortlands while ground and the Central Pacific offensive in its
naval forces prepared for the invasion tracks. Here, at the very outset, was
to follow.16 By 1 November, D-day for demonstrated in striking fashion the ad-
the landing, all fields in the Bougainville vantages of the twin drive through the
area had been rendered inoperational. South-Southwest Pacific and Central
The neutralization of Japanese air Pacific Areas.
power in the northern Solomons coin- The Bougainville campaign had begun
cided with the arrival of strong air rein- on 27 October with the seizure of the
forcements at Rabaul, just at the moment Treasury Islands by New Zealand and
when the Bougainville invasion was get- American troops.17 That same day ma-
ting under way. To the 200 aircraft rines landed on Choiseul to the south-
based at Rabaul were added, at the be- west in a feint toward the east coast of
ginning of November, 173 carrier planes Bougainville. The real invasion, when
from the Combined Fleet at Truk. This it came on 1 November, was actually
move was part of a Japanese plan known made on the west coast, midway up the
as Operation RO, which had as its pur- island, at Empress Augusta Bay, and it
pose the delay of the Allied drive toward caught the Japanese by surprise. Despite
16
For an account of the Bougainville campaign, see
17
Miller, CARTWHEEL, ch. XII; Maj. John N. Rentz, For an account of New Zealand operations in the
USMC, Bougainville and the Northern Solomons, Treasuries as well as on Vella Lavella and Green
Historical Section, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps Island, see Oliver A. Gillespie, The Pacific, "Official
(Washington, 1948); Morison, Breaking the Bismarcks History of New Zealand in the Second World War,
Barrier, chs. XVI-XXI; Craven and Cate, AAF IV, 1939-45" (Wellington, New Zealand: War History
ch. VIII. Branch, Department of Internal Affairs, 1952), ch. V.
local opposition from a small well dug-in by this force was a serious one. With
garrison at Cape Torokina, between the Merrill's cruisers temporarily out of ac-
two southernmost landing beaches, the tion after four engagements in two days,
3d Marine Division made good its land- Halsey did not have a single heavy
ing and by the end of D-day held a cruiser to send against Kurita. This was,
narrow beachhead 4,000 yards in length he later wrote, "the most desperate emer-
along the shore of Empress Augusta Bay. gency that confronted me in my entire
Japanese air and naval reaction to term as COMSOPAC." 19 But south of
the Allied invasion of Bougainville was Guadalcanal, refueling after 1-2 Novem-
prompt and violent. On 1 November, ber strikes in the northern Solomons,
after a vain effort to send in ground was Rear Adm. Frederick C. Sherman's
reinforcements to destroy the American fast carrier force (Saratoga and Prince-
force in Empress Augusta Bay, a naval ton), lent by Nimitz for the invasion.
task force (2 heavy and 2 light cruisers Another carrier force had been prom-
accompanied by 6 destroyers) under Vice ised by Nimitz, who was himself in the
Adm. Sentaro Omori was sent down midst of last-minute preparations for the
from Rabaul. It was intercepted by Gilberts, but it would not arrive until
Rear Adm. Aaron S. Merrill's Task Force the 7th.
39 off Cape Torokina and turned back Though reluctant to use the fast car-
after a battle that lasted most of the riers against a strong base like Rabaul
night.18 A strong attempt by the Japa- and fearful of the damage or loss he
nese next morning, 2 November, to might incur in such a mission, Admiral
knock out Merrill's cruisers from the air Halsey could see no other way of meet-
and thus isolate the beachhead was foiled ing the threat posed by Kurita's force.
by planes from New Georgia. Further Having made up his mind, he acted with
attempts were discouraged by General characteristic dispatch. Sherman was to
Kenney's aircraft from the Southwest proceed immediately toward Rabaul,
Pacific, whose raids against Rabaul kept and, on the morning of the 5th, launch
the Japanese busy defending their own an all-out attack on Kurita's ships from
base. Here again the co-ordinated action a point about 230 miles to the south-
of adjacent Allied theaters paid large east. Aircraft from New Georgia would
dividends. provide cover during the approach and
Meanwhile, Admiral Koga had assem- retirement, and MacArthur's aircraft
bled at Truk a formidable force of 7 would follow up with an attack on
heavy cruisers, 1 light cruiser, 4 destroy- Rabaul that afternoon.
ers, and about a half dozen auxiliary Halsey's boldness paid off handsomely.
vessels. These he sent south under Vice The weather was perfect and the plan
Adm. Takeo Kurita to Rabaul, where was carried out without a hitch. At the
they arrived safely in the early morning cost of ten planes and fifteen men, Sher-
of 5 November. The threat presented man inflicted such heavy damage on the
18
Task Force 39 consisted of Cruiser Division 12
19
(four cruisers) and Destroyer Divisions 45 and 46 Halsey and Bryan, Admiral Halsey's Story, pp.
(four destroyers each). 180-81.
enemy fleet that Koga pulled it back to Rabaul on a double strike. Sherman
Truk late on the afternoon of the 5th. delivered his attack on the morning of
Kenney's follow-up with 27 B-24's and the 11th, damaged some ships, and es-
58 P-38's met little opposition, for the caped without detection. The second
Japanese were out looking for Sherman force, led by Rear Adm. Alfred L. Mont-
and the Southwest Pacific aircraft were gomery, launched its strike simultane-
able to bomb installations and docks ously, but had to fight its way out. It
at Rabaul without serious opposition. would have been better for the Japanese,
Japanese air power at Rabaul fared perhaps, had they not found Montgom-
no better than the surface forces but ery, for they lost thirty-five planes in a
accomplished a good deal more destruc- vain effort to hit the carriers.
tion. Ever since the landing at Torokina, If Admiral Koga had needed any fur-
Japanese aircraft had hammered away ther proof that Operation RO was a fail-
at targets in the Bougainville area and ure, the events of 11 November must
had fought an incessant battle with have convinced him. The next day he
Allied aircraft from NCAV Georgia. In a ordered the remaining 120 carrier planes
sense, this was the real battle of Bougain- back to Truk before they should all be
ville, for had the Japanese won control lost. Thus, on the eve of the Gilberts
of the air they could have cut off the invasion, the one force that the Allies
beachhead area and brought in sufficient feared most, the Combined Fleet, was
troops to drive out the marines. Thus, helpless to interfere. It would be months
the Allied command exerted every effort before the carrier losses could be replaced
to maintain local air superiority and to and the cruisers damaged at Rabaul put
keep open the line of communication. in action again. The failure of the
South Pacific aircraft flew countless mis- RO operation also marked the end of
sions over Bougainville and struck re- Rabaul's importance as the base for Jap-
peatedly at the enemy's air bases. In one anese operations against any Allied ad-
day, there were more than 700 takeoffs vance in the Solomons and New Guinea.
and landings at the Munda field alone. With land-based aircraft at close striking
The contribution of General Kenney's range, the Allies were able to neutralize
air force was to bomb the fields at Ra- the once great Japanese bastion and by-
baul, which he did at every opportunity. pass it without danger. For the Japa-
The arrival of the additional carrier nese, the large garrison and formidable
group (Essex, Bunker Hill, and Inde- defenses at Rabaul ultimately proved a
pendence) from the Central Pacific on liability, rather than an asset.
7 November offered Halsey a golden Air and naval victory assured the suc-
opportunity. 20 Encouraged by Sherman's cess of the Bougainville invasion and
success, he sent both carrier groups to greatly eased the task of the ground
forces. Reinforcements and supplies
began to come in on 8 November and
20
Like Sherman's group, this group of carriers was before the end of the month the Army's
scheduled for the invasion of the Gilberts and had 37th Division was sharing the beachhead
come to the South Pacific to escort Admiral Hill's
Southern Attack Force (2d Marine Division) to the with the 3d Marine Division. Air raids
target. See below, pp. 589-90. were still frequent, and the Japanese had
578 STRATEGY AND COMMAND; THE FIRST TWO YEARS
ADMIRAL HALSEY, MAJ. GEN. ROBERT S. BEIGHTLER, AND MAJ. GEN. ROY S.
GEIGER (seated, left to right) discuss a map problem at the 37th Division command post on
Bougainville.
succeeded in putting ashore first a regi- ered by MacArthur's forces at the turn
ment and then other troops that made of the year.21 It was a one-two punch,
the going hard for the Americans. By 15 a right at Cape Gloucester in western
December, when General Griswold's New Britain to gain control of Dampier
XIV Corps took over from I Marine Strait and a left at Saidor on the north
Amphibious Corps, there were 44,000 shore of the Huon Peninsula. Both oper-
men within a defended semicircular ations had been on the books for some
perimeter about 23,000 yards in length. time, but the New Britain plan was the
As in New Georgia, Halsey made Gen- older one and dated from the days when
eral Harmon his deputy for ground Rabaul was the great objective. The
operations on Bougainville, and by the Saidor plan was of more recent vintage,
end of the month the Americal Division
had begun to replace the 3d Marine
21
Division. Bougainville was now virtually This account of the New Britain and Saidor
operations is based on Miller, CARTWHEEL, pp.
an Army show. 272-306; Morison, Breaking the Bismarcks Barrier,
The blow that finally broke the Japa- pp. 369-91; Craven and Cate, AAF IV, pp. 328-57;
nese hold on the Vitiaz-Dampier bottle- Lt. Col. Frank O. Hough and Maj. John A. Crown,
USMC, The Campaign on New Britain, Histor-
neck and gave the Allies clear passage ical Branch, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps
through the Bismarck barrier was deliv- (Washington, 1953).
GENERAL GRISWOLD AND GENERAL HARMON (center) being briefed on the tactical situation
by 3d Marine Division officers.
having been proposed in September by (Rooke and Long) and virtually half of
General Chamberlin, and was related to New Britain. D-day was optimistically
the Australian drive up the New Guinea set for 20 November, and General
coast from Finschhafen to Sio. The Cape Krueger was directed at the same time
Gloucester operation looked east, the to prepare for the capture of Rabaul
Saidor west and north, but both formed in co-operation with South Pacific forces.
part of the single plan to breach the The extensive operations envisaged in
Bismarcks barrier and both were con- this plan, combined with the rapid prog-
ducted by General Krueger's ALAMO ress of the advance in New Guinea and
Force. the fact that the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Planning for New Britain had begun had already decided to bypass Rabaul,
in August but it was not until 22 Septem- produced a thorough review of the
ber that MacArthur issued the directive New Britain project. General Kenney
for the operation to General Krueger. thought the operation entirely unnec-
Under this directive, General Krueger's essary, and told MacArthur that a field
ALAMO Force (U.S. Sixth Army) was at Cape Gloucester would not provide
required to conduct extensive airborne any more air support than could be
and amphibious operations designed to provided with the bases already in Allied
gain control of two large offshore islands hands. An airfield at Saidor, he con-
SUPPLY ROAD ON BOUGAINVILLE built by Army engineers. Note how coconut logs are used
to support steep bank and underside of road.
ceded, might be necessary.22 General The result of this review was a revised
Chamberlin, MacArthur's G-3, did not plan, issued on 10 November, which
dispute this point, but observed that called only for the occupation of Cape
possession of western New Britain would Gloucester, the adjacent islands, and
strengthen the Allied position in the "minimum portions" of western New
area and facilitate operations in New Britain. But now the naval command-
Ireland and the Admiralties. Admirals ers were dissatisfied. They apparently
Carpender and Barbey also favored con- wanted a PT base on the south shore
trol of both sides of the Vitiaz-Dampier and none was provided for in the plan.
barrier; it was the seizure of Gasmata Obligingly, MacArthur authorized the
on the southwest shore of New Britain seizure of Arawe, believed to be weakly
that bothered them. That operation, defended, as an additional objective on
they felt, would take their ships too General Kenney's assurance that air
close to Japanese bases at Rabaul. support could be provided.23
Fixing a target date for the invasion
proved no easy matter and was compli-
22
Miller, CARTWHEEL, p. 273; Kenny, General
23
Kenny Reports, pp. 326-27. Kenny's objections are There is some dispute about the reasons for
outlined in his letter to MacArthur, 10 Oct 43, in going into Arawe. See Miller, CARTWHEEL, p.
GHQ SWPA G-3 Jnl, 11 Oct 43. 274n.
cated by airfield construction schedules, Guinea coast. Bogadjim was only about
tide, weather, and the phases of the fifty miles away; Madang another twenty.
moon. The first date selected, 20 Novem- Moreover, the bulk of Adachi's 18th
ber, was quickly discarded, and on Cham- Army was divided between Madang and
berlin's recommendation 4 December Sio, toward which the Australians were
was chosen. Krueger objected and asked already driving. The capture of Saidor
for either more time or more ships. would place Allied forces between the
Since the ships were not available, he two main Japanese concentrations.
got more time, and the dates finally Though an outline plan for the Saidor
selected were 15 December for Arawe invasion was ready by 11 December, it
and 26 December for Cape Gloucester. was not until the 17th, two days after the
The same ships that were used for Arawe Arawe landing, that MacArthur ordered
would carry the invasion force to Cape Krueger to proceed with the operation,
Gloucester. in co-operation with Australian opera-
The assault units for the New Britain tions in the Ramu Valley and against Sio.
operation were American and were as- The assault force was to come from the
signed to ALAMO Force. (The New 32d Division, ALAMO Force reserve for
Guinea Force, it will be remembered, western New Britain. D-day was tenta-
was composed almost entirely of Aus- tively set for 2 January 1944, with the
tralian units.) Arawe was to be taken understanding that the exact date of the
by a force built around the 112th Cav- landing would depend upon the situa-
alry Regiment and the 148th Field Artil- tion at Cape Gloucester. This proviso
lery Battalion under Brig. Gen. Julian was necessary because there were not
W. Cunningham. The assault force for enough landing craft in the theater for
the Cape Gloucester landing was a much both operations and Krueger would have
stronger one, consisting of the 1st Marine to use the same vessels for both landings.
Division, veteran of the Guadalcanal General Krueger, a cautious and con-
Campaign, the 12th Marine Defense Bat- servative commander, was apprehensive
talion, the Army's 2d Engineer Special about the Saidor landing. The schedule
Brigade, and miscellaneous service and was admittedly a tight one. Moreover,
supporting units. In ALAMO Force re- the ALAMO Force would be involved in
serve was the 32d Division, which had three separate operations simultaneously
fought at Buna. at a time when New Guinea Force was
Planning for the Saidor operation was engaged on two separate fronts. There
less complicated, partly because the prob- was little margin for error or for the
lems presented were simpler and partly unexpected, and the job of keeping these
because the operation was decided upon forces supplied would be difficult. For
at the last moment. The advantages of these reasons, Krueger urged postpone-
an Allied base at Saidor derived from its ment of the Saidor operation, but to no
location. Not only would it give Mac- avail. The Allied advance had gained
Arthur control of Vitiaz Strait and vir- a momentum MacArthur was unwilling
tually the entire north shore of the Huon to lose. He therefore ordered Krueger
Peninsula, but it would also provide a to proceed as planned with the assurance
base for further advances along the New that supplies would be forthcoming. On
30 December, the target date 2 January withdrawn to Rabaul and left the Amer-
was confirmed. 24 icans in complete possession. Ultimately
By the time all arrangements for the two strips were built, but they were
Saidor invasion had been completed, no longer needed. Like Arawe, Cape
ALAMO Force had established itself firmly Gloucester had little strategic signifi-
in western New Britain. At Arawe, the cance, for its conquest came at a time
112th Cavalry had landed on 15 Decem- when the war was moving rapidly past
ber and secured a beachhead. Opposi- the Bismarck barrier. Yet both opera-
tion was light initially, but the Japanese tions did serve the purpose of providing
quickly ordered reinforcements to Arawe additional security on the right flank of
and by the end of the year the Americans the drive up the New Guinea coast.
faced the prospect of an arduous fight to The Saidor invasion force spent New
clear the area. Two weeks were required Year's Eve and the first day of the year
for that job, but it was not until mid- aboard landing craft. On the 2d, the
February that the Japanese finally with- troops were put ashore with an efficiency
drew. Once won, the area proved of and dispatch that bore witness to the
little value to the Allies and no PT base value of training and experience over
was ever built there. the past few months. There was
At Cape Gloucester the Japanese virtually no opposition and the only
offered little resistance to the assault untoward incident came early the next
forces when they came ashore on 26 morning when the Americans fired on
December. Only when the Marine their own ships in the dim light of dawn.
troops reached the airdrome area west Fortunately there was no damage. The
of the landing beaches did they meet few Japanese in the vicinity of Saidor
any opposition, and that was quickly were quickly disposed of, after which
overcome. Driving rain, jungle under- engineers and service troops moved in
growth, and swamp presented more to clear the way for the construction of
difficulties than did the enemy. The an airfield, roads, docks, and other instal-
most serious fighting came after the cap- lations. On 10 February, when the Aus-
ture of the airfield on 30 December, but tralians at Sio had advanced up the coast
by the middle of January it was over and to make contact with the Saidor Force,
the marines spent the rest of their time General Krueger announced that the
in the Cape Gloucester area in mopping campaign was over. It took a month
up. How heavy had been the fighting more for the Australians in the Ramu
is indicated by the casualties in the 1st Valley to complete their drive and on
Marine Division and attached units: 328 21 March, elements of the 7th Australian
killed and 844 wounded in action. By and 32d U.S. divisions finally met. On
the end of February the Japanese had 13 April, Bogadjim fell and all of the
24
Huon Peninsula with the Markham and
General Krueger did not recall that he had urged Ramu Valleys lay in Allied hands.
postponent of the Saidor operation. Ltr, Krueger to
Col Hoover, 22 Jul 59, OCMH. That he did so is The end of Japanese resistance at
indicated by Miller, CARTWHEEL, page 299, citing Bogadjim marked the completion of
Krueger's letter to MacArthur on 28 December 1943, CARTWHEEL. In a period of ten months,
sub: Deferment of MICHAELMAS [Saidor], GHQ
SWPA G-3 Jnl, 29 Dec 43. two more than MacArthur had origi-
nally estimated it would take, forces of and Southwest Pacific in position to con-
the South and Southwest Pacific had verge on Rabaul. But that objective had
advanced up the coast of New Guinea been changed by the Joint Chiefs of
and through the Solomons in successive Staff while operations were in progress.
stages in a series of mutually supporting Rabaul was not to be captured but
and co-ordinated operations and now neutralized. Thus, as the forces of the
stood in position to breach the Bismarck South and Southwest Pacific came within
barrier. Despite the unique command fighter range of Rabaul, they initiated
arrangements by which MacArthur exer- an intensive air campaign against the
cised strategic control and Halsey the Japanese base and by February 1944 had
command of South Pacific forces, co- rendered it virtually impotent. There-
operation between the two theaters had after, as MacArthur resumed his advance
been excellent. Not once had there been through the Bismarck Archipelago and
any disagreement that had not been thence westward along the New Guinea
settled quickly with good will on both coast toward the Philippines, Allied air-
sides, or any failure to co-ordinate craft kept a careful watch on Rabaul.
operations in the two theaters and to Though never reduced, the Japanese
provide support when it was needed. garrison there maintained a precarious
The original design of CARTWHEEL existence until the war's end brought
had been to place the forces of the South relief.
CHAPTER XXIX
Prospects for the Future

In battle there are not more than two methods of attack—the direct and
indirect; yet these two in combination give rise to an endless series of
maneuvers. . . . Who can exhaust the possibilities of their combination?
SUN TZU
By the end of the year 1943, the first 11and 12) More than half of these casu-
aim of Allied strategy, set in July 1942, alties were suffered by the Army; the
had been achieved. In comparison to the Navy lost about 18,000 men and the
enormous territorial gains of the Japa- Marine Corps over 12,000. Total deaths
nese during the opening months of the during this period were 35,888—20,022
war, the accomplishments of the Allies for the Army; 11,793, Navy; and 4,073
did not seem impressive. But appear- marines. The largest single loss for the
ances were deceptive. Every Allied ad- Army came during the Philippine Cam-
vance had been bitterly contested and paign in 1942; for the Navy and marines,
the way from Buna and Guadalcanal to during the six months of the Guadalca-
the Bismarck barrier, from Hawaii and nal Campaign. One hopeful sign for the
Midway, to Tarawa, was littered with the future was the decline in casualties for
remnants of Japanese air and naval 1943 as compared to the first year of the
power. The Japanese were far from de- war; another was the remarkable num-
feated; their military machine was still ber of wounded men returned to duty
powerful and capable of inflicting great —a tribute to the medical aid men and
damage. But they could never again at- advances in military medicine.
tain their earlier material superiority. The Allies had come a long way since
Allied factories and shipyards were going Pearl Harbor, not in distance, but in
at full speed, producing ships, planes, power, and confidence in the use of that
munitions, and supplies at a rate the power. The distances to be traversed
Japanese could never hope to match. before they came within striking range
But the Allies had paid dearly in of the enemy's inner zone—Japan, Korea,
human lives for their success. American Formosa, Sakhalin, Manchuria, and north
battle casualties alone, not including China—were great, but the Allies had
those of the Allies in the Pacific—the the means now and the experience to
Dutch, the Australians, the British, and move more rapidly and with longer
the Filipinos—during the first two years strides. The accomplishments of 1942
of the war totaled over 75,000. (Tables and 1943 had been notable; those for
PROSPECTS FOR THE FUTURE 585
TABLE 11—ARMY (AND AAF) BATTLE CASUALTIES, PACIFIC AREAS

DECEMBER 1941-DECEMBER 1943
Source: Dept of Army, Battle Casualties and Nonbattle Casualties in World War II, Final Report, pp. 42-43.
1944 and 1945 promised to be even more ations could be clearly discerned. There
so. (Map 14) would be no more frontal attacks against
a strongly entrenched enemy if they
The Pattern of Pacific Warfare could be avoided, no inch-by-inch trek
through the jungle or island-by-island
As the war in the Pacific moved into advance across an ocean dotted with
its third year, the pattern of future oper- myriad atoll and island groups. Instead,
TABLE 12—BATTLE CASUALTIES, NAVY AND MARINE CORPS

DECEMBER 1941-DECEMBER 1943
TABLE 12—BATTLE CASUALTIES, NAVY AND MARINE CORPS

DECEMBER 1941—DECEMBER 1943—Continued
Source: Hist of Medical Dept, U.S. Navy in World War II, III, pp. 170-74.
Allied forces would advance by "kanga- would have been used in mid-1943, for
roo leaps" limited only by the range of current naval doctrine did not encourage
land-based air cover or carrier-borne air- their employment in an area and against
craft, seeking always to deceive and sur- objectives such as those presented in the
prise the enemy by striking first in the South and Southwest Pacific.
Central Pacific and then in the South- Atoll warfare in the Central Pacific
west. By following two paths, the Allies presented problems distinctly different
would keep the Japanese off balance and from those encountered in the Solomons
divided. Trying to defend everywhere at and New Guinea. The distances to be
once, the Japanese would be unable to covered were greater and the objectives
concentrate anywhere, their bypassed were tiny islands surrounded by fringing
garrisons doomed to "wither on the coral reefs. The assault forces would
vine," isolated and strategically impotent. therefore have to venture far beyond the
In the South-Southwest Pacific, the limits of land-based air cover, exposed
central fact controlling operations was to enemy air and surface attack, to seize
the range of fighter aircraft. This fact strongly defended islands too small for
provides the clue to the selection of ob- maneuver or for mass assault. Such oper-
jectives, to the timetable, and to the ations would have to be conducted
limits of the advance. Aircraft carriers swiftly, and would require air and naval
could have overcome this limitation, but forces strong enough to establish air and
MacArthur had none and Halsey had naval supremacy and even take on the
them only briefly. And even if they had main body of the Japanese fleet if need
been available it is doubtful that they be. Also, because of the distance from
rear bases and the duration of the opera- by operations in the Central Pacific had
tion these forces would have to be logis- been largely solved. As in the Solomons
tically self-contained, that is, they would and New Guinea, the concerted and co-
have to carry with them all the supplies ordinated action of ground, sea, and air
and facilities necessary to support the as- forces under a single commander was the
sault troops during and after the landing, essential ingredient of success in the Cen-
maintain and service the fleet, garrison tral Pacific Area. But though the ingre-
the island after it was taken, and, finally, dients were the same, the proportions
convert it into an Allied base in time for were different. The decisive combat ele-
the next operation. ment in the Central Pacific was the large
Whether operations conducted under aircraft carrier. The great lesson of the
the conditions existing in the Central Gilbert Islands campaign in the fall of
Pacific could be carried out at all had 1943 was the demonstration that aircraft
still been a question in mid-1943. Ex- carriers, in groups but not singly, could
perience in the Solomons and New venture deep into the territory of the
Guinea was valuable but not always rele- enemy, within range of his air and naval
vant to the problems faced by Admiral forces without land-based air cover. This
Nimitz. Not once had MacArthur or fact alone made possible the great for-
Halsey ventured far from land-based air ward strides that marked the progress of
support and never did they have to face the war in the Central Pacific.
the possibility of engaging the main The second decisive element of Cen-
strength of the Combined Fleet. In their tral Pacific warfare was the floating sup-
progressive step-by-step advance, they ply base. Consisting of oilers, tenders,
had always had bases near the front repair and salvage ships, tugs, hospital
where they could keep reserves of man- ships, and a large variety of miscellaneous
power and supplies. If necessary, they vessels, the mobile base was capable of
could fall back on these bases. But the supporting and defending itself while
Gilberts lay more than 700 miles from providing the supplies and services re-
the nearest Allied airfield in the Ellice quired for extended operations far from
Islands and more than 2,000 from the the home base. In short, it was the logis-
main base in Hawaii. The geography of tical companion of the fast carrier force,
the two areas differed also, and this fact the "seven-league boots" of the Pacific
had a marked effect on the nature of op- Fleet. Clear also in the pattern of Pacific
erations in each. The South-Southwest warfare was the large role assigned to
Pacific Areas consisted of seas and straits naval gunfire and close air support before
enclosed by New Guinea, itself a sub- and during the landing, and to the am-
continent, and the numerous islands of phibious tractor, the indispensable vehicle
the Solomons chain and the Bismarck for carrying troops across fringing coral
Archipelago. The Central Pacific Area, reefs and strongly defended beaches.
by contrast, consisted largely of open The technique of amphibious opera-
ocean, dotted with tiny islands. It was a tions that emerged from experience in
region particularly suited for naval the Pacific in 1942 and 1943 remained
operations on a grand scale. virtually unchanged throughout the rest
By the end of 1943, the problems posed of the year. First, the objective was iso-
lated and its defenses softened by air and that the goals set at the Imperial Con-
naval operations in which the fast carrier ference of 30 September would not be
forces played a major role when the ob- realized, Imperial General Headquarters
jective was beyond range of land-based had taken a fresh look at Japan's situa-
fighter aircraft. Simultaneously, other tion. Of the five possible courses the
targets were attacked to deceive the Japanese assumed were open to the Al-
enemy as to the true objective. The ap- lies,2 they attached greatest importance to
proach of the assault force signaled the the Allied offensives in the Pacific and in
opening of an air-naval bombardment of Burma. The latter they viewed seriously
the area in which the landing was to be not because of any great Allied successes
made. Then the landing force moved in that area but rather because Thailand
from the ship to shore under cover of air and French Indochina were politically
and naval gunfire. The landing itself the weakest links in the Japanese defense
was made in waves or echelons, with system. The Allies, they therefore as-
rocket-firing landing craft in the lead, sumed, would take advantage of this
followed by amphibian tanks carrying weakness to break through the absolute
the assault troops directly from the national defense line in Southeast Asia,
water on to the beaches and then inland. a move that would greatly strengthen
Finally, came the landing craft with the Nationalist regime in China.
more infantry, artillery, and supporting It was the Allied offensive in the Pacific
troops. Whenever possible, small neigh- that worried the Japanese most. The
boring islands were occupied in advance effects of MacArthur's and Halsey's oper-
to provide sites for the emplacement of ations were serious enough, but Nimitz'
artillery, as in New Georgia. Supplies invasion of the Gilberts had added a new
followed the assault troops closely and, dimension to the Pacific war. Hereto-
while the beachhead area was staked out, fore, Allied advances had been limited
the advance inland proceeded without by the range of land-based fighters; with
pause, air and naval forces providing sup- the introduction of the carrier striking
port when necessary, until the objective force of the Central Pacific, there was
was finally secured. virtually no limit to the extent of an
Allied advance. Theoretically, the Amer-
The Prospects for Japan icans could land anywhere that the car-
riers could go. This was a lesson the
While the Allies were fighting their Japanese grasped immediately and to
way closer to the absolute national de-
fense line, the Japanese were desperately 2
These five courses, or lines of advance, were:
reorganizing their forces in preparation 1. From the Aleutians westward to the Kurils.
for the impending assault on their vital 2. Across the Central Pacific toward the Japanese
stronghold to the south and east.1 Late home islands or the Philippines-Formosa area.
3. North and west to the Philippines by way of
in December 1943, as it became apparent New Guinea.
4. From the Indian Ocean area toward Java and
1
For a description of this line and its role in Japa- Sumatra.
nese strategy, see above, Chapter XXVII. This sec- 5. Toward Malaya and Thailand and Burma.
tion is based on the sources cited in note 1 of that Imperial GHQ Army High Command Record, Japa-
chapter. nese Studies in World War II, 72, p. 115.
which they gave due weight in their plans empire. Also, by placing the air forces
for defense. under the direct control of Southern
Despite their concern over the Central Army and restricting 14th and 2d Area
Pacific area, the Japanese planners be- Army to army troops, Imperial General
lieved that the Allied offensive to the Headquarters hoped to strengthen the
south posed a greater threat in the im- ground defenses of this critical sector.3
mediate future. This conclusion stemmed This was the plan, but before it could
from their estimate that the Allies would be put into effect events in the Central
seek control of the Philippines-Formosa Pacific during January and February
area before invading the home islands, focused attention on that area. Thus,
and that of the two routes to the Philip- when the reorganization did come in
pines—the Central and the Southwest March of 1944, it was accompanied by a
Pacific—the Allies would probably take new and unified command in the Cen-
the southern route because it involved tral Pacific Area that greatly resembled
fewer risks. Thus, the Philippines be- the American command.
came for the Japanese the key to the For the Japanese, the Allied successes
defense of the home islands; northwest in the Pacific during the fall and winter
New Guinea the final battleground for of 1943 meant the end of all hopes for a
control of the vital road to the inner great counteroffensive the following
empire. spring. With MacArthur and Nimitz
To meet the challenge in the Southern through the outer defenses of the abso-
Area, Imperial General Headquarters lute national defense line, it was doubt-
began in December to consider a plan to ful if that vital line could be held. How
reorganize and consolidate the forces in far the Japanese position had deteriorated
western New Guinea and the Philip- may be judged from an Imperial Gen-
pines. The principal feature of this plan eral Headquarters estimate late in De-
was to place all operations in this region cember that it would probably be
under the single control of Field Marshal impossible, even under the most favor-
Terauchi, commander in chief of the able circumstances, to mount an offensive
Southern Army. With headquarters in against the Allies before 1946.4 For the
Manila, Terauchi would, in addition to first time also, Imperial General Head-
the forces in Southeast Asia, command quarters accepted the possibility of an
the 2d Area Army, which had been estab- Allied penetration of the absolute na-
lished under General Anami as a sepa- tional defense line and began to plan for
rate theater only a few months earlier, the expected attack against the Philip-
the 14th Army in the Philippines, and pines. It was there, thought the Japanese
the 3d and 4th Air Armies. This move, planners in common with General Mac-
the planners at General Headquarters Arthur and many Allied planners, that
believed, would shift Terauchi's atten- the decisive battle of the war would be
tion from the Asiatic mainland to the fought.
Pacific, now considered the more im-
portant theater, and at the same time 3
Hattori. The Greater East Asia War, III, 83;
insure the most effective use of the Imperial GHQ Army High Command Record, p. 117.
limited air and shipping resources of the 4
Hattori, The Greater East Asia War, III, 83-85.
Long-Range Plans for the China in the struggle against Japan. By

Defeat of Japan deferring the campaign to clear Burma,
the Allies tacitly admitted that opera-
The question of the Philippines was tions on the mainland of Asia were no
but one of a number of problems, and longer considered decisive and, in effect,
by no means the most urgent, that faced consigned the Generalissimo to a second-
the President and his military advisers ary role.7 The emergence of this view,
aboard the battleship Iowa on their way due partly at least to the recent successes
to Cairo and Tehran for what proved to won in the Pacific and the prospect of
be perhaps the most important of the even greater gains in the future, coin-
wartime conferences and the last in cided with the growing conviction that
which military considerations dominated the main effort against Japan should be
political and postwar problems.5 It was made in the Pacific, a view that received
at this conference, during the meetings formal approval of the Combined Chiefs
with Stalin at Tehran, that agreement of Staff at Cairo.8 The cancellation of
was finally reached to launch the long- operations in Southeast Asia was a heavy
deferred cross-Channel invasion (OVER- blow to those who had fought hard for it.
LORD) the following May, in co-ordination But to balance this loss and the declining
with a Soviet offensive on the Eastern importance of China, they could now look
Front, and a landing in southern France forward to Soviet assistance in Asia, for
(ANVIL). Operations in the Mediterra- at Tehran Stalin had given his assurance
nean were to be limited to an advance in that he would join the Allies in their war
Italy to the Pisa-Rimini line, and the against Japan after Germany had been
projected campaign to clear all of Burma defeated.
was deferred indefinitely by canceling its It was at Cairo also that the war aims
amphibious phase in order to secure of the powers allied against Japan were
landing craft for ANVIL.6 defined. Known as the Cairo Declara-
For President Roosevelt and his ad- tion, these aims held out little promise
visers, the Cairo Conference marked a for an early peace with Japan, whose ag-
turning point in the role reserved for gression the Allies pledged themselves
to punish. The territory Japan had un-
5
The conference was conducted in three install- lawfully annexed was to be returned to
ments, at Cairo with the British and Chinese repre- its rightful owners. Manchuria and
sentatives between 22 and 26 November, with the
British and Russians at Tehran from 28 to 30 Novem-
Formosa were to go to China, Korea was
ber, and again at Cairo with the British alone from to receive its independence, and the Pa-
2 to 7 December. The code name for the entire series cific islands the Japanese had seized
of meetings is SEXTANT, but the meetings with the
Russians at Tehran were given a special code name,
since 1941 were to be restored to their
EUREKA. Minutes and decisions of the three meetings former status.
are bound in the official SEXTANT Conference Book.
6 7
For a full discussion of these and related decisions, Charles F. Romanus and Riley Sunderland, Stil-
see Matloff, Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, well's Command Problems, UNITED STATES
Gordon A. Harrison, Cross-Channel Attack, UNITED ARMY IN WORLD WAR II (Washington, 1956),
STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II (Washington, pp. 79-82; Matloff, Strategic Planning, 1943-44, ch.
1951), pp. 118-27; Leighton and Coakley, Global XVI.
8
Logistics, 1943-45, chs. XII and XIII; Greenfield, CCS 417, 2 Dec 43, sub: Over-all Plan for Defeat
gen. ed., Command Decisions, pp. 182-210, 285-303. of Japan.
Considerable progress was made at the This latest effort represented a con-
Cairo-Tehran Conference on plans for siderable advance over the plan pre-
the Pacific, though this achievement has sented in May. The planners had faced
been obscured by the agreements reached realistically the objective of the war with
on OVERLOAD and ANVIL and the dif- Japan and discarded the announced aim
ferences with the British and Chinese. of unconditional surrender. The Japa-
Two major problems relating to the nese, they held, would never surrender
Pacific had still to be settled when the until the home islands were invaded and
planners boarded the Iowa on 13 Novem- every last-ditch defender driven from his
ber— (1) final decision on the specific place. The difficulties of mounting such
objectives set for the coming year, and an operation would be formidable and
(2) approval of a plan for the ultimate the cost prohibitive. A more reasonable
defeat of Japan.9 Work on a long-range objective, the planners believed, would
plan for the defeat of Japan had begun be "the destruction of Japanese capacity
in August 1942 and by May 1943 had to resist," but they recognized that to
produced a number of studies and a plan accomplish this it might well prove
which considered the alternate routes to necessary to invade.
Japan and the means by which she might Invasion was a last resort. There were
be brought to her knees—invasion, two other ways by which Japan might be
blockade, and aerial bombardment. In defeated—naval blockade and air bom-
the view of the Combined Chiefs, who bardment. Of these, the planners seemed
considered it during the Washington to place more hope on the latter, which,
Conference in May (TRIDENT), this plan, in any case, was a necessary prelude to
though a promising start, still needed a invasion. Since the most desirable bases
good deal of work.10 During the next from which to bomb Japan lay in China
three months, a team of American and and Formosa, that area described as the
British planners working together first in northern littoral of the South China Sea
London and then Washington, produced therefore became in their judgment the
a 103-page document—"The Mile of main intermediate objective short of
Pink," it was called—entitled Apprecia- Japan. There were various routes by
tion and Plan for the Defeat of Japan.11 which this area could be reached—across
the Central Pacific (or along the New
9 Guinea-Philippines axis) and into the
In the preparation of this section on the develop-
ment of long-range plans for the defeat of Japan, the South China Sea by way of the Celebes
author has been greatly assisted by an excellent sum- and Sulu Seas or across the northern tip
mary of the subject by his colleague, Maj. Henry G. of Luzon; from the west through the
Morgan, which made the task of unraveling this
complicated story much lighter than it would other- Straits of Malacca (including the capture
wise have been. of Singapore) and up through the In-
10
Mins, CCS Mtg, 20 May 43; JPS 67/4, 28 April 43, dies; or overland across China. Of these,
Strategic Plan for Defeat of Japan; Mins, JPS Mtg,
19 Aug 42. For a discussion of the plan submitted at the planners thought the Central Pacific
TRIDENT, see above, pp. 457-60. approach most promising. The other
11
CPS 83, 8 Aug 43, Appreciation and Plan for the routes offered advantages and should not
Defeat of Japan. Background papers on the develop-
ment of this plan are filed in ABC 381 Japan (8-27- be neglected, but the main effort in the
42) sec. 3. east when it came should be made from
CAIRO CONFERENCE. Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek sits with President Roosevelt, Prime
Minister Churchill, and Madame Chiang. Standing, from left: General Shang Chen, Lt. Gen.
Lin Wei, Generals Somervell, Stilwell, and Arnold, Field Marshal Dill, Lord Louis Mount-
batten, and Lt. Gen. Sir Adrian Carton de Wiart.
the Central Pacific. The schedule set by when the matter was finally considered
the combined planners would have placed by the Combined Chiefs most of the
Allied forces in the intermediate objec- criticisms had already been put forward.
tive area in 1946, with the invasion of No one was happy about the length of
Japan, if that proved necessary, to begin time it would take to reach Japan, and
in 1947 or later. there was no unanimity on the relative
Though there were several unresolved weight attached to the various lines of
differences between the American and advance, the British arguing strongly for
British planners, the plan in abbreviated the capture of Singapore and the open-
form (including a statement of the dif- ing of the Malacca Straits. To speed up
ferences) was submitted to the Com- the tempo of operations, the Americans
bined Chiefs when they met at Quebec proposed that the plan be keyed to the
(QUADRANT) in August 1943. The U.S. European war with the objective of de-
Chiefs met separately to discuss the plan feating Japan within twelve months after
and added their own comments.12 Thus, the collapse of Germany. The British
12
These comments and the statement of differences tained in CCS 313 and 313/1, 18 and 20 Aug 43, sub:
between the British and American planners are con- Appreciation and Plan for Defeat of Japan.
TEHRAN CONFERENCE. In the front row: Marshal Stalin, President Roosevelt, and Prime
Minister Churchill. Standing, from the left: Harry Hopkins, Foreign Minister Molotov, W.
Averell Harriman, Sir Archibald Clark Kerr, Ambassador to the USSR, and Anthony Eden,
Foreign Secretary.
agreed in principle, but thought the Chiefs noted only that they had made a
twelve month goal unrealistic and only preliminary study of the "Appreciation"
accepted it on the condition that forces but, because the issues were too large
would be deployed in the Pacific as rap- and complicated to be discussed in the
idly as the situation in Europe allowed. time remaining for the conference, the
Thus, the final report of the Conference points of difference should be examined
stated that "operations should be framed further by the planners and taken up
to force the defeat of Japan as soon as at the next meeting of the Combined
possible after the defeat of Germany . . . Chiefs.
on the basis of accomplishing this within One other element in the develop-
twelve months of that event."13 With ment of a long-range plan for the defeat
respect to the plan itself, the Combined of Japan introduced at the Quebec Con-
13
CGS 319/5, 24 Aug 43, sub: Rpt to President and
ference was the possibility of employing
Prime Minister; Mins, 2d Plenary Session, 23 Aug 43; the 1,500-mile range B-29, expected to
CCS Mtg, 24 Aug 43. All in QUADRANT Conference be available soon for operations. This
Book. See also Hayes, The War Against Japan, ch.
XVIII, and Matloff, Strategic Planning, 1943-44,
possibility was raised, not in the "Ap-
ch. X. preciation" of the combined planners,
but in a separate study, hastily prepared plan but not their efforts to find addi-
by the Air Force planners and submitted tional ways in which to utilize the possi-
by General Arnold toward the close of bilities of air bombardment to bring
the conference, probably to support the about the defeat of Japan.15
American case for defeating Japan twelve Meanwhile, another team of planners
months after Germany's defeat. Briefly, of the Joint War Plans Committee had
the air plan called for an aerial offensive been working on the long-range plan
against Japan that would destroy her designed to produce Japan's downfall a
ability to resist by the fall of 1945, that year after Germany's. The first fruits of
is, within twelve months of the estimated its work, submitted on 25 October, held
date for the defeat of Germany. This out little hope for meeting the assigned
result was to be achieved by B-29's based deadline. The planners were convinced
in the Changsha area of China (1,500 that the Japanese would not surrender
miles from the industrial center of unconditionally without invasion, at least
Japan), building up from four groups at a reasonably early date. Given the ex-
in June 1944 to twenty groups the fol- isting schedule of operations, the plan-
lowing May. Though there were obvi- ners could not see how Allied forces
ously many problems to be solved in could by the fall of 1945 achieve the pre-
connection with the plan, especially in requisites for invasion—bases from which
the matter of logistics, it opened up to bomb the center of Japan, the elimi-
fresh possibilities and the Combined nation of Japanese air and naval power,
Chiefs directed their planners to report and the destruction of Japanese shipping.
on this scheme by 15 September and to As the planners saw it, there were four
have ready a month later a new plan possible courses of action:
that would accomplish the defeat of 1. The invasion of Hokkaido, north-
Japan twelve months after the fall of ernmost of the Japanese home islands, in
Germany.14 the summer of 1945 (presumably by
The three months intervening be- forces of the Central Pacific).
tween the conference at Quebec and 2. The capture of Formosa in the
Cairo were busy ones for the American spring of 1945 by way of the Pacific
and British planners engaged in the task (presumably by forces of the Central
of developing the long-range plan. Study Pacific).
of the air plan was completed on the ap- 3. The capture of Singapore by the
pointed date, and the results submitted end of 1945, followed by a co-ordinated
to the Combined Chiefs. There were assault against Formosa from the Pacific
differences in the emphasis placed on and South China Sea in the winter of
various factors by the British and Ameri- 1945-46.
cans, but no disagreement on the main 4. A diversionary assault against
conclusion that for logistical reasons the northern Sumatra in the Netherlands
air plan was not feasible. The Combined East Indies in the spring of 1945 (or
Chiefs therefore decided to abandon the earlier), followed by the capture of
14 15
CGS 323, 20 Aug 43, sub: Air Plan for Defeat of Mins, CCS Mtg, 17 Sep 43; JPS Mtg, 15 Sep 43;
Japan; Mins, CCS Mtg, 21 Aug 43; CPS 86/D, 26 Aug CPS 86/1, 13 Sep 43, sub: Studies on Defeat of Japan;
43, sub: Preparation of Studies on Defeat of Japan. JPS 271, 11 Sep 43, same sub.
Formosa from the Pacific in the winter differences multiplied. Almost all those
of 1945-46. In each case, it was assumed who read it expressed dissatisfaction with
that operations already planned in the some aspect of the plan, often disagree-
Southwest Pacific, Southeast Asia, and ing with one another in their objections,
China would be carried out as scheduled but out of this critical examination there
in order to support the main effort and emerged a clearer understanding of the
to maintain pressure on the Japanese.16 problems involved and of the various
Though the first alternative, the inva- points of view regarding the final defeat
sion of Hokkaido in the summer of 1945, of Japan. First to comment was the
came closest to meeting the requirements senior team of the Joint War Plans Com-
set by the Combined Chiefs, the planners mittee. More optimistic than those who
preferred the second course, which, they had prepared the plan, this group be-
held, combined the promise of Japan's lieved that there was a real possibility of
early defeat with minimum risks. Thus, defeating Japan by October 1945 and
the schedule of operations they presented that the plan should be revised to pro-
called for the capture of Formosa in the vide for this possibility. It also preferred
spring of 1945, or as soon thereafter as the first alternative—the capture of Hok-
possible, followed by the invasion of kaido in the summer of 1945—and
Hokkaido in the summer of 1946 and of thought the large role assigned the
Honshu, the main island of Japan, in the British Fleet in the Pacific unrealistic.
fall. This was the most optimistic fore- Unless British naval forces were refitted
cast the planners would make, but they and organized into self-contained and
recognized that any one of a number of self-supporting units before they were
factors might alter their calculations— transferred into the Pacific, the senior
the speed of current and projected oper- team of the JWPC held, they would
ations in the Southwest and Central drain off U.S. resources and constitute
Pacific, the effectiveness of submarine a liability rather than an asset in the
operations against Japanese shipping, the final operations against Japan.17
possibility of bypassing strongly held The Joint Staff Planners, parent body
Japanese positions such as Truk, and the of the War Plans Committee, also took
extent of British and Russian assistance. exception to the plan, especially its em-
The planners were aware also that the phasis on the necessity for invasion. Both
effectiveness of B-29 operations, which the naval and air representatives felt that
they scheduled for 1944 or early 1945, the role of air bombardment by B-29's
and carrier-based air attacks against and carrier-based aircraft in the final
Japan, both as yet untried methods of defeat of Japan had been minimized.
warfare, might well alter the timetable "When the full weight of our air and
and make possible the defeat of Japan naval power is deployed against her
at an earlier date than the fall of 1946. (Japan)," said Rear Adm. Bernhard H.
As the long-range plan made its way
up the echelons of planning committees 17
JWPC 120, 26 Oct 43, sub: Comments on Defeat
toward the Chiefs of Staff, criticisms and of Japan Within Twelve Months After Defeat of
Germany. The views of this group and of others who
16
CPS 86/2, 25 Oct 43, sub: The Defeat of Japan commented on the plan are ably summarized in
Within Twelve Months after the Defeat of Germany. Hayes, The War Against Japan, II, 114ff.
Bieri, "we may find the road much easier The Joint Chiefs, beset with other
than anticipated." 18 The joint planners problems that would come up at the
were dubious also about the date set for Cairo and Tehran meetings, deferred
the invasion of Hokkaido and of the consideration of the plan, sending it in-
necessity for taking Formosa. And, like stead to the Joint Strategic Survey Com-
the JWPC team, they were skeptical of mittee for comment. These senior
the effectiveness of British naval forces officers found much to criticize in this
in the Pacific at any early date, except latest effort of the planners. They
perhaps in MacArthur's area. The plan, thought it cautious and unimaginative,
they decided, should be revised to pro- overestimating the capabilities of the
vide for the capture of Hokkaido in the Japanese and underestimating the po-
summer of 1945 and, if possible, of tentialities of Allied power. They
Honshu the following spring.19 doubted that invasion would be neces-
The task of revising the plan to meet sary and thought Japan could be defeated
these and other criticisms was accom- by a combination of naval blockade and
plished quickly in the Joint War Plans air bombardment. The main effort, they
Committee. By 2 November it was in declared flatly, should be made in the
the hands of the Joint Staff Planners Central Pacific; there lay "the key to the
who forwarded it to the Joint Chiefs the early defeat of Japan." The JSSC found
next day.20 As revised, the plan still further cause for optimism in the belief
maintained that invasion would be neces- that German resistance might collapse as
sary and called for the seizure of Hok- early as the spring of 1944, and that
kaido in 1945 and of Honshu the Soviet intervention in Asia would fol-
following spring. Central and Southwest low soon after. A new plan should there-
Pacific operations were to continue as fore be made, said the JSSC, one more
scheduled, with MacArthur aiming for bold and imaginative that would reflect
the Philippines and Nimitz for the the bright prospects facing the Allies in
Marianas, where B-29's would be based. Europe and Asia.21
In China, first priority would go to the The first chance the Joint Chiefs had
development of airfields for the B-29, to consider the plan for the defeat of
and preparations were to be made to Japan was on 15 November, while they
occupy the Kurils in the event the Soviet were en route to Cairo. They were not
Union came into the war. Elsewhere, enthusiastic. The emphasis on Hokkaido
operations would continue for the pur- came as a distinct surprise and Admiral
pose of maintaining pressure on the King wondered how the planners ex-
enemy and securing maximum attrition pected to reach it. Why not go instead
of his forces and shipping. to Kyushu, southernmost of the Japanese
home islands and closer to objectives al-
18
Mins, JPS Mtg, 27 Oct 43. ready under consideration? Some doubt
19
Memo, U.S. Members of CPS, 1 Nov 43, sub: The
Defeat of Japan Within Twelve Months After Defeat
21
of Germany, cited in Hayes, The War Against Japan, JCS 533/5, 8 Nov 43, sub: Recommended Line of
p. 115. Action at Next U.S.-British Conferences; Memo, Vice
20
JWPC 120/2, 2 Nov 43, sub: The Defeat of Japan Adm Russell Willson for Adm King, 11 Nov 43, sub:
Within Twelve Months After Defeat of Germany; Plans for Defeat of Japan, ABC 334; JCS Mins (2-
JCS 564, 4 Nov 43, same sub; Mins, JPS Mtg, 3 Nov 43. 14-42) sec. 5.
was expressed also of the possibility of duce a blueprint worked out to the last
invading and defeating Japan in a single detail. All they could do was work out
year. The planners, Marshall felt, had a practical and realistic program that
not given enough weight to the vulnera- would be flexible enough to take into
bility of Japan's oil resources to the account the unknowns in the equation.
south or to the possibility of bypassing Thus, they started with three assump-
strongly defended bases like Truk.22 tions: first, that invasion of Japan might
Like their senior advisers of the Joint not be necessary but that the plan must
Strategic Survey Committee, the Joint be capable of expansion to meet the con-
Chiefs believed that invasion might not tingency of invasion; second, that Ger-
be necessary and that the long-range plan many might be defeated as early as the
should be based on the assumption that spring of 1944; and third, that the Soviet
Japan's defeat could be accomplished by Union might enter the war against
blockade and bombardment. It should Japan soon after Germany's defeat.
take into consideration Soviet interven- On the assumption that Japan could
tion and provide for the employment of be defeated by sea and air blockade and
British naval forces in the Pacific. And intensive air bombardment from pro-
finally, stipulated the Joint Chiefs, the gressively advanced bases, the objective
plan should be flexible and capable of of the plan finally drawn up was to ob-
rapid adjustment to meet sudden and tain positions from which to bomb Japan
unexpected developments, such as the and, if it should prove necessary, mount
early surrender of Germany or defeat of an invasion of the home islands. Such
the Japanese Fleet. positions, the planners believed, could
During the next two weeks, while their best be achieved by making the main
superiors were meeting at Cairo and effort in the Pacific, utilizing both the
Tehran, the planners set about the task Central and Southwest Pacific routes so
of fashioning a new long-range plan. In as to converge on the Formosa-Luzon-
doing so, they would have to weigh a China coast area by the spring of 1945.
number of imponderables and reshuffle As between the two lines of advance,
the factors in an ever-shifting equation they carefully avoided giving one priority
—the date of Germany's defeat, Soviet over the other and specified that opera-
entry into the war against Japan, the tions along each would be mutually sup-
employment of British air and naval porting. But they believed also that the
forces, the role of China, the effective- Central Pacific route was potentially the
ness of B-29 and carrier-based aircraft, more decisive. Thus, in case of conflicts
whether the main effort should be made in timing and allocation of resources
in the Central Pacific, which Japanese between MacArthur and Nimitz, "due
island should be invaded, or whether, in weight," said the planners, should be
fact, the invasion of Japan would be given to the fact that operations along
necessary at all. There were no clear the central route promised "a more
answers to any of these problems, but rapid advance toward Japan and her
the planners were not expected to pro- vital lines of communication; the earlier
acquisition of strategic air bases closer
22
Mins, JCS Mtg, 15 Nov 43. to the Japanese homeland; and, of great-
est importance, are more likely to pre- discussions with the British concerning
cipitate a decisive engagement with the the strategic concept for Europe," they
Japanese Fleet."23 Operations in other pointed out, in a clear reference to the
areas would be subsidiary to those in the debates over Mediterranean strategy,
Central and Southwest Pacific, but the "clearly demonstrates the continuous dif-
planners took note of the possibility that ficulties which arise when the primacy
if the Soviet Union entered the war oper- of the operations in one part of the thea-
ations in the North Pacific Area might ter is not clearly set forth and accepted
well assume an increased importance. —but remains the subject of debate
In any case, the schedule of operations whenever operations are being consid-
was to remain flexible and every prepa- ered in another part of the same theater."
ration made to exploit any opportunity For this reason, they felt, a clear priority
that might develop. should be given to one of the two lines
The forces required for the defeat of of advance, and, as the foremost cham-
Japan were carefully considered in the pions of the Central Pacific, they had no
plan. The key was the date of Germany's doubt as to where the primary effort was
collapse and the prompt redeployment to be made.24
of forces from Europe to the Pacific. A The Joint Chiefs, when they met to
total of forty divisions, including five discuss the plan on 3 December, consid-
Marine divisions, plus supporting troops ered the advice of their senior advisers
would ultimately be deployed against and then asked General Sutherland, who
Japan, the planners estimated. Aircraft had accompanied the planners to Cairo,
also would be brought over from Europe for his views. Speaking for MacArthur,
for the final phase of the Japanese war, Sutherland argued eloquently for the
but the major strategic air weapon, the priority of Southwest Pacific operations
B-29, was already scheduled for early and for RENO III. 25 But the Joint Chiefs
shipment to China and the Marianas, were unconvinced by the arguments of
when bases were ready. Naval forces, either the JSSC or Sutherland. They
except for the employment of British were not yet ready to commit themselves
units, was not a problem, since the lar- to any one line of advance or to a single
gest part of U.S. naval power was incor- concept for the defeat of Japan, prefer-
porated in the Pacific Fleet. ring to leave themselves free to exploit
The reaction to the revised plan, which any opportunity that might arise. In this
was completed by 2 December, was en- respect, the work of the planners had
couraging. The elder statesmen of the been well done. As General Handy
Joint Strategic Survey Committee, who pointed out to Marshall, the planners
had been so critical of the earlier plan, had considered all viewpoints and, while
found this one much more to their placing the main effort against Japan in
liking. Only the failure of the planners the Pacific, had avoided assigning pri-
to establish a clear priority as between ority to operations in any one area. This,
the Central and the Southwest Pacific he observed, was one great advantage of
disturbed them. "The history of our 24
JCS 614, 2 Dec 43, sub: Plan for Defeat of Japan.
23 25
CCS 417, 2 Dec 43, sub: Over-all Plan for Defeat Mins, JCS Mtg, ann. 3 Dec 43. For a summary of
of Japan. these arguments, see above, pp. 538-42.
the plan. It was flexible and allowed the 1944, there had been considerable dis-
Joint Chiefs "to create a main effort by cussion of objectives for 1944, both in
the commitment of forces to one or the the theater and in Washington. Finally,
other axis" whenever they chose. "In on 4 November, General Sutherland had
effect," Handy concluded, "it gives the arrived in Washington to persuade the
Joint Chiefs of Staff almost complete Joint Chiefs of Staff to approve Mac-
liberty of action in the Pacific without Arthur's 5-phase plan (RENO III) for
reference to the British Chiefs of Staff." 26 placing forces of the Southwest Pacific
On this note, the Joint Chiefs accepted on Mindanao by 1 February 1945.29
the plan and recommended its approval. The reaction to Sutherland's argu-
The British Chiefs of Staff, for differ- ments had not been favorable. To the
ent reasons, also favored the plan. By joint planners, RENO III seemed to place
placing the main effort against Japan in too great an emphasis on the Southwest
the Pacific, the plan provided a strong Pacific line of advance at the expense of
argument against expanded operations the Central Pacific, and thereby chal-
in Burma, which the British had stead- lenged the accepted concept of concur-
fastly opposed. This subject led to fur- rent and mutually supporting operations
ther discussions between the U.S. and along both axes of advance. They there-
British Chiefs and resulted in a revision fore proposed a schedule for 1944 that
intended to clarify the plan with respect would take MacArthur's forces only as
to operations in southeast Burma.27 With far as the Vogelkop Peninsula, omitting
this amendment and others of a minor the last two phases of RENO, and Nimitz'
nature, the Combined Chiefs of Staff forces to the Palaus and perhaps to the
approved the over-all plan for the defeat Marianas. The question of the Philip-
of Japan in principle "as a basis for fur- pines they left open, not because of any
ther investigation and preparation." 28 doubts about the ability of U.S. forces to
Though this was short of unqualified undertake such a campaign but because
approval, it provided for the first time an they were unwilling to commit them-
approved guide for short-range strategic selves so far in advance. As a matter of
planning and for long-range objectives. fact, they were most optimistic about
progress during the coming year. Ground,
Operations for 1944 air, and naval forces in the Pacific, al-
ready formidable, would be greatly
Fixing the schedule of operations in strengthened during the next twelve
the Pacific for 1944 proved to be less diffi- months, and shipping, which had been
cult than charting a plan for the defeat so critical in the first two years of the
of Japan. Since the Quebec Conference war, could be expected to become more
in August 1943, at which the Combined plentiful. Thus, the joint planners
Chiefs had approved a program for 1943- hoped that operations in 1944 would so
weaken Japan as to "permit the eventual
26
Memo, Handy for Marshall, 3 Dec 43, no sub, invasion of Honshu not later than the
OPD Exec Files.
27
spring of 1946, in order to force her
CCS 417/1, 5 Dec 43, sub: Over-all Plan for
Defeat of Japan.
28 29
Mins, CCS Mtg, 6 Dec 43. See above, pp. 536-37.
unconditional surrender at the earliest Admiral Cooke reminded the Chiefs, the
practicable date."30 objectives set out in the plan were not
On 15 November, en route to Cairo, intended as an ironclad schedule but
the Joint Chiefs considered briefly the rather as a guide for planning purposes
plans for operations in 1944. Admiral and as a forecast of what could be ac-
Leahy immediately asked whether the complished during the year. The plan-
recommendations of the planners "tie in ners, like their Chiefs, intended to remain
with the plans for the Southwest Pacific flexible and to take advantage of any
Command."31 The response, furnished opportunities that might arise to speed
by one of the naval planners, indicated up the war against Japan. Despite these
that there had been "adjustments" in assurances, the Palaus operation was de-
MacArthur's plans because of a lack of leted at Admiral King's insistence. Truk
resources, but the extent of these adjust- and Ponape remained in the plan,
ments was not indicated. To General though General Marshall, who had
Arnold's query concerning conflicts be- raised questions about both, remained
tween the Southwest and Central Pacific, doubtful of the necessity for going to
Admiral King replied that "dividends either place.33
would be greater" in Nimitz' area and The B-29 program, which had played
that "nothing should interfere" with so large a part in the development of the
operations there.32 long-range plan for the defeat of Japan,
No decision was reached at the meet- also largely affected the selection of at
ing, and the problem was returned to the least one of the objectives for 1944. Ad-
planners for further consideration in the miral King had long favored the Mari-
light of the recently completed long- anas, but even in naval circles there had
range plan for the defeat of Japan. By been no great enthusiasm for the early
the 17th, when the Joint Chiefs met invasion of these islands. The problem
again to discuss the Pacific, the planners of finding adequate bases for the B-29
had completed their work. The refer- when it became available altered the pic-
ence to Honshu was removed as pre- ture radically. China was the first choice,
mature, and provision was made for the but the logisticians doubted that the ef-
employment of B-29's scheduled to be- fort could be supported from China and
come available in the near future, to the planners were skeptical of Chinese
operate from China airfields beginning ability to hold the bases once they were
on 1 May 1944. The reaction of the built. The prospect of basing the B-29's
Joint Chiefs to this revision was, on the in the Marianas, when it appeared that
whole, favorable. There was some dis- the islands could be occupied by the end
cussion of specific objectives such as Truk of 1944, was seized upon by the Air
and the Palaus, but these did not con- Force planners after the Quebec Con-
stitute serious objections. After all, ference in August 1943. Thereafter, they
supported Admiral King strongly when-
30
JCS 581, 9 Nov 43, sub: Specific Opns for Defeat ever the Marianas question arose, arguing
of Japan, 1944; JWPC 115/1, 7 Nov 43, same sub.
31
It is doubtful that the Joint Chiefs had actually
33
examined RENO III at this time. Mins, JCS Mtg, 17 Nov 43; JCS 581/1, 16 Nov 43,
32
Mins, JCS Mtg, 15 Nov 43. sub: Specific Opns for Defeat of Japan, 1944.
that other Central Pacific objectives be

bypassed and neutralized in order to ad-
vance the date for the occupation of these
islands. By October, this idea had won
wide support among the Joint Staff Plan-
ners, who held that "plans for the accel-
eration of the defeat of Japan would
place emphasis upon the seizure of the
Marianas at the earliest possible date,
with the establishment of heavy bomber
bases as the primary mission." 34 Thus,
the plans considered by the Joint Chiefs
aboard the Iowa called for the "seizure
of Guam and the Japanese Marianas" in
October 1944.
There was no question now about the
desirability of the operation, only about
the timing. The sooner the islands were
taken, the sooner would the B-29's begin
operations. The plan, it is true, called
for the B-29's to begin bombing Japan
from Chinese fields in May but the logis- GENERAL MARSHALL at Southwest Pacific
ticians of the Joint Staff Planners were headquarters. From left: Unidentified officer,
doubtful that this commitment would Generals Kenney, Chamberlin, Krueger,
be met. General Arnold, therefore, in- Marshall, and MacArthur.
sisted that the plan include the statement
that B-29 bases in the Marianas would their conference with the British and
be ready in time to permit very long Chinese. They gave it their approval
range bombing of Japan from the Pacific then, and laid it aside for other matters
by the end of the year.35 that would occupy much more of their
The shipboard discussion of 17 No- time during the coming meetings. It was
vember 1943 was the last consideration not until 6 December, after the decision
by the Joint Chiefs of the proposed on OVERLORD and ANVIL had been made
schedule against Japan in 1944 before and the Burma offensive deferred, that
the plan for operations in 1944 was for-
34
JPS 288, 4 Oct 43, sub: Plans for Defeat of Japan mally considered by the Combined
Within Twelve Months After Defeat of Germany;
JPS 264, 6 Sep 43, Outline Plan for Seizure of the Chiefs at Cairo. Already, the long-range
Marianas, Including Guam. For fuller accounts of plan for the defeat of Japan had been
the development of the B-29 and its relation to approved, in principle, and there was
strategy, see Craven and Cate, AAF II, ch. V, pp. 3-
33; Arnold, Global Mission, pp. 245, 477 passim; little discussion. The most controversial
Matloff, Strategic Planning, 1943-44, ch. XVI; Crowl, part of the plan dealing with operations
Campaign in the Marianas, ch. 1.
35
in Southeast Asia had already been
Mins, JCS Mtg, 17 Nov 43; JCS 581/3, Rpt by
Joint Logistics Committee, 4 Dec 43, sub: Specific
settled, and the British had no disposi-
Opns for Defeat of Japan, 1944. tion to quarrel with the U.S. Chiefs of
TABLE 13—SPECIFIC OPERATIONS FOR THE DEFEAT OF JAPAN, 1944
Source: CCS 397, 3 Dec 43.

Staff about a theater the Americans re- early 1944, and the plan to recapture
garded as their own unique responsibil- Burma itself was abandoned altogether.
ity. Approval therefore, was almost Only in the case of B-29 operations was
perfunctory, and next day the conference the program for China advanced. Under
ended.36 The President and most of the the new plan, very long range bombing
staff boarded the Iowa for the journey from China bases would begin in May,
back to Washington, but Generals rather than October 1944, as estimated
Marshall and Arnold, accompanied by at Quebec.
the chief Army and Navy planners, Gen- These were the exceptions for the
eral Handy and Admiral Cooke, returned coming year, placed in the setting of the
home by way of the Pacific. larger plan for the final defeat of Japan.
The plan approved at Cairo set an Their realization would depend on many
ambitious program for 1944 and repre- factors beyond the control of those who
sented a real advance over the plan had fashioned the plans—the reaction of
adopted only five months earlier at Que- the Japanese, production on the home
bec.37 Under the new schedule, Mac- front, the fortunes of war in Europe and
Arthur's forces were to complete the elsewhere, and even the vagaries of wind
seizure of western New Britain in Janu- and weather. Nor would those who had
ary, then go on to gain control of the set these goals seek the prize themselves;
Hansa Bay area and the Bismarck Ar- that was the task of the theater com-
chipelago by May. (Table 13) From there, manders and the men who would lead
they would continue to advance west- the air-ground-naval team into battle.
ward along the New Guinea coast as far What they accomplished and what they
as the Vogelkop Peninsula. believed they could or should do would
Nimitz' forces during this same period have a vital bearing on events during the
were to take the Marshalls, Ponape, year and on the ultimate defeat of Japan.
Truk, and, finally, the Marianas. Thus, They had been given a plan correspond-
by the end of the year, Allied forces in ing generally with their own views and
the Pacific would hold a line from the an accelerated program that would bring
tip of New Guinea to the Marianas, U.S. forces within reach of Japan's inner
from where B-29's were scheduled to zone. Reality was to exceed even those
begin operations by 31 December. expectations. Before the year was out
In contrast to the accelerated program MacArthur's forces were firmly estab-
for the Pacific, the schedule approved at lished in the central Philippines and
Cairo for Southeast Asia and China was preparing to land on Luzon, Marianas-
less ambitious than that adopted at Que- based B-29's were bombing the cities of
bec. Operations in Burma, originally set Japan, the Japanese Navy had been vir-
for November 1943, were deferred to tually defeated, and carrier forces of the
Pacific Fleet had penetrated Japan's inner
zone. There was no doubt about Japan's
36
Mins, CCS Mtg, 6 Dec 43. The plan finally ap- defeat—only when, how, and under
proved became CCS 397 (Rev), 3 Dec 43, sub: whose command. These were the major
Specific Opns for Defeat of Japan, 1944.
37
See above, Chapter XXV, for a discussion of the questions of strategy still to be decided
Quebec Conference. for the Pacific.
Appendix A
DIRECTIVE TO THE SUPREME COMMANDER,
ABDA AREA, 3 JANUARY 1942 (ABC-4/5)
For General Wavell from Chiefs of Staff:

By agreement among the Governments of Australia, Netherlands, United King-
dom and United States, hereinafter referred to as the ABDA Governments.
1. Area.—A strategic area has been constituted to comprise initially all land
and sea areas including general regions of Burma, Malaya, Netherlands East
Indies and Philippine Islands more precisely defined in Annexure 1. This area
will be known as ABDA area.
2. Forces.—You have been designated as Supreme Commander of ABDA area
and of all armed forces afloat ashore and in air of ABDA Governments which are
or will be (a) stationed in area (b) located in Australian territory when such
forces have been allotted by respective Governments for service in or in support
of the ABDA area. You are not authorized to transfer from territories of any
ABDA Government land forces of the Government without consent of local com-
mander or his Government.
3. The Deputy Supreme Commander and if required a Commander of the
Combined Naval Forces and the Commander of Combined Air Forces will be
jointly designated by the ABDA Governments.
4. No Government will materially reduce its armed forces assigned to your area
nor any commitment made by it for reinforcing its forces in your area except after
giving to other Governments and to you timely information pertaining thereto.
5. Strategic concept and policy.—The basic strategic concept of the ABDA
Governments for conduct of war in your area is not only in immediate future to
maintain as many key positions as possible but to take offensive at the earliest
opportunity and ultimately to conduct an all-out offensive against Japan. The
first essential is to gain general air superiority at the earliest moment through
employment of concentrated air power. The piece-meal employment of air forces
should be minimised. Your operations should be so conducted as to further
preparations for the offensive.
6. General strategic policy will be therefore:—
(a) to hold Malaya barrier defined as line Malay Peninsula, Sumatra, Java,
North Australia as basic defensive position of ABDA area and to operate
sea, land and air forces in as great depth as possible forward of barrier in
order to oppose Japanese southward advance;
(b) to hold Burma and Australia as essential support positions for the area
and Burma as essential to support of China and to defense of India;
(c) to re-establish communications through Dutch East Indies with Luzon
and to support Philippines garrison;
(d) to maintain essential communications within the area.
7. Duties, responsibilities and authorities of Supreme Commander.—You will
coordinate in ABDA area strategical operations of all armed forces of ABDA
Governments where desirable to arrange formation of task forces whether national

or inter-national for executing specific operations and appointing any officers
irrespective of seniority or nationality to command such task forces.
8. While you will have no responsibilities in respect of the internal administra-
tion of the respective forces under your command you are authorised to direct
and coordinate the creation and development of administrative facilities and the
broad allocation of war materials.
9. You will dispose of reinforcements which from time to time may be des-
patched to the area by ABDA Governments.
10. You are authorized to require from commanders of the armed forces under
your command such reports as you deem necessary in discharging your responsi-
bilities as supreme commander.
11. You are authorised to control the issue of all communiques concerning the
forces under your command.
12. Through channels specified in paragraph 18 you may submit recommenda-
tions to the ABDA Governments on any matters pertaining to the furthering of
your mission.
13. Limitations.—Your authority and control with respect to the various por-
tions of ABDA area and to forces assigned thereto will normally be exercised
through commanders duly appointed by their respective Governments. Interfer-
ence is to be avoided in administrative processes of armed forces of any of the
ABDA Governments including free communication between them and their
respective Governments. No alterations or revision is to be made in basic tactical
organizations of such forces and each national component of a task force will
normally operate under its own commander and will not be sub-divided into
small units for attachment to other national components of task forces except in
cases of urgent necessity. In general your instructions and orders will be limited
to those necessary for effective coordination of forces in execution of your mission.
14. Relations with ABDA Governments.—The ABDA Governments will jointly
and severally support you in the execution of duties and responsibilities as herein
defined and in the exercising of authority herein delegated and limited. Com-
manders of all sea, land and air forces within your area will be immediately
informed by their respective Governments that from a date to be notified all
orders and instructions issued by you in conformity with the provision of this
directive will be considered by such commanders as emanating from their respec-
tive governments.
15. In the unlikely event that any of your immediate subordinates after making
due representation to you still considers obedience to your orders would jeop-
ardise national interests of his country to an extent unjustified by the general
situation in ABDA area he has the right subject to your being immediately noti-
fied of such intention to appeal direct to his own Government before carrying out
orders. Such appeals will be made by most expeditious methods and copies of
appeals will be communicated simultaneously to you.
16. Staff and assumption of command.—Your staff will include officers of each
of ABDA Powers.
You are empowered to communicate immediately with national commanders
in area with view to obtaining staff officers essential your earliest possible assump-
APPENDIX A 609
tion of command. Your additional staff requirements will be communicated as

soon as possible to ABDA Governments through channels of communication
described in paragraph 18.
17. You will report when you are in position effectively carry essential func-
tions of supreme command so your assumption of command may be promulgated
to all concerned.
18. Superior Authority.—As supreme commander of ABDA area you will
always be responsible to ABDA Governments through agency defined in
Annexure II.
ANNEXURE I.—BOUNDARIES OF ABDA AREA

The ABDA area is bounded as follows:—
North.—By boundary between India and Burma, thence eastward along
Chinese frontier and coastline to latitude 030 degrees north, thence along
parallel 030 degrees north to meridian 140 degrees east. (Note.—Indo-China
and Thailand are NOT included in this area.)
East.—By meridian 140 degrees east from 030 degrees to the Equator, thence
east to longitude 141 degrees east, thence south to the boundary of Dutch
New Guinea (and to) coast on south coast, thence east along southern New
Guinea coast to meridian 143 degrees east, then south down this meridian to
the coast of Australia.
South.—By the northern coast of Australia from meridian 143 degrees east
westward to meridian 114 degrees east, thence north-westward to latitude
015 degrees south, longitude 092 degrees east.
West.—By meridian 092 degrees east.
2. Forces assigned to ABDA and adjacent areas are authorised to extend their
operations into other areas as may be required.
ANNEXURE II
1. On all important military matters not within the jurisdiction of supreme
commander of ABDA area, U. S. Chiefs of Staff and representatives in Washing-
ton of British Chiefs of Staff will constitute agency for developing and submitting
recommendations for decisions by President of U. S. and by British Prime Min-
ister and Minister of Defence. Among chief matters on which decision will be
required are:—
(a) Provision of reinforcements.
(b) Major changes in policy.
(c) Departures from supreme commander's directive.
2. This agency will function as follows:—
(a) Any proposals coming either from Supreme Commander or from any of
the ABDA Governments will be submitted to Chiefs of Staff Committee
both in Washington and in London.
(b) The Chiefs of Staff Committee in London will immediately telegraph to
their representatives in Washington to say whether or not they will be
telegraphing any opinion.
(c) On receipt of these opinions the U.S.A. C's of S. and representatives in

Washington of British C's of S. will develop and submit their recom-
mendations to President and by telegraphing to Prime Minister and
Minister of Defence. Prime Minister will then inform the President
whether he is in agreement with these recommendations.
3. Since London has machinery for consulting Dominion Governments and
since Dutch Government is in London the British Government will be responsible
for obtaining their views and agreement for including these in the final telegrams
to Washington.
4. Agreement having been reached between President and Prime Minister and
Minister of Defence the orders to Supreme Commander will be despatched from
Washington in the name of both of them.
Appendix B
GENERAL OUTLINE OF POLICY OF FUTURE WAR GUIDANCE,
ADOPTED BY LIAISON CONFERENCE, 7 MARCH 1942, AND
REPORT OF PRIME MINISTER AND CHIEFS OF STAFF TO EMPEROR
13 MARCH 1942
1. In order to bring BRITAIN to submission and to demoralize the UNITED

STATES, positive measures shall be taken by seizing opportunities to expand our
acquired war gains, and by building a political and military structure capable of
withstanding a protracted war.
2. By holding the occupied areas and major communication lines, and by
expediting the development and utilization of key resources for national defense;
efforts shall be made to establish a self-sufficient structure, and to increase the
nation's war potential.
3. More positive and definite measures of war guidance shall be adopted by
taking the following situations into consideration: Our national power, the
progress of operations, the German-Soviet war situation, the relations between the
UNITED STATES and the SOVIET UNION, and the trend in CHUNGKING.
4. Our policy toward the SOVIET UNION shall be based on the "Plan for
Expediting the Termination of the War against the UNITED STATES,
BRITAIN, the NETHERLANDS, and CHIANG Kai-shek," adopted on 5 Nov
41; and the "Measures to be Immediately Effected in Line with the Development
of the Situation," adopted on 10 Jan 42. However, under the present circum-
stances, no efforts shall be made to mediate a peace between GERMANY and the
SOVIET UNION.
5. Our policy toward CHUNGKING shall be based on the "Matters Concern-
ing Measures to be taken toward CHUNGKING, in Line with the Development
of the Situation," adopted on 24 Dec 41.
6. Cooperation with GERMANY and ITALY shall be based on the "Plan for
Expediting the Termination of the War against the UNITED STATES,
BRITAIN, the NETHERLANDS and CHIANG Kai-shek," adopted on 15
Nov 41.
Report to the Throne
We humbly report to Your Majesty on behalf of the Imperial General Head-

quarters and the Government.
At this point, when our initial operations are about to come to a favorable end
by dint of the august virtue of Your Majesty, the Imperial General Headquarters
and the Government have, after a careful appraisal, since the latter part of
February, of our acquired war gains and their effect, the changes in the world
situation, and the present war potentialities of our Empire, agreed on the "Gen-
eral Outline on Future War Guidance." We will now give our explanations.
1. Regarding the general outline on war guidance to be effected hereafter in

the war against the UNITED STATES and BRITAIN:
Various measures must be planned and executed in anticipation of a protracted
war. It will not only be most difficult to defeat the UNITED STATES and
BRITAIN in a short period, but, the war cannot be brought to an end through
compromise.
It is essential to further expand the political and military advantages achieved
through glorious victories since the opening of hostilities, by utilizing the present
war situation to establish a political and strategic structure capable of withstand-
ing a protracted war. We must take every possible step, within the limits of our
national power, to force the UNITED STATES and BRITAIN to remain on the
defensive. Any definite measure of vital significance to be effected in this con-
nection will be given thorough study, and will be presented to Your Majesty for
approval each time.
2. Regarding the need for building national power and fighting power for the
successful prosecution of a protracted war.
We deem it highly essential to constantly maintain resilience in our national
defense, and build up the nation's war potential so that we will be capable of
taking the steps necessary to cope with the progress of situation.
If a nation should lose its resilience in national defense while prosecuting a
war, and become unable to rally from an enemy blow; the result would be short
of her desired goal, no matter what victory she might achieve in the process. This
is amply proved in the precious lessons learned from the annals of war.
Consequently, in our Empire's war guidance policy, we have especially empha-
sized that, while taking steps to bring the enemy to submission, we must fully
build up the nation's war potential to cope with a protracted war.
3. Regarding the adoption of a new and more positive measure of war
guidance.
We have made it clear that the question of whether to adopt new and more
positive measures for war guidance for the attainment of the objective of the
Greater East Asia War should be decided after careful study, not only of the war
gains acquired so far, but other factors of extensive and profound significance;
such as, the enemy's national power and our's, especially the increase in the
fighting power on both sides; the progress of our operations, our relations with
the SOVIET UNION and CHINA, the German-Soviet war, and various other
factors.
By "more positive measures of war guidance" we mean such measures as the
invasion of INDIA and AUSTRALIA.
4. Regarding the measures to be immediately taken toward the SOVIET
UNION.
We have made it clear that the measures to be taken toward the SOVIET
UNION will be based on the established policy which was adopted earlier at a
liaison conference. The essentials of that policy are as follows:
a. Utmost efforts shall be made to prevent the expansion of hostilities,
b. JAPAN shall endeavor to the utmost to prevent war with the SOVIET
UNION while operations are being conducted in the Southern Area.
APPENDIX B 613
c. While maintaining peace between JAPAN and the SOVIET UNION,

efforts shall be made to prevent the UNITED STATES and BRITAIN from
strengthening their cooperation with the SOVIET UNION, and to alienate the
latter from the former, if possible. However, this does not imply that our mili-
tary preparations against the SOVIET UNION will be neglected, and it is our
belief that all possible operations preparations should be made to achieve a quick
and decisive victory in case of war.
With regard to the peace between GERMANY and the SOVIET UNION, not
only does a compromise seem utterly hopeless, under the present circumstances,
but we fear that our mediatory efforts at this point would be detrimental to
Japanese-German relations, and would also mean risking a complication in
Japanese-Soviet relations. Consequently, we have made it clear that we have no
intention of taking any positive steps toward mediation.
5. Regarding the measures to be immediately taken toward Chungking:
We have made it clear that measures toward Chungking will be based on the
policy which was adopted at the earlier conference that, "taking advantage of
the restlessness in the Chungking Regime which was caused by our application
of strong pressure on a vulnerable spot of theirs; our measures toward Chungking
shall be shifted, at a proper time, from intelligence activities to activities to bring
the regime to submission. The time and method therefore shall be decided at a
liaison conference."
Meanwhile, the campaign in BURMA is progressing faster than originally
expected, and RANGOON is already in our hands. We believe that our progress
in BURMA is already having serious effects on the Chungking Regime, but since
we greatly fear that any attempt to bring the Chungking Regime to submission,
at too early a stage, would produce an adverse result, our intention is to postpone
it to a date that will be decided later.
6. Regarding measures to be taken toward GERMANY and ITALY.
Since we keenly realized that strengthening cooperation with GERMANY and
ITALY will become increasingly necessary to achieve our war aims, we have
decided that we must adhere closely to the established policy regarding coopera-
tion with GERMANY and ITALY.
We hereby respectfully report to Your Majesty.
13 Mar 42
Prime Minister TOJO Hideki
Chief of the Naval General Staff NAGANO Osami
Chief of the Army General Staff SUGIYAMA Gen
Appendix C
30 March 1942
DIRECTIVE TO THE SUPREME COMMANDER IN THE
SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA
(CCS 57/1)
BY AGREEMENT AMONG THE GOVERNMENTS OF AUSTRALIA,
NEW ZEALAND, UNITED KINGDOM, AND THE UNITED STATES.
1. The SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA has been constituted as defined in

Annex One. Definitions of other areas of the PACIFIC Theater are as shown
therein.
2. You are designated as the Supreme Commander of the SOUTHWEST
PACIFIC Area, and of all armed forces which the governments concerned have
assigned, or may assign to this area.
3. As Supreme Commander you are not eligible to command directly any
national force.
4. In consonance with the basic strategic policy of the governments concerned
your operations will be designed to accomplish the following:
a. Hold the key military regions of Australia as bases for future offensive
action against Japan, and in order to check the Japanese conquest of the
SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA.
b. Check the enemy advance toward Australia and its essential lines of com-
munication by the destruction of enemy combatant, troop, and supply ships,
aircraft, and bases in Eastern Malaysia and the New Guinea—Bismarck-
Solomon Islands Region.
c. Exert economic pressure on the enemy by destroying vessels transporting
raw materials from the recently conquered territories to Japan.
d. Maintain our position in the Philippine Islands.
e. Protect land, sea, and air communications within the SOUTHWEST
PACIFIC Area, and its close approaches.
f. Route shipping in the SOUTHWEST PACIFIC Area.
g. Support the operations of friendly forces in the PACIFIC OCEAN Area
and in the INDIAN Theater.
h. Prepare to take the offensive.
5. You will not be responsible for the internal administration of the respective
forces under your command, but you are authorized to direct and coordinate the
creation and development of administrative facilities and the broad allocation of
war materials.
6. You are authorized to control the issue of all communiques concerning the
7. When task forces of your command operate outside the SOUTHWEST
PACIFIC Area, coordination with forces assigned to the areas in which operating
will be effected by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, or the Combined Chiefs of Staff, as
appropriate.
APPENDIX C 615
8. Commanders of all armed forces within your Area will be immediately in-
formed by their respective governments that, from a date to be notified, all orders
and instructions issued by you in conformity with this directive will be considered
by such commanders as emanating from their respective governments.
9. Your staff will include officers assigned by the respective governments con-
cerned, based upon requests made directly to the national commanders of the
various forces in your Area.
10. The governments concerned will exercise direction of operations in the
SOUTHWEST PACIFIC Area as follows:
a. The Combined Chiefs of Staff will exercise general jurisdiction over grand
strategic policy and over such related factors as are necessary for proper imple-
mentation, including the allocation of forces and war materials.
b. The Joint U.S. Chiefs of Staff will exercise jurisdiction over all matters
pertaining to operational strategy. The Chief of Staff, U.S. Army will act as
the Executive Agency for the Joint U.S. Chiefs of Staff. All instructions to you
will be issued by or through him.
ANNEX ONE
DIVIDING LINE BETWEEN INDIAN THEATER AND

PACIFIC THEATER
From CAPE KAMI in the LUICHOW PENINSULA around the coast of the
TONKIN GULF, INDO-CHINA, THAILAND, and MALAYA to SINGAPORE:
from SINGAPORE south to the north coast of SUMATRA, thence around the
east coast of SUMATRA (leaving the SUNDA STRAIT to the eastward of the
line) to a point on the coast of SUMATRA at Longitude 104° East, thence south
to Latitude 08° South, thence southeasterly towards ONSLOW, AUSTRALIA,
and on reaching Longitude 110° East, due south along that meridian. The
PACIFIC THEATER extends eastward of this dividing line to the continents
of NORTH and SOUTH AMERICA.
DEFINITION OF SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA

The westerly boundary of the SOUTHWEST PACIFIC Area is the westerly
boundary of the PACIFIC Theater, the Area including necessary naval and air
operational areas off the West Coast of AUSTRALIA. The north and east
boundaries of the SOUTHWEST PACIFIC Area run as follows: From CAPE
KAMI (LUICHOW PENINSULA) south to Latitude 20° North; thence east to
Longitude 130° East; thence south to the Equator; thence east to Longitude 165°
East; south to Latitude 10° South; southwesterly to Latitude 17° South, Longitude
160° East; thence south.
DEFINITION OF SOUTHEAST PACIFIC AREA

From the MEXICAN-GUATEMALA western boundary southwesterly to Lati-
tude 11° North, Longitude 110° West; thence south.
DEFINITION OF THE PACIFIC OCEAN AREA

The PACIFIC OCEAN Area includes all of the PACIFIC Theater not included
in the SOUTHWEST and SOUTHEAST PACIFIC Areas, and is sub-divided
into the:
NORTH PACIFIC AREA, North of Latitude 42° North;
CENTRAL PACIFIC AREA, between the Equator and Latitude 42° North;
SOUTH PACIFIC AREA, South of the Equator.
Appendix D
DIRECTIVE TO THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF OF THE
PACIFIC OCEAN AREA
(CCS 57/1)
BY AGREEMENT AMONG THE GOVERNMENTS OF
AUSTRALIA, NEW ZEALAND, UNITED KINGDOM,
AND THE UNITED STATES.
1. The PACIFIC OCEAN Area, comprising the NORTH, CENTRAL and

SOUTH PACIFIC Areas, has been constituted, as defined in Annex 1.1
2. You are designated as the Commander in Chief of the PACIFIC OCEAN
Area, and of all armed forces which the governments concerned have assigned or
may assign to this area.
3. The governments concerned will appoint a commander of the SOUTH
PACIFIC Area, who, as such, will not be eligible to command directly any
national force. Acting under your authority and general direction he will exer-
cise command of the combined armed forces which may at any time be assigned
that area. You will exercise direct command of the combined armed forces in the
NORTH and CENTRAL PACIFIC Areas.
4. In consonance with the basic strategic policy of the governments concerned
your operations will be designed to accomplish the following:
a. Hold the island positions between the United States and the SOUTH-
WEST PACIFIC Area necessary for the security of the line of communications
between those regions; and for supporting naval, air and amphibious operations
against Japanese forces.
b. Support the operations of the forces in the SOUTHWEST PACIFIC Area.
c. Contain Japanese forces within the PACIFIC Theater.
d. Support the defense of the continent of North America.
e. Protect the essential sea and air communications.
f. Prepare for the execution of major amphibious offensives against positions
held by Japan, the initial offensives to be launched from the SOUTH PACIFIC
Area and SOUTHWEST PACIFIC Area.
5. You will not be responsible for the internal administration of the respective
forces under your command. You are authorized to direct and coordinate the
creation and development of administrative facilities and the broad allocation of
war materials.
6. You are authorized to control the issue of all communiques concerning the
7. When task forces of your command operate outside the PACIFIC OCEAN
Area, coordination with forces assigned to the area in which operating will be
1
See Annex One to Appendix C, above.
effected by the Joint Chiefs of Staff or the Combined Chiefs of Staff, as

appropriate.
8. Commanders of all armed forces within your Area will be immediately
informed by their respective governments that, from a date to be notified, all
orders and instructions issued by you in conformity with this directive will be
considered by such commanders as emanating from their respective governments.
9. Your staff will include officers assigned by the governments concerned, based
upon requests made directly to the national commanders of the various forces in
your Area.
10. The governments concerned will exercise direction of operations in the
PACIFIC OCEAN Area as follows:
a. The Combined Chiefs of Staff will exercise general jurisdiction over grand
strategic policy and over such related factors as are necessary for proper imple-
mentation, including the allocation of forces and war material.
b. The Joint U.S. Chiefs of Staff will exercise jurisdiction over all matters
pertaining to operational strategy. The Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet, will
act as the Executive Agency for the Joint U.S. Chiefs of Staff. All instructions
to you will be issued by or through him.
Appendix E
JOINT DIRECTIVE FOR OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS IN THE SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA
AGREED UPON BY THE UNITED STATES CHIEFS OF STAFF, 2 JULY 1942
1. OBJECTIVE: Offensive operations will be conducted with the ultimate

objective of seizure and occupation of the NEW BRITAIN-NEW IRELAND-
NEW GUINEA Area.
2. PURPOSE: To deny the area to JAPAN.
3. TASKS:
a. TASK ONE. Seizure and occupation of SANTA CRUZ ISLANDS,
TULAGI, and adjacent positions.
b. TASK TWO. Seizure and occupation of the remainder of the SOLOMON
ISLANDS, of LAE, SALAMAUA, and Northeast Coast of NEW GUINEA.
c. TASK THREE. Seizure and occupation of RABAUL and adjacent
positions in the NEW GUINEA-NEW IRELAND Area.
4. GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS:
a. The composition of the forces to be used, the timing of the tasks, and the
passage of command will be determined by the U.S. Chiefs of Staff.
b. For planning purposes a target date for TASK ONE is tentatively set as
August 1, 1942.
(c) Direct command of the tactical operations of the amphibious forces will
remain with the Naval task force commander throughout the conduct of all
three tasks.
(d) The withdrawal of the naval attached units of the U.S. Fleet may be
ordered by the U.S. Chiefs of Staff upon the completion of any particular phase
of the operation in the event that:
(1) conditions develop which unduly jeopardize the aircraft carriers:
(2) an emergency arises in other Pacific areas which dictates such with-
drawal.
(e) The eastern and western boundaries of the SOUTHWEST PACIFIC
AREA and of the SOUTH PACIFIC AREA respectively will, as of August 1,
1942, be longitude one hundred fifty-nine degrees east from the equator south-
ward.
5. FORCES
(a) Ground, air, and naval forces now under the command of the Supreme
Commander, Southwest Pacific Area.
(b) At least two aircraft carriers with accompanying cruisers and destroyers,
and the South Pacific Amphibious Force, with necessary transport divisions.
(c) Marine air squadrons and available land-based air support in South
Pacific Area.
(d) Army occupational forces now in the South Pacific Area to be utilized
to garrison TULAGI and adjacent island positions; troops from AUSTRALIA
to provide other garrisons required.
6. COMMAND.
(a) TASK ONE. Seizure and occupation of SANTA CRUZ ISLANDS,
TULAGI, and adjacent positions.
(1) Task Force Commander will be designated by the Commander in
Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet.
(2) Necessary Naval reinforcements and land-based air support will be
attached by the Supreme Commander, Southwest Pacific Area, who will also
provide for interdiction of enemy air and naval activities westward of the
operating area.
b. TASK TWO. Seizure and occupation of the remainder of the SOLOMON
ISLANDS and of LAE, SALAMAUA, and Northeast Coast of NEW GUINEA.
The task forces engaged in this operation will be under the direction of the
Supreme Commander, Southwest Pacific Area.
c. TASK THREE. Seizure and occupation of RABAUL and adjacent posi-
tions in the NEW GUINEA-NEW IRELAND Area. The task forces engaged
in this operation will be under the direction of the Supreme Commander,
Southwest Pacific Area.
Appendix F
LETTER OF INSTRUCTIONS TO MAJ. GEN. MILLARD F. HARMON,
COMMANDING GENERAL, U.S. ARMY FORCES IN THE SOUTH PACIFIC,
7 JULY 1942
1. The establishment of the Pacific Ocean Area as an area of United States

strategical responsibility under the command of the Commander-in-chief, U.S.
Pacific Fleet, became effective on May 8, 1942. The Commander-in-chief, U.S.
Pacific Fleet, has been designated the "Commander-in-chief, Pacific Ocean Area".
Under the Commander-in-chief, Pacific Ocean Area, a U.S. Naval officer has been
designated as "Commander, South Pacific Area". The South Pacific Force under
COMSOPAC include the following:
a. All base and local defense forces (ground, naval and air) now assigned
or to be assigned to forces in the South Pacific Area. The New Zealand Chiefs
of Staff are responsible for the land defense of New Zealand, subject to such
strategic decisions affecting this responsibility as may be made by the Com-
mander-in-chief, Pacific Fleet, for the conduct of naval operations in the
Pacific Ocean Areas.
b. Assigned New Zealand, Free French, Dutch and other United Nations
Naval forces.
c. Such fleet types and aircraft as may be assigned by the Commander-in-
chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet.
2. COMMAND.
a. By direction of the President, you are designated as the "Commanding
General, United States Army Forces in the South Pacific Area" (except CAN-
TON Island) under the "Commander, South Pacific Area". Your short title
will be COMGENSOPAC. As Commanding General of the United States
Army Forces in the South Pacific Area, you will be responsible for the admin-
istration and training of all U.S. Army ground and air troops within the area,
and will assist the Commander of the South Pacific Area in the preparation and
execution of plans for the employment of Army forces in that area. Your
responsibilities with regard to supply are covered in Paragraph 3, below.
b. You will survey and analyze the means provided each Army command in
the South Pacific Area for the execution of its assigned mission and, based
thereon, submit for approval by the War Department, your recommendations
for the rearrangement, reduction or augmentation of the personnel and mate-
rial now allocated to each base command with a view to establishing a balanced,
cohesive and efficient Army contingent for the execution of separate base com-
mand missions and for the effective defense of the South Pacific Area as a whole.
In this connection you are advised that for the present, operations in the South
Pacific Area are restricted to those necessary to support the strategic defensive.
Requirements for the present for this area will be held to the minimum con-
sistent with that role.
3. a. Two mobile Army Air Forces, each comprising one heavy bombardment
group, have been established for operations in the Pacific and Southwest Pacific
Areas, as may be directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. These mobile air forces
will comprise.
(1) A Hawaiian mobile air force, from units duly assigned to the
Hawaiian Department, which will normally base and operate in Hawaii;
(2) An Australian mobile air force, from units duly assigned to the South-
west Pacific Area, which will normally base and operate in Australia,
b. In cooperation with the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department,
and the Commanding General, Southwest Pacific Area, you will assist the
Commander, South Pacific Area in the preparation of advance plans for the
employment, protection and supply of these two mobile air striking forces so
as to facilitate their employment in the South Pacific Area, if and when they
are ordered to that area.
4. SUPPLY.
a. As Commanding General, U.S. Army Forces in the South Pacific Area,
you will be responsible for the supply of all bases in that area for which the
Army is responsible. The basic supply directive is WD letter, file Ag 400
(4-27-42) MC-SP-M, April 28, 1942, subject: "Supply of Overseas Depart-
ment, Theaters, and Separate Bases". See Inclosure No. 2 attached. You are
charged with the duties of overseas department, theater and separate base
commanders as prescribed in paragraph 6 a of Inclosure No. 2 except as modi-
fied below.
b. The San Francisco Port of Embarkation is assigned the responsibility for
supply of your forces.
c. Where possible, delivery of supplies will be made in full shipload lots to
the respective bases in accordance with directives of COMSOPAC for supplies
procured by the Joint Purchasing Board, and of the Commanding General,
San Francisco Port of Embarkation, for supplies furnished by him. Where
redistribution of supplies is necessary, COMGENSOPAC will notify the Com-
manding General, San Francisco Port of Embarkation of the destination of
these supplies as directed by COMSOPAC. War Department letter, AG 400
(6-22-42) MS-SP-M, June 25, 1942, subject: "Supply of United States Army
Forces in the South Pacific Area" is revoked upon your assumption of com-
mand (see Inclosure No. 3).
d. The responsibility for Class III supplies of all categories at Army bases
in the Area rests with the Navy. To this end, COMGENSOPAC will keep
COMSOPAC fully informed of the need for this class of supply,
e. You are specifically charged to:
(1) Secure information from Army Task Force Commanders as to what
supplies can be procured at each base, and pass this information on to COM-
SOPAC, so that these supplies need not be furnished by the Joint Purchasing
Board or Army sources at San Francisco Port of Embarkation.
(2) Receive strength reports from each base and relay them to the Com-
manding General, San Francisco Port of Embarkation and to COMSOPAC.
(3) Arrange for the automatic supply to all bases of Class I supplies which
can be procured by the New Zealand Joint Purchasing Board. The actual
distribution of these supplies will be made as directed by COMSOPAC.
APPENDIX F 623
(4) Notify the Commanding General, San Francisco Port of Embarkation

of the Class I supplies which are being furnished locally.
(5) Have all requisitions for Class II and IV supplies routed through your
headquarters. Arrange to furnish those supplies of these classes which can
be secured locally in the same manner as in (c) above.
(6) Forward requisitions for Class II and IV supplies to the Commanding
General, San Francisco Port of Embarkation for the balance of these classes
of supply with specific instructions as to priority of shipments together with
full information as to the basis of the requisition.
(7) Secure from Army Task Force Commanders information as to any
exportable surplus of local produce available at each base. Inform COM-
SOPAC.
5. You will proceed under air-travel orders to Auckland, New Zealand, making
such inspections of your command enroute as you see fit. Upon arrival at Auck-
land, you will establish your headquarters and make all preparations to assume
command of the forces to which you have been assigned. When you are ready
to assume command, you will report to the Commander, South Pacific Area and
by secret radio the War Department.
By direction of the Commander-in-chief.
G. C. MARSHALL,
Chief of Staff.
OFFICIAL:
THOS T. HANDY,
Brigadier General,
Assistant Chief of Staff.
Appendix G
JAPANESE ARMY-NAVY CENTRAL AGREEMENT CONCERNING
SOUTH PACIFIC AREA OPERATIONS, WITH SUPPLEMENT,
4 JANUARY 1943
I. Operational Objective
The objective of the South Pacific Operations is to establish supremacy in
the South Pacific Area. In order to accomplish this aim the Army and Navy will,
under closely concerted operations, occupy and secure the following strategic
points without delay, and thus, gain sound strategic superiority:
A. Solomon Archipelago Area—Securement of the Solomon Archipelago
(Area North of New Georgia Island and Ysabel Island).
B. Eastern New Guinea Area—Occupy and secure Eastern New Guinea,
especially the strategic points in Northeastern New Guinea and prepare for
subsequent operations.
II. Operational Strategy
A. Solomon Archipelago Area
1. During the period from about the latter part of January to the early
part of February, the Army and Navy will, by every possible means, evacuate
the units in Guadalcanal. The evacuation operation will be enforced in
accordance with a separately drawn up agreement.
2. The defenses of the areas to be secured, as specified in paragraph I
Operation Objective, will be strengthened without delay. For this reason,
the Army and Navy will be allotted the task of defense as follows:
Shortland Islands
Northern Solomon
Bougainville Island Army
Archipelago Buka Island
An Army unit, with about two infantry

New Georgia Island Navy battalions as its nucleus, will be placed
Ysabel Island
under the command of the Navy.
3. The Navy units will continue air operations against the Guadalcanal
Area and will cut off the enemy lines of supply in coordination with sub-
marine operations.
B. New Guinea Area
1. The operational bases at Lae, Salamaua, Madang and Wewak will be
reinforced without delay. Furthermore, the strategic points in the north-
eastern part of New Guinea, generally the area north of the Owen Stanley
Range will be occupied, and preparations will be made for subsequent oper-
ations directed mainly against the Port Moresby area. The details on sub-
sequent operations will be determined separately.
APPENDIX G 625
2. The units in the Buna area will, at an opportune time and as the
occasion may demand, withdraw to the Salamaua area and secure necessary
positions.
III. Air Operations
A. Operational Plans
1. The allotted assignments for the Army and Naval Air Forces will be
as follows:
a. Army Air Force—Will support and cooperate with land and defense
operations of the units in New Guinea, and protect the lines of commu-
nications in the New Guinea Area. Furthermore, as much as possible,
under close cooperation with the Navy, the Army Air Force will enforce
aerial supremacy combat in the Eastern New Guinea Area.
b. Naval Air Force—Will be responsible for air operations of those
areas in the Solomon Archipelago and New Guinea Area not delegated
to the Army Air Force.
c. The Army and Naval Air Forces will mutually support the local units
in the air defense of those areas.
2. During the execution of the Operation, the Army Air Force will, with-
out reference to Item A-1 of the foregoing, support the Naval Air Force with
its main force (all fighter units will take part), and will annihilate enemy air
power. Furthermore, the Army Air Force will support land operations and
protect the lines of communications.
3. The Army and Naval Air Forces will, by taking advantage of the oppor-
tune moment and in close cooperation, simultaneously take part in the same
operation and exert efforts to display their all-out joint might. . . .
IV. Commander and Strength
Navy:
Commander—Commander in Chief, Combined Fleet
Strength—Greater part of the Combined Fleet
Army:
Commander—Commander of 8th Area Army
Strength—8th Area Army
V. Chain of Command
It will be the joint chain of command of the Army and Navy. However, when
the Army units and Navy land combat units are taking part in land operations
in the same area at the same time, the senior commander will be, at times,
ordered to assume the over-all command of the land operations.
VI. Communications
Communications will be carried out in accordance with the Army and Navy
Central Agreement on Communications for the South Pacific Area Operation as
per enclosure. . . .
X. Exchange of Intelligence
A. When necessary, the Army and Navy will exchange their staff officers for
the purpose of liaison work.
B. The local Army and Navy forces will mutually exchange vital information
valuable to the Army and Navy, and will maintain prompt liaison of such
information.
XI. Information
Until further notice, Imperial General Headquarters will release all infor-
mation.
XII. Agreement between Army-Navy Commanders
The following Army and Navy commanders will, at their discretion, conclude
an operation agreement.
Commander in Chief of
Combined Fleet Commander of
and 8th Area
Commander in Chief of Army
South East Area Fleet
Subsequent agreements between the commanders of the Army and Navy

forces concerned will be decided in accordance with the agreements of the afore-
mentioned Army-Navy commanders.
Supplement
I. Objective
During the period from about the latter part of January to the early part
of February, the Army and Navy will, by every possible means, evacuate the units
in Guadalcanal.
A. In order to accelerate preparations for evacuation operations and at the
same time facilitate the concealment of the plan, present preparations for
another offensive operation on Guadalcanal will be accelerated.
B. Without delay, the combat zone of the 17 Army will be readjusted and
reduced to the strategic lines in the rear.
C. Until the evacuation operation is effected, continue and increase supplies
to the units by various means and maintain the fighting power of units in
Guadalcanal. Furthermore, when transporting supplies, the transports will
as much as possible, evacuate the casualties from Guadalcanal. The above task
of transporting supplies and evacuation of casualties to the rear will mainly be
the responsibility of the Navy.
D. The Army and Navy will, in cooperation, equip the air bases in the
Solomon Archipelago Area without delay, and will, at an opportune time,
station their air units. Thus, the Army and Navy will strengthen their air
attacks against the Guadalcanal Area.
E. Along with the enforcement of the air operation mentioned in the above
Item D, the Army and Navy will, by every possible means, evacuate the units
in Guadalcanal to the strategic points in the rear by utilizing all available
warships and other types of vessels.
F. Observe strict caution in maintaining secrecy of this operation.
Appendix H
CONDUCT OF THE WAR IN THE PACIFIC THEATER IN 1943,
MEMORANDUM BY U.S. JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF,
22 JANUARY 1943 (CCS 168)
1. Japan has expanded the scope of her occupation so that it includes not only
her former holdings of (1) Korea and Manchuria on the mainland of Asia and
(2) a considerable part of China (including all of the coast), but in the past
year, (3) all of Indo-China, Malaysia, Thailand, most of Burma, and as well,
(4) all of the Philippines and (5) the Dutch East Indies.
2. The ultimate defeat of Japan proper will be accomplished by measures
which greatly resemble those which would be effective against the British Isles
—blockade (attack on ships and shipping), bombing (attack on forces, defenses,
industries, and morale), and assault (attack via the sea.) Of these measures,
attacks on ships and shipping along enemy lines of communications are inherent
in all offensive operations; it is our purpose during 1943 to work toward positions
from which Japan can be attacked by land based air; assault on Japan is remote
and may well not be found necessary. Allied offensive measures in 1943 comprise
continued and intensified attacks on enemy ships and shipping, in the cutting or
threatening to cut enemy lines of communication between Japan and Japanese
holdings, and in attacks on enemy sea, air, and ground forces by obliging them
to fight to retain their holdings and to maintain their lines of communication.
3. The scope and intensity of the Allied war effort in the Pacific during 1943,
while conditioned on the premise that Germany is the principal enemy, requires
that sufficient means be in hand surely to counter enemy potentialities (para. 4
to follow) and, further, must take care that the means in hand are actively
employed to best advantage. The general capabilities of the Allied effort in the
Pacific in 1943 comprise:
(a) Keep Japan from further expansion, and from consolidating and
exploiting her current holdings.
(b) Maintain the vital Midway-Hawaii line (key to the Pacific).
(c) Secure the line of communications to Australia and New Zealand.
(d) Block enemy approaches to Australia (1) from the Northward via
Rabaul (2) from the Northwestward via the Malay barrier.
(e) Attain positions which menace enemy line of communication with the
Dutch East Indies, the Philippines, and the South China Sea.
(f) Open the line of communications with China via Burma—in order to
make use of Chinese geographical position (as to attack enemy line of com-
munication in Formosa Straits and along the coast of China, perhaps to bomb
Japan).
(g) Make ready to support Russia in case of war with Japan.
(h) Continue and intensify attrition of enemy strength by land, air, and sea
(including submarine) action.
4. Japan's potentialities for offensive action during 1943 embrace:

(a) the Maritime Provinces (Eastern Siberia) —Russia;
(b) Alaska via the Aleutians;
(c) the Midway-Hawaii line—key to the Pacific
(d) the Hawaii-Samoa-Fiji-New Caledonia line, which covers the line of
communications to Australia and New Zealand;
(e) Australia and New Zealand—via the Bismark Archipelago and/or the
Solomons;
(f) Australia—via the Malay barrier;
(g) India—via Burma;
(h) China;
(i) Of the above, (a) is static unless and until war takes place between
Russia and Japan; (b) has proved, and will continue, unprofitable to Japan;
(c) has been tried and may be tried again but is unlikely to succeed; (d) is
now unprofitable except via the Gilbert and Ellice Islands toward Samoa (the
Jaluit-Samoa line); (e) is now under contest by United Nations forces; (f) is
unprofitable except to forestall Allied advance from N.W. Australia; (g) is
feasible except that enemy position is already well extended; (h) same as (g)
—profitable chiefly to forestall Allied action.
5. Allied seizure and occupation, now in progress, of the New Caledonia/New
Guinea line has for objectives:
(a) security of the line of communications from U.S. to Australia and New
Zealand;
(b) blocking of enemy approaches to Eastern Australia;
(c) points d'appui for further action;
(d) attrition of enemy forces which oppose our occupation.
6. Additional to the objectives attained by the seizure and occupation of the
New Caledonia/New Guinea line (para. 5 above), the other feasible objectives
for us appear to be:
(a) Japan via the Maritime Provinces (Eastern Siberia) noted only for
record to offset 4 (a) above.
(b) Japan via the Aleutians and Kuriles—from Alaska.
(c) Advance from Midway towards Truk-Guam line via Wake and North-
westerly Marshall Islands.
(d) Advance on the Samoa-Jaluit line via Ellice and Gilbert Islands.
(e) Advance from Rabaul area on Truk-Guam line.
(f) Dutch East Indies via Malay barrier (as Timor).
(g) participation in ANAKIM.
(h) Of the above (which are set down to match the items of para. 4 above):
(a) is merely potential unless and until war takes place between Japan
and Russia;
(b) is unprofitable with means in sight in 1943 and is best undertaken,
if at all, in connection with (a);
(c) is most useful, not only as to
(1) retention of initiative;
(2) partial counter to enemy potentialities of para. 4 (c); and,
particularly,
APPENDIX H 629
(3) to draw off enemy forces involved in holding Rabaul area;

(d) is effective
(1) to forestall enemy potentialities in para. 4 (d);
(2) to make the line of communications to Australia and New Zealand
fully secure; and
(3) to draw off enemy forces involved in Rabaul area;
(e) cannot be done until after consolidation of the Rabaul area upon
completion of operations now in hand—see para. 5 above—but should,
perhaps must, eventually be undertaken;
(f) useful on limited scale
(1) to counter enemy potentialities of par. 4 (f);
(2) to draw off enemy forces elsewhere in the Pacific;
(3) to employ forces available in Australia (after completion of
para. 5) which would not otherwise be employable; N.B.—Attacks are
not to be developed fully, as this might lead to extensive operations of
the nature of frontal attacks.
(g) not effective before November though forces contributed would likely
have to be made available in October—but—ANAKIM is of such importance
in respect of its objective (bringing Chinese manpower and geographic
position to bear on Japanese forces and positions) as to merit that priority
which may be found indispensable to mount it.
7. Referring now to the general capabilities of Allied action listed in para. 3
above, set off against enemy potentialities in para. 4 above, we intend, as to the
feasible objectives of par. 6 above—additional to those of par. 5 above—to:
(a) and (b) —make the Aleutians as secure as may be—which will imple-
ment 3 (a) (g) (h); N.B.—Germany can be expected to intensify pressure on
Japan to attack Russia in Siberia (Maritime Provinces).
c. undertake advance from Midway towards Truk-Guam line as practicable
—to implement 3 (a) (b) (e) (h) and, particularly, when 6 (e) is undertaken;
(d) undertake advance along Samoa-Jaluit line to implement 3 (a) (c) (h) ;
(e) refrain from advance from Rabaul area towards Truk-Guam line unless
and until forces are in hand to enable it to be carried through and followed up.
Noted that it implements 3 (a), (b), (d) (1), (e), ( h ) ;
(f) undertake advance on the Malay barier (as Timor) on limited scale
to counter enemy capabilities and divert his forces—to implement 3 (a), (d)
(2), (e), (h);
(g) participate in ANAKIM as may be found indispensable to mounting it.
Appendix I
THE ELKTON PLAN
FOR
THE SEIZURE AND OCCUPATION OF
THE NEW BRITAIN-NEW IRELAND-NEW GUINEA AREA,
Prepared by GHQ, SWPA, 28 February 1943
SECTION I—GENERAL
1. a. General Task.
The Joint Directive for offensive operations in the Southwest Pacific is set
forth by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the following form:
Objective
"Seizure and occupation of the NEW BRITAIN-NEW IRELAND-NEW
GUINEA area."
Purpose
"To deny the area to JAPAN."
Tasks
Task One "Seizure and occupation of SANTA CRUZ ISLANDS,
TULAGI, and adjacent positions."
Task Two "Seizure and occupation of remainder of SOLOMONS, LAE,
SALAMAUA, and northeast coast of NEW GUINEA."
Task Three "Seizure and occupation of RABAUL and adjacent positions
in NEW BRITAIN-NEW IRELAND area."
b. Analysis of Task.
(1) Task 1 above may be considered accomplished.
(2) Tasks 2 and 3 require the employment of two general axes of
advance: on the west, along the line northeast coast of NEW GUINEA-
NEW BRITAIN; on the east, through the SOLOMONS; culminating in
the capture of RABAUL. In addition Task 3 requires seizure and occupa-
tion of positions in the NEW BRITAIN-NEW IRELAND area adjacent
to RABAUL.
(3) The northeast coast of NEW GUINEA (northwest of BUNA), the
SOLOMONS (northwest of GUADALCANAL), NEW IRELAND, and
NEW BRITAIN are in the hands of the enemy. The sea and land areas
south of the line BUNA-GUADALCANAL are generally under our control.
The defenses of both sides are concentrated in and around airfields, the
remainder of the land areas generally being unoccupied.
Tasks 2 and 3 generally require the following steps:
(1) Seizure of operating airdromes in the HUON PENINSULA area to
provide necessary direct land-based air support for subsequent operations
along the line of NEW BRITAIN.
APPENDIX I 631
(2) Seizure of operating airdromes in NEW GEORGIA to provide nec-

essary direct land-based air support for subsequent operations along the line
SOLOMONS-NEW IRELAND.
(3) Seizure of operating airdromes in NEW BRITAIN on the west and
BOUGAINVILLE ISLAND on the east, to provide direct land-based air
support for subsequent operations against KAVIENG and RABAUL.
(4) The capture of KAVIENG and the isolation of RABAUL by air and
naval action. (The capture of KAVIENG may be delayed until after Step
(5) if the situation justifies.)
(5) The capture of RABAUL after necessary reduction of enemy strength
by combined attack to eliminate the center of enemy resistance.
2. Scheme of Maneuver.
a. The scheme of maneuver is based on seizure of HUON PENINSULA
followed by converging attacks:
(1) Through NEW BRITAIN.
(2) Through the SOLOMONS to KAVIENG.
Both culminating in a combined assault on RABAUL.
The attack along the NEW GUINEA coast to capture operating airdromes
in the HUON PENINSULA must precede the attack through the SOLO-
MONS, then both attacks proceed toward the objective, RABAUL, as a
converging mutually supporting operation. Preceded by strong land-based
air action and covered by our fleet to prevent major hostile naval interrup-
tion; the forces along the western axis operate against successive objectives
to capture air operating bases in western NEW BRITAIN by air-borne and
small craft operations and thence by amphibious operations to the capture of
RABAUL; the forces along the eastern axis progress northwestward by am-
phibious operations through successive objectives to a meeting with western
forces in a combined attack on RABAUL. Throughout the operations the
employment of aviation of both forces is coordinated by the Commander
in Chief, Southwest Pacific Area, in support of either force requiring the
maximum assistance at the moment. The Fleet seeks decisive combat with
hostile naval forces.
To insure the security of the Southwest Pacific Line of Communications,
the defense of TORRES STRAIT area will be undertaken along the line
DARWIN-MERAUKE by the action of ground, air, and naval units.
MERAUKE will be occupied as an air operating base.
While the operations to secure successive objectives are considered sep-
arately, this does not indicate the timing necessarily. The timing will exploit
favorable conditions and take advantage of the momentum achieved by
either advance.
b. Diversions.
Request will be made on the Joint Chiefs of Staff for a diversion in the
INDIAN OCEAN by Indian Theater Forces and/or in the North PACIFIC
(ALEUTIAN ISLANDS) by North PACIFIC FORCES, to precede our
operations and draw away hostile air and naval forces from the Southwest
PACIFIC and supporting areas.
3. Organization,
a. General Chart.
b. Estimate of Forces Required. (2)

(1) Summary.
In addition to the Naval Striking Force, principal combat elements
during each operation are estimated to be:
Notes:
(1) Preliminary estimate by Commander, Allied Naval Forces, of forces
required for this campaign:
2 Cru Divs
2 Desrons
1 Des Div
4 PT Squadrons
12 Submarines
APPENDIX I 633
in addition to the Naval forces normally required for the defense of the
Southwest Pacific Area. The Commander in Chief, SWPA, considers that
the minimum requirements are:
1 Cru Div
1 Desron
1 Des Div
4 PT Squadrons
in addition to the Naval forces now assigned the SWPA.
(2) For land and air forces required for defense in the Southwest Pacific
Area, see Enclosures 2 and 3.
(3) Groups of four squadrons each, at maximum strength.
(4) 2 Infantry Divisions (One garrisons TORRES STRAIT initially)
1 Air-borne Division
1 Parachute Regiment (Separate)
1 Armored Regt. (Australian Brigade)
(2) Totals.
In view of the determined opposition expected and reduction of
Land Force estimates to an absolute minimum, Land Forces assigned to
an operation must be considered as permanently committed therein. Land
Forces will require an estimated total of 22 2/3 Divisions. Air Forces will
require approximately 30 Groups in the Southwest Pacific Area and 15
Groups in the South Pacific Area. Estimated capacity of amphibious
equipment required is:
Operation Sowespac Sopac
I 1 Div
II 1 Div
III 1 Div 2 Divs
IV 2 Divs
V 2 Divs 1 Div
Southwest Pacific Area will employ small shore-to-shore equipment for one
Division in Operation I. Remaining operations require amphibious equip-
ment.
4. Allotment of Tasks,
a. Naval Striking Force.
(1) Composition
Elements of the U.S. Fleet and attached naval units.
(2) Tasks.
Cover the operations, prevent interference therewith by major enemy
naval forces, and seek decisive action with hostile fleet,
b. Allied Air Forces.
(1) Composition.
Fifth Air Force, R.A.A.F. Command and air elements Southwest
Pacific Force not required for defense of installations, facilities, or shipping
in the Southwest Pacific Area.
(2) Tasks.
(a) Destroy hostile aviation in general supporting areas of Northern
SOLOMONS, NEW IRELAND, eastern NEW BRITAIN, and the north

coast NEW GUINEA. Destroy naval forces and shipping.
(b) Support the operations of the Southwest Pacific Task Forces.
(c) Support the defense of our forward bases and TORRES STRAIT.
(d) Provide transport aviation support for our operations.
(e) Be prepared to provide air support for operations of the South
Pacific Area and the Naval Striking Force,
c. Allied Naval Forces.
(1) Composition.
Task Force 42, Task Force 44, PT Squadrons and escort vessels.
(2) Tasks.
(a) Support the operations of the Southwest Pacific Task Forces.
(b) Support the defense of forward bases in the Southwest Pacific Area
and of TORRES STRAIT, and protect lines of communication,
d. West Force.
(1) Composition.
A self-contained Task Force organized and equipped for ground and
shore-to-shore operations.
(2) Tasks
By air-borne, overland and Overwater operations, capture LAE and
MADANG and secure in the HUON PENINSULA-MARKHAM VALLEY
areas air bases required for subsequent operations,
e. Center Force.
(1) Composition.
A Task Force organized and equipped for airborne and Overwater
operations in NEW BRITAIN.
(2) Tasks.
(a) Supported by air and light naval forces, capture and consolidate
airfields in western NEW BRITAIN to include the general line GAS-
MATA-TALASEA by combined air-borne and Overwater operations.
(b) Supported by air and naval forces and in conjunction with ground
forces of the South Pacific Area, capture RABAUL by an Overwater
operation,
f. Southwest Pacific Amphibious Force.
(1) Composition.
Escort vessels, transport vessels and landing craft.
(2) Tasks.
Embark, conduct, and land Southwest Pacific Task Forces in suc-
cession for the capture of MADANG, Western NEW BRITAIN, and
RABAUL.
g. Supply Services.
(1) Composition.
USASOS and the Australian Lines of Communication.
(2) Tasks.
(a) Provide logistic support for the operations.
(b) Establish an intermediate base in MILNE BAY LOUISIADES
area for logistic support of subsequent operations.
APPENDIX I 635
h. South Pacific Force.

(1) Composition,
as assigned.
(2) Tasks.
(a) Seize and occupy the NEW GEORGIA, BOUGAINVILLE, KAV-
IENG areas in successive operations.
(b) Provide and land a secondary attack force for the capture of
RABAUL.
Appendix J
JAPANESE ARMY-NAVY CENTRAL AGREEMENT ON
SOUTHEAST AREA OPERATIONS, WITH SUPPLEMENT
15 MARCH 1943
I. Operational Objectives
The objective of Southeast Area operations lies in securing or occupying the
strategic areas in the theater and thus establishing a superior and impregnable
strategic position.
A. Plan for directing the operations
The Army and Navy forces shall literally operate as one unit, and the
primary operation of the two forces will be directed against New Guinea, in
order to establish bases for further operations in this theater. In the meantime,
defensive measures will be intensified in the Solomon Islands and Bismarck
Archipelago to secure the important areas already occupied and to destroy the
enemy whenever he attacks.
B. Operation in New Guinea
1. Secure the key points around Lae and Salamaua against enemy air and
ground offensives. The Army and Navy units will employ all means at
their command in securing the supply situation for the units in these areas,
and will thus increase their combat potentiality.
2. Air operations will be intensified to destroy the enemy air strength. At
the same time, primary importance in air operations will be attached to the
sustained effort of cutting off enemy lines of communications and reinforce-
ment extending to the eastern coast of New Guinea. Furthermore, nothing
will be left to be desired in respect to the air cover that our own lines of
communications and supply will receive.
3. To carry out the operations in New Guinea, the Army and Navy will
cooperate in the effort of quickly completing and strengthening the group
of necessary air, air defense and lines of communication, and supply bases
in New Guinea and New Britain. Simultaneously, vitally necessary roads
will be built, mostly by Army units, and special effort will be made in
expediting the establishment of military supply dumps and thus completing
the establishment of operational bases on New Guinea and on the western
part of New Britain.
4. Along with the preparation and expansion of bases mentioned in the
preceding paragraph, troops and equipment in the vicinity of Lae and Sala-
maua will be increased, in order to strengthen the security of these areas.
Completion of other facilities will also be expedited in preparation for the
forthcoming operation, which will be directed primarily against Port
Moresby. Agreement on subsequent operations will be made separately.
C. Operations in the Solomon Area
1. The defense of the key points north of New Georgia Island and Isabel
Island will be strengthened, and present conditions secured and expanded,
APPENDIX J 637
so that enemy attacks can be repulsed at any time. Ground defense of this
area will be shared by the Army and Navy as follows: Army—Northern por-
tion of the Solomon Islands. Navy—Central portion of the Solomon Islands
(New Georgia Island, Isabel Island, and adjacent islands) (some Army units
will be placed under the Navy commander in accordance with agreement
between the local Army and Navy commanders).
2. The operations of the naval air forces and submarines will be directed
to check enemy efforts to send reinforcements and supplies to the Guadal-
canal area and to crush the enemy strength.
3. The Army and Navy units will cooperate in building the necessary
roads on Bougainville Island as well as in establishing as quickly as possible
a supply line extending to the Solomon Islands.
4. Operations in the Bismarck Archipelago
The Army and Navy will cooperate in strengthening the defenses on
New Britain Island, especially the defenses in the western part of the island
and around Surumi. Also, in order to maintain supply lines to New Guinea,
they will be charged with the task of completing land and sea lines of
communication bases.
III. Air Operations
A. Every effort will be made by both the Army and Navy to rapidly increase
their air strength and maintain their combat strength. Thus an increase in
air strength will be achieved as planned, and it will be fully prepared in
bringing the overall operation to a successful end.
B. In directing air operations, emphasis will be placed on achieving cooper-
ation between Army and Navy air strength.
C. Allocation of air responsibility between Army and Navy air units during
the operation, especially up to around September 1943, will be as follows:
1. Army air units
a. Will cooperate with the Navy in protecting the lines of communica-
tions and supply in the New Guinea area and in the Bismarck Archipelago.
b. Will shut off enemy land transportation in the New Guinea area as
well as support our ground and defense operations in the New Guinea
area.
c. Will cooperate with the Navy in aerial supremacy battles in the New
Guinea area.
d. Will cooperate with the Navy in cutting off the enemy's sea lanes
north of Buna.
2. Navy air units
a. Will intercept enemy surface transportation around New Guinea, as
well as cooperate with the Army in aerial supremacy combat in the same
area.
b. Will take part in the air operation in the Solomon area. Such an
operation will consist of aerial supremacy combat, interception of enemy
transportation, interception of enemy aircraft, ground support, and cover-
ing lines of communications and supply.
c. Will protect lines of communications and supply in Bismarck Archi-
pelago area.
d. Will cooperate as much as possible, with the Army in protecting the

lines of communications and supply in the New Guinea area.
e. In the defense of the Bismarck Archipelago, the Navy air units will
be assigned the primary responsibility, and will receive the cooperation
of the Army air units in the locality. Besides, the local air defense will be
made by mutual cooperation of army and navy units in the locality.
3. Army and Navy air units will be called upon to supply the Army
and Navy units in the New Guinea area via air whenever it is deemed
necessary. . . .
IV. Commanders, and Strength
Navy:
Commander—Commander in Chief of Combined Fleet
Unit —Main force of Combined Fleet
Army:
Commander—Commanding General of the 8th Area Army
Unit —Eighth Area Army
V. Chain of Command
Operations in this theater are basically conducted under cooperation between
the Army and Navy. However, in the event that the Army and Navy are engaged
in land operations in the same area at the same time, the senior commander of
the area from among the Army and Navy will, as the occasion may demand,
command the operation. . . .
VIII. Transport and Escort
A. For the time being, Palau will be the relay point for forwarding of
supplies (reinforcements) as well as for concentrating Army units in the South-
east Area. With use of its vessels the Navy will, when deemed necessary,
cooperate as much as possible with the Army in transporting the foregoing
Army units and supplies. In each instance, the Army Department and Navy
Section of Imperial General Headquarters will, when the above cooperation
is effected, determine the details.
B. Depending on operational conditions in the local operations, the Navy
will assist the Army or will even carry the full burden of transporting materiel
and Army units not covered in the preceding paragraph. Matters pertaining
to such transportation will be studied and agreed upon by the Army and Navy
commanders concerned.
C. The transport ships (including empty transports) returning from the
Southeast Area will, insofar as is possible, return home directly from the point
of departure. For the time being, however, Palau will be used as a relaying
port, and the transports will, as much as possible, navigate in convoy forma-
tion. The local Army and Navy commanders concerned will determine the
details on the navigation of the convoy.
D. The Navy will provide the necessary escort for convoys (including empty
ships) on return voyages as well as for convoys transporting Army units and
supply materiel to the fronts. In carrying out the escort procedure, the Army
Department and the Navy Section of Imperial General Headquarters, or the
Army and Navy commanders concerned will, as specified in the preceding
paragraphs, determine the details on the convoy escort. . . .
APPENDIX J 639
Supplement
The Agreement Between the Army and Navy Commander
1. Assignment of air bases to be used by Army and Navy.
a. Primarily Army:.
Rabaul (South) Wake Island, Lorengau, Finschhafen
b. Primarily Navy:
Rabaul (East) Kavieng, Surumi
c. Jointly used by Army and Navy:
Rabaul (West, Bamo, Tuluvu, Lae, Madang, Wewak, Babo, Hollandia
2. The local Army and Navy commanders will decide as to which airfield or
airfields will be designated for joint use in the Lae, Madang and Wewak airfield
group, and as to which branch of service will use the new airfields, pending
construction.
3. In addition, the Army will use Palau as a shelter airfield for one bomber
regiment.
4. Army will, until the air bases necessary for its own use are constructed and
for operational and supply reasons, provide necessary ground duty units and
facilities for air security to the following Navy air bases: Mindanao, Manado,
Ambon, Namlea, Boela, Palau, Kendari and Makassar.
5. The Army and Navy will, according to operational circumstances, mutually
facilitate and utilize the respective air bases and will mutually render assistance
in supply and in air base maintenance.
6. Summary
Bringing the operations in the Southeast Area, especially in New Guinea,
to a successful end is a matter of vital importance to the national defense of our
Imperial homeland. Therefore, there are ample reasons to fear that poor plan-
ning or execution of the operation would lead to grave consequences. Further-
more, in order to maintain the impregnable strategical position of the Southeast
Area at large, it is absolutely a minimum prerequisite to securely hold the present
positions in New Guinea, Solomon Island and Bismarck Archipelago Areas.
Serious failure in any of these areas would jeopardize the entire Southern Region.
Arriving at the foregoing estimation of the situation, the Army Department
and the Navy Section of Imperial General Headquarters have agreed to exert all
their efforts and bring the Southeast Area Operation to a successful end at all
costs, under the plan singularly followed by both the Army Department and Navy
Section of Imperial General Headquarters and the frontline echelons. It is
based upon the joint strategical plan sanctioned by the Emperor on March 5th
and on the strategical study conducted in the presence of His Majesty.
7. These are the steps to be taken as immediate measures by the Army Depart-
ment and Navy Section of Imperial General Headquarters,
a. Strengthening of respective Air Arms.
In the Southeast Area both branches of service will hastily increase their
air strength or bring up the air units presently there to full strength, designate
their areas of responsibility and increase and strengthen their air bases in those
areas, and thus complete their preparations for air operations.
b. Supply, especially to these units in eastern New Guinea, must be carried
out under a joint Army-Navy effort and with all available means at their
command. To accomplish this objective, the following measures will be taken

without delay.
(1) Both services will quickly increase the number of barges and other
surface craft in the Southeast Area.
(2) Under joint Army-Navy effort, the facilities of the line of communi-
cations of small surface craft will be completed, and the transportation of
supplies by small surface craft will be expedited. Furthermore, the Navy
will, with a group of Naval vessels, enforce emergency transportation of
supplies. The Army will exert every effort in maintaining the land lines
of communications. Also, supply by air will be stepped up.
(3) However, in the event that it becomes impossible to cope with the
situation with the aforementioned measures, which are to be enforced with
every means available, the Navy will carry out the task of supply with every
available means at its command.
c. The Army will, without loss of time, send new contingents of air defense
troops required in the establishment of air bases and strengthen the defensive
facilities in the New Guinea area. Furthermore, the Army, in addition to the
foregoing assignments covered in the earlier plan, will put the Army transports
at its disposal to maximum use and transport the newly-reinforced units to
the Southeast Area. The Navy will assist in the transporting as much as
possible.
8. Since how to supply our troops stationed in the zone within the radius of
enemy aircraft has a decisive effect on the future course of the war, concrete plans
will be made quickly and various means to insure its execution will be expedited,
together with organizing the necessary materiel.
9. The Army Department and Navy Section of Imperial General Headquarters
will formulate a joint concrete plan to direct their operations.
10. The Army-Navy Central Agreement on the South Pacific Ocean Area
Operation, which is in effect at present, will be revised on the basis of the fore-
going plans.
11. The Army Department and Navy Section of Imperial General Head-
quarters will direct their respective front line echelons in accordance with the
preceding plan formulated at Imperial General Headquarters and will strive to
achieve complete harmony and cooperation in directing operations. As a most
practicable measure to realize this central plan, the Army Department and the
Navy Section will simultaneously call their respective chiefs of staff of the local
Army and Fleet back to Tokyo toward the end of March and issue the necessary
instructions on the foregoing matters.
Appendix K
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF DIRECTIVE:
OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS IN THE SOUTH AND SOUTHWEST
PACIFIC AREAS DURING 1943, 28 MARCH 1943
(JCS 238/5/D)
1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff directive communicated in COMINCH dispatch

022100 of July 1942 is cancelled and the following directive is substituted
therefor.
2. Command.
a. The operations outlined in this directive will be conducted under the
direction of the Supreme Commander, Southwest Pacific Area.
b. Operations in the Solomon Islands will be under the direct command of
the Commander, SOPAC Area, operating under general directives of the
Supreme Commander, Southwest Pacific Area.
c. Units of the Pacific Ocean Area, other than those assigned by the Joint
Chiefs of Staff to task forces engaged in these operations, will remain under
the control of the Commander in Chief, Pacific Ocean Area (CINCPAC).
3. Forces will be allocated for these operations as determined by the Joint
Chiefs of Staff.
4. Tasks.
a. Establish airfields on Kiriwina and Woodlark Islands.
b. Seize Lae-Salamaua-Finschhafen-Madang Area and occupy Western New
Britain.
c. Seize and occupy Solomon Islands to include the southern portion of
Bougainville.
5. Purposes. To inflict losses on Japanese forces, to deny these areas to Japan,
to contain Japanese forces in the Pacific Theater by maintaining the initiative,
and to prepare for ultimate seizure of Bismarck Archipelago.
6. Plans. Supreme Commander, Southwest Pacific Area, will submit general
plans including composition of task forces, sequence and timing of major offen-
sive operations to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Appendix L
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF DIRECTIVE:
UNIFIED COMMAND FOR U.S. JOINT OPERATIONS
20 APRIL 1943 (JCS 263/2/D)
Definition
1. Unified command as employed for U.S. Joint Operations is that command

organization in which a force composed of units of the Army and of the Navy
operates as a single command unit under an officer specifically assigned by higher
authority to the command thereof.
Commander
2. A commander for U.S. Joint Operations, with appropriate title, is designated

by and is responsible to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. His selection from the ground
or air arm of the Army, or from the Navy by the Joint Chiefs of Staff will be
guided by the nature of the contemplated operation and by the end to be
attained.
Exercise of Command
3. When the Joint Force Commander has been designated and the units com-
posing his force assigned, his command responsibilities are the same as if the
forces involved were all Army or all Navy. He will exercise his command of the
Army and Navy forces assigned, through the commanders of these forces or of
the task forces concerned. Normally in operations, this will consist of the assign-
ment of their respective missions. In carrying out its mission the tactics and
technique of the force concerned are the responsibility of the commander of
that force. The participation in matters of administration on the part of the
Joint Force Commander will be kept to a minimum, and disciplinary matters
will in so far as practicable be handled through the commander of the service
concerned. Directives or instructions of major importance relating to separate
services of a Joint Force will be sent to the Joint Force Commander by the Joint
Chiefs of Staff rather than by the individual Chiefs of Staff of the Services
concerned.
Organization
4. (a) A joint force commander will not function in a dual capacity as joint
force commander and as commander of a component of his force, unless so
directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
(b) A joint staff of appropriate size will be organized to assist the Joint
Force Commander. It will comprise representatives of each of the several com-
ponent parts of his force in such a manner as to insure an understanding of
APPENDIX L 643
their several capabilities, needs, and limitations, together with the knowledge
essential to maximum efficiency in integration of their efforts.
Subsidiary Joint Forces
5. The principles and system of unified command as outlined above will be

extended, as appropriate, to subsidiary joint forces when so directed by the
commander of the joint force of which they are a part.
Appendix M
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF MEMORANDUM:
STRATEGIC PLAN FOR THE DEFEAT OF JAPAN
APPROVED BY THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF, 19 MAY 1943
(JCS 287/1 AND CCS 220)
1. A brief discussion of a strategic plan for the defeat of JAPAN is contained

in Enclosure "A."
2. The plan is based on the following overall strategic concept for the prose-
cution of the war.
a. In cooperation with RUSSIA and other Allies to force an unconditional
surrender of the AXIS in EUROPE.
b. Simultaneously, in cooperation with the other PACIFIC powers con-
cerned, to maintain and extend unremitting pressure against JAPAN with
the purpose of continually reducing her Military power and attaining posi-
tions from which her ultimate unconditional surrender can be forced.
c. Upon the defeat of the AXIS in EUROPE, in cooperation with other
PACIFIC powers and, if possible, with RUSSIA, to direct the full resources
of the UNITED STATES and GREAT BRITAIN to force an unconditional
surrender of JAPAN. If, however, conditions develop which indicate that the
war as a whole can be brought more quickly to a successful conclusion by the
earlier mounting of a major offensive against JAPAN, the strategical concept
set forth herein may be reversed.
3. In view of the long period covered and the inevitable changes in conditions
that cannot be foreseen, it is not practicable to divide the plan into definitely
coordinated phases. With this reservation in regard to timing and coordination,
the plan is expressed as follows:
PHASE 1
a. CONTINUE AND AUGMENT EXISTING UNDERTAKINGS IN
AND FROM CHINA.
Chinese Forces assisted by U.S. Forces,
b. RECAPTURE BURMA.
British Forces assisted by U.S. and Chinese Forces.
c. OPEN A LINE OF COMMUNICATIONS TO THE CELEBES SEA.
United States Forces.
PHASE II
a. OPERATIONS TO OPEN THE STRAIT OF MALACCA AND TO
COMPEL WIDE DISPERSION OF ENEMY FORCES.
British Forces,
b. RECAPTURE THE PHILIPPINES.
United States Forces.
c PREPARE TO CAPTURE HONG KONG.
Chinese Forces.
APPENDIX M 645
PHASE III
a. C O N T I N U E O P E R A T I O N S TO OPEN THE STRAIT OF
MALACCA AND TO COMPEL WIDE DISPERSION OF ENEMY
FORCES.
British Forces.
b. SECURE CONTROL OF THE NORTHERN PART OF THE
SOUTH CHINA SEA, AND ASSIST IN THE CAPTURE OF HONG
KONG.
United States Forces,
c. CAPTURE HONG KONG.
Chinese Forces.
PHASE IV
ESTABLISH AIR BASES IN JAPANESE OCCUPIED CHINA FROM
WHICH TO LAUNCH AN OVERWHELMING BOMBING OFFENSIVE
AGAINST JAPAN.
Chinese Forces, assisted by British and U.S. Forces.
PHASE V
CONDUCT AN OVERWHELMING AIR OFFENSIVE AGAINST
JAPAN.
U.S. Forces, assisted by British and Chinese Forces.
PHASE VI
INVADE JAPAN.
U.S. Forces, assisted by British and Chinese Forces.
ENCLOSURE "A"
STRATEGIC PLAN FOR THE DEFEAT OF JAPAN
4. Objective of the plan.
THE UNITED NATIONS war objective is the unconditional surrender of
the AXIS Powers. The accomplishment of this objective may require the
invasion of JAPAN.
5. Most probable Japanese courses of action.
JAPAN'S most probable courses of action are to direct her major effort
toward securing and exploiting the territory she controls, and eliminating
CHINA from the war.
6. The invasion of JAPAN.
Since the invasion, of JAPAN is a vast undertaking, it should not be
attempted until Japanese power and will to resist have been so reduced that
favorable conditions for invasion obtain. Under these conditions the invasion
of JAPAN is considered feasible.
It is probable that the reduction of JAPAN'S power and will to resist may
only be accomplished by a sustained, systematic, and large-scale air offensive
against JAPAN itself.
7. An overwhelming air offensive against JAPAN.
An air offensive on the required scale can only be conducted from bases in
CHINA.
8. Recapture BURMA.
The attainment of bases in CHINA for the air offensive against JAPAN is
dependent on the continuation of CHINA in the war, and on the establishment
of adequate supply routes, not only to maintain CHINA, but also to maintain
UNITED NATIONS forces which are to operate in and from CHINA. The
recapture of BURMA is a prerequisite to the attainment of adequate bases in
CHINA. The capacity of the Burma Road supplemented by the air route from
INDIA is inadequate to support the air and ground forces required to imple-
ment an air offensive on the required scale. The seizure of a port in CHINA to
augment the supply routes through BURMA is essential.
9. The seizure of a port in CHINA.
HONG KONG is the most suitable port which may be seized initially. Its
seizure requires an offensive from the interior of CHINA by forces supported
through BURMA, and, probably, by supplementary amphibious operations.
Control of the SOUTH CHINA SEA by the UNITED NATIONS will be neces-
sary to prevent JAPAN from successfully opposing these measures.
10. A line of communications to HONG KONG.
The most feasible sea route from the UNITED STATES to HONG KONG
is through the CELEBES and SULU SEAS; that from the UNITED KINGDOM
is through the STRAIT OF MALACCA. The establishment of these routes
will require the neutralization of Japanese bases in the northern EAST INDIES,
the PHILIPPINES, FORMOSA, and on the Asiatic .mainland south of HONG
KONG. Control of these areas will prevent JAPAN from supporting her forces
in the NETHERLANDS EAST INDIES and will deny her the economic advan-
tages she receives from that area. Operations to open a line of communications
to HONG KONG and to control the SOUTH CHINA SEA are considered
feasible.
11. A line of communications from HAWAII to the CELEBES SEA.
This line of communications to the CELEBES SEA will be established by
advancing in the CENTRAL and SOUTHWEST PACIFIC areas with a view
to shortening the sea route, providing for its security, and denying to the enemy
bases and means by which he may interfere with the line of communications.
12. A line of communications through the STRAIT OF MALACCA.
Although the supply of forces in CHINA will come mainly from the
UNITED STATES, operations to open the STRAIT OF MALACCA, after the
reconquest of BURMA, are a vital part of the plan. The enemy must be con-
tinuously compelled to disperse his forces throughout the PACIFIC and ASIATIC
areas thus exposing them to attrition on an additional front in SOUTH-
EASTERN ASIA. This area is one of British strategic responsibility, and is a
suitable and feasible undertaking for British Commonwealth Forces.
13. Control of the seas.
Since control of the seas in the western PACIFIC by the UNITED
NATIONS may force the unconditional surrender of JAPAN before invasion
and even before JAPAN is subjected to an intensive air offensive, every means
to gain this control will be undertaken by the UNITED STATES. The estab-
lishment of the line of communications to the CELEBES SEA will be used as
the vehicle to gain this end. The selection of intermediate objectives which will
APPENDIX M 647
compel the enemy to expose his naval forces will be the greatest single factor
in determining the enemy positions to be seized.
Attrition of enemy shipping, air, and naval resources will be a continuing
objective. Raids on Japanese lines of communication, and carrier-based air raids
on Japanese positions extending to JAPAN itself, will be implemented as our
naval strength increases.
Appendix N
EXTRACT FROM THE FINAL REPORT OF THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF
STAFF TO THE PRESIDENT AND PRIME MINISTER AT THE
TRIDENT CONFERENCE. APPROVED 25 MAY 1943
(CCS 242/6)
In a previous memorandum (C.C.S. 242) the Combined Chiefs of Staff
presentee! certain agreed conclusions reached during the present conference
regarding operations in the three main theaters. These conclusions have been
amended to accord with the views expressed by the President and the Prime
Minister. The amended conclusions, and others reached since the previous
memorandum was submitted, have now been related to resources available, and
a final agreed summary of conclusions is submitted herein.
I. OVERALL OBJECTIVE
In conjunction with RUSSIA and other allies to bring about at the earliest
possible date, the unconditional surrender of the AXIS Powers.
II. OVERALL STRATEGIC CONCEPT FOR THE PROSECUTION OF
THE WAR
1. In cooperation with RUSSIA and other allies to bring about at the
earliest possible date, the unconditional surrender of the AXIS in EUROPE.
2. Simultaneously, in cooperation with other PACIFIC Powers concerned,
to maintain and extend unremitting pressure against JAPAN with the pur-
pose of continually reducing her Military power and attaining positions from
which her ultimate surrender can be forced. The effect of any such extension
on the overall objective to be given consideration by the Combined Chiefs
of Staff before action is taken.
3. Upon the defeat of the AXIS in EUROPE, in cooperation with other
PACIFIC Powers and, if possible, with RUSSIA, to direct the full resources
of the UNITED STATES and GREAT BRITAIN to bring about at the
earliest possible date the unconditional surrender of JAPAN.
III. BASIC UNDERTAKINGS IN SUPPORT OF OVERALL STRATEGIC
CONCEPT
Whatever operations are decided on in support of the overall strategic
concept, the following established undertakings will be a first charge against our
resources, subject to review by the Combined Chiefs of Staff in keeping with the
changing situation.
1. Maintain the security and war making capacity of the WESTERN
HEMISPHERE and the BRITISH ISLES.
2. Support the war making capacity of our forces in all areas.
3. Maintain vital overseas lines of communication, with particular emphasis
on the defeat of the U-boat menace.
4. Intensify the air offensive against the AXIS Powers in EUROPE.
5. Concentrate maximum resources in a selected area as early as practicable
for the purpose of conducting a decisive invasion of the AXIS citadel.
APPENDIX N 649
6. Undertake such measures as may be necessary and practicable to aid the

war effort of RUSSIA.
7. Undertake such measures as may be necessary and practicable in order
to aid the war effort of CHINA as an effective ally and as a base for operations
against JAPAN.
8. To prepare the ground for the active or passive participation of TURKEY
in the war on the side of the Allies.
9. To prepare the French Forces in AFRICA to fulfill an active role in the
war against the AXIS Powers.
IV. SPECIFIC OPERATIONS FOR 1943/44 IN EXECUTION OF OVER-
ALL STRATEGIC CONCEPT. . . .
3. Operations for the defeat of JAPAN.
We have directed the Combined Staff Planners to prepare an appreciation
leading up to a plan for the defeat of JAPAN, including an estimate of the
forces required.
a. Operations in the BURMA-CHINA Theater.
The Combined Chiefs of Staff have agreed on:
(1) The concentration of available resources, as first priority within the
ASSAM-BURMA Theater, on the building up and increasing of the air
route to CHINA to a capacity of 10,000 tons a month by early Fall, and
the development of air facilities in ASSAM with a view to:
(a) Intensifying air operations against the Japanese in BURMA;
(b) Maintaining increased American air forces in CHINA; and
(c) Maintaining the flow of airborne supplies to CHINA.
(2) Vigorous and aggressive land and air operations at the end of the
1943 monsoon from ASSAM into BURMA via LEDO and IMPHAL, in
step with an advance by Chinese forces from YUNNAN, with the object
of containing as many Japanese forces as possible, covering the air route
to CHINA, and as an essential step towards the opening of the BURMA
road.
(3) The capture of AKYAB and of RAMREE ISLAND by amphibious
operations, with possible exploitation.
(4) The interruption of Japanese sea communications into BURMA.
(5) The continuance of administrative preparations in INDIA for the
eventual launching of an overseas operation of about the size of ANAKIM,
b. Operations in the PACIFIC.
Various courses of action have been examined by the Combined Chiefs
of Staff and the operations they have agreed to undertake have the following
objects:
(1) Conduct of air operations in and from CHINA.
(2) Ejection of the Japanese from the ALEUTIANS.
(3) Seizure of the MARSHALL and CAROLINE ISLANDS.
(4) Seizure of the SOLOMONS, the BISMARCK ARCHIPELAGO,
and Japanese held NEW GUINEA.
(5) Intensification of operations against enemy lines of communication.
Appendix O
EXTRACT FROM THE FINAL REPORT OF THE COMBINED CHIEFS
OF STAFF TO THE PRESIDENT AND PRIME MINISTER AT THE
QUADRANT CONFERENCE, 24 AUGUST 1943 (CCS 319/5)
1. In previous memoranda (C.C.S. 319 and C.C.S. 319/2) the Combined

Chiefs of Staff presented certain agreed conclusions reached during the present
Conference regarding operations in the main theaters of war. These amended
conclusions have been related to resources available, and an agreed summary is
submitted herewith.
I. OVER-ALL OBJECTIVE
2. In conjunction with RUSSIA and other Allies to bring about at the earliest
possible date, the unconditional surrender of the AXIS powers.
II. OVER-ALL STRATEGIC CONCEPT FOR THE PROSECUTION OF
THE WAR
3. In cooperation with RUSSIA and other Allies to bring about at the earliest
possible date, the unconditional surrender of the AXIS in EUROPE.
4. Simultaneously, in cooperation with other PACIFIC Powers concerned to
maintain and extend unremitting pressure against JAPAN with the purpose of
continually reducing her Military power and attaining positions from which her
ultimate surrender can be forced. The effect of any such extension on the over-all
objective to be given consideration by the Combined Chiefs of Staff before action
is taken.
5. Upon the defeat of the AXIS in EUROPE, in cooperation with other
PACIFIC Powers and, if possible, with RUSSIA, to direct the full resources of
the UNITED STATES and GREAT BRITAIN to bring about at the earliest
possible date the unconditional surrender of JAPAN.
III. BASIC UNDERTAKINGS IN SUPPORT OF OVER-ALL STRATEGIC
CONCEPT.
6. Whatever operations are decided on in support of the overall strategic
concept, the following established undertakings will be a first charge against our
resources, subject to review by the Combined Chiefs of Staff in keeping with the
changing situation.
a. Maintain the security and war-making capacity of the WESTERN
HEMISPHERE and the BRITISH ISLES.
b. Support the war-making capacity of our forces in all areas.
c. Maintain vital overseas lines of communication, with particular emphasis
on the defeat of the U-boat menace.
d. Continue the disruption of AXIS sea communications.
e. Intensify the air offensive against the AXIS Powers in EUROPE.
f. Concentrate maximum resources in a selected area as early as practicable
for the purpose of conducting a decisive invasion of the AXIS citadel.
g. Undertake such measures as may be necessary and practicable to aid the
war effort of Russia.
APPENDIX O 651
h. Undertake such measures as may be necessary and practicable in order to

aid the war effort of CHINA as an effective Ally and as a base for opera-
tions against JAPAN.
i. To prepare the ground for the active or passive participation of TURKEY
in the war on the side of the Allies. (See also paragraph 62.)
j. To prepare the French Forces in AFRICA to fulfill an active role in the
war against the AXIS Powers.
IV. EXECUTION OF THE OVER-ALL STRATEGIC CONCEPT
The War Against JAPAN

20. Long-term strategy
We have made a preliminary study of long-term strategy for the defeat of
JAPAN and are of the opinion that the following factors require particular
emphasis:
a. The dependence of JAPAN upon air power, naval power, and shipping
for maintaining her position in the Pacific and Southeast Asia.
b. The consequent need for applying the maximum attrition to JAPAN'S
air force, naval forces, and shipping by all possible means in all possible
areas.
c. The advantage to be gained and the time to be saved by a more extensive
use of the superior air resources at the disposal of the United Nations,
both in the strategic field and in conjunction with operations on land.
21. We consider that great advantage may be obtained, by modern and untried
methods, from the vast resources which, with the defeat of Germany, will become
available to the United Nations. We have in mind:
a. A project rapidly to expand and extend the striking power of the United
Nations air forces in CHINA as well as of the ground troops for their
defense by employing the large numbers of load carrying aircraft available
to open an "air road" to CHINA.
b. The employment of lightly equipped jungle forces, dependent largely
upon air supply lines.
c. The use of special equipment, such as artificial harbors, HABBAKUKS,
etc., to enable the superior power of the United Nations to be deployed
in unexpected and undeveloped areas.
22. From every point of view operations should be framed to force the defeat
of JAPAN as soon as possible after the defeat of GERMANY. Planning should
be on the basis of accomplishing this within twelve months of that event. Deci-
sions as to specific operations which will insure a rapid course of events must
await further examination on the lines indicated above.
23. The deployment of forces and the operations to be undertaken in the war
against JAPAN must be in accord with the over-all objective and strategic con-
cept reaffirmed in Sections I and II above (paragraphs 2-5).
24. We are agreed that the reorientation of forces from the European Theater
to the PACIFIC and FAR EAST should be started as soon as the German situa-
tion, in our opinion, so allows.
25. The principle has been accepted that the forces to carry out operations
from the East, including the SOUTHWEST PACIFIC, shall be provided by the
UNITED STATES, and for operations from the West by GREAT BRITAIN,
except for special types not available to GREAT BRITAIN which will be pro-
vided by the UNITED STATES. The employment of Dominion forces will be
a matter of discussion between all Governments concerned.
26. Specific operations 1943-44
We have found it impracticable during QUADRANT to arrive at all the
necessary decisions for operations in the war against JAPAN in 1943-44. We
therefore propose that, as soon as the necessary further examinations have been
made, a Combined Chiefs of Staff Conference should be held wherever may be
most convenient, unless agreement is reached through the ordinary channels.
There are, nevertheless, certain decisions which we feel able to make at once.
27. Operations in the Pacific 1943-44.
We approve the proposals of the United States Chiefs of Staff for operations
in the PACIFIC in 1943-44 as follows:
28. Gilberts
The seizure and consolidation of the GILBERTS preparatory to a further
advance into the MARSHALLS.
29. Marshalls
The seizure of the MARSHALL ISLANDS (including WAKE and
KUSAIE) preparatory to a westward advance through the central PACIFIC.
30. Ponape
The capture of PONAPE preparatory to operations against the TRUK area.
31. Carolines (Truk area)
The seizure of the eastern CAROLINES as far west as WOLEAI and the
establishment of a fleet base at TRUK.
32. Palau Islands
The capture of the PALAUS including YAP.
33. Operations against Guam and the Japanese Marianas
The seizure of GUAM and the Japanese MARIANAS.
34. Paramushiru.
Consideration of operations against PARAMUSHIRU and the KURILES.
35. Operations in the New Guinea-Bismarcks-Admiralty Islands subsequent
to current operations
The seizure or neutralization of eastern NEW GUINEA as far west as
WEWAK and including the ADMIRALTY ISLANDS and BISMARCK ARCHI-
PELAGO. RABAUL is to be neutralized rather than captured.
36. Operations in NEW GUINEA subsequent to the WEWAK-KAVIENG
Operation
An advance along the north coast of NEW GUINEA as far west as VOGEL-
KOP, by step-by-step airborne-waterborne advances.
37. Operations in INDIA-BURMA-CHINA Theater, 1943-44
To carry out operations for the capture of UPPER BURMA in order to
improve the air route and establish overland communications with CHINA.
Target date mid-February 1944.
It is recognized that the extent of these operations is dependent upon logis-
tic considerations as affected by recent floods.
APPENDIX O 653
38. To continue preparations for an amphibious operation in the Spring of

1944. Pending a decision on the particular operation, the scale of these prepara-
tions should be of the order of those contemplated at TRIDENT for the capture
of AKYAB and RAMREE.
39. To continue the preparation of INDIA as a base for the operations even-
tually contemplated in the Southeast Asia Command.
40. To continue to build up and increase the air routes and air supplies of
CHINA, and the development of air facilities, with a view to:
a. Keeping CHINA in the war.
b. Intensifying operations against the Japanese.
c. Maintaining increased U.S. and Chinese Air Forces in CHINA.
d. Equipping Chinese ground forces.
41. We have decided that our main effort should be put into offensive opera-
tions with the object of establishing land communications with CHINA and
improving and securing the air route. Priorities cannot be rigid and we therefore
propose to instruct the Supreme Commander in formulating his proposals to
regard this decision as a guide and to bear in mind the importance of the longer
term development of the lines of communication.
Appendix P
APPOINTMENT OF LT. GEN. ROBERT C. RICHARDSON, JR.
AS COMMANDING GENERAL, U.S. ARMY FORCES,
CENTRAL PACIFIC AREA
16 AUGUST 1943
By direction of the President you are hereby informed that the Commanding
General, Hawaiian Department has been designated as "Commanding General,
U.S. Army Forces, Central Pacific Area" (including Canton Island) under the
"Commander-in-chief, Pacific Ocean Area". His short title will be COMGEN-
CENTPAC. For this purpose the Central Pacific Area is as has been delineated
to the Commander-in-chief, Pacific Ocean Area. As Commanding General, U.S.
Army Forces, Central Pacific Area, he will be responsible for the administration
and training of all U.S. Army Ground and Air Troops within the area, and will
be subject to the direction of the Commander-in-chief of the Pacific Ocean Area
in the preparation and execution of plans for the employment of Army Forces
in that area. Responsibility with regard to supply remains unchanged.
By order of the Secretary of War:
J. A. ULIO
Major General
The Adjutant General
Appendix Q
JAPANESE GENERAL OUTLINE
OF THE FUTURE WAR DIRECTION POLICY,
ADOPTED AT THE IMPERIAL CONFERENCE,
30 SEPTEMBER 1943
Policy
(1) JAPAN will speedily establish a strategic position to gain victory over
the UNITED STATES and BRITAIN while crushing enemy offensives in order
to decide the issue of war during this year or the next, and at the same time,
rapidly build up the decisive battle strength, especially air power, and prosecute
the war against the UNITED STATES and BRITAIN on our own initiative.
(2) JAPAN will further strengthen co-operation with GERMANY and strive
relentlessly for the successful conclusion of the joint war and will also take the
initiative in improving relations with the SOVIET UNION.
(3) JAPAN will promptly establish the domestic structure for the decisive
battle and will further solidify the unity of Greater East Asia.
Procedure
(1) The strategic posture to meet the Anglo-American invasion will be estab-
lished, at the latest by around the middle of 1944 by surmounting all difficulties,
and in the meantime the enemy offensive forces will be attacked and destroyed
whenever occasion arises.
The strategic areas to be held at all costs in the PACIFIC and the INDIAN
Ocean areas in prosecuting the war will be the KURILES, the BONINS, the
Inner South Seas (central and western parts), and the area covering western
NEW GUINEA, the SUNDA Islands, and BURMA.
Sea communications within the absolute national defense sphere will be
safeguarded throughout the duration of the war.
(2) JAPAN will strive to the utmost to prevent the outbreak of the war
with the SOVIET UNION and will take the initiative in improving the Soviet-
Japanese relations and will also endeavor to mediate for peace between the
SOVIET UNION and GERMANY at proper opportunities.
(3) JAPAN will maintain unremitting pressure against CHUNGKING and
will take the earliest possible opportunity to settle the Chinese problem while
checking especially the enemy air forces based in CHINA from bombing our
homeland and disrupting our sea traffic.
(4) JAPAN will take every possible measure to strengthen co-operation with
GERMANY. However, every precaution will be exercised to prevent the out-
break of war with the SOVIET UNION.
(5) JAPAN will win the confidence of the nations and the peoples of Greater
East Asia and will guide them in order to receive and further encourage their
co-operation with JAPAN'S war efforts. Vigilance will be exercised over enemy
political strategem toward the nations and the peoples of Greater East Asia, and
necessary steps will be taken to forestall such enemy endeavors.
(6) The Imperial General Headquarters and the Government will further
strengthen co-operation in their joint endeavor and will direct the war with
renewed vigor.
(7) Resolute measures will be taken to build up the decisive military capa-
bility, especially the air power. The dauntless spirit to face the national crisis
will be encouraged in order to bring the total national power into full play.
(8) The propaganda effort against the enemy will be conducted under a con-
sistent policy, and will be directed mainly toward propagation of the Axis cause,
diffusion of JAPAN'S policy in Greater East Asia, demoralizing our major enemy,
the UNITED STATES, alienation of the UNITED STATES, BRITAIN,
CHINA and the SOVIET UNION, and helping INDIA achieve her
independence.
Appendix R
JAPANESE ARMY-NAVY CENTRAL AGREEMENT CONCERNING
THE CENTRAL AND SOUTH PACIFIC OPERATIONS,
WITH SUPPLEMENT, 30 SEPTEMBER 1943
I. Operational Objectives
The objectives of the Southeast Area Operations are to destroy the attacking
enemy in strategic sectors in this area and to plan to hold out as long as possible,
thereby expediting future operations.
II. Operational Direction
The Army and Navy will closely cooperate to destroy the attacking enemy at
all times at strategic sectors in the Southeast Area, extending east from Eastern
New Guinea to the Solomon Islands, and thereby endeavor to hold out as long
as possible. In order to accomplish this:
A. Defenses of the strategic sectors in the Bougainville—Bismarck Archi-
pelago Area, centering around the vicinity of Rabaul, will be strengthened,
and efforts will be made to hold them as long as possible. Moreover, supplies
for strategic sectors on both shores of Dampier Strait as well as those in the
Northern New Guinea Area will be secured as much as possible and efforts
will be made to maintain them.
B. Efforts will be made to destroy with air and sea strength the attacking
enemy before he makes a landing. In the event that the enemy does make a
landing the enemy will be destroyed in the initial stage, thereby endeavoring
to check his counterattack plan.
C. Large quantities of munitions will be amassed in the above strategic
sectors and, in particular, supply transportation to the New Guinea Area will
be speedily expedited.
III. Air Operations
A. The Army and Navy will utilize all available means to intensify their
air operations, and will especially endeavor to display combined Army and
Navy air strength and thereby conduct thoroughly satisfactory operations.
B. In air operations direction, overall operational policy will be considered,
in particular search and patrol operations will be intensified and in the event
of enemy landing operation, efforts will be made to destroy him resolutely
at sea. . . .
IV. Commanders and Forces to be used
1. Army:
Commander—Commander of the 8th Area Army
Strength—8th Area Army
2. Navy:
Commander—Commander in Chief of the Combined Fleet
Strength—Bulk of the Combined Fleet
V. Command Relation
The Army and Navy will coordinate. Nevertheless, in the event that both the
Army and Navy units simultaneously conduct localized ground operations, the
senior ranking officer may be ordered to assume unified operational command.
VI. Communications, Air Security and Weather
In accordance with the appendix, Army-Navy Central Agreement Concerning
Communications, Air Security and Weather in the Southeast Area Operation.
VII. Supply
The Army and Navy will cooperate in regard to the supply of the Eastern
New Guinea Area, particularly in the Dampier Strait and Madang Area, as well
as to the Bougainville Island Area. Supply will be maintained as much as
possible by the use of small craft and emergency transportation by naval craft.
VIII. Transportation and Escort
A. The Navy will cooperate with its naval vessels as much as possible for
the transportation to concentrate and replenish Army forces in the Southeast
Area. Whenever this is to be done, it will be conferred upon and decided at
the Army and Navy Sections, Imperial General Headquarters.
B. In the transportation of Army units and supplies for local operations
other than those mentioned in the above paragraph, the Army and Navy will
cooperate and ships and naval vessels will be used. In regard to this, the
Army and Navy commanders concerned will confer and decide.
C. Ships returning from the Southeast Area will be made as much as
possible to proceed on a direct course from their point of departure. Never-
theless, for the time being, they will use Palau as a relay point and endeavor
to proceed in a convoy. In regard to the above, the local Army and Navy
commanders will confer and decide.
D. The Navy will furnish escorts for the transportation of Army units and
supplies as well as for the return from such mission.
In regard to the execution of the above, the Army and Navy Sections, Impe-
rial General Headquarters, or the Army and Navy commanders concerned
will confer and decide in accordance with the provisions set down in the
foregoing paragraphs.
IX. Public Information
It will be unified and handled by Imperial General Headquarters until further
notice.
X. Designation of Operations
Solomon—Bismarck Archipelago Operation—Operation Ka.
New Guinea Area Operation—Operation To.
XI. Agreements Between Army and Navy Commanders
The following Army and Navy commanders will conclude agreements at their
discretion: Commander in Chief of the Combined Fleet and the 8th Area Army
Commander; Southeast Area Fleet Commander and the 8th Area Army
Commander.
Supplement
This agreement stipulates the outline of operational direction throughout all of

the Central and South Pacific Area this year and next year, and matters of special
necessity. Agreements on matters pertaining to operations in the southeast area
APPENDIX R 659
of the Central and South Pacific Areas and other areas will be made separately
according to necessity.
I. Operational Policy
The Imperial Army and Navy will cooperate closely and annihilate the attack-
ing enemy at strategic sectors of the Southeast Area and will plan to hold out as
long as possible. During this time, the backbone for Counteroffensives from the
area North of Australia to strategic sectors in the Central Pacific Area will be
completed, fighting strength for the counteroffensive will be prepared, and a
thorough counteroffensive will be launched against the attacking enemy. Efforts
will be made to annihilate the enemy beforehand and break down his fighting
spirit.
II. Outline of Operational Direction
1. Plans will be made to hold out as long as possible by destroying the enemy
attacking in the strategic sector of the Southeast Area, extending from Eastern
New Guinea east to the Solomon Islands.
2. With the deadline generally set at spring of 1944, operational bases extend-
ing from strategic sectors in the area North of Australia to strategic sectors in the
Caroline and Mariana Islands Area will be completed and their defenses strength-
ened, and such measures for Counteroffensives as the construction of operational
bases in the Philippines Area and preparation of land, sea and air counteroffen-
sive strength will be speedily strengthened.
3. In the event of an enemy attack, all types of fighting strength will be concen-
trated against the enemy's attack front with bases in the aforementioned strategic
sectors as the main support. Efforts will be made to destroy the enemy beforehand
and thwart his attack plan.
4. Efforts will be made to conduct aggressive operations from the area north of
Australia after the middle of 1944 if the situation permits. In regard to the
direction of attack, separate studies and the necessary preparations will be made.
III. Southeast Area
Current operations in the Southeast Area will be based on the appendix,
"Army-Navy Central Agreement Concerning Southeast Area Operation."
IV. Area North of Australia
1. The Army and Navy will cooperate and speedily strengthen operational
preparations in the area North of Australia, such as the preparation of bases,
strengthening of defenses, storing of munitions, sea transport and establishment
of line of communications bases with a deadline set about spring of 1944.
2. The foregoing operational preparations will be accelerated so as to leave
nothing to be desired in the current defenses of the area North of Australia and
particularly so that these operations will become the backbone for a counter-
offensive according to charges in operation in the Southeast Area. . . .
4. For the strengthening of operational preparations in the area North of
Australia, the Navy will escort the Army forces and munitions to said area.
Moreover, the Army and Navy will cooperate and as much as possible provide
cover for supplies and the above transport by means of air strength.
Matters pertaining to the carrying out of the above will be conferred upon and
decided by the Army and Navy commanders concerned.
V. Central Pacific Area

1. With the spring of 1944 as the deadline, the Navy will speedily strengthen
operational preparations in the Caroline and Mariana Islands Area. The Army
will dispatch the necessary Army force and elements of line of communications
organs to the Central Pacific Area, where they will be placed under the command
of the Navy commander. Thus, the Army will cooperate with the Navy in
strengthening operational preparations.
2. The Army will be responsible for the aforementioned transportation of
Army forces while the Navy will be responsible for the subsequent constant
transportation of supply materials (replacements) and evacuation of patients.
The Army will be responsible for weapons and clothing in the constant supply
of materials for Army forces, while the Navy will be chiefly responsible for such
things as other provisions and construction materials. The details for providing
for the above supplies and other materials for the operations will be conferred
upon and decided on each occasion by the Army and Navy Section of Imperial
General Headquarters. . . .
2. Commanders
Southeast Area Operation:
Army—Commander of the 8th Area Army
Navy—Commander in Chief of the Combined Fleet
(Commander of the Southeast Area Fleet)
North of Australia Area Operation:
Army—Commander in Chief of the Southern Central Army
(Commander of the 19th Army)
Navy—Commander in Chief of the Combined Fleet
(Commander of the Southwest Area Fleet)
Central Pacific Area Operation:
Commander in Chief of the Combined Fleet.
Appendix S
SUMMARY OF RENO III, OUTLINE PLAN FOR OPERATIONS
OF THE SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA TO REOCCUPY THE SOUTHERN
PHILIPPINES, PREPARED BY GHQ, SWPA, 20 OCTOBER 1943
Our strategic objective is the isolation of Japan from the Malay-NEI area.
Present tasks are to:
1. Seize or neutralize E NG as far W as Wewak, and including the Admi-
ralties and the Bismarck Archipelago. Neutralize, rather than capture
Rabaul.
2. Advance along the N coast of NG as far W as the Vogelkop by AB-amphib
jumps.
3. Prepare to seize Mindanao by AB-amphib Opns.
Our eventual task is to reoccupy the S PI, and by subsequent opns isolate Japan
from the Malaya-NEI area.
Accomplishment of the tasks presently assigned by Quadrant decisions initially
requires opns along 2 general axes.
1. NW along the NG coast from Vitiaz St in order to advance land-based
air.
2. W through the N Solomons—New Ireland, including the Admiralties, to
a junction with the W axis in order to complete the isolation of Rabaul
and obtain necessary bases for naval support of opns along the axis.
The eventual task requires seizure of Mindanao, followed by opns in conjunc-
tion with other Theaters to sever sea and air communications between Japan
and Malaya-NEI area. These opns require attacks against strongly defended air
and naval bases. Our advantages lie in superior equipment and potentially
superior strength in the air and on the sea, but amphib equipment will be
limited pending cessation of the offensive in Europe. On the assumption that
the Japanese will maintain their strategic defense, our advantages must be fully
utilized to deal him a succession of blows precluding his recouping of air and
sea forces after each of his defeats and so permit destruction of his bases in detail.
The general scheme of maneuver is to advance our land-based bomber line
rapidly W along the land masses on NG and the PI by successive occupation of
the minimum bases required. Hostile strength is by-passed wherever practicable
to avoid costly and time-consuming opns; our flanks are protected by air opns;
and necessary advanced naval bases are established under protection of land-
based aviation in order to extend the range of naval action. Destructive air
attacks are employed to soften up objectives and to gain air superiority. Hostile
naval forces and shipping are destroyed along our line of advance to prevent
reinforcement. Ground forces are displaced forward by air and amphib move-
ments. Air and naval forces are established at each objective and the process is
then repeated, neutralizing by air and sea action hostile concentrations that may
be by-passed. The number of objectives is decreased and the length of bound
increased by use of a/c carriers to provide close air support. The same result is
aided by extending the destructive effort of bombers through use of air envelop-
ment to advance the fighter line through inland fields established and maintained
by air support.
Sequence and timing are based on present enemy dispositions and are subject
to change dependent upon enemy reaction and success of our opns. Timing is
also dependent upon the availability of means, particularly amphib forces, and
the timing given herein is based on an estimate of means to be available as a
result of quadrant.
Logistic support is provided by the SOS of Sopac and SWPA. As opns progress
to the NW, ports and supply bases are advanced by corresponding bounds.
Heavy shipping is used wherever unloading facilities are available and amphib
craft are used for assault elements and where the use of heavy shipping is imprac-
ticable. Trans-Pacific shipping is diverted directly to newly established bases
along the line of advance. Bulk petroleum is transported forward in small
tankers to points where the tactical situation permits the installation of bulk
storage tanks.
Known requirements in items of special equipment, major units, air and service
units, are set forth in the "1944 Troop Basis, GHQ, SWPA, 9 October 1943."
Phase I
Naval bases are required in the Bismarcks to support subsequent opns into
W NG. Direct attack to capture Rabaul will be costly and time-consuming.
Anchorages and potential air and naval bases exist at Kavieng and in the Admi-
ralties. With the capture and development of such bases, Rabaul can be isolated
from the NE. Direct attack into the Wewak area would also be costly in means
and time. Presently occupied a/mes do not provide sufficient protection to by-
pass the area, but potential air bases exist in the Hansa Bay area, from which the
isolation of Rabaul can be completed and opns to the W of Wewak be protected.
Scheme of Maneuver:
A. Target date 1 Feb 44. SWPA forces seize the Hansa Bay area by amphib
opns with AB support. Direct air support is provided from the Vitiaz St-Ramu
Valley a/mes. Shore-to-shore opns secure the mouth of the Sepik to contain
enemy forces in the Wewak area. Advance bases are established for the support
of opns in the Humboldt Bay area. Hostile forces in the Madang-Alexishafen
area are isolated and the area later occupied by holding forces from the Huon
Peninsula-Ramu Valley.
B. Target date 1 Mar 44. Kavieng is occupied by an amphib opn of Sopac
Forces. The opn is preceded by intensive air and naval neutralization of the
Rabaul area and has the direct support of heavy elements of the PacFlt. Air
support comes from W New Britain and from carriers. General air support is
from NG, Nor-Sols, and Kiriwina and Woodlark. Interference from hostile flt
is covered by opns of Cenpac and in the Mandates and by the PacFlt. Air ele-
ments are then established for support of opns against the Carolines and Rabaul.
APPENDIX S 663
Light naval forces are established for support of opns to the W and to help
blockade Rabaul.
C. Target date 1 Mar 44. The Admiralties are taken by amphib opns of
SWPA Forces staging through Vitiaz jit. Direct air support comes from the
Vitiaz St area and from CVEs. General air support from the Markham-Ramu
area. Air and naval forces are established in the Admiralties, and base facilities
developed, for the support of opns along the N coast of NG.
D. When the blockade has sufficiently reduced the defensive capacity of the
enemy garrison, Rabaul is occupied at a date and by forces later to be deter-
mined, and appropriate base facilities are established.
Forces required:
Garrison Assault Air Naval
2 US inf div 7 US inf div HB 5 grps 15 APD 2 CV
6 Austn divs 2 US Para RCTs MB 10 grps 16 APA 9 CVE
1NZ div 3 MarDefBns LB 11½ grps 5 AKA 4 CA
1Aust armd bde Day F 16½ grps 85 LST 4 CL
Night F 14 grps 60 LCI 58 DD
Trp Carr 6¼ grps 105 LCT 164 PT
Photo & Recce 8½ grps (and small craft)
Naval strategic support will be elements of the US Pac Flt as designated by the
JCS.
Phase II
(Initiated 1 Jun 44)
Advanced air and naval bases are required at an intermediate point on the
N coast of NG for the support of Opns into Geelvink Bay and protection of the
L/C thereto. Air bases in Wewak are too distant from the Geelvink area to sup-
port attacks and are held in great strength by the Japanese. Costly and time-
consuming opns will be avoided by by-passing and neutralizing the Wewak area.
Partially developed sites exist in the Humboldt Bay area which may be improved
to meet essential requirements. The concentration of hostile a/mes in the Banda
Sea area requires establishment of flank protection and support for opns into
Geelvink Bay. Occupation of the Aroe-Kai-Tanimbar Islands provides a difficult
but feasible means of securing this protection and support.
Scheme of Maneuver:
A. Humboldt Bay, target date 1 Jun 44. An amphib opn from NG bases with
AB support seizes objectives in the Aitape-Humboldt Bay area, by-passing
Wewak. Air support is provided from the Markham-Ramu Valley, Hansa Bay,
and the Admiralties. Close support comes from CVEs. Inland air bases are estab-
lished in the upper Digoe-Fly Rivers by air transport as practicable. Adv bases
are established in the Humboldt Bay area for support of opns into the Geelvink-
Vogelkop area. Forces in the Aitape area initiate infiltration opns from the W
toward Wewak and finally occupy it when hostile resistance has deteriorated.
B. Arafura Sea. 1 Jun 44. Preceded by aerial neutralization of Timor a/mes,
the Aroe-Kai-Tanimbar Islands are occupied by an amphib assault of Austn
troops supported by AB elements. General air support is provided from Darwin
area, convoy cover from Merauke-Horn Is-Arnhem Bay, and by CVEs. Air bases
are promptly developed.
Forces required:
Garrison Assault Air Grps Naval
6 Austn inf divs 4 US inf divs 8 HB 2 CV 15 APD
1 NZ inf div 2 Austn inf divs 12 MB 7CVE 5 APA
5 US inf divs 1 US AB div 11¾LB 4 CA 84 LST
1 Austn armd bde 2 para RCTs 22½ Night F 6 CL 60 LCI
1 MarDefBn 18½ F 83 DD 145 LCT
8¼ Trp Carrier 8 PF
11 Photo Recce 168 PT
Naval strategic support will be from the US PacFlt as designated by the JCS
to insure noninterference by hostile heavy flt elements.
Phase III
(Initiated 15 Aug 44)
Major naval and air bases are required in W NG to support opns to the NW.
Potential sites are available in the Geelvink Bay-Vogelkop area. Opns require
protection against major enemy flt elements by the US Flt.
Scheme of Maneuver:
A. Geelvink Bay, 15 Aug 44. Anchorages, a/mes, and potential base sites are
seized by an AB overseas landing, staged in NG. Babo and Nabire are neutral-
ized by air staged through Aroe-Kai-Tanimbar. Direct air support is provided
from the Humboldt Bay area through inland air bases established and main-
tained in favorable locations by air transport, and also by CVEs. Major air and
naval base development is instituted for support of opns against Mindanao.
B. Vogelkop Area, 1 Oct. 44. The Sorong and Kabui Bay areas are occupied
by an amphib opn with AB support. This opn is launched as soon as air support
is available from Geelvink Bay bases. The Klamono oil field is occupied and
intensively developed as a source of bunker fuel.
Forces required:
Garrison Combat Air Groups
7 Austn inf divs
1 NZ inf div
4 US inf divs
1 Austn armd bde
APPENDIX S 665
Naval Combat Amphib Craft

2 CV 15 APD
6 CVE 16 APA
4 CA 5 AKA
6 CL 54 LST
64 DD 60 LCI
183 PT 175 LCT
Phase IV
(Initiated 1 Dec 44)
Advance into Mindanao requires a broadening of the front for deployment

of air forces, protection for flanks, and establishment of advance bases for sup-
port of sea and AB movements. These requirements can be met by establishing
air and light naval elements on Halmahera and/or Morotai. Menado must at
least be denied to the enemy and Palau must be occupied by either Cenpac or
SWPA forces. The Ambon area must be neutralized by air action, but may
have to be occupied if hostile strength in the NEI requires such action.
Scheme of Maneuver:
A. Halmahera-Menado, target date 1 Dec 44. A/mes or sites therefore on

Halmahera and/or Morotai are occupied and Menado seized by amphib opns
from Geelvink Bay, supported by AB elements. Air and naval forces are estab-
lished for flank protection and support of subsequent opns to seize and occupy
Mindanao.
B. Ambon (contingent opn), 1 Dec 44. In the event that hostile strength in
the E NEI jeopardizes opns on Mindanao, it may be necessary to establish air
and naval forces on Ambon. If required, this opn will be amphib, staged from
Geelvink via the Dampier Strs, will seize enemy air bases on Ceram and Boeroe
and capture Ambon. Enemy air forces on Timor are neutralized from Darwin,
and general air support comes from Aroe-Kai-Tanimbar-Geelvink-Vogelkop
areas.
C. Palau, 1 Dec 44, or 15 Jan 45 if Ambon is occupied. In the event that

SWPA forces are assigned the task of occupying Palau, that group is seized by
amphib opns with the direct support of the PacFlt, including strong carrier
elements. Naval air elements are established on Palau for protection of the
axis of advance against enemy air attacks from the N.
Completion of Phase III accomplishes the tasks presently assigned to the
SWPA by the Quadrant decisions. Estimates of forces required to accomplish
Phases IV and V of this plan are of problematical value in view of the certainty
of major changes in the Pacific situation and in the availability and types of
means available for the carrying out of Phase III. A tentative estimate of divs
for Phases IV and V have been shown in Annex 3, but only as a basis for 44
troop estimates. For Phase IV these are:
Garrison Combat
5 Austn inf divs 7 US inf divs
4 US inf divs 1 Para RCT
1 Austn armd bde 1 MarDefBn
2 US inf divs for possible opns
in Jan 45
No estimates of naval or air means can be given at this time.
Phase V
(Initiated 1 Feb 45)
Occupation of Mindanao requires an attack by major forces of all components

over a widely spread area in order to achieve surprise and disperse the defensive
effort. Employment of air envelopment on a major scale, using equipment now
in prospect, becomes feasible upon establishment of adequate bases in the
Geelvink-Vogelkop area. Present guerrilla organization provides necessary ter-
minal facilities. Prompt and ample seaborne reinforcement of initial assault is
essential. Consolidation of the S PI requires occupation of covering positions
in the islands to the SW and N of Mindanao and the establishment of major
forces thereon preparatory to subsequent opns. Inasmuch as the enemy must
defend Mindanao with all the means at his disposal, prompt consolidation and
subsequent exploitation should meet a minimum of effective opposition.
Scheme of Maneuver (see also map in Annex 2-e)
A. Occupation of Mindanao, target date 1 Feb 45. Beachheads and a/mes

through the N and NW portions of Mindanao are seized by major combined
AB-amphib opns with carrier based air support. An AB invasion in strength is
staged in New Britain and E NG via W NG. Guerrilla forces are employed to
seize a/mes on which to land AB forces. Landing opns seize beachheads in the
proximity of a/mes. Paratroops are dropped on a/mes. Light air elements are
flown in to support the advance of occupation forces and protect subsequent
landings. Initial landings are promptly reinforced by air transport.
B. Consolidation of Southern PI: The Minadanao Occupation Force follows
the AB invasion closely along the main line of advance to beachheads in our
possession. All types of aviation are established in order to maintain air superi-
ority and cover the occupation of Zamboanga and Davao and positions in islands
to the SW and N. The L/C W of the line Palau-Vogelkop is kept open by
naval elements from advanced bases in the Vogelkop area, supported by air
from Palau, Menado, and Halmahera-Morotai. Additional forces of all arms
are rapidly established on Mindanao in preparation for opns to reoccupy the
northern PI and to isloate Japan from the Malay-NEI.
APPENDIX S 667
Logistic bases are set forth on map of Annex 4-f. Ground forces required (a
suggestion rather than definite estimate):
Garrison Combat
4 US inf divs 2 US AB divs
3 US inf divs for contingent opns 1 para RCT
1 Austn armd bde 2 MarDefBns
Forces for the consolidation are undetermined. Impossible to estimate at this
time the naval and air forces required.
Appendix T
OVERALL PLAN FOR THE DEFEAT OF JAPAN:
REPORT BY THE COMBINED STAFF PLANNERS,
APPROVED IN PRINCIPLE, 2 DECEMBER 1943
(CCS 417)
PROBLEM
1. To prepare an overall plan for the defeat of Japan.
ASSUMPTIONS
2. Our studies of this subject have taken account of:
a. The possibility that invasion of the principal Japanese islands may not be
necessary and the defeat of Japan may be accomplished by sea and air blockade
and intensive air bombardment from progressively advanced bases. The plan
must, however, be capable of expansion to meet the contingency of invasion.
b. The possibility that Germany may be defeated as early as the spring of
1944.
c. The possibility that the U.S.S.R. may enter the war against Japan early
after the defeat of Germany, and our plan proposes that all possible preparations
should be made to take advantage of such a development. Further progress is
dependent upon staff conversations with the Soviets.
d. The possibility that a full campaign in Burma may have to be carried
out following on the TARZAN operation.1
OVERALL OBJECTIVE
3. To obtain objectives from which we can conduct intensive air bombard-
ment and establish a sea and air blockade against Japan, and from which to
invade Japan proper if this should prove to be necessary.
GENERAL CONCEPT
4. The main effort against Japan should be made in the Pacific.
CONCEPT WITHIN THE PACIFIC

5. The advance along the New Guinea-N.E.I.-Philippine axis will proceed
concurrently with operations for the capture of the Mandated Islands. These
two series of operations will be mutually supporting. United Nations naval
forces can be deployed to support successive operations along each axis, and to
prevent interference by hostile surface units with simultaneous operations in the
two areas. Transfer of forces and resources from one area to the other is con-
templated. When conflicts in timing and allocation of means exist, due weight
should be accorded to the fact that operations in the Central Pacific promise at
1
TARZAN was the code for operations in upper Burma.
APPENDIX T 669
this time a more rapid advance toward Japan and her vital lines of communica-
tion; the earlier acquisition of strategic air bases closer to the Japanese home-
land; and, of greatest importance, are more likely to precipitate a decisive
engagement with the Japanese Fleet.
The aim should be to advance along the New Guinea-N.E.I.-Philippine axis
and to complete the capture of the Mandated Islands in time to launch a major
assault in the Formosa-Luzon-China area in the spring of 1945 (i.e., before the
onset of the typhoon season), from a distant base.
CONCEPT WITHIN OTHER AREAS

6. Operations in the North Pacific, the South Pacific, China and the South
East Asia theater should be conducted in support of the main operations in the
Central and South West Pacific. In the event of the U.S.S.R. entering the war,
operations in the North Pacific may assume far greater importance and may
involve a major redeployment of forces.
GENERAL CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS

7. The conduct of operations should be designed to:
a. Destroy the Japanese Fleet at an early date.
b. Secure the maximum attrition of enemy forces.
c. Intensify air, submarine and mining operations against enemy shipping
and lines of communication.
d. Enable us to launch shore-based and carrier-borne air attack on Japan.
e. Keep China in the war.
f. Insure that the sequence of operations remains flexible and that prepara-
tions are made to take all manner of short cuts made possible by developments
in the situation.
g. Take advantage of the earliest practicable reorientation of forces from the
European Theater.
SPECIFIC OPERATIONS IN 1944

8. For operations planned for 1944, see schedule in C.C.S. 397, Specific Opera-
tions for the Defeat of Japan, 1944 (To be revised).2 These operations are in
accordance with the overall concept. In brief they contemplate:
Central Pacific
a. Capture of the Mandated Islands and conduct of V.L.R. strategic bomb-
ing of Japan proper from the Marianas (Guam, Tinian and Saipan).
South West Pacific
b. Continuing the advance along the New Guinea-N.E.I.-Philippine axis.
Intensification of air bombardment of targets in the N.E.I.-Philippine area.
North Pacific
c. Preparations to conduct very long range strategic bombing against the
2
See Appendix U.
Kuriles and Northern Japan. (Preparations for the possible entry of the U.S.S.R.
into the war are discussed in Annex I.)
South East Asia Theater
d. Operations for the capture of Upper Burma in the spring of 1944 in
order to improve the air route and establish overland communications with
China, and an amphibious operation at approximately the same time. Con-
tinuance of operations during the autumn of 1944 within the limits of the forces
available (See Par. 14) to extend the position held in Upper Burma.
e. Should the means be available, additional ground, sea and air offensive
operations, including carrier-borne raids, with the object of maintaining pres-
sure on the enemy, forcing dispersion of his forces, and attaining the maximum
attrition practicable on his air and naval forces and shipping.
China Area
f. Conducting V.L.R. air operations from the Chengtu area in China
against vital targets in the Japanese inner zone.
g. Building up the U.S. Air Forces in China and the Chinese Army and air
force with the objective of intensifying land and air operations in and from
China.
DISPOSITION OF FORCES
Naval Forces
9. Considering the British Naval forces shown below, we believe the com-
bined naval forces will be adequate to conduct the operations envisaged for the
defeat of Japan. We show in Annex II, page 9,3 the estimated dispositions of
British Naval forces in the Indian Ocean and the Pacific after the completion
of operation BUCCANEER,4 and the subsequent build-up of British Naval forces
in the Pacific during 1944 and early 1945.
10. This allocation provides for sufficient forces in the Indian Ocean to main-
tain our communications with the Andamans, to act as a deterrent against any
attempt to recapture them by the Japanese and to carry out operations, raids,
and threats against Japanese possessions in S.E. Asia. All other available units,
to the extent that they can be supported and profitably employed, will be con-
centrated for the main effort in the Pacific.
11. Though full details have not yet been worked out, we consider that the
British Naval forces shown can be supported logistically and should in general
operate from advanced bases in the Bismarck and Solomons area so that they
may either cover the operations along the New Guinea-N.E.I.—Philippines axis,
or cooperate with the U.S. Fleet in the Central Pacific.
12. Logistic preparations should be made by the British for the increased
British Naval forces expected to become available for the long distance assault
contemplated in the spring of 1945. Manpower limitations will probably pre-
vent any new bases being manned by the British until after the defeat of
Germany.
3
Not included.
4
BUCCANEER is the code name for the proposed amphibious operations against the Andaman
Islands.
APPENDIX T 671
13. Our studies have reemphasized the importance of the provision of air-
craft carriers of all sorts for our future operations against Japan.
Land Forces
14. Present plans contemplate the timely deployment in the Pacific of about
40 U.S. Divisions and supporting troops. British/Indian land forces which can
be made available to South East Asia command up to the end of 1944 are likely
to be fully committed in carrying out the operations recommended for the
season 1943/44, and subsequently extending the area of occupation in Burma
and in carrying out additional operations against the enemy. This concept is
subject to alteration in the light of the progress of the 1943/44 operations and
of detailed examination of the forces which will be required for 1944/45, but
included in the forces retained in the theater there should be at least one
amphibious division.
15. After the defeat of Germany the number of additional British divisions
from the European theater and the dates by which they can be made available
for the war against Japan cannot yet be assessed, but it is estimated that some
9 months will be required for the necessary reorganization, passage and training.
Additional British forces may prove essential for Burma. In the Pacific, the
target should be to provide four British divisions based on Australia for service
in that theater as early as possible after the defeat of Germany. At least two of
these divisions should be amphibiously trained.
16. After providing for paragraph 15 above, additional British forces becom-
ing available will probably be best placed in reserve at the disposal of South
East Asia, ready for additional offensive operations in that area.
17. Australian and New Zealand forces should continue to be employed in
Pacific operations. The employment of Canadian forces should be discussed
with the Canadian Government.
18. We believe that the combined land forces to be made available as out-
lined in paragraphs 14, 15, 16 and 17 above will be adequate to conduct the
operations envisaged for the defeat of Japan.
Assault Shipping and Landing Craft

19. Present plans contemplate an eventual U.S. assault lift of 12 divisions
in the Pacific. The British should maintain in the South East Asia theater an
assault lift for at least one division. As soon as the war with Germany is over
the British should aim to provide in the South West Pacific as large an assault
lift as possible (probably between two and three divisions simultaneously).
Air Forces
20. British and U.S. air forces are sufficient for plans at present contemplated
although if the U.S.S.R. enters the war the demand on our resources for the
establishment of a bomber force in the Maritime Provinces may conflict with
the development of our air effort against Japan through China.
The large air forces which will be available when Germany is defeated
must be redeployed against Japan as quickly as possible. The general prin-
ciples which we consider should govern this redeployment are in Annex III,
page 10.5 Immediate examinations of the problems involved in the redeploy-
ment of British and U.S. air forces should be made. Studies are now under way
to determine the best employment of the B-29 aircraft against Japan.
Appendix "A" to Annex III shows the U.S. and British air forces which may
be available for deployment against Japan after the defeat of Germany.6
PREPARATION OF BASES IN INDIA

21. The preparation of the bases in India required for approved operations
in the South East Asia and China theater should continue in consonance with
provisions of paragraphs 4, 5 and 6.
RECOMMENDATIONS
22. It is recommended that the Combined Chiefs of Staff:
a. Approve the overall plan for the defeat of Japan and direct that the
necessary preparation be initiated.
b. Approve the specific operations set out in C.C.S. 397, Specific Operations
for the Defeat of Japan, 1944. (To be revised.)
NOTE ON PREPARATIONS THAT SHOULD BE MADE FOR

POSSIBLE RUSSIAN ENTRY INTO THE WAR
1. We urge the U.S.S.R. to come in as early as possible; ask them to tell us
when they propose to come in; what they propose to do when they come in; and
what they want us to do to help.
2. Meanwhile, in so far as they do not conflict with the operations in the
Central and Southwest Pacific, preparations should be made by the spring or
early summer of 1944 so that we can assist her:—
a. By building up supplies by trans-Pacific shipment, sea and air.
b. By insuring that her defenses and means in Kamchatka are adequate.
If she wants our forces there we should be prepared to move them in, especially
air.
c. By furnishing aircraft and air units released from the European front,
both from the East and the West.
3. If and when conversations with the Soviets can be arranged, plans should
also be made for operations:—
a. To enter and develop bases in Kamchatka and the Maritime Provinces.
b. To seize and hold the Northern Kuriles and to open a sea route to the
Maritime Provinces.
c. To supply and operate air forces from Siberian bases.
4. We must constantly review the situation so as to be ready to adjust our
operations elsewhere when the U.S.S.R. comes into the war.
5
Not included.
6
Not included.
Appendix U
SPECIFIC OPERATIONS FOR THE DEFEAT OF JAPAN, 1944
3 DECEMBER 1943
(CCS 397 REV)
MEMORANDUM BY THE U.S. CHIEFS OF STAFF

1. We are agreed that every effort should be exerted to bring the U.S.S.R.
into the war against Japan at the earliest practicable date, and that plans should
be prepared in that event.
2. We are agreed that plans should be prepared for operations in the event
that Germany is defeated earlier than the fall of 1944.
3. A schedule of proposed operations and projected target dates for planning
purposes is given in the appendix to the Enclosure.1 The operations envisaged
are based on a concept of obtaining strategic objectives and bases from which
to conduct further operations to force the unconditional surrender of Japan at
the earliest practicable date. The operations are in consonance with the over-all
objectives and over-all strategic concept agreed upon at QUADRANT and reaf-
firmed by the Combined Chiefs of Staff in C.C.S. 380/2, and with provisions of
C.C.S 417 (Over-all Plan for the Defeat of Japan).
4. General. In addition to the specific objectives hereinafter indicated sup-
porting operations should be conducted. Both the specific and supporting
operations will be designed to destroy the Japanese fleet at an early date; to
secure maximum attrition of enemy air forces; to intensify air, submarine, and
mining operations against enemy shipping and lines of communication; to
establish air and sea blockade of the main Japanese islands; to continue efforts
to keep China in the war; and to enable us to launch land and carrier based air
operations against Japan.
5. North Pacific. Plans for the North Pacific involve the augmentation of
base facilities and defensive installations in the Aleutians in preparation for
entry into the Kuriles and Soviet territory in the event of Russian collaboration.
Naval surface and submarine action, including raids on the Japanese fishing
fleet will be carried out. Preparations will be made for executing very long
range strategic bombing against the Kuriles and northern Japan.
6. Central, South and Southwest Pacific. The advance along the New Guinea-
N.E.I.-Philippine axis will proceed concurrently with operations for the cap-
ture of the Mandated Islands. A strategic bombing force will be established in
Guam, Tinian, and Saipan for strategic bombing of Japan proper. Air bom-
bardment of targets in the N.E.I.-Philippine Area and the aerial neutralization
of Rabaul will be intensified.
7. China. Our efforts in the China Area should have as their objective the
intensification of land and air operations in and from China and the build-up
of the U.S.A.A.F. and the Chinese army arid air forces. It shall include also
1
See Table 12, p. 586.
the establishing, without materially affecting other approved operations, of a

very long range strategic bombing force at Calcutta, with advanced bases at
Chengtu to attack vital targets in the Japanese "inner zone."2
8. Southeast Asia. Operations for the capture of Upper Burma in the spring
of 1944 in order to improve the air route and establish overland communica-
tions with China, and an amphibious operation at approximately the same time.
Continuance of operations during the autumn of 1944 within the limits of the
forces available ... to extend the position held in Upper Burma.
Should the means be available, additional ground, sea and air offensive opera-
tions including carrier borne raids, with the object of maintaining pressure on
the enemy, inducing dispersion of his forces, and attaining the maximum
attrition practicable on his air and naval forces and shipping.
9. As more carriers become available, the operations set forth should be sup-
plemented, between scheduled operational dates as practicable, with massed
carrier task force strikes against selected vital targets.
10. The completion of these operations will place the United Nations in
positions from which to use most advantageously the great air, ground, and
naval resources which will be at our disposal after Germany is defeated.
ENCLOSURE
A schedule of operations for 1944 is set forth in the Appendix.3 Target dates
which have been determined after careful consideration of prospective means
and of time and space factors, are presented for planning purposes only. We
are convinced that the sequence of operations must be flexible; we must be
prepared to take all manner of short cuts made possible by developments in the
situation. The four primary developments which may permit short cuts are:
a. Early defeat of the Japanese Fleet.
b. Sudden withdrawal of Japanese forces from areas (as from Kiska).
c. Increase in our means such as by acceleration of the assault ship-building
program and by an earlier defeat of Germany than 1 October 1944.
d. The early collaboration of the U.S.S.R. in the war against Japan.
We have directed that further study be conducted and plans made and kept
up to date for the conditions assumed in c. and d.
We have directed that special attention be given to the optimum employment
of the enormous air forces which will be released upon the defeat of Germany.
We have directed that a study be made for the optimum use, timing and
deployment in the war against Japan in very long range bombers.
2
Includes Japan proper, Manchuria, Korea, North China, Karafuto (Japanese Sakhalin), and
Formosa.
3
The schedule of operations is included in the text as Table 13, page 604.
Appendix V
GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA
"ELKTON" III
PLAN FOR THE SEIZURE
AND OCCUPATION OF THE
LAE SALAMAUA MADANG
WESTERN NEW BRITAIN
SOLOMONS AREAS
26 APRIL 1943
Table of Contents Page
Section I— General (Pages 1-9)
1. a. Task 1
b. Analysis of Task 1
2. Scheme of Maneuver 2
3. Organization 4
4. Allotment of Tasks 6
Section II—Operation I (Pages 10-14)
1. Task 10
3. Organization 11
SECTION III—Operation II (Page 15-19)
1. Task 15
3. Organization 16
Section IV—Operation III Page 20-23
1. Task 20
3. Organization 20
"ELKTON" III
SECTION I—GENERAL
1. a. GENERAL TASK.
(1) The Joint Chiefs of Staff directive for offensive operations is set forth
in the following form:
"2. Command.
a. The operations outlined in this directive will be conducted under the
direction of the Supreme Commander, SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA.
b. Operations in the SOLOMON ISLANDS will be under the direct

command of the Commander, SOPAC AREA, operating under general
directives of the Supreme Commander, SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA.
c. Units of the PACIFIC OCEAN AREA, other than those assigned by
the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Task Forces engaged in these operations, will
remain under the control of the Commander-in-chief, PACIFIC OCEAN
AREA (CINCPAC).
3. Forces will be allocated for these operations as determined by the Joint
Chiefs of Staff.
4. Tasks.
a. Establish airfields on KIRIWINA and WOODLARK ISLANDS.
b. Seize LAE-SALAMAUA-FINSCHHAFEN-MADANG area and occupy
WESTERN NEW BRITAIN.
c. Seize and occupy SOLOMON ISLANDS to include the southern por-
tion of BOUGAINVILLE.
5. Purposes.
To inflict losses on Japanese Forces, to deny these areas to JAPAN, to
contain Japanese Forces in the PACIFIC theater by maintaining the initia-
tive, and to prepare for ultimate seizure of BISMARCK ARCHIPELAGO"
b. ANALYSIS OF THE TASK.
(1) The sea and land areas south of the line WAU-RUSSELL ISLAND are
generally under our control, with the enemy in control north of that line. The
defenses of both sides are concentrated in and around airfields. The remainder
of the land areas are generally unoccupied.
(2) Task a. Requires establishment of airfields on KIRIWINA and WOOD-
LARK ISLANDS, neither of which is occupied by our own or enemy forces.
(3) Tasks b. and c. require the employment of two general lines of advance:
on the West, along the northeast coast of NEW GUINEA to seize the HUON
PENINSULA AREA as far as MADANG, and then across VITIAZ STRAIT
to seize the Western NEW BRITAIN AREA; on the East, northwestward
through the SOLOMONS to seize southeastern BOUGAINVILLE. The stated
objectives are preliminary to the seizure of RABAUL and the occupation of the
BISMARCK ARCHIPELAGO.
(4) The establishment of airfields on WOODLARK ISLAND is a necessary
preliminary to the seizure of the Southeastern BOUGAINVILLE AREA in order
to provide wider employment of air power and obtain closer support for opera-
tions against BUIN-FAISI. By arrangement the occupying forces for WOOD-
LARK ISLAND are to be furnished by the SOUTH PACIFIC AREA but the
operation will be undertaken by the SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA. SOUTH
PACIFIC will establish their own air forces on WOODLARK and control their
operation. The establishment of airfields on KIRIWINA ISLAND is comple-
mentary to the occupation and consolidation of WOODLARK, and is required
for the control of the air over the SOLOMON SEA and to assist our advance
along the western axis. Early occupation and consolidation of both islands are
mandatory. Full scale consolidation must await provision of adequate fighter
cover on GOODENOUGH ISLAND. In order to maintain the initiative and
contain Japanese forces in the SOUTHWEST PACIFIC theater, continuous air
APPENDIX V 677
activity on a pre-offensive scale and early infiltrating attacks along both axes,
avoiding commitment of important forces, should be started immediately and
prosecuted vigorously.
(5) Task b. requires successively the seizure of the LAE-MARKHAM
VALLEY AREA, the occupation of HUON PENINSULA, the seizure and
occupation of Western NEW BRITAIN, with the objective of securing airdromes
to cover further advances, and the seizure and occupation of MADANG to pro-
tect the northern flank. Operations along the eastern axis require the seizure
and consolidation, or neutralization, successively of NEW GEORGIA airfields,
the seizure and consolidation of airfields in the BUIN-FAISI AREA, the seizure
of KIETA and neutralization of BUKA.
Generally speaking, the advance into the BUIN-FAISI AREA along the
eastern axis is doubtful of success pending implementation of land-based air-
fields on WOODLARK ISLAND to provide a wider deployment and closer
support of that operation and the implementation of airfields on KIRIWINA
and in the LAE AREA to neutralize supporting Japanese air bases at BUKA,
RABAUL and KAVIENG. Operations to seize and occupy the western portion
of NEW BRITAIN and MADANG cannot progress prior to the implementation
of airfields in the LAE and/or MARKHAM VALLEY AREA. The sequence
of the advance along either axis alone or one axis in relation to the other cannot
be rigidly preplanned but must remain flexible in order to take advantage of
the situation obtaining regardless of the arrangement of tasks a., b. and c. in
the directive.
2. SCHEME OF MANEUVER.
a. The general scheme of maneuver is to improve all presently occupied
forward air bases; occupy and implement air bases which can be secured with-
out committing large forces; employ air forces from these bases to soften up and
to gain air superiority over the initial attack objectives along the two axes;
neutralize with appropriate aviation supporting hostile air bases and destroy
hostile naval forces and shipping within range; move land forces forward covered
by air and naval forces to obtain first objectives (existing and potential hostile
air bases) and consolidate same; displace aviation forward onto captured
airdromes.
This process is repeated to successive objectives, neutralizing by air action, or
by air, land and sea action, intermediate hostile installations which are not
objectives of immediate attack.
The entire movement will be covered by air attack on Japanese air and sea
bases along the general perimeter BUKA, RABAUL, KAVIENG and WEWAK
with the objective of interrupting and denying sea supply and/or support or
reinforcement of objectives under attack.
b. In the initiation of the operations, SOUTHWEST PACIFIC FORCES, by
amphibious means, first secretly infiltrate and later when pursuit coverage is
available from GOODENOUGH ISLAND, move in force to occupy and con-
solidate WOODLARK and KIRIWINA ISLANDS. Diverting and covering
air attacks on Japanese bases and infiltration ground attacks northwestward
through the SOLOMONS and toward SALAMAUA and LAE will support the
operation.
Preceded by strong land-based air action, the forces along the western axis
operate against successive objectives to capture by air-borne and shore-to-shore
operations air operating bases in the HUON PENINSULA-MARKHAM VAL-
LEY AREA, in Western NEW BRITAIN, and along the North-eastern coast
of NEW GUINEA to include MADANG: the forces along the eastern axis
progress northwestward by amphibious operations, to secure airdromes in the
BUIN-FAISI AREA, neutralizing or capturing enemy airdromes of NEW
GEORGIA, later occupying the KIETA AREA and neutralizing hostile airfields
in the vicinity of BUKA PASSAGE.
The general sequence and timing of the operations along either axis, or along
one axis in relationship to the other, will be governed by conditions obtaining
at the time in order that the maximum benefit can be derived from the successes
of our own forces or weaknesses of the enemy. Generally speaking for planning
purposes, occupation of WOODLARK and KIRIWINA ISLANDS will be
simultaneous. The advance northward along the NEW GUINEA coast to secure
airfields in the HUON PENINSULA-MARKHAM VALLEY AREA will pre-
cede major attack on the BUIN-FAISI AREA and will be covered by diverting
air and ground infiltration attacks along the eastern axis. Following the dis-
placement of SOUTHWEST PACIFIC Air Force into LAE AREA, the seizure
of southeastern BOUGAINVILLE may progress covered by neutralizing attacks
by SOUTHWEST PACIFIC Air Force on BUKA, RABAUL and KAVIENG.
The remainder of the operations along both axes will be made simultaneously
to the final objectives, the SOUTH PACIFIC Air Force assisting in the neutrali-
zation of the RABAUL area and thus partially freeing the SOUTHWEST
PACIFIC Air Forces to neutralize hostile air action along the Northeastern NEW
GUINEA coast.
c. OPERATIONS REQUIRED.
(1) SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA.
Operation I, NEW BRITAIN FORCES.
Establish airfields on KIRIWINA and WOODLARK.
Operation II, NEW GUINEA FORCE.
IIa IIb IIc
Seize LAE Seize SALAMAUA Seize MADANG
Seize FINSCHHAFEN
Operation III, NEW BRITAIN FORCE.
IIIa IIIb
Occupy CAPE GLOUCESTER and ARAWE. Occupy GASMATA.
Neutralize TALASEA.
(2) SOUTH PACIFIC AREA.
Operation A. Operation B. Operation C.

Infiltration NEW GEORGIA Seize and occupy Seize and occupy
and/or YSABEL ISLANDS. BUIN-FAISI and KIETA.
NEW GEORGIA. Neutralize
BUKA.
APPENDIX V 679
d. ESTIMATED TIMING AND SEQUENCE OF OPERATIONS.
Notes:
General.
For planning purposes, it is estimated that "1st month" can be June 1943.
S.W.P.A.
Operation I. Solid line, establishment of fighter sector KIRIWINA and
WOODLARK. Dotted line, establishment of additional
designated air elements.
Operation IIa. Dotted line, seizure of operating base in MARKHAM
VALLEY. Solid line, seizure of LAE.
Operation IIb. Solid line, seizure of SALAMAUA and FINSCHHAFEN,
establishment of air support for ARAWE and GLOUCES-
TER operations. Dotted line, establishment of air support
for MADANG and GASMATA operations.
Operation IIc. Initial dotted line, overland approach to MADANG AREA.
Solid line, combined operation to seize MADANG. Dotted
line, consolidation.
Operation IIIa. Solid line, occupation of CAPE GLOUCESTER and
ARAWE. Dotted line, consolidation and development.
680 STRATEGY AND COMMAND: T.HE FIRST TWO YEARS
Operation IIIb. Solid line, occupation of GASMATA, neutralization TALA-

SEA. Dotted line, consolidation and development.
S.P.A.
Operation A. Solid line, infiltration into NEW GEORGIA and/or YSABEL.
Operation B. Solid line, seizure BUIN-FAISI and NEW GEORGIA AREAS.
Dotted line, consolidation and development.
Operation C. Solid line, seizure KIETA. Dotted line, neutralization BUKA.
3. ORGANIZATION,
a. GENERAL CHART.
b. ESTIMATE OF THE FORCES AVAILABLE.1

(1) Summary
Principal combat elements available for each operation are estimated to be:
(a) SWPA:
Naval 2 Ground Air 3
Operation I T.F. 74 1Regimental Combat Team (U.S.) 7 Sqs HB
T.F. 72 4 Sqs MB
T.G. 70.1 5 Sqs LB
T.F. 76 3 Sqs F (escort)
10 Sqs F (int.)
1 Sq FR
4 Sqs TC
1 Sq OB
Requested from SPA:
3 APD's 1Defense Battalion (U.S. Marines) 3Sqs F
6 LST's 1Regimental Combat Team (U.S.)
6 PT's
26 LCI's (2 weeks)
APPENDIX V 681
Naval Ground Air

Operation II T.F. 74 3 Inf. Divs. (Aust.) 8 Sqs HB
T.F. 72 1Inf. Div. (Aust.) (Reserve) 13 Sqs MB
T.G. 70.1 1Inf. Div. (Aust.) (Defense) 6 Sqs LB
T.F. 76 (2 RAAF)
16 Sqs F (int.)
2 Sqs F (night)
14 Sqs TC
1Sq FR
1Sq OB
Operation III T.F. 74 1Marine Div. (U.S.) 8 Sqs HB
T.F. 72 1Inf. Div. (U.S.) (Reserve) 13 Sqs MB
T.G. 70.1 10 Sqs LB
T.F. 76 16 Sqs F (int.)
3 Sqs F (escort)
2 Sqs F (night)
18 Sqs TC
5 Sqs OB
4 Sqs FR
GHQ Reserve 3 Inf. Divs. (U.S.)
1Parachute Regt. (U.S.)
1Armored Bde. (Aust.)
(b) SPA
FORCES AS ESTIMATED BY COMSOPAC.

Notes:
1
Land and Air Forces required for defense of continental AUSTRALIA
and TORRES STRAIT, are shown in Inclosures 2 and 3.
2
T.F. 74—1 Crudiv T.F. 72—12 submarines (average)
1Desron T.G. 70.1—2 PT Squadrons
1Desdiv
T.F. 76, SWPA Amphibious Force
Means available LST LCI (L) LCT (5) APC
1May 3 9
1June 8 24 20 7
1July 15 26 20 16
(Plus units from SOPAC)
3
Air Forces shown are available for operations in NEW GUINEA.
4. ALLOTMENT OF TASKS.
a. SOUTH PACIFIC FORCES.
(1) Composition.
As assigned.
(2) Tasks.
(a) Seize and occupy the SOLOMON ISLANDS to include the southern
portion of BOUGAINVILLE.
(b) Provide strategic naval support for the operations.

(c) Support the operations of SOUTHWEST PACIFIC FORCES as
directed,
b. NEW BRITAIN FORCE.
(1) Composition.
A Task Force organized and equipped for air-borne and over-water
operations in D'ENTRECASTEAUX, WOODLARK and TROBRIAND
ISLANDS and Western NEW BRITAIN.
(2) Tasks.
(a) Establish airfields on KIRIWINA and WOODLARK Islands, and
occupy western NEW BRITAIN, to include the general line GASMATA-
TALASEA, by combined air-borne and over-water operations,
c. NEW GUINEA FORCE.
(1) Composition.
A Task Force organized and equipped for airborne, overland and
shore-to-shore operations in NEW GUINEA.
(2) Tasks.
By airborne, overland and Overwater operations:
(a) Seize LAE and SALAMAUA.
(b) Secure in the HUON PENINSULA-MARKHAM VALLEY AREAS,
air bases required for subsequent operations.
(c) Seize the north coast of NEW GUINEA to include MADANG,
d. ALLIED AIR FORCES.
(1) Composition.
Fifth Air Force, R.A.A.F. Command and air elements SOUTHWEST
PACIFIC FORCE not required for defense of installations, facilities, or shipping
in the SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA.
(2) Tasks.
(a) Destroy hostile aviation in general supporting areas of Northern
SOLOMONS, NEW IRELAND, NEW BRITAIN and the north coast of
NEW GUINEA. Destroy naval forces and shipping.
(b) Support the operations of the SOUTHWEST PACIFIC Task Forces.
(c) Support the defense of SOUTHWEST PACIFIC forward bases.
(d) Provide transport aviation support for SOUTHWEST PACIFIC
operations.
(e) Be prepared to provide general air support for operations in the
SOUTH PACIFIC AREA.
e. ALLIED NAVAL FORCES.
(1) Composition.
Task Force 74, Task Force 72, T.F. 76, Task Group 70.1 and escort
vessels.
(2) Tasks.
(a) Support the operations of the SOUTHWEST PACIFIC Task Force.
(b) Support the defense of forward bases in the SOUTHWEST PACIFIC
AREA and of TORRES STRAIT, and protect lines of communication.
(c) Embark, transport and land elements of the SOUTHWEST PACIFIC
Task Forces as required.
APPENDIX V 683
f. SUPPLY SERVICES.
(1) Composition.
USASOS and the Australian Lines of Communication.
(2) Tasks.
(a) Provide logistic support for the operations.
(b) Reinforce intermediate bases in the PORT MORESBY and MILNE
BAY-LOUISIADES AREA and an advance base at ORO BAY.
(c) Establish advanced bases as required,
x. COORDINATION OF OPERATIONS.
(1) With the initiation of Operation I, the organic Air Forces of the
SOUTHWEST PACIFIC and SOUTH PACIFIC AREAS will provide defensive
reconnaissance as indicated in the following paragraphs, thereafter as directed by
the Commander-in-chief, SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA.
SWPA
(a) The SOLOMON and BISMARCK SEA AREA west of the 155°
meridian East Longitude and southwest of the line BUKA PASSAGE-NEW
IRELAND.
SPA
(b) East and northeastward of SOUTHWEST PACIFIC defensive recon-
naissance boundaries as required, with a permissible overlap of one degree
along the eastern boundary.
(c) The water area southwest of the SOLOMONS eastward of 155°E and
northward of 9° South to be covered by SOUTH PACIFIC.
(d) Offensive reconnaissances of the two areas will cover such sectors as
required without regard to defensive reconnaissance boundaries.
(2) Within the defensive reconnaissance areas indicated in paragraph (1),
the Air and Naval Forces of the SOUTHWEST PACIFIC and SOUTH PACIFIC
AREAS will attack targets of opportunity as directed by respective commanders.
Within the reconnaissance area of the other Force, timely notification by each
commander will be given the other of contemplated air and naval (including
shipping) movements. Necessary coordination when required will be arranged
by the Commander-in-chief, SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA.
(3) The forces of the SOUTHWEST PACIFIC and SOUTH PACIFIC
AREAS will mutually support each other generally as follows, timing being
directed by the Commander-in-chief, SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA:
Operation I Fighter protection for occupation of WOODLARK ISLAND will
and A. be provided by SOUTHWEST PACIFIC FORCES assisted by
long-range fighters of SOUTH PACIFIC FORCES, operating
from airdromes of the SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA. Both
forces will support the operation along their respective axes by
intensive air action against hostile rearward air bases and by
diversions employing land and light naval forces threatening
nearby enemy bases.
Operation II. SOUTH PACIFIC FORCES will pin down hostile air forces
along their axis of advance by air attack and infiltration north-
westward without commitment to major action.
Operation B. SOUTHWEST PACIFIC Air Forces will cover the operations of
SOUTH PACIFIC FORCES by neutralization of hostile air
bases along the line BUKA-RABAUL-KAVIENG.
Operation III When SOUTH PACIFIC Air Forces are established in southern
and C. BOUGAINVILLE, SOUTH PACIFIC Air Forces will assist
SOUTHWEST PACIFIC Air Forces in the neutralization of
the RABAUL-KAVIENG AREA.
(4) The SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA and SOUTH PACIFIC AREA
will exchange daily summaries of intelligence and operations. The Commander-
in-chief, SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA will be furnished the plan of major
operations by SOUTH PACIFIC FORCES sufficiently in advance of operations
to permit necessary coordination.
(5) (a) Direct command communication will be established between Gen-
eral Headquarters, SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA, and Headquarters, SOUTH
PACIFIC AREA.
(b) Direct communication on operational and intelligence matters will
be established between the two air forces, and reconnaissance information inter-
changed by the most rapid means.
5. LOGISTIC ARRANGEMENTS.
SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA.

a. GENERAL.
(1) Logistic support is the responsibility of the United States Army Services
of Supply and the Australian Line of Communication from the Zone of Interior
(AUSTRALIA) to the intermediate bases on the YORK PENINSULA, at PORT
MORESBY and MILNE BAY and to the advance base at ORO BAY and others
subsequently established.
b. TRANSPORTATION.
(1) The Australian Line of Communication will be responsible for the over-
water transportation of all requirements for the YORK PENINSULA north from
CAIRNS (exclusive), for the TORRES STRAIT and NORTHERN TERRI-
TORY FORCES (except for naval forces) and, insofar as is practicable, for the
Australian Land Forces based on PORT MORESBY.
(2) The United States Army Services of Supply will be responsible for the
Overwater transportation of all requirements (except for Naval forces) for the
intermediate base at MILNE BAY, the advance base at ORO BAY and others
subsequently established, and for all military units at PORT MORESBY, except
those requirements transported by the Australian Line of Communication.
(3) The Allied Naval Force will furnish Overwater transportation for the
NEW BRITAIN FORCE until relieved,
c. PORTS AND BASES.
(1) The Australian Line of Communication will establish port organizations
on the YORK PENINSULA, in the TORRES STRAIT AREA, and in
APPENDIX V 685
the NORTHERN TERRITORY. In NEW GUINEA, the United States Army

Services of Supply and Australian Line of Communication will maintain separate
port and base organizations for the logistic support of their respective units
based therein. Coordination will be effected by the Combined Operational Serv-
ice Command under the Commander, NEW GUINEA FORCE.
d. UNIT RESPONSIBILITY IN FORWARD AREAS.
(1) NEW GUINEA FORCE and NEW BRITAIN FORCE will establish
their own services for logistic support forward of the intermediate and advance
bases.
(2) At objectives under attack, organic service elements of assault forces,
reinforced where necessary by Australian Line of Communication or the United
States Army Services of Supply, will provide logistic support.
(3) (a) NEW BRITAIN FORCE will provide logistic support of Allied
Air Forces, serving in its area of responsibility.
(b) The United States Army Service of Supply will provide logistic sup-
port for Allied Air Forces in NEW GUINEA. Pending establishment of necessary
facilities in forward areas, the NEW GUINEA FORCE will provide required
logistic support.
(4) The Allied Naval Forces will continue their present system of logistic
support for naval forces, except that Task Forces will furnish this support to
naval forces in advance areas until the Navy system is established.
e. SOUTH PACIFIC AREA.
(1) In accordance with plans and directives of the Commander, SOUTH
PACIFIC FORCES.
Appendix W
03500 20 Oct 43
Reno III
HISTORICAL RECORD INDEX CARD
GHQ SWPA
TYPE: Mimeo Secret Outline Plan, DATE: 20 Oct 43
P241-43 FILE: G-3 GHQ Planning
FROM: G-3 GHQ Planning PAGES: Cover, (4), 13, plus
TO: (Not stated) maps and charts
SUBJ: Reno III, Outline Plan for Opns of the SWPA, 1944
(Plan Reno III was promulgated as a result of certain Quadrant (Quebec I)
Conference decisions and differs rather radically from Reno, Reno II-A, and
Reno II, which have been treated separately. Attached hereto is a memo dated
31 Oct 43 saying in part:
("The accompanying Reno III Outline Plan for operations of the Southwest
Pacific Area to reoccupy the Southern Philippines has been submitted to the Joint
Chiefs of Staff in compliance with the enclosed directive. Pending approval this
plan will be utilized as a guide by the commander to whom issued for long-range
planning for the year 1944 . . . ."
(The directive mentioned is a radio, #8162/19th, presumably Oct 43, from
Gen Marshall to Gen MacArthur, saying in part: ("Certain papers delivered to
you by Colonel Ritchie contain quadrant decisions covering operation against
the Japanese. It is requested that you forward by 1 November 1943 outline plans
for your operations to seize Kavieng and Admiralty Islands and for your advances
in New Guinea as far west as Vogelkop . . . . This information is necessary for
the integration of operations in your area with other approved operations against
the Japanese in 1943-1944, particularly those to be conducted in the Japanese
Mandates."
(Herewith follows the synopsis of Reno III—Ed.)
Our strategic objective is the isolation of Japan from the Malaya-NEI area.
Present tasks are to:
1. Seize or neutralize E NG as far W as Wewak and including the Admi-
ralties and the Bismarck Archipelago.
Neutralize, rather than capture Rabaul.
2. Advance along the N coast of NG as far W as the Vogelkop by AB-
amphib jumps.
3. Prepare to seize Mindanao by AB-amphib opns.
Our eventual task is to reoccupy the S PI, and by subsequent opns isolate Japan
from the Malay-NEI area.
Accomplishment of the tasks presently assigned by Quadrant decisions initially
requires opns along 2 general axes.
1. NW along the NG coast from Vitiaz St in order to advance land-based
air.
APPENDIX W 687
2. W through the N Solomons-New Ireland, including the Admiralties,

to a junction with the W axis in order to complete the isolation of
Rabaul and obtain necessary bases for naval support of opns along the
axis.
The eventual task requires seizure of Mindanao, followed by opns in con-
junction with other Theaters to sever sea and air communications between Japan
and the Malaya-NEI area. These opns require attacks against strongly defended
air and naval bases. Our advantages lie in superior equipment and potentially
superior strength in the air and on the sea, but amphib equipment will be limited
pending cessation of the offensive in Europe. On the assumption that the Jap-
anese will maintain their strategic defense, our advantages must be fully utilized
to deal him a succession of blows precluding his recouping of air and sea forces
after each of his defeats and so permit destruction of his bases in detail.
The general scheme of maneuver is to advance our land-based bomber line
rapidly W along the land masses of NG and the PI by successive occupation of
the minimum bases required. Hostile strength is by-passed wherever practicable
to avoid costly and time-consuming opns; our flanks are protected by air opns;
and necessary advanced naval bases are established under protection of land-
based aviation in order to extend the range of naval action. Destructive air
attacks are employed to soften up objectives and to gain air superiority. Hostile
naval forces and shipping are destroyed along our line of advance to prevent
reinforcement. Ground forces are displaced forward by air and amphib move-
ments. Air and naval forces are established at each objective and the process is
then repeated, neutralizing by air and sea action hostile concentrations that may
be by-passed. The number of objectives is decreased and the length of bound
increased by the use of a/c carriers to provide close air support. The same result
is aided by extending the destructive effort of bombers through use of air
envelopment to advance the fighter line through inland fields established and
maintained by air support.
Sequence and timing are based on present enemy dispositions and are subject
to change dependent upon enemy reaction and success of our opns. Timing is
also dependent upon the availability of means, particularly amphib forces, and
the timing given herein is based on an estimate of means to be available as a
result of quadrant.
Logistic support is provided by the SOS of Sopac and SWPA. As opns
progress to the NW, ports and supply bases are advanced by corresponding
bounds. Heavy shipping is used wherever unloading facilities are available and
amphib craft are used for assault elements and where the use of heavy shipping is
impracticable. Trans-Pacific shipping is diverted directly to newly established
bases along the line of advance. Bulk petroleum is transported forward in small
tankers to points where the tactical situation permits the installation of bulk
storage tanks.
Known requirements in items of special equipment, major units, air and
service units, are set forth in the "1944 Troop Basis, GHQ, SWPA, 9 October
1943." (Requirements for each phase of the opns are set forth below—Ed.)
Phase I
Naval bases are required in the Bismarcks to support subsequent opns into
W NG. Direct attack to capture Rabaul will be costly and time-consuming.
Anchorages and potential air and naval bases exist at Kavieng and in the Admi-
ralties. With the capture and development of such bases, Rabaul can be isolated
from the NE. Direct attack into the Wewak area would also be costly in means
and time. Presently occupied a/mes do not provide sufficient protection to
by-pass the area, but potential air bases exist in the Hansa Bay area, from which
the isolation of Rabaul can be completed and opns to the W of Wewak be
protected. Scheme of Maneuver:
A. Target date 1 Feb 44. SWPA forces seize the Hansa Bay area by amphib
opns with AB support. Direct air support is provided from the Vitiaz St-Ramu
valley a/mes. Shore-to-shore opns secure the mouth of the Sepik to contain
enemy forces in the Wewak area. Advance bases are established for the support
of opns in the Humboldt Bay area. Hostile forces in the Madang-Alexishafen
area are isolated and the area later occupied by holding forces from the Huon
Peninsula-Ramu Valley.
B. Target date 1 Mar 44. Kavieng is occupied by an amphib opn of Sopac
Forces. The opn is preceded by intensive air and naval neutralization of the
Rabaul area and has the direct support of heavy elements of the PacFlt. Air
support comes from W New Britain and from carriers. General air support is
from NG, Nor-Sols, and Kiriwina and Woodlark. Interference from hostile flt
is covered by opns of Cenpac and in the Mandates and by the PacFlt. Air
elements are then established for support of opns against the Carolines and
Rabaul. Light naval forces are established for support of opns to the W and to
help blockade Rabaul.
C. Target date 1 Mar 44. The Admiralties are taken by amphib opns of
SWPA Forces staging through Vitiaz St. Direct air support comes from the
Vitiaz St area and from CVEs. General air support from the Markham-Ramu
area. Air and naval forces are established in the Admiralties, and base facilities
developed, for the support of opns along the N coast of NG.
D. When the blockade has sufficiently reduced the defensive capacity of the
enemy garrison, Rabaul is occupied at a date and by forces later to be deter-
mined, and appropriate base facilities are established.
Forces required:
Garrison Assault Air Naval
2 US inf divs 7 US inf divs HB 5 grps 15 APD 2 CV
6 Austn divs 2 US Para RCTs MB 10 grps 16APA 9 CVE
1 NZ div 3 MarDefBns LB 11½ grps 5 AKA 4 CA
1 Austn armd bde Day F 16½ grps 85 LST 4 CL
Night F 14 grps 60 LCI 58 DD
Trp Carr 6¼ grps 105 LCT 164 PT
Photo & Recce 8½ grps (and small craft)
APPENDIX W 689
Naval strategic support will be elements of the US Pac Flt as designated by the
JCS. Location and types of bases for logistic support are mapped in Annex 4-b,
and the scheme of maneuver is mapped in Annex 2-a.
Phase II
(Initiated 1 Jun 44)
Advanced air and naval bases are required at an intermediate point on the N
coast of NG for the support of opns into Geelvink Bay and protection of the
L/C thereto. Air bases in Wewak are too distant from the Geelvink area to
support attacks and are held in great strength by the Japanese. Costly and time-
consuming opns will be avoided by by-passing and neutralizing the Wewak area.
Partially developed sites exist in the Humboldt Bay area which may be
improved to meet essential requirements. The concentration of hostile a/mes in
the Banda Sea area requires establishment of flank protection and support for
opns into Geelvink Bay. Occupation of the Aroe-Kai-Tanimbar Islands pro-
vides a difficult but feasible means of securing this protection and support.
Scheme of Maneuver (see also map, Annex 2 - b ) :
A. Humboldt Bay, target date 1 Jun 44. An amphib opn from NG bases
with AB support seizes objectives in the Aitape-Humboldt Bay area, by-passing
Wewak. Air support is provided from the Markham-Ramu Valley, Hansa Bay,
and the Admiralties. Close support comes from CVEs. Inland air bases are
established in the upper Digoe-Fly Rivers by air transport as practicable. Adv
bases are established in the Humboldt Bay area for support of opns into the
Geelvink-Vogelkop area. Forces in the Aitape area initiate infiltration opns
from the W toward Wewak and finally occupy it when hostile resistance has
deteriorated.
B. Arafura Sea. 1 Jun 44. Preceded by aerial neutralization of Timor
a/mes, the Aroe-Kai-Tanimbar Islands are occupied by an amphib assault of
Austn troops supported by AB elements. General air support is provided from
Darwin area, convoy cover from Merauke-Horn Is-Arnhem Bay, and by CVEs.
Air bases are promptly developed.
Forces required:
Garrison Assault Air Grps Naval
6 Austn inf divs 4 US inf divs 8 HB 2 CV 15 APD
1 NZ inf div 2 Austn inf divs 12 MB 7CVE 5 APA
5 US inf divs 1 US AB div 11¾LB 4 CA 84 LST
1 Austn armd bde 2 para RCTs 22½ Night F 6 CL 60 LCI
1 MarDefBn 18½ F 83DD 145 LCT
8¼Trp Carr 8 PT
11 Photo Recce 168 PT
Naval strategic support will be from the US PacFlt as designated by the JCS to
insure noninterference by hostile heavy flt elements. Locations and types of
bases for logistic support are in Annex 4-c.
Phase III
(Initiated 15 Aug 44)
Major naval and air bases are required in W NG to support opns to the NW.
Potential sites are available in the Geelvink Bay-Vogelkop area. Opns require
protection against major enemy flt elements by the US Flt. Scheme of Maneuver
(see also map, Annex 2-c) :
A. Geelvink Bay. 15 Aug 44. Anchorages, a/mes, and potential base sites
are seized by an AB overseas landing, staged in NG. Babo and Nabire are
neutralized by air staged through Aroe-Kai-Tanimbar. Direct air support is
provided from the Humboldt Bay area through inland air bases established and
maintained in favorable locations by air transport, and also by CVEs. Major
air and naval base development is instituted for support of opns against
Mindanao.
B. Vogelkop Area, 1 Oct 44. The Sorong and Kabui Bay areas are occupied
by an amphib opn with AB support. This opn is launched as soon as air sup-
port is available from Geelvink Bay bases. The Klamono oil field is occupied
and intensively developed as a source of bunker fuel.
Forces required (see also Annexes 3-2, -b, and -c):
Garrison Combat Air Groups
7 Austn inf divs
1 NZ inf div
4 US inf divs
1 Austn armd bde
Naval Combat Amphib Craft
2 CV 15 APD
6 CVE 16 APA
4 CA 5 AKA
6 CL 54 LST
64 DD 60 LCI
183 PT 175 LCT
Phase IV
(Initiated 1 Dec 44)
Advance into Mindanao requires a broadening of the front for deployment of
air forces, protection for flanks, and establishment of advance bases for support
of sea and AB movements. These requirements can be met by establishing air
and light naval elements on Halmahera and/or Morotai. Menado must at least
be denied to the enemy and Palua must be occupied by either Cenpac or SWPA
forces. The Ambon area must be neutralized by air action, but may have to be
occupied if hostile strength in the NEI requires such action. Scheme of Maneu-
ver (see also map in Annex 2-d):
A. Halamhera-Menado, target date 1 Dec 44. A/mes or sites therefor on
Halamahera and/or Morotai are occupied and Menado seized by amphib opns
APPENDIX W 691
from Geelvink Bay, supported by AB elements. Air and naval forces are estab-
lished for flank protection and support of subsequent opns to seize and occupy
Mindanao.
B. Ambon (contingent opn), 1 Dec. 44. In the event that hostile strength
in the E NEI jeopardizes opns on Mindanao, it may be necessary to establish air
and naval forces on Ambon. If required, this opn will be amphib, staged from
Geelvink via the Dampier Strs, will seize enemy air bases on Ceram and Boeroe
and capture Ambon. Enemy air forces on Timor are neutralized from Darwin,
and general air support comes from Aroe-Kai-Tanimbar-Geelvink-Vogelkop
areas.
C. Palau, 1 Dec 44, or 15 Jan 45 if Ambon is occupied. In the event that
SWPA forces are assigned the task of occupying Palau, that group is seized by
amphib opns with the direct support of the PacFlt, including strong carrier
elements. Naval air elements are established on Palau for protection of the axis
of advance against enemy air attacks from the N.
For location of bases for logistic support see Annex 4-e. Completion of Phase
III accomplishes the tasks presently assigned to the SWPA by the quadrant
decisions. Estimates of forces required to accomplish Phases IV and V of this
plan are of problematical value in view of the certainty of major changes in the
Pacific situation and in the availability and types of means available for the
carrying out of Phase III. A tentative estimate of divs for Phases IV and V
have been shown in Annex 3, but only as a basis for 44 troop estimates. For
Phase IV these are:
Garrison Combat
4 US inf divs 1 Para RCT
1 Austn armd bde 1 MarDefBn
2 US divs for possible
opns in Jan 45
No estimates of naval or air means can be given at this time.
Phase V
(Initiated 1 Feb 45)
Occupation of Mindanao requires an attack by major forces of all components

over a widely spread area in order to achieve surprise and disperse the defensive
effort. Employment of air envelopment on a major scale, using equipment now
in prospect, becomes feasible upon establishment of adequate bases in the
Geelvink-Vogelkop area. Present guerrilla organization provides necessary ter-
minal facilities. Prompt and ample seaborne reinforcement of initial assault is
essential. Consolidation of the S PI requires occupation of covering position in
the islands to the SW and N of Mindanao and the establishment of major forces
thereon preparatory to subsequent opns. "Inasmuch as the enemy must defend
Mindanao with all the means at his disposal, prompt consolidation and subse-
quent exploitation should meet a minimum of effective opposition." Scheme of

Maneuver (see also map in Annex 2-e) :
A. Occupation of Mindanao, target date 1 Feb 45. Beachheads and a/mes
through the N and NW portion of Mindanao are seized by major combined
AB-amphib opns with carrier based air support. An AB invasion in strength is
staged in New Britain and E NG via W NG. Guerrilla forces are employed to
seize a/mes on which to land AB forces. Landing opns seize beachheads in the
proximity of a/mes. Paratroops are dropped on a/mes. Light air elements are
flown in to support the advance of occupation forces and protect subsequent
landings. Initial landings are promptly reinforced by air transport.
B. Consolidation of Southern PI: The Mindanao Occupation Force follows
the AB invasion closely along the main line of advance to beachheads in our
possession. All types of aviation are established in order to maintain air superi-
ority and cover the occupation of Zamboanga and Davao and positions in islands
to the SW and W. The L/C W of the line Palau-Vogelkop is kept open by
naval elements from advanced bases in the Vogelkop area, supported by air from
Palau, Menado, and Halmahera-Morotai. Additional forces of all arms are
rapidly established on Mindanao in preparation for opns to reoccupy the north-
ern PI and to isolate Japan from the Malay-NEI. Logistic bases are set forth on
map of Annex 4-f. Ground forces required (a suggestion rather than definite
estimate):
Garrison Combat
4 US inf divs 2 US AB divs
3 US inf divs for contingent opns 1 para RCT
1 Austn armd bde 2 MarDefBns
Forces for the consolidation are undetermined. Impossible to estimate at this
time the naval and air forces required.
(Annex 1 gives a map outline of the phases of opns as outlined above. An
undated map attached to Annex 1 starts Phase I of the opns in the Vogelkop-
Geelvink Area on 15 Jun 44, and must be dated after Apr 44 since it lists the
Wadke-Sarmi Opn as a "Current Operation." It also lists the Marianas Opns
of Cenpac to start on 15 Jun 44. (Annex 2-a through 2-f (3) outlines the
scheme of maneuver for ground forces and the location of the air forces through-
out each phase of the operations.) (Annex 3 lists the combat elements required
for navy, air, and ground forces. Information from this Annex has been inte-
grated into the synopsis above. (Annexes 4-a through 4-f give the location
and types of bases for logistic support of each phase of the opns planned in
Reno III. (Supplement "A," G-2 Estimate of the Enemy Situation," is under
a separate cover. (Supplement "B" is a chart showing the detailed use of ground,
air and naval forces for each objective area, giving type and number of units
for each opn. (Supplement "C" is a time and location schedule of each division
utilized in the planned opns—Ed.)
Guide to Footnotes
The footnotes in this volume are de- pose of each item in the footnote:
signed to accomplish two objectives: (1) 1. Kind of Document. The nature of
to indicate the nature of the evidence the sources used in the preparation of
on which the author based his account, this volume varies widely, both as to
and (2) to enable the scholar and re- type and official character, and has to
searcher to identify the document and be taken into account in evaluating the
to locate it among the mass of World evidence. There is a wide gap between
War II records, with the assistance of an informal memorandum or personal
the archivist, in as brief a time as pos- note and a directive from the Joint
sible. These objectives were not always Chiefs of Staff or an order from a theater
consistent with brevity, but the author commander. Thus, the first item in the
has used every device to reduce the length citation indicates, usually in abbreviated
of the footnotes and to keep their num- form, the type of document cited. Those
ber to the minimum. Thus, collective most frequently used in the preparation
footnotes summarizing the sources for a of this volume are (a) official reports,
particular subject or section of a chapter orders, plans, and directives of theater
have been employed wherever possible; headquarters, the War Department, and
information not essential to identifica- the Joint and Combined Chiefs of Staff;
tion or location has been omitted; and (b) minutes of meetings and conferences,
abbreviations and code names, rigorously ranging from those of senior staff officers
eschewed in the text, have been used and commanders, such as the Pacific
liberally in the footnotes. Though these Military Conference in March 1943, to
short cuts should not present any diffi- the wartime meetings of the Combined
culty for the reader familiar with mili- Chiefs of Staff with the President and
tary records and abbreviations, a word Prime Minister (recorded in bound,
of explanation for the uninitiated may printed volumes called Conference
be helpful. Books); (c) estimates, studies, and plans
The information normally required to developed in the theater, by staff agen-
identify and locate a document in any cies in the War and Navy Departments,
of the various military archival deposi- and by committees of the Joint and
tories includes (a) a description of the Combined Chiefs of Staff; (d) official
type of document, (b) the originator, correspondence within and between
(c) the recipient, (d) date, (e) subject, headquarters, agencies, and overseas com-
and (f) file reference. With important mands in the form of radio messages,
exceptions, to be noted below, the author letters and memoranda; (e) informal and
has made every effort to provide this often revealing exchanges of view within
information, in the order named, in the and between agencies, offices, and com-
citations to this volume. The following mands, expressed usually in memoranda,
explanation should make clear the pur- records of conversations, notes on meet-
ings, and comments on studies and drafts may not have one, and some documents
of plans; and finally, (f) notes, routing such as radio messages never do. When
slips, and memoranda for the record, the document cited has a subject head-
filed with the official correspondence. ing, this information is included in the
2. Originator. The originator of a footnote in abbreviated form as an aid
document may be a single person, an to identification.
office, a headquarters, or an agency. Mili- 6. Location. Under the Army deci-
tary staff officers are dedicated to ano- mal system for filing, a document can
nymity and official documents are issued usually be located by its file number.*
in the name of a commander or an office. This number is invariably preceded by
Thus, the identity of the actual author a letter symbol identifying the record
of the document is often difficult to group (or office of origin) in which the
determine, and, in any case, is likely file is located. The letter symbols most
to be of little importance. Where it is often used in the present volume are (a)
significant, the citation so indicates. AG, denoting the central files of The
3. Recipient. A document may be ad- Adjutant General's Office, record keeper
dressed to a specific individual, a head- for the Army; (b) OCS or WDCSA, the
quarters, an agency, to no one in files of the Chief of Staff; (c) WPD and
particular, or to everyone concerned, OPD, the War Plans Division of the
depending on the nature of the source. War Department General Staff and its
Thus, the establishment or clarification successor, the Operations Division; (d)
of policy by the War Department or ABC, the records of the Strategy and
Joint Chiefs of Staff would have no spe- Policy Group of the Operations Division;
cific addressee, and a memo for record (e) JB, the Joint Board; (f) OPD Exec,
no recipient but the files. the special collection maintained by the
4. Date. In some cases, such as radio Executive Office of OPD; (g) SWPA,
messages, the time may be an important the Southwest Pacific Area; (h) POA,
element in the identification of a docu- Pacific Ocean Areas; and (i) PTO, the
ment. When it is, this information is Pacific Theater of Operations, a file des-
included in the citation. The military ignation and not a theater command.
system for dates (7 December 1941) and This system and the abbreviations may
times (the 24-hour clock—0900 for 9:00 vary somewhat among offices and agen-
a.m. and 2100 for 9:00 p.m.) is used cies, and in different periods of time (the
throughout, in the text as well as the WPD records, for example, do not em-
footnotes. Navy radio messages are usu- ploy the decimal system), but the letter
ally identified by the month and a date- symbol and number usually provide suf-
time group, a 6-number group of which ficient information to locate the relevant
the first two represent the day of the file quickly.
month and the last four the time the The files themselves are often volumi-
message was sent.
5. Subject. Military usage dictates a
subject heading for certain types of docu- * For a description of the system, see War Depart-
ment Decimal File System, compiled under the direc-
ments, notably memoranda; others, such tion of The Adjutant General of the Army, revised
as letters, reports, and studies, may or edition (Washington, 1943), and supplements.
GUIDE TO FOOTNOTES 695
nous, consisting of several volumes (called committees. A typical example is the

sections), and any one numbered file may strategic plan for the defeat of Japan
be subdivided in a variety of ways—by developed in the spring of 1943. Start-
date, theater, country, and the like. ing in the Joint U.S. Strategic Commit-
Thus the entire file reference, including tee as JUSSC 40/2, it became JPS 67/4
symbol, number, date, area, and section, after the Joint Staff Planners had worked
is necessary to locate the document. it over. The Joint Chiefs took the plan
Once the particular document is found, with them to TRIDENT as JCS 287/1, and
the researcher's task is easy. Most of the it emerged finally from the Combined
files are indexed, and some offices, such Chiefs of Staff in May 1943 as CCS 220.
as the Operations Division, assigned a Though the final version differed from
case number to each document showing the first, it is still recognizable as basically
the relative position of that document the same study.
in the file. This information is indicated Joint and combined papers require
in the footnote whenever necessary. no further identification than the num-
Thus WPD 4439-5 refers to the fifth ber, date, and subject or title. Citations
case in the War Plans Division file 4439 of these documents, therefore, ordinarily
(an arbitrarily assigned number for a omit originator, recipient, and file refer-
subject heading). ence. The last item is omitted also in
Certain exceptions must be noted. footnote references to radio messages and
Among these, perhaps the most impor- certain other types of documents. Navy
tant for this volume are the documents messages are identified usually by date-
originating with the Joint Board, the time groups, and Army messages filed
Joint and Combined Chiefs of Staff, and in the Classified Message Center of The
their committees. These are usually Adjutant General's Office (and else-
identified by a letter symbol indicating where) by the date and CM-IN or CM-
the committee of origin (JPS for Joint OUT number assigned by that office.
Staff Planners, JSSC for Joint Strategic Finally, it has not been necessary to
Survey Committee, JWPC for Joint War furnish file references for letters, direc-
Plans Committee, CPS for Combined tives, and other types of documents
Staff Planners) or the Joint and Com- issued by The Adjutant General since
bined Chiefs themselves. The letter sym- these can be readily identified and lo-
bol is followed by a number representing cated in central files by date and AG
a subject, and frequently by a slash and symbol.
another number, indicating the num- Frequent use has been made of Japa-
bered version of that particular docu- nese sources throughout this volume.
ment. Thus, JPS 67/4, represents the No particular difficulty should be en-
fifth version of a study (assigned the countered in footnote references to these
number 67) prepared by the Joint Staff sources since most of them refer either
Planners. to (a) studies in the collection designated
The reader should be aware also that Japanese Studies in World War II (de-
a study may be known by different num- scribed fully in The Sources), by number
bers, acquired as it makes its way up and title; or (b) works published in
the hierarchy of joint and combined Japan and translated for the author.
No file references are required since and those prepared by an office or head-
both English and Japanese versions are quarters and not intended for publica-
available in the Office of the Chief of tion. The latter vary widely in size,
Military History. quality, and form, and are described in
The reader will note numerous refer- the bibliography. Where author and
ences to letters of recent origin addressed title are indicated, the manuscript is
to the Chief of Military History. These cited in the usual manner. Frequently,
letters represent, in effect, the comments authorship is not given or known, and
of many of the wartime commanders the manuscript is identified by title and
and staff officers on the present volume office of origin, with appropriate volume
in manuscript form. In their response and page references. In each case, the
to requests for comment, many of these location of the manuscript, or of the copy
officers furnished information not avail- used by the present author, is indicated,
able in the official records. This infor- since such manuscripts are like docu-
mation was used by the author in revising ments in that they can be found only
the volume, and the letters themselves in specific record collections or files.
are retained in a single file in OCMH The citation of published works and
as constituting a valuable source for the official records will present no problem
war in the Pacific. to the reader; these are cited in the cus-
One further type of source, manuscript tomary fashion and a list of most of the
histories, must be noted. These are of published sources used by the author or
two kinds: those intended for publica- useful for background will be found in
tion in the present series or elsewhere; the bibliography.
The Sources
The student of World War II is con- Introduction: Guide to the Records
fronted with an enormous body of rec-
ords and an imposing list of published Though the largest part of the total
works and official documents. For the body of military records can be safely
World War II years alone, the Army, it eliminated by the historian so far as his
has been estimated, has more than 17,000 purposes are concerned, the remainder
tons of records, with an undetermined constitutes a body of considerable mag-
but large quantity of prewar records nitude. Fortunately, there are a number
essential to an understanding of the war- of archival aids to enable him to identify
time period. When to this total is added the materials he needs and locate them
the extant records of the Navy, which in the various records depositories. The
has its own vast records depots filled most valuable of these aids is the 2-
with World War II records; the Air volume Federal Records of World War
Force, which has moved many of the rec- II (Washington, 1951) prepared by the
ords to its own depots; and the Marine National Archives. The second volume
Corps, the result is a truly staggering of this work deals exclusively with mili-
mass of paper. tary agencies and contains not only
Obviously a large part of this material descriptions of the records and their
is of a purely routine nature, important location as of 1950, but also brief his-
for accounting purposes and orderly ad- tories of the organizations that created
ministration but of little interest to the them, including the overseas commands.
student of war. He can further reduce It is the indispensable guide for all those
the total appreciably by eliminating the entering for the first time the strange
records of housekeeping activities of the world of military archives.2
numerous military installations estab- Federal Records of World War II
lished during the war at home and provides only the most general descrip-
abroad. The scope of his inquiry and tion of the vast body of records it sur-
the historian's own interests serve also veys. For more specific descriptions, the
to eliminate large bodies of records from student must turn to the inventories and
consideration. If his research is focused guides prepared from time to time by
on matters of strategy and organization, the National Archives and listed in the
as this volume is, he can safely ignore Guide to the Records in the National
the records and reports of all units but
those on the highest level; if it is focused Riper, "A Survey of Materials for the Study of Mili-
tary Management," American Political Science
on military operations, then the records Review, XLIX, No. 3 (September, 1955), 828-50.
and reports of the units involved become 2
For a general description of the problems involved
his primary sources.1 in the use of federal records, see Philip C. Brooks,
"The Historian's Stake in Federal Records," Missis-
1
An excellent brief account of the problems in- sippi Valley Historical Review, XLIII, No. 2 (Sep-
volved in the use of military records is Paul P. Van tember, 1956), 259-74.
Archives (Washington, 1948) and the War Department, and the present Office,
latest edition of the Publications of the Secretary of Defense. This new division
National Archives and Records Service of the National Archives, still located
(Washington, January 1961).3 temporarily in Alexandria, Virginia, will
The Army and Navy have their own henceforth administer all permanent rec-
guides to the records. These are not ords of the World War II and postwar
listed in any single publication as are periods transferred to the National Ar-
those of the National Archives, but can chives. Records for the earlier period
ordinarily be obtained without difficulty are already located in the Archives Build-
from the originating agencies, both of ing in Washington and are administered
which make provision for assistance, by the War Records Division.
within the limits of existing laws and The Army's former depository of pre-
regulations, to students of military war and World War II records at Kansas
affairs.4 City, containing largely unit and opera-
The major depository of records for tional records, and the Navy's deposi-
the World War II period, in addition tories comprising similar records located
to the services themselves, which still in Alexandria, Va., and Mechanicsburg,
hold some of the most important records Pa., are now administered by the GSA
of the war, is the World War II Records Federal Records Centers in those areas.
Division of the National Archives in The Navy continues to control the hold-
Alexandria, Virginia. Formerly the De- ings of its Operational Archives Branch
partmental Records Branch of the Adju- in Arlington, Va., while the Historical
tant General's Office, the World War II Branch, G-3, Headquarters, U.S. Marine
Records Division was transferred with Corps, maintains the archives for the
its records to the National Archives in Marine Corps.
1958. At the time of its transfer, the
Army's Departmental Records Branch The Records
was a joint records depository serving
headquarters agencies of both the Army Research for the present study of strat-
and the Air Force, as well as the former egy and command in the Pacific has
ranged widely over the records from the
highest levels to the comparatively low
3
See also Elizabeth Bethel, "Early Records of the level of division and corps in the theater,
War Department General Staff," American Archivist
(October, 1945), 241-7, and E. L. Huber, "War and from the early 1900's down to 1944.
Department Records in the National Archives," Through these records, the author has
Military Affairs (Winter, 1942), 247-54.
4
had an unrivaled opportunity to trace
Among the Army's publications are Guide to the
Records of the Adjutant General's Department, the approach of war and the emergence
1940-45 (1950); Guide to the Records of the Office of American and Japanese Strategy before
of the Secretary of War, 1939-46 (1949); Descriptive Pearl Harbor, and to follow closely the
List of Studies of the USAF Historical Division
(1956); Inventory of Certain Records of United States progress of the war from the lofty heights
Army Forces in the Far East and United States Forces of the Combined Chiefs of Staff and the
in the Philippines, July 1941-May 1942 (1952). The Japanese Imperial General Headquar-
Navy's contribution is a short pamphlet entitled A
Brief Guide to U.S. Naval History Sources in the ters, from the viewpoint of the Army and
Washington, D.C. Area (1957). Navy, from the vantage point of the
THE SOURCES 699
theater commanders, and, finally, from The Joint Board kept few records.
the level of the commanders on the field Those for the years 1903 to 1919 occupy
of battle. Wherever possible, he has altogether about half a file drawer in
viewed the war from both sides and the National Archives, where they can be
sought to find in the records the reasons used without restriction. Sparse as they
for both American and Japanese actions. are, these records, including correspond-
In some matters, the record was volumi- ence, minutes of meetings, memoranda,
nous; in others, so sparse as to require strategic studies and plans, contain
requests for information from the valuable material.
participants. The General Board of the Navy dealt
It is obviously impossible to describe with a variety of matters of the first
here all the records used directly or indi- importance and its records constitute
rectly in the preparation of this volume. an indispensable source for the study
For that, the reader will have to rely on of strategy during these years. Still classi-
the footnotes and the various guides fied, these records are located in the
noted above.5 This discussion, therefore, Navy's Operational Archives Branch in
is confined to those record collections Arlington and are controlled by the
considered most valuable for the study Naval History Division. The general
of Pacific strategy. records of the Navy Department for these
The sources for the study of strategy years (Record Group 80) are located in
in the prewar period are best considered the Navy Branch, War Records Division,
separately since they are maintained National Archives. These are well in-
and organized somewhat differently from dexed and in the custody of archivists
those dealing with World War II. It is whose intimate knowledge of the records
useful also, because of the reorganiza- greatly simplifies the task of research.
tion after World War I, to divide these Records of the early planning activi-
records into two general categories: (a) ties of the War Department General Staff
those for the period 1900 to 1919, and became part of the records of the Army
(b) those covering the years 1919 to 1942. War College. These as well as the rec-
During the earlier period strategic plan- ords of the Office of the Chief of Staff,
ning was the function mainly of the two and other staff divisions, altogether over
war colleges, the General Board of the 4,000 cubic feet of records, constitute
Navy, and the Joint Army-Navy Board; Record Group 165 of the National Ar-
in the latter period, of the War Plans chives holdings.6 Frequently overlooked
Divisions of the two services, and of the by the student of military affairs, this
reorganized Joint Board and its Joint collection contains the Army's plans for
Planning Committee, with the General a variety of situations, strategic studies,
Board playing a minor role. comments on plans developed by other
agencies, memoranda, and other docu-
ments of interest and value in any survey
5
He may also wish to consult the bibliographical
note in each of the companion volumes of the Pacific
6
subseries listed on p. iv, which describes not only the This collection is described in Preliminary Check-
operational records but also those pertaining to the list of the Records of the War Department General
strategic background of each campaign. Staff, prepared by Elizabeth Bethel, copy in OCMH.
of military strategy in the period 1903 War Plans collection in the World War
to 1919. II Records Division.
The record for the years after World With the entry of the United States
War I, especially those immediately pre- into war, existing agencies for planning
ceding Pearl Harbor, are indispensable were reorganized and greatly enlarged,
to an understanding of the war. Fortu- and new agencies established. Planning
nately, the records become fuller with activities increased sharply and the vol-
the passage of time. Those for the Joint ume of records grew at a rapid rate.
Board from 1919 to 1941, for example, Fortunately for the student, strategic
are fully ten times more voluminous planning in the Army was concentrated
than for the earlier period. A large part in the War Plans Division (redesignated
of this material has been declassified, and the Operations Division in March 1942),
transferred to the National Archives of which maintained excellent records of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The same not only its own activities but also those
material, with the valuable addition of of joint and combined committees.
supporting memoranda and studies re- These records, on which the author
flecting the points of view of the Army relied almost entirely for the story of
and Navy, can be found in the World the higher direction of the war in the
War II Records Division of the National Pacific, contain virtually a complete set
Archives in Alexandria. Though not of Joint and Combined Chiefs of Staff
the official record of the Joint Board, papers, radio messages to and from the
this collection represents the file of the theater commanders, official correspond-
Army members of the Joint Planning ence, memoranda, and strategic studies
Committee and is in some ways a more and plans, together with the background
valuable source than the original. and supporting documents.
The records of the Army War Plans The records of the Operations Divi-
Division constitute the best single col- sion, practically all of which (with the
lection for the prewar period. Located exception noted below) have been re-
in the World War II Records Division tired to the World War II Records
and carefully indexed by subject with Division of the National Archives, are
cross references, this large body of mate- maintained in separate groups. The
rial throws light on every major issue radio messages, the largest and most com-
facing the Army during these years. The plete collection outside the permanent
files are organized on a numerical system central file (microfilmed) of the Depart-
(not the Army decimal file system) in ment of the Army, form the OPD Mes-
which each number designates a partic- sage Center File. In it, are the incoming
ular subject. For identification the num- and outgoing messages, arranged by num-
bers are preceded by the symbol WPD, ber, for the entire period of the war.
and within each file the documents are In many ways, this collection is more
arranged chronologically by case num- convenient to use than the official file of
ber. The War Plans Division also main- the Staff Communications Office, Office
tained a full set of joint and Army plans, of the Chief of Staff, which, in addition,
supported by Development Files. Most maintained a Chief of Staff Log of mes-
of these are now in a special Obsolete sages between General Marshall and the
THE SOURCES 701
theater commanders. This log contains parable to that of the Operations

also the records of radio-telephone con- Division. Some of them are in the Wash-
versations (telecons) as well as the daily ington area, some in records centers in
reports from the theaters. different parts of the country, and some
The OPD Central File is the largest remain in the theater under control of
and most valuable of the Operations Di- successor commands. The records of the
vision's wartime records, probably the overseas commands have been further
most important single collection of scattered by distribution among the
World War II Army records dealing Army, Navy, and Air Force. The main
with strategy and policy. It is organized collections in the Federal Records Cen-
into two groups based on classification, ter Annex, Kansas City, are those of
and within each by subject under the General Headquarters, Southwest Pacific
Army decimal system, and by case num- Area, and its subordinate commands, of
ber. In each case the number is preceded Headquarters, South Pacific Area, and
by the identifying symbol OPD. Joint of the Hawaiian Department and its suc-
and combined records, including those cessor commands. The records of Ad-
of the subordinate committees and of miral Nimitz' headquarters are divided
the wartime meetings with the Allies, between the naval depository in Arling-
together with the studies and memo- ton and the Federal Records Center in
randa prepared by officers in the Mechanicsburg, Pennsylvania. Some op-
Operations Division, form still another erational records are also in the GSA
separate collection of the wartime OPD Center in Alexandria. Marine Corps
records — perhaps the most important records, as indicated earlier, are retained
outside the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It was for the most part in the Historical
collected by the Strategy and Policy Branch, G-3, Headquarters, U.S. Marine
Group of OPD, and unlike other records Corps.
of OPD is identified by the symbol ABC, The records of General MacArthur's
combined with a number assigned ac- command are of perhaps chief interest
cording to the Army decimal system. to the student of Army planning in the
The Executive Office of OPD main- Pacific. Initially, these were divided be-
tained an informal collection of records tween the United States and Australia,
on matters of a particularly sensitive those for Allied Land Forces (and cer-
nature that required special handling. tain other specified records) going to the
These were not maintained or organized latter. Since most U.S. ground forces
in any systematic way, but there exists served under Sixth Army (ALAMO
an index of the files in the collection. Force), this distribution left the bulk
Located in the Office of the Chief of of the ground operational records for
Military History at the time the author the Americans, and these are divided
used them, the Executive Office Files between the World War II Records Divi-
were scheduled for early transfer to the sion in Alexandria and in the Federal
World War II Records Division in Records Center Annex in Kansas City.
Alexandria. The records of the Allied Air Forces,
There is no convenient collection of General Kenney's command, were re-
records for the overseas commands com- turned to the United States and are
filed with those of the Fifth Air Force sas City and the World War II Records
and the Far East Air Force in Kansas Division, with the bulk of the files in
City, where the records of the Seventh Kansas City but the more important
and Thirteenth Air Forces are located. ones in Alexandria. The letters of
Selected portions of these records have Generals Harmon and Richardson to
since been moved to the Air Historical Marshall and officers in the Operations
Office at Maxwell Field, Montgomery, Division are also in the OPD files, with
Alabama. copies in the Central Files of The Adju-
The early records of MacArthur's tant General's Office, which also contain
command in the Philippines, U.S. Army much of the wartime correspondence of
Forces in the Far East, were retained the Army headquarters in the Pacific.
as a special collection in The Adjutant These files, too, are in the World War
General's Office, since transferred to the II Records Division. While there may
World War II Records Division. A por- appear to be a division of the records
tion of the headquarters files of GHQ of Army overseas commands between the
went to Kansas City, but the important Kansas City Federal Records Center
G-3 Journals are in the World War II Annex and the World War II Records
Records Division. Not all of the records Division, the records in custody of the
of MacArthur's wartime command have latter are mainly those which were for-
been returned to the United States, or, warded to higher headquarters during
if they have, their location seems to be the war. The retained organizational
unknown. Among these records are the copies will be found in Kansas City.
files of the Chief of Staff and of the G-3
Planning Division. Manuscript Histories
Special mention should be made of the
notes taken by the Historical Section of There are a great number of unpub-
MacArthur's headquarters. These con- lished manuscripts available to the stu-
sist of many thousands of cards contain- dent of World War II. Often these
ing precis of the plans, studies, and works were prepared by highly qualified
important correspondence of the head- scholars as part of an official program
quarters for the entire period of the war, that was never intended for publication.
organized chronologically and by sub- Even when their authors were not so
ject, with cross references. A part of qualified, these manuscripts represent a
this collection is now in the possession careful survey of a large body of records,
of the Office of the Chief of Military backed by official sanction, and often
History, which has also a further selec- with the co-operation of participants in
tion, typed and bound in a volume en- the events described. Thus, they may
titled Historical Record Index Cards, not only prove valuable as a guide to the
GHQ SWPA. records, but may supplement the records
The records of U.S. Army Forces in the themselves.
South Pacific Area, General Harmon's The number of manuscript histories
command, and of the Army headquarters dealing with World War II is very large
in Hawaii are distributed between the indeed. Virtually every major agency
Federal Records Center Annex in Kan- in the War Department and every major
THE SOURCES 703
command in the United States and over- volumes of which are completed.9 This
seas prepared a history of its activities work, even in its incomplete form, is
during World War II. The Naval His- the most accurate and detailed descrip-
tory Division alone has almost 300 such tion of the organization of the high com-
unpublished histories. The Army's Of- mand in World War II known to this
fice of the Chief of Military History has author. Its publication would be a real
many more, and has eased the task of service to scholars. The unfinished
the researcher by preparing a series of manuscript of the late Capt. Tracy B.
Historical Manuscript Accession Lists.7 Kittredge, USN, Evolution of Global
The Air Force, too, has a large number Strategy, also contains much of interest
of these manuscripts, and, like OCMH, and value to the student of Pacific strat-
publishes periodically a guide to these egy, especially for the prewar period.
and other studies. Captain Kittredge, a lifelong student of
By far the most valuable and, profes- naval affairs, was on the staff of U.S.
sionally, among the most competent of Naval Forces, Europe, before he joined
the unpublished histories are those pre- the Joint Chiefs of Staff Historical Divi-
pared by the Historical Division of the sion, and during that period prepared
Joint Chiefs of Staff. For Pacific strat- an account of U.S.-British Naval Co-
egy, the two volumes of Lt. Grace P. operation, 1939-1945, that cannot be
Hayes are unsurpassed.8 Carefully and ignored by any student of World War
fully documented, well organized and II strategy. A copy is on file in OCMH.
presented, these two volumes present a Space prohibits discussion of the
detailed and accurate account of the numerous manuscripts prepared by staff
role of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the agencies in Washington and filed now
Pacific war. Though the narrative is in the historical offices of the Army and
focused on the Joint Chiefs and their Navy. The Navy manuscripts are espe-
committees, it contains much Army and cially useful for the Pacific war, but
Navy material as well. Like all the man- many of the Army manuscripts also con-
uscripts prepared by the Historical Di- tain material dealing with the Pacific.
vision of the Joint Chiefs, Lieutenant Histories were prepared also in the
Hayes' two volumes are classified and overseas commands, and these constitute
available only to those with proper a primary source for the student of the
clearance and access. war in the Pacific since they are based
Two other manuscripts in the Joint on theater records and represent the
Chiefs historical series should be noted theater point of view. The program in
in connection with Pacific strategy and MacArthur's area was perhaps the most
command. The first is the projected ambitious, though the results in terms
3-volume work of Vernon E. Davis on of quality are disappointing. In addition
the organization of the Joint Chiefs, two to a 2-volume over-all history covering
Allied and Japanese operations in the
7
The student of Pacific commands will be inter- Southwest Pacific, it produced adminis-
ested primarily in No. 5 of this series, dated
9
1August 1957. Vol. I: Origins of the Joint and Combined Chiefs
8
Vol. I: Pearl Harbor Through TRIDENT (1953); of Staff; Vol. II: Development of the JCS Committee
Vol. II: The Advance to Victory (1954). Structure.
trative histories of USAFFE, the Services however, is undeniable. There are three
of Supply, and intelligence activities as such narratives, one by the first com-
well as a number of monographs, all on mander of Army forces in Australia, one
file in the Office of Military History. by General Harmon, and one by
Greatest interest, perhaps, attaches to Admiral Halsey—all on file in OCMH.11
the two over-all volumes, known as the
MacArthur History. Prepared after the The Japanese
war under the direction of Maj. Gen.
Charles A. Willoughby, these volumes The Japanese side of the war, though
are based on extensive research in Allied not as fully documented as the German,
and Japanese records. A very limited is fairly well understood and becoming
number of copies — five in all — were better known with each passing year.
printed in Japan, and one of these, with Aside from the documents captured by
thirty-two footlockers of supporting ma- Allied forces on the field of battle,12
terial, is on file in the World War II there are a number of other sources
Records Division in Alexandria. from which the Japanese story can be
Historians were assigned also to Gen- reconstructed. The chief of these, in
eral Harmon's headquarters, and they the absence of records destroyed by the
prepared during the war a multivolume air raids over Japan and by the Japanese
narrative covering both the organiza- themselves, is the series of monographs
tional and operational aspects of the war known as Japanese Studies in World
in the South Pacific. Though prepared War II. Prepared by former Japanese
independently, it was incorporated into Army and Navy officers in Tokyo after
the history prepared in Hawaii by the the war working under the direction of
historical section of General Richard- the Historical Section, G-2, of the Far
son's headquarters. This larger work East Command, these monographs cover
consists of many parts, including a nar- almost every aspect of the war in con-
rative account of Army forces in the siderable detail. Where available, rec-
theater, a record of Army-Navy relations ords were used in their preparation,
and of Army participation in operations, but more frequently the studies are
and separate histories of staff sections
and the major subordinate commands.10 11
Maj. Gen. Julian F. Barnes, The Organization
In a separate category from manu- and Activities of the U.S. Army Forces in Australia;
Lt. Gen. Millard F. Harmon, The Army in the South
scripts prepared by historians in uniform Pacific, Admiral William F. Halsey, Jr., Narrative
are those written by senior commanders Account of the South Pacific Campaign, 20 April
as a record of their contribution to vic- 1942-15 June 1944.
12
Captured documents are not covered here,
tory. In a sense, these are not histories though the author has made occasional use of them.
at all, though they are cast in historical There is no single collection of such documents
form, but primary sources. Their value, known to the author, but they can usually be found
filed with G-2 and G-3 Journals and in the intelli-
gence reports of the various commands in the theater
10
History of United States Army Forces, Middle and in Washington. The largest collection of such
Pacific and Predecessor Commands During World material is in the G-2 Library, War Department
War II, 7 December 1941-2 September 1945, Hist General Staff. The most important are noted in the
Sec G-2, USAFMIDPAC, 33 volumes. Copy in bibliographical notes of the volumes in the Pacific
OCMH. subseries.
THE SOURCES 705
based on recollections of the officers in- monographs in the Japanese Studies and
volved, on personal diaries, and on infor- in its documentation furnished an
mation furnished the authors. The excellent guide to the series.
subjects covered range widely and in- Another major contribution to the
clude politico-military matters as well as study of the war in the Pacific is the
strategy, logistics, and administration work of the U.S. Strategic Bombing Sur-
and operations of Japanese ground, air, vey (USSBS). The result of this survey,
and naval forces.13 undertaken after the war in both Ger-
In addition to these studies, the Far many and Japan to measure the effect
East Command assembled from a variety of strategic bombardment, was a series
of sources a unique collection of Impe- of published reports dealing with all
rial General Headquarters directives and aspects of the Japanese war effort, a
orders for the wartime period. Alto- Summary Report (Pacific War), and
gether, there are seventeen volumes in two volumes of interrogations of Japa-
the collection, nine of which contain nese officials.15 The last represent only
directives of Army Section and Navy a portion of the interrogations con-
Section of Imperial General Headquar- ducted by USSBS; the remainder are in
ters and the rest, Army and Navy orders. the National Archives with USSBS rec-
In addition, the Historical Section of ords. Japanese shipping losses during
the Far East Command prepared another the war are covered in another publica-
eight volumes of interrogations and tion, the work of the Joint Army-Navy
statements of Japanese wartime officials.14 Assessment Committee, published by the
All in all, the contribution of the Far Navy Department in 1947 and revised
East Command to the study of the Japa- since.
nese side of the war represents the most For the prewar period, the best single
valuable single collection of Japanese source for the study of the steps by which
material in existence. Japan entered the war is the Interna-
The same officers who produced the tional Military Tribunal for the Far
Japanese Studies in World War II also East. The testimony and exhibits of the
prepared a history of Japanese Opera- Tribunal, stored in the World War II
tions in the Southwest Pacific Area, Records Division, represent an invalu-
which forms the second volume of the able collection of primary source material
MacArthur History. Though limited to for almost every phase of Japanese his-
only one area of the Pacific, this work tory in the decade preceding Pearl Har-
is probably the most valuable Japanese bor. The judgment of the Tribunal
account of the war. It is based on the issued in November 1948, itself a multi-
13
For a list of these monographs, see the accession
volume work, is an additional source of
list prepared by OCMH, which has on file copies of considerable value. Nor should the stu-
both the Japanese and English versions. There are
15
about 180 volumes in the series, a number of which Among the titles of USSBS publications are: Air
have been reproduced for limited distribution. The Campaigns of the Pacific War (1947); Employment
series is unclassified and available for use in OCMH. of Forces Under the Southwest Pacific Command
14
Personal History Statements, 2 vols.; Interroga- (1947); The Campaigns of the Pacific War (1946),
tions of Japanese Officials on World War II, 2 vols.; which deals exclusively with naval engagements;
Statements of Japanese Officials on World War II, Japanese Air Power (1946); and Oil in Japan's War
4 vols. (1946).
dent overlook the thirty-nine volumes Command and can be considered virtu-
of the Hearings Before the Joint Com- ally a primary source for the Pacific war.
mittee on the Investigation of the Pearl Useful also for a high-level view of the
Harbor Attack (79th Cong., 2d sess.), war as seen from Tokyo is Saburo Haya-
which contain many Japanese docu- shi's KOGUN: The Japanese Army in
ments, including the diary of Prince the Pacific War (Quantico, Va.: The
Konoye. Marine Corps Association, 1959) and a
One further collection of Japanese description of Japan during the war
records should be noted, though this was years entitled The Lost War (New York:
not examined by the author. This is a Alfred A. Knopf, 1946) by Masuo Kato.
collection seized by U.S. authorities after Available also in English are several
the war and containing records of the excellent accounts of Japanese naval op-
Japanese Army and Navy Ministries dat- erations, including a particularly fine
ing from the turn of the century. Before study, Midway: The Battle that Doomed
these records were returned to Japan in Japan (Annapolis: U.S. Naval Institute,
the fall of 1958, microfilm copies of cer- 1955) by Mitsuo Fuchida and Masatake
tain documents were made by the Naval Okumiya.18
History Division and of others by a The library of secondary works and
group of scholars under a grant from the reference books on Japanese military
Ford Foundation. The latter documents and political institutions is large, and
are on file in the National Archives.16 has no place in the present survey. But
The student of the Pacific War inter- it may not be inappropriate to call atten-
ested in the Japanese story will find a tion to several works particularly help-
number of published works by partici- ful to an understanding of the role of
pants and by observers of the Japanese Imperial General Headquarters in the
scene of considerable value. The most formulation of policy and strategy and
important of these is the 4-volume work of the military in the national life of
of Takushiro Hattori, a wartime colonel Japan. The most recent of these is Yale
and one of the chief Army planners in Candee Maxon's Control of Japanese
the general staff.17 Hattori was also head Foreign Policy: A Study of Civil-Military
of the group of ex-Army officers who Rivalry (Berkeley: University of Cali-
worked on the second volume of the fornia Press, 1957), which draws heavily
MacArthur History and his work repre- on Japan's World War II experience.
sents a fuller version of that volume, Other excellent studies in the same field
unedited by American hands. In this are Hugh Byas, Government by Assassi-
sense, it is more revealing than the Japa- nation (New York: Alfred A. Knopf,
nese history prepared by the Far East 1942); Hillis Lory, Japan's Military
Masters (New York: The Viking Press,
16
The original collection, comprising 7,000 linear 1943); and Kenneth W. Colegrove, Mili-
feet, is described by James W. Morley, "Check List of
Seized Japanese Records in the National Archives,"
18
Far Eastern Quarterly (May, 1950). See also Masatake Okumiya and Jiro Horikoshi,
17
The Complete History of the Greater East Asia Zero! (New York: Ballantine Books, 1956); and
War, 4 vols. (Dai Toa Senso Zenshi, Tokyo: Masu Mochitsura Hashimoto, Sunk: The Story of the Japa-
Publishing Co., 1953). The four volumes were nese Submarine Fleet, 1942-1945 (London: Cassell &
translated for OCMH and are on file there. Co., Ltd., 1954).
THE SOURCES 707
tarism in Japan (Boston and New York: readable and thoroughly reliable works
World Peace Foundation, 1936).19 For of Douglas L. Oliver, The Pacific Islands
a description of Japan's wartime econ- (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
omy, the student will find Jerome B. 1952) , the Geography of the Pacific
Cohen's Japan's Economy in War and (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1951)
Reconstruction (Minneapolis: Univer- edited by O. W. Freeman, The Pacific
sity of Minnesota Press, 1949) thoroughly World (New York: W. W. Norton &
reliable and complete. Co., 1944) edited by Fairfield Osborn,
or Joseph C. Furnas, Anatomy of Para-
Reference Works dise (New York: W. Sloan Associates,
1948). The best studies of exploration
Certain standard reference works will are J. C. Beaglehole, The Exploration
also be useful. To find his way in the of the Pacific (London: A. & C. Black,
vast Pacific Ocean and in areas of the Ltd., 1934) and James A. Williamson,
world with which he may be unfamiliar, Cook and the Opening of the Pacific
the student can turn to an atlas—any (New York: The Macmillan Company,
standard atlas will do. But this is only 1948).
an introduction; for a more detailed Most of the chronologies of World
guide he will have to turn elsewhere. War II are of limited usefulness for
Maps in abundance will be found in all military purposes. There are, however,
the volumes of the Pacific subseries of several important exceptions: Mary H.
UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD Williams, compiler, Chronology: 1941-
WAR II and in other series. The Allied 1945, UNITED STATES ARMY IN
Geographic Section, G-2 of GHQ WORLD WAR II (Washington, 1959);
SWPA, published during the war well United States Naval Chronology, World
over one hundred Terrain Studies, Ter- War II, prepared by the Naval History
rain Handbooks, and Special Reports Division (Washington, 1955); Chronol-
covering all areas of the entire region ogy of World War II, prepared by the
encompassed in General MacArthur's Air War College at Maxwell Field, and,
command. The standard reference work finally, Chronology of Events in the
on the Pacific is R. W. Robson, The Southwest Pacific Area, prepared in
Pacific Islands Handbook, 1944, pub- General MacArthur's headquarters. In-
lished in a North American edition by formation about Army units serving in
the MacMillan Company (New York, the Pacific can be found in Order of
1946). The 1944 edition includes a Battle of U.S. Army Ground Forces in
chronology of the war and its effect on World War II: Pacific Theater of Op-
each of the islands in the Pacific. In erations. Prepared in the Office of Mili-
addition, the student may wish to con- tary History, this volume is as yet
sult for historical background, as well unpublished but a limited number of
as geographic information, the extremely copies are available.
Statistical data on a variety of subjects
19
Two reference hooks, often overlooked though have been compiled but are not yet
readily available, are The Japan Year Book, and the
War Department Handbook on Japanese Military
consolidated in any single work. Army
Forces (TM-E 30 -480). strength and casualties figures can be
found in Strength of the Army (STM- as did the author: Ray S. Cline, Wash-
30), prepared in The Adjutant General's ington Command Post: The Operations
Office, and in Army Battle Casualties Division (1951); Stetson Conn and
and Non-Battle Deaths in World War II, Byron Fairchild, The Framework of
Final Report, prepared under the direc- Hemisphere Defense (1960); Richard
tion of the Office of the Comptroller, De- M. Leighton and Robert W. Coakley,
partment of the Army. Naval casualties, Global Logistics and Strategy, 1940-1943
including Marine, can be obtained from (1953) and a second volume in prepara-
The History of the Medical Department tion covering the years 1943-1945;
of the United States Navy in World Maurice Matloff and Edwin M. Snell,
War II, 2 vols. (Washington, 1953-54) Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare,
Other statistical collections containing 1941-1942 (1953), and a second volume,
material on the Pacific are Statistical for the years 1943-1944 (1959), by Mr.
Review, World War II (1946), prepared Matloff alone; Mark Skinner Watson,
by the Control Division Army Service Chief of Staff: Prewar Plans and Prepa-
Forces, and a volume in preparation for rations (1950); Charles F. Romanus and
the Army series and available in incom- Riley Sunderland, Stilwell's Mission to
plete form in OCMH, as are the other China (1953) and Stilwell's Command
references noted above. This last work Problems (1956). One other publication
is tentatively titled Statistics and is being of the Office of the Chief of Military
prepared under the direction of Theo- History should be noted, Command
dore E. Whiting in the Office of the Decisions, a collection of essays by pres-
Comptroller. ent and former members of the office,
published originally by Harcourt, Brace
Official Publications and Company (New York, 1959), and,
with an introduction by Kent R. Green-
Official publications dealing with the field and several additional essays, by the
war include the published histories of Government Printing Office in 1960.
each of the services and of the Allies, the The historical program of the U.S.
reports of the wartime chiefs and major Air Force produced seven volumes deal-
commanders, and official collections of ing with World War II when the Air
documents. There is little need to note Forces was a part of the Army, Unlike
here the numerous titles of the official the Army series, of which it was a part,
historical programs; they are readily the "Army Air Forces in World War II"
available and not all of them are relevant was published by the University of Chi-
to this study. The Pacific volumes of cago Press. Each volume in the series is
the present series, UNITED STATES the work of many hands, ably brought
ARMY IN WORLD WAR II, prepared together by the editors, Wesley Frank
in the Office of the Chief of Military Craven and James Lea Cate. Four of
History and published by the Govern- the seven volumes contain material bear-
ment Printing Office, have already been ing on the Pacific: Plans and Early
noted, but there are additional volumes Operations: January 1939 to August
in this series the student will find ex- 1942 (1948), The Pacific—Guadalcanal
tremely helpful in his study of strategy, to Saipan: August 1942 to July 1944
THE SOURCES 709
(1950), The Pacific: Matterhorn to Nag- lications on World War II. Its program
asaki, June 1944 to August 1945 (1953), was envisaged as consisting of two phases
and Men and Planes (1955). —first, the preparation of monographs
The Navy's historical program for on each campaign in which the Marine
World War II did not contemplate the Corps participated, and second, a 5-vol-
publication of a series, but by arrange- ume series entitled "History of U.S.
ment with Samuel Eliot Morison, then Marine Corps Operations in World War
Professor of History at Harvard, a semi- II," all to be published by the Govern-
official "History of United States Naval ment. Printing Office. The first phase,
Operations in World War II" was under- which produced fifteen monographs, has
taken, to be published by Little, Brown been completed and an excellent start
and Company in Boston. At the present was made on the second phase with the
writing, this series of fourteen volumes publication in 1958 of the first volume
is almost completed, with only one vol- of the series carrying the Marine story
ume remaining to be written.20 Though through the Guadalcanal Campaign.
largely replaced by Admiral Morison's The official historical programs of our
work, the classified volumes published Allies during World War II have pro-
by the Office of Naval Intelligence dur- duced a number of volumes on the Pa-
ing the war are still useful. These vol- cific war. Of first importance is the
umes, written by competent historians British series "History of the Second
in uniform, form the series known as World War" edited by J. R. M. Butler
ONI Combat Narratives and cover vir- and published by Her Majesty's Station-
tually every naval engagement for the ery Office. To date, two volumes of a
first two years of the war. The Navy projected five have been published on
has also published two volumes dealing the war against Japan, and four of a pro-
with logistics in the Pacific that the stu- jected six on grand strategy. Though
dent of the war will find most useful: undocumented, these volumes are
Rear Adm. Worrall R. Carter, USN among the best yet published on the
(Ret.), Beans, Bullets, and Black Oil: war.21 The Australian series, like the
The Story of Fleet Logistics Afloat . . . British, is organized into separate sub-
(Washington, 1953); and Building the series by service but does not include a
Navy's Bases in World War II, 2 vols. series on strategy. Two of the Army
(Washington, 1947). volumes, one on air operations and one
The Historical Branch of the Marine on the Navy have been published thus
Corps has to its credit a long list of pub- far in Canberra, with a total of three
20
The volumes dealing with the Pacific war are: 21
The two volumes on Japan are: The Loss of
The Rising Sun in the Pacific, 1931-April 1942 Singapore (London, 1957) and India's Most Danger-
(1948), Coral Sea, Midway and Submarine Actions, ous Hour (1958), both by Maj. Gen. S. Woodburn
May 1942-August 1942 (1950), The Struggle for Kirby, et al. The most useful of the strategy volumes
Guadalcanal, August 1942-February 1943 (1950), for the Pacific war are: J. R. M. Butler, Grand Strat-
Breaking the Bismarcks Barrier, 22 July 1942-1 May egy: September 1939-June 1941 (1957) and John
1944 (1950), Aleutians, Gilberts and Marshalls, June Ehrman, Grand Strategy, August 1943-September
1942-April 1944 (1951), New Guinea and the Mari- 1944 (1956). One other volume in the British series
anas, March 1944-August 1944 (1953), Leyte, that should be consulted is S. W. Roskill, The War
1944 (1958), and Liberation of the Philippines: at Sea, projected in three volumes of which two have
Luzon, Mindanao, the Visayas, 1944-1945 (1959). been published.
more still to come. The official history prepare final reports comparable to those
of New Zealand forces in the war against of General Eisenhower for the European
Japan projects only one volume for the theater, but there are reports from some
Pacific and this has already been pub- of the British commanders engaged in
lished. Finally, the Dutch have published operations against the Japanese, notably
an account of their own operations in those of General Wavell on "ABDA-
the Netherlands Indies in five volumes, COM" (1942) in OCMH, and of Maj.
two of which deal with the prewar Gen. E. M. Maltby, "Operations in Hong
period.22 Kong, 8-25 December 1941," Supple-
The number of official publications ment to the London Gazette, January
issued by the services and other agencies 29, 1948. Nor should the student over-
of the government during and immedi- look the reports of Generals Marshall
ately after the war is enormous. These and Arnold to the Secretary of War, and
cover such a wide variety of subjects and of Admiral King to the Secretary of the
are so uneven in quality and reliability Navy. These appeared in several forms
that it would be impractical to discuss and were widely distributed, appearing
them here. But no survey of the sources finally in a single volume, edited by
for the prewar period would be complete Walter Millis, as The War Reports of
without noting the contributions of the General of the Army George C. Marshall,
State Department in its Foreign Rela- General of the Army H. H. Arnold, and
tions volumes dealing with Japan and Fleet Admiral Ernest J. King (Philadel-
the Far East and in the wartime Peace phia and New York: J. B. Lippincott
and War, United States Foreign Policy, Company, 1947).
1931-1941 (Washington, 1943). These
contain documents of prime importance Memoirs and Biography
to a study of U.S. entry into the war and
complement the published volumes of Second to the records in importance
the Pearl Harbor investigation, which are the memoirs and biographical litera-
no student can afford to ignore.23 The ture of the war. On the highest level are
reports of the wartime commanders must The Public Papers and Addresses of
be noted also. Unfortunately, the Amer- Franklin D. Roosevelt, 13 vols. (New
ican commanders in the Pacific did not York: Random House, 1938-1950) and
22
biographies of Roosevelt and the Roose-
The Australian volumes are Lionel Wigmore,
The Japanese Thrust (Canberra: Australian War
velt era. The most valuable of the biog-
Memorial, 1957), Dudley McCarthy, Southwest Pa- raphies is Robert E. Sherwood's Roosevelt
cific Area — First Year: Kokoda To Wau (1959), and Hopkins: An Intimate History (New
G. Hermon Gili, Royal Australian Navy, 1939-42
(1957), and George Odgers, Air War Against Japan
York: Harper & Brothers, 1948). The
(1957). The New Zealand official history by Oliver A. volumes of Winston Churchill's "The
Gillespie, is entitled simply The Pacific (Wellington: Second World War" contain much valu-
War History Branch, Department of Internal Affairs,
1952); the 5-volume Dutch series "Nederlands-Indie
able material on the Pacific. Though
Contra Japan" (1949-1957). Henry L. Stimson did not figure prom-
23
Pearl Harbor Attack: Hearing Before the Joint inently in the shaping of U.S. strategy,
Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor
Attack, 39 pts., 79th Cong., 2d sess. (Washington,
his book, written with McGeorge Bundy,
1946). On Active Service in Peace and War
THE SOURCES 711
(New York: Harper & Brothers, 1948), be considered virtually as authorized

will prove most useful. biographies.25 Less favorable to Mac-
On the military side of the high com- Arthur is the work of the journalist-
mand, three of the members of the Joint historian team of Richard H. Rovere
Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Leahy, Admiral and Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., written
King, and General Arnold have written at the time of MacArthur's relief in 1951
their memoirs.24 Of these, the most use- and called The General and the Presi-
ful for the Pacific war is King's volume. dent, and the Future of American For-
General Marshall never wrote his mem- eign Policy (New York: Farrar, Straus
oirs, but a definitive 3-volume biography and Young, 1951). John Gunther has
undertaken with Marshall's consent and turned his talents also to The Riddle of
co-operation, is in preparation by Forrest MacArthur (New York: Harper &
C. Pogue, Research Director of the Brothers, 1951) to produce a fairly well-
George C. Marshall Foundation. Until balanced and impartial account of the
it appears, the student will have to rely general. Other journalists such as Clark
on two journalistic biographies: William Lee and Frazier Hunt have tried their
Frye, Marshall, Citizen Soldier (New hand on this difficult subject, and the re-
York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1947), and Robert sults, though readable, do not add much
Payne, The Marshall Story (New York: to our understanding of the complex
Prentice-Hall, 1951). Finally, the stu- character of General MacArthur. The
dent will find worthwhile material on only other Pacific area commander whose
the Pacific in that portion of General story has appeared in print to date is
Eisenhower's Crusade in Europe (New Admiral Halsey, who collaborated with
York: Doubleday and Company, 1948), Joseph Byran to write Admiral Halsey's
dealing with his tour of duty in the Op- Story (New York: Whittlesey House,
erations Division of the War Department 1947).
General Staff, to which he was assigned Below the level of theater commander,
in December 1941 primarily because of the number of memoirs increases sub-
his earlier association with General stantially. Virtually all of MacArthur's
MacArthur. senior subordinates have told their
The senior commanders in the Pacific stories, perhaps because they were so in-
are well represented in the memoirs and adequately told during the war. General
biographical literature of the war. As Brereton, who commanded the Far East
one would expect, General MacArthur has Air Force in the Philippines, produced
been the favorite subject of the biogra- The Brereton Diaries (New York:
phers. Two of these were officers on his William Morrow and Company, 1946);
staff, closely associated with him during Wainwright, with the assistance of Bob
the war and after, and their volumes may Considine, General Wainwright's Story
24 25
Fleet Adm. William D. Leahy, I Was There (New Maj. Gen. Charles A. Willoughby and John
York: Whittlesey House, 1950); Ernest J. King and Chamberlin, MacArthur 1941-1951 (New York: Mc-
Walter Muir Whitehill, Fleet Admiral King (New Graw-Hill Book Co., Inc., 1954); Courtney Whitney,
York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1952); Henry H. Arnold, MacArthur: His Rendezvous with Destiny (New
Global Mission (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1949). York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1956).
(New York: Doubleday and Company, would be a tedious and unrewarding

1945). General Kenney, Allied Air exercise, and there is no need to do so
Forces Commander, told his story in for there are several excellent bibliogra-
General Kenney Reports (New York: phies to these histories. The student can
Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1949), and the consult these for any unit or vessels in
major ground force commanders, Gen- which he may be interested. Major
erals Krueger and Eichelberger, theirs credit for the preparation of the bibliog-
in From Down Under to Nippon (Wash- raphies belongs to C. E. Dornbusch of
ington: Combat Forces Press, 1953) and the New York Public Library, who has
Our Jungle Road to Tokyo (New York: made a specialty of unit histories and
The Viking Press, 1950). gathered for the library the largest
For some unexplained reason, naval collection of such histories outside
commanders are conspiciously absent Washington.26
from the list. We have no memoirs from
Admiral Nimitz, Admiral Spruance, Ad- General Works and Special Studies
miral Sherman, or any of the other senior
naval officers in the Pacific except Halsey. The task of the student of World War
There is a biography, The Magnificent II is made more difficult by the fact that
Mitscher (New York: W. W. Norton and much of the most useful material on the
Company, 1954), by Theodore Taylor Pacific war appears in article form in
and an account by the Marine General journals that are not indexed in such
Holland M. Smith, with Percy Finch, standard references as the Reader's Guide
entitled Coral and Brass (New York: to Periodical Literature.27 Some of it,
Charles Scribner's Sons, 1949). however, can be found in the National
Defense Review, issued by the Army
Unit Histories Library from 1947 to 1955, and the
Periodical Index of the Air University
The histories of units, ranging in size Library. For articles and books pub-
from separate regiments and lower to lished during the war years, there are
field armies and army groups, are most two useful guides, one compiled by
useful for operational and administra- Henry O. Spier entitled World War II
tive history, and in some cases they may
26
prove of value for other purposes. Vir- For Army units, see Unit Histories of World
War II (1950), issued by the Office of the Chief of
tually all separate units prepared a his- Military History; Unit Histories of World War II
tory of one kind or another during the and After: United States Army (1953), issued by The
war, since regulations required them to Adjutant General; and C. E. Dornbusch, complier,
Histories of American Army Units, World Wars I
do so. These are on file in the World and II and Korean Conflict (1956). For naval and
War II Records Division and the Kansas Marine units, see Post-War Souvenir Books and Unit
City Federal Records Center Annex, Histories of the Navy, Marine Corps, and Construc-
tion Battalions (1953), compiled by Mr. Dornbusch
where they can be consulted readily. and issued by the Naval History Division.
In addition to these unpublished his- 27
See Max L. Marshall, A Survey of Military Peri-
tories, there are a great number of pub- odicals, an M.A. thesis prepared at the University of
lished histories of units and, for the Missouri, 1952, which describes eighty-nine military
periodicals. A copy can be found in the Army Library
Navy, of ships of all types. To list them in the Pentagon.
THE SOURCES 713
in Our Magazines and Books, September Though there are few general accounts
1939-September 1945 (New York: The of the Pacific war covering both the high-
Stuyvesant Press Corp., 1945), and one level story and the operations of all
by the Legislative Reference Service, services, there are a number of works
Library of Congress, a serial entitled recounting the contributions of a single
Bibliographies of the World at War, service or type of unit. In this category,
issued in 1942 and 1943. the Army, including the Air Forces,
Valuable also are the bibliographical comes off a poor third to the Marines and
sections of various military journals. the Navy.29 For the Marines, we have at
Military Affairs, the quarterly journal of least two excellent unofficial histories,
the American Military Institute with Frank O. Hough, The Island War (Phil-
headquarters in Washington, contains in adelphia and New York: J. B. Lippin-
each issue a section entitled "Military cott Co., 1947) and Fletcher Pratt, The
Library," and Military Review, the Marines' War (New York: W. Sloane
monthly journal of the Command and Associates, 1946), a scholarly study writ-
General Staff College, abstracts the lead- ten at Princeton University by Jeter A.
ing articles from military journals Isely and Philip A. Crowl, The U.S.
throughout the world. Naval literature is Marines and Amphibious War, Its The-
covered in The American Neptune under ory, and Its Practice in the Pacific
the title "Recent Writings in Maritime (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University
History," prepared by Prof. Robert G. Press, 1951), a History of Marine Corps
Albion of Harvard. Aviation in World War II (Washing-
For general works on World War II ton: Combat Forces Press, 1952) by
the student will find useful the Harvard Robert Sherrod, a number of fine divi-
Guide to American History (Cam- sion histories, and such outstanding
bridge: Harvard University Press, examples of combat narrative as Herbert
1955). The Writings on American His- L. Merillat's The Island (Boston:
tory, published annually by the Ameri- Houghton Mifflin Co., 1944) and Richard
can Historical Association, contains a Tregaskis' Guadalcanal Diary (New
fairly full listing of works on military York: Random House, Inc., 1943).
subjects. There are also several naval The catalogue of naval histories deal-
bibliographies which list background ing with the Pacific war offers for under-
materials for World War II, especially standable reasons, a large and varied
the Pacific area.28 fare. In addition to the excellent treat-
ment of the Navy in World War II in
28
A Selected and Annotated Bibliography on
United States Naval History, Naval Biography, Naval
Strategy and Tactics, prepared by the Naval History
29
Division (Washington, 1956); Robert G. Albion, One should note for its value Brig. Gen. William
Maritime and Naval History: An Annotated Bibliog- F. Heavy, Down Ramp! The Story of the Army Am-
raphy (1951) (a revised edition was published in phibian Engineers (Washington: Infantry Journal
mimeographed form in 1955 by the Marine Historical Press, 1947), and for its readability and accuracy
Association, Mystic, Conn.); Werner B. Ellinger and Walter D. Edmonds, They Fought With What They
Herbert Rosinski, Sea Power in the Pacific, 1936- Had, The Story of the Army Air Forces in the South-
1941 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, west Pacific, 1941-1942 (Boston: Little, Brown and
1942). Co., 1951).
general histories of the Navy,30 the stu- pursue submarine operations further,
dent can consult the 5-volume series there is the work of Charles A. Lock-
Battle Report (New York: Rinehart and wood, Sink 'em All: Submarine Warfare
Company, 1944-1949) by Walter Karig in the Pacific (New York: E. P. Dutton
and others, though he would be better & Co., 1951) and Edward L. Beach,
advised to turn to the Morison series. Submarine! (New York: Henry Holt &
A provocative discussion of the role of Co., 1952.
the Navy, useful even if the reader does For those who wish to investigate the
not agree, is William D. Puleston's In- problems associated with the Pearl Har-
fluence of Sea Power in World WarII bor attack, there are two surveys of the
(New Haven: Yale University Press, literature in the field, one by the present
1947). More scholarly and, in its field, a author, "Pearl Harbor in Perspective"
pioneering work, is the study of Duncan U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings (April,
Ballantine, U.S, Naval Logistics in the 1955), and the other by Wayne S. Cole,
Second World War (Princeton, N.J.: "American Entry into World War II: A
Princeton University Press, 1947). Then Historiographical Appraisal," The Mis-
there are separate histories of naval avia- sissippi Valley Historical Review (March,
tion, destroyers, and submarines, all of 1957). The basic documents for the
them detailed and accurate. The first of study of the attack have been noted
these is traced in two separate works, the above under official publications and
scholarly and readable study of Archi- Japanese records—the Pearl Harbor
bald D. Turnbull and Clifford L. Lord, hearings and the records of the Interna-
History of United States Naval Aviation tional Military Tribunal for the Far East.
(New Haven: Yale University Press, The best account of American foreign
1949) and Frederick C. Sherman's Com- policy in the years immediately preced-
bat Command: The American Aircraft ing the Japanese attack is the 2-volume
Carriers in the Pacific War (New York: work of William L. Langer and S. Everett
E. P. Dutton & Co., 1950). Theodore Gleason, The Challenge to Isolation
Roscoe had written a volume on United 1937-1940 (New York: Harper & Broth-
States Destroyer Operations in World ers, 1952) and The Undeclared War
War II (Annapolis: U.S. Naval Institute, (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1953).
1953) and another, United States Sub- On the Japanese side, Herbert Feis,
marine Operations in World War II Road to Pearl Harbor, The Coming of
(Annapolis: U.S. Naval Institute, 1949), the War Between the United States and
both large, handsome volumes that treat Japan (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Uni-
their subjects with loving care and atten- versity Press, 1950), provides the best sum-
tion to detail. For those who wish to mary of the available Japanese evidence.
The grand strategy of the war, like the
30
question of war guilt, has come under
Dudley W. Knox, A History of the United States
Navy (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1948) and
the close scrutiny of many military critics
E. B. Potter, editor, et al., The United States and and scholars and is the subject of con-
World Sea Power (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, tinued controversy. On this level, it is
Inc., 1955). See also John Creswell, Sea Warfare,
1939-1945 (London and New York: Longmans,
difficult to separate Pacific strategy from
Green, & Co., Inc., 1950). the strategy of global war, and most
THE SOURCES 715
writers have made no effort to do so. As Compromise (Boston: Little, Brown&

a matter of fact, some of the most contro- Co., 1958), and the third by the British
versial questions of Pacific strategy, such military historian, Alfred H. Burne,
as the Europe-first concept, are inti- Strategy in World War II (Harrisburg,
mately related to the larger problems of Pa.: Military Service Publishing Com-
strategy. These questions are discussed pany, 1947). Most of the writing on
in the official histories, general histories Pacific strategy alone is found in military
of the war, and memoirs noted above, periodicals such as the United States
but other works dealing specifically with Naval Institute Proceedings, Army (and
strategy should be noted here. An excel- its predecessors, Combat Forces Journal
lent introduction to the subject can be and the Infantry Journal), Military Re-
found in three small books, all of them view, Military Affairs, Marine Corps
readable and based on wide knowledge— Gazette, the British Journal of the Royal
one by the former Chief Historian of the Service Institute, and others. The list of
Army, Kent Roberts Greenfield, The these articles is too long for a general
Historian and the Army (New Bruns- survey such as this one, but no study of
wick: Rutgers University Press, 1954), the Pacific war should overlook this
one by Professor Morison, Strategy and important source.
Basic Military Map Symbols
Symbols within a rectangle indicate a military unit, within
a triangle an observation post, and within a circle a supply
point.
Military Units—Identification
Antiaircraft Artillery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Armored C o m m a n d . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Army A i r F o r c e s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Artillery, except Antiaircraft and Coast Artillery . . . . . . . . . . . .
Cavalry, Horse . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Cavalry, Mechanized. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Chemical Warfare S e r v i c e . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Coast Artillery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Engineers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Infantry..............................................
Medical Corps . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Ordnance D e p a r t m e n t . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Quartermaster C o r p s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Signal Corps . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Tank D e s t r o y e r . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Transportation C o r p s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Veterinary C o r p s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Airborne units are designated by combining a gull wing
symbol with the arm or service symbol:
Airborne A r t i l l e r y . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Airborne I n f a n t r y . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
*For complete listing of symbols in use during the World War II period, see
FM 21-30, dated October 1943, from which these are taken.
BASIC MILITARY MAP SYMBOLS 717
Size Symbols
The following symbols placed either in boundary lines or
above the rectangle, triangle, or circle inclosing the identifying
arm or service symbol indicate the size of military organization:
Squad . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Section...............................................
Platoon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Company, troop, battery, Air Force flight . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Battalion, cavalry squadron, or Air Force squadron . . . . . . . . . .
Regiment or group; combat team (with abbreviation CT fol-

lowing identifying numeral) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Brigade, Combat Command of Armored Division, or Air Force
Wing..............................................
Division or Command of an Air F o r c e . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Corps or Air Force . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Army..............................................
Group of A r m i e s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
EXAMPLES
The letter or number to the left of the symbol indicates the
unit designation; that to the right, the designation of the parent
unit to which it belongs. Letters or numbers above or below
boundary lines designate the units separated by the lines:
Company A, 137th Infantry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
8th Field Artillery B a t t a l i o n . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Combat Command A, 1st Armored Division. . . . . . . . . . . .
Observation Post, 23d I n f a n t r y . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Command Post, 5th Infantry Division . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Boundary between 137th and 138th Infantry . . . . . . . . . . .
Weapons
Machine g u n . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Gun.................................................
G u n battery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Howitzer o r Mortar . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Tank . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Self-propelled g u n . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II
The following volumes have been published or are in press:
The War Department

Chief of Staff: Prewar Plans and Preparations
Washington Command Post: The Operations Division
Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare: 1941-1942
Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare: 1943-1944
Global Logistics and Strategy: 1940-1943
Global Logistics and Strategy: 1943-1945
The Army and Economic Mobilization
The Army and Industrial Manpower
The Army Ground Forces
The Organization of Ground Combat Troops
The Procurement and Training of Ground Combat Troops
The Army Service Forces
The Organization and Role of the Army Service Forces
The Western Hemisphere
The Framework of Hemisphere Defense
Guarding the United States and Its Outposts
The War in the Pacific
The Fall of the Philippines
Guadalcanal: The First Offensive
Victory in Papua
CARTWHEEL: The Reduction of Rabaul
Seizure of the Gilberts and Marshalls
Campaign in the Marianas
The Approach to the Philippines
Leyte: The Return to the Philippines
Triumph in the Philippines
Okinawa: The Last Battle
Strategy and Command: The First Two Years
The Mediterranean Theater of Operations
Northwest Africa: Seizing the Initiative in the West
Sicily and the Surrender of Italy
Salero to Cassino
Cassino to the Alps
The European Theater of Operations
Cross-Channel Attack
Breakout and Pursuit
The Lorraine Campaign
The Siegfried Line Campaign
The Ardennes: Battle of the Bulge
The Last Offensive
The Supreme Command
Logistical Support of the Armies, Volume I
Logistical Support of the Armies, Volume II
The Middle East Theater
The Persian Corridor and Aid to Russia
The China-Burma-India Theater
Stilwell's Mission to China
Stilwell's Command Problems
Time Runs Out in CBI
The Technical Services
The Chemical Warfare Service: Organizing for War
The Chemical Warfare Service: From Laboratory to Field
The Chemical Warfare Service: Chemicals in Combat
The Corps of Engineers: Troops and Equipment
The Corps of Engineers: The War Against Japan
The Corps of Engineers: The War Against Germany
The Corps of Engineers: Military Construction in the United States
The Medical Department: Hospitalization and Evacuation; Zone of Interior
The Medical Department: Medical Service in the Mediterranean and Minor
Theaters
The Medical Department: Medical Service in the European Theater of Operations
The Medical Department: Medical Service in the War Against Japan
The Ordnance Department: Planning Munitions for War
The Ordnance Department: Procurement and Supply
The Ordnance Department: On Beachhead and Battlefront
The Quartermaster Corps: Organization, Supply, and Services, Volume I
The Quartermaster Corps: Organization, Supply, and Services, Volume II
The Quartermaster Corps: Operations in the War Against Japan
The Quartermaster Corps: Operations in the War Against Germany
The Signal Corps: The Emergency
The Signal Corps: The Test
The Signal Corps: The Outcome
The Transportation Corps: Responsibilities, Organization, and Operations
The Transportation Corps: Movements, Training, and Supply
The Transportation Corps: Operations Overseas
Special Studies
Chronology: 1941-1945
Military Relations Between the United States and Canada: 1939-1945
Rearming the French
Three Battles: Arnaville, Altuzzo, and Schmidt
The Women's Army Corps
Civil Affairs: Soldiers Become Governors
Buying Aircraft: Materiel Procurement for the Army Air Forces
The Employment of Negro Troops
Manhattan: The U.S. Army and the Atomic Bomb
Pictorial Record
The War Against Germany and Italy: Mediterranean and Adjacent Areas
The War Against Germany: Europe and Adjacent Areas
The War Against Japan
Index
ABC-1, 86-89, 143, 165-66, 201, 205. See also training of, 330, 357
United States, and Great Britain. in USAFIA, 198
ABDA area, 165-66, 168-69, 172-73, 177, 202, 210, Air Forces, U.S. Naval, 101, 133, 219, 234, 372, 391,
244, 249-50, 607-10 392n, 470, 482, 487
ABDACOM, 161-63, 168-72, 174, 176-77, 179-80, and amphibious operations, 589-90
191, 198, 201-03, 240-42, 252 and Coral Sea, 277
ABDAIR, 171 deployment of, 537, 541
Adachi, General Hatazo, 364-65, 367-68, 565-66, 581 and Port Moresby invasion, 277
Adak, 423-24, 527, 531 in South Pacific, 319, 339, 391, 504
Admiralty Islands, 198, 313, 370, 371, 374-75, 452, Air Forces units
466-67, 515, 520, 525, 535-36, 551-52, 580. See Groups, 98, 326-27, 333-34, 529, 537
also Bismarck Archipelago. 11th Bombardment, 258, 320-21
17th Bombardment, 269-70, 273
Aerial offensive, 78, 385, 458
90th Bombardment, 327, 328
against Germany, 79, 82, 88, 159, 377, 380-81, 459
Squadrons, 168, 209, 219, 224, 322
against Japan, 91, 100, 385, 447-48, 451, 453, 524,
70th Pursuit, 212
544, 593, 596-98, 599, 603
Air operations, 333, 562, 579. See also Aerial offen-
Aerial reconnaissance, 120-21, 313, 320-21, 340, 426, sive.
522, 524 Air power. See also Air reinforcements.
Africa, and RAINBOW, 72. See also North Africa; in ABDACOM area, 163
TORCH in Far East, 136
Agattu, 430 and Japanese war plans, 131
Air bombardment. See Aerial offensive. MacArthur on, 186-87, 189
Air Corps, U.S. Army, and Far East Air Force, 98 role of, in Army-Navy disagreements, 352-54
Air Forces, Allied. See Allied Air Forces. role of, in British strategy, 380-81
Air Forces, U.S. Army, 98, 102, 177, 208, 226, 228, role of, in Pacific, 587
341, 353-54, 482. See also Fifth Air Force; Sev- in Southwest Pacific, 186-87, 296
enth Air Force; Eleventh Air Force; Thirteenth and TULSA, 298
Air Force; Far East Air Force, Air reinforcements, 325-26. See also Air power.
in ABDACOM, 163, 168 for Fijis, 281
and amphibious operations, 589-90 MacArthur and, 388
and ANZAC, 201 of New Caledonia, 281
and Atlantic vs. Pacific priority, 392-93 and Pensacola convoy, 153
and Australia, 210, 223, 248 for Philippines, 152
and CARTWHEEL, 402-03 for South Pacific, 322, 329-33, 336-40
in Central Pacific, 482, 487, 489, 524 Air routes, 98-99, 204
and Central Pacific offensive, 470-71, 567 Air warning system at Hawaii, 103
command of, 257-59, 361, 374, 406, 487, 489 Aircraft. See also Bombardment aircraft; Fighter
deployment of, 224, 329-30, 334-35, 337-39, 395, aircraft; Patrol aircraft.
537, 541 allocation of, 258, 344
and Hawaiian garrison, 103 control of, in South Pacific Area, 258-59
and JPS, 227-28 and Eastern Solomons, Battle of, 329
and JUSSC, 228-29 and Japan, war against, 600
and Pacific offensive, 372-73 mobility, 258
and Philippines, 100-01, 536 and Pacific offensive, 395
planners, 221, 258, 324, 334, 392-93, 596, 602-03 in South Pacific, 206, 319, 329-30, 339
and South Pacific, 258-59, 262-63, 311, 313, 319- in Southwest Pacific, 306, 329-30
20, 322, 337-39, 352-54 and supply to Philippines, 192
in Southwest Pacific, 255, 325-26, 335, 391 Aircraft carriers, Allied, 101, 133, 143, 207, 216, 269-
and Soviet Union, 527-28, 529 74, 275, 276, 279, 281, 295-96, 313, 318-20, 325,
supply and maintenance, 337 329, 345, 350, 449, 464, 468, 482, 504, 543, 545n,
and Tokyo Raid, 269-70, 273 570, 572, 576-77, 587, 589, 590, 597, 599
Aircraft carriers, Japanese, 56, 108, 131, 132, 138, offensive in, 421-22, 425-28, 543
167-68, 178, 200, 214, 216-17, 239, 274-77, 279- and Pacific offensive, 383
80, 283-84, 329, 345, 349, 412-13, 575, 577, 590 and Pacific route, 70
Airfields, Allied, 172, 219, 385, 396, 398, 431, 503, and resources, allocation of, 428
522, 579-80, 582, 593, 596 strategic value of, 530
in Central Pacific, 464, 468, 470, 522, 598-600, U.S. Fleet and, 442
602-03 U.S. objectives in, 429, 433
in China, 451, 459, 593, 598, 602 Algiers, 351
construction of, 313, 316-17, 319, 563-64 Allied Air Forces, 220, 375. See also Air Forces, U.S.
in Hawaii, 102-03 Army.
in North Pacific, 422-23, 425, 428, 431, 528, 531-33 and ABDACOM, 179
in Philippines, 181, 444 in Battle of Bismarck Sea, 368
in Solomons, 214-15, 388, 507, 509, 562, 577 command of, 313
in South Pacific, 204, 257-58, 371 and I-GO, 413, 415
in Southwest Pacific, 208, 210, 219, 306, 319-20, and Japanese shipping, 545-46
371, 396, 503 and Japanese strategy, 216
in Soviet Union, 154-55, 419-20, 527-29 and Java, 178
Airfields, Japanese, 108, 201, 214, 306, 368, 430-31, and Port Moresby operations, 275, 277, 317
446, 557, 575 and priorities, 334
Akagi, 279-80, 283-84 and South Pacific, 313, 319-20, 325-26
Akin, Brig. Gen. Spencer B., 253 and Southwest Pacific, 253, 329, 391, 502-03, 563
Alabama, 545n Allied co-operation, 71-74, 101, 113, 155-56, 157,
Alameda, 270 451, 458, 559, 592, 597. See also United States,
Alameda Naval Station, 270 and Great Britain, military co-operation.
ALAMO FORCE. See Task Forces, U.S., ALAMO FORCE. Allied Force Headquarters, 493-95
Alaska. See also Aleutians; North Pacific. Allied forces, 159-60, 205-06, 222, 256, 276, 600. See
air bases in, 528 also Deployment of U.S. forces; United States,
Allied naval forces in, 545 forces.
and Allied strategy, 159 Japanese estimate of, 111
Army forces in, 420 organization of, and CARTWHEEL, 403-07, 408
Army-Navy relations in, 423-24 Allied Land Forces, 313, 403-07, 408
defense of, 146, 336, 377-78, 420 Allied Naval Forces, 275-76, 403, 502, 563, 600
and hemisphere defense, 102 Allied organization in the Pacific, 244-49
and Japan, strategy against, 528 Allied strength, Japanese estimate of, 111, 544-45
Japanese threat to, 146-47, 420 Allies
offensive in, 425-26 American aid to, 76-77. See also Great Britain,
reinforcement of, 61, 70, 421 American aid to; Soviet Union, American aid to.
and shipping, 349 war aims of, 158-59, 385-86, 592-93. See also Cairo
submarine base at, 545 Declaration; United States, national defense
Alaska-Hawaii-Panama Triangle, 38-39, 42, 91, 102 policy.
Alaskan Defense Command, 421 Alligator. See LVT's.
Alaskan Department, 424 Amboina Island, 166, 175, 245
Alaskan Theater, 530-31 Ambon, 444, 555
Aleutians, 27, 289, 386, 453, 458-59, 528, 590n. See Amchitka, 424-28
also North Pacific. Americal Division. See Divisions, U.S.
Allied intelligence on, 340 American-British staff conversations, 86-88. See also
bases in, 530-33 ABC-1; U.S., and Great Britain.
and Casablanca Conference, 429 Ammunition, 145, 189, 191-92, 344
command in, 421 Amphibious command, 257
defense of, 281, 421, 532 Amphibious craft, 505, 598. See also LVT's.
forces in, 532-33 Amphibious Force, South Pacific, 403
and Japan, Imperial General Headquarters, 433 Amphibious forces. See also Amphibious Force,
and Japanese, expulsion of, 528 South Pacific; Fifth Amphibious Force; Seventh
Japanese attack on, 278-83 Amphibious Force.
Japanese in, 285, 421, 425-26 and Attu, 430
Japanese threat in, 311, 420 and CARTWHEEL, 502
in Japanese war plans, 109 in Central Pacific, 489-90
and Nimitz, 473 and ELKTON I, 389
INDEX 723
and Kiska, 425-26 and command, in Pacific, 294, 397, 479-81, 499-501
and Marshalls, 460-61, 464 and command, in South Pacific, 257-58, 260-61,
and North Pacific offensive, 425-26, 430, 531 262, 303
and South Pacific offensive, 319-20, 325 deployment of forces, 390-91, 537, 541-42
and Southwest Pacific, 343, 502-03 Hawaiian Department. See Hawaiian Depart-
Amphibious operations ment.
and ANVIL, 592 and JPS, 227
and command, 294 and logistics, 260-61, 498
in Central Pacific, 449, 471 and military co-operation with British 78-79
in Gilberts, 568-73 and North Pacific Area, 424
in New Britain, 579 organization of, in Central Pacific, 482, 484-86
and Pacific offensive, 295, 370 organization of, in Pacific, 499
and Philippines, 536 and Pacific defense, 102, 224
plans for, in Pacific, 70 and Pacific offensive, 292, 295, 300, 318, 373,
and South Pacific offensive, 256 394-95, 469
and Southwest Pacific offensive, 300 and Pacific reinforcements, 322, 328, 335-36
technique of, 589-90 preparations for war, 118-19
and U.S. Navy planners, 251 and resources, allocation of, 333-34, 347
Amphtrac. See LVT's. and South Pacific, 257-58, 391, 459
Anami, General K., 553, 555, 557, 591 and Southwest Pacific, 299-300, 459
Andaman Island, 108 strength of, 224, 390, 537, 538-41
Anderson, Brig Gen. Orvil A., 335, 336, 392-93 training of, in South Pacific, 260
Anglo-American relations. See U.S., and Great training of, in Southwest Pacific, 313
Britain. Army Air Forces, See Air Forces, U.S. Army.
Anhui, 191 Army planners, U.S., 27, 35-36, 75, 83, 99, 146, 153,
Ankenbrandt, Col. Francis T., 261 187-88, 2-18, 222, 280, 291, 310-11, 421-23, 427-
Antiaircraft artillery, 98, 101, 188 28, 431, 464, 467-69, 475, 480, 499-500, 523-25
Antiaircraft artillery units, 103, 140, 206, 208, 219, and ABDACOM, 172
281, 407n, 421 and air power, 258, 330
Anti-Comintern Pact, 51 and Allied organization, 244
ANVIL, 592-93, 603 and BOLERO, 290
and
ANZAC area, 201-02, 215, 218, 241, 244-45, 248, CARTWHEEL, 462, 464
256-57 and Central Pacific offensive, 462, 467-68, 523-24
ANZAC Force, 202, 216 and command, in Central Pacific, 479
Apamama, 445, 524, 571 and command, in Pacific, 246, 249, 372-73, 397,
Aparri, 136 462-63, 499-500
Appeasement, Allied fear of, 118 and command, unified, 160-61, 475
"Appreciation and Plan for the Defeat of Japan," and Eisenhower, staff organization of, 499-500
593. See also Japan, plans for defeat of. and ELKTON II, 391
Arafura Sea, 536, 538 and Nimitz, 462-63, 474, 477
Arawe, 580, 581, 582 and North Pacific, 246, 423, 427-28
ARCADIA Conference, 158-59, 333, 378, 380 and Pacific defense, 39-41, 209
and Atlantic vs. Pacific priority, 308 and Pacific Fleet, command of, 477
and Combined Chiefs of Staff, 225-26, 227 and Pacific offensive, 251, 311, 464
and command, 160, 164-66 and Pacific reinforcements, 145, 220, 282-83, 290-
and Philippines, 187 92, 322, 324
and resources, allocation of, 163-64 and Pacific strategy, 221-22, 310-11, 467-68
and South Pacific, 205 and Pacific theaters, co-operation between, 358
Argonne, 261, 360 and priorities, 334
Arizona, 132 and RAINBOW 2, 74
Armaments, 159, 330 on resources, allocation of, 150
Army, U.S. and South Pacific offensive, 305, 467-68
and Atlantic vs. Pacific priority, 333-34 and Southwest Pacific, 246, 295-97
casualties, 584-85 and Soviet bases, 419
in Central Pacific, 459, 466, 470, 478-79 and U.S. naval strategy, 292
command, and ABDACOM, 170-71 Army-Navy Logistical Board, 492
and command, in Central Pacific, 476 Army-Navy relations, 22, 240
and command, in Europe, 300 and CARTWHEEL, 402-03
in Central Pacific, 358-59, 473, 475, 487-91, 492, offensive, preparations for, 84
568 threat in, 42, 74
and command, 29-30, 246, 294, 299-300, 397-98, Atlantic vs. Pacific priority, 80, 82, 84, 87, 90-91, 126,
475 158-59, 209, 220-22, 289-92, 308-11, 318, 324,
and Halsey, 356 326, 329-30, 333, 376-80, 385, 594-95
and Hawaii, 103, 360 and air deployment, 329-30
and logistics, 355, 474 and Army, 333-34
MacArthur and, 120-21, 311, 313 at Casablanca Conference, 383-84
Marshall and, 331, 360-61 and Central Pacific, 440
in North Africa, 493-94 Great Britain on, 378-79, 440
in North Pacific, 423-24, 427, 430-31 JCS on, 219
in Pacific, 256, 290-91, 303-04, 326, 387-89, 495- JPC on, 69
96, 498 King on, 282, 308-09, 331
and resources, allocation of, 333-34 MacArthur on, 282, 341-42
in South Pacific, 259-61, 352-57, 360, 510 Marshall on, 83, 308-09, 331
in Southwest Pacific, 296-300, 357-58 and Pacific Military Conference, 392-93
and strategy, 218-19. See also Atlantic vs. Pacific and Philippines, 438-39
priority. and Quebec Conference, 517-18
in USAFIA area, 152 and resources, allocation of, 537, 541
Arnold, General Henry H., 123, 262, 353, 362, 393, Roosevelt on, 85, 222-23, 309-10
454n, 479, 605 and shipping, 163-64
and air deployment, 329-30, 334-35, 337-38 Stark on, 82
and air reinforcements, 329-30, 332, 337 and TRIDENT, 458-59
and Alaska, 532 and U.S. Navy, 333-34
and Atlantic vs. Pacific priority, 334 Atoll warfare in Central Pacific, 587-90
and B-29's, 385, 596 Attu, 420-21, 424-25, 523
and BOLERO, 335 air base at, 431
and Central Pacific offensive, 471 command for offensive at, 430-31
and China, 385 Japan and, 283, 425, 430-31, 433, 543
and Fijis, 281 offensive against, 430-31
and Ghormley, 354 Auckland, 256, 262, 305, 347
and Gilberts, 471 Australia, 118, 148, 151, 175-76, 242, 553. See also
and Harmon, 354 Sydney; Darwin.
and JCS, 226 and ABDA area, 202
and joint staffs, 360 and ABDACOM, 161, 163, 240-41
and logistics, 355 air power in, 303, 334
and Makin, 524 airfields in, 313
and Marianas, 603 Allied naval bases in, 341-42
and New Caledonia, 281 Allied naval forces in, 545
and Nimitz, 354 and Allied strategic aims, 159
and Pacific, visit to, 336-37, 354 and ANZAC, 201
and Philippines, 140 B-17's in, 258
and priorities, 335, 602 bombed, 217
and Quebec Conference, 596 and Brereton, 137
and Soviet Union, 529 and Burma, defense of, 203
and Tokyo Raid, 269 and Combined Chiefs of Staff, 243
and TORCH, 335 command for, 245
and unified command in Pacific, 361 communications to, 99, 204. See also Communica-
tions, Allied line of.
and U.S. Navy air operations, 354
cruisers, 276, 311, 313, 323
Aroe, invasion of, 514 defense of, 150, 152, 159, 172, 177, 187, 198-99,
Artillery, U.S., 206, 219, 224, 305, 322, 350, 432 201-05, 220, 222, 224, 242, 245, 251-52, 255-56,
Arundel, 559, 560, 562 275, 280, 282, 291-92, 336, 343, 377-79, 382,
Asia mainland, 438, 592 438, 467
Asiatic Fleet, U.S., 85, 101, 115, 136, 168, 172, 240 forces in, 221, 247-48
Atlantic. See also Atlantic vs. Pacific priority. headquarters, Allied, at, 157, 193
Allied command in, 243 and Japan, 214, 216-17, 275, 279
defense of, 67-68, 71-73, 75, 79, 82, 86, 88 Japanese threat to, 179, 202-03, 289-90, 311, 440
INDEX 725
in Japanese war plans, 109, 199-200, 216-17 Australian Mandated Territory, 198
MacArthur ordered to, 194-95 Axis coalition, 59-61, 70-71, 81, 89
naval forces, 332
and New Caledonia, 208-09 B-17's, 103, 136, 155, 167, 215, 282, 288, 354-55. See
and New Zealand, co-operation with, 245 also Bombardment aircraft, Allied.
and P-40's, demand for, 218 and Midway, 218, 283-84
and Pacific command, 251-52 and North Pacific, 281
and Pacific offensive, 466 performance of, 354-57
and Philippines, reinforcement of, 153 and Philippines, 98, 100-01, 123, 136
and Philippines, route to, 443-44 and Port Moresby invasion, 317
and Port Moresby invasion, 274 shortage of, 231
reinforcement of, 203, 210, 216, 223, 225, 241, 255 in South Pacific, 263, 319-20, 327
and South Pacific islands, 204-05 in Southwest Pacific, 136, 195, 202, 216, 218, 295
and Southwest Pacific, 240, 245, 249 B-18's, 282
submarine base at, 545 B-24's, 577
supply bases in, 403 B-25's, 269-70, 273, 327
and U.S., 465 B-26's, 263, 281, 283, 327
U.S. Army and, 218, 343 B-29's, 597-98, 600, 602-05
U.S. Forces in, 247. See also Australia, forces in. bases for, 530
U.S. Navy planners on, 246 and Japan, strategy against, 385, 595-96, 599,
and U.S. public opinion, 126n 602-03
and U.S. strategy, 451 in North Pacific, 531-33
Australia Area, and Japan, 212 Baanga Island, 507, 559-60
Australian Chiefs of Staff, 245, 255 Bairoko Harbor, 559-60
Australian forces, 156, 161, 175-76, 248, 316-17, 566,Baker Island, 485-86, 522
581-82 Bali, 176
air forces, 253, 255, 391 Balikpapan, 175
and Burma, 176, 203 Ballale, 533-34
and CARTWHEEL, 402-07, 408 Banda Sea, 547, 552
commandos, 208 Bandjermasin, 175
Divisions, 202-03, 255, 391 Bandoeng, 179
6th, 202-03 Barakoma, 562
7th, 202-03, 295, 317, 337, 350, 533-34, 563-64, Barbey, Rear Adm. Daniel, 502, 580
566, 582 Barnes, Brig. Gen. Julian F., 149, 151
9th, 203, 343, 533-34, 563, 566 and ABDACOM, 171
and ELKTON plans, 389, 391 and New Caledonia, 211
infantry, 316, 566 and supply problems, 210, 313
and Lae, 533-34, 563 and USAFIA, 171, 248
and Markham Valley, 563-64 "Barracudas," 507
in Middle East, 203 Bases, Allied. See Airfields; Naval bases.
militia, 253 Basic Logistical Plan, 474, 492, 498
Navy, 172 Bataan, 193, 382
and Netherlands Indies, defense of, 202-03 American retreat to, 137
and New Caledonia, 208, 210 command in, 196
and New Guinea, 317, 327, 329, 503, 533-34, 579 defense of, 190, 264-65
and New Guinea Force, 581 MacArthur on, 195
and Northeast Area, 199 MacArthur's withdrawal to, 181
in Pacific, 559 siege of, 181-84
and Port Moresby, 337 supply of, 191
surrender of, 265
and Rabaul, 200, 295
Batan Island, 136
and Salamana, 563 Batavia, 164, 168, 179
and Southwest Pacific, 253, 459 Batavia talks. See Japan, and Netherlands East
and Tulagi, 275 Indies.
Australian Government, 201, 243, 247. See also Battery Denver, 267
Curtin, John. Battle Fleet, role in ORANGE Plan, 24, 30
Australian intelligence, Coastwatching Service, 306, Battleships, Japanese, 56, 131, 138, 178, 216, 239,
445-46, 562 279-80, 342, 349
Battleships, U.S., 101, 132-33, 143, 279, 350, 504 and Japanese, 216, 368-69, 534, 551, 552, 565,
Beebe, Brig. Gen. Lewis G., 195-97 575-77
Belgium, 74 MacArthur on, 534-35
Belleau Wood, 545n operations in, 533-85, 575-78
Bering Strait, 528 Bradley, Maj. Gen. Follett, 420, 528-29
Beru Atoll, 446 Breene, Brig. Gen. Robert G., 261-62, 348, 360, 406
Bieri, Vice Adm B. H., 363n, 542n, 597-98 Brereton, Maj. Gen. Lewis H., 136-37, 173, 177, 242
Bismarck Archipelago, 198, 204, 212, 221, 320, 364, and ABDACOM, 168, 170-72
367, 398, 452-53, 458-59, 467, 469, 471-72, 502, on Philippines, 140, 188
520, 543, 552, 563, 575, 589, 605 and supply problems, 210
aerial reconnaissance of, 313 Brett, Lt. Gen. George H., 151-52, 168, 171, 176-77,
Allied offensive on, 292-95, 371 195, 198, 242, 245, 247-48, 261
Japanese in, 198, 200, 216, 324, 412, 551 and ABDACOM air forces, 173
in Japanese naval plans, 111 and Allied air forces, 253, 313
Japanese reinforcement of, 412 and Allied conference, 156
in Japanese war plans, 105, 108, 166, 199-200 and Barnes, 171
MacArthur on, 514, 583 and Philippines, 188, 191-92
and Pacific operations (1943-44), 515 and Port Moresby invasion, 275-76
and RENO II, 514 and supply problems, 210
and RENO III, 536 Brink, Lt. Col. Francis G., 156-57, 160
and Southwest Pacific Area, 249 Brisbane, 151, 189, 305, 311, 401, 535
Bismarcks Barrier, 551, 575, 578-79, 582, 583, 584 Brisbane-Melbourne area, 255
Bismarck Sea, Battle of, 368, 411 Brooke-Popham, Air Chief Marshall Sir Robert, 139n
Blarney, General Sir Thomas A., 253, 313, 403, 408, Brown, Maj. Gen. Albert E., 430-31
494n, 533, 566 Browning, Capt. Miles R., USN, 390n, 395-96,
Blanche Channel, 504 442-44
Blockade against Germany, 82, 159 Brussels Conference (1937), 51
Blockade against Japan, 91, 385 Buckner, Lt. Gen. Simon B., Jr., 421, 423-24, 424n,
Blockade-running, 152, 188-89, 191-93 427, 430-31, 531
Bloody Ridge, Battle of, 336 Buin, 371, 401, 402, 533, 534
Bogadjim, 566, 581, 582 Buka, 198, 275, 306, 313, 316, 368, 405
Bohol, 181 Bulgaria, 89
BOLERO, 222, 282, 290, 292, 308, 310-11, 326, 333, Buna, 284, 298, 316-17, 332, 340, 350, 367, 402, 413,
339. See also ROUNDUP; SLEDGEHAMMER. 584
Bombardment. See Aerial offensive- and Allied offensive, 364
Bombardment aircraft. Allied, 136, 178, 202, 218, Japanese and, 285, 316-17, 329, 337, 365, 367
221, 224, 275, 326-27, 330, 353, 354-57, 368, 372, Bunker Hill, 577
380-81, 395, 444, 464, 485-86. See also names of Burma, 175-76, 203, 378, 383, 439-40, 447, 451, 453,
bombers (B-17's, etc.). 456, 515, 544, 590
and Hawaii, 145, 303 and ABDACOM, 161, 163, 176
MacArthur on, 325-26, 341 Allied offensive in, 382-83, 460, 592, 601, 603, 604
and New Guinea, 275, 563 and Allied strategy, 159, 187, 379, 383, 385
and South Pacific, 258, 281, 325-26, 339, 343, 391 and Australian divisions, 203
and Southwest Pacific, 152, 255, 303, 371, 391 defense of, 172, 203, 241
Bombardment aircraft, Japanese, 178, 201, 217, 274, Great Britain on, 379, 383, 601
283, 336, 342, 365, 369, 412-13 Japanese and, 179-80, 217, 546
Bonins, Japanese and, 546 in Japanese war plans, 64, 105, 108, 131, 138, 166
Bora Bora, 205-06, 212, 219, 318 and TRIDENT, 457
Borneo, 120, 153, 186, 190, 541 Burma Road, 97, 451
and Allied offensive, 309 Butler, Brig. Gen. William O., 421, 424
in Japanese war plans, 96, 105, 108
Japanese offensive against, 137-39, 167-68, 174-75 C-47's, 563
Bougainville, 198, 371, 388, 390, 395-97, 398, 400-401, Caballo, 24. See also Manila Bay.
402, 447, 469, 502, 505, 551-52, 560, 561-62, 571, Cairo Conference, 537, 542, 592
577-78 and Allied war aims, 592
and ELKTON I, 389 and China, 605
invasion of, forces for, 534 and European command, 480
INDEX 727
and Pacific command, 480-81 Casablanca Conference, 375, 379-86

and Pacific operations, 603-05 and Aleutians, 429
and Quebec Conference, 605 Allied objectives at, 385-86
and Southeast Asia, 605 and Central Pacific, 437-40, 441
Cairo Declaration, 592 and Germany, 380
Calhoun, Vice Adm. William L., 491 and Italy, 380
California, "invasion fever" in, 141 and Japan, 381, 447
California, 132 JCS on, 393-94
Callaghan, Rear Adm. Daniel J., 350 and Mediterranean, 380
Camranh Bay, 62, 138, 175 and ORANGE plan, 437
Canada, 33 and Pacific, 381-85, 392-93, 437-40
Canadian troops, 137, 432 and Pacific Military Conference, 390
Canton, 99, 137, 204-06, 212, 359n and Pacific vs. Mediterranean concept, 382
Cape Esperance, Battle of, 341-42 and unified command, 475n
Cape Gloucester, 395, 398, 401, 534, 551, 564, 578-81 Casey, Brig. Gen. Hugh J., 253
and CARTWHEEL, 401, 402 Casualties, Allied, 133, 136, 268, 573, 582, 584-87
forces for, 581 Cavalry, 1st Division, 407n
Japan and, 565, 582 Cavalry, 112th Regiment, 502n, 581-82
and Saidor, 581 Cavite, 24, 136, 146
strategic value of, 582 Cebu, 181, 191, 266
Cape Torokina, 576 Celebes Islands, 190, 453, 538, 555
Capital ships, losses of, 279 Japanese offensive against, 167-68, 175
Carabao, 24. See also Manila Bay. in Japanese war plans, 108, 166
Caribbean, 69-70 and RENO III, 536
Carlson, Lt. Col. Evans F., 436, 444-45 Celebes Sea, 453, 467, 553, 593
Carney, Rear Adm. Robert B., 534 approaches to, 448
Carolina maneuvers, 119 and Japanese offensive, 448
Caroline Islands, 91, 143, 382, 434, 439, 453, 458, 459, operations in, 451
464, 469, 515, 516, 520, 524and RENO II, 514
Allied offensive against, 292, 311, 459 Central America, 249. See also Latin America.
and Allied strategy, 385 Central Pacific. See also Central Pacific Area; Central
Army planners on, 468 Pacific offensive; Central Pacific route; Hawaii;
Japan and, 411, 546-47, 552-53, 564
Hawaiian Department; Micronesia.
in ORANGE plan, 33, 37
aircraft carriers in, role of, 589
and RENO II, 514
amphibious operations in, 449
Carpender, Rear Adm. Arthur S., 253, 403, 580
CARTWHEEL, 401, 402-07, 408-11, 415, 452-53, 461-62, Army command in, 485-90
464, 514-15, 520, 525, 533-35 Army organization in, 482, 484-86
Army planners on, 462 Army-Navy relations in, 473
and Central Pacific offensive, 469 atoll warfare in, 587-90
command for, 583 command in, 475-79, 481-82, 487-92, 510, 589,
completion of, 575-83 654. See also Central Pacific Area.
first phase of, 502-11 Cooke on, 439
forces for, 402-07, 408, 461, 465, 502 defense of, 343
and Gilberts invasion, 470-71 and ELKTON plan, 396
and Halsey, 575, 583 forces in, 537, 541, 578-79, 596
JPS on, 469-70 geography of, 589
JWPC on, 469 German islands in, 25
and MacArthur, 465, 575, 582-83 Great Britain and, 439-40
Marshall on, 466, 472 Japan and, 444-47, 450, 522-23, 552-53, 555,
and Marshalls, offensive in, 461, 463, 464 557-58, 571-72, 590-91
Navy planners on, 462 JPS on, 542
and New Guinea, 564 and line of communications, 134
objectives of, 471-72 logistics in, 474, 487, 491
planning for, in South Pacific, 408 MacArthur on, 438-39
and RENO II, 514 naval power in, 449
shipping for, 521-22, 526 Navy, role of, 589
Casablanca, 351 Navy planners on, 37
and Nimitz, 396, 435-36, 481 Central Pacific route, 590n

objectives in, 469, 523-25 and Celebes Sea, 448
operations in, 453, 520, 541, 589, 598, 604, 605. JCS on, 514
See also Central Pacific offensive. MacArthur on, 192, 450, 514
in ORANGE plans, 436 and Philippines, 443, 541
and Pearl Harbor, 436 Sutherland on, 541
planners and, 522-23, 526 vs. South-Southwest Pacific route, 438, 448-49,
reconnaissance in, 522 450, 467-68, 514, 516, 541. See also Central Pacific
role of, in U.S. strategy, 435-37, 447-53, 465, 536. offensive.
See also Central Pacific offensive; Central Pacific Ceram, 453
route. Ceylon, 174, 216, 255, 279-80, 282, 545
situation in, 1942-43, 434-36 Chaffee, Lt. Gen. Adna R., 22
staff organization in, 490-91 Chamberlin, Brig. Gen. Stephen J., 151-52, 253, 298,
strategic value of, 435-36, 448-49 380n, 579-80
strategy in, 437, 440-44, 473, 514, 516-17, 522-23, Changsha, air bases at, 596
524-26. See also Central Pacific offensive; Cen- Charleston, as embarkation point, 212
tral Pacific route. Chiang Kai-shek, 47, 59, 118, 155-56, 161, 270-72
and U.S. Fleet, 449 Chicago, 202
Central Pacific Area, 249 Chief of Naval Operations, 205, 226, 359. See also
Army-Navy relations in, 358-59 Stark, Admiral Harold R. and King, Admiral
command in, 358-59, 486-87, 489-90 Ernest J.
Joint Staff proposals for, 490-93 Chief of Staff Conference, Eisenhower on, 494
organization of, 481-86, 493 China, 52-53, 58, 89, 203, 515, 541, 590, 593, 599,
Central Pacific Force, 481-82, 545n 605. See also Chiang Kai-shek; U.S., and China.
Central Pacific offensive, 292, 437, 451, 454, 567-73. as air base, 385, 447-48, 453, 459, 530
See also Gilbert Islands. airfields in, 451, 593, 596, 602
airbases for, 470, 599-600 and Allied co-operation, 155
Army on, 462-63, 466-69 in Allied strategy, 91, 159, 448, 451, 456, 459, 592,
Browning on, 442-43 599
and CARTWHEEL, 469 and ARCADIA Conference, 159
and Casablanca Conference, 437-40 B-29's in, 600
Cooke on, 462, 469 in British strategy, 378-79, 383
forces for, 459-61, 463, 468-69, 567-68 and Cairo Conference, 592
and Gilberts-Nauru plan, 468-69, 470-71 Japan and, 37, 39, 45, 47, 50-51, 58-59, 66, 74, 93,
Halsey on, 441-42 99, 108-09, 114, 137-38, 216, 330-31, 340, 541,
and Hawaii, 473 545, 547-49, 592
Japanese estimate of, 543-44 in Japanese-American negotiations, 105, 113,
Japanese strategy against, 536, 598-99 115-17
JCS on, 386, 467, 470-71 operations in, 597-98
JPS on, 462, 470, 535 reaction to modus vivendi, 118
JSSC on, 467, 600 reinforcement of, 241
JWPC on, 460-61, 468-69, 514-16, 601 supply line to, 180
and King, 437-43, 466-67, 518-19 territorial integrity of, 50
Koga and, 575 and Tokyo raid, 269-70, 273
and MacArthur, 444, 450, 464-66, 535 U.S. aid to, 61, 97, 376
and Nimitz, 441, 468, 471 China Incident, 50-51, 548
objectives of, 469, 471, 515-16, 522-24 China Theater, 161
and ORANGE plan, 466 Chinese troops, at Hong Kong, 451
Choiseul, 534, 575
and Pacific Military Conference, 452
Christmas Island, 99, 204-06, 212
plans for, 460-61, 463, 468-72, 502 Chuchow airfield, and Tokyo raid, 271
and Quebec Conference, 518-19 Chungking Conference, 155, 156
and Rabaul, 460, 471-72 Chungking Government, 270, 549
and South China Sea, 593-94 Churchill, Winston S.
and Southwest Pacific offensive, 587, 600-602 and Allied strategy, 386
Spruance on, 442 and ARCADIA Conference, 158
and TRIDENT, 460 and Australia, 203, 220, 223
U.S. Navy and, 460, 462, 464, 469, 567 and Brett, 173
INDEX 729
and British chiefs of staff, 166, 227 and shipping priorities, 349
and Casablanca Conference, 385 and strategic responsibility, 242-43
and command, in Pacific, 243 and unified command in Far East, 160
and command, unified, 160, 161n and U.S. deployment, 219
and Japan, 142, 381 and U.S. Navy Department, 234
and MacArthur, 247 Combined Fleet. See Japanese Combined Fleet.
and military co-operation with U.S., 78, 142 Combined Staff Planners, 165, 227, 234, 593, 596
and modus vivendi, 118 Command, 116-17, 144, 156-57, 158, 160-61, 163-66.
and New Zealand, defense of, 220 179, 225, 243, 276, 294. See also ABDACOM;
and Plan Dog, 83-84 Unified command,
and Quebec Conference, 520 in ABDA area, 168-72, 179
and resources, allocation of, 164 in Aleutians, 421
on Singapore, 80-81 in ANZAC area, 201-02
and strategic responsibility, 241-43 and CARTWHEEL, 583. See also Southwest Pacific
and TRIDENT, 458 command problems,
Chynoweth, Brig. Gen. Bradford, 196 in Central Pacific. See Central Pacific, command
Civilian defense, 145 in.
Civilian populations in Europe, 243, 478-80
on Wake, 101 in Far East, 160-61
and war warnings, 119 in Hawaii, 144-45
Clark, Maj. Gen. Mark, 335 Japanese, 235-39, 364, 412-13, 553, 591
Clark Field, 101, 123, 136, 140 and logistics, 346
Climate, effect on logistics and strategy, 252, 346 and MacArthur. See MacArthur,
Coast artillery units, U.S., 98, 103, 209-10 in New Caledonia, 208-10
Coast Farmer, 191 for New Georgia campaign, 510-11
Coastal artillery on Wake, 101 in North Pacific. See North Pacific, command in.
Coast watchers, 388, 413 in Pacific. See Pacific command problems,
Colcough, Capt. Oswald S., 531 in Panama, 144
Collins, Maj. Gen. J. Lawton, 343 in Philippines, 195-97
Colombo, 282 in South Pacific. See South Pacific command
Color plans, 22. See also names of plans (ORANGE, problems.
etc.). in Southwest Pacific. See Southwest Pacific com-
COMAIRSOPAC, 403 mand problems.
Combat fatigue, problems of, 330 and strategy, relation between, 372
Combat teams, Army regimental, 328, 342 unity of. See Unified command.
"Combined," definition of, 164 Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet (CINCPAC),
Combined Chiefs of Staff, 164-66, 226, 230-31. See 250-51, 479. See also Nimitz, Rear Adm.
also Great Britain, Chiefs of Staff; Joint Chiefs Chester W.
of Staff. Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet (COMINCH) 226,
and ABDA area, 175, 202 233-34, 246. See also King, Admiral Ernest J.
and aerial offensive, 596 Commander, South Pacific Area (COMSOPAC),
and Anglo-American relations, 383-84 260-61. See also Halsey, Admiral William F.
and ANZAC proposal, 245 Commanding General, U.S. Army Forces in Central
and ARCADIA, 227 Pacific, 486. See also Richardson, Maj. Gen.
and Burma, 386 Robert C., Jr.
and Cairo Conference, 592 Communications, Allied line of, 156-57, 189, 199,
and Central Pacific offensive, 386 218-19, 252, 257-58, 327-28, 467
and Japan, plan for defeat of, 594-95, 601 and air defense, 332-33
and Java, 174, 176 Australia-to-U.S., 99, 198-99, 204-05. See also
and New Caledonia, 209 South Pacific islands,
and New Guinea, 520 defense of, 172, 198-99, 205, 212, 218, 221, 224
and Pacific operations (1943-44), 459, 517-18, 241, 258, 291-92, 307, 324, 336, 343, 367, 377-78,
603-05 382, 438, 440-41, 470
and Pacific strategy, 219, 385n, 386, 439, 459, 520 Hawaii-Philippines, 101
593 Japanese attack on, 133-34, 279
and Philippines, reinforcement of, 187-88 and Japanese strategy, 107, 111, 131, 204, 217, 278,
and Quebec Conference, 517-18 575
and resources, allocation of, 243 Japanese threat to, 280, 290, 311, 440
and Micronesia, 435 Darwin, 150, 195, 202, 247, 453

and New Zealand, 245 Davao, 137, 167, 181, 266, 555
in North Pacific, 528 Death March, Philippine, 265
and Pacific command, 256 Deboyne Island, 274-75
to Philippines, 187 Declaration of war, 125-26
to Philippines, and Allied strategic aims, 159 Defensive strategy, See U.S. strategy, defensive,
in South Pacific, 123, 249, 436-37 de Gaulle, General Charles, 208
and TRIDENT, 458 Del Monte Airfield, 136, 181, 192, 195
Communications, committee on, 231 Department of National Defense, considered, 144
Communications, Japanese line of, 189, 199, 438, Deployment of U.S. forces, 600. See also Air Forces,
458, 465, 505, 517, 544, 599-600 U.S. Army; Atlantic vs. Pacific priority; Navy,
Congress, U.S., 23, 34-35, 43, 53, 63, 101, 122, 144, U.S., deployment of; Resources, allocation of.
449, 487 to Australia, 198, 204, 222
and declaration of war, 125-26, 142-43 in Central Pacific, 537, 541-42, 578-79, 596
Convoys, 148, 172. See also Pensacola convoy. and Combined Chiefs of Staff, 219
Cooke, Admiral Charles M., 234, 301, 393, 500, 605 to Europe, 222
and air reinforcements, South Pacific, 336 Marshall on, 519
and Bougainville, 469 and Marshalls, 463-64
and Central Pacific offensive, 439, 462, 469 in Pacific, 159-60, 217-18, 220-24, 240, 256,
and command in Pacific, 397 460-61, 469, 541-42
and command. Southwest Pacific offensive, 296, in Philippines, and ABDACOM, 168
298 in South Pacific, 537, 541
and Marshalls, 462 in Southwest Pacific, 159, 253
and Nauru, 523 Destroyer Divisions, 45th and 46th, 576n
and Pacific Military Conference, 390-91 Destroyers, Allied, 101, 132-33, 143, 168, 175, 178,
and Pacific objectives, 602 192, 201-02, 215-16, 253, 270, 276-77, 279, 281,
and Pacific organization, 499 311, 313, 320, 341, 343, 350, 449, 482, 504, 545n,
and priorities, 336 563, 569
and resources, allocation of, 392-93 Destroyers, Japanese, 56, 131, 133, 138, 274, 279-80,
Coral atolls, problems of, 569 317, 329, 340-41, 345, 349, 367, 576
Coral Sea, 199, 264, 274-76, 289-90, 308, 316. See Devereux, Maj. James P. S., 133
also Port Moresby, and Japan. De Witt, Lt. Gen. John L., 421-31, 530
battle of 276-79, 293 Dill, Field Marshal Sir John, 165
Corregidor, 24, 35, 182, 186-87, 190, 193, 264-65, Disease, problems of, 184-85, 252, 265, 337
313. See also Manila Bay. Divisions, U.S. See also Infantry, U.S.
command in, 196 Americal Division, 212, 224, 342, 347-48, 350, 367,
defense of, 196 578
Japanese attack on, 266-68 New York National Guard, 207
MacArthur's headquarters, 137, 181 Philippine Division, 182-83, 196
surrender of, 268 Dominion Chiefs of Staff, and Southwest Pacific
Corvettes, 201-02 command, 245
Craig, General Malin, 73 Dominion Governments, and Pacific strategy, 220-21
Cross-Channel attack, 380-81, 456, 459, 512-13, 517. Dona Nati, 191
See also BOLERO; ROUNDUP; SLEDGEHAMMER. Doolittle, Lt. Col. James H., and Tokyo Raid, 269-73
Cruiser Division, U.S., 12th, 576n Doorman, Rear Adm. K. W. F. M., 178
Cruisers, Allied, 101, 132-33, 168, 178, 201-02, 215, DRY GOODS, 505
216, 253, 270, 276, 279, 281, 311, 313, 323, 341,
Dukw, 505, 569
350, 449, 482, 504, 545n, 571
Cruisers, Japanese, 56, 131, 138, 167-68, 200, 215, Dumpu, 566
274, 279-80, 284, 317, 329, 349, 576 Duncan, Capt. Donald B., 269
Crutchley, Rear Adm. V. A. C., 311, 313 Dutch Borneo, in Japanese war plans, 108, 166
Cryptanalysts, 415 Dutch East Indies. See Netherlands East Indies.
Cunningham, Brig. Gen. Julian W., 581 Dutch Harbor, 280, 283, 545
Curtin, John, 201, 203, 221-22, 247, 255, 343, 391 Dutch New Guinea, 514, 553
Cuyo Island, 195
East Asia, 549
Dampier Strait, 551-52, 564-65, 575, 578 Eastern Axis operations, in CARTWHEEL, 401, 402
d'Argenlieu, Admiral Thierry, 208-11 Eastern Solomons, Battle of the, 329
INDEX 731
Economic pressures against Japan, 34, 41-42, 51, 53, European Axis, Roosevelt on, 142. See also Axis;
59, 65, 88, 91, 94, 97, 99, 113, 118 Germany; Italy.
Efate, 218-19, 257, 263, 275, 291-92, 319, 320, 338, 571 European deployment, 222.
Eglin Field, Florida, 270 European Theater, U.S. Army troops in, December,
Eichelberger, Lt. Gen. Robert L., 313, 362, 407 1943, 537, 538, 540
Eisenhower, General Dwight D., 151, 218, 223, 227, Everest, Col. Frank F., 261
231, 246, 326 Executive Order of March 12, 1942, and naval
and Army command. South Pacific, 260 reorganization, 226
on priority, 218, 335 Exeter, 178
staff organization of, 493-95
El Alamein, 343, 351 Fairchild, Maj. Gen. Muir S., 230, 532
El Fraile, 24. See also Manila Bay. Faisi, 401, 402, 533
Elcano, 191 Far East
Eleventh Air Force, 421, 429, 432, 530 Allied defense of, 240-43
ELKTON plan 392, 400, 630-35 Allied strategy in, 79-80, 88, 159
ELKTON I, 389 Great Britain on, 79, 87-88, 157
ELKTON II, 390-95 and Soviet Union, 155, 529
ELKTON III, 408-11, 675-85. See also CARTWHEEL. unified command in, 160-61
Ellice Islands, 291, 440-41, 471, 543, 589 U.S. policy in, 37, 87-88, 97-98, 126, 156-57
airbases in, 464, 468, 470, 522 Far East Air Force, 98, 134, 136, 168, 181
and Marshalls, invasion of, 524 Field artillery units, U.S., 177, 209, 407n, 502n, 581
Embick, Lt. Gen. Stanley D., 38, 41, 230, 532 Fifteenth Army Group, 494
Emmons, Lt. Gen. Delos G., 78, 144, 207, 256-57 Fifth Air Force, 403
command of Hawaiian Department, 144-45 Fifth Amphibious Force, 482, 489-90
and New Caledonia, 209-11 Fifth columnists, rumors of, 141
and Nimitz, 359, 359n Fighter aircraft, Allied, 202, 218, 221, 224, 330, 413,
and Pacific Military Conference, 390 464, 563. See also names of fighter and pursuit
and Pacific reinforcements, 321 aircraft (P-38's, etc.).
and reinforcement of Hawaii, 147 and CARTWHEEL, 401, 521-22
on unified command, 144n range of, 587
and U.S. Army forces, South Pacific, 260 in South Pacific, 256, 327, 336, 339, 343
and U.S. Navy, relations with, 360 in Southwest Pacific, 178, 255, 371
Empress Augusta Bay, 534, 535, 575-76 Fighter aircraft, Japanese, 176, 201, 283, 365, 412-13
Engineer brigades. Second Special, 407n, 581 Fiji Islands, 99, 148, 199, 246, 260, 284
Eniwetok, 460, 468, 524-25 and ANZAC area, 201
Enogai Inlet, 505, 510 Army troops in, 257
Enterprise, 207, 271-72, 281, 284, 319-20, 329, 336, defense of, 208, 212, 218, 220, 223, 342-43
345, 350 Japan and, 212, 316, 435, 440
Envelopment, strategy of, 560-61 in Japanese war plans, 109, 204, 217, 278-79
Espiritu Santo, 219, 257, 263, 346, 360, 571 reinforcement of, 281, 338, 343
airfield at, 319-20 and South Pacific Expeditionary Force, 319-20
reinforcement of, 328, 338 Fijian troops, 208, 504
Essex, 545n, 577 Filipino troops, 137, 264. See also Philippine Scouts.
EUREKA. See Tehran Conference. Filipinos. See also Philippines.
Europe, 37, 74 "invasion fever," 141
air forces in, December, 1943, 537, 538, 540 and MacArthur, 193
Allied offensive in, 219 morale of, 151
and Allied priorities, 158 Finschhafen, 398, 461, 502, 533, 534, 552, 564, 575,
and Allied strategy, 378. See also Atlantic vs. 579
Pacific priority. and CARTWHEEL, 401, 402
and Allied strategy at Quebec Conference, 517 and ELKTON I, 389
and American strategy, 74-76, 456, 605 and Japan, 367-68, 566
command in, 300, 479-80 operations at, 565-66
invasion of, 308, 377 Fitch, Rear Adm. Aubrey W., 257, 352, 504
and Japanese strategy, 126 Fitch, Col. Burdette M., 255
and RAINBOW, 71-73 Fleet Marine Force, 567
"Europe First" concept, 438-39. See also "Germany Fletcher, Rear Adm. Frank J., 276-77, 281, 319, 325
First"; Atlantic vs. Pacific priority. Ford Island, 132
Ford Motor Factory, Singapore, 174 Wehrmacht, 380

Formosa, 117, 123, 447, 584, 596-99 and Western Hemisphere, threat to, 69
airfields in, 123, 593 "Germany first" strategy, 79, 85-88, 158-59, 217-18,
and Cairo Declaration, 592 289-90, 308-10, 377-78, 385. See also Atlantic
Japan and, 111, 134, 591 vs. Pacific priority,
U.S. proposals to attack, 136 and RAINBOW 5, 72
Forrestal, James V., 151 and TRIDENT, 457-59
Fortune poll, 126n Gerow, Brig. Gen. Leonard T., 118-19, 140, 148,
Fourteenth Corps, 509, 559-60, 578 227, 291
France, 69, 74, 77, 89, 592. See also ANVIL. Ghormley, Rear Adm. Robert L., 78-79, 82-83, 257,
and Indochina, Japanese in, 22-23, 94. See also 260, 294, 354, 478
Indochina. on British strategy, 84
Japan and, 50, 59 and command of South Pacific Area, 256-57, 343
Navy of, in U.S. strategy, 75, 77 and command, Southwest Pacific offensive, 301,
and New Caledonia, 208-10 302, 304
rearmament of, 495 and Guadalcanal, 319, 327-29, 340, 342
Free French, 89, 204-05, 208-09, 347 and Harmon, 261, 352
Fremantle, 178 and Joint Purchasing Board, 260-61
Fuller, Maj. Gen. J. F. G., 126 and MacArthur, 306-07, 311, 326, 341-42, 357-58
Funafuti, 291, 441n, 571 and Milne Bay, 358
and Ndeni, 356
and Nimitz, 342-43
G-2, 119 and Pacific offensive, 306-07, 313, 327-28, 364,
G-4, 233 375, 389
Gallup poll, 126n and Pacific reinforcements, 318, 331, 335
Gasmata, 215, 580 and Pacific Theaters, co-operation between, 357
Geelvink Bay, 536, 555 and South Pacific offensive, 305, 318-19, 321-23,
Geography 325, 327-29
and logistics, problems of, 346 and Southwest Pacific offensive, 298-99, 302, 304
of New Georgia, and TOENAILS, 504 and U. S. Army, 360
and strategy, 589 Gilbert Islands, 396, 434, 439-42, 468-69, 471, 515,
German islands in Pacific, 25 520, 543-44, 576, 589. See also Makin; Tarawa,
Germany, 89, 541 amphibious operations in, 568-70, 571-73
and Allied priorities, 334 and CARTWHEEL, 470-71
and Allied strategy, 88-89, 159, 221-22, 310, and Central Pacific Area, 249
376-77, 380-81, 456, 459. See also "Germany invasion of, 460, 481, 501, 515, 526, 567-71
first" strategy. invasion of, plans for, 469, 522
and Anti-Comintern Pact, 39 invasion of, and U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 470-71
bomber offensive against. See Aerial offensive Japan and, 131, 133, 445-46, 541, 553, 564, 571-73,
against Germany. 590
declares war against U.S., 143 and Marshalls, invasion of, 463-64, 524, 569
defeat of, and Pacific strategy, 599-600 operations in, 567-73
defeat of, and Japan, 594-95 strategic value of, 573
defeat of, and JSSC, 598 U.S. Army troops and, 589-90
early victories of, 54 U.S. JSSC on, 467
and Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, 549 and U.S. Navy, 464
invasion of Poland, 52 Gilberts Expeditionary Forces, command of, 489
invasion of western Europe, 74 Gilberts-Nauru plan, 464, 468-71
and Japan, 45, 50-51, 126, 548-49 Gizo, 559
and Pacific Military Conference, 392-93 Glassford, Rear Adm. William A., 152
and Singapore, 64 Global strategy, and JSSC, 456. See also Atlantic vs.
and Soviet Union, 52, 63, 65, 93, 529 Pacific priority.
and TRIDENT, 459 Governments-in-Exile, 89
and U.S. Army, 394-95 Great Britain, 25-26, 31, 69, 78-79, 84, 91, 118, 142,
and U.S. joint planners, 394-95 164, 226, 344, 379, 451, 495, 517-18, 520, 594.
and U.S. strategy, 141, 158, 221-22, 310, 392-93, See also ARCADIA Conference; Cairo Conference;
457 Casablanca Conference; Quebec Conference;
and U.S. war aims, 86 Tehran Conference; TRIDENT.
INDEX 733
air forces, 78, 87, 138, 380-81, 599 Allied offensive against, 319
and Allied command, 160-61, 225, 251, 480 and Army, 25th Division, 343
and Allied conferences, 155-56, 158-59, 375, and Army-Navy differences, 352-55
456-58, 512-13, 592 Battle of, 349-50
American aid to, 61, 77-82, 85-86, 118, 126, 142 casualties in, 584, 586
Army forces, 79, 87, 164, 168, 173, 175, 203 defense of, 367
as assembly point, 219. See also BOLERO. Halsey and, 403
and Burma, 176, 203, 241, 383, 456, 601 and I-GO, 413
Chiefs of Staff, 90, 156, 161, 177, 227, 241, 334, Japan and, 323-24, 327-28, 337, 349-50, 364-65,
378-79, 383, 458, 601. See also United States, 367, 543
and Great Britain, military co-operation, Japanese base at, 306
and China, 52, 378-79, 383 Japanese evacuation of, 388
cruisers, 172, 178 Japanese losses at, 369
defense of, 78-79, 87, 158, 334 Japanese offensive against, 306, 327-28, 336,
destroyers, 172 340-42, 345, 413. See also Solomons, Japanese
Dominions of, 143 offensive on.
Empire, 77, 82-83, 87, 186 and logistics, problems of, 347
as factor in U.S. strategy, 31, 75, 77, 81-82, 89 Marshall on, 327
and Far East, 79, 87, 157, 174 and Pacific command, 352-53
German threat to, 74 and Pacific offensive, Task Two, 313
and Hong Kong, 137 reinforcement of, 342-44, 350
and India, 241, 383 Roosevelt on, 344
and Indian Ocean, 241, 280 significance of, 446
and Japan, 50, 58-59, 62, 109, 121-22, 125-26, 142, and supply, problems of, 328, 347, 355
378-79, 381, 451, 457-58, 517. See also RED War U.S. Marines on, 323-25, 327-29, 336, 342, 345
Plan. Guam, 43, 123, 199, 309, 386, 515, 603
Joint Staff Mission, 166, 226 defense of, 91, 101
naval forces of, 87, 101, 111, 123, 138, 172, 174, Japanese offensive against, 124, 133
177-79, 205, 242, 282, 296, 342, 597-600 in Japanese war plans, 58, 64, 107-08, 111, 131
and Pacific, 198, 204-05, 296, 378-79, 383-84, 429, threat to, 119
439-40, 456-57, 517-19, 603-05 in U.S. strategy, 97
and Philippines, 189, 439-40 and Washington Conference, 26
and Plan Dog, 83-84 Guerrilla operations in Philippines, 193
planners, 147, 383, 594 Gulf of Papua, 199, 216
and priorities, 334-35 Gunboats, 101
and resources, allocation of, 344, 440, 518 Gwin, 507
and Roosevelt, 344
and shipping, 164, 207 Hainan, 123, 138
and Singapore, 153, 157, 164, 594 Hale, Maj. Gen. Willis H., 487
and SLEDGEHAMMER, 308, 308n, 309, 318 Halmahera, 536, 553
and Southeast Asia, 240 Halsey, Admiral William F., 281, 389, 395, 478, 487,
and strategic responsibility, 240, 242-43, 246 558, 567
strategy of, 78-79, 87-88, 158, 308, 318, 378-81, and Army troops, 537, 540, 541
440, 451, 455-58, 517, 600 and B-17's, 356
and TORCH, 322 and Bismarcks, 563
and U.S. See U.S., and Great Britain. and Bougainville, 397, 469, 533-35, 578
Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, 58, 546-47, and carriers, 587
549 and CARTWHEEL, 401, 402, 403, 411, 415, 465, 514,
Greece, 89 533-35, 575, 583
Grew, Joseph, 94, 115, 117, 124 and Central Pacific offensive, 461, 463
Griswold, Maj. Gen. Oscar W., 509-11, 528, 559-60, and Coral Sea, 276
562 and ELKTON II, 390-91
Grumman Wildcats, 101 forces under, 391
Guadalcanal, 212, 214-15, 284, 356, 364, 370, 374, and Griswold, 509
376, 388, 400, 402, 437, 487, 505, 584 and Harmon, 356, 361, 509-10, 578
and air reinforcements, 338 and Hester, 509
air support in, 333 and Japan, 543, 590
Allied forces at, 413 and joint staff, 501n
and Kavieng, 516 and MacArthur, 326

and King, 408 and Ndeni, 356
King on, 373-74 and New Georgia, 400-401, 510
and Kiriwina, 396 and Noumea, 348
and logistics, 474 and offensive strategy, 354
and MacArthur, 387-89, 401, 402, 533-34 and P-400's, 330
and New Georgia, 388, 396, 411, 504-07, 559 and Pacific Military Conference, 389-90
Nimitz on, 371 and Pacific reinforcement, 325
and Noumea, 348 and Pacific Theaters, co-operation between, 357
and Pacific command, 371, 397-98 and shipping, shortage of, 526
and Pacific Military Conference, 396-97 and South Pacific, 262-63, 325-26, 371, 621-23
and Pacific offensive, 370-71, 396-97, 515, 589 and South Pacific reinforcement, 321-22, 326,
and Rabaul, 374, 442, 576-77 328-29, 331, 340, 342-43
relations with Army, 356-57 and staff organization, 261, 504
and Russell Islands, 388 on supply, 348
and Santa Cruz Islands, 345 and TOENAILS, 507
and shipping, 526 and Turner, 507
and Solomons, 350, 441-42, 560-63, 575 and USAFISPA, 260-63
and South Pacific command, 343-44, 372 and U.S. Navy, 342-43, 353-54, 360
and South Pacific offensive, 371, 459, 502, 560-63 Hart, Admiral Thomas C., 94, 101, 115, 123, 137
and TOENAILS, 505-06 146, 149-50, 153, 157, 168, 172-73, 188
and Tokyo raid, 271-72 Hawaii, 103, 199, 245. See also Pearl Harbor.
and Turner, 510 air forces in, 303, 334
and U.S. Navy Third Fleet, 403 Allied intelligence on, 340
and Vella Lavella, 562-63 and Allied strategy, 159
and Woodlark-Kiriwina offensive, 371, 395-96 and Army, 218. See also Hawaiian Department.
Handy, Maj. Gen. Thomas T., 227, 298, 362, 397, Army-Navy relations in, 360
490, 600-601, 605 B-17's in, 258
on Alaskan Theater, 423-24 base at, 33, 204, 470, 545, 589
and Aleutians, 532 and Central Pacific Area, 249
and Hester, 507 and Central Pacific offensive, 473
and Marshalls, 480 command in, 144-5. See also Hawaiian Depart-
and Nimitz, 499-500 ment.
and Pacific command, 373 defense of, 38-39, 74, 85, 102-03, 140, 143, 145-47,
and Pacific organization, 499-500 204-05, 207, 224, 289, 336, 377-78, 436
and shipping, shortage of, 526 forces in, 61, 221, 240, 281
and Supreme Command, Europe, 480 "invasion fever," 141
Hansa Bay, 536, 605 and Japanese attack, 123-24
Harmon, Lt. Gen. Millard F., 260-61, 303, 319, 393- and Japanese naval plans, 111
94, 396, 463n, 487 Japanese threat to, 102, 147, 207, 311, 436-37, 440
and Air Forces, South Pacific, 262-63, 325-26, 329, logistics in, 498
331 and Marshalls, invasion of, 524
and air power, role of, 352-55 Military Government in, 478-79, 482
and B-17's, 356-57 and ORANGE plans, 466
and Bougainville, 578 and Pensacola convoy, 148
and communications, line of, 343 reaction to Pearl Harbor, 140
and COMSOPAC, 260-61 reinforcement of, 70, 147-48, 207, 225, 326-28
and ELKTON II, 392 route through, 191-92
and fighter planes, performance of, 333 and shipping, 349
and Fiji, reinforcement of, 343 Somervell on, 499
and Ghormley, 352 and Southwest Pacific offensive, 295
and Guadalcanal, 325, 328, 340, 342-43, 345, subversion feared, 119
352-54 and war warning, 119-21, 123-24
and Halsey, 356, 361, 510 Hawaiian Artillery Command, 484
and Henderson Field, 333, 356-57 Hawaiian Department, 103, 207, 240, 256-57, 478-79,
and Hester, 509, 511 482-87
and joint staffs, 361 Hawaiian Department Reserve, 484
on logistics, 262, 346, 355 Hawaiian Mobile Air Force, 258, 319
INDEX 735
Helfrich, Vice Adm. Conrad E. L., 173, 178 and Bougainville, 551
Henderson Field, 325, 333, 336, 345, 350, 353, 354, and command, 412-13
356-57, 377-78, 413 and Southeast Area, 367, 412-13, 551-52
defense of, 326, 342 Incendiary bombs, and Tokyo raid, 272-73
Japanese attack on, 328-29, 342, 365 Independence, 545n, 577
Hepburn, Rear Adm. Arthur J., 43 India, 214, 242, 383, 515
Hepburn Report, 101 Allied forces in, 177
Herron, Maj. Gen. Charles D., 102 defense of, 159, 220, 241, 379
Hester, Maj. Gen. John H., 504, 507, 509-11 Japanese threat to, 179, 311
Hickam airfield, Japanese attack on, 132 lend-lease shipments to, 349
Higashikuni, Prince Nanuhiko, 114 and resources, allocation of, 344
Hill, Admiral Harry W., 571, 573, 577n Indian brigades, at Sittang Bridge, 180
Hiryu, 279-80, 284 Indian Ocean, 172, 179, 544, 555, 590n
Hodge, Maj. Gen. John R., 511 British interests in, 241
Hokkaido, 433, 596-98 Japan and, 108, 214, 280
Hollandia, 514, 516, 536 Indochina, 93, 175, 451, 590
Homma. Lt. Gen. Masaharu, 134, 137, 181-84, 264- Japanese in, 59, 62-65, 80, 94, 111, 217
66, 268 in Japanese war plans, 64, 108
Hong Kong, 108, 124, 131, 137, 168, 448, 451 in U.S.-Japanese negotiations, 105, 115-18, 138
Honolulu, 192 Indonesia, 138, 198
Honshu, 597-98, 601-02 Infantry, U.S., 103, 206, 212, 219, 224, 305, 322, 428,
Hoover, Rear Adm. John H., 482, 487, 489, 567-68 536-37
Hoover, Lt. Travis, and Tokyo raid, 273 Infantry Divisions, U.S.
Hopkins, Harry, 139, 164, 203, 241, 310, 454n 7th, 429-430, 461, 524
Horii, Maj. Gen. Tomitaro, 199-200, 215, 274, 284, 24th, 407n
316-17 25th, 343, 510, 534, 559-60, 562
Hornbeck, Stanley K., 269-70 26th, 209
Home, Vice Adm. F. J., 230 27th, 147, 207, 472, 489-90, 522, 569, 573
Hornet, 270-72, 281, 284, 336, 345 32nd, 220, 255, 295, 337, 350, 581-82
Houston, 178 37th, 220, 223, 505, 507, 509-10, 560, 577-78
Howitzers, 155mm., 207 41st, 203, 204, 220, 255, 295
Howland Island, 464 43rd, 328, 343, 348, 388, 504, 507, 509-11, 559-60
Hu Shih, 123 Infantry Regiments, U.S.
Hull, Cordell, 37, 114, 122, 124 24th, 219
and MacArthur, command of, 193n 132nd, 209
on modus vivendi, 118, 118n, 119 147th, 220, 356
and national defense policy, 84-85 158th, 407n, 502n
negotiations with Japan, 65, 92-94, 117, 119 162nd, 503
on Pearl Harbor attack, 139, 142 164th, 212, 345
on Singapore, 80-81 172nd, 507
and Soviet Maritime Provinces, 155 184th, 209
and Tripartite Pact, 61 503rd Paratroop, 407n, 533, 563
and war with Japan, 123, 126 Ingersoll, Capt. Royal E., USN, 68
Hull, Maj. Gen. John E., 490, 512 Inouye, Vice Adm. Shigeyoshi, 133-34, 199-200,
Humboldt Bay, 536 215-17
Huon Gulf, 214-16, 389, 396 Intelligence, Allied, 230-31, 270, 280, 340-41, 349-
Huon Peninsula, 368, 396, 412, 533-34, 563-64, 567, 50, 402, 446
578-79, 581 Inukai, 48
Hurley, Maj. Gen. Patrick J., 188, 191-93, 362 Invasion of Japan. See Japan, invasion of.
Hyakutake, Lt. Gen. Harukichi, 279, 284, 316, 349, Invasion of U.S., possibility of, 31-32
369 Iowa, 592-93, 603-05
Iran, and Tokyo raid, 273
I-GO, 413, 415 Ireland, 163-64, 220
Iba, Japanese attack on, 136 Ismay, General Hastings L., 227
Iceland, 163-64 Isolationism, American, 21, 43
Ickes, Harold, 97 Isthmus of Kra, 131
Imamura, Lt. Gen. Hitoshi, 364-65, 367, 411, 563 Italy, 89. See also Tripartite .Pact.
and Army-Navy Central Agreement, 411-12 and Allied strategy, 88, 158, 380, 459
and Anti-Comintern Pact, 39 Emperor of, 46, 61, 94, 115, 121-22, 225, 234-37,
declares war in Europe, 74 549-50
declares war on U.S., 143 "Estimate of the Enemy Situation," 543-45
invasion of, and TRIDENT, 459 expansion of, 37, 45-48, 50, 62-64, 80, 93-94, 108,
and Japan, 45, 50 166-67, 173-75, 179-80, 188, 190-91, 198
operations in, and Teheran Conference, 592 expansion of, Allied opposition to, 50-52, 83, 93
and threat to Western Hemisphere, 69 expansion of, U.S. opposition to, 45, 47, 50-54, 59,
Iwo Jima, 573 69, 83, 86, 126
fighter aircraft. See Fighter aircraft, Japanese,
Jaluit, 445, 468, 524 and Fijis. See Fijis,
Japan forces, deployment of, 138-39, 340, 591. See also
"absolute national defense sphere," 546-47, Japanese air forces; Japanese ground forces;
552-53, 564-65, 575, 590, 591 Japanese naval forces,
and aerial reconnaissance, 64, 132, 365 foreign policy, 25-26, 47, 54, 59-66, 93, 99, 105,
air forces. See Japanese air forces; Japanese air 547-49. See also Japan, and Axis; Japan, and
units. France; Japan, and Germany; Japan, and Great
air operations, 135, 265, 365, 371, 400, 507, 555 Britain; Japan, and Italy; Japan, and Nether-
air power of, 365, 369, 547, 563, 575, 577, 596 lands; Japan, and U.S.
aircraft, 123, 217, 329-30, 333, 545, 557, 571-72 and France, 50, 59, 62-63
and Aleutians, 279, 283, 420-21, 425-26, 528, 532, and German-Soviet Pact, 52-53
543 and Germany, 45, 64, 548-49, 655-56. See also
Aleutians Force, 279, 283 Japan, and Axis.
and Allied strategy, estimate of, 543-45, 590-91 and Gilbert Islands, 133, 445-46, 546, 553, 564,
American fear of, 382, 420 571-73, 590
amphibious operations, 166, 178-79, 184 and Great Britain, 47, 50-53, 83, 93, 121-22
artillery, 173-74, 183, 215, 265-66 and Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere,
and Attu, 283, 430-31, 503 51-52, 546-47
and Axis, relations with, 50-54, 58-63. See also and Guadalcanal, 306, 323-24, 327-29, 336-37,
Japan, and Germany; Japan, and Italy, 340-42, 345, 349-50, 364-65, 367, 369, 388, 413,
bases, 94, 166, 306-07, 340. See also Rabaul; Truk, 543
battleships. See Battleships, Japanese, and Guam. See Guam.
and Bismarck Archipelago, 198, 367, 412, 543, 551 High Command, 115, 234-39
bombardment of. See Aerial offensive; Tokyo and Hong Kong. See Hong Kong.
Raid. Imperial Conference, 58, 237
bombers. See Bombers, Japanese, Imperial Conference (July 2, 1941), 93
and Borneo, 137-39, 168, 174-75, 541 Imperial Conference (Sept. 6, 1941), 104-05, 117
and Bougainville. See Bougainville, Imperial Conference (Nov. 5, 1941), 115, 117
and British strategy, 378-79, 381, 601 Imperial Conference (Dec. 1, 1941), 121-22
Cabinet, 121-22, 225, 236-37 Imperial Conference (Sept. 30, 1943), 549-50, 590
and Caroline Islands, 411, 468, 546, 552-53, 564 Imperial General Headquarters, 111, 181, 184,
carriers. See aircraft carriers, Japanese, 199-200, 214, 217, 225, 235-39, 278, 284, 340,
casualties, 543, 584 364-65, 367, 411-12, 433, 553, 555, 557, 591
and Central Pacific, 249, 444-47, 450, 522-23, 543, Imperial General Headquarters, and Allied strat-
550-53, 555, 557-58, 590-91 egy, 544-45
Chiefs of Staff, 234 Imperial General Headquarters, and Allied
and China. See China, Japan and. strength, estimate of, 544-45
convoys, 123, 178-79, 274-77 Imperial General Headquarters, Army Section,
and Corregidor. See Corregidor, 225, 235, 237, 239, 547, 550
cruisers. See Cruisers, Japanese, Imperial General Headquarters, and command,
decision for war, 113-17, 121-22, 124-27 235, 237-39, 413
destroyers. See Destroyers, Japanese, Imperial General Headquarters, Navy Section,
domestic politics, 46-47, 48, 52, 55-56, 92, 94, 225, 235, 237, 550, 553
114-15, 225, 234, 236-37, 549-50 Imperial General Headquarters, and Navy war
economic pressures against. See Economic pres- plans, 109
sures against Japan, Imperial General Headquarters, and Port Moresby
economy of, 50, 54-56, 59-60, 64-65, 95, 105, 113- operation, 216-17, 284, 316
14, 121, 125, 127, 138, 545-46. See also Japan, Imperial General Headquarters, and strategy, 167,
industrial production. 236-37, 278, 543-47, 565, 590-91
INDEX 737
and Indochina, 59, 62-65, 80, 93, 94 and South Pacific, 331, 450
industrial production, 50, 54-55, 584. See also and Southeast Area, 364-69, 412, 543, 547, 550-52,
Japan, economy of. 636-40. See also Japanese ground units, Armies,
Infantry, 138, 183, 279, 367-69, 553-54. See also 8th Area Army,
Japanese ground units, and Southeast Asia, 62-63, 93, 127, 138-39, 166-68,
invasion of, considered, 385, 447, 451-52, 530-31, 173-75, 179-80, 190-91, 590
593, 596-99 and Southwest Pacific, 207, 331, 450, 547
and invasion of U.S., possibility of, 420 and Soviet Union, 58-61, 63-64, 93, 154, 216-17,
and Italy, 45 419, 527-28, 545, 547-48, 592, 655-56
Joint Staff, 217 strategy, 95-96, 108-09, 131, 134, 139, 154-55, 166,
and Kiska. See Kiska, 181-83, 216-17, 265-68, 411-12, 543-47, 564-65,
and Kuril Islands, 420, 433, 546 611-13, 624-26, 636-40, 655-60
and Lae, 215, 367-68, 412, 564 strategy, defensive, 216-17, 285, 435, 546-47, 549,
Liaison Conferences, 58, 115, 121-22, 236-37, 549, 590. See also New Operational Policy,
611-13 strategy, offensive, 96, 131-39, 166-67, 216-17, 329,
limited war strategy, 125 340-41, 365, 367, 398, 550
and Makin. See Makin, strategy, U.S. estimate of, 467-68
and Malaya. See Malaya, strategy against, 22, 25, 91, 111, 158-59, 163, 256-
and Marianas. See Marianas, 57, 289, 378, 381-82, 385-86, 447-53, 457-60,
and Marshalls, 445, 468, 546, 553, 564 517, 527-30, 535-36, 538, 543-45, 584, 592-97,
and Midway. See Midway. 600, 668-72. See also Aerial offensive; Naval
Midway Force, 279-80 blockade; Japan, invasion of; Japan, plans for
military command and organization, 225, 237, 239. defeat of.
See also Japan, High Command, strength of, 310-11, 386
and Netherlands, 50, 58-60, 64-65, 83, 93, 121-22 submarines. See Submarines, Japanese,
and Netherlands East Indies, 59-60, 62, 95-96, and Tulagi. See Tulagi,
167-68, 175, 176, 178-80, 340, 411, 438, 541, 546, and U.S., negotiations with, 93, 115-21
547 and U.S., relations with, 22-23, 25, 36, 45, 47,
and New Britain. See New Britain, 50-54, 59, 60-61, 65, 69, 83, 86, 92-93, 103-04,
and New Georgia, 388, 504-07, 511, 559-60, 562-63 113, 115-21, 126
and New Guinea, 188, 289, 306, 324, 327, 331, 337, and Wake. See Wake,
340, 350, 364-68, 411-13, 415, 470, 518, 543, 546, war aims, 116, 125, 138-39, 327, 546
551-53, 555, 557, 564-66, 591. See also New war plans, 56-57, 58, 95-96, 107-09, 131, 166,
Guinea.
199-200, 204, 217, 278. See also Japan, strategy,
"New Operational Policy," 546-47, 549. See also
Japan, strategy, war plans, and Great Britain, 58-59, 95-96
and North Pacific, 419-20 war plans, for Southeast Asia, 105-11
Operation RO, 575, 577 war plans, and Soviet Union, 57, 95-96
paratroopers, 175 war plans, and U.S., 57-59, 64, 95-96, 104-11
and Pearl Harbor. See Pearl Harbor, Zeros. See Zeros, Japanese.
and Philippines, 30-31, 58, 124, 134-37, 181-84, Japanese Air Forces, 108-09, 132-34, 137-38, 173-74,
264-68, 340, 411, 541, 543, 553, 591. See also 239, 334. See also Japanese Army Air Forces;
Philippines. Japanese air units.
Planning Board, 114. See also Japan, economy of. Japanese air units, 239
plans for defeat of, 91, 447-53, 457-60, 593-601, Army, 3rd Air, 591
603-05, 644-47, 668-72 Army, 4th Air, 552, 591
and Port Moresby, 215-17, 274-78, 316-17, 327, Brigade, 12th Air, 365
329, 336-37, 340, 350, 365, 413, 415 Division, 6th Air, 365, 369, 412-13, 552
preparations for war, 54-59, 64, 93-95, 105, 115-17 Division, 7th Air, 552, 555
and Rabaul. See Rabaul,
Fleet, 1st Air, 239
resources of, 179, 290, 443, 545-46, 599. See also
Japan, economy of. Fleet, 11th Air, 134, 136, 239, 279, 369, 412, 552
and Russo-German war, 65, 93, 104 Flotilla, 22nd Air, 446
and Salamaua. See Salamaua, Group, 3rd Air, 138
and Shortland Islands. See Shortlands, Group, 4th Air, 215
and Solomons, 198, 216, 289-90, 306-07, 311, 324, Group, 5th Air, 134
327, 331, 336, 340-43, 365-69, 400, 411-12, 470, groups, air, 182, 201
543, 546, 553, 558, 560, 565. See also Solomons. Squadron, 76th Air, 365
Japanese Army, 46, 48-49, 50, 56, 64, 93, 104, 108-09, Forces
111, 114-16, 234, 237, 239. See also Japanese 5th Special Base Force, 445
ground units, 6th Defense Force, 445
deployment of, 109, 123, 214-15, 217, 279-80, 340, Units
412, 446, 505, 552, 553-54 Rabaul Defense Unit, 552
extremists, 47-48, 52, 54 4th South Seas Garrison Unit, 552
organization of, 235-37, 239 Japanese Navy, 46, 56, 199-201, 214-15, 217, 234,
planners, 96, 214, 278 239, 272, 274, 278, 279-80, 345, 458, 505, 523,
and strategy, 105, 121-22, 216-17, 411 576, 587, 600, 605. See also Carriers, Japanese;
Japanese Army Air Forces, 56, 412, 551-52. See also Cruisers, Japanese; Japanese Combined Fleet;
Japanese air units. Destroyers, Japanese; Japanese Navy units;
Japanese Army-Navy Central Agreements, 411-13, Submarines, Japanese.
550, 624-26, 636-40, 657-60 air forces, 412, 552. See also Japanese air units,
Japanese Army-Navy relations, 52, 57, 108, 111, 116, and Australia, 214, 216-17
235-37, 411-12, 547, 550, 553 and Central Pacific, 445-47, 541
Japanese Combined Fleet, 101, 109, 111, 122, 204, and Guadalcanal, 329, 340, 342
216, 239, 279, 284, 340, 365, 411, 413, 468, 552-53, and Midway, 278-80
555, 571, 575, 577, 589 Navy Ministry, 114, 235-36
Japanese ground units Navy planners, 96, 204, 212, 214
Armies organization of, 235, 239
China Expeditionary Army, 239 paratroopers, 167-68
Kwantung Army, 47, 239 and Pearl Harbor, 107, 121-22
North China Army, 364 and Solomons, 214-15, 349, 369, 411-12
Southern Army, 111, 116-17, 121, 167, 239, and Southeast Area, 364-65, 411
553, 591 strength of, 596
2nd Area Army, 553-55, 557, 591 and war plans, 95, 104-05, 108-09, 114, 116, 216-17
8th Area Army, 364-65, 367, 411, 551-53 Japanese Navy units
14th Army, 134, 137, 152, 181, 184, 591 Divisions
15th Army, 138, 179-80 5th Carrier Division, 217
16th Army, 138, 167-68 5th Cruiser Division, 217
17th Army, 279, 316, 337, 364-65, 369, 412-13, Fleets
552 Southeast Area Fleet, 364-65, 412, 551
18th Army, 364-68, 412-13, 552, 565-66, 581 Southern Expeditionary Fleet, 138, 239
19th Army, 552, 555 Southwest Area Fleet, 555
25th Army, 123, 138, 166-67 1st Fleet, 239
Divisions 2nd China Expeditionary Fleet, 137
Imperial Guards Division, 138 2nd Fleet, 134, 167, 279
2nd Division, 345 3rd Fleet, 134, 137, 369, 413
3rd Division, 555 4th Fleet, 111, 133, 199-200, 215, 217, 274, 555
6th Division, 369, 505, 552 5th Fleet, 111-12, 433
16th Division, 181-82, 184 6th Fleet, 111, 239
17th Division, 552 8th Fleet, 412
20th Division, 368, 552 Forces
35th Division, 555n landing forces, 200, 215, 217, 274, 367-68
36th Division, 555 Pearl Harbor Striking Force, 111, 116, 121,
38th Division, 137, 167-68, 349, 369, 505, 552 123, 131-32, 140
41st Division, 368, 552 6th Special Naval Landing Force, 445, 505
46th Division, 555 South Seas Force, 199-200
48th Division, 181-82 3rd Special Base Force, 446
51th Division, 368, 411, 552 Yokosuka 7th Special Naval Landing Force,
Brigades 505
65th Brigade, 182, 184, 447, 552 Java, 242, 244, 292, 590n
Regiments and ABDA, 241
51st Transport Regiment, 552 Allied headquarters in, 157, 160
Detachments and Allied strategic aims, 159
Okabe Detachment, 368 defense of, 174-75, 176-79, 218
South Seas Detachment, 133, 199, 200, 215, Japanese offensive against, 168, 178-79, 191
217, 239, 274-75, 279, 284, 316-17, 329 in Japanese war plans, 96, 105, 108, 166
INDEX 739
Java Sea, 175, 178, 242 and Pacific operations (1943-44), plans for,
Johore Bhanu, 138 516-17, 602-03
Johore Strait, 173 and Pacific strategy, 453, 467, 470-71, 514-16,
"Joint," definition of, 164 627-29
Joint Action of the Army and Navy, 475 and priorities, 334-35. See also Joint Chiefs of
Joint Administrative Committee, 455. See also Joint Staff, and Atlantic vs. Pacific priority,
Logistics Committee. and Rabaul, 364, 579, 583
Joint Board, 23, 37, 39, 72, 74, 83, 86, 108, 149, 152, and RENO III, 542, 601
226. See also Joint Chiefs of Staff. and resources, allocation of, 389
approves ABC-1, 90 and shipping, 349, 525-26
establishment of, 22 and South Pacific offensive, 305, 311, 396
on Hawaiian defense, 145 and Southwest Pacific, 247, 250, 298-99, 302, 358,
and Japan, negotiations with, 119 467, 542
and national defense policy, 84 and Soviet Union, 376-77, 420, 529
and offensive strategy, 34 and strategic responsibility, 243
and Pacific strategy, 28-29, 34, 40 and TRIDENT, 456-57
and Philippines, 23, 36, 99, 100, 148-49 and unified command, 160-61, 475-76, 477-78,
and plans for two-ocean war, 68 642-43
and RAINBOW plans, 71, 75n, 89-90 Joint command, 197, 477. See also Unified command.
and unified command, 29-30, 144 Joint Deputy Chiefs of Staff, 230
and U.S. Pacific Fleet, 143 Joint Intelligence Committee, 230-31
and U.S. strategy in Far East, 38 Joint Logistics Committee, 455
Joint Chiefs of Staff, 223, 229, 246, 250, 258, 291, Joint planners, 28, 31, 73, 75, 77-78, 84, 244, 335-38,
343, 375, 379-87, 395-96, 427-28, 430, 431-32, 349, 394-95. See also Joint Staff Planners; Joint
524, 532, 542. See also Arnold; King; Leahy; War Plans Committee.
Marshall. Joint Planning Committee, 22n, 29-30, 39-40, 68-71,
and ABDACOM, 173, 177 75-76, 159, 226-27
and air deployment in Pacific, 333, 337 Joint Psychological Warfare Committee, 230-31
and Allied strategy, 219, 229, 377-84, 456 Joint Purchasing Board, 260-61
and Anglo-American relations, 387 Joint Staff Mission, 165, 231
and ANZAC proposal, 245 Joint Staff Planners, 227-29, 234, 241, 334, 447-48,
and Atlantic vs. Pacific priority, 219, 222, 308 455, 460-66, 469-70, 512, 513, 524-42, 597-98,
and Casablanca decisions, 393-94 603. See also Joint War Plans Committee,
and Central Pacific, 440-41, 467, 470-71, 514, 524 and Central Pacific offensive, 460, 462, 469, 470,
composition of, 226-27 524-25, 542
and deployment of forces, 393 and Combined Staff Planners, 227
and ELKTON II, 393-95 and Japan, plans for defeat of, 597-98
and Gilberts, 470-71, 568 and MacArthur, 462, 514
and Hawaii, reinforcement of, 207 and Marshalls, invasion of, 460, 462-64, 469-70,
and Japan, plans for defeat of, 452, 598-601 524-25, 527
and Japan, strategy against, 535-36, 594, 599 membership and functions, 227-29, 455
and JSSC, 230 and North Pacific offensive, 431-32, 528-31, 532
and JUSSC, 227, 229 and Pacific command, 241, 462-63, 466
and MacArthur, 389, 408-11, 462, 467 and RENO III, 537-38, 542
and Marshalls, invasion of, 524, 527 and resources, allocation of, 334, 537
and Navy Department, 234 and South Pacific, 470
and Nimitz, 256, 462-63 and Southwest Pacific, 470, 542
and North Pacific offensive, 330-31, 420, 423, and U.S. Navy Plans Division, 234
427-28, 430, 528, 530-32 and U.S. strategy, 219, 231, 447-48, 469-70, 597-98
organization of, 166, 225, 230-31, 455 Joint staffs, proposals for, 359-61, 490-91, 495-96
and Pacific command, 242-44, 246, 247, 249, 362, Joint Strategic Survey Committee, 227-30, 377-79,
373, 397-98, 461, 463. See also Joint Chiefs of 455-56, 467, 531-32, 598, 600
Staff, and unified command. Joint Supply Committee, 164
and Pacific Military Conference, 393-95 Joint U.S. Strategic Committee, 228-31, 234, 241,
and Pacific objectives, 603 447-52, 455
and Pacific Ocean Areas, 246, 250 Joint War Plan ORANGE. See ORANGE War Plans.
and Pacific offensive, 306-07, 309, 313, 331, 364, Joint War Plans Committee, 447n, 460n, 515, 597,
370, 374-75, 386, 394-95, 396, 461 601
and CARTWHEEL, 469 and Attu, 430

and Central Pacific offensive, 460-61, 468-69, on Australia, command for, 245
514-16 authority of, 478
and Japan, plan for defeat of, 596-98, 599-600 and Bataan, fall of, 265
and Japan, strategy against, 452 and Casablanca Conference, 382, 394, 437-38, 517
and MacArthur, 515-16, 601 and CCS, 234, 384
and Marshalls, 460-62, 463-64 and Central Pacific, 437-38, 439-40, 493, 516-17
and Pacific operations, 453, 538 and Central Pacific offensive, 441-43, 461-62,
and Pacific strategy, 466-69, 513-15 466-67, 471, 518-19, 602
and RENO III, 515, 601-02 on Central Pacific route, 438
responsibility and membership of, 455 on China, 447-48
Jolo Island, 137 and command in Pacific, 241, 244-47, 252, 260,
Jomard Passage, 275-76 296-98, 301-03, 372-74, 387, 390, 397-98, 461-63,
Jones, Maj. Gen. Albert M., 196 476-78, 481
Junyo, 279, 283 and communications, lines of, 205
and Efate, 218-19, 291-92
Kaga, 279-80, 283-84 and Eisenhower, 493
Kahili, 533-34 and Fijis, 223, 281
and Ghormley, removal of, 343
Kai, 514 and Gilberts, invasion of, 471
Kaiapit, 565-66 and Halsey, 373-74
Kamchatka Peninsula, 528 and Hart, 173
Kato, Lt. Gen. R., 411 and Hokkaido, 598
Kavieng, 467, 471, 516, 520, 535-36 and Japanese offensives, 280, 337, 340-41
and ELKTON I, 389 and JCS, 226, 234
Japanese and, 200, 306 and joint staffs, 360-61
plans for Allied offensive against, 316 and Kiriwina, 371
Kendari, 175, 555 and logistics problems, 356
Kenney, Lt. Gen. George C., 253, 261, 368, 393-94, and Leavey Report, 493
403, 502, 563, 576 and Lutes Report, 493
and Allied air forces, 313 and MacArthur, 296, 298-99, 300-01, 307, 373-74,
and Arawe, 580 387-88, 410
and Cape Gloucester, 579-80 and Makin, 523
and MacArthur, 357 and Marianas, 458, 517, 602
and Noumea Conference, 337 and Marshall, 248-49, 299-303, 360-61, 374, 477,
and Pacific Military Conference, 389-90 495
and Rabaul, 577 and Marshalls, invasion of, 461, 527
Kido, Marquis, and 1941 Cabinet crisis, 114-15 and Mediterranean Theater organization, 495
Kieta, 401, 402, 534 and Nauru, 523
Kimmel, Admiral Husband E., 103, 115, 139, 143-44, and Navy command, 226
146-47 and New Caledonia, 208, 281
King, Admiral Ernest J., 145, 226, 233-34, 251, 339, and New Guinea, Japanese operations in, 317
371, 526 and New Zealand, 245
and ABDA area, 170 and Nimitz, 303, 390, 461, 476-77, 481, 496, 500,
and Admiralties, 375 516-17, 523
and air forces, deployment of, 258, 303, 330-31, and North Pacific offensive, 423-24, 425-28,
334, 337-39 430-31, 478, 530
and Aleutians, 532 and Northeast Area, defense of, 201
and Allied raids in Pacific, 290, 294 and Pacific defense, 159, 241, 282-83
and Allied strategy, 377-78 and Pacific objectives, 602
and ANZAC, 201 and Pacific Military Conference, 390
and Army, 27th Division, 472 and Pacific offensive, 291-92, 302-03, 306-07, 327,
and Army command, South Pacific, 260 370-71, 387-88, 394, 396-97, 408, 461-62
and Army-Navy relations, Central Pacific, 359 and Pacific organization, 248-49, 295-96, 500
and Army organization, Central Pacific, 486 and Pacific reinforcements, 318, 322-25, 335,
and Army staff, 360-61 340-41
and Atlantic-Pacific priority, 222, 308-09, 331, 334, and Pacific strategy, 221, 289, 370, 382, 518-19
335, 379, 439-40 and Philippines, 188, 385, 438
INDEX 741
and Quebec Conference, 517 Kurusu, Saburo, 117, 121-22, 124

and resources, allocation of, 377, 382, 385 Kusaie, 460, 468, 524-25
and Richardson, 486 Kusaka, Vice Adm. Jinishi, 412, 551
on shipping, 164, 344 Kwajalein, 123, 132-33, 441n, 460, 468, 524, 572
and Solomons, operations in, 398 Kyushu, 598
and South Pacific, 256, 326, 328, 329, 344, 396
and Southwest Pacific offensive, 295-301, 518-19 Lae, 199, 274, 298, 389, 396, 398, 461, 533, 563-65, 575
and Soviet Union, 527-28 Allied offensive against, 275, 302, 316, 503
and Theobald, 423 and CARTWHEEL, 401, 402
and Tokyo raid, 269 and ELKTON I, 389
and Tongatabu, 218-19, 291-92 Japanese and, 214-15, 306, 365, 367-68, 412, 564
and TORCH, 335 and Nassau Bay, 503
and TRIDENT, 457-58, 517 Lae-Salamaua area, 214-15
and Tulagi, 294 Lae-Salamaua-Australia route, 199
and U.S. Marines, 472, 476 Lae-Salamaua-Finschhafen line, 502
Kinkaid, Admiral Thomas C., 427-31, 563 Lambeti Point, 510
Kiriwina, 371, 395-96, 398, 401, 402, 411, 415, 461, Lamon Bay, 137, 181
502-03 Land offensive
Kiriwina Task Force, 502-03 British on, 82
Kiska, 420-22, 424, 429-32, 470, 523. See also in Europe, plans for, 159
Aleutians. Stark on, 82
bombing of, 423, 428-29, 432 Landing craft, 449, 581. See also LVT's; LST's.
forces for, 431-32 Landrum, Maj. Gen. Eugene M., 431
Japanese and, 283, 425-26, 432-33, 543 Langley, 177-78
occupation of, 428-33 Latin America, 69, 77, 85. See also Panama Con-
offensive against, 383, 424-26, 427-30 ference; South America; Western Hemisphere.
Knox, Frank, 86, 102-03, 139, 142, 144 League of Nations, 25, 45, 47-48
Kobayashi, Ichigo, 59-60, 62 Leahy, Admiral William D., 40-41, 43, 227, 335, 345,
Kobe, and Tokyo raid, 273 394
Koga, Admiral, 552-53, 557, 571-72, 575-77 and air reinforcements, South Pacific, 330
Kokoda, 317, 350 and Central Pacific offensive, 471
Kokoda Trail, 316, 327, 331, 336-37, 340 on Middle East, 335
Kolombangara, 368, 504-05, 559-62 and Pacific offensive, 394
Kondo, Admiral Nobutake, 167, 178 replaced by Stark as CNO, 73
Konoye, Prince Fumimaro, 54, 58, 93 as Roosevelt's chief of staff, 227
and decision for war, 114-15 and Southwest Pacific, 299, 300, 602
favors peace, 121 and TRIDENT, 456-57
on Imperial General Headquarters and Liaison Leary, Vice Adm. Herbert F., 201, 215, 218, 248,
Conference, 236-37 253, 297
and Japanese Army, 49 Leavey, Brig. Gen. Edmond, 491, 493, 495-96, 498-99
policy toward U.S., 94, 104-05, 105n, 113-14 Legaspi, 137
Konoye Cabinet Legaspi, 191
foreign policy of, 58-66 Lembang, 168
and Japanese economy, 59-60 Lend-lease, 63, 79-80
Korea, 109, 111, 584, 592 and China, 97, 180
Koro Island, 320 to India, 349
Kota Bharu, 123, 138 to Middle East, 349
Kowloon airfield, Japanese attack on, 137 and shipping shortage, 164
Kra Isthmus, Japanese attack on, 138 and Soviet Union, 344, 419-21
Kra Peninsula, attack on feared, 120 Lesser Sunda Islands, 553
Krueger, Lt. Gen. Walter, 358, 407, 419, 502-03, 566, Lexington, 102, 215-16, 276-77, 281, 545n
579, 581-82 Leyte, 181
Kuala Lumpur, 166 Lingayen Gulf, 137, 181
Kuching, 139 Liscome Bay, 572-73
Kula Gulf, 505 Litvinov, Maxim, 155
Kuril Islands, 108, 420, 433, 447, 528, 530, 544, 546, Liversedge, Col. Harry B., 510
590n, 598 Logistics, 156, 503, 505, 507. See also Communica-
Kurita, Vice Adm. Takeo, 576 tions, lines of; Supply.
and ABDACOM, 163 authority of, as Supreme Commander SWPA,

and aerial offensive, 596 250-51
and Army-Navy relations, 355-56 and B-17's, 357
and atoll warfare, 589 and Bataan, 182, 184
in Central Pacific, 491 and Bismarck Archipelago, 583
in China, 602 and blockade-running, 188-89, 192
co-ordination of, 474 and Bougainville operation, 534-35
and ELKTON II, 392 and carriers, 587
and Gilberts, 569-71 and CARTWHEEL, 402-08, 415, 461-62, 465, 469,
and Harmon, 262 471-72, 502, 514, 533-35, 563-67, 575, 582-83
in Hawaii, 498 and Celebes Sea, 451
and Joint Staff Planners, 228 and Central Pacific offensive, 438-39, 450, 463,
and Navy Department, Logistic Plans Division, 233 464-66, 535
and North Pacific, 428, 530-31 and Central Pacific route, 444, 514
in Pacific Ocean Areas, 492 and command problems, 193-97, 244, 250, 296-97,
and Pacific offensive, 305-06, 450, 465, 496, 498 298-304, 361, 372-74, 387, 388, 397-98, 401.
in Pacific strategy, 521-22, 524, 596 See also Southwest Pacific Area,
and South Pacific, 257, 259-62, 346-48, 355, 465, and communications, line of, 280
505 and corps headquarters, 313
in Southwest Pacific, 252, 503 and defensive strategy, Southwest Pacific, 331
and War Department, 231, 233 and deployment of troops in Philippines, 137
Logistics Section, Pacific, 496, 498 and Dutch, 177
London Conference, 221-22 and ELKTON I, 389
London Naval Conference, 56 and ELKTON II, 390-91
Long, 579 and envelopment, strategy of, 560-61
Lorengau, 313 and Ghormley, 306-07, 311, 326, 341, 357-58
Los Angeles, 140, 192 and Great Britain, 123, 186, 342, 520
Los Negros, 552 and Guadalcanal, 326, 341, 358
Low, Capt. Francis L., USN, 269 and Halsey, 387-89, 401, 405, 533-34
LST's, 526, 569 and Harmon, 326
Lunga Point, 306, 325, 342, 356, See also Henderson headquarters at Corregidor, 137
Field. and Huon Peninsula, 563
Lutes, Maj. Gen. Leroy, 347-48, 491-93, 499 Imamura on, 551
Luzon, 21, 101, 123, 150, 187, 593, 599, 605 and Indian Ocean, 582
airfields on, 134-35, 181 and Japan, 543, 590-91
American retreat, 137 and Japan, strategy against, 450, 538, 600
defense of, 98 and Japanese attack on Philippines, 136-37
Japanese attack on, 136-37 on Japanese strategy, 156, 280
and RENO, 444 and JCS, 186-88, 389, 411
surrender of, 265 and Joint War Plans Committee, 601
Luzon Force, 196, 265 and Kenney, 357
LVT's, 569 and King. See King, Admiral Ernest J., and
Lytton Commission, 47-48 MacArthur,
and Kiriwina, 502
MacArthur, General Douglas, 100, 264, 282, 558, 567, and Krueger, 502, 581-82
591, 599 and Lae, 563-64
and ABDACOM, 170-71 and Markham Valley, 566
and air power, 189, 251 and Marshall. See Marshall, General George C.,
and Allied air forces, 313, 341 and MacArthur.
and Allied naval bases in Australia, 341-42 and Midway-Aleutians attack, 281
and Allied raids in Pacific, 294 and Mindanao, 194-95
and Allied strategy, 186-89, 255, 341-42 and naval forces, 331-32, 358
appointed Supreme Commander SWPA, 247-49 and naval power, 251
and Arawe, 580 and New Britain, 294-95, 578-79
and Atlantic vs Pacific priority, 308, 341-42 and New Georgia, 396, 401
and Australia, command in, 247-48 and New Guinea, 280, 297, 317-18, 329, 340, 371,
and Australia, defense of, 255-56, 275, 280, 282 396, 465, 472, 514, 564, 575
INDEX 743
and New Guinea Axis, 401, 402 and South Pacific Area, 311, 313, 330, 341, 357-58,
and New Ireland, 294-95 371, 388
and Nimitz, 387 and South Pacific offensive, 311, 313, 325-26,
and Noumea Conference, 337 465-66
on offensive strategy, 189-91. See also MacArthur, and South Pacific reinforcement, 318
General Douglas, and Pacific offensive, and Southwest Pacific Area, 247, 252-53, 296-97,
on ORANGE plans, 37, 100, 438-39 298-304
ordered to Australia, 194-95, 242 and Southwest Pacific offensive, 303, 453, 459, 502,
and Pacific defense, 280, 282-83 514, 519, 535, 604-05. See also MacArthur,
and Pacific Military Conference, 390, 396 General Douglas, and TULSA.
and Pacific objectives, 396, 465 and Southwest Pacific route, 443-44, 450, 514
and Pacific offensive, 220-21, 251, 293-94, 311, and Soviet Union, 419
331-32, 364, 398-99, 452 staff organization of, 493-94
and Pacific offensive, plans for, 294-98 and Stimson, 342
and Pacific offensive, preparations for, 311, 313, and supply, 210, 341
316 and Sutherland, 537-38
and Pacific offensive, Task One, 306-07, 317 and TRIDENT, 465
and Pacific offensive, Task Two, 313, 318, 330-31, and TULSA, 297-98, 313, 316, 327
370-75 and USAFFE, 97, 195-96, 403
and Pacific offensive, Task Three, 313, 370, 372-75 and USAFIA, 152, 161
and Pacific reinforcement, 221, 223, 318, 322-23, and U.S. Marines, 343, 472
330-32, 340-42 and U.S. Navy, 300, 311, 313, 372-73
and Pacific strategy, 150, 156-57, 220-21, 223, 375, and Vitiaz Strait, 581
443, 444, 464-66, 514. See also RENO; CARTWHEEL. and Vogelkop Peninsula, 516
and Pacific Theaters, co-operation between, 357 and War Department, on Philippine command,
and Papuan campaign, 337, 367 197
and Pensacola convoy, 152 and war warning, 119, 120-21
and Philippine Army, 39 and Wavell, 168-70
and Philippines, 136-37, 190, 193, 290, 438-39, and Wewak, 516, 527
514, 536-41, 553, 591, 598, 605 and Woodlark, 371, 502
and Philippines, command in, 195-97 McCain, Rear Adm. John R., 256-57, 261, 352, 360
and Philippines, defense of, 100, 149-50, 181, 190 and air forces, South Pacific, 319-20, 337-38
and Philippines, recapture of, 443-44. See also and Army air forces, 259, 262-63
RENO. McCawley, 507
and Philippines, reinforcement of, 98, 149-50, McClure, Brig. Gen. Robert B., 562
186-89 Machine guns, on Wake, 101
on Philippines, strategic value of, 150, 186-87 MacKechnie Force, 503
and Philippines, supply of, 192 McNair, Lt. Gen. Lesley J., 144n, 361, 479
and popular opinion, 381 McNarney, Lt. Gen. Joseph T., 230, 282, 361-62,
and Port Moresby, 221, 275-76 390, 454n, 479
on preparations for war, 120-21 Madang, 396, 398, 461, 552, 564, 566, 581
and Quebec Conference, 535-36 and CARTWHEEL, 401, 402
and Rabaul, 342, 370, 374, 386, 394, 442, 443, 465, and ELKTON I, 389
471-72, 514-15, 534, 536, 551, 576 Japanese and, 365, 367-68
on RAINBOW plans, 100, 140 MAGIC, 93, 117
and RENO, 443-44 Magruder, Brig. Gen. John, 97, 156
and RENO II, 514 Mahan, Admiral Alfred T., 21, 204
and RENO III, 536-37, 601 Makassar Strait, 168, 172, 174-75, 553
and resources, allocation of, 150, 342. See also Makin, 133, 464, 489, 523-24, 567, 569, 571, 572, 573
MacArthur, General Douglas, and Atlantic vs. Makin raid, 436, 444-45
Pacific priority, Malacca Straits, 594
and Roosevelt, 186, 221 Malay Barrier, 143, 186, 187, 225
and Saido, 581-82 and ABDACOM, 163
and shipping, 331, 341, 345-46, 521-22, 526 and Allied strategy, 159, 187, 309
and Singapore, fall of, 190-91 defense of, 88, 150, 172
and Solomons, 293-94, 297, 342-43, 357, 456, 472 and Great Britain, 242
South Pacific, role in, 476 and Japanese, 241
Malay Peninsula Marine Corps, U.S., Defense Battalions

and Allied strategic aims, 159 1st, 101
Japanese invasion of, 168 3d, 319-20, 325
and Japanese war aims, 166 4th, 562n
Malaya, 123, 126, 157, 190, 466, 590n 6th, 101
and ABDACOM, 161 12th, 502n
defense of, 172 Marine Corps, U.S., Divisions
and Japanese economy, 50, 113 1st, 295, 304-06, 319, 325, 343, 407n, 461, 463, 466,
Japanese forces in, 217 469, 472, 581-82
Japanese offensive against, 117, 124, 138, 166-67, 2d, 461, 463, 465, 469-70, 522, 569, 571, 573, 577n
173 3d, 461, 472, 534, 576-78
in Japanese war plans, 64, 96, 105, 107-09, 131 4th, 524
reinforcement of, 122 Marine Corps, U.S., Raider Battalions
Malinta Tunnel, 267 1st, 293, 319-20
Maloelap, 441n, 460, 468, 524 2d, 436
Manchukuo, 154. See also Manchuria. 4th, 506
Manchuria, 126, 220, 584 Marine Corps, U.S., Regiments
and Cairo Declaration, 592 1st, 305
defense of, 167 2d, 305, 319
Japan and, 37, 45, 47-48, 50, 57, 109 4th, 101
Manchurian Incident, 478 5th, 305
Mandated Islands, 249, 439-40, 460, 467. See also 11th, 305
Central Pacific offensive. 22d, 524
Manila, 123, 137, 146, 181, 591. Maritime Provinces. See Soviet Maritime Provinces.
Manila Bay, 23-24, 29, 181, 191, 265-68 Mariveles, 182-83
base at, 28. See also Philippines. Mariveles Mountains, 266
defense of, 98, 436 Mark Twain, and Tokyo raid, 269
Harbor Defense, 196 Markham Valley, 533-34, 564, 575
in ORANGE Plan, 1935, 37 Marshall, General George C., 118-19, 145, 202, 223,
and RAINBOW 5, 100 281, 294, 313, 379, 382, 423, 427-28, 430, 471-72,
Manus Island, 452, 471, 516 490, 495, 514, 536, 600-601, 605
Marcus Island, 446, 543, 544 and ABC-1, 89
Mariana Islands, 382, 434, 438, 458, 515, 517, 518,and ABDA area, 168-70, 177
520, 524, 538, 552-53, 564, 598, 601, 602-03, 605 and ABDACOM, 198
B-29's in, 600 and air forces, deployment of, 198, 325-26, 330,
base at, 605 334, 338
Japanese and, 517, 546, 552-53, 564 and Aleutians, 421, 426, 429
in ORANGE Plan, 1926, 33 and Allied strategy, 187, 189, 380, 382
Marine Corps, U.S., 42, 101, 182, 206-07, 219, 323, and ammunition shortage, 344
388, 444-45, 464, 504, 575, 582, 600 appointed Army Chief of Staff, 73
Amphibious Training Center, 429 and Army-Navy relations, 103, 326, 359, 360-61
and Bougainville campaign, 575-76, 577 and Army organization in Central Pacific, 485-86
and CARTWHEEL, 402 and Atlantic vs. Pacific priority, 76, 80, 83, 222,
casualties, 584, 586-87 223, 308-09, 331, 334
and Central Pacific, 459 on blockade-running, 188
deployment of, 465, 476, 537, 538-40 and BOLERO, 308
at Guadalcanal, 323-24, 327-29, 336, 342, 345, 350, and CARTWHEEL, 466, 472
437 and Casablanca Conference, 380, 382, 394, 429
and Guam, 101, 133, 228-29 and Central Pacific, 249, 440
and Midway, 281 and Central Pacific offensive, 466, 525
and North Pacific offensive, 429 and Combined Chiefs of Staff, 165
and Pacific offensive, 292, 295, 313 and command in Europe, 479-80
and South Pacific, 256-57, 259, 305-06, 391, 459, and command in Far East, 160-61
559-60 and command in Hawaii, 144
and Southwest Pacific offensive, 299-300, 459 and command in Pacific, 245-46, 370, 372, 387,
and Wake, 101, 133 390, 397-99, 479-80, 498-501
Marine Corps, U.S., aircraft, 133, 319, 391 and command in Southwest Pacific, 296, 298-303
Marine Corps, U.S., Amphibious Corps, 1st, 528 and command, unity of, 144, 160-61, 244, 303,
INDEX 745
359-62, 372-74, 476, 478-79 and priorities, 334-35. See also Marshall, General
and crisis of June, 1940, 76-77 George C., and resources, allocation of;
and Europe, strategy in, 377 Marshall, General George C., and Atlantic vs.
and Far East, strategy in, 156-57 Pacific priority.
and forces, deployment of, 478, 519, 530-31 and Quebec Conference, 517
and Guadalcanal, 327, 341 and RAINBOW 5, 90
and Halsey, 372 and resources, allocation of, 147, 385, 394, 428
and Harmon, 260 and Richardson, 486
and Hawaiian defense, 121 and ROUNDUP, 308
and Japan, negotiations with, 119 on shipping, 164, 344, 525
and Japan, plan for defeat of, 599 and South Pacific, 326-28, 344, 372
and Japanese threat, 119 and Southeast Area, 121
and JCS, 226 and Southwest Pacific offensive, 298-303, 525, 535
and joint staffs, 359-61, 491-93, 496 and Soviet Union, 154-55, 429
and King. See King, Admiral Ernest J., and and Stalin, 529
Marshall. on strategic planning, 229
and Kiska, 425-29, 431 and strategic responsibility, 243
and Leahy, 227, 345 and Supreme Command, 479-80
and Leavey report, 492-93 and Tanaga, 423
on logistics, 355-56 and Task Force 6184, 210-11
and Logistics Group, War Department, 233 and Tokyo Raid, 270
and Lutes report, 492-93 and TORCH, 322, 332, 334-35
and MacArthur, 186-89, 193-95, 247-48, 253, and USAFIA, 151-52, 171
299-303, 307, 326, 331-32, 372, 374, 389, 408-11, and U.S. Marines, deployment of, 466, 470, 472
461, 466, 535-36 and Wainwright, 197
and Marshall Islands, 525, 527 and war alerts, 74, 123-24, 140
on Middle East, 334-35 and War Department Operations Division, 231
and Midway, 282 Marshall, Brig. Gen. Richard J., 253, 313, 406
on mobilization, 76 Marshall Islands, 91, 143, 382, 396, 434, 438, 439-42,
and naval reinforcements, Southwest Pacific, 332 452-53, 458-59, 468-69, 515-16, 520, 523, 569,
and New Guinea, 317, 518 605
and Nimitz, 371-72, 478, 479, 500 Allied offensive on, 292, 311
and North Africa, invasion of, 308 and Allied strategy, 385
and North Pacific command, 424 approaches to, 463-64
and North Pacific offensive, 420-21, 423, 425-29, Army planners on, 468
430-31, 530-31 invasion of, and CARTWHEEL, 461, 463-64
and Pacific, co-ordination in, 476 invasion of, forces for, 459-62, 463-64, 470, 524
on Pacific, role of, 382 invasion of, JCS on, 462
and Pacific air offensive, 100 invasion of, JPS on, 462-64, 470
and Pacific objectives, 602 invasion of, JSSC on, 467
and Pacific Ocean Area organization, 476, 492-93 invasion of, JWPC on, 462, 468-69
and Pacific offensive, 293-95, 301, 306, 372, 374, invasion of, plans for, 460-64, 471, 481, 522,
394, 410 524-27
and Pacific offensive, Task Two, 327, 370 and Japan, 108, 132, 445-46, 543, 546, 553, 564
and Pacific offensive, Tasks Two and Three, Nimitz on, 462
372-74 objectives in, 524-25
and Pacific offensive, Task Three, 370 in ORANGE Plans, 33, 37
and Pacific organization, 496 Marshalls-Carolines-Marianas, 70, 382
and Pacific reinforcement, 282, 318, 322, 326, Martin, Maj. Gen. Frederick L., 144
331-33 Maruyama, Lt. Gen. Masao, 345
and Pacific staff organization, 500-501 Masland, John W., 126n
and Pacific Theaters, co-operation between, 357-58 Matsouka, Yosuke, 58, 63, 65, 93-94
and Pacific vs. Mediterranean priority, 382 Medical problems, 184-86, 584
and Pearl Harbor, 103, 142 Medical supplies, 192
on Pensacola convoy, 148, 152 Mediterranean area, 79, 86-88, 376
and Philippines, 98, 121, 140, 149, 151-53, 187-89, Allied bases in, 89
191-92, 197, 246 and Allied strategy, 380, 382, 455-56, 600
and Plan Dog, 83 British responsibility for, 242-43
and British strategy, 378 Morobe, 503

King on, 495 Moscow Conference, 155
Marshall on, 379 Motor ships, 191
and Tehran Conference, 592 Moulmein, 180
and TRIDENT, 457, 459 Mt. Natib, 183
Mediterranean Theater Mt. Satelberg, 566
organization of, 493-95 Munda, 401, 505
U.S. Army troops in (December 1943), 537, 538, airfield at, 368, 371, 507, 509, 533, 559, 577
540 Japanese defense of, 511
Melanesia, 198 Munda operation and Pacific Military Conference,
Melbourne, 195, 210, 245, 252, 253, 304, 311, 318 396
Menado, 167, 175 Munda Point, 504, 507
Merrill, Rear Adm. Aaron S., 576 Munich crisis, 68
MICHAELMAS. See Saidor. Munitions, shipment of, to Allies, 76
Micronesia, 434-36
Middle East, 220, 308, 310, 334, 343 Nachi, 433
lend-lease shipments to, 349 Nadzab, 533-34, 563
and priorities, 334-35, 344 Nagano, Admiral, 95, 114, 116, 278
reinforcement of, 376 Nagoya, 273
Midway, 131, 271, 281, 285, 293, 308, 364 Nagumo, Vice Adm. Chuichi, 131, 178, 200, 280,
and air action, 282 283, 345
and Allied offensive in Pacific, 294, 299 Nashville, 272
defense of, 101, 281-83 Nassau Bay, 415, 502-03, 533
and Japan, 109, 316, 435, 440, 543 National Guard, U.S., mobilization of, 76
Japanese attack on, 278-81, 283-84 National Guard, U.S., 26th Division, 209
Japanese losses at, 283-84 National Guard, U.S., 33rd Division, 209
reinforcement of, 281
significance of Battle of, 289, 311, 324, 436-37 Nauru, 445-46, 463-64, 469, 471, 522-24, 544, 571
U.S. Navy at, 264 Nautilus, 283-84
Midway-Wake-Marshalls advance, 440-41 Naval bases, U.S., 23, 43, 153, 172, 202, 219, 221
Militia in New Guinea, 199 Naval blockade against Japan, 593, 598-99
Military Joint Planning Committee, 164 Naval Construction Battalion, 58th, 562n
Mille, 468, 524 Naval forces, 186-87, 189, 201. See also Navy, U.S.,
Milne Bay, 316, 329, 358, 415, 502-03 deployment of.
Mindanao, 136, 181, 186, 191, 266, 444, 468, 536, 601 Naval operations
command in, 196 in ABDA area, 172-73
invasion of, discussed, 538-41 in Central Pacific, 589
Japanese offensive against, 137, 196, 266 Naval planners, U.S.
MacArthur on, 194-95, 466 and aircraft, 258
and RENO II, 514 and amphibious operations, 251
and RENO III, 536 and ANZAC, 201
Mindanao Force, 195 and Australian area, 246
Miri, 138 and BOLERO, 290
Mitscher, Capt. Marc A., USN, 270 and CARTWHEEL, 462
Mobile air forces, 303 and Central Pacific offensive, 37, 462, 469
Mobile forces, 221 and communications, line of, 219
Modus vivendi, U.S. attempts at, with Japan, 118-19 and ELKTON II, 392-93
Molotov, Vyacheslav M., 63, 308n and Funafuti, 290-91
Molucca Sea, 172, 174-75 and Hawaii, 143
Moluccas, 108 and Kiska, 431
Monroe Doctrine, 75 and MacArthur, 317, 372-73
Montgomery, Gen. Sir Bernard L., 343, 351 and Marshalls, 525
Montgomery, Rear Adm. Alfred, 577 and New Guinea, 317
Moore, Capt. Charles J., USN, 448n and Nimitz, 373
Moore, Rear Adm. Charles A., 193n and Pacific, command in, 246, 372-73, 463
Moore, Maj. Gen. George F., 196, 266 and Pacific, reinforcement of, 220, 290-93
Morale, 184-86, 194, 267, 269, 271 and Pacific, staff organization in, 496
Mormacsun, 189 and Pacific fleet, 145-46, 372-73
INDEX 747
and Pacific offensive, 39-40, 41, 221, 251, 307, 311, Netherlands, 50, 58, 64-65, 74, 118, 121-22
370, 394-95, 469 and ABDACOM, 172-73, 174, 177, 240-41
and Pacific Ocean area, 246 air forces, 253
and Pacific strategy, 27, 291-93 demand for fighters, 218
and Pacific Theater, organization of, 244, 248 forces, 156, 161, 167-68, 175
and priorities, 334 and Java, 174, 177-79, 242
and Rabaul, 469 naval forces, 101, 111, 172-73
and Solomons, 372-73 and Pacific command, 251. See also Netherlands,
and South Pacific, 305, 334 and ABDACOM.
and Southwest Pacific, 295-96, 334 and Philippines, 189
and U.S. strategy in Far East (1935-36), 38 on war against Japan, 91, 143
Naval reinforcements, 172-73, 331-32. See also Netherlands East Indies, 89, 157, 240, 246, 249, 411,
Navy, U.S. 466, 515, 544, 596-97
and Aleutians, 281 and ABDACOM, 161
and Coral Sea, 276 and Allied headquarters, 157
and Guadalcanal, 350 and Allied offensive, 293, 311
Navy, U.S., 37, 42, 85, 101-02, 118, 142, 145, 175-79, and Australia, defense of, 242
264, 276, 302, 342-43, 347, 353-55, 464. See also defense of, 202-03
aircraft carriers, cruisers, Pacific Fleet, Seventh and Japan, 50, 59, 62, 64, 113, 217, 340, 438, 448,
Fleet, Third Fleet, U.S. Fleet. 541, 546-47
and air power, role of, 353-54 Japanese offensive in, 67-68, 175-76, 178-80, 191
and Army air forces, 354-56, 357 and Japanese war plans, 95-96, 105, 107-08, 138,
and Atlantic-Pacific priority, 333-34, 393 166
casualties, 584, 586-87 and Japanese-U.S. negotiations, 116
and Central Pacific, 437-38, 442, 449, 460, 464, and Pacific offensive, 444
522-23, 589 and Pacific strategy, 382
deployment of, 87, 442-43, 467, 470 and RENO II, 514
and Hawaii, 144, 145-47, 207 U.S. on, 126, 126n, 542
and Joint Staff Planners, 227 Netherlands Indies-Banda Sea route, 443
and JUSSC, 228 New Britain, 198-99, 294-95, 364, 371, 389, 395, 398,
and logistics, 259-60, 354 469, 502, 533, 551-52, 564, 605. See also Bismarck
and MacArthur, 188, 244, 251, 357 Archipelago.
and North Pacific, 422-23, 425-26, 431-32 ALAMO Force and, 582
and Northeast Area, 201 Allied air forces and, 563
organization of, 226, 491-92 Allied offensive on, 302, 566. See also New Britain
and Pacific, orientation of, 67 operation.
and Pacific command, 244, 294, 374, 397, 406, 479 and CARTWHEEL, 408, 469
and Pacific defense, 102, 224, 436 Chamberlin on, 580
and Pacific Military Conference, 393 and Japan, 369, 412, 565
and Pacific offensive, 221, 289-95, 311, 370-71, Japanese forces in, 552
562-63 Japanese reinforcement of, 412
and Pacific reinforcement, 218-19, 328, 336 in Japanese war plans, 109
and Philippines, 98, 101, 150-51, 152-53 MacArthur on, 578
and preparations for war, 118-20 New Britain operation, 578-82, 630-35, 675-85
and RAINBOW plans, 71, 74, 143 New Caledonia, 99, 199, 208-12, 219, 246, 261, 284,
and resources, allocation of, 333-34, 393 293-94, 320, 342, 347
role of, in two-front war, 32-33 and air reinforcements, 338
and South Pacific, 205-06, 311, 313, 336, 562-63 and ANZAC area, 201
and Southwest Pacific, 293-94, 296, 299-302 Army troops in, 257, 328
strength of, 111, 449, 538 and command, problems of, 208-09
task force organization, 474 defense of, 208-12, 220
and Tokyo raid, 269-74 and Japan, 217, 278, 279, 316, 440
Navy Department, U.S., 77, 233-34, 339 reinforcement of, 208-09, 212, 281
Navy, Secretary of, 84, 90. See also Knox, Frank. strategic significance of, 208
Navy War College, U.S., 437 New Georgia, 328, 367-68, 371, 388, 396, 461, 504,
Navy War Plans Division, U.S., 68, 227-28 533, 534, 569, 575
Ndeni, 319, 356 air base at, 400-401, 576
592496 O-62-49
Allied offensive against, 388, 411, 504-11. See also New Zealand, 157, 199, 240, 246, 262, 306
TOENAILS. Army troops in, 257, 328
and command, problems of, 510-12 and Australia, co-operation with, 245
and ELKTON I, 389 coast watchers, 445-46
Japan and, 388, 412, 504-07, 559-60 and Combined Chiefs of Staff, 243
MacArthur on, 444 and communications, 99, 204
occupation of, 401, 402, 502 defense of, 159, 201, 220, 224, 245, 251-52, 257,
operations in, 559-63 292, 336, 377-78, 379
reinforcement of, 510 demand for bombers, 218
and South Pacific offensive, 395 and Fijis, defense of, 208, 223
and supplies, 505 and Pacific command, 251-52
New Georgia Attack Force, 504, 511-12 port company at, 347
New Georgia Group, 390 procurement in, 260
New Georgia Occupation Force, 504, 511 reinforcement of, 241
New Guinea, 198, 241, 245-46, 249, 255, 274, 320, and South Pacific Air Force, 319
323, 371, 382, 413, 415, 453, 458, 459, 461, 468, and South Pacific islands, 204-05
515, 525, 551-52, 579, 582, 583, 589, 590n on Southwest Pacific command, 245
aerial reconnaissance of, 313 and strategic responsibility, 243
and air superiority, 357 and U.S. strategy, 451
airfields in, 313 New Zealand Chiefs of Staff, 245, 257
Allied air forces and, 563 New Zealand forces, 223, 348, 391, 459, 559, 575
Allied bases in, 364 Nichols Field, 136
Allied offensive against, 290-92, 302, 313, 316, 332, Nicobar Island, 108
372, 375, 378, 387-88, 389, 533, 544, 551 Nimitz, Admiral Chester W., 144, 293-94, 358, 362,
and Allies, 350, 413, 564 387, 389-90, 427, 430, 444, 473, 515-16, 523-24,
bombing of, planned, 295 558, 567-68, 591, 598-99, 602
and CARTWHEEL, 402 and air deployment in South Pacific, 339
defense of, 317-18 and Allied raids in Pacific, 290
Great Britain and, 379, 517-18 appointed Commander in Chief, Pacific Ocean
and Japan, 212, 214, 324, 331, 350, 364-65, 367-68, Areas, 249
411-13, 543, 546, 552, 564-66, 591 and Army, 360, 474, 476, 479, 489, 537
Japanese in, 296-97, 306, 324, 329, 336-37, 400, and Army Air Forces, 487, 489
413, 470, 518, 552, 555, 557, 591 and Army organization in Central Pacific, 485
Japanese offensive against, 198, 214-15, 289, 327, and Arnold, 354
413, 415 authority of, 25-51, 478-79. See also Nimitz,
Japanese threat to, 280, 340 Admiral Chester W., role of.
in Japanese war plans, 109 and Bougainville campaign, 576
MacArthur and, 297, 329, 371, 465, 472, 514, 564 and Carolines, 453
oil reserves, 451 and Celebes Sea, 451
operations in, 400-401, 402, 512, 563-67, 575, 587 and Central Pacific, 435-36, 453, 476-77, 478-79,
operations in, plans for, 630-35, 675-85 516-17, 589, 605
and Pacific offensive, 383, 444 and Central Pacific Force, 481-82
and RENO II, 514 and Central Pacific offensive, 441, 459, 468-69,
and RENO III, 536 471-74, 567-68
and resources, allocation of, 342 and Central Pacific Theater organization, 481-82
supply bases in, 406 and command, unity of, 476-77
New Guinea Force, 407, 419, 503, 533, 566-67, 581 and command in Central Pacific, 478-79, 481-82,
New Guinea Volunteer Reserve, 199 487, 489-90
New Hanover, 515 and command in Pacific, 244, 373-74, 397-98, 401
New Hebrides, 199, 201, 218, 221, 246, 257, 276, and command in Southwest Pacific, 374
291-94, 319, 320, 571 and communications, line of, 205
New Ireland, 198, 294-95, 364, 371, 515, 516, 525, and Coral Sea, 276, 277
551-52, 580. See also Bismarck Archipelago. and De Witt, 422
Allied offensive on, 302, 316 and Emmons, 256, 359, 359n
and Japan, 200 and Ghormley, 343
operations in, plans for, 630-35 and Gilbert-Nauru plan, 469
New Orleans, 192 and Hale, 487, 489
New York, as embarkation port, 210 and Halsey, 343-44, 371, 403
INDEX 749
Handy on, 499-500 North Pacific Force, 545n

Japanese on, 590 North Pacific offensive, 424-26, 438
and Joint Chiefs of Staff, 256, 463 American strategy and, 535-36
and joint staff, 495-96 and Army-Navy relations, 430-31
and Joint War Plans Committee, 515, 601 and Army planners, 427-28
and Kinkaid, 427 bases for, 528
and King. See King, Admiral Ernest J. and Nimitz. Buckner on, 531
and Kiska, 427-28, 431 command in, 430-31
Leavey on, 491 debated, 527-30
and logistics, 474, 487, 498 De Witt and, 428-31, 530
and Marshall. See Marshall, General George C. forces for, 425-26, 530
and Nimitz. JCS on, 386
and Marshall Islands, 462-63, 515, 524-25, 526 JPS on, 421-32, 530-32
and Midway-Aleutians attack, 281 King on, 425-26, 427-28, 430-31, 530
and Nauru, 522-24 Kinkaid and, 429-30
and North Pacific Area, 256, 421, 478 Landrum and, 431
and North Pacific offensive, 425-27, 530 and logistics, 530
and Northeast Area, 215-16 Marshall and, 425-26, 427-31
at Noumea, 337 and Nimitz, 425-27, 530
and Pacific, reinforcement of, 283, 318, 325, 332-33 and Pacific Military Conference, 430
and Pacific Fleet, 250-51, 256, 374, 479, 481 plans for, 421-23
and Pacific Ocean Areas, 256-57 and resources, allocation of, 426, 428, 431
and Pacific offensive, 251, 303, 307, 370-71, 388 Roosevelt on, 425
and Pacific strategy, 289, 370-72, 514 shipping for, 426, 530
and Philippines, 290 and Soviet Union, 429, 527-30
and Port Moresby invasion, 275-76 and U.S. Marine officers, 429
and Rabaul, 215, 374, 386 and U.S. Navy, 425-26, 431
and Richardson, 490, 495-96, 498, 500 weather and, 430
role of, 473-74, 477-79, 481, 498 North Pacific route, 590n
and South Pacific, 294, 305, 318-19, 321, 343, 478 Northeast Area
and Southwest Pacific, 358, 374 defense of, 199, 201-02, 215-16, 241, 255
and Southwest Pacific offensive, 298-303 Japanese and, 215-16, 275
staff organization of, 473-74, 481-82, 495-96, 498 strategic importance of, 198-99
and Supreme Command, 479 Northeast Australia, 396
and Turner, 510 Northern Attack Force, 570
and U.S. Navy planners, 463 Northern China, 584
Yamamoto on, 279 Northern Solomons, 391, 396, 515
Nomura, Kichisaburo, 65, 92, 94, 104, 114-17, 119, Northwest Australia, as airbase, 444
121-22, 124, 125n Norway, 310
North Africa, 163, 308, 310, 318, 344, 351, 376, 380, Noumea, 212, 262, 279, 306, 360, 389
493-95, 525, 537, 538, 540. See also TORCH. conference at, 337, 354
North Pacific, 281, 419. See also North Pacific offen- Free French port, 347-48
sive. port facilities, 347
air bases in, 531 U.S. headquarters at, 261
Allied strength in, 281 Noyes, Rear Adm. Leigh, and South Pacific Expedi-
American interests in, 417 tionary Force, 319
and American strategy, 527-28, 530-33
Army-Navy relations in, 427 Oahu, 103, 123, 131-32, 256, 569. See also Pearl
Japan and, 419-20 Harbor.
Joint Chiefs of Staff and, 532 Oakland, 141
JSSC on, 532 Ocean Island, 445
logistics in, 531 Offensive operations. See also names of Theaters
North Pacific Area, 256, 421, 423, 427, 600 and islands; Aerial offensive; Land offensive,
and Army planners, 246 and ABDACOM, 163
Army-Navy relations in, 423-24, 427 against Germany, 90. See also Germany, and U.S.
command in, 246, 421, 423-24, 430-31, 478 strategy.
defined, 249 and RAINBOW plans, 71-72
Soviet Union and, 600 in South Pacific Area, 257-58
Offensive strategy. See Strategy, offensive. Army strength in (December 1943), 537, 538-40
Office of Strategic Services, 231. British naval forces in, 598-99
Ohio National Guard, 220 and Casablanca Conference, 392-93, 439-40
Oil, Japanese, efforts to secure, 60, 65, 95, 97, 104, defense of, 68-73, 77, 102, 159, 224-25, 282, 344
114, 599 defensive strategy for, 69-70, 76, 82, 85
Oklahoma, 132 deployment in, 221-24
Omori, Rear Adm. Sentaro, 576 Japanese air forces in, 334
Oran, 351 objectives in, 593, 601-05, 627-29
ORANGE War Plans, 22, 24-31, 82, 251, 292 port facilities, shortage of, 346-48
appraisal of, 41-42, 43 reinforcement of, 218-19, 225, 282-83, 290-91, 292,
and Casablanca Conference, 437 322, 324-27, 330-33, 335-36, 341-42, 394-95
and Central Pacific, 436-37, 466 and resources, allocation of, 164, 333-34, 452
MacArthur on, 466 role of, King on, 377-79
objectives of, 437 and shipping shortage, 344-49
and Philippines, 36, 98, 181, 436-37 strategic responsibility in, 240-43, 246
revision of 1921, 27 Supreme Command of, 479-81
revision of 1926, 33-34 and U.S. Navy, 311
revision of 1928, 34 Pacific command problems, 240-50, 352-63, 372-75,
revision of 1935, 37 387-90, 397-99, 462-63, 498-501. See also Army-
revision of 1935-36, 38-39 Navy relations; Central Pacific Area; North
revision of 1938, 41-42, 67 Pacific Area; South Pacific Area; Southwest
Ordnance, 98 Pacific Area; Unified command.
Oro Bay, 413 Army and, 372, 495, 499-501
Ota, Rear Adm. Minoru, 505, 560 and Central Pacific, 473-79
"Overall Plan for the Defeat of Japan," 668-72. Cooke on, 397
See also Japan, plans for defeat of. and Halsey, 371, 397, 401
OVERLORD, 518, 526, 592-93, 603 Handy on, 499-500
Owen Stanley Range, 199, 284, 316-17, 329, 337, and JCS, 373, 398, 463
350, 367 JPS on, 462-63
joint staff organization, 495-96, 498, 500
P-38's, 322, 330-31, 392n, 415, 577 and King, 372-74, 390, 397-98, 461-62
P-39's, 330, 353 and Marshall, 390, 397-99, 498-501
P-40's, 98, 101, 136, 178, 202, 218, 282-83 and MacArthur. See MacArthur, General Douglas,
P-400's, 330, 353 and command problems.
Pacific and Nimitz, 373-74, 397-98, 461, 495-96, 500
air forces in, 329-30, 331, 334, 395, 537, 538-40 and Pacific offensive, Tasks 2 and 3, 370-72
air reinforcement, 344 and Roosevelt, 252
Allied defense of, 240-43 Somervell on, 498-99
Allied forces in, 601 and U.S. Navy, 372-73, 397, 463, 496
Allied objectives in, 385 Pacific Fleet, U.S., 61, 74, 115, 132-33, 143, 145,
Allied offensive in, 289-92, 294ff., 389. See also 240-41, 256, 276, 284, 289, 372-74, 403, 436,
Pacific offensive. 477, 481, 575
Allied organization in, 244-49 and ANZAC, 201-02
Allied raids in, 290, 292 in Central Pacific, 434, 436, 567
and Allied strategy, 377-79, 385-86. See also Joint and communications, line of, 205, 245
Strategic Survey Committee; Atlantic vs. Pacific defensive role of, 143
priority; Pacific strategy. deployment of (December, 1943), 537, 538-40
American commands in, 240. See also Pacific and Nimitz, 250-51, 256
command problems. and Japanese attack at Pearl Harbor, 132-33, 143
American forces in, 217-18, 220-24, 240, 390-91 Japanese threat to, 146
American interests in, 241-42 and Japanese war plans, 105-07, 109, 111, 131
American responsibility in, 242-43. See also Stra- and Midway, 279-81
tegic responsibility. and Northeast Area, 201
American strategy in. See Pacific strategy; Strat- and Pacific command, 499
egy, U.S. and Pacific offensive, 370-71
Army-Navy relations in, 387, 388-89. See also and South Pacific, 319, 530
Army-Navy relations. strength of, 101, 143, 282, 545
Army strength in (April 1942), 224 Pacific Military Conference, 389-97, 430, 442, 444, 452
INDEX 751
Pacific Ocean Areas, 248-49, 256, 358-59 and Casablanca Conference, 381-85, 437-40
command in, 249-50, 490-91 Combined Chiefs of Staff on, 219, 520
defense of, 280 and JCS. See Strategy, U.S., and JCS.
established, 617-18 in JPC report (1939), 70
and Japanese Navy, 239 JPS on. See Strategy, U.S., and JPS.
logistics in, 492, 496 and JSSC. See Strategy, U.S., and JSSC.
organization of, 255-56, 491-93 JWPC on, 468-69, 513-16
and U.S. naval planners, 246 and MacArthur, 150-51, 220-21, 251, 331, 341-42,
Pacific offensive, 220-21, 223, 364, 374-75, 398-99, 443-44, 465, 514. See also MacArthur, General
415, 619-20, 641. See also Pacific; Pacific opera- Douglas.
tions; Pacific strategy. objectives of, 447
and air bases, 599 offensive, argued for, 34. See also Strategy, U.S.,
and Cairo Conference, 572 offensive.
and Casablanca Conference, 439-40 pattern of, 585-90
and ELKTON, 395 at Quebec Conference, 517-18
forces for, 324 and resources, allocation of, 289, 382, 439-40, 516.
Japanese fear of, 590-91 and shipping, shortage of, 521-22, 526
and JCS, 309, 395-96 and TRIDENT, 457-58
JPS on, 383, 466 U.S. Navy planners and, 469. See also Navy
and MacArthur, 294, 331-32, 387, 395, 398-99 planners.
and Marshall, 294 Pacific Theater, organization of, 248-49
objectives of, 388-89, 393, 395-98, 452-53, 458 Pacific Theater Mobile Air Force, 303
plans for, 100, 251, 289-304, 386-88. See also Pacific Theater planners, 400
CARTWHEEL. Pacific theaters, relations between, 331, 357-58. See
and RAINBOW plans, 74 also South Pacific, and Southwest Pacific; Cen-
resources for, 318, 458-59 tral Pacific, and South Pacific.
and supply, problems of, 305-06 Pacific warfare, pattern of, 585, 587, 589-90
and Task One, 302-04, 306, 307, 311, 313, 317, Palau Islands, 134, 434, 444, 514-15, 520, 536, 538,
322-23, 327, 364, 388 601-02
and Task Two, 302-04, 307, 311, 313, 316-18, Palaus-Vogelkop Peninsula line, 515
322-23, 327, 329-32, 335-36, 364, 370-75, 395, Palembang, 175
441, 452 Palmyra, 205-06
Tasks Two and Three, command for, 374-75 Pan American clippers, 152
Tasks Two and Three, plans for, 387-89 Panama, 61, 70, 102, 119-20, 123-24, 144, 146-47, 349
Task Three, 302, 304, 307, 311, 313, 316, 318, 364, Panama Canal, 21, 69, 74, 140, 143, 146, 192,
370, 372-75 Panama Canal route, 192, 210
and TRIDENT, 456-57, 460 Panama Conference, 73
Pacific operations. See also Pacific; Pacific offensive. Panay, 181, 266
MacArthur on, 514 Panay Incident, 51
1943, 559-67 Papuan Campaign, 367, 389, 403-07
1943-44, 457-60, 514-16, 517, 521-22, 524 Papuan Peninsula, 198, 205, 316, 337, 364, 411
1944, 538, 601-05, 673-74 Parachute regiments, for RENO III, 537
priorities of, 600-601
Paramushiro, 420, 528, 530-32
and resources, allocation of, 521-22, 524, 525
shipping for, 526
Parker, Maj. Gen. George M., Jr., 182-83
Pacific routes, 590n. See also Central Pacific route; Patch, Maj. Gen. Alexander M., 209-12, 219, 257,
Southwest Pacific route. 347-48, 367
Pacific strategy, 23, 43, 159, 217-18, 219-22, 289-94, Patrol planes, 101, 131
310-11, 370-72, 377-79, 385-86, 389, 392-93, Patrol Wing, U.S., 10th, 136
437-38, 515-16, 627-29. See also Army planners; Pattani, 138
Atlantic vs. Pacific priority; Central Pacific; Patton, Maj. Gen. George, 335, 525
Japan, plans for defeat of; Japan, strategy PBY's, 101, 281, 283
against; Navy planners; Strategy, Allied; Strat- Pearl Harbor, 23, 61, 74, 85, 256, 204, 274, 276, 279,
egy, U.S.; South Pacific; Southwest Pacific. 306, 319, 389, 436, 569, 584. See also Hawaii.
and air forces, role of, 372, 587 attack on, 102, 103, 117, 120, 122-25, 131-33, 135,
and Anglo-American relations, 381-85 139
Army planners and, 467-68. See also Army attack on, investigation of, 144
planners. attack on, results of, 126, 132-33, 205
base at, 23, 30, 61, 101, 146-47, 256, 281, 343, 545, and Japanese-Allied negotiations, 105
570 JCS and, 542
headquarters at, 522 and JPC report (1939), 70
Japanese plans to attack, 64, 96, 105-08, 121-22 JWPC on, 515, 601
and JPC report (1939), 69-70 loss of, 264-68
and Tokyo raid, 271 MacArthur and, 150, 186-87, 196, 438-39, 443-44,
Pearl Harbor-Midway-Luzon route, 70 514, 535-39, 591, 604
Peck, Brig. Gen. Dewitt, 390n Marshall on, 151, 536
Peirse, Air Marshal Sir Richard, 168, 173 neutralization of, discussed, 35-36, 190
Pensacola convoy, 148-53 operations in, 171, 598. See also Philippines, and
Percival, Lt. Gen. A. E., 139n, 173 Allied offensive.
Pershing, General of the Armies of the United and ORANGE plans, 24, 30, 34-35, 38-39, 42, 181,
States John J., 28-29 436-37
Persian Corridor, 344 and Quebec Conference, 520
Perth, 178 recapture of, 451
recapture of, and Casablanca Conference, 439
Pescadores, 123, 134
recapture of, and TRIDENT, 457-58
Petropavlovsk, base at, 528 reinforcement of, 36-37, 97-99, 119, 122-23,
Philippine Army, 39, 97, 100-101, 182-83, 265 149-50, 152-53, 186-89. See also Blockade
Philippine Death March, 265 running.
Philippine Department, 29 and RENO III, 536-37
Philippine Division. See Divisions, U.S. and Roosevelt, 592
Philippine Scouts, 98, 182 and Southwest Pacific offensive, 536-37, 538-41,
Philippines, 91, 140, 148, 246, 249, 284, 411, 544,542
583, 590n. See also Filipinos. strategic value of, 30-31, 150-51, 186-87, 268, 443
and ABDACOM, 161 supply of, 191-93, 210
air attacks on, 265 Sutherland on, 538-42
and Allied air bases, 385 and war warning, 119-20, 123-24
and Allied offensive, 293, 309, 311 and Washington Conference, 26-27
and Allied strategy, 159, 186-88, 290, 382, 437-39, Phillips, Admiral Sir Thomas, 123
518 Phoney war, 73
American forces in, 240, 253 Pisa-Rimini line, 592
American public opinion and, 126n Plan Dog, 81-84
and American strategy, 88, 97, 100, 156, 443, 447 Poland, German invasion of, 52
and ARCADIA Conference, 187 Politics and strategy, 451, 465
and Atlantic vs. Pacific priority, 438-39 Ponope, 453, 458, 515-16, 520, 602, 605
as basic problem of Pacific strategy, 21 Port and Service Command, U.S., 484
casualties in, 584, 586 Port Darwin, 152, 172
and Central Pacific route, 538-41 Port facilities, shortage of in Pacific, 346-48
command in, 195-97 Port Moresby, 199, 221, 289, 316, 331, 437, 563, 566
defense of, 22-24, 27, 33, 37, 85, 91, 97-100, 118, and ABDA area, 202
121, 137, 146, 150, 182-84, 224, 264 and Australia, defense of, 255-56
defense of, and ABDACOM, 168-70 defense of, 202, 218
defense of, and Joint Board, 148-49 and Japan, 214-217, 274-79, 284, 316-17, 327, 329,
defense of, Marshall on, 149 336-37, 340, 350, 365, 413, 415. See also Coral
defense of, and ORANGE Plans, 34-35, 39, 42, 181 Sea, Battle of.
defense of, Roosevelt on, 149 Portuguese Timor, 176
defense of, and Singapore Conference, 157 Pound, Admiral Sir Dudley, 83, 164, 201
defense of, Stimson on, 149 Pownall, Rear Adm. Charles A., 482, 571
defense of, and USAFIA, 152, 161 President Coolidge, 328
defense of, Wavell on, 177 Pribilof Island, 424
independence of, 34-36, 190 Prince of Wales, 123, 138, 146
Japan and, 117, 167-68, 541, 543, 553, 591 Princessa, 191
Japanese forces in, 217, 340, 555, 591 Princeton, 545n, 576
Japanese offensive against, 64, 123-24, 134-37, Priorities, 333-39. See also Atlantic vs. Pacific
146, 181-84 priority; Resources, allocation of.
and Japanese strategy, 58, 96, 99, 105, 107-08, 109, Production, Allied, 605
131, 181-83 Propaganda, 159, 247
INDEX 753
Psychological warfare, 231 Radar, and Battle of Guadalcanal, 350

PT bases, 580, 582 Radford, Rear Adm. Arthur W., 570
PT boats, 195, 503, 528, 563 Radio Tokyo, 272
Public opinion, 126, 126n, 139, 142, 148-49, 220, RAINBOW 1, 71-72
269, 308, 381 RAINBOW 2, 71-72, 73-74
Pursuit craft, U.S., 145. See also Air Groups, Pur- RAINBOW 3, 71-72, 74, 89
suit; Fighter aircraft. RAINBOW 4, 71-72, 75-76, 89
Pye, Vice Adm. William S., 144 RAINBOW 5, 71-72, 89-90, 100, 119, 289, 436. See
also ABC-1.
QUADRANT Conference, See Quebec Conference. invoked, 139-40
Quebec Conference, 512-13, 516, 517-18, 520, 594, revised, 100, 143
601, 605, 650-53 Ramu Valley, 552, 566, 581-82
and Atlantic vs. Pacific priority, 517-18 Rangoon, 159, 180
and Central Pacific, objectives in, 524 Rations, problem of
and logistics, 521-22 and Bataan, 184-85
and MacArthur, 519, 535-36 and Corregidor, 267
and RENO III, 536 and Philippines, 189, 191-92, 196, 265
and Southwest Pacific offensive (1943-44), 520 Reconnaissance. See Aerial reconnaissance.
and strategy against Japan, 595-96 RED War Plan, 31
Quezon, Manuel, 98, 185, 190 RED-ORANGE War Plan, 31-33
Reeves, Rear Adm. John W., 531
Rabaul, 212, 215, 386, 400, 411, 413, 437, 440, 442, Reinforcement, problems of
447, 453, 460, 467, 470, 514, 520, 544, 579 in Pacific, 225, 282, 290-92, 318, 322-27, 330-33
Allied air bombardment of, 202, 275, 357. See in Philippines, 185-89
also Rabaul, Allied offensive against; Rabaul, in South Pacific, 321-23, 326-33, 342-43
neutralization of, plans for. Relief Carrier Group, and Gilberts, 571
Allied offensive against, 215, 275, 294-95, 296-97, Rendova, 415, 504-05, 507, 562
301-02, 307, 313-16, 364, 371, 375, 388-89, 391, RENO, 443-44
397, 437, 452, 502, 551, 577. See also Southwest RENO II, 514-15
Pacific offensive. RENO III, 536-38, 542, 600-601, 661-67, 686-92
Allied offensive against, command of, 300-302, Repulse, 138, 146
373-75 Resistance movements, Allied support of, 88
and Allied strategy, 385 Resources, allocation of, 145-47, 158, 186-87, 217-22,
Army planners and, 469 324, 326, 333, 344, 376-79, 383-84, 454, 526,
and Casablanca Conference, 439 599-600. See also Atlantic vs. Pacific priority;
and Central Pacific offensive, 471-72 Priorities.
defense of, 200 in ABDA Area, 172
and ELKTON, 389-90, 393 and Allied strategy, 380
fall of, 201 and ARCADIA .Conference, 158
Great Britain on, 383 Army-Navy disagreement on, 290-91
Japan and, 336, 411, 504-05, 551, 565, 577 and Atlantic vs. Pacific priority, 308, 517-18, 537,
Japanese base at, 200-201, 217, 274, 279, 290, 306, 541
313, 317-18, 323, 328-29, 337, 340, 342, 349, 364, and British strategy, 378-79
368, 446, 571, 575-77 and CARTWHEEL, 402
Japanese offensive against, 200-201 and Casablanca Conference, 385
in Japanese war plans, 199-200 and Central Pacific offensive, 516
JCS on, 514, 579, 583 Combined Chiefs of Staff on, 243
JPS on, 542 and ELKTON II, 390-95
JWPC on, 515 and Far East, 153, 159
and MacArthur, 443, 465, 514, 534, 536, 542, 576 and Gilberts, 569
neutralization of, plan for, 458, 469, 535, 583 JPS on, 537
and Pacific Military Conference, 394-95 and Kiska, 429-30, 431
and Pacific strategy, 382-83, 398, 471-72 MacArthur on, 150, 342
and Quebec Conference, 520 and North Pacific offensive, 426, 428, 431
and RENO II, 514 in Pacific, 164, 207, 386, 393-94
and RENO III, 536 and Pacific strategy, 289, 381-82, 439-40, 516,
and TULSA Plans, 297-98 521-22
U.S. Navy planners on, 469 and RENO III, 538
in Southwest Pacific, 163-64, 516 Routes to Japan, 590n. See also Central Pacific
and TRIDENT, 458 route; Southwest Pacific route.
Rice Anchorage, 507 Rumania, 89
Richardson, Adm. James O., 41 Rumors and "invasion fever," 140-41
Richardson, Lt. Gen. Robert C., Jr., 313, 463n, Russell Islands, 388, 400, 413
482-92, 495-96, 498, 500, 526, 537, 567, 654 Russo-German War, 99, 104
Ritchie, Col. William L., 233, 535 Ryujo, 279, 283, 329
Roberts, Col. Frank N., 469 Ryukus, 134
Roberts, Owen, 144
Roberts, Col. Thomas D., 261 Saidor, 566, 578-82
Rockwell, Rear Adm. Francis W., 429, 430 Saigon, 62, 64
Rommel, General Erwin, 351 St. George's Channel, 200
Rooke, 579 St. Matthias, 515
Roosevelt, Franklin D., 62, 72-73, 77, 81, 94, 97, Saipan, 133, 280, 309, 445, 512n
122, 142, 149, 173, 197, 203, 220, 226-27, 241, Sakhalin, 584
308n, 344, 351, 380, 425 Salamaua, 199, 274, 298, 398, 415, 461, 502-03, 533,
and ABC-1, 90 563
and ABDA area, 168-70 Allied offensive against, 302, 316
and Allied co-operation, 155-56. See also Roosevelt, and CARTWHEEL, 401, 402
Franklin D., and Great Britain; United States, Japan and, 214-15, 563
and Great Britain. Japanese base at, 306, 367-68
and Allied strategy, 222-23, 380-81, 386 Japanese reinforcement of, 365, 412
and Atlantic vs. Pacific priority, 85, 222-23, 290, Samoa, 27, 99, 205-06, 246, 284, 293, 320, 569
292, 309-10, 318, 344 defense of, 204-05
and Australia, 203, 220, 222-23, 241, 343 Japan and, 109, 204, 212, 217, 278-79, 316, 435, 440
and Cairo Conference, 592, 605 Samoa-Ellice-Gilbert advance, 440-41
and Casablanca Conference, 375, 385 Samoa-New Guinea-Mindanao route, 70
and China, 155, 241, 592 San Cristobal, 275
and Churchill, 142, 156, 381 San Diego, 305-06, 319, 429
and command, unified, 144, 160, 161n, 362 San Francisco, 119-20, 123-24, 140-41, 210, 212, 257,
and command in Pacific, 244, 249, 252, 362 260-61, 270-71, 303
and declaration of war, 125-26, 142-43 San Francisco-Sydney line, 252. See also Communi-
and economic sanctions, 53, 59, 94 cations, Allied line of.
and Fijis, 220, 223 Sanananda, 367
and Great Britain, 77, 86, 310, 344 Santa Cruz Islands, 294, 319, 345, 356
and Great Britain, aid to, 77-78 Santa Isabel, 367, 369, 412
and Japan, 53, 59, 65, 93, 94, 114, 118-19, 123-24, Saratoga, 134, 281, 319-20, 336, 576
269, 274 Sarawak, 139
and Latin America, 73, 77 Sarmi, 555
and MacArthur, 193-95, 221, 223, 247, 253 Sasaki, Maj. Gen. Noboru, 505, 560, 562
and military, relations with, 75, 227 Savo Island, 323, 350, 354
and North Africa, 310, 344 Savo Island, Battle of, 324-25, 327
and Pacific, 85, 310, 331, 348-49 Sayre, Francis B., 151, 185
and Pearl Harbor, 139, 142, 144 Sealark Channel, 320
and Philippines, 149, 151, 185-86, 187-88, 190, Seattle, 140
197, 592 Seawitch, 178
and politics, 81, 85 Segi Point, 505-06
and Quebec Conference, 520 Service Command Area (Bataan), 182
Service forces and troops, Allied, 103, 209-10, 224,
and resources, allocation of, 153, 164, 220, 258,
233, 248, 257, 262, 484
331, 344, 348 Service Squadron, South Pacific, 257, 259-60, 403
and Soviet Union, 155, 420, 529 Services of Supply, U.S., 253, 262, 313, 348, 403, 491.
and strategic responsibility, 241-43 See also U.S. Army Forces in Australia.
and TRIDENT, 458 Seventh Air Force, U.S., 282, 470
and U.S. strategy, 75n, 84-85, 90, 92, 156-57,Seventh Amphibious Force, 502-03
222-23, 269, 274, 292, 310 Seventh Fleet, U.S., 403, 504
Rota, 123 Shanghai, 124, 137
ROUNDUP, 221-22, 308 Sharp, Maj. Gen. William F., 195-96, 266
INDEX 755
Shemya Island, 430-31 Allied victory in, 350

Sherman, Admiral Frederick C., 571, 576-77 bombing of, planned, 295
Shimada, Admiral Shigetaro, 235 and British strategy, 379
Shimushu, 528, 530 and CARTWHEEL, 401, 402, 411
Shipbuilding, 449 command in, 397-98
Shipping, Allied, 449, 601 Japan and, 212, 214, 296-97, 306-07, 311, 324, 327,
and ANZAC, 201 331, 336, 365, 367-69, 400, 411-13, 441-42, 470,
and CARTWHEEL, 521-22, 525 543, 546, 552, 558, 560, 565, 575
and ELKTON II, 392-93 Japanese offensive against, 198, 216, 274-75,
Japanese and, 132, 413, 551 289-90, 340, 344, 349-50, 413
and Pacific strategy, 465, 521-26 Japanese reinforcement of, 368-69
priorities, 147, 163-64 Japanese threat in, 340-43, 345
for RENO III, 537 King on, 398
shortages of, 98-99, 163-64, 189, 203, 205, 209, and logistics, problems of, 355
218, 252, 306, 323, 328, 331, 341, 344-49, 392, and MacArthur, 294, 297, 465, 472
426, 521-26, 530, 569, 581 operations in, 502, 575-78, 589, 675-85
Shipping, Japanese, 279, 306, 313, 436, 541, 543, reinforcement of, 326
545-47, 555, 557, 596-98 and resources, allocation of, 342
Shoho, 274-77 Roosevelt on, 344
Shokaku, 274-77 and Southwest Pacific Area, 249
Short, Lt. Gen. Walter C., 103, 121, 144-45, 147, and Southwest Pacific offensive, 302-03
204, 359 U.S. Navy planners on, 372-73
Shortland Islands, 216, 341, 368, 401, 533-34, 562, Solomons-New Hebrides-Fijis-Hawaii route, 199
575 Somervell, Lt. Gen. Brehon B., 233, 260, 347, 491,
Siberia, 340, 447. See also Soviet Union, 496, 498-99
air bases in, 420, 527-29 Soryu, 279-80, 283-84
Japanese threat to, 311, 420, 528 South America, 70, 75, 143, 249. See also Latin
Sicily, 380, 456, 459, 569 America.
Silverthorne, Col. Carl D., 233 South Atlantic, 69
Singapore, 26, 62-63, 80, 85, 87-88, 91, 150, 153, South Atlantic-Africa route, and reinforcement of
164, 241-42, 593-94, 596 Australia, 152
and Allied strategy, 159, 191 South China Sea, 174-75, 448, 451, 468, 553
and American public opinion, 126n Japan and, 167, 221, 292, 593-94
British responsibility for, 242-43 offensive in, 596
defense of, 157, 172 routes to, 593-94
fall of, 174, 190 South Dakota, 343, 345
Great Britain on, 84, 87-88 South Pacific, 344, 419, 571. See also South Pacific
Japanese offensive against, 138, 166-67, 173-74 Area; South Pacific command problems; South
and Japanese war plans, 58, 64, 108, 131, 138, 166 Pacific offensive.
Singapore Conference, 155-57, 160 air forces in, 325-26, 329-30, 391, 575, 577
Singora, Japanese landings at, 138 air reinforcements for, 322, 329-33, 338-39, 340
Sio, 566, 579, 581 Allied strength in, Japanese estimate of, 551
Sittang Bridge, battle of, 180 Army-Navy relations in, 352-57, 510
Sixth Army, U.S., 403-07, 407n, 408, 579 and CARTWHEEL, 503-11, 583
SLEDGEHAMMER, 222, 308-310, 308n, 318, 326, 340, 376 ferry route in, 123
"Slot," 341 forces in, 391, 396, 401-03, 470, 537, 539-41. See
Smith, Maj. Gen. Holland M., USMC, 482, 489, also South Pacific Force.
512n, 523, 573 Japan in, 331, 340
Solomon Islands, 198, 221, 246, 275-76, 295, 313, 323, Japanese aircraft in, 329-30
371, 382, 398, 400-401, 453, 458-59, 552, 583, Japanese threat to, 289-90
589. See also Bougainville; Eastern Solomons, and Japanese war plans, 105
Battle of the; New Georgia, and joint staffs, 361
air operations in, 333, 356, 357, 562 JSSC on, 467
Allied bases in, 364 logistics in, 474
Allied offensive against, 290-92, 296, 300, 311, and MacArthur, 341, 371, 388
317-20, 372, 375, 378, 389, 440, 544, 551 naval forces in, 332
Allied offensive against, plans for, 305, 311, 313, and New Zealand, 240
316, 387-88 operations in, 443, 465, 503-11, 559-63. See also
South Pacific offensive. Japanese estimate of, 544

pattern of warfare in, 587 JCS on, 386
and priorities, 334 and JPS, 470
and Rabaul, 579 MacArthur on, 465-66
reinforcement of, 292, 326-33 preparations for, 305-07, 311, 313, 318-20. See
and shipping, 345, 349 also Pacific offensive, Task One.
and Southwest Pacific, co-operation between, and logistics, problems of, 305-06
388-89 reinforcement for, 321-23
and strategy against Japan, 450-52 South Pacific-Southwest Pacific, boundary between,
and supply, problems of, 346-48 397
U.S. Marines in, 559-60 South-Southwest Pacific route vs. Central Pacific
U.S. naval forces in, 336 route, 450-51
U.S. naval planners on, 334 Southeast Area
South Pacific Air Force, 319-20. See also South command in, 412-13
Pacific, air forces in. and Japan, 364-65, 367-69, 411-12
South Pacific Amphibious Force, 319-20 Southeast Asia, 451, 590, 597, 603-05
South Pacific Area, 256-63. See also South Pacific. and Cairo Conference, 592
air command in, 257-59 defense of, 121, 203
air forces in, 338-39 and Great Britain, 240
amphibious command, 257 Japanese expansion into, 45, 127, 138-39, 166-67,
Army command in, 257-58 179-80
Army headquarters in, 360 Japanese forces in, 591
command in, 343-44, 403, 621-23. See also South and Japanese war aims, 126, 138
Pacific command problems. and Quebec Conference, 517
defined, 249, 374 resources of, as factor in war, 125
forces in, 256-57 Southeast Asia route, 541
geography of, 589 Southern Attack Force, 571, 577n
logistics in, 257, 262 Southern Bougainville, invasion of, 533-35
and MacArthur, 357-58 Southern Carrier Group, 571
offensive operations in. See South Pacific offensive. Southern Solomons, and Nimitz, 473
operations in, 463. See also South Pacific, opera- Southwest Pacific, 389. See also Southwest Pacific
tions in. Area; Southwest Pacific offensive.
organization of, 256-59, 260, 356 air bases in, 503
and Pacific offensive, 370. See also South Pacific aircraft in, and Rabaul, 576-77
offensive. Allied forces in, 391, 502-03
reinforcement of, 318 Allied headquarters in, 157
service commands, 257 Allied naval forces in, 502
and Southwest Pacific Area, relations with, 311, and Allied strategy, 186-88
313, 326, 357-58, 362 Allied strength in, 391
and Southwest Pacific offensive, 298, 311, 313 Allied strength in, Japanese estimate of, 551
staff, 360 American air forces in, 325-26
and Tulagi offensive, 302 and American strategy, 535
South Pacific command problems, 259-61, 352-53, Army-Navy relations in, 357-58
372, 510-12, 583. See also South Pacific Area, Army troops in, 220, 537-41
command in. and Australia, 240
South Pacific Expeditionary Force, 319 command in. See Southwest Pacific command
South Pacific Force, 389, 545n, 621-23 problems.
South Pacific islands, 204-05, 206-08 forces in, 159, 583
South Pacific offensive, 256-57, 263, 319, 324, 371, Japan and, 289-90, 331, 450
430, 503-11, 641. See also Guadalcanal; Pacific Japanese aircraft in, 329-30
offensive, Task One; Solomons; Tulagi. Japanese expansion in, 166-67
and Army-Navy co-operation, 311, 313 Japanese strategy in, 216-17
Army planners on, 467-68 JSSC on, 467
command of, 319 and MacArthur. See MacArthur, General Douglas.
forces for, 305, 318-19, 459 operations in, 463, 502-03, 538, 597-98, 601, 605
Halsey and, 371 operations in, and Central Pacific, 600
Harmon and, 371 pattern of warfare in, 587
and Japanese air attack, 371 and priorities, 207, 334
INDEX 757
reinforcement of, 163-64, 292, 331, 408, 536 Southwest Pacific route, 443-44, 450, 514, 590n
Roosevelt on, 344 Soviet Maritime Provinces, 154-55, 419
shipping for, 147, 349 Soviet Union, 126, 220, 345, 376, 379
and Singapore Conference, 157 air bases in, 126, 527-28
and South Pacific, co-operation between, 388-89 and Allied conferences, 155-56
and strategy against Japan, 450-52 and Allied co-operation, 458, 531, 592
U.S. naval forces in, 293-94 and Allied strategy, 221-22, 376-77
U.S. naval planners on, 334 American aid to, 142, 527-28. See also Soviet
Southwest Pacific Area, 246. See also Southwest Union, lend-lease to.
Pacific. and American air forces, 529
and Allied forces, 253 and Asia, 592
amphibious operations in, 502-03 and British strategy, 378-79
and Army command, 303 and Far East, 155
Army-Navy co-operation in, 360 and Germany, 63, 65, 93, 529, 548
and Army planners, 246 and Japan, 50, 51-52, 59-61, 63-64, 419, 459,
boundary of, 249, 252, 313 527-29, 545, 547-48, 592
and Celebes Sea, 448 and Japan, war against, 598-600
command in, 246-49, 294, 362, 372-74. See also Japanese fear of, 114, 150, 166-67, 216-17, 547
Southwest Pacific command problems, and Japanese war plans, 109, 111-12
defined, 374 and Kurils, 598
established, 248-49, 614-16 lend-lease to, 164, 344, 419
forces in, 253, 372 military co-operation with U.S., 420
geography of, 589 neutrality of, 155, 419, 527
and logistics, difficulties of, 252 neutrality pact with Germany, 52
and offensive operations, 370, 619-20. See also neutrality pact with Japan, 63-64, 93
Southwest Pacific offensive, and North Pacific offensive, 429, 527-30
organization of, 252-53 and OVERLORD, 592
and Philippines, 538, 541-42 and Pacific strategy, 599
and RENO III, 661-67 participation in war, 154
and South Pacific Area, relations with, 311, 313, and South Pacific, 419
326, 357-58, 362 and Tehran Conference, 592
Southwest Pacific command problems, 156-57, 194, and Tokyo Raid, 269, 273
245-49, 294-304, 362, 372-74, 403-08, 602 and U.S. See United States, and Soviet Union.
Southwest Pacific Forces, 395-96, 401, 402 Spaatz, Maj. Gen. Carl, 228, 335
Southwest Pacific offensive, 295-304, 438, 502-03, Spanish-American War, 21
514-16, 641 "Specific Operations for the Defeat of Japan,"
and air power, 296 673-74. See also Japan, plans for defeat of;
Army and, 299-300 Japan, strategy against.
and command problems, 295-304 SPM group, 182
forces for, 299-300, 459 Spruance, Rear Adm. Raymond A., 281, 284, 307n,
Great Britain on, 519 396, 444, 482, 489, 524, 568
Japanese estimate of, 544, 551 and Central Pacific, 442, 522n, 523-24
Japanese fear of, 591 and Pacific Military Conference, 390, 395-96
Japanese strategy against, 599 and U.S. Pacific Fleet, 442
JCS on, 386 Stalin, Marshal Joseph, 63-64, 155-56, 419-20, 527,
JPS on, 470 529, 592
and King, 295-99, 518-19 Stalingrad, 350-51, 376-77
MacArthur on, 514, 535. See also MacArthur, Stark, Admiral Harold R., 81-84, 115, 118, 125n,
General Douglas, 126, 143n, 147, 152-53, 173
and Philippines, 536-37 and ABC-1, 89
plans for, 186-88, 295-304 appointed Chief of Naval Operations, 73
preparations for, 313. See also Pacific offensive, on Atlantic vs. Pacific priority, 80
Tasks 2 and 3. on economic sanctions, 94, 94n
and Quebec Conference, 518-19, 520 on Great Britain, 82
and U.S. Marines, 299 on Hawaii, 144-47
and U.S. Navy, 299-302 and Japanese threat, 117, 119
vs. Central Pacific offensive, debate on, 587, and JCS, 226
600-602 and Joint Board, 226
and King, 226 and Allied co-operation, 70-71

and mobilization, 76-77 and Army-Navy dispute, 218-19. See also Army-
and Pacific defense, 163-64 Navy relations.
on Philippines, 149 and Central Pacific. See Central Pacific, role of,
and reaction to Pearl Harbor, 142 in U.S. strategy; Central Pacific, strategy for;
replaced by King, 145 Central Pacific offensive; Central Pacific route,
on Soviet participation in war, 154 and Combined Chiefs of Staff, 219, 520
and war warning, 123-24 and command, relationship between, 370-72
State Department, U.S., 77 defensive, 34, 39-41, 70-72, 76, 82, 90-91, 143, 251,
Stilwell, Lt. Gen. Joseph W., 270 290-91, 331
Stimson, Henry L., 47, 78, 92, 97, 119, 123, 342 and Germany. See Germany; "Germany first"
and Pearl Harbor, 102, 139, 142 strategy.
and Philippines, 98, 148-49, 187-88 and Great Britain, 381-85. See also Great Britain,
and RAINBOW 5, 90 and Japan. See Japan, plans for defeat of; Japan,
Stivers, Col. Charles P., 253 U.S. strategy against.
Strait of Malacca, 593 and JCS, 219, 381-84, 467, 470-71, 514, 516
Strait of Sunda, 175 and JPS, 219, 228-29, 469-70
"Strategic Plan for Defeat of Japan," 644-47. See and JSSC, 229-30, 447-52, 456, 467
also Japan, plans for defeat of; Japan, strategy and JWPC, 468-69, 513-16
against. and MacArthur. See Pacific strategy, and Mac-
Strategic planning, 68-71, 231, 233-34. See also Arthur.
Army planners; Joint Staff planners; Joint and North Pacific, 527-30, 531-33, 535-36
Strategic Survey Committee; Joint War Plans offensive, 39-42, 84, 136, 150-51, 189-91, 251,
Committee; Naval planners. 370-72, 377
Strategic responsibility and political factors, 451, 465
and command, 243 Roosevelt and, 222-23, 310
spheres of, 205-07, 240-43, 246-47, 249-50 and South Pacific, 442-43
Strategy, Allied. See also Strategy, U.S. and Southwest Pacific, 535
aims of, 158-59 and two-front war, offensive-defensive, 32
and British Chiefs of Staff, 378 Stratemeyer, Maj. Gen. George E., 230, 377, 394
and Europe, role of, 378 Streett, Brig. Gen. St. Clair, 361-62
in Far East, 159, 189 Strong, Brig. Gen. George V., 76, 78
and Germany, 221-22, 289, 310, 376-77, 380, 385 Strother, Col. Dean C., 261
and Italy, 380 Subic Bay, 23-24
and Japan. See Japan, strategy against; Pacific Submarines, Allied, 101, 143, 168, 178, 188, 192, 253,
strategy. 276, 281, 283-84, 313, 319, 350, 436, 449, 504,
Japanese estimate of, 544-45, 590-91 545-46, 553, 557, 562, 597
MacArthur on. See Pacific strategy, and Mac- Submarines, Japanese, 131-32, 133, 200, 209, 217,
Arthur. 239, 274, 279, 280, 433, 571-72
and Mediterranean, 380 Subversion, 119, 121
and Pacific vs. Mediterranean concept, 382 Sugiyama, General, 105, 114, 116-17, 278
and Philippines, 186-88 Sulu Archipelago, 137
and priorities, 335. See also Priorities. SuluSea, 448, 451, 593
and Sicily, 380 Sumatra, 174-75, 179, 191, 241, 249, 544, 590n, 596-97
and Singapore, 191 and Allied strategic aims, 159
in Southwest Pacific, 186-88 and Japanese war plans, 96, 108, 166
and Soviet Union, 221-22, 376-77 Sunda Islands, 546
Strategy, U.S., 25, 38, 74-77, 81-83, 88, 141, 156-58, Sunda Strait, 178
319, 437, 443, 447, 451, 459. See also ABC-1; Supply, problems of, 140, 185-86, 188, 376. See also
ANVIL; Army planners; Atlantic vs. Pacific Logistics.
priority; BOLERO; CARTWHEEL; Central Pacific; and ABDACOM, 179
ELKTON; "Germany first" strategy; Japan, plans and ANZAC area, 201
for defeat of; Japan, strategy against; Navy and CARTWHEEL, 403
planners; ORANGE Plans; Pacific strategy; Plan and Central Pacific, 487, 589
Dog; RAINBOW; RED-ORANGE War Plan; RENO; and Guadalcanal, 325, 328, 355
ROUNDUP; SLEDGEHAMMER; South Pacific; South- and MacArthur, 341
west Pacific; Strategy, Allied; TOENAILS; TORCH; and New Caledonia, 210
TULSA. and New Georgia, 505, 507
INDEX 759
and Pacific offensive, 305-06 Tokyo Bay, 280

and Philippines, 191-93, 195-96 Tokyo Naval War College, 105
and South Pacific Area, 257, 259-60, 261-62, Tokyo Raid, 264, 269-74, 278, 436
346-48 Tonga Group, 218
and Southwest Pacific, 341 Tongatabu, 218, 21-9, 257, 291, 318, 356
and Tulagi, 325 Tonolei Harbor, 533-34
Supply bases, floating, 589 TORCH, 322, 326, 332-36, 344-45
Supreme Allied War Council, 164 Torokina, 576-77
Supreme Command in Europe, 479-80 Torpedo boats, 101
Supreme Command in Pacific, 479-81 Torpedo bombers, 339
Supreme Commander of the Southwest Pacific Area, Torres Strait, 153, 199, 274, 289-90
247-49. See also MacArthur, General Douglas. Townsville, 202, 215-16, 502-03
Surabaya, 167, 172, 176, 555 Toyoda, Soemu, 94, 114
Sutherland, Maj. Gen. Richard K., 253, 337, 389, 392, Transportation, committee on, 231
396, 442, 537-42, 600-601 Transports, 152, 306, 317, 449
and Pacific Military Conference, 390, 395-96, 444 Treasury Islands, 534, 575
and RENO III, 537-42 TRIDENT Conference, 454-60, 465, 467, 517, 593,
Suva, 148, 223, 262, 279, 347 648-49
Suzuki, Teiichi, 95 Tripartite Pact, 60-61, 62, 80, 93, 113, 115-16
Sydney, 174, 252 Trobriand Islands, 371, 502-03, 533. See also Wood-
lark Island; Kiriwina.
Takagi, Vice Adm. Takeo, 274 Truk, 217, 274-75, 290, 295, 319, 345, 349, 434, 438,
Tamana, 446 439, 448n, 453, 458, 515-16, 520, 575, 597, 602,
Tanaga Island, 422-23, 424-25, 427 605
Tanimbar Island, 514 and Allied offensive, 309, 383
Tankan Bay, 131 and Japan, 199, 340, 543
Tanks, 98, 103, 182, 209, 405 Japanese base at, 199-200, 279, 411, 446, 523, 552,
Tarakan, 167-68 555, 576, 599
Tarawa, 133, 445-46, 464, 468, 522-24, 569, 571-73 Truk-Guam line, 386, 440, 447
Task forces, U.S. Tulagi, 284, 289, 306, 364, 505
ALAMO Force (New Britain Force), 408, 502-03, Allied offensive against, 275-76, 293-94, 297,
566, 579, 581-82 301-02, 319
Task Force 16, 281 and Japan, 214-17, 274-76, 323, 365
Task Force 39, 576 and Pacific offensive, Task Two, 313
Task Force 6184, 209-10, 211-12, 224, 342. See U.S. Marines on, 323, 325
also Divisions, U.S., Americal. TULSA plan, 297-98, 313, 316-18, 327, 389
Woodlark Force, 502-03. Turner, Rear Adm. Richard K., 149, 227, 234, 257,
Task One, Task Two, Task Three. See Pacific offen- 354, 360, 406, 445n, 482, 570
sive, Task One, etc. and Army troops, 489
TBF's, 281 and Central Pacific, 510
Tehran Conference, 537, 592 and command, 511-12
Ter Poorten, Lt. Gen. H., 168 and Guadalcanal, 344n
Terauchi, Field Marshal Hisaichi, 167, 553, 591 and Hester, 509
Terrain, and strategy, 252 on MacArthur, 251
Thailand, 62-64, 89, 93, 105, 108, 123, 131, 138, and Nauru, 523
179-80, 590 and New Georgia, 504, 507
Theobald, Rear Adm. Robert A., 421-24, 424n, 427 on Pacific Theater, 248
Third Fleet, 403 and South Pacific, 319, 320, 325
Thirteenth Air Force, 261, 263, 403 Twining, Maj. Gen. Nathan F., 261, 352-53, 360,
Tientsin, 137 390, 403
Timor, 108, 166, 176, 242, 245, 453, 553 Two Ocean Navy Bill, 449
Tinker, Maj. Gen. Clarence L., 145, 282 Tydings-McDuffie Act, 36
Tjilatjap, 177-78
TOENAILS, 504-07, 509-10 Umnak, 283
Togo, Shigenori, 115-16, 124 Unconditional surrender, 447, 593, 596, 602
Tojo, Hideki, 58, 94, 104, 105n, 115, 235-36, 549-50 Unified command. See-also Command.
and decision for war, 114, 121-22, 124-25 Army planners on, 372
Tokyo, 212 in Central Pacific, 475-79, 589
defined, 475-76, 642-43 and Japan, economic sanctions against, 51, 59, 61,
in Far East, 160-61 94, 118
Hull on, 512 and Japan, negotiations with, 94, 104-05, 109,
Japanese and, 412, 591 114-24
JCS on, 475-78 in Japanese war plans, 59, 64, 108-09, 125-26, 327
King on, 476-77 military strength, 70, 73, 85, 97-98
MacArthur on, 250, 297, 372 national defense policy, 84-88, 92, 96-97. See also
Marshall on, 144, 299-300, 359-62, 372-74, 478-79 Strategy, U.S., defensive.
and New Georgia, 511-12 neutrality of, 73
in North Atlantic, 423-24 politics, 126, 126n, 148-49, 465. See also Congress;
in ORANGE Plan, 29-30 Roosevelt, Franklin D.
in Pacific, 244, 250, 361-63, 372-74, 462-63, 559 preparations for war, 61-62, 75-76, 100, 126, 142
and Pacific offensive, 398-99 and South Pacific islands, 204-05
Roosevelt on, 144 and Soviet Union, 142, 154-55, 344, 419-20, 527-30
in Southwest Pacific, 297, 303 and Tripartite Pact, 61-62
and staff organization, 475-76 U.S. Army Forces in Australia (USAFIA), 151-52,
Streett on, 361, 362 161, 170-71, 191, 198, 248, 253, 257
U.S. naval planners on, 372 U.S. Army Forces in the Far East (USAFFE), 97, 170,
Wedemeyer on, 361-62 182, 193-96, 240, 248, 253, 403
Unified Command for U.S. Joint Operations, 475-76 U.S. Army Forces in the South Pacific Area, 260-63
United Kingdom. See Great Britain. U.S. Fleet, 28, 31, 68-69, 77, 79, 88, 102, 216, 345, 449
United Nations, 165, 210. See also United States, and U.S. Forces in the Philippines (USFIP), 197, 253, 264
Great Britain.
United States Van Mook, 177n
aid to Allies. See Allies, U.S. aid to. Vandegrift, Maj. Gen. Alexander A., 304-06, 320,
and Australia, 203, 465 325, 342
and Axis, 142 Vella Gulf, 560
and Burma, defense of, 203 Vella Lavella, 504, 559-63
and China, 51-53, 59-62, 97, 117, 123 Vigan, Japanese landings at, 136
entry into war, 79, 82-83, 96, 142-43 Vila, 368, 505, 560
forces, 100-101, 163-64, 176, 220, 533, 559, 563,Vinakauan airfield, 201
578. See also Air forces, U.S. Army; Deployment Viru harbor, 505-07
of U.S. forces; Divisions, U.S.; Infantry, U.S.; Visayan Force, 196
Naval forces, Visayan Islands, 136, 192-93, 266
foreign policy, basic aims of, 61-63. See also Visayan-Mindanao Force, 196
United States, and China; United States, and Vitiaz Strait, 389, 396, 564, 575, 578, 581
Great Britain; United States, and Japan; United Vladivostok, 155, 269, 273
States, and Soviet Union, Vogelkop Peninsula, 451, 514-16, 520, 535-36, 538,
and Germany, 143. See also Germany; "Germany 601, 605
first" strategy.
and Great Britain, 61, 68-69, 142, 310, 380-86, Wainwright, Lt. Gen. Jonathan M., 182-84, 196-97,
494, 517, 594. See also ARCADIA Conference; 248, 253, 264-65, 266-68
Casablanca Conference; London Conference; Wake Island, 91, 97, 101, 123, 131, 284, 440, 446,
TRIDENT Conference. 460, 463-64, 469, 524-25, 543-44
and Great Britain, aid to, 142 and Central Pacific offensive, 468-69
and Great Britain, and unified command, 475n. Japanese offensive against, 124, 133-34
See also Command, Allied. and Japanese war plans, 107-08, 131
and Great Britain, military co-operation with, Wallis Island, 569, 571
68, 78-83, 84-89, 123, 155-59, 230, 451 War, declaration of, 124
and Great Britain, and Pacific offensives, 386, War aims. See Allies, war aims of.
603-05 War Council, U.S., 85, 118-19, 142
and Great Britain, and strategy, 88, 379-85, War Department, U.S., 77, 123, 140, 145, 260, 391,
457-59, 594, 600-601 480, 490
and Indochina, 94, 117-18 and air forces, 261, 339, 372
and Italy, 143 and Australia, defense of, 198, 203, 220
and Japan, 25, 50, 61, 65, 80, 92-93, 97, 113, 115, organization of, 226, 231, 233
117, 126, 420. See also Japan, plans for defeat of; and Pacific command, 257
Japan, strategy against. and Philippines, 98, 100, 192, 197
INDEX 761
and shipping, shortage of, 526 Western New Britain, 401, 402
and USAFIA, 152, 171, 198 Wewak, 365, 367-68, 471-72, 514-16, 520, 527, 533,
and war warning, 119-20 536, 555
War Department, U.S., Operations Division, 231-34, Wheeler Airfield, 132
361-62. See also War Plans Division, U.S. Whitlock, Col. Lester J., 253-55
War Department planners, 486 Wickham Anchorage, 506
War Plans, U.S., 67-71, 139-40, 143, 221-22. See also Wilkinson, Rear Adm. Theodore, 388-89, 510, 562
ORANGE Plans; Strategy, U.S. Williamson, Brig. Gen. Raymond E. S., 348
War Plans Division, U.S., 76, 98, 146, 157, 227, 231. Willoughby, Col. Charles A., 253
See also War Department, U.S., Operations Willson, Vice Adm. Russell, 230, 532
Division. Wilson, Woodrow, 25
War Shipping Administration, U.S., 345, 349 Wood, Maj. Gen. Leonard, 24, 27-28
War warning, 119-24 Woodlark Island, 371, 395-96, 398, 402, 461
Warfare, nature of, in Pacific, 585, 587, 589-90 occupation of, 401, 402, 411, 415, 502-03
Washington Naval Conference (1921-22), 25-27, 56 Woodlark Force. See Task Forces.
Washington Treaty, 43, 45 World War I, 25
Wasp, 281, 319-20, 336, 354 Wotje, 441n, 460, 468, 524
Wavell, Lt. Gen. Sir Archibald, 156, 164, 172-77,
201-03, 242, 253 Yamamoto, Admiral Isoroku, 64, 204, 277-80, 284,
and ABDACOM, 161-63, 168-70, 177, 202, 607-09 349-50, 365, 411-15, 575
and Burma, 175-76, 203 on Japanese strategy, 96
and MacArthur, 168-70 and Pearl Harbor attack, 105, 107, 122, 125, 132
and Philippines, 177 Yamashita, Lt. Gen. Tomayuki, 138, 166, 173
and unified Allied command, 160-61 Yamato, 280
Weapons, allocation of, and Combined Chiefs of Yap, 515
Staff, 165-66 Yarnell, Capt. Harry E., USN, 25
Weapons, Committee on, 231 Yokohama, 273
Weather, Committee on, 231
Yokosuka Navy Yard, 273
Weather, as strategic factor, 122, 271, 430
Wedemeyer, Brig. Gen. Albert C., 231, 335-36, Yokoyama Force, 317
361-62, 390n, 392-93 Yonai, Admiral Mitsumasa, 53
Wellington, 262, 305 Yorktown, 143, 207, 216, 276-77, 281, 284, 545n
West Coast, U.S., defense of, 140, 143, 146-47 Yoshida, Zengo, 58
West Virginia, 132 Yugoslavia, 89
Western Defense Command, 421-22, 478
Western Hemisphere defense, 69-70, 71, 73, 75, 77, "Zeros," Japanese, 136, 201, 369
82-84, 86-87, 240-41, 336. See also RAINBOW; Zieta, 560
United States, national defense policy. Zuikaku, 274-77
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Foreword

Washington, D. C. JAMES A. NORELL

Hanover, New Hampshire LOUIS MORTON

VII. T H E MALAY BARRIER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 5 4

IX. AUSTRALIA AND THE LINE OF COMMUNICATION ... 198

X. THE U.S. AND JAPANESE HIGH COMMANDS . . . . . 225

X I . ORGANIZATION A N D COMMAND O F T H E PACIFIC . 2 4 0

XIII. PLANNING T H E OFFENSIVE . . . . . . . . . . . 289

XV. CRISIS IN THE PACIFIC, AUGUST-NOVEMBER 1942 . . . . . 324

XVI. COMMAND A N D CO-OPERATION . . . . . . . . . . . . ... 352

XVII. JAPANESE AND AMERICAN PLANS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 364

XVIII. T H E PACIFIC I N GRAND STRATEGY . . . . . . . . . . . . . 376

XIX. MEANS A N D ENDS: T H E MARCH 1943 DIRECTIVE . 3 8 7

X X . CARTWHEEL A N D T H E I-GO OPERATION . . . . . . . . . . 4 0 0

XXIII. CENTRAL PACIFIC TIMETABLE . . . . . . . .

XXIV. ORGANIZING FOR THE OFFENSIVE ......... .... 473

XXV. OPERATIONS AND PLANS, SUMMER 1943 . . . . . . . . . . 502

XXVI. REVIEW A N D ADJUSTMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 2 1

XXVII. T H E JAPANESE REVISE THEIR STRATEGY . . . . . . . . . . 5 4 3

XXVIII. THE EXECUTION OF STRATEGY: PACIFIC OPERATIONS,

XXIX. PROSPECTS FOR THE FUTURE 584

B. GENERAL OUTLINE OF POLICY OF FUTURE WAR GUID-

C. DIRECTIVE TO THE SUPREME COMMANDER IN THE

D. DIRECTIVE TO THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF OF THE

G. JAPANESE ARMY-NAVY CENTRAL AGREEMENT CONCERN-

H. CONDUCT OF THE WAR IN THE PACIFIC THEATER IN

I. THE ELKTON PLAN FOR THE SEIZURE AND OCCUPATION

J. JAPANESE ARMY-NAVY CENTRAL AGREEMENT ON SOUTH-

K. JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF DIRECTIVE: OFFENSIVE OPERA-

M. JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF MEMORANDUM: STRATEGIC

N. EXTRACT FROM THE FINAL REPORT OF THE COMBINED

P. APPOINTMENT OF LT. GEN. ROBERT C. RICHARDSON, JR.,

Q. JAPANESE GENERAL OUTLINE OF THE FUTURE WAR

R. JAPANESE ARMY-NAVY CENTRAL AGREEMENT CONCERN-

S. SUMMARY OF RENO III, OUTLINE PLAN FOR OPERATIONS

T. OVERALL PLAN FOR THE DEFEAT OF JAPAN: REPORT

U. SPECIFIC OPERATIONS FOR THE DEFEAT OF JAPAN, 1944,

W. RENO III, HISTORICAL RECORD INDEX CARD, GHQ SWPA,

BASIC MILITARY M A P SYMBOLS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 1 6

7. Command Organization, South Pacific Forces, August 1943 . . . . . . . . . 404

Maps I-III are in inverse order inside back cover

Lt. Gen. Jonathan M. Wainwright . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 268

Illustrations are from the following sources:

All other photographs are from Department of Defense files.

THE PACIFIC WORLD

The theater of war is the province of strategy.

The Pacific World

ON BOARD THE POWHATAN. Commodore Perry entertains the Japanese Commissioners in

The Great Powers in the Pacific men's souls or on settlements. With

THE ROAD TO WAR

Am I deceived, or was there a clash of arms? I am not deceived, it was

The Beginnings of Pacific Strategy

acquired Philippine Islands, became an

posed by the Philippines, Guam, and The Washington Conference brought

enemy. If it failed to do that, it was not,

Japanese Policy and Strategy,

NEW ARMY-CONTROLLED JAPANESE CABINET, MARCH 1936. At left, War Minister

JAPANESE TROOPS MARCHING THROUGH THE PEIPING GATE, September 1937.

a "Co-Prosperity Sphere" in east Asia were willing, however, to agree to lesser