Case
Case
Case
Victorino L. Guevara executed a will, apparently with all the formalities of the
law. His last will and testament, however, was never presented to the court for
probate, nor has any administration proceeding ever been instituted for the
settlement of his estate. His only legitimate son Ernesto M. Guevara appears to
have possessed the land adjudicated to him in the registration proceeding and to
have disposed of various portions thereof for the purpose of paying the debts left
by his father.
In the meantime Rosario Guevara, who appears to have had her father's last will and
testament in her custody, presented the will to the court, not for the purpose of
having it probated but only to prove that the deceased Victirino L. Guevara had
acknowledged her as his natural daughter. Upon that proof of acknowledgment she
claimed her share of the inheritance from him, but on the theory or assumption that
he died intestate, because the will had not been probated, for which reason, she
asserted, the betterment therein made by the testator in favor of his legitimate son
Ernesto M. Guevara should be disregarded.
Issue:
Whether or not the petition for probate of the will is barred by the statute of
limitations.
Ruling:
No. Even if the decedent left no debts and nobody raises any question as to the
authenticity and due execution of the will, none of the heirs may sue for the
partition of the estate in accordance with that will without first securing its
allowance or probate by the court, first, because the law expressly provides that "no
will shall pass either real or personal estate unless it is proved and allowed in the
proper court"; and, second, because the probate of a will, which is a proceeding in
rem, cannot be dispensed with the substituted by any other proceeding, judicial or
extrajudicial, without offending against public policy designed to effectuate the
testator's right to dispose of his property by will in accordance with law and to
protect the rights of the heirs and legatees under the will thru the means provided
by law, among which are the publication and the personal notices to each and all of
said heirs and legatees.
Nor may the court approve and allow the will presented in evidence in such an
action for partition, which is one in personam, any more than it could decree the
registration under the Torrens system of the land involved in an ordinary action for
reinvindicacion or partition.
Facts:
Facts:
Respondents were the legitimate children of Alejandro Dorotheo and Aniceta
Reyes. Aniceta died in 1969 without her estate being settled. Alejandro died
thereafter. After Alejandro's death, petitioner, who claims to have taken care of
Alejandro before he died, filed a special proceeding for the probate of the latter's
last will and testament. In 1981, the court issued an order admitting Alejandro's
will to probate. Private respondents did not appeal from said order. In 1983,
they filed a "Motion to Declare the Will Intrinsically Void." The trial court
granted the motion.
Issue:
No. Under the law, it does not necessarily follow that an extrinsically valid last will and testament is
always intrinsically valid. Even if the will was validly executed, if the testator provides for dispositions
that deprives or impairs the lawful heirs of their legitime or rightful inheritance according to the laws
on succession, the unlawful provisions/dispositions thereof cannot be given effect. This is specially so
when the courts had already determined in a final and executory decision that the will is intrinsically
void.
In this case, the court had ruled that the will of Alejandro was extrinsically valid but the intrinsic
provisions thereof were void. Thus, the rules of intestacy apply as correctly held by the trial court. But
it should be noted that in the same Order, the trial court also said that the estate of the late spouses
be distributed according to the laws of intestacy. Accordingly, it has no option but to implement that
order of intestate distribution and not to reopen and again re-examine the intrinsic provisions of the
same will.
Palacios vs. Palacios
Facts:
Juan Palacio executed his last will and testament and availing himself of the
provisions of the new Civil Code, he filed before the CFI of Batangas a petition for
its approval. In said will, he instituted as his sole heirs his natural children
Antonio Palacio and Andrea Palacio. Maria Catimbang filed an opposition to the
probate of the will alleging that she is the acknowledged natural daughter of
petitioner but that she was completely ignored in said will thus impairing her
legitimate.
After the presentation of petitioner’s evidence relative to the essential requisites
and formalities provided by the Law for the validity of a will, the court issued an
order admitting the will to probate. The court, however, set a date for the hearing of
the opposition relative to the intrinsic validity of the will and after proper hearing
concerning this incident, the court issued another order declaring opposition to be
the natural child of petitioner and annulling the will in so far as it impairs her
legitimate.
Issue:
Whether or not the opposition to the intrinsic validity of the will is proper.
Ruling:
No. Opposition to the intrinsic validity or to the legality of the provisions of the will
cannot be entertained in probate proceeding because its only purpose is merely to
determine if the will has been executed in accordance with the requirements of the
law, much less if the purpose of the opposition is to show that the oppositor is an
acknowledged natural child who allegedly has been ignored in the will for such issue
cannot be raised here but in a separate action. This is especially so when the
testator, as in the present case, is still alive and has merely filed a petition for the
allowance of his will leaving the effects thereof after his death.
It is clear that the trial court erred in entertaining the opposition and in annulling the
portion of the will which allegedly impairs the legitime of the oppositor on the
ground that, as it has found, she is an acknowledged natural daughter of the
testator. This is an extraneous matter which should be threshed out in a separate
action.
II. INSTITUTION OF HEIRS
Facts:
Basilia Austria vda. De Cruz filed a petition for probate, ante mortem
of her last will and testament. However, the probate was opposed by
petitioners and others nephews and nieces of Basilia . Their opposition
was dismissed by the CFI and the probate was allowed. The trial court
decided that as per provisions in the will, the estate shall pass on to
Basilia’s adopted children. After two years from the probate of the will,
Basilia died, and Perfecto was appointed as executor. Petitioners filed
an Intervention to Partition, contending that they are the nearest of
kin to the decedent, that Perfecto Cruz and siblings were not adopted
in accordance with law, thus, they are mere strangers and without
right to succeed as heirs.The trial court allowed the intervention.
Issue:
Whether or not the institution of heirs made by Basili should be
annulled
Ruling:
No, the institution is valid and is not based on false cause. Under
Article 850 of the Civil Code, it provides for the Annulment of a Will
based on a false cause. It can be inferred from the Will of Basilia that
when she instituted her heirs, she was possessed of testamentary
capacity and the will was free from falsification, fraud, trickery or
undue influence.
Also, in her will, she does not specifically state the cause of her
institution. Therefore, in the absence of proof that there exists false
cause in the institution of heirs, testacy must be favored from
intestacy, and the will must be given full express.
Gabriel vs. Mateo
Facts:
Florencia Mateo executed her last will and testament on two used
sheets of paper and the same was signed by her and three attesting
witnesses. She bequeathed all her properties to her instituted heir,
Tomasa Mateo, a niece. Nothing was instituted for her only sister, Rita
Mateo and to her other nephews and nieces. Accordingly, Rita Mateo
opposed the probate of the will, interposing that the testator was
affectionate to all her nieces and nephews during her lifetime, and that
she, Rita Mateo, was in good terms with her sister, thus must be
instituted in the will.
Issue:
Whether or not the testator was absolutely free in making all those
provisions in favor of Tomasa Mateo, and nothing for her sister,
nephews and nieces.
Ruling:
Yes. The Supreme Court held that there is nothing strange in the
wishes of the testator not to leave anything for her sister. It is
reasonable that the entirety of her estate was left to Tomasa since
according to evidence, Tomasa was taken by the testator when the
former was only three years old and had never been separated from
her ever since. In addition, as can be inferred, Florencia Mateo has no
compulsory heirs; thus, she is free to dispose of her property.
Collateral relatives are merely intestate heirs.
IV. FORCED SUCCESSION/ LEGITIME
FACTS:
Respondents, claimed that the property was actually sold to them by Justina Navarro prior
to her death and presented a did of sale to prove their claim. Petitioner filed a Complaint
on praying for the partition and award to them of an area equivalent to one-fifth (1/5), by
right of representation. The RTC ruled that the conveyance made by Justina Navarro is
subject to nullity because the property conveyed had a conjugal character and that Agatona
Guevarra as her compulsory heir should have the legal right to participate with the
distribution of the estate under question to the exclusion of others. The Deed of Sale did
not at all provide for the reserved legitime or the heirs, and, therefore it has no force and
effect against AgatonaGuevarra and should be declared a nullity ab initio.
ISSUE:
RULING:
No. The Kasulatan, being a document acknowledged before a notary public, is a public
document and prima facie evidence of its authenticity and due execution. There is no basis
for the trial court’s declaration that the sale embodied in the Kasulatan deprived the
compulsory heirs of Guevarra of their legitimes. As opposed to a disposition inter vivos by
lucrative or gratuitous title, a valid sale for valuable consideration does not diminish the
estate of the seller. When the disposition is for valuable consideration, there is no
diminution of the estate but merely a substitution of values, that is, the property sold is
replaced by the equivalent monetary consideration. The Property was sold in 1957 for
P250.00.
The trial court’s conclusion that the Property was conjugal, hence the sale is void ab initio
was not based on evidence, but rather on a misapprehension. The presumption under
Article 160 of the Civil Code applies only when there is proof that the property was
acquired during the marriage. Proof of acquisition during the marriage is an
essential condition for the operation of the presumption in favor of the conjugal
partnership. There was no evidence presented to establish that Navarro acquired the
Property during her marriage.
Sps. Joaquin v. CA
FACTS:
Issue: WON the petitioners are deprived of their legitime from the
purported sale.
Held:
No. Petitioners do not have any legal interest over the properties subject of
the Deeds of Sale. As the appellate court stated, petitioners’ right to their
parents’ properties is merely inchoate and vests only upon their parents’
death. While still living, the parents of petitioners are free to dispose of their
properties. In their overzealousness to safeguard their future legitime,
petitioners forget that theoretically, the sale of the lots to their siblings does
not affect the value of their parents’ estate. While the sale of the lots reduced
the estate, cash of equivalent value replaced the lots taken from the estate.
FACTS:
Simeon Blas contracted a first marriage with Marta Cruz and had three children, only one of whom,
Eulalio, left children namely: Maria Gervacio Blas (one of the plaintiffs), Marta Gervacio Blas (one
of the defendants), and Lazaro Gervacio Blas. Lazaro died and is survived by three legitimate
children who are plaintiffs herein namely, Manuel, Leoncio and Loid. Subsequently after Marta’s
death, Simeon contracted a second marriage with Maxima Santos. At the time of second marriage,
no liquidation of the properties of Simeon and Marta was made. A week before Simeon’s death, he
executed a last Will and Testament, and he also ordered a preparation of a document (Exhibit A)
because the properties he had acquired during his first marriage with Mart had not been liquidated
and were not separated from those acquired during the second marriage. Such document contains
promises by Maxima to respect the disposition of said will and to give one-half (1/2) of the
properties she and her husband will leave to the heirs, legatees or beneficiaries named in the will.
Pursuant to this document, the plaintiffs instituted an action against the administration of the estate
of Maxima Santos to secure a judicial declaration that one-half (1/2) of the properties left by
Maxima be adjudicated to them. Upon filing of opposition by the administratix, the trial court
dismissed the complaint. Hence, this appeal.