Gorgias PDF
Gorgias PDF
Gorgias PDF
Gorgias (/ˈɡɔːrdʒiəs/;[1] Greek: Γοργίας [ɡorɡíaːs]) is a are two types: "…one part of it would be flattery, I sup-
Socratic dialogue written by Plato around 380 BC. The pose, and shameful public harangue, while the other—
dialogue depicts a conversation between Socrates and a that of getting the souls of the citizens to be as good
small group of sophists (and other guests) at a dinner gath- as possible and of striving valiantly to say what is best,
ering. Socrates debates with the sophist seeking the true whether the audience will find it more pleasant or more
definition of rhetoric, attempting to pinpoint the essence unpleasant—is something admirable. But you’ve never
of rhetoric and unveil the flaws of the sophistic oratory seen this type of oratory…" (502e). Although rhetoric
popular in Athens at this time. The art of persuasion has the potential to be used justly, Socrates believes that
was widely considered necessary for political and legal in practice, rhetoric is flattery; the rhetorician makes the
advantage in classical Athens, and rhetoricians promoted audience feel worthy because they can identify with the
themselves as teachers of this fundamental skill. Some, rhetorician’s argument.
like Gorgias, were foreigners attracted to Athens because
of its reputation for intellectual and cultural sophistica-
tion. In the Gorgias, Socrates argues that philosophy is an 2.2 The question of techne: art vs. knack
art, whereas rhetoric is a skill based on mere experience.
To Socrates, most rhetoric in practice is merely flattery. Socrates and Polus debate whether rhetoric can be con-
In order to use rhetoric for good, rhetoric cannot exist sidered an art. Polus states that rhetoric is indeed a craft,
alone; it must depend on philosophy to guide its morality. but Socrates replies, “To tell you the truth, Polus, I don't
Socrates, therefore, believes that morality is not inherent think it’s a craft at all” (462b). The dialogue continues:
in rhetoric and that without philosophy, rhetoric is simply
“POLUS: So you think oratory’s a knack?
used to persuade for personal gain. Socrates suggests that
he is one of the few (but not only) Athenians to practice SOCRATES: Yes, I do, unless you say it’s something else.
true politics (521d). POLUS: A knack for what?
SOCRATES: For producing a certain gratification and
pleasure” (462c).
1 The characters
Socrates continues to argue that rhetoric is not an art, but
merely a knack: "…it guesses at what’s pleasant with no
• Socrates consideration for what’s best. And I say that it isn't a craft,
but a knack, because it has no account of the nature of
• Gorgias
whatever things it applies by which it applies them, so
• Polus that it’s unable to state the cause of each thing” (465a).
• Callicles
2.3 The morality of rhetoric
• Chaerephon
Socrates discusses the morality of rhetoric with Gorgias,
asking him if rhetoric was just. Socrates catches the in-
congruity in Gorgias statements: “well, at the time you
2 Major themes said that, I took it that oratory would never be an un-
just thing, since it always makes its speeches about jus-
2.1 Definition of rhetoric tice. But when a little later you were saying that the or-
ator could also use oratory unjustly, I was surprised and
Socrates interrogates Gorgias in order to determine the thought that your statements weren't consistent” (461a).
true definition of rhetoric, framing his argument in the To this argument, Gorgias "…is left wishing he could
question format, “What is X?" (2).[2] He asks, "…why respond, knowing he cannot, and feeling frustrated and
don’t you tell us yourself what the craft you’re an expert competitive. The effect of the 'proof' is not to persuade,
in is, and hence what we’re supposed to call you?" (449e). but to disorient him”.[3]
Throughout the remainder of the dialogue, Socrates de- Socrates believes that rhetoric alone is not a moral en-
bates about the nature of rhetoric. Socrates believes there deavor. Gorgias is criticized because, “he would teach
1
2 3 SUMMARY
anyone who came to him wanting to learn oratory but the teacher cannot be held responsible for this. He makes
without expertise in what’s just…" (482d). Socrates be- an argument from analogy: Gorgias says that if a man
lieves that people need philosophy to teach them what is who went to wrestling school took to thrashing his par-
right, and that oratory cannot be righteous without phi- ents or friends, you would not send his drill instructor
losophy. into exile (456d–457c). He says that just as the trainer
teaches his craft (techne) in good faith, and hopes that his
student will use his physical powers wisely, the rhetori-
2.4 Truth cian has the same trust, that his students will not abuse
their power.
Socrates continually claims that his methods of question- Socrates says that he is one of those people who is actually
ing are aimed at discovering the truth. He sarcastically happy to be refuted if he is wrong. He says that he would
compliments Callicles on his frankness because it helps rather be refuted than to refute someone else because it is
expose the truth about oratory: “I well know that if you better to be delivered from harm oneself than to deliver
concur with what my soul believes, then that is the very someone else from harm. Gorgias, whose profession is
truth. I realize that the person who intends to put a soul to persuasion, readily agrees that he is also this sort of man,
an adequate test to see whether it lives rightly or not must who would rather be refuted than refute another. Gorgias
have three qualities, all of which you have: knowledge, has only one misgiving: he fears that the present company
goodwill, and frankness” (487a). Truth can be found may have something better to do than listen to two men
through deliberation with others, relaying to one another try to outdo each other in being wrong (458b–c). The
the knowledge in ones’ soul in order to come to a conclu- company protests and proclaims that they are anxious to
sion about each other’s beliefs. witness this new version of intellectual combat.
At the same time, truth is not based upon commonly ac-
cepted beliefs. Socrates outlines a problem about truth
when it is misaligned from public opinion: “you don't 3.3 The debate about rhetoric
compel me; instead you produce many false witnesses
against me and try to banish me from my property, the Socrates gets Gorgias to agree that the rhetorician is ac-
truth. For my part, if I don't produce you as a single wit- tually more convincing in front of an ignorant audience
ness to agree with what I'm saying, then I suppose I've than an expert, because mastery of the tools of persuasion
achieved nothing worth mentioning concerning the things gives a man more conviction than mere facts. Gorgias ac-
we’ve been discussing” (472c). cepts this criticism and asserts that it is an advantage of
his profession that a man can be considered above special-
ists without having to learn anything of substance (459c).
Socrates calls rhetoric a form of flattery, or pandering,
3 Summary and compares it to pastry baking and beautification (cos-
metics). He says that rhetoric is to politics what pastry
3.1 Introduction baking is to medicine, and what cosmetics are to gym-
nastics. All of these activities are aimed at surface adorn-
The dialogue begins just after Gorgias has given a speech. ment, an impersonation of what is really good (464c–
Callicles says that Gorgias is a guest in his home, and 465d).
has agreed to a private audience with Socrates and his Some have argued that Gorgias may have been uncharac-
friend Chaerephon. Socrates gets Gorgias to agree to his teristically portrayed by Plato, because "…Plato’s Gor-
cross-examination style of conversation, asks him ques- gias agrees to the binary opposition knowledge vs. opin-
tions, and praises him for the brevity of his replies. Gor- ion” (82).[4] This is inaccurate because, “for Gorgias the
gias remarks that no one has asked him a new question sophist, all 'knowledge' is opinion. There can be no ratio-
in a long time, and when Socrates asks, he assures him nal or irrational arguments because all human beliefs and
that he is just as capable of brevity as of long-windedness communicative situations are relative to a kairotic mo-
(449c). ment” (83).[4]
3.2 Physical and intellectual combat com- 3.4 The pitiful tyrant
pared
Socrates then advances that “orators and tyrants have the
Gorgias admits under Socrates’ cross-examination that very least power of any in our cities” (466d). Lumping
while rhetoricians give people the power of words, they tyrants and rhetoricians into a single category, Socrates
are not instructors of morality. Gorgias does not deny says that both of them, when they kill people or banish
that his students might use their skills for immoral pur- them or confiscate their property, think they are doing
poses (such as persuading the assembly to make an un- what is in their own best interest, but are actually pitiable.
wise decision, or to let a guilty man go free), but he says Socrates maintains that the wicked man is unhappy, but
3.6 Socrates debates with himself 3
that the unhappiest man of all is the wicked one who does death (486a,b). Socrates is not offended by this, and tells
not meet with justice, rebuke, and punishment (472e). Callicles that his extraordinary frankness proves that he
Polus, who has stepped into the conversation at this point, is well-disposed towards him (487d).
laughs at Socrates. Socrates asks him if he thinks laugh- Callicles then returns to his defense of nature’s own jus-
ing is a legitimate form of refutation (473e). Polus then tice, where the strong exercise their advantages over the
asks Socrates if putting forth views that no one would ac- weak. He states that the natural man has large appetites
cept is not a refutation in itself. Socrates replies that if and the means to satisfy them, and that only a weakling
Polus cannot see how to refute him, he will show Polus praises temperance and justice based on artificial law not
how.
natural. (483b, 492a–c).
Socrates states that it is far worse to inflict evil than to be Socrates calls Callicles a “desired touchstone” (486) and
the innocent victim of it (475e). He gives the example of counters that not only "nomos" (custom or law) but also
tyrants being the most wretched people on earth. He adds nature affirms that to do injustice is more disgraceful than
that poverty is to financial condition as disease is to the to suffer it, that equality is justice (489a–b), and that a
body as injustice is to the soul (477b–c). This analogy is man such as Callicles’ ideal is like a leaky jar, insatiable
used to define the states of corruption in each instance. and unhappy (494a). Socrates returns to his previous po-
Money-making, medicine, and justice are the respective sition, that an undisciplined man is unhappy and should
cures (478a,b). Socrates argues that just penalties disci- be restrained and subjected to justice (505b).
pline people, make them more just, and cure them of their
evil ways (478d). Wrongdoing is second among evils, but
wrongdoing and getting away with it is the first and great- 3.6 Socrates debates with himself
est of evils (479d). It follows from this, that if a man does
not want to have a festering and incurable tumor growing Callicles becomes exasperated at the intellectual stale-
in his soul, he needs to hurry himself to a judge upon re- mate, and invites Socrates to carry on by himself, ask-
alizing that he has done something wrong. Socrates posits ing and answering his own questions (505d). Socrates
that the rhetorician should accuse himself first, and then requests that his audience, including Callicles, listen to
do his family and friends the favor of accusing them, so what he says and kindly break in on him if he says some-
great is the curative power of justice (480c–e). thing that sounds false. If his opponent (whom he will
Socrates maintains that if your enemy has done something be speaking for himself) makes a point, he agrees to con-
awful, you should contrive every means to see that he does cede to it (506a–c). Socrates proceeds with a monologue,
not come before the judicial system.[5] Polus and Callicles and reiterates that he was not kidding about the best use
are both astounded at Socrates’ position and wonder if he of rhetoric, that it is best used against one’s own self. A
is just kidding (481b). man who has done something wrong is wretched, but a
man who gets away with it is even worse off (509b).
• Schofield, Malcolm (edt); translations by Tom Grif- • Gorgias public domain audiobook at LibriVox
fith (2009). Plato: Gorgias, Menexenus, Protago-
ras (Cambridge Texts in the History of Political
Thought). Cambridge University Press. p. 264.
ISBN 978-0-521-83729-3.
5
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