G.R. No.

L-28329 August 17, 1975

COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS, petitioner, 
vs.
ESSO STANDARD EASTERN, INC., (Formerly: Standard-Vacuum Refining Corp. (Phil.), respondent.

Office of the Solicitor General Antonio P. Barredo, Assistant Solicitor General Antonio A. Torres and Solicitor Antonio M. Martinez for
petitioner.

Carlos J. Valdez & Associates for respondent.

ESGUERRA, J.:

Appeal from the decision of the Court of Tax Appeals reversing the Commissioner of Customs' decision holding respondent ESSO
Standard Eastern, Inc., (formerly the Standard-Vacuum Refining Corporation (Phil.) and hereinafter referred to as ESSO) liable in the
total sum of P775.62 as special import tax on certain articles imported by the latter under Republic Act No. 387, otherwise known as the
Petroleum Act of 1949.

Respondent ESSO is the holder of Refining Concession No. 2, issued by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources on
December 9, 1957, and operates a petroleum refining plant in Limay Bataan. Under Article 103 of Republic Act No. 387 which provides:
"During the five years following the granting of any concession, the concessionaire may import free of customs duty, all equipment,
machinery, material, instruments, supplies and accessories," respondent imported and was assessed the special import tax (which it
paid under protest) on the following separate importations:

1) One carton, scientific instruments with C & F value of assessed a special import tax in the amount of P31.98
(Airport Protest No. 10);

2) One carton of recorder parts with C & F value of $221.56; assessed special import tax in the amount of P43.82
(Airport Protest No. 11);

3) One carton of valves with C & F value of $310.58; assessed special import tax in the amount of P60.72 (Airport
Protest No. 12);

4) One box of parts for Conversion boilers and Auxiliary Equipment with C & F value of $2,389.69; assessed special
import tax in the amount of P467.00 (Airport Protest No. 15);

5) One carton of X-ray films with C & F value of $132.80; assessed special import tax in the amount of P26.00
(Airport Protest No. 16); and

6) One carton of recorder parts with C & F value of $750.39; assessed special import tax in the amount of P147.00
(Airport Protest No. 17).1

The Collector of Customs on February 16, 1962, held that respondent ESSO was subject to the payment of the special import tax
provided in Republic Act No. 1394, as amended by R.A. No. 2352, and dismissed the protest.2

On March 1, 1962, respondent appealed the ruling of the Collector of Customs to the Commissioner of Customs who, on March 19,
1965, affirmed the decision of said Collector of Customs.3

On July 2, 1965, respondent ESSO filed a petition with the Court of Tax Appeals for review of the decision of the Commissioner of
Customs.

The Court of Tax Appeals, on September 30, 1967, reversed the decision of herein petitioner Commissioner of Customs and ordered
refund of the amount of P775.62 to respondent ESSO which the latter had paid under protest.4

This decision of the Court of Tax Appeals is now before this Court for review.

Petitioner contends that the special import tax under Republic Act No. 1394 is separate and distinct from the customs duty prescribed
by the Tariff and Customs Code, and that the exemption enjoyed by respondent ESSO from the payment of customs duties under the
Petroleum net of 1949 does not include exemption from the payment of the special import tax provided in R.A. No. 1394.5
For its stand petitioner puts forward this rationale:

A perusal of the provisions of R.A. No. 1394 will show that the legislature considered the special import tax as a tax
distinct from customs duties as witness the fact that Section 2(a) of the said law made separate mention of customs
duties and special import tax when it provided that ... if as a result of the application of the schedule therein, the total
revenue derived from the customs duties and from the special import tax on goods, ... imported from the United
States is less in any calendar year than the proceeds from the exchange tax imposed under Republic Act Numbered
Six Hundred and One, as amended, on such goods, articles or products during the calendar year 1955, the President
may, by proclamation, suspend the reduction of the special import tax for the next succeeding calendar year ....

If it were the intention of Congress to exempt the holders of petroleum refinery concessions like the protestant
(respondent herein), such exemption should have been clearly stated in the statute. Exemptions are never presumed.
They must be expressed in the clearest and most unambiguous language and not left to mere implication.6

Specifically, petitioner in his brief submitted two assignment of errors allegedly committed by the Court of Tax Appeals in the
controverted decision, to wit:

1st assignment of error:

THE COURT OF TAX APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE TERM "CUSTOMS DUTY" IN ARTICLE 103 OF
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 387 INCLUDES THE SPECIAL IMPORT TAX IMPOSED BY REPUBLIC ACT NO. 1394;

2nd assignment of error:

THE COURT OF TAX APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT EXEMPTION FROM PAYMENT OF CUSTOMS
DUTIES UNDER REPUBLIC ACT NO. 387 INCLUDES EXEMPTION FROM PAYMENT OF THE SPECIAL IMPORT
TAX.

On the other hand, the Court of Tax Appeals rationalized the ground for its ruling thus:

If we are to adhere, as we should, to the plain and obvious meaning of words in consonance with settled rules of
interpretation, it seems clear that the special import tax is an impost or a charge on the importation or bringing into
the Philippines of all goods, articles or products subject thereto, for the phrase "import tax on all goods, articles or
products imported or brought into the Philippines" in explicit and unambiguous terms simply means customs duties. It
is hardly necessary to add that "customs duties" are simply taxes assessed on merchandise imported from, or
exported to a foreign country.

And being a charge upon importation, the special import tax is essentially a customs duty, or at least partakes of the
character thereof.

Citing numberous American decisions and definitions of terms "customs duties," "duties," "imposts," "levies," "tax," and "tolls," and their
distinctions, including some pronouncements of this Court on the subject, the Court of Tax Appeals in its decision, went to great lengths
to show that the term "special import tax" as used in R.A. No. 1394 includes customs duties. It sees the special import tax as nothing
but an impost or a charge on the importation or bringing into the Philippines of goods, articles or products.7

To clinch its theory the Court of Tax Appeals cited the similarity in the basis of computation of the customs duty as well as the similarity
in the phraseology of Section 3 of Republic Act No. 1394 (which established the special import tax) and Section 9-01 of the Tariff &
Customs code (the basic law providing for and regulating the imposition of customs duties and imposts on importations).8

For its part, private respondent, ESSO, in its answer to the petition, leaned heavily on the same arguments as those given by the Tax
Court, the burden of which is that the special import tax law is a customs law. 9

It is clear that the only issue involved in this case is whether or not the exemption enjoyed by herein private respondent ESSO Standard
Eastern, Inc. from customs duties granted by Republic Act No. 387, or the Petroleum Act of 1949, should embrace or include the
special import tax imposed by R.A. No. 1394, or the Special Import Tax Law.

We have examined the records of this case thoroughly and carefully considered the arguments presented by both parties and We are
convinced that the only thing left to this Court to do is to determine the intention of the legislature through interpretation of the two
statutes involved, i.e., Republic Act No. 1394 and Republic Act No. 387.

It is a well accepted principle that where a statute is ambiguous, as Republic Act No. 1394 appears to be, courts may examine both the
printed pages of the published Act as well as those extrinsic matters that may aid in construing the meaning of the statute, such as the
history of its enactment, the reasons for the passage of the bill and purposes to be accomplished by the measure. 10
Petitioner in the first assignment of error took exception to the finding of the Court of Tax Appeals that "The language of Republic Act
No. 1394 seems to leave no room for doubt that the law intends that the phrase 'Special import tax' is taken to include customs duties"
and countered with the argument that "An examination of the provisions of Republic Act No. 1394 will indubitably reveal that Congress
considered the special import tax as a tax different from customs duties, as may be seen from the fact that Section 2(a) of said law
made separate mention of customs duties and special import tax ..." Thus:

... if as a result of the application of the schedule therein the total revenue derived from the customs duties and from
the special import tax on goods, ... imported from the United States is less in any calendar year than the proceeds
from the exchange tax imposed under Republic Act Numbered Six Hundred and One, as amended, on such goods,
articles or products during the calendar year 1955, the President may, by proclamation, suspend the reduction of the
special import tax for the next succeeding calendar year ...

Petitioner further argues:

Customs duties are prescribed by the Tariff and Customs Code, while the special import tax is provided for by
Republic Act No. 1394. If our legislature had intended to classify the special import tax as customs duty, the said Art
would not have expressly exempted from payment of the special Import tax importations of machinery, equipment,
accessories, and spare parts for use of industries, without distinguishing whether the industries referred to are the
industries exempt from the payment of Customs duties or the non-exempt ones (Sec. 6). It is sufficient that the
imported machinery, etc., is for the use of any industry. 11

A study of petitioner's two assignments of errors shows that one is anchored on practically the same ground as the other: both involve
the interpretation of R.A. No. 387 (The Petroleum Act of 1949) in relation with R.A. No. 1394 (The Special Import Tax Law).

While the petitioner harps on particular clauses and phrases found in the two cited laws, which in a way was likewise resorted to by the
respondent ESSO, it would do Us well to restate the fundamental rule in the construction of a statute.

In order to determine the true intent of the legislature, the particular clauses and phrases of the statute should not be taken as detached
and isolated expressions, but the whole and every part thereof must be considered in fixing the meaning of any of its parts. In fact every
statute should receive such construction as will make it harmonize with the pre-existing body of laws. Antagonism between the Act to
be interpreted and existing or previous laws is to be avoided, unless it was clearly the intention of the legislature that such antagonism
should arise and one amends or repeals the other, either expressly or by implication.

Another rule applied by this Court is that the courts may take judicial notice of the origin and history of the statutes which they are called
upon to construe and administer, and of facts which affect their derivation, validity and operation. 12

Applying the above stated rules and principles, let us consider the history, the purpose and objectives of Republic Act No. 387 as it
relates to Republic Act No. 1394 and other laws passed by the Congress of the Philippines insofar as they relate to each other.

Republic Act No. 387, the Petroleum Act of 1949, has this for its title, to wit:

AN ACT TO PROMOTE THE EXPLORATION, DEVELOPMENT, EXPLOITATION, AND UTILIZATION OF THE

PETROLEUM RESOURCES OF THE PHILIPPINES; TO ENCOURAGE THE CONSERVATION OF SUCH
PETROLEUM RESOURCES; TO AUTHORIZE THE SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE AND NATURAL
RESOURCES TO CREATE AN ADMINISTRATION UNIT AND A TECHNICAL BOARD IN THE BUREAU OF MINES;
TO APPROPRIATE FUNDS THEREFORE; AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.

Art. 103 of said Act reads:

ART. 103. Customs duties. — During the five years following the granting of any concessions, the concessionaire
may import free of customs duty, all equipment, machinery, material, instruments, supplies and accessories.

xxx xxx xxx

Art. 102 of the Same law insofar as pertinent, provides:

ART. 102. Work obligations, taxes, royalties not to be charged. — ...; nor shall any other special taxes or levies be
applied to such concessions, nor shall concessionaires under this Act be subjected to any provincial, municipal, or
other local taxes or levies; nor shall any sales tax be charged on any petroleum produced from the concession or
portion thereof, manufactured by the concessionaire and used in the working of his concession. ....

Art. 104, still of the same Act, reads:

 ART. 104. No export to be imposed. — No export tax shall be levied upon petroleum produced from concessions
granted under this Act.

The title of Republic Act No. 387 and the provisions of its three articles just cited give a clue to the intent of the Philippine legislature,
which is to encourage the exploitation and development of the petroleum resources of the country. Through the instrumentality of said
law, it declared in no uncertain terms that the intensification of the exploration for petroleum must be carried on unflinchingly even if, for
the time being, no taxes, both national and local, may be collected from the industry. This is the unequivocal intention of the Philippine
Congress when the language of the Petroleum Act is examined. Until this law or any substantial portion thereof is clearly amended or
repealed by subsequent statutes, the intention of the legislature must be upheld.

Against this unambiguous language of R.A. No. 387, there is the subsequent legislation, R.A. No. 1394, the Special Import Tax Law,
which, according to the herein petitioner, shows that the legislature considered the special import tax as a tax distinct from customs
duties.

Republic Act No. 1394, otherwise known as the Special Import Tax Law, is entitled as follows:

AN ACT TO IMPOSE A SPECIAL IMPORT TAX ON ALL GOODS, ARTICLES OR PRODUCTS IMPORTED OR
BROUGHT INTO THE PHILIPPINES, AND TO REPEAL REPUBLIC ACTS NUMBERED SIX HUNDRED AND ONE,
EIGHT HUNDRED AND FOURTEEN, EIGHT HUNDRED AND SEVENTY-ONE, ELEVEN HUNDRED AND
SEVENTY-FIVE. ELEVEN HUNDRED AND NINETY-SEVEN AND THIRTEEN HUNDRED AND SEVENTY FIVE.

The title indicates unmistakably that it is repealing six prior statutes. As will be seen later, all these laws dealt with the imposition of a
special excise tax on foreign exchange or other form of levy on importation of goods into the country.

Section I of Republic Act No. 1394 reads as follows:

SECTION 1. Except as herein otherwise provided, there shall be levied, collected and paid as special import tax on
all goods, articles or products imported or brought into the Philippines, irrespective of source, during the period and in
accordance with the rates provided for in the following schedule:

xxx xxx xxx

It would appear that by the provision of Section 1 of this Act, the pertinent provision of the Petroleum Law, for which there appears to be
no proviso to the contrary has been modified or altered.

Section 6 of Republic Act No. 1394 declares that the tax provided for in its Section I shall not be imposed against importation into the
Philippines of machinery and/or raw materials to be used by new and necessary industries as determined in accordance with R A. No.
901 and a long list of other goods, articles, machinery, equipment, accessories and others.

We shall now examine the six statutes repealed by R.A. No. 1394, namely:

R.A. No. 601 is an Act imposing a special excise tax of 17% on foreign exchange sold by the Central Bank or its
agents. This is known as the Exchange Tax Law;

R.A. No. 814 amended Sections one, two and five and repealed Sections three and four of R.A. No. 601;

R.A. No. 871 amended Sections one and two of R.A. No. 601, as amended earlier by R.A. No. 814;

R.A. No. 1175 amended further Sections one and two of R.A. No. 601, as amended;

R.A. No. 1197 amended furthermore R.A. No. 601 as amended previously by R.A. No. 1175;

R.A. No. 1375 amended Sections one and two of R.A. No. 601 as amended by R.A. Nos. 1175 and 1197.

As can be seen from the foregoing, in one fell swoop, Republic Act No. 1394 repealed and revoked six earlier
statutes which had something to do with the imposition of special levies and/or exemption of certain importations from
the burden of the special import taxes or levies. On the other hand, it is apparent that R.A. No. 387, the Petroleum
Act, had been spared from the pruning knife of Congress, although this latter law had granted more concessions and
tax exemption privileges than any of the statutes that were amended, repealed or revoked by R.A. No. 1394. The
answer must be that the Congress of the Philippine saw fit to preserve the privileges granted under the Petroleum
Law of 1949 in order to keep the door open to the exploitation and development of the petroleum resources of the
country with such incentives as are given under that law.
 This ascertained will and intention of the legislature finds a parallelism in a case brought earlier before this Court.

A fishpond owner was slapped with taxes as a "merchant" by the Collector of Internal Revenue. He paid under protest and filed an
action to recover the taxes paid, claiming that he was an agriculturist and not a merchant. When this Court was called upon to interpret
the provisions of the Internal Revenue Law on whether fish is an agricultural product which falls under the exemption provisions of said
law, it inquired into the purpose of the legislature in establishing the exemption for agricultural products. We held:

The first inquiry, therefore, must relate to the purpose the legislature had in mind in establishing the exemption
contained in the clause now under consideration. It seems reasonable to assume that it was due to the belief on the
part of the law-making body that by exempting agricultural products from this tax the farming industry would be
favored and the development of the resources of the country encouraged. .... 13

Having this in mind, particularly the manner in which extrinsic aids the history of the enactment of the statute and purpose of the
legislature in employing a clause or provision in the law had been applied in determining the true intent of the lawmaking body, We are
convinced that R.A. No. 387, The Petroleum Act of 1949, was intended to encourage the exploitation, exploration and development of
the petroleum resources of the country by giving it the necessary incentive in the form of tax exemptions. This is the raison d etre for
the generous grant of tax exemptions to those who would invest their financial resources towards the achievement of this national
economic goal.

On the contention of herein petitioner that the exemptions enjoyed by respondent ESSO under R.A. No. 387 have been abrogated by
R.A. No. 1394, We hold that repeal by implication is not favored unless it is manifest that the legislature so intended. As laws are
presumed to be passed with deliberation and with full knowledge of all existing ones on the subject, it is logical to conclude that in
passing a statute it was not intended to interfere with or abrogate any former law relating to the same matter, unless the repugnancy
between the two is not only irreconcilable but also clear and convincing as a result of the language used, or unless the latter act fully
embraces the subject matter of the earlier. 14

As observed earlier, Congress lined up for revocation by Republic Act No. 1394 six statutes dealing with the imposition of special
imposts or levies or the granting of exemptions from special import taxes. Yet, considering the tremendous amount of revenues it was
losing under the Petroleum Law of 1949, it failed to include the latter statute among those it chose to bury by the Special Import Taw
Law. The reason for this is very clear: The legislature wanted to continue the incentives for the continuing development of the petroleum
industry.

It is not amiss to mention herein passing that contrary to the theory of the herein petitioner, R.A. No. 387 had not been repealed by R.A.
No. 2352 which expressly abrogated Section 6 of R.A. No. 1394 but did not repeal any part of R.A. No. 387. Therefore, the exemption
granted by Republic Act No. 387 still stands.

WHEREFORE, taking into consideration the weight given by this Court to the findings and conclusions of the Court of Tax Appeals on a
matter it is well-equipped to handle, which findings and conclusions We find no reason to overturn, the petition of the Commissioner of
Customs to reverse the decision of the Court of Tax Appeals should be, as it is hereby, denied.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Castro (Chairman), Makasiar, Muñoz Palma and Martin, JJ., concur.

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. L-33693-94 May 31, 1979

MISAEL P. VERA, as Commissioner of Internal Revenue, and THE FAIR TRADE BOARD, petitioner, 
vs.
HON. SERAFIN R. CUEVAS, as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch IV, INSTITUTE OF EVAPORATED FILLED
MILK MANUFACTURERS OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., CONSOLIDATED MILK COMPANY (PHIL.) INC., and MILK INDUSTRIES,
INC., respondents.

Solicitor General Felix Q. Antonio and Solicitor Bernardo P. Pardo for petitioners.

Sycip, Salazar, Luna, Manalo & Feliciano for private respondents.

DE CASTRO, J.:

This is a petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction to review the decision rendered by respondent judge, in Civil Case No. 52276
and in Special Civil Action No. 52383 both of the Court of First Instance of Manila.

Plaintiffs, in Civil Case No. 52276 private respondents herein, are engaged in the manufacture, sale and distribution of filled milk
products throughout the Philippines. The products of private respondent, Consolidated Philippines Inc. are marketed and sold under the
brand Darigold whereas those of private respondent, General Milk Company (Phil.), Inc., under the brand "Liberty;" and those of private
respondent, Milk Industries Inc., under the brand "Dutch Baby." Private respondent, Institute of Evaporated Filled Milk Manufacturers of
the Philippines, is a corporation organized for the principal purpose of upholding and maintaining at its highest the standards of local
filled milk industry, of which all the other private respondents are members.

Civil Case No. 52276 is an action for declaratory relief with ex-parte petition for preliminary injunction wherein plaintiffs pray for an
adjudication of their respective rights and obligations in relation to the enforcement of Section 169 of the Tax Code against their filled
milk products.

The controversy arose from the order of defendant, Commissioner of Internal Revenue now petitioner herein, requiring plaintiffs- private
respondents to withdraw from the market all of their filled milk products which do not bear the inscription required by Section 169 of the
Tax Code within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the order with the explicit warning that failure of plaintiffs' private respondents to
comply with said order will result in the institution of the necessary action against any violation of the aforesaid order. Section 169 of the
Tax Code reads as follows:

Section 169. Inscription to be placed on skimmed milk. —  All condensed skimmed milk and all milk in whatever form,
from which the fatty part has been removed totally or in part, sold or put on sale in the Philippines shall be clearly and
legibly marked on its immediate containers, and in all the language in which such containers are marked, with the
words, "This milk is not suitable for nourishment for infants less than one year of age," or with other equivalent words.

The Court issued a writ of preliminary injunction dated February 16, 1963 restraining the Commissioner of Internal Revenue from
requiring plaintiffs' private respondents to print on the labels of their rifled milk products the words, "This milk is not suitable for
nourishment for infants less than one year of age or words of similar import, " as directed by the above quoted provision of Law, and
from taking any action to enforce the above legal provision against the plaintiffs' private respondents in connection with their rifled milk
products, pending the final determination of the case, Civil Case No. 52276, on the merits.

On July 25, 1969, however, the Office of the Solicitor General brought an appeal from the said order by way of certiorari to the Supreme
Court. 1 In view thereof, the respondent court in the meantime suspended disposition of these cases but in view of the absence of any
injunction or restraining order from the Supreme Court, it resumed action on them until their final disposition therein.

Special Civil Action No. 52383, on the other hand, is an action for prohibition and injunction with a petition for preliminary injunction.
Petitioners therein pray that the respondent Fair Trade Board desist from further proceeding with FTB I.S. No. I . entitled "Antonio R. de
Joya vs. Institute of Evaporated Milk Manufacturers of the Philippines, etc." pending final determination of Civil Case No. 52276. The
facts of this special civil action show that on December 7, 1962, Antonio R. de Joya and Sufronio Carrasco, both in their individual
capacities and in their capacities as Public Relations Counsel and President of the Philippine Association of Nutrition, respectively, filed
FTB I.S. No. 1 with Fair Trade Board for misleading advertisement, mislabeling and/or misbranding. Among other things, the complaint
filed include the charge of omitting to state in their labels any statement sufficient to Identify their filled milk products as "imitation milk"
or as an imitation of genuine cows milk. and omitting to mark the immediate containers of their filled milk products with the words: "This milk is not
suitable for nourishment for infants less than one year of age or with other equivalent words as required under Section 169 of the Tax Code. The Board
proceeded to hear the complaint until it received the writ of preliminary injunction issued by the Court of First Instance on March 19, 1963.

Upon agreement of the parties, Civil Case No. 52276 and Special Civil Action No. 52383 were heard jointly being intimately related with each other, with
common facts and issues being also involved therein. On April 16, 1971, the respondent court issued its decision, the dispositive part of which reads as
follows:

Wherefore, judgment is hereby rendered:

In Civil Case No. 52276:

(a) Perpetually restraining the defendant, Commissioner of Internal Revenue, his agents, or employees from requiring plaintiffs to
print on the labels of their filled milk products the words: "This milk is not suitable for nourishment for infants less than one year of
age" or words with equivalent import and declaring as nun and void and without authority in law, the order of said defendant dated
September 28, 1961, Annex A of the complaint, and the Ruling of the Secretary of Finance, dated November 12, 1962, Annex G of
the complaint; and

In Special Civil Action No. 52383:

(b) Restraining perpetually the respondent Fair Trade Board, its agents or employees from continuing in the investigation of the
complaints against petitioners docketed as FTB I.S. No. 2, or any charges related to the manufacture or sale by the petitioners of
their filled milk products and declaring as null the proceedings so far undertaken by the respondent Board on said complaints. (pp.
20- 21, Rollo).

From the above decision of the respondent court, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue and the Fair Trade Board joined together to file the present
petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction, assigning the following errors:

I. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT SEC. TION 169 OF THE TAX CODE HAS BEEN REPEALED BY
IMPLICATION.

II. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT SECTION 169 OF THE TAX CODE HAS LOST ITS TAX PURPOSE, AND
THAT COMMISSIONER NECESSARILY LOST HIS AUTHORITY TO ENFORCE THE SAME AND THAT THE PROPER
AUTHORITY TO PROMOTE THE HEALTH OF INFANTS IS THE FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION, THE SECRETARY OF
HEALTH AND THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, AS PROVIDED FOR IN RA 3720, NOT THE COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL
REVENUE.

III. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE POWER TO INVESTIGATE AND TO PROSECUTE VIOLATIONS OF
FOOD LAWS IS ENTRUSTED TO THE FOOD AND DRUG INSPECTION, THE FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION, THE
SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, AND THAT THE FAIR TRADE BOARD IS WITHOUT
JURISDICTION TO INVESTIGATE AND PROSECUTE ALLEGED MISBRANDING, MISLABELLING AND/OR MISLEADING
ADVERTISEMENT OF FILLED MILK PRODUCTS. (pp, 4-5, Rollo).

The lower court did not err in ruling that Section 169 of the Tax Code has been repealed by implication. Section 169 was enacted in 1939, together with
Section 141 (which imposed a Specific tax on skimmed milk) and Section 177 (which penalized the sale of skimmed milk without payment of the specific
tax and without the legend required by Section 169). However, Section 141 was expressly repealed by Section 1 of Republic Act No. 344, and Section
177, by Section 1 of Republic Act No. 463. By the express repeal of Sections 141 and 177, Section 169 became a merely declaratory provision, without
a tax purpose, or a penal sanction.

Moreover, it seems apparent that Section 169 of the Tax Code does not apply to filled milk. The use of the specific and qualifying terms "skimmed milk"
in the headnote and "condensed skimmed milk" in the text of the cited section, would restrict the scope of the general clause "all milk, in whatever form,
from which the fatty pat has been removed totally or in part." In other words, the general clause is restricted by the specific term "skimmed milk" under
the familiar rule of ejusdem generis that general and unlimited terms are restrained and limited by the particular terms they follow in the statute.

Skimmed milk is different from filled milk. According to the "Definitions, Standards of Purity, Rules and Regulations of the Board of Food Inspection,"
skimmed milk is milk in whatever form from which the fatty part has been removed. Filled milk, on the other hand, is any milk, whether or not condensed,
evaporated concentrated, powdered, dried, dessicated, to which has been added or which has been blended or compounded with any fat or oil other
than milk fat so that the resulting product is an imitation or semblance of milk cream or skim milk." The difference, therefore, between skimmed milk and
filled milk is that in the former, the fatty part has been removed while in the latter, the fatty part is likewise removed but is substituted with refined coconut
oil or corn oil or both. It cannot then be readily or safely assumed that Section 169 applies both to skimmed milk and filled milk.

The Board of Food Inspection way back in 1961 rendered an opinion that filled milk does not come within the purview of Section 169, it
being a product distinct from those specified in the said Section since the removed fat portion of the milk has been replaced with coconut oil and
Vitamins A and D as fortifying substances (p. 58, Rollo). This opinion bolsters the Court's stand as to its interpretation of the scope of Section 169.
Opinions and rulings of officials of the government called upon to execute or implement administrative laws command much respect and weight.
(Asturias Sugar Central Inc. vs. Commissioner of Customs, G. R. No. L-19337, September 30, 1969, 29 SCRA 617; Tan, et. al. vs. The Municipality of
Pagbilao et. al., L-14264, April 30, 1963, 7 SCRA 887; Grapilon vs. Municipal Council of Carigara L-12347, May 30, 1961, 2 SCRA 103).

This Court is, likewise, induced to the belief that filled milk is suitable for nourishment for infants of all ages. The Petitioners themselves admitted that:
"the filled milk products of the petitioners (now private respondents) are safe, nutritious, wholesome and suitable for feeding infants of all ages" (p. 44,
Rollo) and that "up to the present, Filipino infants fed since birth with filled milk have not suffered any defects, illness or disease attributable to their
having been fed with filled milk." (p. 45, Rollo).

There would seem, therefore, to be no dispute that filled milk is suitable for feeding infants of all ages. Being so, the declaration required by Section 169
of the Tax Code that filled milk is not suitable for nourishment for infants less than one year of age would, in effect, constitute a deprivation of property
without due. process of law.

Section 169 is being enforced only against respondent manufacturers of filled milk product and not as against manufacturers, distributors or sellers of
condensed skimmed milk such as SIMILAC, SMA, BREMIL, ENFAMIL, OLAC, in which, as admitted by the petitioner, the fatty part has been removed
and substituted with vegetable or corn oil. The enforcement of Section 169 against the private respondents only but not against other persons similarly
situated as the private respondents amounts to an unconstitutional denial of the equal pro petition of the laws, for the law, equally enforced, would
similarly offend against the Constitution. Yick Wo vs. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356,30 L. ed. 220).

As stated in the early part of this decision, with the repeal of Sections 141 and 177 of the Tax Code, Section 169 has lost its tax purpose. Since Section
169 is devoid of any tax purpose, petitioner Commissioner necessarily lost his authority to enforce the same. This was so held by his predecessor
immediately after Sections 141 and 177 were repealed in General Circular No. V-85 as stated in paragraph IX of the Partial Stipulation of facts entered
into by the parties, to wit:

... As the act of sewing skimmed milk without first paying the specific tax thereon is no longer unlawful and the enforcement of the
requirement in regard to the placing of the proper legend on its immediate containers is a subject which does not come within the
jurisdiction of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, the penal provisions of Section 177 of the said Code having been repealed by
Republic Act No. 463. (p. 102, Rollo).

Petitioner's contention that he still has jurisdiction to enforce Section 169 by virtue of Section 3 of the Tax Code which provides that the Bureau of
Internal Revenue shall also "give effect to and administer the supervisory and police power conferred to it by this Code or other laws" is untenable. The
Bureau of Internal Revenue may claim police power only when necessary in the enforcement of its principal powers and duties consisting of the
"collection of all national internal revenue taxes, fees and charges, and the enforcement of all forfeitures, penalties and fines connected therewith." The
enforcement of Section 169 entails the promotion of the health of the nation and is thus unconnected with any tax purpose. This is the exclusive function
of the Food and Drug Administration of the Department of Health as provided for in Republic Act No. 3720. In particular, Republic Act No. 3720 provides:

Section 9. ... It shall be the duty of the Board (Food and Drug Inspection), conformably with the rules and regulations, to hold
hearings and conduct investigations relative to matters touching the Administration of this Act, to investigate processes of food, drug
and cosmetic manufacture and to subject reports to the Food and Drug Administrator, recommending food and drug standards for
adoption. Said Board shall also perform such additional functions, properly within the scope of the administration thereof, as maybe
assigned to it by the Food and Drug Administrator. The decisions of the Board shall be advisory to the Food and Drug Administrator.

Section 26. ...

xxx xxx xxx

(c) Hearing authorized or required by this Act shall be conducted by the Board of Food and Drug Inspection which shall submit
recommendation to the Food and Drug Administrator.

(d) When it appears to the Food and Drug Administrator from the reports of the Food and Drug Laboratory that any article of food or
any drug or cosmetic secured pursuant to Section 28 of this Act is adulterated or branded he shall cause notice thereof to be given
to the person or persons concerned and such person or persons shall be given an opportunity to subject evidence impeaching the
correctness of the finding or charge in question.

(e) When a violation of any provisions of this Act comes to the knowledge of the Food and Drug Administrator of such character that
a criminal prosecution ought to be instituted against the offender, he shall certify the facts to the Secretary of Justice through the
Secretary of Health, together with the chemists' report, the findings of the Board of Food and Drug Inspection, or other documentary
evidence on which the charge is based.

(f) Nothing in this Act shall be construed as requiring the Food and Drug Administrator to certify for prosecution pursuant to
subparagraph (e) hereof, minor violations of this Act whenever he believes that public interest will be adequately served by a
suitable written notice or warning.

The aforequoted provisions of law clearly show that petitioners, Commissioner of Internal Revenue and the Fair Trade Board, are without jurisdiction to
investigate and to prosecute alleged misbranding, mislabeling and/or misleading advertisements of filled milk. The jurisdiction on the matters cited is
vested upon the Board of Food and Drug inspection and the Food and Drug Administrator, with the Secretary of Health and the Secretary of Justice,
also intervening in case criminal prosecution has to be instituted. To hold that the petitioners have also jurisdiction as would be the result were their
instant petition granted, would only cause overlapping of powers and functions likely to produce confusion and conflict of official action which is neither
practical nor desirable.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed en toto. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Teehankee, (Chairman), Fernandez, Melencio-Herrera, JJ., concur.

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. L-43760 August 21, 1976

PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF FREE LABOR UNIONS (PAFLU), petitioner 

vs.
BUREAU OF LABOR RELATIONS, HONORABLE CARMELO C. NORIEL, NATIONAL FEDERATION OF FREE
LABOR UNIONS (NAFLU), and PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS CO., INC., respondents.

Guevara, Pineda, Guevara & Castillon for petitioner.

Olalia Dimapilis & Associates for respondent Union (NAFLU)

Assistant Solicitor General Reynato S. Puno and Solicitor Jesus V. Diaz for respondent Bureau of Labor Relations, etc., et
al.

FERNANDO, Acting C.J.:

A certification by respondent Director of Labor Relations, Carmelo C. Noriel, that respondent National Federation of Free
Labor Unions (NAFLU) as the exclusive bargaining agent of all the employees in the Philippine Blooming Mills, Company,
Inc. disregarding the objection raised by petitioner, the Philippine Association of Free Labor Unions (PAFLU), is assailed
in this certiorari proceeding. Admittedly, in the certification election held on February 27, 1976, respondent Union obtained
429 votes as against 414 of petitioner Union. Again, admittedly, under the Rules and Regulations implementing the
present Labor Code, a majority of the valid votes cast suffices for certification of the victorious labor union as the sole and
exclusive bargaining agent.1 There were four votes cast by employees who did not want any union. 2 On its face
therefore, respondent Union ought to have been certified in accordance with the above applicable rule. Petitioner,
undeterred, would seize upon the doctrine announced in the case of Allied Workers Association of the Philippines v. Court
of Industrial Relations3 that spoiled ballots should be counted in determining the valid votes cast. Considering there were
seventeen spoiled ballots, it is the submission that there was a grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondent
Director. Implicit in the comment of respondent Director of Labor Relations, 4 considered as an answer, is the controlling
weight to be accorded the implementing rule above-cited, no inconsistency being shown between such rule and the
present Labor Code. Under such a view, the ruling in the Allied Workers Association case that arose during the period
when it was the Industrial Peace Act 5, that was in effect and not the present law, no longer possesses relevance. It
cannot and should not be applied. It is not controlling. There was no abuse of discretion then, much less a grave one.

This Court is in agreement. The law is on the side of respondent Director, not to mention the decisive fact appearing in the
Petition itself that at most, only ten of the spoiled ballots "were intended for the petitioner Union,"6 thus rendering clear that
it would on its own showing obtain only 424 votes as against 429 for respondent Union. certiorari does not lie.

1. What is of the essence of the certification process, as noted in Lakas Ng Manggagawang Pilipino v. Benguet
Consolidated, Inc.7 "is that every labor organization be given the opportunity in a free and honest election to make good its
claim that it should be the exclusive collective bargaining representative."8 Petitioner cannot complain. It was given that
opportunity. It lost in a fair election. It came out second best. The implementing rule favors, as it should, respondent
Union, It obtained a majority of the valid votes cast. So our law Prescribes. It is equally the case in the United States as
this excerpt from the work of Cox and Bok makes clear: "It is a well-settled rule that a representative will he certified even
though less than a majority of all the employees in the unit cast ballots in favor of the union. It is enough that the union be
designated by a majority of the valid ballots, and this is so even though only a small proportion of the eligible voters
participates. Following the analogy of political elections, the courts have approved this practice of the Board."9

2. There is this policy consideration. The country is at present embarked on a wide-scale industrialization project. As a
matter of fact, respondent firm is engaged in such activity. Industrialization, as noted by Professor Smith, Merrifield and
Rothschild, "can thrive only as there is developed a. stable structure of law and order in the productive sector."10That
objective is best attained in a collective bargaining regime, which is a manifestation of industrial democracy at work, if
there be no undue obstacles placed in the way of the choice of a bargaining representative. To insist on the absolute
majority where there are various unions and where the possibility of invalid ballots may not be ruled out, would be to
frustrate that goal. For the probability of a long drawn-out, protracted process is not easy to dismiss. That is not unlikely
given the intensity of rivalry among unions capable of enlisting the allegiance of a group of workers. It is to avoid such a
contingency that there is this explicit pronouncement in the implementing rule. It speaks categorically. It must be obeyed.
That was what respondent Director did.

3. Nor can fault of a grave and serious character be imputed to respondent Director presumably because of failure to
abide by the doctrine or pronouncement of this Court in the aforesaid Allied Workers Association case. The reliance is on
this excerpt from the opinion: "However, spoiled ballots, i.e., those which are defaced, torn or marked (Rules for
Certification Elections, Rule II, sec. 2[j]) should be counted in determining the majority since they are nevertheless votes
cast by those who are qualified to do so." 11 Nothing can be clearer than that its basis is a paragraph in a section of the
then applicable rules for certification elections. 12 They were promulgated under the authority of the then prevailing
Industrial Peace Act. 13 That Legislation is no longer in force, having been superseded by the present Labor Code which
took effect on November 1, 1974. This certification election is governed therefore, as was made clear, by the present
Labor Code and the Rules issued thereunder. Absent a showing that such rules and regulations -are violative of the Code,
this Court cannot ignore their existence. When, as should be the case, a public official acts in accordance with a norm
therein contained, no infraction of the law is committed. Respondent Director did, as he ought to, comply with its terms.
He took into consideration only the "valid votes" as was required by the Rules. He had no choice as long as they remain in
force. In a proper showing, the judiciary can nullify any rule it found in conflict with the governing statute. 14 That was not
even attempted here. All that petitioner did was to set forth in two separate paragraphs the applicable rule followed by
respondent Director 15and the governing article. 16 It did not even bother to discuss why such rule was in conflict with the
present Labor Code. It failed to point out any repugnancy. Such being the case, respondent Director must be upheld.

4. The conclusion reached by us derives further support from the deservedly high repute attached to the construction
placed by the executive officials entrusted with the responsibility of applying a statute. The Rules and Regulations
implementing the present Labor Code were issued by Secretary Blas Ople of the Department of Labor and took effect on
February 3, 1975, the present Labor Code having been made known to the public as far back as May 1, 1974, although its
date of effectivity was postponed to November 1, 1974, although its date of effectivity was postponed to November 1,
1974. It would appear then that there was more than enough time for a really serious and careful study of such suppletory
rules and regulations to avoid any inconsistency with the Code. This Court certainly cannot ignore the interpretation
thereafter embodied in the Rules. As far back as In re Allen," 17 a 1903 decision, Justice McDonough, as ponente, cited
this excerpt from the leading American case of Pennoyer v. McConnaughy, decided in 1891: "The principle that the
contemporaneous construction of a statute by the executive officers of the government, whose duty it is to execute it, is
entitled to great respect, and should ordinarily control the construction of the statute by the courts, is so firmly embedded
in our jurisprudence that no authorities need be cited to support it." 18 There was a paraphrase by Justice Malcolm of such
a pronouncement in Molina v. Rafferty," 19 a 1918 decision: "Courts will and should respect the contemporaneous
construction placed upon a statute by the executive officers whose duty it is to enforce it, and unless such interpretation is
clearly erroneous will ordinarily be controlled thereby." 20 Since then, such a doctrine has been reiterated in numerous
decisions . 21 As was emphasized by Chief Justice Castro, "the construction placed by the office charged with
implementing and enforcing the provisions of a Code should he given controlling weight. " 22

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is dismissed. Costs against petitioner Philippine Association of Free Labor Unions
(PAFLU).

Barredo, Antonio, Aquino and Concepcion Jr., JJ., concur.

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 106724 February 9, 1994

THE NATIONAL POLICE COMMISSION, represented by its Acting Chairman, Cesar Sarino, Teodolo C. Natividad,
Vice-Chairman and Executive Officer, Brig. Gen. Virgilio H. David, Edgar Dula Torre, Guillermo P. Enriquez,
Commissioners, and Chief Supt. Levy D. Macasiano Director for Personnel, petitioners, 
vs.
Honorable Judge Salvador de Guzman, Jr., Chief Supt. Norberto M. Lina, Chief Supt. Ricardo Trinidad, Jr., Sr.
Supt. Manuel Suarez, Supt. Justito B. Tagum, Sr. Supt. Tranquilino Aspiras, Sr., Supt. Ramon I. Navarro, 
Sr. Supt. Ramon I. Navarro, Sr. Supt. Jose P. Suria, Sr. Supt. Agaton Abiera, Chief Insp. Bienvenido Torres, and
the National (ROTC) Alumni Association Inc. (NARRA), represented by its President Col. Benjamin Gundran, and
Director Hermogenes Peralta, Jr., respondents.

The Solicitor General for petitioners.

Renecio R. Espiritu for private respondents.

Diosdado P. Peralta for respondent-intervenor.

BIDIN, J.:

The case at bar had its origin in the implementation of the compulsory retirement of PNP officers as mandated in Sec. 39,
RA 6975, otherwise known as "An Act Establishing the Philippine National Police Under a Reorganized Department of the
Interior and Local Government", which took effect on 
January 2, 1991. Among others, RA 6975 provides for a uniform retirement system for PNP members. Section 39 thereof
reads:

Sec. 39. Compulsory Retirement. — Compulsory retirement, for officer and non-officer, shall be upon the
attainment of age fifty-six (56); Provided, That, in case of any officer with the rank of chief superintendent,
director or deputy director general, the Commission may allow his retention in the service for an
unextendible period of one (1) year.

Based on the above provision, petitioners sent notices of retirement to private respondents who are all members of the
defunct Philippine Constabulary and have reached the age of fifty-six (56).

In response, private respondents filed a complaint on December 19, 1991 for declaratory relief with prayer for the
issuance of an ex parte restraining order and/or injunction (docketed as Civil Case No. 91-3498) before the Regional Trial
Court of Makati, Branch 142. In their complaint, respondents aver that the age of retirement set at fifty-six (56) by Section
39 of RA 6975 cannot be applied to them since they are also covered by Sec. 89 thereof which provides:

Any provision hereof to the contrary notwithstanding, and within the transition period of four (4) years
following the effectivity of this Act, the following members of the INP shall be considered compulsorily
retired:

a) Those who shall attain the age of sixty (60) on the first year of the effectivity of this Act.

b) Those who shall attain the age of fifty-nine (59) on the second year of the effectivity of this Act.

c) Those who shall attain the age of fifty-eight (58) on the third year of the effectivity of this Act.
 d) Those who shall attain the age of fifty-seven (57) on the fourth year of the effectivity of this Act.

It is the submission of respondents that the term "INP" includes both the former members of the Philippine Constabulary
and the local police force who were earlier constituted as the Integrated National Police (INP) by virtue of 
PD 765 in 1975.

On the other hand, it is the belief of petitioners that the 4-year transition period provided in Section 89 applies only to the
local police forces who previously retire, compulsorily, at age sixty (60) for those in the ranks of Police/Fire Lieutenant or
higher (Sec. 33, PD 1184); while the retirement age for the PC had already been set at fifty-six (56) under the AFP law.

On December 23, 1991, respondent judge issued a restraining order followed by a writ of injunction on January 8, 1992
upon posting of a P100,000.00 bond by private respondents.

After the parties have submitted their respective pleadings, the case was submitted for resolution and on August 14, 1992,
the respondent judge rendered the assailed decision, the decretal portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, the court hereby declares that the term "INP" in Section 89 of the PNP Law includes all
members of the present Philippine National Police, irrespective of the original status of the present
members of the Philippine National Police before its creation and establishment, and that Section 39
thereof shall become operative after the lapse of the 
four-year transition period.

The preliminary injunction issued is made permanent.

SO ORDERED. (Rollo, pp. 29-30)

Petitioners filed the instant petition on October 8, 1992 seeking the reversal of the above judgment. On January 12, 1993,
the Court resolved to treat the respondents' Comment as Answer and gave due course to the petition.

In ruling in favor of private respondents, respondent judge observed, among others, that:

It may have been the intention of Congress to refer to the local police forces as the "INP" but the PNP
Law failed to define who or what constituted the INP. The natural recourse of the court is to trace the
source of the "INP" as courts are permitted to look to prior laws on the same subject and to investigate
the antecedents involved. There is nothing extant in the statute books except that which was created and
established under 
PD 765 pursuant to the mandate of Article XV of the 1973 Constitution providing that the "State shall
establish and maintain an integrated national police force whose organization, administration and
operation shall be provided by law." Heretofore, INP was unknown. And the said law categorically
declared the PC "as the principal component of the Integrated National Police" (Sec. 5, PD 765).

The court was supplied by respondents (petitioners herein) with excerpts taken from the discussion
amongst the members of Congress concerning the particular provision of Section 89.  The court is not
persuaded by said discussion; it was a simple matter for the members of the legislature to state precisely
in clear and unequivocal terms their meaning, such as "integrated police" as used in PD 765. Instead,
they employed "INP", a generic term that includes the PC as the principal component of the
INP, supra. In failing to categorically restrict the application of Section 89 as the members of legislature
are said to have intended, it gave rise to the presumption that it has not limited nor intended to limit the
meaning of the word when the bill was finally passed into law. It is not difficult for the court to also
presume that in drafting the wording of the PNP Law, the legislators were aware of the historical
legislative origin of the "INP".

xxx xxx xxx

The court takes particular note of the fact that Section 89 is found in the Transitory Provisions of the law
which do not provide for any distinction between the former PC officers and those belonging to the civilian
police forces. These provision are specifically enacted to regulate the period covering the dissolution of
the PC and the creation of the PNP, a period that necessarily would be attended by imbalances and or
confusion occasioned by the wholesale and mass integration. In fact, the retirement payment scheme of
 the INP is still to be formulated, leaving the impression that nothing is really settled until after the
transition of four years has lapsed. Section 89 therefore prevails over Section 39 up to the year 1995
when the retirement age for the members of the PNP shall then be age 56; after the year 1995, Section
39 shall then be the applicable law on retirement of PNP members. (Rollo, pp. 27-28; emphasis supplied)

Petitioners disagree and claim that the use of the term INP in Sec. 89 does not imply the same meaning contemplated
under PD 765 wherein it is provided:

Sec. 1. Constitution of the Integrated National Police. — There is hereby established and constituted the
Integrated National Police (INP) which shall be composed of the Philippine Constabulary as the nucleus,
and the integrated police forces as established by Presidential Decrees 
Nos. 421, 482, 531, 585 and 641, as components, under the Department of National Defense.

On the other hand, private respondents assert that being the nucleus of the Integrated National Police (INP) under PD
765, former members of the Philippine Constabulary (PC) should not be discriminated against from the coverage of the
term "INP" in Sec. 89, RA 6975. Clearly, it is argued, the term "INP" found in Section 89 of RA 6975 refers to the INP in
PD 765. Thus, where the law does not distinguish, the courts should not distinguish.

Does the law, RA 6975, distinguish INP from the PC? Petitioners submit that it does and cite Sections 23 and 85 to stress
the point, viz.:

Sec. 23. Composition. — Subject to the limitations provided for in this Act, the Philippine National Police,
hereinafter referred to as the PNP, is hereby established, initially consisting of the members of the police
forces who were integrated into the Integrated National Police (INP) pursuant to Presidential Decree No.
765, and the officers and enlisted personnel of the Philippine Constabulary (PC). . .

xxx xxx xxx

The permanent civilian employees of the present PC, INP, Narcotics Command, CIS and the technical
command of the AFP assigned with the PC, including NAPOLCOM hearing officers holding regular items
as such, shall be absorbed by the Department as employees thereof, subject to existing laws and
regulations.

xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 85. Phase of Implementation. — The implementation of this Act shall be undertaken in three (3) phases, to wit:

Phase I — Exercise of option by the uniformed members of the Philippine Constabulary, the PC elements assigned
with the Narcotics Command, CIS, and the personnel of the technical services of the AFP assigned with the PC to
include the regular CIS investigating agents and the operatives and agents of the NAPOLCOM Inspection,
Investigation and Intelligence Branch, and the personnel of the absorbed National Action Committee on Anti-
Hijacking (NACAH) of the Department of National Defense, to be completed within six (6) months from the date of the
effectivity of this Act. At the end of this phase, all personnel from the INP, PC, technical Services, NACAH, and
NAPOLCOM Inspection, Investigation and Intelligence Branch shall have been covered by official orders assigning
them to the PNP . . .

xxx xxx xxx

. . . Any PC-INP officer or enlisted personnel may, within the twelve-month period from the effectivity of this Act, retire
...

Phase III — . . . To accomplish the tasks of Phase III, the Commission shall create a Board of Officers composed of
the following: NAPOLCOM Commissioner as Chairman and one (1) representative each from the PC, INP, Civil
Service Commission and the Department of Budget and Management.

Section 86 of the same law further provides:

Sec. 86. Assumption by the PNP of Police Functions. — The PNP shall absorb the functions of the PC, the INP and
the Narcotics Command upon the effectivity of this Act.
From a careful perusal of the above provisions, it appears therefore that the use of the term INP is not synonymous with the PC. Had it
been otherwise, the statute could have just made a uniform reference to the members of the whole Philippine National Police (PNP) for
retirement purposes and not just the INP. The law itself distinguishes INP from the PC and it cannot be construed that "INP" as used in
Sec. 89 includes the members of the PC.

And contrary to the pronouncement of respondent judge that the law failed to define who constitutes the INP, Sec. 90 of RA 6975 has in
fact defined the same. Thus,

Sec. 90. Status of Present NAPOLCOM, PC-INP. — Upon the effectivity of this Act, the present National Police
Commission and the Philippine Constabulary-Integrated National Police shall cease to exist. The Philippine
Constabulary, which is the nucleus of the Philippine Constabulary-Integrated National Police shall cease to be a
major service of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. The Integrated National Police, which is the civilian component
of the Philippine Constabulary-Integrated National Police, shall cease to be the national police force and lieu thereof,
a new police force shall be established and constituted pursuant to this Act. (emphasis supplied)

It is not altogether correct to state, therefore, that the legislature failed to define who the members of the INP are. In this regard, it is of
no moment that the legislature failed to categorically restrict the application of the transition period in Sec. 89 specifically in favor of the
local police forces for it would be a mere superfluity as the PC component of the INP was already retirable at age fifty-six (56).

Having defined the meaning of INP, the trial court need not have belabored on the supposed dubious meaning of the term.
Nonetheless, if confronted with such a situation, courts are not without recourse in determining the construction of the statute with
doubtful meaning for they may avail themselves of the actual proceedings of the legislative body. In case of doubt as to what a
provision of a statute means, the meaning put to the provision during the legislative deliberations may be adopted (De Villa v. Court of
Appeals, 
195 SCRA 722 [1991] citing Palanca v. City of Manila, 41 Phil. 125 [1920]; Arenas v. City of San Carlos, 82 SCRA 318 [1978]).

Courts should not give a literal interpretation to the letter of the law if it runs counter to the legislative intent (Yellow Taxi and Pasay
Transportation Workers' Association v. Manila Yellow Taxi Cab. Co., 80 Phil. 83 [1948]).

Examining the records of the Bicameral Conference Committee, we find that the legislature did intent to exclude the members of the PC
from the coverage of Sec. 89 insofar as the retirement age is concerned, thus:

THE CHAIRMAN. (SEN. MACEDA). Well, it seems what people really want is one common rule, so if it is fifty-six,
fifty-six; of course, the PC wants sixty for everybody. Of course, it is not acceptable to us in the sense that we tied this
up really to the question of: If you are lax in allowing their (the PC) entry into the PNP, then tighten up the retirement.
If we will be strict in, like requiring examinations and other conditions for their original entry, then since we have sifted
out a certain amount of undesirables, then we can allow a longer retirement age. That was the rationale, that was the
tie-up. Since we are relaxing the entry, we should speed up . . .

THE CHAIRMAN. (REP. GUTANG). Exit.

THE CHAIRMAN. (SEN. MACEDA) . . . the retirement, the exit.

THE CHAIRMAN. (REP. GUTANG). So let me get it very clear, Mr. Chairman. Fifty-six, let's say, that will not make
any adjustment in the PC because there (they) are (retirable at age) fifty-six.

THE CHAIRMAN. (SEN. MACEDA). Kaya nga, wala na silang masasabi.

THE CHAIRMAN. (REP. GUTANG). In the case of the Police, since they are retireable now at sixty, for the officers, it
will be 
applicable to them on a one-year every year basis for a total period of four years transition. (Bicameral Conference
Committee on National Defense, March 12, 1990)

REP. GUTANG. On the first year of effectivity, the police will retire at 60 years.

THE CHAIRMAN. (SEN. MACEDA). Sixty.

REP. GUTANG. On the second year, 59.

THE CHAIRMAN. (SEN. MACEDA). Oo.

REP. GUTANG. On the third year, 58.

 THE CHAIRMAN. (SEN. MACEDA). Fifty-eight. So 'yung 55, on the third year, 58, doon siya re-retire.

REP. GUTANG. Oo.

SEN. SAGUISAG. So kung 55, when the law becomes effective . . .

THE CHAIRMAN. (SEN. MACEDA). He will retire at 58, doon siya aabot.

REP. UNICO. Pwede.

SEN. SAGUISAG. Dahil 'yon, may time to . . .

THE CHAIRMAN. (SEN. MACEDA). Walang problema dito sa transition ng pulis, acceptable ito, eh.

THE CHAIRMAN. (REP. COJUANGCO). Sa PC?

THE CHAIRMAN. (SEN. MACEDA). PC, walang mawawala sa kanila, 56 ang retirement age nilang
talaga, eh. Kaya ayaw ko 
ngang dagdagan 'yung 56 nila at 'yon din ang sa Armed Forces, 56. (Ibid., May 22, 1990)

In applying the provisions of Sec. 89 in favor of the local police force as established in PD 765, the Court does not, in any
manner, give any 
undue preferential treatment in favor of the other group. On the contrary, the Court is merely giving life to the real intent of
the legislators based on the deliberations of the Bicameral Conference Committee that preceded the enactment of RA
6975.

The legislative intent to classify the INP in such manner that Section 89 of RA 6975 is applicable only to the local police
force is clear. The question now is whether the classification is valid. The test for this is reasonableness such that it must
conform to the following requirements: (1) It must be based upon substantial distinctions; (2) It must be germane to the
purpose of the law; (3) It must not be limited to existing conditions only; (4) It must apply equally to all members of the
same class (People vs. Cayat, 68 Phil. 12 [1939]).

The classification is based upon substantial distinctions. The PC, before the effectivity of the law (RA 6975), were already
retirable at age 56 while the local police force were retirable at 60, and governed by different laws 
(P.D. 1184, Sec. 33 and Sec. 50). The distinction is relevant for the purpose of the statute, which is to enable the local
police force to plan for their retirement which would be earlier than usual because of the new law. Section 89 is merely
transitory, remedial in nature, and loses its force and effect once the four-year transitory period has elapsed. Finally, it
applies not only to some but to all local police officers.

It may be appropriate to state at this point that it seems absurd that a law will grant an extension to PC officers' retirable
age from 56 to 60 and then gradually lower it back to 56 without any cogent reason at all. Why should the retirement age
of PC officers be increased during the transitory period to the exclusion of other PC officers who would retire at age 56
after such period? Such absurdity was never contemplated by the law and would defeat its purpose of providing a uniform
retirement age for PNP members.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The writ of injunction issued on January 8, 1992 is hereby LIFTED and the
assailed decision of respondent judge is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Cruz, Feliciano, Padilla, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason, Puno, Vitug and
Kapunan, JJ., concur.

Nocon, J., is on leave.

 
  
Republic of the Philippines
Supreme Court
Manila
 
EN BANC
 
 
MUNICIPALITY OF NUEVA ERA, G.R. No. 169435
ILOCOS NORTE, represented by its
Municipal Mayor, CAROLINE Present:
ARZADON-GARVIDA,
Petitioner, PUNO, C.J.,
QUISUMBING,*
YNARES-SANTIAGO,**
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
CARPIO,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
- versus - CORONA,
CARPIO MORALES,
AZCUNA,
TINGA,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA,
MUNICIPALITY OF MARCOS, REYES, and
ILOCOS NORTE, represented by its LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, JJ.
Municipal Mayor, SALVADOR
PILLOS, and the HONORABLE Promulgated:
COURT OF APPEALS,
Respondents. February 27, 2008
 
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
 
DECISION
 
 
REYES, R.T., J.:

AS the law creating a municipality fixes its boundaries, settlement of boundary disputes between municipalities is facilitated by carrying into effect

the law that created them.

Any alteration of boundaries that is not in accordance with the law creating a municipality is not the carrying into effect of that law but its

amendment, which only the Congress can do.[1]

For Our review on certiorari is the Decision[2] of the Court of Appeals (CA) reversing to a certain extent that[3] of the Regional Trial Court

(RTC), Branch 12, LaoagCity, Ilocos Norte, in a case that originated from the Sangguniang Panlalawigan (SP) of Ilocos Norte about the boundary

dispute between the Municipalities of Marcos and Nueva Era in Ilocos Norte.

The CA declared that Marcos is entitled to have its eastern boundary extended up to the boundary line between the province of Ilocos

Norte and Kalinga-Apayao.[4] By this extension of Marcos eastern boundary, the CA allocated to Marcos a portion of Nueva Eras territory.

The Facts

The Municipality of Nueva Era was created from the settlements of Bugayong, Cabittaoran, Garnaden, Padpadon, Padsan, Paorpatoc,

Tibangran, and Uguis which were previously organized as rancherias, each of which was under the independent control of a chief. Governor General
Francis Burton Harrison, acting on a resolution passed by the provincial government of Ilocos Norte, united these rancherias and created the

township of Nueva Era by virtue of Executive Order (E.O.) No. 66 [5] dated September 30, 1916.

The Municipality of Marcos, on the other hand, was created on June 22, 1963 pursuant to Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3753 entitled An Act

Creating the Municipality of Marcos in the Province of Ilocos Norte. Section 1 of R.A. No. 3753 provides:

 
SECTION 1. The barrios of Capariaan, Biding, Escoda, Culao, Alabaan, Ragas and Agunit in
the Municipality of Dingras, Province of Ilocos Norte, are hereby separated from the said municipality and constituted into a new
and separate municipality to be known as the Municipality of Marcos, with the following boundaries:
 
On the Northwest, by the barrios Biding-Rangay boundary going down to the barrios Capariaan-Gabon boundary
consisting of foot path and feeder road; on the Northeast, by the Burnay River which is the common boundary of barrios Agunit
and Naglayaan; on the East, by the Ilocos Norte-Mt. Province boundary; on the South, by the Padsan River which is at the same
time the boundary between the municipalities of Banna and Dingras; on the West and Southwest, by the boundary between the
municipalities of Batac and Dingras.
 
The Municipality of Marcos shall have its seat of government in the barrio of Biding.

Based on the first paragraph of the said Section 1 of R.A. No. 3753, it is clear that Marcos shall be derived from the listed barangays of

Dingras, namely: Capariaan, Biding, Escoda, Culao, Alabaan, Ragas and Agunit. The Municipality of Nueva Era or any of its barangays was not

mentioned. Hence, if based only on said paragraph, it is clear that Nueva Era may not be considered as a source of territory of Marcos.

There is no issue insofar as the first paragraph is concerned which named only Dingras as the mother municipality of Marcos. The problem,

however, lies in the description of Marcos boundaries as stated in the second paragraph, particularly in the phrase: on the East, by the Ilocos Norte-

Mt. Province boundary.

It must be noted that the term Mt. Province stated in the above phrase refers to the present adjoining provinces of

Benguet, Mountain Province, Ifugao, Kalinga and Apayao, which were then a single province.

Mt. Province was divided into the four provinces of Benguet, Mountain Province, Ifugao, and Kalinga-Apayao by virtue of R.A. No. 4695

which was enacted on June 18, 1966. On February 14, 1995, the province of Kalinga-Apayao, which comprises the sub-provinces of Kalinga and

Apayao, was further converted into the regular provinces of Kalinga and Apayao pursuant to R.A. No. 7878.

The part of then Mt. Province which was at the east of Marcos is now the province of Apayao. Hence, the eastern boundary referred to by

the second paragraph of Section 1 of R.A. No. 3753 is the present Ilocos Norte-Apayao boundary.

On the basis of the said phrase, which described Marcos eastern boundary, Marcos claimed that the middle portion of Nueva Era, which

adjoins its eastern side, formed part of its territory. Its reasoning was founded upon the fact that Nueva Era was between Marcos and the Ilocos

Norte-Apayao boundary such that if Marcos was to be bounded on the east by the Ilocos Norte-Apayao boundary, part of Nueva Era would

consequently be obtained by it.[6]

Marcos did not claim any part of Nueva Era as its own territory until after almost 30 years, [7] or only on March 8, 1993, when its

Sangguniang Bayan passed Resolution No. 93-015.[8] Said resolution was entitled: Resolution Claiming an Area which is an Original Part of Nueva

Era, But Now Separated Due to the Creation of Marcos Town in the Province of Ilocos Norte.
 

Marcos submitted its claim to the SP of Ilocos Norte for its consideration and approval. The SP, on the other hand, required Marcos to

submit its position paper.[9]

In its position paper, Marcos alleged that since its northeastern and eastern boundaries under R.A. No. 3753 were the Burnay River and

the Ilocos Norte-Mountain Provinceboundary, respectively, its eastern boundary should not be limited to the former Dingras-Nueva Era boundary,

which was coterminous and aligned with the eastern boundary of Dingras. According to Marcos, its eastern boundary should extend further to the

east or up to the Ilocos-Norte-Mt. Province boundary pursuant to the description of its eastern boundary under R.A. No. 3753.[10]

In view of its claim over the middle portion of Nueva Era, Marcos posited that Nueva Era was cut into two parts. And since the law

required that the land area of a municipality must be compact and contiguous, Nueva Eras northern isolated portion could no longer be considered as

its territory but that of Marcos. Thus, Marcos claimed that it was entitled not only to the middle portion[11] of Nueva Era but also to Nueva Eras

isolated northern portion. These areas claimed by Marcos were within Barangay Sto. Nio, Nueva Era.

Nueva Era reacted to the claim of Marcos through its Resolution No. 1, Series of 1993. It alleged that since time immemorial, its entire land

area was an ancestral domain of the tinguians, an indigenous cultural community. It argued to the effect that since the land being claimed by Marcos

must be protected for the tinguians, it must be preserved as part of Nueva Era.[12]

According to Nueva Era, Marcos was created out of the territory of Dingras only. And since R.A. No. 3753 specifically mentioned seven

(7) barrios of Dingras to become Marcos, the area which should comprise Marcos should not go beyond the territory of said barrios.[13]

From the time Marcos was created in 1963, its eastern boundary had been considered to be aligned and coterminous with the eastern

boundary of the adjacent municipalityof Dingras. However, based on a re-survey in 1992, supposedly done to conform to the second paragraph of

Section 1 of R.A. No. 3753, an area of 15,400 hectares of Nueva Era was alleged to form part of Marcos. [14] This was the area of Barangay Sto. Nio,

Nueva Era that Marcos claimed in its position paper.

On March 29, 2000, the SP of Ilocos Norte ruled in favor of Nueva Era. The fallo of its decision[15] reads:

 
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, this Body has no alternative but to dismiss, as it hereby DISMISSES said
petition for lack of merit. The disputed area consisting of 15,400 hectares, more or less, is hereby declared as part and portion of
the territorial jurisdiction of respondent Nueva Era.[16]

R.A. No. 3753 expressly named the barangays that would comprise Marcos, but none of Nueva Eras barangays were mentioned. The SP thus

construed, applying the rule of expressio unius est exclusio alterius, that no part of Nueva Era was included by R.A. No. 3753 in creating Marcos.[17]

The SP ratiocinated that if Marcos was to be bounded by Mt. Province, it would encroach upon a portion, not only of Nueva Era but also of

Abra. Thus:
 
x x x Even granting, for the sake of argument, that the eastern boundary of Marcos is indeed Mountain Province,
Marcos will then be claiming a portion of Abra because the province, specifically Barangay Sto. Nio, Nueva Era, is actually
bounded on the East by the Province of Abra. Abra is situated between and separates the Provinces of Ilocos Norte
and MountainProvince.
 
This is precisely what this body would like to avoid. Statutes should be construed in the light of the object to be
achieved and the evil or mischief to be suppressed, and they should be given such construction as will advance the object,
suppress the mischief and secure the benefits intended.[18] (Citations omitted)

The SP further explained:

 
Invariably, it is not the letter, but the spirit of the law and the intent of the legislature that is important. When the
interpretation of the statute according to the exact and literal import of its words would lead to absurdity, it should be construed
according to the spirit and reason, disregarding if necessary the letters of the law. It is believed that congress did not intend to
have this absurd situation to be created when it created the Municipality of Marcos. This body, by the mandate given to it by the
RA 7160 otherwise known Local Government Code, so believes that respondent Nueva Era or any portion thereof has been
excluded from the ambit of RA 3753. Under the principle of espressio (sic) unios (sic) est exclusio alterius, by expressly naming
the barangays that will comprise the town of Marcos, those not mentioned are deemed excluded. In Republic Act 4354, where
Section 2 thereof enumerated the barrios comprising the City of Davao excluding the petitioner Barrio Central as part of the said
City, the court held that there arose a prima facie conclusion that the said law abolished Barrio Central as part of Davao City.
 
Historically, the hinterlands of Nueva Era have been known to be the home of our brothers and sisters belonging to
peculiar groups of non-(C)hristian inhabitants with their own rich customs and traditions and this body takes judicial notice that
the inhabitants of Nueva Era have proudly claimed to be a part of this rich culture.  With this common ancestral heritage which
unfortunately is absent with Marcos, let it not be disturbed.[19] (Emphasis ours and citations omitted)

RTC Decision

On appeal by Marcos, the RTC affirmed the decision of the SP in its decision[20] of March 19, 2001. The dispositive part of

the RTC decision reads:

 
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is hereby DISMISSED. The questioned decision of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Ilocos
Norte is hereby AFFIRMED.
 
No costs.
 
SO ORDERED.[21]

The RTC reasoned out in this wise:

 
The position of the Municipality of Marcos is that the provision of R.A. 3753 as regards its boundary on the East which is
the Ilocos Norte-Mt. Province should prevail.
 
On the other hand, the Municipality of Nueva Era posits the theory that only the barrios of the Municipality of Dingras as stated
in R.A. 3753 should be included in the territorial jurisdiction of the Municipality of Marcos. The Sangguniang Panlalawigan
agreed with the position of Nueva Era.
 
xxxx
 
An examination of the Congressional Records during the deliberations of the R.A. 3753 (House Bill No. 3721) shows the
Explanatory Note of Congressman Simeon M. Valdez, 2nd District, Ilocos Norte, to wit:
 
 
EXPLANATORY NOTE
 
This bill seeks to create in the Province of Ilocos Norte a new municipality to be known as
the Municipality of Marcos, to be comprised by the present barrios of Capariaan, Biding Escoda, Culao,
 Alabaan, Ragas and Agunit, all in the Municipality of Dingras of the same province. The seat of government
will be in the sitio of San Magro in the present barrio of Ragas.
 
xxxx
 
On the other hand, the Municipality of Dingras will not be adversely affected too much because its
finances will still be sound and stable. Its capacity to comply with its obligations, especially to its employees
and personnel, will not be diminished nor its operations paralyzed. On the contrary, economic development in
both the mother and the proposed municipalities will be accelerated.
 
 
 
 
In view of the foregoing, approval of this bill is earnestly requested.
 
 
(Sgd.) SIMEON M. VALDEZ
Congressman, 2nd District
Ilocos Norte[22]
 
Parenthetically, the legislative intent was for the creation of the Municipality of Marcos, Ilocos Norte from the barrios
(barangays) of the Municipality of Dingras, Ilocos Norte only.Hence, the Municipality of Marcos cannot add any area beyond
the territorial jurisdiction of the Municipality of Dingras, Ilocos Norte. This conclusion might have been different only if the area
being claimed by the Municipality of Marcos is within the territorial jurisdiction of the Municipality of Dingras and not
the Municipality of Nueva Era. In such case, the two conflicting provisions may be harmonized by including such area within the
territorial jurisdiction of the Municipality of Dingras as within the territorial jurisdiction of the Municipality of Marcos.[23]
(Emphasis ours)

CA Disposition

Still determined to have a more extensive eastern boundary, Marcos filed a petition for review [24] of the RTC decision before the CA. The

issues raised by Marcos before the CA were:

 
1. Whether or not the site of Hercules Minerals and Oil, Inc. which is within a Government Forest Reservation in Barangay Sto.
Nio, formerly of Nueva Era, is a part of the newly created Municipality of Marcos, Ilocos Norte.
 
2. Whether or not the portion of Barangay Sto. Nio on the East which is separated from Nueva Era as a result of the full
implementation of the boundaries of the new Municipality of Marcos belongs also to Marcos or to Nueva Era.[25]

The twin issues involved two portions of Nueva Era, viz.: (1) middle portion, where Hercules Minerals and Oil, Inc. is located; and (2) northern
portion of Nueva Era, which, according to Marcos, was isolated from Nueva Era in view of the integration to Marcos of said middle portion.

Marcos prayed before the CA that the above two portions of Nueva Era be declared as part of its own territory. It alleged that it was entitled to the

middle portion of Nueva Era in view of the description of Marcos eastern boundary under R.A. No. 3753. Marcos likewise contended that it was

entitled to the northern portion of Nueva Era which was allegedly isolated from Nueva Era when Marcos was created. It posited that such isolation of

territory was contrary to law because the law required that a municipality must have a compact and contiguous territory.[26]

In a Decision[27] dated June 6, 2005, the CA partly reversed the RTC decision with the following disposition:

 
WHEREFORE, we partially GRANT the petition treated as one for certiorari. The Decisions of both the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan and Regional Trial Court of Ilocos Norte are REVERSED and SET ASIDE insofar as they
made the eastern boundary of the municipality of Marcos co-terminous with the eastern boundary of Dingras town, and another is
rendered extending the said boundary of Marcos to the boundary line between the province of Ilocos Norte and Kalinga-
Apayao, but the same Decisions are AFFIRMED with respect to the denial of the claim of Marcos to the detached northern
portion of barangay Sto. Nio which should, as it is hereby ordered to, remain with the municipality of Nueva Era. No costs.
  
SO ORDERED.[28]

In concluding that the eastern boundary of Marcos was the boundary line between Ilocos Norte and Kalinga-Apayao, the CA gave the

following explanation:

 
Clearly then, both the SP and the RTC erred when they ruled that the eastern boundary of Marcos is only coterminous
with the eastern boundary of the adjacent municipality of Dingras and refused to extend it up to the boundary line between the
provinces of Ilocos Norte and Mountain Province (Kalinga-Apayao). R.A. No. 3753, the law creating Marcos, is very explicit and
leaves no room for equivocation that the boundaries of Marcos town are:
 
 
 
On the Northwest by the barrios Biding-Rangay boundary going down to the barrios Capariaan-
Gabon boundary consisting of foot path and feeder road; on the Northeast, by the Burnay River which is the
common boundary of barrios Agunit and Naglayaan; on the East, by the Ilocos Norte-Mt. Province
boundary; on the South by the Padsan River, which is at the same time the boundary between the
municipalities of Banna and Dingras; on the West and Southwest by the boundary between the municipalities
of Batac and Dingras.
 
To stop short at the eastern boundary of Dingras as the eastern boundary also of Marcos and refusing to go farther to
the boundary line between Ilocos Norte and Mountain Province(Kalinga-Apayao) is tantamount to amending the law which
Congress alone can do. Both the SP and RTC have no competence to undo a valid act of Congress.
 
It is not correct to say that Congress did not intend to take away any part of Nueva Era and merge it with Marcos for it
is chargeable with conclusive knowledge that when it provided that the eastern boundary of Marcos is the boundary line between
Ilocos Norte and Mountain Province, (by the time of both the SB and RTC Decision was already Kalinga-Apayao), it would be
cutting through a portion of Nueva Era. As the law is written so must it be applied. Dura lex sed lex![29]

The CA likewise held that the province Abra was not located between Marcos and Kalinga-Apayao; and that Marcos would not encroach

upon a portion of Abra for it to be bounded by Kalinga-Apayao, to wit:

 
Nueva Eras contention that to lay out the eastern jurisdiction of Marcos to the boundary line between Ilocos Norte
and Mountain Province (Kalinga-Apayao) would mean annexing part of the municipality of Itnig, province of Abra to Marcos as
Abra is between Ilocos Norte and Mountain Province is geographically erroneous. From Nueva Eras own map of Region 1,
which also depicts the locations of Kalinga-Apayao, Abra, Mountain Province, Benguet and Nueva Vizcaya after the partition of
the old Mountain Province into the provinces of Kalinga-Apayao, Ifugao, Mountain Province and Benguet, the province of Abra
is situated far to the south of Kalinga Apayao and is between the latter and the present Mountain Province, which is farther south
of Abra. Abra is part of the eastern boundary of Ilocos Sur while Kalinga-Apayao is the eastern boundary of Ilocos Norte. Hence,
in no way will the eastern boundary of the municipality of Marcos encroach upon a portion of Abra.[30]
 

However, Marcos claim over the alleged isolated northern portion of Nueva Era was denied. The CA ruled:

 
Going now to the other area involved, i.e., the portion of Sto. Nio that is separated from its mother town Nueva Era and
now lies east of the municipalities of Solsona and Dingras and north of Marcos, it bears stressing that it is not included within the
area of Marcos as defined by law. But since it is already detached from Sto. Nio, Marcos is laying claim to it to be integrated into
its territory by the SP because it is contiguous to a portion of said municipality.
 
We hold that the SP has no jurisdiction or authority to act on the claim, for it will necessarily substantially alter the
north eastern and southern boundaries of Marcos from that defined by law and unduly enlarge its area. Only Congress can do
that. True, the SP may substantially alter the boundary of a barangay within its jurisdiction. But this means the alteration of the
boundary of a barangay in relation to another barangay within the same municipality for as long as that will not result in any
change in the boundary of that municipality. The area in dispute therefore remains to be a part of Sto. Nio, a barangay of Nueva
Era although separated by the newly created Marcos town pursuant to Section 7(c) of the 1991 Local Government Code which
states:
 
SEC. 7. Creation and Conversion. As a general rule, the creation of a local government unit or its
conversion from one level to another shall be based on verifiable indicators of viability and projected
capacity to provide services, to wit:
  
xxxx
 
(c) Land Area. It must be contiguous, unless it comprises two or more islands or is separated by a
local government unit independent of the others; properly identified by metes and bounds with technical
descriptions; and sufficient to provide for such basic services and facilities to meet the requirements of its
populace.[31]

The CA also expressed the view that Marcos adopted the wrong mode of appeal in bringing the case to it.  The case, according to the CA,

was appealable only to the RTC.Nonetheless, despite its pronouncement that the case was dismissible, the CA took cognizance of the same by

treating it as one for certiorari, to wit:

 
A final word. At the outset, we agonized over the dilemma of choosing between dismissing outright the petition at bar
or entertaining it. This is for the simple reason that a petition for review is a mode of appeal and is not appropriate as the Local
Government Code provides for the remedy of appeal in boundary disputes only to the Regional Trial Court but not any further
appeal to this Court. Appeal is a purely statutory right. It cannot be exercised unless it is expressly granted by law. This is too
basic to require the citation of supporting authority.
 
xxxx
 
By the same token, since the Local Government Code does not explicitly grant the right of further appeal from
decisions of the RTCs in boundary disputes between or among local government units, Marcos town cannot exercise that right
from the adverse decision of the RTC of Ilocos Norte. Nonetheless, because of the transcendental legal and jurisdictional issues
involved, we solved our inceptive dilemma by treating the petition at bar as a special civil action for certiorari.[32]

Nueva Era was not pleased with the decision of the CA. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45.

Issues

Nueva Era now raises the following issues:

 
a) Whether or not, the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction on the Petition for Review on Appeal, since Sec. 119 of the Local
Government Code, which provides that An appeal to the Decision of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan is exclusively vested to
the Regional Trial Court, without further Appeal to the Court of Appeals;
 
b) Whether or not, the Court of Appeals gravely abused its discretion, in treating the Petition for Review On Appeal, filed under
Rule 45, Revised Rules of Court, as a Petition for Certiorari, under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court;
 
c) Whether or not, the Court of Appeals erred in its appreciation of facts, in declaring that MARCOS East is not coterminous with
the Eastern boundary of its mother town-Dingras. That it has no factual and legal basis to extend MARCOS territory
beyond Brgys. Agunit (Ferdinand) and Culao (Elizabeth) of Marcos, and to go further East, by traversing and
disintegrating Brgy. Sto. Nio, and drawing parallel lines from Sto. Nio, there lies Abra, not Mt. Province or Kalinga-
Apayao.[33]

Basically, there are two (2) issues to resolve here: (1) whether or not the mode of appeal adopted by Marcos in bringing the case to the CA

is proper; and (2) whether or not the eastern boundary of Marcos extends over and covers a portion of Nueva Era.

Our Ruling

 
Marcos correctly appealed the RTC judgment via petition for review under Rule 42.

 
Under Section 118(b) of the Local Government Code, (b)oundary disputes involving two (2) or more municipalities within the same province shall

be referred for settlement to the sangguniang panlalawigan concerned. The dispute shall be formally tried by the said sanggunian in case the

disputing municipalities fail to effect an amicable settlement.[34]

The SP of Ilocos validly took cognizance of the dispute between the parties. The appeal of the SP judgment to the RTC was likewise properly filed

by Marcos before the RTC.The problem, however, lies in whether the RTC judgment may still be further appealed to the CA.

The CA pronounced that the RTC decision on the boundary dispute was not appealable to it. It ruled that no further appeal of

the RTC decision may be made pursuant to Section 119 of the Local Government Code[35] which provides:

 
SECTION 119. Appeal. Within the time and manner prescribed by the Rules of Court, any party may elevate the
decision of the sanggunian concerned to the proper Regional Trial Court having jurisdiction over the area in dispute. The
Regional Trial Court shall decide the appeal within one (1) year from the filing thereof. Pending final resolution of the disputed
area prior to the dispute shall be maintained and continued for all legal purposes.

The CA concluded that since only the RTC was mentioned as appellate court, the case may no longer be further appealed to it. The CA

stated that (a)ppeal is a purely statutory right. It cannot be exercised unless it is expressly granted by law. This is too basic to require the citation of

supporting authority.[36]

The CA, however, justified its taking cognizance of the case by declaring that: because of the transcendental legal and jurisdictional issues

involved, we solved our inceptive dilemma by treating the petition at bar as a special civil action for certiorari.[37]

The CA erred in declaring that only the RTC has appellate jurisdiction over the judgment of the SP.

True, appeal is a purely statutory right and it cannot be exercised unless it is expressly granted by law. Nevertheless, the CA can pass upon

the petition for review precisely because the law allows it.

Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 129 or the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, as amended by R.A. No. 7902, [38] vests in the CA the

appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments, decisions, resolutions, orders or awards of Regional Trial Courts and quasi-judicial agencies,

instrumentalities, boards or commissions, among others. [39] B.P. Blg. 129 has been further supplemented by the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as

amended, which provides for the remedy of appeal via petition for review under Rule 42 to the CA in cases decided by the RTC in the exercise of its

appellate jurisdiction.

Thus, the CA need not treat the appeal via petition for review filed by Marcos as a petition for certiorari to be able to pass upon the

same. B.P. Blg. 129, as amended, which is supplemented by Rule 42 of the Rules of 

Civil Procedure, gives the CA the authority to entertain appeals of such judgments and final orders rendered by the RTC in the exercise of its

appellate jurisdiction.

 
At the time of creation of Marcos, approval in a plebiscite of the creation of a local
government unit is not required.

 
Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution provides that:
 
 No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially
altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code and subject to approval by a majority of
the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected.[40]

The purpose of the above constitutional provision was acknowledged by the Court through Justice Reynato S. Puno in Miranda v. Aguirre,
[41]
 where it was held that:

 
The 1987 Constitution, more than any of our previous Constitutions, gave more reality to the sovereignty of our
people for it was borne out of the people power in the 1986 EDSA revolution. Its Section 10, Article X addressed the
undesirable practice in the past whereby local government units were created, abolished, merged or divided on the basis of the
vagaries of politics and not of the welfare of the people. Thus, the consent of the people of the local government unit directly
affected was required to serve as a checking mechanism to any exercise of legislative power creating, dividing, abolishing,
merging or altering the boundaries of local government units. It is one instance where the people in their sovereign capacity
decide on a matter that affects them direct democracy of the people as opposed to democracy thru peoples representatives. This
plebiscite requirement is also in accord with the philosophy of the Constitution granting more autonomy to local government
units.[42]

Nueva Era contends that the constitutional and statutory[43] plebiscite requirement for the creation of a local government unit is applicable to

this case. It posits that the claim of Marcos to its territory should be denied due to lack of the required plebiscite.

We agree with Nueva Eras contention that Marcos claim over parts of its territory is not tenable. However, the reason is not the lack of the

required plebiscite under the 1987 and 1973 constitutions and the Local Government Code of 1991 but other reasons as will be discussed below.

At the time Marcos was created, a plebiscite was not required by law to create a local government unit. Hence, Marcos was validly created

without conducting a plebiscite.As a matter of fact, no plebiscite was conducted in Dingras, where it was derived.

Lex prospicit, non respicit. The law looks forward, not backward.[44] It is the basic norm that provisions of the fundamental law should be

given prospective application only, unless legislative intent for its retroactive application is so provided.[45]
 

In the comparable case of Ceniza v. Commission on Elections[46] involving the City of Mandaue, the Court has this to say:

 
Petitioners assail the charter of the City of Mandaue as unconstitutional for not having been ratified by the residents of
the city in a plebiscite. This contention is untenable. The Constitutional requirement that the creation, division, merger, abolition,
or alteration of the boundary of a province, city, municipality, or barrio should be subject to the approval by the majority of the
votes cast in a plebiscite in the governmental unit or units affected is a new requirement that came into being only with the 1973
Constitution. It is prospective in character and therefore cannot affect the creation of the City of Mandaue which came into
existence on June 21, 1969.[47] (Citations omitted and underlining supplied).

Moreover, by deciding this case, We are not creating Marcos but merely interpreting the law that created it. Its creation was already a fait

accompli. Therefore, there is no reason for Us to further require a plebiscite.

As pointed out by Justice Isagani Cruz, to wit:

 
Finally, it should be observed that the provisions of the Constitution should be given only a prospective application
unless the contrary is clearly intended. Were the rule otherwise, rights already acquired or vested might be unduly disturbed or
withdrawn even in the absence of an unmistakable intention to place them within the scope of the Constitution.[48]
 
No part of Nueva Eras territory was taken for the creation of Marcos under R.A. No.
3753.

Only the barrios (now barangays) of Dingras from which Marcos obtained its territory are named in R.A. No. 3753. To wit:

 
SECTION 1. The barrios of Capariaan, Biding, Escoda, Culao, Alabaan, Ragas and Agunit in
the Municipality of Dingras, Province of Ilocos Norte, are hereby separated from the said municipality and constituted into a new
and separate municipality to be known as the Municipality of Marcos, with the following boundaries:

Since only the barangays of Dingras are enumerated as Marcos source of territory, Nueva Eras territory is, therefore, excluded.

Under the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius, the mention of one thing implies the exclusion of another thing not mentioned. If a

statute enumerates the things upon which it is to operate, everything else must necessarily and by implication be excluded from its operation and

effect.[49] This rule, as a guide to probable legislative intent, is based upon the rules of logic and natural workings of the human mind.[50]

Had the legislature intended other barangays from Nueva Era to become part of Marcos, it could have easily done so by clear and concise

language. Where the terms are expressly limited to certain matters, it may not by interpretation or construction be extended to other matters. [51] The

rule proceeds from the premise that the legislature would not have made specified enumerations in a statute had the intention been not to restrict its

meaning and to confine its terms to those expressly mentioned.[52]

Moreover, since the barangays of Nueva Era were not mentioned in the enumeration of barangays out of which

the territory of Marcos shall be set, their omission must be held to have been done intentionally. This conclusion finds support in the rule of casus

omissus pro omisso habendus est, which states that a person, object or thing omitted from an enumeration must be held to have been omitted

intentionally.[53]

Furthermore, this conclusion on the intention of the legislature is bolstered by the explanatory note of the bill which paved the way for the

creation of Marcos. Said explanatory note mentioned only Dingras as the mother municipality of Marcos.

 

Where there is ambiguity in a statute, as in this case, courts may resort to the explanatory note to clarify the ambiguity and ascertain the

purpose and intent of the statute.[54]

Despite the omission of Nueva Era as a mother territory in the law creating Marcos, the latter still contends that said law included Nueva

Era. It alleges that based on the description of its boundaries, a portion of Nueva Era is within its territory.

The boundaries of Marcos under R.A. No. 3753 read:

 
On the Northwest, by the barrios Biding-Rangay boundary going down to the barrios Capariaan-Gabon boundary
consisting of foot path and feeder road; on the Northeast, by the Burnay River which is the common boundary of barrios Agunit
and Naglayaan; on the East, by the Ilocos Norte-Mt. Province boundary; on the South, by the Padsan River which is at the same
time the boundary between the municipalities of Banna and Dingras; on the West and Southwest, by the boundary between the
municipalities of Batac and Dingras.

 
Marcos contends that since it is bounded on the East, by the Ilocos Norte-Mt. Province boundary, a portion of Nueva Era formed part of its territory

because, according to it, Nueva Era is between the Marcos and Ilocos Norte-Mt. Province boundary. Marcos posits that in order for its eastern side to

reach the Ilocos Norte-Mt. Province boundary, it will necessarily traverse the middle portion of Nueva Era.

Marcos further claims that it is entitled not only to the middle portion of Nueva Era but also to its northern portion which, as a

consequence, was isolated from the major part of Nueva Era.

We cannot accept the contentions of Marcos.

Only Dingras is specifically named by law as source territory of Marcos. Hence, the said description of boundaries of Marcos is descriptive

only of the listed barangays of Dingras as a compact and contiguous territory.

Considering that the description of the eastern boundary of Marcos under R.A. No. 3753 is ambiguous, the same must be interpreted in

light of the legislative intent.

The law must be given a reasonable interpretation, to preclude absurdity in its application. [55] We thus uphold the legislative intent to create

Marcos out of the territory of Dingras only.

Courts must give effect to the general legislative intent that can be discovered from or is unraveled by the four corners of the statute, and in

order to discover said intent, the whole statute, and not only a particular provision thereof, should be considered. [56] Every section, provision or clause

of the statute must be expounded by reference to each other in order to arrive at the effect contemplated by the legislature. The intention of the

legislator must be ascertained from the whole text of the law, and every part of the act is to be taken into view.[57]

It is axiomatic that laws should be given a reasonable interpretation, not one which defeats the very purpose for which they were

passed. This Court has in many cases involving the construction of statutes always cautioned against narrowly interpreting a statute as to defeat the

purpose of the legislature and stressed that it is of the essence of judicial duty to construe statutes so as to avoid such a deplorable result (of injustice

or absurdity) and that therefore a literal interpretation is to be rejected if it would be unjust or lead to absurd results.[58]

Statutes are to be construed in the light of the purposes to be achieved and the evils sought to be remedied.  Thus, in construing a statute, the

reason for its enactment should be kept in mind and the statute should be construed with reference to the intended scope and purpose. The court may

consider the spirit and reason of the statute, where a literal meaning would lead to absurdity, contradiction, injustice, or would defeat the clear

purpose of the lawmakers.[59]

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals is partly REVERSED. The Decision of the Regional

Trial Court in Ilocos Norte isREINSTATED.

 
SO ORDERED.
 
 
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-17931             February 28, 1963

CASCO PHILIPPINE CHEMICAL CO., INC., petitioner, 

vs.
HON. PEDRO GIMENEZ, in his capacity as Auditor General of the Philippines, 
and HON. ISMAEL MATHAY, in his capacity as Auditor of the Central Bank, respondents.

Jalandoni & Jamir for petitioner.

Officer of the Solicitor General for respondents.

CONCEPCION, J.:

This is a petition for review of a decision of the Auditor General denying a claim for refund of
petitioner Casco Philippine Chemical Co., Inc.

The main facts are not disputed. Pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act No. 2609, otherwise
known as the Foreign Exchange Margin Fee Law, the Central Bank of the Philippines issued on July
1, 1959, its Circular No. 95. fixing a uniform margin fee of 25% on foreign exchange transactions. To
supplement the circular, the Bank later promulgated a memorandum establishing the procedure for
applications for exemption from the payment of said fee, as provided in said Republic Act No. 2609.
Several times in November and December 1959, petitioner Casco Philippine Chemical Co., Inc. —
which is engaged in the manufacture of synthetic resin glues, used in bonding lumber and veneer by
plywood and hardwood producers — bought foreign exchange for the importation of urea and
formaldehyde — which are the main raw materials in the production of said glues — and paid therefor
the aforementioned margin fee aggregating P33,765.42. In May, 1960, petitioner made another
purchase of foreign exchange and paid the sum of P6,345.72 as margin fee therefor.

Prior thereto, petitioner had sought the refund of the first sum of P33,765.42, relying upon Resolution
No. 1529 of the Monetary Board of said Bank, dated November 3, 1959, declaring that the separate
importation of urea and formaldehyde is exempt from said fee. Soon after the last importation of these
products, petitioner made a similar request for refund of the sum of P6,345.72 paid as margin fee
therefor. Although the Central Bank issued the corresponding margin fee vouchers for the refund of
said amounts, the Auditor of the Bank refused to pass in audit and approve said vouchers, upon the
ground that the exemption granted by the Monetary Board for petitioner's separate importations of
urea and formaldehyde is not in accord with the provisions of section 2, paragraph XVIII of Republic
Act No. 2609. On appeal taken by petitioner, the Auditor General subsequently affirmed said action of
the Auditor of the Bank. Hence, this petition for review.

The only question for determination in this case is whether or not "urea" and "formaldehyde" are
exempt by law from the payment of the aforesaid margin fee. The pertinent portion of Section 2 of
Republic Act No. 2609 reads:
 The margin established by the Monetary Board pursuant to the provision of section one hereof
shall not be imposed upon the sale of foreign exchange for the importation of the following:.

xxx     xxx     xxx

XVIII. Urea formaldehyde for the manufacture of plywood and hardboard when imported by
and for the exclusive use of end-users.

Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing stipulation of facts be admitted and
approved by this Honorable Court, without prejudice to the parties adducing other evidence to
prove their case not covered by this stipulation of facts. 1äwphï1.ñët

Petitioner maintains that the term "urea formaldehyde" appearing in this provision should be
construed as "urea andformaldehyde" (emphasis supplied) and that respondents herein, the Auditor
General and the Auditor of the Central Bank, have erred in holding otherwise. In this connection, it
should be noted that, whereas "urea" and "formaldehyde" are the principal raw materials in the
manufacture of synthetic resin glues, the National Institute of Science and Technology has
expressed, through its Commissioner, the view that:

Urea formaldehyde is not a chemical solution. It is the synthetic resin formed as a

condensation product from definite proportions of urea and formaldehyde under certain
conditions relating to temperature, acidity, and time of reaction. This produce when applied in
water solution and extended with inexpensive fillers constitutes a fairly low cost adhesive for
use in the manufacture of plywood.

Hence, "urea formaldehyde" is clearly a finished product, which is patently distinct and different from
urea" and "formaldehyde", as separate articles used in the manufacture of the synthetic resin known
as "urea formaldehyde". Petitioner contends, however, that the bill approved in Congress contained
the copulative conjunction "and" between the terms "urea" and "formaldehyde", and that the members
of Congress intended to exempt "urea" and "formaldehyde" separately as essential elements in the
manufacture of the synthetic resin glue called "urea" formaldehyde", not the latter as a finished
product, citing in support of this view the statements made on the floor of the Senate, during the
consideration of the bill before said House, by members thereof. But, said individual statements do
not necessarily reflect the view of the Senate. Much less do they indicate the intent of the House of
Representatives (see Song Kiat Chocolate Factory vs. Central Bank, 54 Off. Gaz., 615; Mayon
Motors Inc. vs. Acting Commissioner of Internal Revenue, L-15000 [March 29, 1961]; Manila Jockey
Club, Inc. vs. Games & Amusement Board, L-12727 [February 29, 1960]). Furthermore, it is well
settled that the enrolled bill — which uses the term "urea formaldehyde" instead of "urea and
formaldehyde" — is conclusive upon the courts as regards the tenor of the measure passed by
Congress and approved by the President (Primicias vs. Paredes, 61 Phil. 118, 120; Mabanag vs.
Lopez Vito, 78 Phil. 1; Macias vs. Comm. on Elections, L-18684, September 14, 1961). If there has
been any mistake in the printing ofthe bill before it was certified by the officers of Congress and
approved by the Executive — on which we cannot speculate, without jeopardizing the principle of
separation of powers and undermining one of the cornerstones of our democratic system — the
remedy is by amendment or curative legislation, not by judicial decree.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs against the petitioner. It is
so ordered.

Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Paredes, Dizon, Regala
and Makalintal, JJ., concur.