G.R. No.

L-45081             July 15, 1936

JOSE A. ANGARA, petitioner,

vs. judicial department. The Assembly also exercises the judicial power of trying
THE ELECTORAL COMMISSION, PEDRO YNSUA, MIGUEL impeachments. And the judiciary in turn, with the Supreme Court as the final
CASTILLO, and DIONISIO C. MAYOR, respondents. arbiter, effectively checks the other departments in the exercise of its power
to determine the law, and hence to declare executive and legislative acts void
Godofredo Reyes for petitioner. if violative of the Constitution.
Office of the Solicitor General Hilado for respondent Electoral Commission.
Pedro Ynsua in his own behalf. 3. ID.; ID.; ID.; JUDICIARY THE ONLY CONSTITUTIONAL ARBITER
No appearance for other respondents. TO ALLOCATE CONSTITUTIONAL BOUNDARIES. — But in the main,
the Constitution has blocked out with deft strokes and in bold lines, allotment
SYLLABUS of power to the executive, the legislative and the judicial departments of the
government. The overlapping and interlacing of functions and duties between
the several departments, however, sometimes makes it hard to say just where
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; SEPARATION OF POWERS. — The the one leaves off and the other begins. In times of social disquietude or
separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of government. political excitement, the great landmarks of the Constitution are apt to be
It obtains not through express provision but by actual division in our forgotten or marred, if not entirely obliterated. In cases of conflict, the
Constitution. Each department of the government has exclusive cognizance judicial department is the only constitutional organ which can be called upon
of matters within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere. to determine the proper allocation of powers between the several departments
and among the integral or constituent units thereof.
2. ID.; ID.; SYSTEM OF CHECKS AND BALANCES. — But it does not
follow from the fact that the three powers are to be kept separate and distinct 4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; MODERATING POWER OF THE JUDICIARY IS
that the Constitution intended them to be absolutely unrestrained and GRANTED, IF NOT EXPRESSLY, BY CLEAR IMPLICATION. — As any
independent of each other. The Constitution has provided for an elaborate human production, our Constitution is of course lacking perfection and
system of checks and balances to secure coordination in the workings of perfectibility, but as much as it was within the power of our people, acting
various departments of government. For example, the Chief Executive under through their delegates to so provide, that instrument which is the expression
our Constitution is 80 far made a check on the legislative power that his of their sovereignty however limited, has established a republican
assent is required in the enactment of laws. This, however, is subject to the government intended to operate and function as a harmonious whole, under a
further check that a bill may become a law notwithstanding the refusal of the system of checks and balances, and subject to specific limitations and
President to approve it, by a vote of two-thirds or three-fourths, as the case restrictions provided in the said instrument. The Constitution sets forth in no
may be, of the National Assembly. The President has also the right to uncertain language the restrictions and limitations upon governmental powers
convene the Assembly in special session whenever he chooses. On the other and agencies. If these restrictions and limitations are transcended, it would be
hand, the National Assembly operates as a check on the Executive in the inconceivable if the Constitution had not provided for a mechanism by which
sense that its consent through its Commission on Appointments is necessary to direct the course of government along constitutional channels, for, then,
in the appointment of certain officers; and the concurrence of a majority of the distribution of powers would be mere verbiage, the bill of rights mere
all its members is essential to the conclusion of treaties. Furthermore, in its expressions of sentiment, and the principles of good government mere
power to determine what courts other than the Supreme Court shall be political apothegms. Certainly, the limitations and restrictions embodied in
established, to define their jurisdiction and to appropriate funds for their the Constitution are real as they should be in any living constitution. In the
support, the National Assembly exercises to a certain extent control over the United States where no express constitutional grant is found in their
constitution, the possession of this moderating power of the courts, not to . . . the people who are authors of this blessing must also be its guardians . . .
speak of its historical origin and development there, has been set at rest by their eyes must be ever ready to mark, their voice to pronounce . . .
popular acquiescence for a period of more than one and a half centuries. In aggression on the authority of their constitution." In the last and ultimate
our case, this moderating power is granted, if not expressly, by clear analysis, then, must the success of our government in the unfolding years to
implication from section 2 of article VIII of our Constitution. come be tested in the crucible of Filipino minds and hearts than in the
consultation rooms and court chambers.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; WHAT IS MEANT BY "JUDICIAL SUPREMACY." —
The Constitution is a definition of the powers of government. Who is to 8. ID.; OUR CONSTITUTION HAS ADOPTED THE AMERICAN TYPE
determine the nature, scope and extent of such powers? The Constitution OF CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT. — Discarding the English type
itself has provided for the instrumentality of the judiciary as the rational way. and other European types of constitutional government, the framers of our
And when the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it does Constitution adopted the American type where the written constitution is
not assert any superiority over the other departments; it does not in reality interpreted and given effect by the judicial department. In some countries
nullify or invalidate an act of the Legislature, but only asserts the solemn and which have declined to follow the American example, provisions have been
sacred obligation assigned to it by the Constitution to determine conflicting inserted in their constitutions prohibiting the courts from exercising the
claims of authority under the Constitution and to establish for the parties in power to interpret the fundamental law. This is taken as a recognition of what
an actual controversy the rights which that instrument secures and guarantees otherwise would be the rule that in the absence of direct prohibition courts
to them. This is in truth all that is involved in what is termed "judicial are bound to assume what is logically their function. For instance, the
supremacy" which properly is the power of judicial review under the Constitution of Poland of 1921, expressly provides that courts shall have no
Constitution. power to examine the validity of statutes (article 81, chapter IV). The former
Austrian Constitution contained a similar declaration. In countries whose
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; JUDICIAL REVIEW LIMITED TO ACTUAL constitutions are silent in this respect, courts have assumed this power. This
LITIGATION; WISDOM, JUSTICE OR EXPEDIENCY OF is true in Norway, Greece, Australia and South Africa. Whereas, in
LEGISLATION. — Even then, this power of judicial review is limited to Czechoslovakia (arts. 2 and 3, Preliminary Law to Constitutional Charter of
actual cases and controversies to be exercised after full opportunity of the Czechoslovak Republic, February 29, 1920) and Spain (arts 121-123,
argument by the parties, and limited further to the constitutional question Title IX, Constitution of the Republic of 1931) especial constitutional courts
raised or the very lis mota presented. Any attempt at abstraction could only are established to pass upon the validity of ordinary laws.
lead to dialectics and barren legal questions and to sterile conclusions
unrelated to actualities. Narrowed as its function is in this manner, the 9. ID.; JURISDICTION OVER THE ELECTORAL COMMISSION. — The
judiciary does not pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of nature of the present controversy shows the necessity of a final constitutional
legislation. More than that, courts accord the presumption of constitutionality arbiter to determine the conflict of authority between two agencies created by
to legislative enactments not only because the Legislature is presumed to the Constitution. If the conflict were left undecided and undetermined, a void
abide by the Constitution but also because the judiciary in the determination would be created in our constitutional system which may in the long run
of actual cases and controversies must reflect the wisdom and justice of the prove destructive of the entire framework. Natura vacuum abhorret, so must
people as expressed through their representatives in the executive and we avoid exhaustion in our constitutional system. Upon principle, reason and
legislative departments of the government. authority, the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission
and the subject matter of the present controversy for the purpose of
7. ID.; ID.; ID.; SYSTEM ITSELF NOT THE CHIEF PALLADIUM OF determining the character, scope and extent of the constitutional grant to the
CONSTITUTIONAL LIBERTY; SUCCESS MUST BE TESTED IN THE Electoral Commission as "the sole judge of all contests relating to the
CRUCIBLE OF FILIPINO MINDS AND HEARTS. — But much as we election, returns and qualifications of the members of the National
might postulate on the internal checks of power provided in our Constitution, Assembly."cralaw virtua1aw library
it ought not the less to be remembered that, in the language of James
Madison, the system itself is not "the chief palladium of constitutional liberty 10. ID.; THE ELECTORAL COMMISSION; CONSTITUTIONAL GRANT
OF POWER TO THE ELECTORAL COMMISSION TO BE THE SOLE Constitution of Poland of March 17, 1921 (art. 19) and the Constitution of
JUDGE OF ALL CONTESTS RELATING TO THE ELECTION, the Free City of Danzig of May 13, 1922 (art. 10) vest the authority to decide
RETURNS AND QUALIFICATIONS OF MEMBERS OF THE contested elections to the Diet or National Assembly in the Supreme Court.
NATIONAL ASSEMBLY. — The original provision regarding this subject For the purpose of deciding legislative contests, the Constitution of the
in the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902 (sec. 7, par. 5) laying down the rule German Reich of July 1, 1919 (art. 31), the Constitution of the Czechoslovak
that the assembly shall be the judge of the elections, returns, and Republic of February 29, 1920 (art. 19) and the Constitution of the Grecian
qualifications of its members", was taken from clause 1 of section 5, Article I Republic of June 2, 1927 (art. 43) all provide for an Electoral Commission.
of the Constitution of the United States providing that "Each House shall be
the Judge of the Elections, Returns, and Qualifications of its own 12. ID.; ELECTORAL COMMISSION IN THE UNITED STATES. — The
Members, . . . ." The Act of Congress of August 29, 1916 (sec. 18, par. 1) creation of an Electoral Commission whose membership is recruited both
modified this provision by the insertion of the word "sole" as follows: "That from the legislature and the judiciary is by no means unknown in the United
the Senate and House of Representatives, respectively, shall be the sole States. In the presidential elections of 1876 there was a dispute as to the
judges of the elections, returns, and qualifications of their elective members, . number of electoral votes received by each of the two opposing candidates.
. ." apparently in order to emphasize the exclusive character of the As the Constitution made no adequate provision for such a contingency,
jurisdiction conferred upon each House of the Legislature over the particular Congress passed a law on January 29, 1877 (United States Statutes at Large,
cases therein specified. This court has had occasion to characterize this grant vol. 19, chap. 37, pp. 227-229), creating a special Electoral Commission
of power to the Philippine Senate and House of Representatives, respectively, composed of five members elected by the Senate, five members elected by
as "full, clear and complete." (Veloso v. Boards of Canvassers of Leyte and the House of Representatives, and five justices of the Supreme Court, the
Samar [1919], 39 Phil., 886, 888.) fifth justice to be selected by the four designated in the Act. The decision of
the commission was to be binding unless rejected by the two houses voting
11. ELECTORAL COMMISSION; HISTORICAL INSTANCES. — The separately. Although there is not much moral lesson to be derived from the
transfer of the power of determining the election, returns and qualifications experience of America in this regard, the experiment has at least abiding
of the members of the Legislature long lodged in the legislative body, to an historical interest.
independent, impartial and non-partisan tribunal, is by no means a mere
experiment in the science of government. As early as 1868, the House of 13. ID.; ID.; FAMILIARITY OF THE MEMBERS OF THE
Commons in England solved the problem of insuring the non-partisan CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION WITH THE HISTORY AND
settlement of the controverted elections of its members by abdicating its POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT OF OTHER COUNTRIES OF THE
prerogative to two judges of the King’s Bench of the High Court of Justice WORLD; ELECTORAL COMMISSION IS THE EXPRESSION OF THE
selected from a rota in accordance with rules of court made for the purpose. WISDOM AND ULTIMATE JUSTICE OF THE PEOPLE. — The members
Having proved successful, the practice has become imbedded in English of the Constitutional Convention who framed our fundamental law were in
jurisprudence (Parliamentary Elections Act, 1868 [31 & 32 Vict. c. 125] as their majority men mature in years and experience. To be sure, many of them
amended by Parliamentary Elections and Corrupt Practices Act, 1879 [42 & were familiar with the history and political development of other countries of
43 Vict. c. 75], s. 2; Corrupt and Illegal Practices Prevention Act 1883 [46 & the world. When, therefore, they deemed it wise to create an Electoral
47 Vict. c. 51], s. 70; Expiring Laws Continuance Act, 1911 [1 & 2 Geo. 5, c. Commission as a constitutional organ and invested it with the exclusive
22]; Laws of England, vol. XII, p. 408, vol. XXI, p. 787). In the Dominion of function of passing upon and determining the election, returns and
Canada, election contests which were originally heard by the Committee of qualifications of the members of the National Assembly, they must have
the House of Commons, are since 1922 tried in the courts. Likewise, in the done so not only in the light of their own experience but also having in view
Commonwealth of Australia, election contests which were originally the experience of other enlightened peoples of the world. The creation of the
determined by each house, are since 1922 tried in the High Court. In Electoral Commission was designed to remedy certain evils of which the
Hungary, the organic law provides that all protests against the election of framers of our Constitution were cognizant. Notwithstanding the vigorous
members of the Upper House of Diet are to be resolved by the Supreme opposition of some members of the Convention to its creation, the plan was
Administrative Court (Law 22 of 1916, chap. 2, art. 37, par. 6). The approved by that body by a vote of 98 against 58. All that can be said now is
that, upon the approval of the Constitution, the creation of the Electoral Assembly, is intended to be as complete and unimpaired as if it had remained
Commission is the expression of the wisdom and "ultimate justice of the originally in the Legislature. The express lodging of that power in the
people." (Abraham Lincoln, First Inaugural Address, March 4, 1861.) Electoral Commission is an implied denial of the exercise of that power by
the National Assembly. And this is as effective a restriction upon the
14. ID.; ID.; ID.; PURPOSE WAS TO TRANSFER IN ITS TOTALITY legislative power as an express prohibition in the constitution (Ex parte
POWER EXERCISED PREVIOUSLY BY THE LEGISLATURE OVER Lewis, 46 Tex. Crim. Rep., 1; State v. Whisman, 33 S. D., 260; L. R. A.,
THE CONTESTED ELECTIONS OF THE MEMBERS TO AN 1917B, 1). If the power claimed for the National Assembly to regulate the
INDEPENDENT AND IMPARTIAL TRIBUNAL. — From the proceedings of the Electoral Commission and cut off the power of the
deliberations of our Constitutional Convention it is evident that the purpose Electoral Commission to lay down a period within which protest should be
was to transfer in its totality all the powers previously exercised by the filed were conceded, the grant of power to the commission would be
Legislature in matters pertaining to contested elections of its members, to an ineffective. The Electoral Commission in such a case would be invested with
independent and impartial tribunal. It was not so much the knowledge and the power to determine contested cases involving the election, returns, and
appreciation of contemporary constitutional precedents, however, as the qualifications of the members of the National Assembly but subject at all
long-felt need of determining legislative contests devoid of partisan times to the regulative power of the National Assembly. Not only would the
considerations which prompted the people acting through their delegates to purpose of the framers of our Constitution of totally transferring this
the Convention to provide for this body known as the Electoral Commission. authority from the legislative body be frustrated, but a dual authority would
With this end in view, a composite body in which both the majority and be created with the resultant inevitable clash of powers from time to time. A
minority parties are equally represented to off-set partisan influence in its sad spectacle would then be presented of the Electoral Commission retaining
deliberations was created, and further endowed with judicial temper by the bare authority of taking cognizance of cases referred to, but in reality
including in its membership three justices of the Supreme Court. without the necessary means to render that authority effective whenever and
wherever the National Assembly has chosen to act, a situation worse than
15. ID.; ID.; ID.; THE ELECTORAL COMMISSION IS AN that intended to be remedied by the framers of our Constitution. The power to
INDEPENDENT CONSTITUTIONAL CREATION ALTHOUGH FOR regulate on the part of the National Assembly in procedural matters will
PURPOSES OF CLASSIFICATION IT IS CLOSER TO THE inevitably lead to the ultimate control by the Assembly of the entire
LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT THAN TO ANY OTHER. — The proceedings of the Electoral Commission, and, by indirection, to the entire
Electoral Commission is a constitutional creation, invested with the abrogation of the constitutional grant. It is obvious that this result should not
necessary authority in the performance and execution of the limited and be permitted.
specific function assigned to it by the Constitution. Although it is not a power
in our tripartite scheme of government, it is, to all intents and purposes, when 17. ID.; ID.; ID; ID.; THE POWER TO PROMULGATE INCIDENTAL
acting within the limits of its authority, an independent organ. It is, to be RULES AND REGULATIONS LODGED ALSO IN THE ELECTORAL
sure, closer to the legislative department than to any other. The location of COMMISSION BY NECESSARY IMPLICATION. — The creation of the
the provision (sec. 4) creating the Electoral Commission under Article VI Electoral Commission carried with it ex necesitate rei the power regulative in
entitled "Legislative Department" of our Constitution is very indicative. Its character to limit the time within which protests intrusted to its cognizance
composition is also significant in that it is constituted by a majority of should be filed. It is a settled rule of construction that where a general power
members of the Legislature. But it is a body separate from and independent is conferred or duty enjoined, every particular power necessary for the
of the Legislature. exercise of the one or the performance of the other is also conferred (Cooley,
Constitutional Limitations, eighth ed., vol. I, pp. 138, 139). In the absence of
16. ID.; ID; ID.; GRANT OF POWER TO THE ELECTORAL any further constitutional provision relating to the procedure to be followed
COMMISSION INTENDED TO BE AS COMPLETE AND UNIMPAIRED in filing protests before the Electoral Commission, therefore, the incidental
AS IF IT HAD REMAINED ORIGINALLY IN THE LEGISLATURE. — power to promulgate such rules necessary for the proper exercise of its
The grant of power to the Electoral Commission to judge all contests relating exclusive powers to judge all contests relating to the election, returns and
to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the National qualifications of members of the National Assembly, must be deemed by
necessary implication to have been lodged also in the Electoral Commission. official records on file in the archives division of the National Assembly
attached to the record of this case upon the petition of the petitioner, the three
18. ID; ID.; ID.; POSSIBILITY OF ABUSE NO ARGUMENT AGAINST justices of the Supreme Court and the six members of the National Assembly
GRANT OF POWER. — The possibility of abuse is not an argument against constituting the Electoral Commission were respectively designated only on
the concession of the power as there is no power that is not susceptible of December 4 and 6, 1936. If Resolution No. 8 of the National Assembly
abuse. If any mistake has been committed in the creation of an Electoral confirming non-protested elections of members of the National Assembly
Commission and in investing it with exclusive jurisdiction in all cases had the effect of limiting or tolling the time for the presentation of protests,
relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of members of the the result would be that the National Assembly — on the hypothesis that it
National Assembly, the remedy is political, not judicial, and must be sought still retained the incidental power of regulation in such cases — had already
through the ordinary processes of democracy. All the possible abuses of the barred the presentation of protests before the Electoral Commission had had
government are not intended to be corrected by the judiciary. The people in time to organize itself and deliberate on the mode and method to be followed
creating the Electoral Commission reposed as much confidence in this body in a matter entrusted to its exclusive jurisdiction by the Constitution. This
in the exclusive determination of the specified cases assigned to it, as it has result was not and could not have been contemplated, and should be avoided.
given to the Supreme Court in the proper cases entrusted to it for decision.
All the agencies of the government were designed by the Constitution to 20. ID.; ID.; ID.; CONFIRMATION BY THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY
achieve specific purposes, and each constitutional organ working within its CAN NOT DEPRIVE THE ELECTORAL COMMISSION OF ITS
own particular sphere of discretionary action must be deemed to be animated AUTHORITY TO FIX THE TIME WITHIN WHICH PROTESTS
with same zeal and honesty in accomplishing the great ends for which they AGAINST THE ELECTION, RETURNS AND QUALIFICATIONS OF
were created by the sovereign will. That the actuations of these constitutional MEMBERS OF THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY SHOULD BE FILED. —
agencies might leave much to be desired in given instances, is inherent in the Resolution No. 8 of the National Assembly confirming the election of
imperfections of human institutions. From the fact that the Electoral members against whom no protests has been filed at the time of its passage
Commission may not be interfered with in the exercise of its legitimate on December 3, 1936, can not be construed as a limitation upon the time for
power, it does not follow that its acts, however illegal or unconstitutional, the initiation of election contests. While there might have been good reason
may not be challenged in appropriate cases over which the courts may for the legislative practice of confirmation of members of the Legislature at
exercise jurisdiction. the time the power to decide election contests was still lodged in the
Legislature, confirmation alone by the Legislature cannot be construed as
19. ID.; ID.; ID.; FACTS OF THE CASE; EQUITABLE depriving the Electoral Commission of the authority incidental to its
CONSIDERATIONS. — The Commonwealth Government was inaugurated constitutional power to be "the sole judge of all contests relating to the
on November 15, 1935, on which date the Constitution, except as to the election, returns, and qualifications of the members of the National
provisions mentioned in section 6 of Article XV thereof, went into effect. Assembly", to fix the time for the filing of said election protests.
The new National Assembly convened on November 25, of that year, and the Confirmation by the National Assembly of the returns of its members against
resolution confirming the election of the petitioner was approved by that whose election no protests have been filed is, to all legal purposes,
body on December 3, 1935. The protest by the herein respondent against the unnecessary. Confirmation of the election of any member is not required by
election of the petitioner was filed on December 9 of the same year. The the Constitution before he can discharge his duties as such member. As a
pleadings do not show when the Electoral Commission was formally matter of fact, certification by the proper provincial board of canvassers is
organized but it does appear that on December 9, 1935, the Electoral sufficient to entitle a member-elect to a seat in the National Assembly and to
Commission met for the first time and approved a resolution fixing said date render him eligible to any office in said body (No. 1, par. 1, Rules of the
as the last day for the filing of election protests. When, therefore, the National Assembly, adopted December 6, 1935).
National Assembly passed its resolution of December 3, 1935, confirming
the election of the petitioner to the National Assembly, the Electoral 21. ID.; EFFECT OF CONFIRMATION UNDER THE JONES LAW. —
Commission had not yet met; neither does it appear that said body had Under the practice prevailing when the Jones Law was still in force, each
actually been organized. As a matter of fact, according to certified copies of House of the Philippine Legislature fixed the time when protests against the
election of any of its members should be filed. This was expressly authorized Dionisio Mayor, were candidates voted for the position of member of
by section 18 of the Jones Law making each House the sole judge of the the National Assembly for the first district of the Province of
election, returns and qualifications of its members, as well as by a law (sec. Tayabas;
478, Act No. 3387) empowering each House respectively to prescribe by
resolution the time and manner of filing contest the election of members of (2) That on October 7, 1935, the provincial board of canvassers,
said bodies. As a matter of formality, after the time fixed by its rules for the proclaimed the petitioner as member-elect of the National Assembly
filing of protests had already expired, each House passed a resolution for the said district, for having received the most number of votes;
confirming or approving the returns of such members against whose election
no protest had been filed within the prescribed time. This was interpreted as (3) That on November 15, 1935, the petitioner took his oath of
cutting off the filing of further protests against the election of those members office;
not theretofore contested (Amistad v. Claravall [Isabela], Second Philippine
Legislature, Record — First Period, p. 89; Urgello v. Rama [Third District, (4) That on December 3, 1935, the National Assembly in session
Cebu], Sixth Philippine Legislature; Fetalvero v. Festin [Romblon], Sixth assembled, passed the following resolution:
Philippine Legislature, Record — First Period, pp. 637-640; Kintanar v.
Aldanese [Fourth District, Cebu], Sixth Philippine Legislature, Record — [No. 8]
First Period, pp. 1121, 1122; Aguilar v. Corpus [Masbate], Eighth Philippine
Legislature, Record — First Period, vol. III, No. 56, pp. 892, 893). The
RESOLUCION CONFIRMANDO LAS ACTAS DE
Constitution has expressly repealed section 18 of the Jones Law. Act No.
AQUELLOS DIPUTADOS CONTRA QUIENES NO SE
3387, section 478, must be deemed to have been impliedly abrogated also,
HA PRESENTADO PROTESTA.
for the reason that with the power to determine all contests relating to the
election, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, is
inseparably linked the authority to prescribe regulations for the exercise of Se resuelve: Que las actas de eleccion de los Diputados
that power. There was thus no law nor constitutional provision which contra quienes no se hubiere presentado debidamente una
authorized the National Assembly to fix, as it is alleged to have fixed on protesta antes de la adopcion de la presente resolucion sean,
December 3, 1935, the time for the filing of contests against the election of como por la presente, son aprobadas y confirmadas.
its members. And what the National Assembly could not do directly, it could
not do by indirection through the medium of confirmation. Adoptada, 3 de diciembre, 1935.

LAUREL, J.: (5) That on December 8, 1935, the herein respondent Pedro Ynsua
filed before the Electoral Commission a "Motion of Protest" against
This is an original action instituted in this court by the petitioner, Jose A. the election of the herein petitioner, Jose A. Angara, being the only
Angara, for the issuance of a writ of prohibition to restrain and prohibit the protest filed after the passage of Resolutions No. 8 aforequoted, and
Electoral Commission, one of the respondents, from taking further praying, among other-things, that said respondent be declared elected
cognizance of the protest filed by Pedro Ynsua, another respondent, against member of the National Assembly for the first district of Tayabas, or
the election of said petitioner as member of the National Assembly for the that the election of said position be nullified;
first assembly district of the Province of Tayabas.
(6) That on December 9, 1935, the Electoral Commission adopted a
The facts of this case as they appear in the petition and as admitted by the resolution, paragraph 6 of which provides:
respondents are as follows:
6. La Comision no considerara ninguna protesta que no se
(1) That in the elections of September 17, 1935, the petitioner, Jose haya presentado en o antes de este dia.
A. Angara, and the respondents, Pedro Ynsua, Miguel Castillo and
 (7) That on December 20, 1935, the herein petitioner, Jose A. decision and to matters involving their internal organization, the
Angara, one of the respondents in the aforesaid protest, filed before Electoral Commission can regulate its proceedings only if the
the Electoral Commission a "Motion to Dismiss the Protest", alleging National Assembly has not availed of its primary power to so
(a) that Resolution No. 8 of Dismiss the Protest", alleging (a) that regulate such proceedings;
Resolution No. 8 of the National Assembly was adopted in the
legitimate exercise of its constitutional prerogative to prescribe the (d) That Resolution No. 8 of the National Assembly is, therefore,
period during which protests against the election of its members valid and should be respected and obeyed;
should be presented; (b) that the aforesaid resolution has for its
object, and is the accepted formula for, the limitation of said period; (e) That under paragraph 13 of section 1 of the ordinance appended
and (c) that the protest in question was filed out of the prescribed to the Constitution and paragraph 6 of article 7 of the Tydings-
period; McDuffie Law (No. 127 of the 73rd Congress of the United States)
as well as under section 1 and 3 (should be sections 1 and 2) of
(8) That on December 27, 1935, the herein respondent, Pedro Ynsua, article VIII of the Constitution, this Supreme Court has jurisdiction
filed an "Answer to the Motion of Dismissal" alleging that there is no to pass upon the fundamental question herein raised because it
legal or constitutional provision barring the presentation of a protest involves an interpretation of the Constitution of the Philippines.
against the election of a member of the National Assembly after
confirmation; On February 25, 1936, the Solicitor-General appeared and filed an answer in
behalf of the respondent Electoral Commission interposing the following
(9) That on December 31, 1935, the herein petitioner, Jose A. special defenses:
Angara, filed a "Reply" to the aforesaid "Answer to the Motion of
Dismissal"; (a) That the Electoral Commission has been created by the
Constitution as an instrumentality of the Legislative Department
(10) That the case being submitted for decision, the Electoral invested with the jurisdiction to decide "all contests relating to the
Commission promulgated a resolution on January 23, 1936, denying election, returns, and qualifications of the members of the National
herein petitioner's "Motion to Dismiss the Protest." Assembly"; that in adopting its resolution of December 9, 1935,
fixing this date as the last day for the presentation of protests against
The application of the petitioner sets forth the following grounds for the the election of any member of the National Assembly, it acted within
issuance of the writ prayed for: its jurisdiction and in the legitimate exercise of the implied powers
granted it by the Constitution to adopt the rules and regulations
(a) That the Constitution confers exclusive jurisdiction upon the essential to carry out the power and functions conferred upon the
electoral Commission solely as regards the merits of contested same by the fundamental law; that in adopting its resolution of
elections to the National Assembly; January 23, 1936, overruling the motion of the petitioner to dismiss
the election protest in question, and declaring itself with jurisdiction
(b) That the Constitution excludes from said jurisdiction the power to to take cognizance of said protest, it acted in the legitimate exercise
regulate the proceedings of said election contests, which power has of its quasi-judicial functions a an instrumentality of the Legislative
been reserved to the Legislative Department of the Government or Department of the Commonwealth Government, and hence said act
the National Assembly; is beyond the judicial cognizance or control of the Supreme Court;

(c) That like the Supreme Court and other courts created in (b) That the resolution of the National Assembly of December 3,
pursuance of the Constitution, whose exclusive jurisdiction relates 1935, confirming the election of the members of the National
solely to deciding the merits of controversies submitted to them for Assembly against whom no protest had thus far been filed, could not
and did not deprive the electoral Commission of its jurisdiction to
 take cognizance of election protests filed within the time that might (e) That the Electoral Commission is an independent entity created
be set by its own rules: by the Constitution, endowed with quasi-judicial functions, whose
decision are final and unappealable;
(c) That the Electoral Commission is a body invested with quasi-
judicial functions, created by the Constitution as an instrumentality ( f ) That the electoral Commission, as a constitutional creation, is
of the Legislative Department, and is not an "inferior tribunal, or not an inferior tribunal, corporation, board or person, within the
corporation, or board, or person" within the purview of section 226 terms of sections 226 and 516 of the Code of Civil Procedure; and
and 516 of the Code of Civil Procedure, against which prohibition that neither under the provisions of sections 1 and 2 of article II
would lie. (should be article VIII) of the Constitution and paragraph 13 of
section 1 of the Ordinance appended thereto could it be subject in the
The respondent Pedro Ynsua, in his turn, appeared and filed an answer in his exercise of its quasi-judicial functions to a writ of prohibition from
own behalf on March 2, 1936, setting forth the following as his special the Supreme Court;
defense:
(g) That paragraph 6 of article 7 of the Tydings-McDuffie Law (No.
(a) That at the time of the approval of the rules of the Electoral 127 of the 73rd Congress of the united States) has no application to
Commission on December 9, 1935, there was no existing law fixing the case at bar.
the period within which protests against the election of members of
the National Assembly should be filed; that in fixing December 9, The case was argued before us on March 13, 1936. Before it was submitted
1935, as the last day for the filing of protests against the election of for decision, the petitioner prayed for the issuance of a preliminary writ of
members of the National Assembly, the Electoral Commission was injunction against the respondent Electoral Commission which petition was
exercising a power impliedly conferred upon it by the Constitution, denied "without passing upon the merits of the case" by resolution of this
by reason of its quasi-judicial attributes; court of March 21, 1936.

(b) That said respondent presented his motion of protest before the There was no appearance for the other respondents.
Electoral Commission on December 9, 1935, the last day fixed by
paragraph 6 of the rules of the said Electoral Commission; The issues to be decided in the case at bar may be reduced to the following
two principal propositions:
(c) That therefore the Electoral Commission acquired jurisdiction
over the protest filed by said respondent and over the parties thereto, 1. Has the Supreme Court jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission
and the resolution of the Electoral Commission of January 23, 1936, and the subject matter of the controversy upon the foregoing related
denying petitioner's motion to dismiss said protest was an act within facts, and in the affirmative,
the jurisdiction of the said commission, and is not reviewable by
means of a writ of prohibition; 2. Has the said Electoral Commission acted without or in excess of
its jurisdiction in assuming to the cognizance of the protest filed the
(d) That neither the law nor the Constitution requires confirmation by election of the herein petitioner notwithstanding the previous
the National Assembly of the election of its members, and that such confirmation of such election by resolution of the National
confirmation does not operate to limit the period within which Assembly?
protests should be filed as to deprive the Electoral Commission of
jurisdiction over protest filed subsequent thereto; We could perhaps dispose of this case by passing directly upon the merits of
the controversy. However, the question of jurisdiction having been presented,
we do not feel justified in evading the issue. Being a case primæ
impressionis, it would hardly be consistent with our sense of duty to overlook which can be called upon to determine the proper allocation of powers
the broader aspect of the question and leave it undecided. Neither would we between the several departments and among the integral or constituent units
be doing justice to the industry and vehemence of counsel were we not to thereof.
pass upon the question of jurisdiction squarely presented to our
consideration. As any human production, our Constitution is of course lacking perfection
and perfectibility, but as much as it was within the power of our people,
The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of acting through their delegates to so provide, that instrument which is the
government. It obtains not through express provision but by actual division in expression of their sovereignty however limited, has established a republican
our Constitution. Each department of the government has exclusive government intended to operate and function as a harmonious whole, under a
cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own system of checks and balances, and subject to specific limitations and
sphere. But it does not follow from the fact that the three powers are to be restrictions provided in the said instrument. The Constitution sets forth in no
kept separate and distinct that the Constitution intended them to be absolutely uncertain language the restrictions and limitations upon governmental powers
unrestrained and independent of each other. The Constitution has provided and agencies. If these restrictions and limitations are transcended it would be
for an elaborate system of checks and balances to secure coordination in the inconceivable if the Constitution had not provided for a mechanism by which
workings of the various departments of the government. For example, the to direct the course of government along constitutional channels, for then the
Chief Executive under our Constitution is so far made a check on the distribution of powers would be mere verbiage, the bill of rights mere
legislative power that this assent is required in the enactment of laws. This, expressions of sentiment, and the principles of good government mere
however, is subject to the further check that a bill may become a law political apothegms. Certainly, the limitation and restrictions embodied in
notwithstanding the refusal of the President to approve it, by a vote of two- our Constitution are real as they should be in any living constitution. In the
thirds or three-fourths, as the case may be, of the National Assembly. The United States where no express constitutional grant is found in their
President has also the right to convene the Assembly in special session constitution, the possession of this moderating power of the courts, not to
whenever he chooses. On the other hand, the National Assembly operates as speak of its historical origin and development there, has been set at rest by
a check on the Executive in the sense that its consent through its Commission popular acquiescence for a period of more than one and a half centuries. In
on Appointments is necessary in the appointments of certain officers; and the our case, this moderating power is granted, if not expressly, by clear
concurrence of a majority of all its members is essential to the conclusion of implication from section 2 of article VIII of our constitution.
treaties. Furthermore, in its power to determine what courts other than the
Supreme Court shall be established, to define their jurisdiction and to The Constitution is a definition of the powers of government. Who is to
appropriate funds for their support, the National Assembly controls the determine the nature, scope and extent of such powers? The Constitution
judicial department to a certain extent. The Assembly also exercises the itself has provided for the instrumentality of the judiciary as the rational way.
judicial power of trying impeachments. And the judiciary in turn, with the And when the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it does
Supreme Court as the final arbiter, effectively checks the other departments not assert any superiority over the other departments; it does not in reality
in the exercise of its power to determine the law, and hence to declare nullify or invalidate an act of the legislature, but only asserts the solemn and
executive and legislative acts void if violative of the Constitution. sacred obligation assigned to it by the Constitution to determine conflicting
claims of authority under the Constitution and to establish for the parties in
But in the main, the Constitution has blocked out with deft strokes and in an actual controversy the rights which that instrument secures and guarantees
bold lines, allotment of power to the executive, the legislative and the judicial to them. This is in truth all that is involved in what is termed "judicial
departments of the government. The overlapping and interlacing of functions supremacy" which properly is the power of judicial review under the
and duties between the several departments, however, sometimes makes it Constitution. Even then, this power of judicial review is limited to actual
hard to say just where the one leaves off and the other begins. In times of cases and controversies to be exercised after full opportunity of argument by
social disquietude or political excitement, the great landmarks of the the parties, and limited further to the constitutional question raised or the
Constitution are apt to be forgotten or marred, if not entirely obliterated. In very lis mota presented. Any attempt at abstraction could only lead to
cases of conflict, the judicial department is the only constitutional organ dialectics and barren legal questions and to sterile conclusions unrelated to
actualities. Narrowed as its function is in this manner, the judiciary does not solemn and inescapable obligation of interpreting the Constitution and
pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation. More defining constitutional boundaries. The Electoral Commission, as we shall
than that, courts accord the presumption of constitutionality to legislative have occasion to refer hereafter, is a constitutional organ, created for a
enactments, not only because the legislature is presumed to abide by the specific purpose, namely to determine all contests relating to the election,
Constitution but also because the judiciary in the determination of actual returns and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly.
cases and controversies must reflect the wisdom and justice of the people as Although the Electoral Commission may not be interfered with, when and
expressed through their representatives in the executive and legislative while acting within the limits of its authority, it does not follow that it is
departments of the governments of the government. beyond the reach of the constitutional mechanism adopted by the people and
that it is not subject to constitutional restrictions. The Electoral Commission
But much as we might postulate on the internal checks of power provided in is not a separate department of the government, and even if it were,
our Constitution, it ought not the less to be remembered that, in the language conflicting claims of authority under the fundamental law between
of James Madison, the system itself is not "the chief palladium of department powers and agencies of the government are necessarily
constitutional liberty . . . the people who are authors of this blessing must determined by the judiciary in justifiable and appropriate cases. Discarding
also be its guardians . . . their eyes must be ever ready to mark, their voice to the English type and other European types of constitutional government, the
pronounce . . . aggression on the authority of their constitution." In the Last framers of our constitution adopted the American type where the written
and ultimate analysis, then, must the success of our government in the constitution is interpreted and given effect by the judicial department. In
unfolding years to come be tested in the crucible of Filipino minds and hearts some countries which have declined to follow the American example,
than in consultation rooms and court chambers. provisions have been inserted in their constitutions prohibiting the courts
from exercising the power to interpret the fundamental law. This is taken as a
In the case at bar, the national Assembly has by resolution (No. 8) of recognition of what otherwise would be the rule that in the absence of direct
December 3, 1935, confirmed the election of the herein petitioner to the said prohibition courts are bound to assume what is logically their function. For
body. On the other hand, the Electoral Commission has by resolution adopted instance, the Constitution of Poland of 1921, expressly provides that courts
on December 9, 1935, fixed said date as the last day for the filing of protests shall have no power to examine the validity of statutes (art. 81, chap. IV).
against the election, returns and qualifications of members of the National The former Austrian Constitution contained a similar declaration. In
Assembly, notwithstanding the previous confirmation made by the National countries whose constitutions are silent in this respect, courts have assumed
Assembly as aforesaid. If, as contended by the petitioner, the resolution of this power. This is true in Norway, Greece, Australia and South Africa.
the National Assembly has the effect of cutting off the power of the Electoral Whereas, in Czechoslovakia (arts. 2 and 3, Preliminary Law to constitutional
Commission to entertain protests against the election, returns and Charter of the Czechoslovak Republic, February 29, 1920) and Spain (arts.
qualifications of members of the National Assembly, submitted after 121-123, Title IX, Constitutional of the Republic of 1931) especial
December 3, 1935, then the resolution of the Electoral Commission of constitutional courts are established to pass upon the validity of ordinary
December 9, 1935, is mere surplusage and had no effect. But, if, as laws. In our case, the nature of the present controversy shows the necessity of
contended by the respondents, the Electoral Commission has the sole power a final constitutional arbiter to determine the conflict of authority between
of regulating its proceedings to the exclusion of the National Assembly, then two agencies created by the Constitution. Were we to decline to take
the resolution of December 9, 1935, by which the Electoral Commission cognizance of the controversy, who will determine the conflict? And if the
fixed said date as the last day for filing protests against the election, returns conflict were left undecided and undetermined, would not a void be thus
and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, should be upheld. created in our constitutional system which may be in the long run prove
destructive of the entire framework? To ask these questions is to answer
Here is then presented an actual controversy involving as it does a conflict of them. Natura vacuum abhorret, so must we avoid exhaustion in our
a grave constitutional nature between the National Assembly on the one constitutional system. Upon principle, reason and authority, we are clearly of
hand, and the Electoral Commission on the other. From the very nature of the the opinion that upon the admitted facts of the present case, this court has
republican government established in our country in the light of American jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the subject mater of the
experience and of our own, upon the judicial department is thrown the present controversy for the purpose of determining the character, scope and
extent of the constitutional grant to the Electoral Commission as "the sole The first step towards the creation of an independent tribunal for the purpose
judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the of deciding contested elections to the legislature was taken by the sub-
members of the National Assembly." committee of five appointed by the Committee on Constitutional Guarantees
of the Constitutional Convention, which sub-committee submitted a report on
Having disposed of the question of jurisdiction, we shall now proceed to pass August 30, 1934, recommending the creation of a Tribunal of Constitutional
upon the second proposition and determine whether the Electoral Security empowered to hear legislature but also against the election of
Commission has acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction in adopting executive officers for whose election the vote of the whole nation is required,
its resolution of December 9, 1935, and in assuming to take cognizance of as well as to initiate impeachment proceedings against specified executive
the protest filed against the election of the herein petitioner notwithstanding and judicial officer. For the purpose of hearing legislative protests, the
the previous confirmation thereof by the National Assembly on December 3, tribunal was to be composed of three justices designated by the Supreme
1935. As able counsel for the petitioner has pointed out, the issue hinges on Court and six members of the house of the legislature to which the contest
the interpretation of section 4 of Article VI of the Constitution which corresponds, three members to be designed by the majority party and three
provides: by the minority, to be presided over by the Senior Justice unless the Chief
Justice is also a member in which case the latter shall preside. The foregoing
"SEC. 4. There shall be an Electoral Commission composed of three Justice proposal was submitted by the Committee on Constitutional Guarantees to
of the Supreme Court designated by the Chief Justice, and of six Members the Convention on September 15, 1934, with slight modifications consisting
chosen by the National Assembly, three of whom shall be nominated by the in the reduction of the legislative representation to four members, that is, two
party having the largest number of votes, and three by the party having the senators to be designated one each from the two major parties in the Senate
second largest number of votes therein. The senior Justice in the Commission and two representatives to be designated one each from the two major parties
shall be its Chairman. The Electoral Commission shall be the sole judge of in the House of Representatives, and in awarding representation to the
all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the members executive department in the persons of two representatives to be designated
of the National Assembly." It is imperative, therefore, that we delve into the by the President.
origin and history of this constitutional provision and inquire into the
intention of its framers and the people who adopted it so that we may Meanwhile, the Committee on Legislative Power was also preparing its
properly appreciate its full meaning, import and significance. report. As submitted to the Convention on September 24, 1934 subsection 5,
section 5, of the proposed Article on the Legislative Department, reads as
The original provision regarding this subject in the Act of Congress of July 1, follows:
1902 (sec. 7, par. 5) laying down the rule that "the assembly shall be the
judge of the elections, returns, and qualifications of its members", was taken The elections, returns and qualifications of the members of either
from clause 1 of section 5, Article I of the Constitution of the United States house and all cases contesting the election of any of their members
providing that "Each House shall be the Judge of the Elections, Returns, and shall be judged by an Electoral Commission, constituted, as to each
Qualifications of its own Members, . . . ." The Act of Congress of August 29, House, by three members elected by the members of the party having
1916 (sec. 18, par. 1) modified this provision by the insertion of the word the largest number of votes therein, three elected by the members of
"sole" as follows: "That the Senate and House of Representatives, the party having the second largest number of votes, and as to its
respectively, shall be the sole judges of the elections, returns, and Chairman, one Justice of the Supreme Court designated by the Chief
qualifications of their elective members . . ." apparently in order to Justice.
emphasize the exclusive the Legislative over the particular case s therein
specified. This court has had occasion to characterize this grant of power to The idea of creating a Tribunal of Constitutional Security with
the Philippine Senate and House of Representatives, respectively, as "full, comprehensive jurisdiction as proposed by the Committee on Constitutional
clear and complete" (Veloso vs. Boards of Canvassers of Leyte and Samar Guarantees which was probably inspired by the Spanish plan (art. 121,
[1919], 39 Phil., 886, 888.) Constitution of the Spanish Republic of 1931), was soon abandoned in favor
of the proposition of the Committee on Legislative Power to create a similar
body with reduced powers and with specific and limited jurisdiction, to be Mr. VENTURA. But does that carry the idea also that the Electoral
designated as a Electoral Commission. The Sponsorship Committee modified Commission shall confirm also the election of those whose election
the proposal of the Committee on Legislative Power with respect to the is not contested?
composition of the Electoral Commission and made further changes in
phraseology to suit the project of adopting a unicameral instead of a Mr. ROXAS. There is no need of confirmation. As the gentleman
bicameral legislature. The draft as finally submitted to the Convention on knows, the action of the House of Representatives confirming the
October 26, 1934, reads as follows: election of its members is just a matter of the rules of the assembly.
It is not constitutional. It is not necessary. After a man files his
(6) The elections, returns and qualifications of the Members of the credentials that he has been elected, that is sufficient, unless his
National Assembly and all cases contesting the election of any of its election is contested.
Members shall be judged by an Electoral Commission, composed of
three members elected by the party having the largest number of Mr. VENTURA. But I do not believe that that is sufficient, as we
votes in the National Assembly, three elected by the members of the have observed that for purposes of the auditor, in the matter of
party having the second largest number of votes, and three justices of election of a member to a legislative body, because he will not
the Supreme Court designated by the Chief Justice, the Commission authorize his pay.
to be presided over by one of said justices.
Mr. ROXAS. Well, what is the case with regards to the municipal
During the discussion of the amendment introduced by Delegates Labrador, president who is elected? What happens with regards to the
Abordo, and others, proposing to strike out the whole subsection of the councilors of a municipality? Does anybody confirm their election?
foregoing draft and inserting in lieu thereof the following: "The National The municipal council does this: it makes a canvass and proclaims
Assembly shall be the soled and exclusive judge of the elections, returns, and — in this case the municipal council proclaims who has been elected,
qualifications of the Members", the following illuminating remarks were and it ends there, unless there is a contest. It is the same case; there is
made on the floor of the Convention in its session of December 4, 1934, as to no need on the part of the Electoral Commission unless there is a
the scope of the said draft: contest. The first clause refers to the case referred to by the
gentleman from Cavite where one person tries to be elected in place
xxx     xxx     xxx of another who was declared elected. From example, in a case when
the residence of the man who has been elected is in question, or in
Mr. VENTURA. Mr. President, we have a doubt here as to the scope case the citizenship of the man who has been elected is in question.
of the meaning of the first four lines, paragraph 6, page 11 of the
draft, reading: "The elections, returns and qualifications of the However, if the assembly desires to annul the power of the
Members of the National Assembly and all cases contesting the commission, it may do so by certain maneuvers upon its first meeting
election of any of its Members shall be judged by an Electoral when the returns are submitted to the assembly. The purpose is to
Commission, . . ." I should like to ask from the gentleman from give to the Electoral Commission all the powers exercised by the
Capiz whether the election and qualification of the member whose assembly referring to the elections, returns and qualifications of the
elections is not contested shall also be judged by the Electoral members. When there is no contest, there is nothing to be judged.
Commission.
Mr. VENTURA. Then it should be eliminated.
Mr. ROXAS. If there is no question about the election of the
members, there is nothing to be judged; that is why the word "judge" Mr. ROXAS. But that is a different matter, I think Mr. Delegate.
is used to indicate a controversy. If there is no question about the
election of a member, there is nothing to be submitted to the
Electoral Commission and there is nothing to be determined.
Mr. CINCO. Mr. President, I have a similar question as that Mr. ROXAS. Yes, by the Electoral Commission.
propounded by the gentleman from Ilocos Norte when I arose a
while ago. However I want to ask more questions from the delegate Mr. LABRADOR. So that under this draft, no member of the
from Capiz. This paragraph 6 on page 11 of the draft cites cases assembly has the right to question the eligibility of its members?
contesting the election as separate from the first part of the sections
which refers to elections, returns and qualifications. Mr. ROXAS. Before a member can question the eligibility, he must
go to the Electoral Commission and make the question before the
Mr. ROXAS. That is merely for the sake of clarity. In fact the cases Electoral Commission.
of contested elections are already included in the phrase "the
elections, returns and qualifications." This phrase "and contested Mr. LABRADOR. So that the Electoral Commission shall decide
elections" was inserted merely for the sake of clarity. whether the election is contested or not contested.

Mr. CINCO. Under this paragraph, may not the Electoral Mr. ROXAS. Yes, sir: that is the purpose.
Commission, at its own instance, refuse to confirm the elections of
the members." Mr. PELAYO. Mr. President, I would like to be informed if the
Electoral Commission has power and authority to pass upon the
Mr. ROXAS. I do not think so, unless there is a protest. qualifications of the members of the National Assembly even though
that question has not been raised.
Mr. LABRADOR. Mr. President, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. ROXAS. I have just said that they have no power, because they
THE PRESIDENT. The gentleman may yield, if he so desires. can only judge.

Mr. ROXAS. Willingly. In the same session, the first clause of the aforesaid draft reading "The
election, returns and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly
Mr. LABRADOR. Does not the gentleman from Capiz believe that and" was eliminated by the Sponsorship Committee in response to an
unless this power is granted to the assembly, the assembly on its own amendment introduced by Delegates Francisco, Ventura, Vinzons, Rafols,
motion does not have the right to contest the election and Lim, Mumar and others. In explaining the difference between the original
qualification of its members? draft and the draft as amended, Delegate Roxas speaking for the Sponsorship
Committee said:
Mr. ROXAS. I have no doubt but that the gentleman is right. If this
draft is retained as it is, even if two-thirds of the assembly believe xxx     xxx     xxx
that a member has not the qualifications provided by law, they
cannot remove him for that reason. Sr. ROXAS. La diferencia, señor Presidente, consiste solamente en
obviar la objecion apuntada por varios Delegados al efecto de que la
Mr. LABRADOR. So that the right to remove shall only be retained primera clausula del draft que dice: "The elections, returns and
by the Electoral Commission. qualifications of the members of the National Assembly" parece que
da a la Comision Electoral la facultad de determinar tambien la
Mr. ROXAS. By the assembly for misconduct. eleccion de los miembros que no ha sido protestados y para obviar
esa dificultad, creemos que la enmienda tien razon en ese sentido, si
Mr. LABRADOR. I mean with respect to the qualifications of the enmendamos el draft, de tal modo que se lea como sigue: "All cases
members. contesting the election", de modo que los jueces de la Comision
 Electoral se limitaran solamente a los casos en que haya habido this amendment by a vote of seventy-six (76) against forty-six (46), thus
protesta contra las actas." Before the amendment of Delegate maintaining the non-partisan character of the commission.
Labrador was voted upon the following interpellation also took
place: As approved on January 31, 1935, the draft was made to read as follows:

El Sr. CONEJERO. Antes de votarse la enmienda, quisiera (6) All cases contesting the elections, returns and qualifications of
the Members of the National Assembly shall be judged by an
El Sr. PRESIDENTE. ¿Que dice el Comite? Electoral Commission, composed of three members elected by the
party having the largest number of votes in the National Assembly,
El Sr. ROXAS. Con mucho gusto. three elected by the members of the party having the second largest
number of votes, and three justices of the Supreme Court designated
El Sr. CONEJERO. Tal como esta el draft, dando tres miembros a la by the Chief Justice, the Commission to be presided over by one of
mayoria, y otros tres a la minoria y tres a la Corte Suprema, ¿no cree said justices.
Su Señoria que esto equivale practicamente a dejar el asunto a los
miembros del Tribunal Supremo? The Style Committee to which the draft was submitted revised it as follows:

El Sr. ROXAS. Si y no. Creemos que si el tribunal o la Commission SEC. 4. There shall be an Electoral Commission composed of three
esta constituido en esa forma, tanto los miembros de la mayoria Justices of the Supreme Court designated by the Chief Justice, and of
como los de la minoria asi como los miembros de la Corte Suprema six Members chosen by the National Assembly, three of whom shall
consideraran la cuestion sobre la base de sus meritos, sabiendo que el be nominated by the party having the largest number of votes, and
partidismo no es suficiente para dar el triunfo. three by the party having the second largest number of votes therein.
The senior Justice in the Commission shall be its chairman. The
El Sr. CONEJERO. ¿Cree Su Señoria que en un caso como ese, Electoral Commission shall be the sole judge of the election, returns,
podriamos hacer que tanto los de la mayoria como los de la minoria and qualifications of the Members of the National Assembly.
prescindieran del partidismo?
When the foregoing draft was submitted for approval on February 8, 1935,
El Sr. ROXAS. Creo que si, porque el partidismo no les daria el the Style Committee, through President Recto, to effectuate the original
triunfo. intention of the Convention, agreed to insert the phrase "All contests relating
to" between the phrase "judge of" and the words "the elections", which was
xxx     xxx     xxx accordingly accepted by the Convention.

The amendment introduced by Delegates Labrador, Abordo and others The transfer of the power of determining the election, returns and
seeking to restore the power to decide contests relating to the election, qualifications of the members of the legislature long lodged in the legislative
returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly to the body, to an independent, impartial and non-partisan tribunal, is by no means
National Assembly itself, was defeated by a vote of ninety-eight (98) against a mere experiment in the science of government.
fifty-six (56).
Cushing, in his Law and Practice of Legislative Assemblies (ninth edition,
In the same session of December 4, 1934, Delegate Cruz (C.) sought to chapter VI, pages 57, 58), gives a vivid account of the "scandalously
amend the draft by reducing the representation of the minority party and the notorious" canvassing of votes by political parties in the disposition of
Supreme Court in the Electoral Commission to two members each, so as to contests by the House of Commons in the following passages which are
accord more representation to the majority party. The Convention rejected
partly quoted by the petitioner in his printed memorandum of March 14, of commons, undertook to propose a remedy for the evil, and, on the
1936: 7th of March, 1770, obtained the unanimous leave of the house to
bring in a bill, "to regulate the trial of controverted elections, or
153. From the time when the commons established their right to be returns of members to serve in parliament." In his speech to explain
the exclusive judges of the elections, returns, and qualifications of his plan, on the motion for leave, Mr. Grenville alluded to the
their members, until the year 1770, two modes of proceeding existing practice in the following terms: "Instead of trusting to the
prevailed, in the determination of controverted elections, and rights merits of their respective causes, the principal dependence of both
of membership. One of the standing committees appointed at the parties is their private interest among us; and it is scandalously
commencement of each session, was denominated the committee of notorious that we are as earnestly canvassed to attend in favor of the
privileges and elections, whose functions was to hear and investigate opposite sides, as if we were wholly self-elective, and not bound to
all questions of this description which might be referred to them, and act by the principles of justice, but by the discretionary impulse of
to report their proceedings, with their opinion thereupon, to the our own inclinations; nay, it is well known, that in every contested
house, from time to time. When an election petition was referred to election, many members of this house, who are ultimately to judge in
this committee they heard the parties and their witnesses and other a kind of judicial capacity between the competitors, enlist themselves
evidence, and made a report of all the evidence, together with their as parties in the contention, and take upon themselves the partial
opinion thereupon, in the form of resolutions, which were considered management of the very business, upon which they should determine
and agreed or disagreed to by the house. The other mode of with the strictest impartiality."
proceeding was by a hearing at the bar of the house itself. When this
court was adopted, the case was heard and decided by the house, in 155. It was to put an end to the practices thus described, that Mr.
substantially the same manner as by a committee. The committee of Grenville brought in a bill which met with the approbation of both
privileges and elections although a select committee. The committee houses, and received the royal assent on the 12th of April, 1770. This
of privileges and elections although a select committee was usually was the celebrated law since known by the name of the Grenville
what is called an open one; that is to say, in order to constitute the Act; of which Mr. Hatsell declares, that it "was one of the nobles
committee, a quorum of the members named was required to be works, for the honor of the house of commons, and the security of
present, but all the members of the house were at liberty to attend the the constitution, that was ever devised by any minister or statesman."
committee and vote if they pleased. It is probable, that the magnitude of the evil, or the apparent success
of the remedy, may have led many of the contemporaries of the
154. With the growth of political parties in parliament questions measure to the information of a judgement, which was not
relating to the right of membership gradually assumed a political acquiesced in by some of the leading statesmen of the day, and has
character; so that for many years previous to the year 1770, not been entirely confirmed by subsequent experience. The bill was
controverted elections had been tried and determined by the house of objected to by Lord North, Mr. De Grey, afterwards chief justice of
commons, as mere party questions, upon which the strength of the common pleas, Mr. Ellis, Mr. Dyson, who had been clerk of the
contending factions might be tested. Thus, for Example, in 1741, Sir house, and Mr. Charles James Fox, chiefly on the ground, that the
Robert Walpole, after repeated attacks upon his government, introduction of the new system was an essential alteration of the
resigned his office in consequence of an adverse vote upon the constitution of parliament, and a total abrogation of one of the most
Chippenham election. Mr. Hatsell remarks, of the trial of election important rights and jurisdictions of the house of commons.
cases, as conducted under this system, that "Every principle of
decency and justice were notoriously and openly prostituted, from As early as 1868, the House of Commons in England solved the problem of
whence the younger part of the house were insensibly, but too insuring the non-partisan settlement of the controverted elections of its
successfully, induced to adopt the same licentious conduct in more members by abdicating its prerogative to two judges of the King's Bench of
serious matters, and in questions of higher importance to the public the High Court of Justice selected from a rota in accordance with rules of
welfare." Mr. George Grenville, a distinguished member of the house court made for the purpose. Having proved successful, the practice has
become imbedded in English jurisprudence (Parliamentary Elections Act, many of them were familiar with the history and political development of
1868 [31 & 32 Vict. c. 125] as amended by Parliamentary Elections and other countries of the world. When , therefore, they deemed it wise to create
Corrupt Practices Act. 1879 [42 & 43 Vict. c. 75], s. 2; Corrupt and Illegal an Electoral Commission as a constitutional organ and invested it with the
Practices Preventions Act, 1883 [46 & 47 Vict. c. 51;, s. 70; Expiring Laws exclusive function of passing upon and determining the election, returns and
Continuance Act, 1911 [1 & 2 Geo. 5, c. 22]; Laws of England, vol. XII, p. qualifications of the members of the National Assembly, they must have
408, vol. XXI, p. 787). In the Dominion of Canada, election contests which done so not only in the light of their own experience but also having in view
were originally heard by the Committee of the House of Commons, are since the experience of other enlightened peoples of the world. The creation of the
1922 tried in the courts. Likewise, in the Commonwealth of Australia, Electoral Commission was designed to remedy certain evils of which the
election contests which were originally determined by each house, are since framers of our Constitution were cognizant. Notwithstanding the vigorous
1922 tried in the High Court. In Hungary, the organic law provides that all opposition of some members of the Convention to its creation, the plan, as
protests against the election of members of the Upper House of the Diet are hereinabove stated, was approved by that body by a vote of 98 against 58. All
to be resolved by the Supreme Administrative Court (Law 22 of 1916, chap. that can be said now is that, upon the approval of the constitutional the
2, art. 37, par. 6). The Constitution of Poland of March 17, 1921 (art. 19) and creation of the Electoral Commission is the expression of the wisdom and
the Constitution of the Free City of Danzig of May 13, 1922 (art. 10) vest the "ultimate justice of the people". (Abraham Lincoln, First Inaugural Address,
authority to decide contested elections to the Diet or National Assembly in March 4, 1861.)
the Supreme Court. For the purpose of deciding legislative contests, the
Constitution of the German Reich of July 1, 1919 (art. 31), the Constitution From the deliberations of our Constitutional Convention it is evident that the
of the Czechoslovak Republic of February 29, 1920 (art. 19) and the purpose was to transfer in its totality all the powers previously exercised by
Constitution of the Grecian Republic of June 2, 1927 (art. 43), all provide for the legislature in matters pertaining to contested elections of its members, to
an Electoral Commission. an independent and impartial tribunal. It was not so much the knowledge and
appreciation of contemporary constitutional precedents, however, as the
The creation of an Electoral Commission whose membership is recruited long-felt need of determining legislative contests devoid of partisan
both from the legislature and the judiciary is by no means unknown in the considerations which prompted the people, acting through their delegates to
United States. In the presidential elections of 1876 there was a dispute as to the Convention, to provide for this body known as the Electoral Commission.
the number of electoral votes received by each of the two opposing With this end in view, a composite body in which both the majority and
candidates. As the Constitution made no adequate provision for such a minority parties are equally represented to off-set partisan influence in its
contingency, Congress passed a law on January 29, 1877 (United States deliberations was created, and further endowed with judicial temper by
Statutes at Large, vol. 19, chap. 37, pp. 227-229), creating a special Electoral including in its membership three justices of the Supreme Court.
Commission composed of five members elected by the Senate, five members
elected by the House of Representatives, and five justices of the Supreme The Electoral Commission is a constitutional creation, invested with the
Court, the fifth justice to be selected by the four designated in the Act. The necessary authority in the performance and execution of the limited and
decision of the commission was to be binding unless rejected by the two specific function assigned to it by the Constitution. Although it is not a
houses voting separately. Although there is not much of a moral lesson to be power in our tripartite scheme of government, it is, to all intents and
derived from the experience of America in this regard, judging from the purposes, when acting within the limits of its authority, an independent
observations of Justice Field, who was a member of that body on the part of organ. It is, to be sure, closer to the legislative department than to any
the Supreme Court (Countryman, the Supreme Court of the United States and other. The location of the provision (section 4) creating the Electoral
its Appellate Power under the Constitution [Albany, 1913] — Relentless Commission under Article VI entitled "Legislative Department" of our
Partisanship of Electoral Commission, p. 25 et seq.), the experiment has at Constitution is very indicative. Its compositions is also significant in that
least abiding historical interest. it is constituted by a majority of members of the legislature. But it is a
body separate from and independent of the legislature.
The members of the Constitutional Convention who framed our fundamental
law were in their majority men mature in years and experience. To be sure,
The grant of power to the Electoral Commission to judge all contests Constitutional Limitations, eight ed., vol. I, pp. 138, 139). In the absence of
relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the any further constitutional provision relating to the procedure to be followed
National Assembly, is intended to be as complete and unimpaired as if it in filing protests before the Electoral Commission, therefore, the incidental
had remained originally in the legislature. The express lodging of that power to promulgate such rules necessary for the proper exercise of its
power in the Electoral Commission is an implied denial of the exercise of exclusive power to judge all contests relating to the election, returns and
that power by the National Assembly. And this is as effective a restriction qualifications of members of the National Assembly, must be deemed by
upon the legislative power as an express prohibition in the Constitution (Ex necessary implication to have been lodged also in the Electoral Commission.
parte Lewis, 45 Tex. Crim. Rep., 1; State vs. Whisman, 36 S.D., 260; L.R.A.,
1917B, 1). If we concede the power claimed in behalf of the National It is, indeed, possible that, as suggested by counsel for the petitioner, the
Assembly that said body may regulate the proceedings of the Electoral Electoral Commission may abuse its regulative authority by admitting
Commission and cut off the power of the commission to lay down the protests beyond any reasonable time, to the disturbance of the tranquillity and
period within which protests should be filed, the grant of power to the peace of mind of the members of the National Assembly. But the possibility
commission would be ineffective. The Electoral Commission in such case of abuse is not argument against the concession of the power as there is no
would be invested with the power to determine contested cases involving power that is not susceptible of abuse. In the second place, if any mistake has
the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the National been committed in the creation of an Electoral Commission and in investing
Assembly but subject at all times to the regulative power of the National it with exclusive jurisdiction in all cases relating to the election, returns, and
Assembly. Not only would the purpose of the framers of our Constitution qualifications of members of the National Assembly, the remedy is political,
of totally transferring this authority from the legislative body be not judicial, and must be sought through the ordinary processes of
frustrated, but a dual authority would be created with the resultant democracy. All the possible abuses of the government are not intended to be
inevitable clash of powers from time to time. A sad spectacle would then corrected by the judiciary. We believe, however, that the people in creating
be presented of the Electoral Commission retaining the bare authority of the Electoral Commission reposed as much confidence in this body in the
taking cognizance of cases referred to, but in reality without the necessary exclusive determination of the specified cases assigned to it, as they have
means to render that authority effective whenever and whenever the National given to the Supreme Court in the proper cases entrusted to it for decision.
Assembly has chosen to act, a situation worse than that intended to be All the agencies of the government were designed by the Constitution to
remedied by the framers of our Constitution. The power to regulate on the achieve specific purposes, and each constitutional organ working within its
part of the National Assembly in procedural matters will inevitably lead to own particular sphere of discretionary action must be deemed to be animated
the ultimate control by the Assembly of the entire proceedings of the with the same zeal and honesty in accomplishing the great ends for which
Electoral Commission, and, by indirection, to the entire abrogation of the they were created by the sovereign will. That the actuations of these
constitutional grant. It is obvious that this result should not be permitted. constitutional agencies might leave much to be desired in given instances, is
inherent in the perfection of human institutions. In the third place, from the
We are not insensible to the impassioned argument or the learned counsel for fact that the Electoral Commission may not be interfered with in the exercise
the petitioner regarding the importance and necessity of respecting the of its legitimate power, it does not follow that its acts, however illegal or
dignity and independence of the national Assembly as a coordinate unconstitutional, may not be challenge in appropriate cases over which the
department of the government and of according validity to its acts, to avoid courts may exercise jurisdiction.
what he characterized would be practically an unlimited power of the
commission in the admission of protests against members of the National But independently of the legal and constitutional aspects of the present case,
Assembly. But as we have pointed out hereinabove, the creation of the there are considerations of equitable character that should not be overlooked
Electoral Commission carried with it ex necesitate rei the power regulative in in the appreciation of the intrinsic merits of the controversy. The
character to limit the time with which protests intrusted to its cognizance Commonwealth Government was inaugurated on November 15, 1935, on
should be filed. It is a settled rule of construction that where a general power which date the Constitution, except as to the provisions mentioned in section
is conferred or duty enjoined, every particular power necessary for the 6 of Article XV thereof, went into effect. The new National Assembly
exercise of the one or the performance of the other is also conferred (Cooley, convened on November 25th of that year, and the resolution confirming the
election of the petitioner, Jose A. Angara was approved by that body on his duties as such member. As a matter of fact, certification by the proper
December 3, 1935. The protest by the herein respondent Pedro Ynsua against provincial board of canvassers is sufficient to entitle a member-elect to a seat
the election of the petitioner was filed on December 9 of the same year. The in the national Assembly and to render him eligible to any office in said body
pleadings do not show when the Electoral Commission was formally (No. 1, par. 1, Rules of the National Assembly, adopted December 6, 1935).
organized but it does appear that on December 9, 1935, the Electoral
Commission met for the first time and approved a resolution fixing said date Under the practice prevailing both in the English House of Commons and in
as the last day for the filing of election protest. When, therefore, the National the Congress of the United States, confirmation is neither necessary in order
Assembly passed its resolution of December 3, 1935, confirming the election to entitle a member-elect to take his seat. The return of the proper election
of the petitioner to the National Assembly, the Electoral Commission had not officers is sufficient, and the member-elect presenting such return begins to
yet met; neither does it appear that said body had actually been organized. As enjoy the privileges of a member from the time that he takes his oath of
a mater of fact, according to certified copies of official records on file in the office (Laws of England, vol. 12, pp. 331. 332; vol. 21, pp. 694, 695; U. S. C.
archives division of the National Assembly attached to the record of this case A., Title 2, secs. 21, 25, 26). Confirmation is in order only in cases of
upon the petition of the petitioner, the three justices of the Supreme Court the contested elections where the decision is adverse to the claims of the
six members of the National Assembly constituting the Electoral protestant. In England, the judges' decision or report in controverted elections
Commission were respectively designated only on December 4 and 6, 1935. is certified to the Speaker of the House of Commons, and the House, upon
If Resolution No. 8 of the National Assembly confirming non-protested being informed of such certificate or report by the Speaker, is required to
elections of members of the National Assembly had the effect of limiting or enter the same upon the Journals, and to give such directions for confirming
tolling the time for the presentation of protests, the result would be that the or altering the return, or for the issue of a writ for a new election, or for
National Assembly — on the hypothesis that it still retained the incidental carrying into execution the determination as circumstances may require (31
power of regulation in such cases — had already barred the presentation of & 32 Vict., c. 125, sec. 13). In the United States, it is believed, the order or
protests before the Electoral Commission had had time to organize itself and decision of the particular house itself is generally regarded as sufficient,
deliberate on the mode and method to be followed in a matter entrusted to its without any actual alternation or amendment of the return (Cushing, Law and
exclusive jurisdiction by the Constitution. This result was not and could not Practice of Legislative Assemblies, 9th ed., sec. 166).
have been contemplated, and should be avoided.
Under the practice prevailing when the Jones Law was still in force, each
From another angle, Resolution No. 8 of the National Assembly confirming house of the Philippine Legislature fixed the time when protests against the
the election of members against whom no protests had been filed at the time election of any of its members should be filed. This was expressly authorized
of its passage on December 3, 1935, can not be construed as a limitation by section 18 of the Jones Law making each house the sole judge of the
upon the time for the initiation of election contests. While there might have election, return and qualifications of its members, as well as by a law (sec.
been good reason for the legislative practice of confirmation of the election 478, Act No. 3387) empowering each house to respectively prescribe by
of members of the legislature at the time when the power to decide election resolution the time and manner of filing contest in the election of member of
contests was still lodged in the legislature, confirmation alone by the said bodies. As a matter of formality, after the time fixed by its rules for the
legislature cannot be construed as depriving the Electoral Commission of the filing of protests had already expired, each house passed a resolution
authority incidental to its constitutional power to be "the sole judge of all confirming or approving the returns of such members against whose election
contest relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the members of no protests had been filed within the prescribed time. This was interpreted as
the National Assembly", to fix the time for the filing of said election protests. cutting off the filing of further protests against the election of those members
Confirmation by the National Assembly of the returns of its members against not theretofore contested (Amistad vs. Claravall [Isabela], Second Philippine
whose election no protests have been filed is, to all legal purposes, Legislature, Record — First Period, p. 89; Urguello vs. Rama [Third District,
unnecessary. As contended by the Electoral Commission in its resolution of Cebu], Sixth Philippine Legislature; Fetalvero vs. Festin [Romblon], Sixth
January 23, 1936, overruling the motion of the herein petitioner to dismiss Philippine Legislature, Record — First Period, pp. 637-640;
the protest filed by the respondent Pedro Ynsua, confirmation of the election Kintanar vs. Aldanese [Fourth District, Cebu], Sixth Philippine Legislature,
of any member is not required by the Constitution before he can discharge Record — First Period, pp. 1121, 1122; Aguilar vs. Corpus [Masbate], Eighth
Philippine Legislature, Record — First Period, vol. III, No. 56, pp. 892, 893). (g) That under the organic law prevailing before the present
The Constitution has repealed section 18 of the Jones Law. Act No. 3387, Constitution went into effect, each house of the legislature was
section 478, must be deemed to have been impliedly abrogated also, for the respectively the sole judge of the elections, returns, and
reason that with the power to determine all contest relating to the election, qualifications of their elective members.
returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, is
inseparably linked the authority to prescribe regulations for the exercise of (h) That the present Constitution has transferred all the powers
that power. There was thus no law nor constitutional provisions which previously exercised by the legislature with respect to contests
authorized the National Assembly to fix, as it is alleged to have fixed on relating to the elections, returns and qualifications of its members, to
December 3, 1935, the time for the filing of contests against the election of the Electoral Commission.
its members. And what the National Assembly could not do directly, it could
not do by indirection through the medium of confirmation. (i) That such transfer of power from the legislature to the Electoral
Commission was full, clear and complete, and carried with it ex
Summarizing, we conclude: necesitate rei the implied power inter alia to prescribe the rules and
regulations as to the time and manner of filing protests.
(a) That the government established by the Constitution follows
fundamentally the theory of separation of power into the legislative, ( j) That the avowed purpose in creating the Electoral Commission
the executive and the judicial. was to have an independent constitutional organ pass upon all
contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of
(b) That the system of checks and balances and the overlapping of members of the National Assembly, devoid of partisan influence or
functions and duties often makes difficult the delimitation of the consideration, which object would be frustrated if the National
powers granted. Assembly were to retain the power to prescribe rules and regulations
regarding the manner of conducting said contests.
(c) That in cases of conflict between the several departments and
among the agencies thereof, the judiciary, with the Supreme Court as (k) That section 4 of article VI of the Constitution repealed not only
the final arbiter, is the only constitutional mechanism devised finally section 18 of the Jones Law making each house of the Philippine
to resolve the conflict and allocate constitutional boundaries. Legislature respectively the sole judge of the elections, returns and
qualifications of its elective members, but also section 478 of Act
(d) That judicial supremacy is but the power of judicial review in No. 3387 empowering each house to prescribe by resolution the time
actual and appropriate cases and controversies, and is the power and and manner of filing contests against the election of its members, the
duty to see that no one branch or agency of the government time and manner of notifying the adverse party, and bond or bonds,
transcends the Constitution, which is the source of all authority. to be required, if any, and to fix the costs and expenses of contest.

(e) That the Electoral Commission is an independent constitutional (l) That confirmation by the National Assembly of the election is
creation with specific powers and functions to execute and perform, contested or not, is not essential before such member-elect may
closer for purposes of classification to the legislative than to any of discharge the duties and enjoy the privileges of a member of the
the other two departments of the governments. National Assembly.

(f ) That the Electoral Commission is the sole judge of all contests (m) That confirmation by the National Assembly of the election of
relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the any member against whom no protest had been filed prior to said
National Assembly. confirmation, does not and cannot deprive the Electoral Commission
of its incidental power to prescribe the time within which protests
 against the election of any member of the National Assembly should
be filed.

We hold, therefore, that the Electoral Commission was acting within the
legitimate exercise of its constitutional prerogative in assuming to take
cognizance of the protest filed by the respondent Pedro Ynsua against the
election of the herein petitioner Jose A. Angara, and that the resolution of the
National Assembly of December 3, 1935 can not in any manner toll the time
for filing protests against the elections, returns and qualifications of members
of the National Assembly, nor prevent the filing of a protest within such time
as the rules of the Electoral Commission might prescribe.

In view of the conclusion reached by us relative to the character of the

The petition for a writ of prohibition against the Electoral Commission is

Avanceña, C. J., Diaz, Concepcion, and Horrilleno, JJ., concur.