[No. 44896. July 31, 1936] 1. 6.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; NOT EXCLUSIVE.

—The original
RODOLFO A. SCHNECKENBURGER, petitioner, vs. MANUEL V. jurisdiction granted to the Courts of First Instance to try
MORAN, Judge of First Instance of Manila, respondent. criminal cases was not made exclusive by any law in force prior
to the inauguration of the Commonwealth, and having reached
the conclusion that the jurisdiction conferred upon this court
1. 1.CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, IN GENERAL.—The inauguration by the Constitution over cases affecting ambassadors, other
of the Philippine Commonwealth on November 15, 1935, has public ministers, and consuls, is not an exclusive jurisdiction,
brought about a fundamental change in the political and legal the laws in force at the time of the adoption of the
status of the Philippines. Constitution, granting the Courts of First Instance jurisdiction
in such cases, are not inconsistent with the Constitution, and
1. 2.ID.; ID.; CONSTITUTION OF THE PHILIPPINES is must be deemed to remain operative and in force.
FUNDAMENTAL LAW OF THE LAND.—The Constitution of
the Philippines has become the supreme law of the land since 1. 7.AMBASSADORS AND CONSULS; CONSULS; PRIVILEGES
the inauguration of the Philippine Commonwealth. AND IMMUNITIES.—It is well settled that a consul is not
entitled to the privileges and immunities of an ambassador or
1. 3.COURTS; SUPREME minister, but is subject to the laws and regulations of the
COURT; JURISDICTION ; ORIGINAL.—The Constitution country to which he is accredited. (Ex parte Baiz, 135 U. S.,
provides that the original jurisdiction of this court "shall 403; 34 Law. ed., 222.)
include all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers
and consuls." 1. 8.ID.; ID.; EXEMPTION FROM CRIMINAL PROSECUTION.—
A consul is not exempt from criminal prosecution for violations
1. 4.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; NOT EXCLUSIVE.—The original of the laws of the country where he resides. (U. S. vs. Ravara, 2
jurisdiction conferred upon this court by the Constitution over Dall., 297; 1 Law. ed., 388; Wheaton's International Law [2d
cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers, and ed.], 423.)
consuls, is not exclusive.
ORIGINAL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Prohibition.
1. 5.ID.; FIRST INSTANCE ; JURISDICTION ; ORIGINAL.— The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.
Prior to the inauguration of the Commonwealth, Courts of Cardenas & Casal for petitioner.
First Instance were vested with original jurisdiction over all Solicitor-General Hilado for respondent.
criminal cases in which a penalty of more than six months'
imprisonment or a fine exceeding one hundred dollars might be ABAD SANTOS, J.:
imposed. Such jurisdiction included the trial of criminal
actions brought against consuls. The petitioner was duly accredited honorary consul of Uruguay at
Manila, Philippine Islands on June 11, 1934. He was subsequently
250 charged in the Court of First Instance of Manila with the crime of
2 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED falsification of a private document. He objected to the jurisdiction of the
court on the ground that both under the Constitution of the United
50 States and the Constitution of the Philippines the court below had no
Schneckenburger vs. Moran jurisdiction to try him. His objection having been overruled, he filed this
petition for a writ of prohibition with a view to preventing the Court of
First Instance of Manila from taking cognizance of the criminal action
filed against him.
 251 ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls." In deciding the
VOL. 63, JULY 31, 1936 251 instant case this court cannot go beyond this constitutional provision.
2. It remains to consider whether the original jurisdiction. thus
Schneckenburger vs. Moran conferred upon this court by the Constitution over cases affecting
In support of this petition counsel for the petitioner contend (1) That the ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls, is exclusive. The
Court of First Instance of Manila is without jurisdiction to try the case Constitution does not define the jurisdiction of this court in specific
filed against the petitioner for the reason that under Article III, section terms, but merely provides that "the Supreme Court shall have such
2, of the Constitution of the United States, the Supreme Court of the original and appellate jurisdiction as may be possessed and exercised by
United States has original jurisdiction in all cases affecting ambassadors, the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands at the time of the adoption
other public ministers, and consuls, and such jurisdiction excludes the of this Constitution." It then goes on to provide that the original
courts of the Philippines; and (2) that even under the Constitution of the jurisdiction of this court "shall include all cases affecting ambassadors,
Philippines original jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors, other other public ministers, and consuls."
public ministers, and consuls, is conferred exclusively upon the Supreme In the light of the constitutional provisions above adverted to, the
Court of the Philippines. question arises whether the original jurisdiction possessed and exercised
This case involves no question of diplomatic immunity. It is well by the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands at the time of the
settled that a consul is not entitled to the privileges and immunities of an adoption of the Constitution was exclusive.
ambassador or minister, but is subject to the laws and regulations of the The original jurisdiction possessed and exercised by the Supreme
country to which he is accredited. (Ex parte Baiz, 135 U. S., 403; 34 Law. Court of the Philippine Islands at the time of the adoption of the
ed., 222.) A consul is not exempt from criminal prosecution for violations Constitution was derived from section 17 of Act No. 136, which reads as
of the laws of the country where he resides. (U. S. vs. Ravara, 2 Dall., follows: "The Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction to issue
297; 1 Law. ed., 388; Wheaton's International Law [2d ed.], 423.) The writs of mandamus, certiorari, prohibition, habeas corpus, and quo
substantial question raised in this case is one of jurisdiction. warranto in the cases and in the manner prescribed in the Code of Civil
1. We find no merit in the contention that Article III, section 2, of the Procedure, and to hear and determine the controversies thus brought
Constitution of the United States governs this case. We do not deem it before it, and in other cases provided by law." Jurisdiction to issue writs
necessary to discuss the question whether the constitutional provision of quo warranto, certiorari, mandamus, prohibition, and habeas corpus
relied upon by the petitioner extended ex propio vigore over the was also conferred on the Courts of First Instance by the Code of Civil
Philippines. Suffice it to say that the inauguration of the Philippine 253
Commonwealth on November 15, 1935, has brought about a fundamental
VOL. 63, JULY 31, 1936 253
change in the political and legal status of the Philippines. On the date
mentioned the Constitution of the Philippines went into full force and Schneckenburger vs. Moran
effect. This Constitution is the supreme law of the land. Not only the Procedure. (Act No. 190, secs. 197, 217, 222, 226, and 525.) It results that
members of this court but all other officers, legislative, executive and the original jurisdiction possessed and exercised by the Supreme Court of
judicial, of the Government of the Commonwealth, are bound by oath to the Philippine Islands at the time of the adoption of the Constitution was
support the Constitution. (Article XIII, section 2.) This court owes its own not exclusive of, but concurrent with, that of the Courts of First Instance.
exist- Inasmuch as this is the same original jurisdiction vested in this court by
252 the Constitution and made to include all cases affecting ambassadors,
252 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED other public ministers, and consuls, it follows that the jurisdiction of this
court over such cases is not exclusive.
Schneckenburger vs. Moran The conclusion we have reached upon this branch of the case finds
ence to that great instrument, and derives all its powers therefrom. In support in the pertinent' decisions of the Supreme Court of the United
the exercise of its powers and jurisdiction, this court is bound by the States. The Constitution of the United States provides that the Supreme
provisions of the Constitution. The Constitution provides that the Court shall have "original jurisdiction" in all cases affecting
original jurisdiction of this court "shall include all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls. In construing this
constitutional provision, the Supreme Court of the United States held In my humble opinion, there are three reasons why the jurisdiction of
that the "original jurisdiction" thus conferred upon the Supreme Court by this court over the petitioner in the instant case is concurrent and not
the Constitution was not an exclusive jurisdiction, and that such grant of exclusive. The strictly legal reason is set forth in the preceding
original jurisdiction did not prevent Congress from conferring original illuminating opinion. The other reasons are (a) historical and based on
jurisdiction in cases affecting consuls on the subordinate courts of the what I consider is the (b) theory upon which the grant of legislative
Union. (U. S. vs. Ravara, supra; Börs vs. Preston, 111 U. S., 252; 28 Law. authority under our Constitution is predicated.
ed., 419.) (a) As the provision in our Constitution regarding jurisdiction in
3. The laws in force in the Philippines prior to the inauguration of the cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls, has
Commonwealth conf erred upon the Courts of First Instance original been taken from the Constitution of the United States, considerable light
jurisdiction in all criminal cases to which, a penalty of more than six would be gained
months' imprisonment or a fine exceeding one hundred dollars might be 255
imposed. (Act No. 136, sec. 56.) Such jurisdiction included the trial of VOL. 63, JULY 31, 1936 255
criminal actions brought against consuls for, as we have already
indicated, consuls, not being entitled to the privileges and immunities of Schneckenburger vs. Moran
ambassadors or ministers, are subject to the laws and regulations of the by an examination of the history and interpretation thereof in the United
country where they reside. By Article XV, section 2, of the Constitution, States.
all laws of the Philippine Islands in force at the time of the adoption of The fifth resolution of the New Jersey plan (Paterson resolutions of
the Constitution were to continue in force until June 15, 1787) gave the Supreme Court of the United States, the only
254 national court under the plan, authority to hear and determine "by way
of appeal, in the dernier resort * * * all cases touching the rights of
254 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
ambassadors * * *." This clause, however, was not approved. On July 18,
Schneckenburger vs. Moran the Convention of 1787 voted an extraordinarily broad jurisdiction to the
the inauguration of the Commonwealth; thereafter, they were to remain Supreme Court extending "to cases arising under laws passed by the
operative, unless inconsistent with the Constitution, until amended, general legislature, and to such other questions as involve the national
altered, modified, or repealed by the National Assembly. The original peace and harmony." This general proposition was considerably
jurisdiction granted to the Courts of First Instance to try criminal cases narrowed by Randolph in his draft of May 29 which, however, did not
was not made exclusive by any law in force prior to the inauguration of mention anything about ambassadors, other public ministers and
the Commonwealth, and having reached the conclusion that the consuls. But the Committee of Detail, through Rutledge, reported on
jurisdiction conferred upon this court by the Constitution over cases August 6 as follows: "Article XI, Section 3. The jurisdiction of the
affecting ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls, is not an Supreme Court shall extend * * * to all cases affecting ambassadors,
exclusive jurisdiction, the laws in force at the time of the adoption of the other public ministers and consuls; * * * In * * * cases affecting
Constitution, granting the Courts of First Instance jurisdiction in such ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, * * * this jurisdiction
cases, are not inconsistent with the Constitution, and must be deemed to shall be original * * *." On September 12, the Committee on Style
remain operative and in force, subject to the power of the National reported the provision as follows: "Article III, Section 2. The judicial
Assembly to amend, alter, modify, or repeal the same. (Asiatic P. power shall extend * * * to all cases affecting ambassadors, other public
Co. vs. Insular Collector of Customs, U. S. Supreme Court [Law. ed.], ministers ,and consuls * * * In (all) cases affecting ambassadors, other
Adv. Ops., vol. 80, No. 12, pp. 620, 623.) public ministers and consuls * * * the Supreme Court shall have original
We conclude, therefore, that the Court of First Instance of Manila jurisdiction." This provision was approved in the convention with hardly
has jurisdiction to try the petitioner, and that the petition for a writ of any amendment or debate and is now found in clause 2, section 2 of
prohibition must be denied. So ordered. Article III of the Constitution of the United States. (The Constitution and
Avanceña, C. J., Villa-Real, Imperial, Diaz, and Recto, JJ., concur. the Courts, Article on "Growth of the Constitution", by William M. Meigs,
New York, 1924, vol. I, pp. 228, 229. See also Farrand, Records of the
LAUREL, J., concurring: Federal Convention of 1787, Yale University Press, 1934,
 256 ablest jurists in the Constitutional Convention, who was later Chief
256 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States (1796-1800). It is
interesting to note that 10 of the 18 senators and 8 of the members of the
Schneckenburger vs. Moran House of the first Congress had been among the 55 delegates who
3 vols.; Warren, The Making of the Constitution, Boston, 1928, pp. 534- actually attended the Convention that adopted the federal Constitution
537.) (Warren, Congress, the Constitution and the Supreme Court [Boston,
The word "original", however, was early interpreted as not exclusive. 1935], p. 99). When, therefore, the first Congress approved the Judiciary
Two years after the adoption of the Federal Constitution, or in 1789, the Act of 1789 vesting in the Supreme Court original but not exclusive
First Judiciary Act (Act of September 24, 1789, 1 Stat., c. 20, 687) was jurisdiction of all suits in which a consul or a vice-consul shall be a party,
approved by the first Congress creating the United States District and express legislative interpretation as to the meaning of the word."original"
Circuit Courts which were nisi prius courts, or courts of first instance as not being exclusive was definitely made and this interpretation has
which dealt with different items of litigation. The district courts are now never been repudiated. As stated by the Supreme Court of the United
the only federal courts of first instance, the circuit courts having been States in Ames vs. Kansas ([1884], 111 U. S., 449; 4 S. Ct., 437; 28 Law.
abolished by the Act of March 3, 1911, otherwise known as the Judicial ed., 482) :
Code. The Judiciary Act of 1787 invested the district courts with "In view of the practical construction put on this provision of the
jurisdiction, exclusively of the courts of the several states, of all suits Constitution by Congress, at the very moment of the organization of the
against consuls or vice-consuls and the Supreme Court of the United government, and of the significant fact that, from 1789 until now, no
States with original but not exclusive jurisdiction of all suits in which a court of the United States has ever in its actual adjudications determined
consul or vice-consul shall be a party. By the passage of the Act of to the contrary, we are unable to say that it is not within the power of
February 18, 1875 (18 Stat., 470, c. 137), the clause giving the federal Congress to grant to the inferior courts of the United States jurisdiction
courts exclusive jurisdiction was repealed and, since then, state courts in cases where the Supreme Court has been vested by the Constitution
have had concurrent jurisdiction with the federal courts over civil or with original jurisdiction. It rests with the legislative department of the
criminal proceedings against a consul or vice-consul. At the present time, government to say to what extent such grants shall be made, and it may
the federal courts exercise exclusive jurisdiction "of suits or proceedings safely be assumed that nothing will ever be done to encroach upon the
against ambassadors or other public ministers, or their domestics or high privileges of those for whose protection the constitutional provision
domestic servants, as & court of law can have consistently with the law was intended,
of nations; and original, but not exclusive, jurisdiction, of all suits 258
brought by ambassadors, or other public ministers, or in which a consul
258 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
or vice-consul is a party." (Act of March 3, 1911, 36 Stat., 1156, reënact-
ing sec. 687 of the Act of September 24, 1789; 28 U. S. C. A., sec. 341; Schneckenburger vs. Moran
Hopkins' Federal Judicial Code, 4th ed., by Babbit, 1934, sec. 233.) The At any rate, we are unwilling to say that the power to make the grant
district courts now have original jurisdiction "of all suits against consuls does not exist."
and viceconsuls." (Act of March 3, 1911, 36 Stat., 1093; 28 U. S. C. A., Dicta in some earlier cases seem to hold that the word "original" means
sec. 41, subsec. 18; Hopkins' Federal Judicial Code, 4th ed., by Babbit, "exclusive" and as observed by Justice Field in United
1934, sec. 24, par. 18.) States vs. Louisiana ([1887], 123 U. S., 36; 8 S. Ct., 17; 31 Law. ed., 69),
257 the question has given rise to some differences of opinion among the
VOL. 63, JULY 31, 1936 257 earlier members of the Supreme Court of the United States. (See, for
instance, dissenting opinion of Iredell, /., in U. S. vs. Ravara [1793], 2
Schneckenburger vs. Moran Dall., 297; 1 Law. ed., 388.) Reliance was had on more or less general
The Judiciary Act of 1789 was one of the early and most satisfactory acts expressions made by Chief Justice Marshall in the case
passed by the Congress of the United States. It has remained essentially of Marbury vs. Madison ([1803], 1 Cranch, 137; 2 Law. ed., 60), where it
unchanged for more than 145 years. It was prepared chiefly by Oliver was said:
Elisworth of Connecticut (1 Ann. Cong., 18, April 7, 1789) one of the
 "If congress remains at liberty to give this court appellate correct, in terms much broader than the decision, and not only much
jurisdiction, where the constitution has declared their jurisdiction shall broader than the reasoning with which that decision is supported, but in
be original; and original jurisdiction where the constitution has declared some instances contradictory to its principle. The reasoning sustains the
it shall be appellate; the distribution of jurisdiction, made in the negative operation of the words in that case, because otherwise the
constitution, is form without substance." But Chief Justice Marshall who clause would have no meaning whatever, and because such operation
penned the decision in this case in 1803 had occasion later, in 1821, to was necessary to give effect to the intention of the article. The effort now
explain the meaning and extent of the pronouncements made in the made is, to apply the conclusion to which the court was conducted by that
Marbury case. He said: reasoning in the particular case, to one in which the words have their full
"In the case of Marbury vs. Madison ([1803], 1 Cranch [U. S.], 137, 172; 2 operation when understood affirmatively, and in which the negative, or
Law. ed., 60), the single question before the court, so far as that case can exclusive sense, is to be so used as to defeat some of the great objects of
be applied to this, was, whether the legislature could give this court the article. To this construction the court cannot give its assent. The
original jurisdiction in a case in which the Constitution had clearly not general expressions in the case of Marbury vs. Madison must be
given it, and in which no doubt respecting the construction of the article understood with the limi-
could possibly be raised. The court decided, and we think very properly, 260
that the legislature could not give original jurisdiction in such a case. 260 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
But, in the reasoning of the court in support of this decision, some
expressions are used which go far beyond it. The counsel for Marbury Schneckenburger vs. Moran
had insisted on the unlimited discretion of the legislature in the tations which are given to them in this opinion; limitations which in no
apportionment of the judicial power; and it is against this argument that degree affect the decision in that case, or the tenor of its reasoning."
the reasoning of the court is directed, They say that, if such had been the (Cohens vs. Virginia [1821], 6 Wheat., 264, 400; 5 Law. ed., 257.)
intention of the article, What the Supreme Court in the case of Marbury vs. Madison held then
259 was that Congress could not extend its original jurisdiction beyond the
cases expressly mentioned in the Constitution, the rule of construction
VOL. 63, JULY 31, 1936 259
being that affirmative words of the Constitution declaring in what cases
Schneckenburger vs. Moran the Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction must be construed
'it would certainly have been useless to proceed farther than to define the negatively as to all other cases. (See Ex parte Vallandigham [1864], 1
judicial power, and the tribunals in which it should be vested.' The court Wall, 243, 252; 17 Law. ed., 589; Martin vs. Hunter's Lessee [1816], 1
says, that such a construction would render the clause, dividing the Wheat., 305, 330; 4 Law. ed., 97; U. S. vs. Haynes [D. C. Mass., 1887], 29
jurisdiction of the court into original and appellate, totally useless; that Fed., 691, 696.) That was all.
'affirmative words are often, in their operation, negative of other objects It should be observed that Chief Justice Marshall concurred in the
than those which are affirmed; and, in this case (in the case opinion rendered in the case of Davis vs. Packard ([1833], 7 Pet., 276; 8
of Marbury vs. Madison), a negative or exclusive sense must be given to Law. ed., 684). In this case the jurisdiction of the state court of New York
them, or they have no operation at all.' 'lt cannot be presumed/ adds the over a civil suit against a foreign consul was denied solely on the ground
court, 'that any clause in the Constitution is intended to be without that jurisdiction had been conferred in such a case upon the district
effect; and, therefore, such a construction is inadmissible, unless the courts of the United States exclusively of the state courts. Such a-
words require it.' The whole reasoning of the court proceeds upon the ground, says Justice Harlan in Börs vs. Preston ([1884], 111 U. S., 252; 4
idea that the affirmative words of the clause giving one sort of S. Ct., 407; 28 Law. ed., 419), would probably not have been given had it
jurisdiction, must imply a negative of any other sort of jurisdiction, been believed that the grant of original jurisdiction to the Supreme Court
because otherwise the words would be totally inoperative, and this deprived Congress of the power to confer concurrent original jurisdiction
reasoning is advanced in a case to which it was strictly applicable. If in in such cases upon subordinate courts of the Union, concluding that the
that case original jurisdiction could have been exercised, the clause decision in the case "may be regarded as an affirmance of the
under consideration would have been entirely useless. Having such cases constitutionality of the Act of 1789, giving original jurisdiction in such
only in its view, the court lays down a principle which is generally cases, also, to District Courts of the United States." Of the seven justices
who concurred in the judgment in the case of Davis, five participated in neither public policy nor convenience would justify the Supreme Court in
the decision of Osborn vs. Bank of the United States ([1824], 9 Wheat., implying that Congress is prohibited from giving original jurisdiction in
738; 6 Law. ed., 204), also penned by Chief Justice Marshall and cases affecting consuls to the inferior judicial tribunals of the United
261 States. Chief Justice Taney said:
VOL. 63, JULY 31, 1936 261 "If the arrangement and classification of the subjects of jurisdiction into
appellate and original, as respects the Supreme Court, do not exclude
Schneckenburger vs. Moran that tribunal from appellate power in the cases where original
relied upon as authority together with Marbury vs. Madison, supra. jurisdiction is granted, can it be right, from the same clause, to imply
The rule enunciated in Börs vs. Preston, supra, is the one followed in words of exclusion as respects other courts whose jurisdiction is not there
the United States. The question involved in that case was whether the limited or prescribed, but left for the future regulation of Congress? The
Circuit Court then existing had jurisdiction under the Constitution and true rule in this case is, I think, the rule which is constantly applied to
laws of the United States to hear and determine any suit whatever ordinary acts of legislation, in which the grant of jurisdiction over a
against the consul of a foreign government. Justice Harlan said: certain subject-matter to one court, does not, of itself, imply that that
"The Constitution declares that The judicial power of the United States jurisdiction is to be exclusive. In the clause in question, there is nothing
shall extend * * * to all cases aff ecting ambassadors or other public but mere affirmative words of grant, and none that import a design to
ministers and consuls;' to controversies between citizens of a state and exclude the subordinate jurisdiction of other courts of the United States
foreign citizens or subjects; that 'ln all cases affecting ambassadors, other on the same subject-matter." (See also U. S. vs. Ravara [1793], 2 Dall.,
public ministers and consuls, * * * the Supreme Court shall have original 297; 1 Law. ed., 388; United States vs. Louisiana [1887], 123 U. S., 36; 8
jurisdiction;' and that in all other cases previously mentioned in the S. Ct., 17; 31 Law. ed., 69; Ex parte Baiz [1890], 135 U. S., 403; 10 S. Ct.,
same clause 'The Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction, both 854; 34 Law. ed., 222, denying writ of prohibition Hollander vs. Baiz [D.
as to law and fact, with such exceptions and under such regulations as C. N. Y., 1890]; 41 Fed., 732; lasigi vs. Van de Carr [1897], 166 U. S., 391;
the Congress shall make.' The Judiciary Act of 1789 invested the District 17 S. Ct, 595; 41 Law. ed., 1045; Graham vs. Strucken [C. C. N. Y., 1857];
Courts of the United States with jurisdiction, exclusively of the courts of 4 Blatchf., 58; Lorway vs. Lousada [D. C. Mass., 1866]; Fed. Cas., No.
the several States, of all suits against consuls or vice-consuls, except for 8517; St. Luke's Hospital vs. Barclay [C. C. N. Y., 1855]; 3 Blatchf.,
offenses of a certain character; this court, with 'Original, but not 259; State of Texas vs. Lewis [C. C. Tex., 1882], 14 Fed., 65; State of
exclusive, jurisdiction of all suits * * * in which a consul or vice-consul Alabama vs. Wolffe [C. C. Ala., 1883], 18 Fed., 836,
shall be a party;' and the circuit courts with jurisdiction of civil suits in 837; Pooley vs. Luco [D. C. Cal., 1896], 76 Fed., 146.)
which an alien is a party. (1 Stat. at L., 76-80.) In this act we have an 263
affirmance, by the first Congress—many of whose members participated
VOL. 63, JULY 31, 1936 263
in the Convention which adopted the Constitution and were, therefore,
conversant with the purposes of its framers—of the principle that the Schneckenburger vs. Moran
original jurisdiction of this court of cases in which a consul or vice-consul It is interesting to note that in the case of St. Luke's
is a party, is not necessarily exclusive, and that the subordinate courts of Hospital vs. Barclay, supra,, the jurisdiction of circuit courts exclusive of
the Union may be invested with jurisdiction of cases affecting such state courts over aliens, no exception being made as to those who were
representatives of foreign governments. On a question of constitutional consuls, was maintained. (See 1 U. S. Stat. at L., c. 20, sec. 11, pp. 78,
construction, this fact is entitled to great weight." 79.)
262 From the history of, and the judicial interpretation placed on, clause
262 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED 2, section 2 of Article III of the Constitution of the United States it seems
clear that the word "original" in reference to the jurisdiction of Supreme
Schneckenburger vs. Moran Court of the United States over cases affecting ambassadors, other public
In this case of Börs, Justice Harlan adopted the view entertained by ministers and consuls, was never intended to be exclusive as to prevent
Chief Justice Taney in the earlier case of Gittings vs. Crawford (C. C. the Congress from vesting concurrent jurisdiction over cases affecting
Md., 1838; Taney's Dec., 1, 10). In that case of Gittings, it was held that consuls and vice-consuls in other federal courts.
 It should be observed that the Philadelphia Convention of 1787 Kent, Commentaries, 44; Story on the Constitution, sec. 1660; Mathews,
placed cases affecting the official representatives of foreign powers under The American Constitutional System [1932], 204,
the jurisdiction of the Federal Supreme Court to prevent the public peace 205; Gittings vs. Crawford, C. C. Md., 1838; Taney's Dec., 1;
from being jeopardized. Since improper treatment of foreign Wilcox vs. Luco, 118 Cal., 639; 45 Pac., 676; 2 C. J., 1305; 9 R. C. L., 161.)
ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls may be a casus belli, it The only provisions touching the subject to which we may refer are those
was thought that the federal government, which is responsible for their found in the Constitution of the Philippines. Let us trace the history of
treatment under international law, should itself be provided with the these provisions.
means to meet the demands imposed by international duty. (Tucker, The The report of the Committee on the Judicial Power, submitted on
Constitution of the United States [1899], vol. II, 760, 772; vide, The September 29, 1934, did not contain any provision regarding cases
Federalist, No. LXXXI, Ashley's Reprint [1917], 415.) Bearing in mind affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls. The draft of
the distinction which international law establishes between ambassadors the sub-committee of seven
and other public ministers, on the one hand, and consuls and other 265
commercial representatives, on the other, Congress saw it fit to provide VOL. 63, JULY 31, 1936 265
in one case a rule different from the other, although as far as consuls and
vice-consuls are concerned, the jurisdiction of the Federal Supreme Schneckenburger vs. Moran
Court, as already observed, though original is not exclusive. But in the of the Sponsorship Committee, submitted on October 20, 1934, however,
United States, there are two judicial systems, independent one from the contains the following provision:
other, while in the Philippines there is but one judicial system. So that "Article X, Section 2. The Supreme Court shall have such original
the reason in the United States for exclud- jurisdiction as may be possessed and exercised by the present Supreme
264 Court of the Philippine Islands at the time of the adoption of this
Constitution, which jurisdiction shall include all cases affecting
264 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
ambassadors, other foreign ministers and consuls * * *." The Special
Schneckenburger vs. Moran Committee on the Judiciary, composed principally of Delegates Vicente J.
ing certain courts—the state courts—from taking cognizance of cases Francisco and Norberto Romualdez, included in its report the provisions
against foreign representatives stationed in the United States does not which now appear in sections 2 and 3 of Article VIII of the Constitution.
obtain in the Philippines where the ocurt of the lowest grade is as much Section 2 provides:
a part of an integrated system as the highest court. "The National Assembly shall have the power to define, prescribe, and
Let us now turn our attention to our own laws as they affect the case apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts, but may not deprive the
of the petitioner. Undoubtedly Philippine courts are not federal courts Supreme Court of its original jurisdiction over cases affecting
and they are not governed by the Judiciary Acts of the United States. We ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls * * *." And the second
have a judicial system of our own, standing outside the sphere of the sentence of section 3 provides:
American federal system and possessing powers and exercising 'The original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court shall include all cases
jurisdiction pursuant to the provisions of our own Constitution and laws. affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls."
The jurisdiction of our courts over consuls is defined and determined The provision in our Constitution in so far as it confers upon our
by our Constitution and laws which include applicable treaties and Supreme Court "original jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors,
accepted rules of the law of nations. There are no treaties between the other public ministers and consuls" is literally the same as that
United States and Uruguay exempting consuls of either country from the contained in clause 2, section 2 of Article III of the United States
operation of local criminal laws. Under the generally accepted principles Constitution.
of international law, declared by our Constitution as part of the law of In the course of the deliberations of the Constitutional Convention,
the nation (Art. II, sec. 3, cl. 2), consuls, vice-consuls and other some doubt was expressed regarding the character of the grant of
commercial representatives of foreign nations do not possess the status "original jurisdiction" to our Supreme Court. An examination of the
and can not claim the privileges and immunities accorded to records of the proceedings of the Constitutional Convention show that
ambassadors and ministers. (Wheaton, International Law, sec. 249; I the framers of our Constitution were familiar with the history of, and the
judicial construction placed on, the same provision of the United States tions or restrictions are found either in the language used, or in the
Constitution. In order to end what would have been a protracted purposes held in view as well as the circumstances which led to the
discussion on the subject, a member of the Special Committee on the adoption of the particular provision as part of the fundamental law. (Ex
Judiciary gave the follow- parte Lewis, 45 Tex. Crim. Rep., 1; 73 S. W., 811; 108 Am. St. Rep., 929.)
266 Subject to certain limitations, the Filipino people, through their
266 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED delegates, have committed legislative power in a most general way to the
National Assembly of the nation. In other words, the National Assembly
Schneckenburger vs. Moran has plenary legislative power in all matters of legislation except as
ing information to the members of the Convention: limited by the Constitution. When, therefore, the Constitution vests in
"* * * Sr. Presidente, a fin de poder terminar con el Artículo 2, el the Supreme Court original jurisdiction in cases affecting ambassadors,
Comité está dispuesto a hacer constar que la interpretación que se debe other public ministers and consuls, without specifying the exclusive
dar a la última parte de dicho artículo es la misma interpretación que character of the grant, the National Assembly is not deprived of its
siempre se ha dado a semejante disposición en la Constitución de los authority to make that jurisdiction concurrent. It has been said that
Estados Unidos." (January 16, 1935.) Without further discussion, the popular government lives because of the inexhaustible reservoir of power
provision was then and there approved. behind it. It is unquestionable that the mass of powers of government is
It thus appears that the provision in question has been given a well- vested in the representatives of the people, and that these
settled meaning in the United States—the country of its origin. It has representatives are no further restrained under our system than by the
there received definite and hitherto unaltered legislative and judicial express language of the instrument imposing the restraint, or by
interpretation. And the same meaning was ascribed to it when particular provisions which, by clear intendment, have that effect.
incorporated in our own Constitution. To paraphrase Justice Gray of the (Angara vs. Electoral Commission, p. 139, ante.) What the Constitution
Supreme Court of the United States, we are justified in interpreting the prohibits is merely the deprivation of the Supreme Court of its original
provision of the Constitution in the light of the principles and history jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and
with which its framers were familiar. (United States vs. Wong Kin consuls, and while it must be admitted that original jurisdiction if made
Ark [1897], 169 U. S., 649; 18 S. Ct, 456; 42 Law. ed., 890, cited with concurrent no longer remains exclusive, it is also true that jurisdiction
approval in Kepner vs. United States, a case of Philippine origin does not cease to be original merely because it is concurrent.
[1904]; 195 U. S., 100; 49 Law. ed., 114.) It is also quite true that concurrent original jurisdiction in this class
(b) What has been said hereinabove is not unnecessary attachment to of cases would mean the sharing of the Supreme Court with the most
history or idolatrous adherence to precedents. In referring to the history inferior courts of cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and
of this provision of our Constitution it is realized that historical consuls such that the Supreme Court would have concurrent jurisdiction
discussion while valuable is not necessarily decisive. Rationally, with the lowest courts in our judicial hierarchy, the justice
however, the philosophical reason for the conclusion announced is not far 268
to seek if certain principles of constitutional government are borne in
268 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
mind. The constitution is both a grant of, and a limitation upon,
governmental powers. In the absence of clear and unequivocal restraint Schneckenburger vs. Moran
of legislative authority, the power is retained by the people and is of the peace courts, in a petty case involving for instance, the violation of
exercisable by their representatives in the legislature. The general rule is a municipal ordinance affecting the parties just mentioned. However, no
that the legislature possesses plenary power for all purposes of civil serious objection to this result can be seen other than the misinterpreted
government. A prohibition to exercise legislative power is the exception. unwillingness to share this jurisdiction with a court pertaining to the
(Denio, C. J., in People vs. Draper, 15 N. Y., 532, 543.) These prohibi- lowest category in our judicial organization. Upon the other hand, the
267 fundamental reasoning would apply with equal force if the highest court
VOL. 63, JULY 31, 1936 267 of the land is made to take cognizance exclusively of a case involving the
violation of the municipal ordinance simply because of the character of
Schneckenburger vs. Moran the parties affected. After alluding to the fact that the position of consul
of a foreign government is sometimes filled by a citizen of the United sec. 4, p. 156), provide for appeal to the Supreme Court in all cases
States (and this is also true in the Philippines) Chief Justice Taney, affecting foreign diplomatic and consular representatives.
in Gittings vs. Crawford, supra, observed: Before the approval of the Constitution, jurisdiction over consuls was
"It could hardly have been the intention of the statesmen who framed our exercisable by our courts. This is more so now that the Independence
constitution to require that one of our citizens who had a petty claim of Law and Constitution framed and adopted pursuant thereto are in force.
even less than five dollars against another citizen, who had been clothed The fact that the National Assembly has not enacted any law
by some foreign government with the consular office, should be compelled determining what courts of the Philippines shall exercise concurrent
to go into the Supreme Court to have a jury summoned in order to enable jurisdiction with the Supreme Court is of no moment. This can not mean
him to recover it; nor could it have been intended, that the time of that and should not be interpreted to mean that the original jurisdiction
court, with all its high duties to perform, should be taken up with the vested in the Supreme Court by the Constitution is not concurrent with
trial of every petty offense that might be committed by a consul in any other national courts of inferior category.
part of the United States; that consul, too, being often one of our own The respondent judge of the Court of First Instance of the City of
citizens." Manila having jurisdiction to take cognizance of the criminal case
Probably, the most serious objection to the interpretation herein brought against the petitioner, the writ of prohibition should be denied.
advocated is, that considering the actual distribution of jurisdiction Petition denied.
between the different courts in our jurisdiction, there may be cases 270
where the Supreme Court may not actually exercise either original—
whether exclusive or concurrent—or appellate jurisdiction,
notwithstanding the grant of original jurisdiction in this class of cases to
the Supreme Court. If, for instance, a criminal case is brought either in a
justice of the peace court or in a Court of First Instance against a foreign
consul and no question of law is involved, it is evident that in case of
conviction, the proceed-
269
VOL. 63, JULY 31, 1936 269
Schneckenburger vs. Moran
ings will terminate in the Court of 'Appeals and will not reach the
Supreme Court. In this case, the Supreme Court will be deprived of all
jurisdiction in a case affecting a consul notwithstanding the grant
thereto in the Constitution of original jurisdiction in all cases affecting
consuls. This is a situation, however, created not by the Constitution but
by existing legislation, and the remedy is in the hands of the National
Assembly. The Constitution cannot deal with every casus omissus, and in
the nature of things, must only deal with fundamental principles, leaving
the details of administration and execution to the other branches of the
government. It rests with the National Assembly to determine the
inferior courts which shall exercise concurrent original jurisdiction with
the Supreme Court in cases affecting ambassadors, other public
ministers and consuls, considering the nature of the offense and
irrespective of the amount of the controversy. The National Assembly
may, as in the United States (Cooley, Constitutional Law, 4th ed. [1931],