People vs. Lagon

People vs.
Lagon
G.R. No. 45815 | May 18, 1990
FACTS:
On 7 July 1976, a criminal information was filed with the City Court of Roxas City, charging
private respondent Libertad Lagon with the crime of estafa under paragraph 2(d) of Article 315
of the RPC. The information charged that the accused had allegedly issued a check in the
amount of P4,232.80 as payment for goods or merchandise purchased, knowing that she did
not have sufficient funds to cover the check, which check therefore subsequently bounced.
The case proceeded to trial and the prosecution commenced the presentation of its evidence.
However, in an Order dated 2 December 1976, the City Court dismissed the information upon
the ground that the penalty prescribed by law for the offense charged was beyond the court's
authority to impose. The judge held that the jurisdiction of a court to try a criminal action is
determined by the law in force at the time of the institution of the action, and not by the law in
force at the time of the commission of the crime. At the time of the alleged commission of the
crime in April 1975, jurisdiction over the offense was vested by law in the City Court. However,
by the time the criminal information was filed, paragraph 2(d) of Article 315 of the Revised
Penal Code had already been amended and the penalty imposable upon a person accused has
increased, and was beyond the City Court's authority to impose. Thus, the City Court dismissed
the information.
Hence, this petition. The petition brought by the People, signed by the City Fiscal and Assistant
City Fiscal of Roxas City argued that the City Court of Roxas City had jurisdiction over the
Criminal Case and that it had erred in issuing its Order dismissing the case. The OSG agreed
with the position taken by the petitioner.
ISSUE: Whether or not the City Court had erred in dismissing the criminal information on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction
HELD: NO.
The Court considers that petitioner has failed to show that the City Court had committed
reversible error in dismissing the criminal information in Criminal Case No. 7362 without
prejudice to its refiling in the proper court.
Under the penultimate paragraph of Section 87 of the Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended, the
law governing the subject matter jurisdiction of municipal and city courts in criminal cases in
1975 and 1976, "municipal judges in the capitals of provinces and sub-provinces and judges of
city courts shall have like jurisdiction as the Court of First Instance to try parties charged with an
offense within their respective jurisdictions, in which the penalty provided by law does not
exceed prision correccional or imprisonment for not more than six (6) years or fine not
exceeding P6,000.00 or both . . . ." It appears that at the time of the commission of the offense
charged on 5 April 1975, the penalty imposable for the offense charged under paragraph 2(d) in
relation to the third sub-paragraph of the first paragraph, Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code,
was arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period; at that
time therefore, the offense clearly fell within the jurisdiction of the City Court of Roxas City.
At the time of the institution of the criminal prosecution on 7 July 1976, the penalty
imposable for the offense charged in Criminal Case No. 7362 had been increased by P.D. No.
818 (effective 22 October 1975) to prision mayor in its medium period.
It is firmly settled doctrine that the subject matter jurisdiction of a court in criminal law matters is
properly measured by the law in effect at the time of the commencement of a criminal
action, rather than by the law in effect at the time of the commission of the offense charged.
Thus, in accordance with the above rule, jurisdiction over the instant case pertained to the then
Court of First Instance of Roxas City considering that P.D. No. 818 had increased the imposable
penalty for the offense charged in Criminal Case No. 7362 to a level in excess of the maximum
penalty which a city court could impose.
ISSUE: Whether or not the application of the above-settled doctrine to the instant case would
result in also applying Presidential Decree No. 818 to the present case, in disregard of the rule
against retroactivity of penal laws?
HELD: NO.
In the first place, subject-matter jurisdiction in criminal cases is determined by the authority of
the court to impose the penalty imposable under the applicable statute given the allegations of a
criminal information. In People v. Purisima, the Court stressed that:
“it is settled that the jurisdiction of the court is not determined by what may be meted out
to the offender after trial, or even by the result of the evidence that would be presented
at the trial, but by the extent of the penalty which the law imposes for the misdemeanor,
crime or violation charged in the complaint.”
Thus, it may be that after trial, a penalty lesser than the maximum imposable under the statute
is proper under the specific facts and circumstances proven at the trial. In such a case, that
lesser penalty may be imposed by the trial court (provided it had subject-matter jurisdiction
under the rule above referred to) even if the reduced penalty otherwise falls within the exclusive
jurisdiction of an inferior court.
In the case at bar, the increased penalty provided for the offense charged in Criminal Case No.
7362 by P.D. No. 818 (prision mayor in its medium period) is obviously heavier than the penalty
provided for the same offense originally imposed by paragraph 2(d) of Article 315 of the Revised
Penal Code (up to prision correccional in its minimum period).
Should the criminal information be refiled in the proper court, that is, the proper Regional Trial
Court, that court may not impose that more onerous penalty upon private respondent Libertad
Lagon (assuming the evidence shows that the offense was committed before 22 October 1975).
But the Regional Trial Court would remain vested with subject-matter jurisdiction to try and
decide the (refiled) case even though the penalty properly imposable, given the date of the
commission of the offense charged, should be the lower penalty originally provided for in
paragraph 2(d) of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code which is otherwise within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the City Court of Roxas City. In other words, the circumstance that P.D. No. 818
would be inapplicable to the refiled case would not result in the Regional Trial Court losing
subject-matter jurisdiction, nor in the case falling back into the City Court's exclusive jurisdiction.
DECISION: WHEREFORE, the Court Resolved to DENY the Petition for Review for lack of
merit. The Order dated 2 December 1976 of the public respondent Presiding Judge of the City
Court of Roxas City is hereby AFFIRMED. No costs.

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