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PJC H2 Hist P1

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Candidate's Name: __________________________ CT Group: _________

PIONEER JUNIOR COLLEGE

H2 HISTORY

JC 2 PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION 2018

H2 9752/1: Shaping the International Order (1945-2000)

DATE: 13/09/2018 (THU) TIME: 1400–1700

INSTRUCTIONS TO CANDIDATES:

Write your answers on the separate answer paper provided. Start each answer on a
new piece of paper.

Write in dark blue or black ink.

If you use more than one sheet of paper, fasten the sheets together.

Section A
Answer Question 1.

Section B
Answer two questions.

Information to candidates:

You are reminded of the need for grammatically correct English and clear presentation
in your answers.

For official use


Question No. Full Marks Marks Obtained
1 (a) /10
1 (b) /30
/30
/30
TOTAL: 100
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THIS PAGE IS INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK.


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Section A

You must answer Question 1.

THE ORIGINS OF THE COLD WAR AND THE MARSHALL PLAN

1 Read the sources and answer the questions which follow.

Source A

The Cold War grew out of a complicated interaction of external and internal
developments inside both the United States and the Soviet Union. The external
situation − circumstances beyond the control of either power − left Americans and
Russians facing one another across prostrated Europe at the end of World War Two.
Internal influences in the Soviet Union − the search for security, the role of ideology,
massive post-war reconstruction needs, the personality of Stalin − together with those
in the United States − the need for self-determination, fear of Communism, the illusion
of omnipotence fostered by American economic strength and the atomic bomb − made
the resulting confrontation a hostile one. Leaders of both superpowers sought peace,
but in doing so yielded to considerations, which, while they did not precipitate war,
made resolution of differences impossible.

Excerpt from a book by historian John Lewis Gaddis, published in 1972.

Source B

I should say there were conflicting feelings. Molotov was willing to agree to discuss
the question. He understood the Soviet Union needed help. In his reply he noted that
reconstruction was everyone’s main aim, and the United States’ offer of help should
be welcomed.

Stalin, with his suspicious nature, didn’t like it. ‘This is a ploy by Truman. They don’t
want to help us. What they want is to infiltrate European countries,’ he said. But
Molotov insisted on his view and went to the Paris Conference in 1947. Stalin,
meanwhile, received information that the Americans did not want us to take part. Stalin
became even more suspicious and moved to stop the countries friendly to us taking
part.

Vladimir Yerofeyev, a senior Soviet official who worked as a translator in the Soviet
Foreign Ministry at the time of the Marshall Plan, interviewed in 1997.
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Source C

The truth of the matter is that Europe’s requirements for the next three or four years
of foreign food and other essential products – principally from the US – are so much
greater than her present ability to pay that she must have substantial additional help
or face economic, social, and political deteriorating of a very grave character. It is
logical that the US assists in Europe’s return to normal economic health, without which
there can be no political stability and no assured peace.

Our policy is directed not against any country or doctrine but against hunger, poverty
and chaos. Its purpose should be the revival of a working economy to permit the
emergence of political and social conditions in which free institutions can exist. Any
government willing to assist in the task of recovery will find full cooperation from the
United States Government. Any government which blocks the recovery of other
countries cannot expect help from us. Furthermore, governments which seek to
perpetuate human misery to profit therefrom will encounter the opposition of the US.

From a speech by US Secretary of State George Marshall at Harvard University,


5 June 1947.

Source D

In January of this year, an economic conference was held in Moscow of


representatives from Bulgarian, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Romania, Hungary and the
Soviet Union, at which it was decided to create a Council for Mutual Economic
Assistance (CMEA). The conference has considerable success in the development of
economic relations between the countries affected and realising a policy of economic
cooperation, which will help to speed up the reconstruction and development of their
national economies.

The conference stated that the governments of the United States, England and certain
other countries of Western Europe are boycotting trade relations with the Soviet Union
and its allies, because the Soviet Union and its allies do not consider it possible to
subordinate themselves to the dictates of the Marshall Plan, as this plan infringes on
the sovereignty of countries and the interests of their national economies.

Taking this into consideration, the conference discussed the question of the possibility
of organising economic cooperation between the countries of the peoples’
democracies and the Soviet Union. In order to realise broader economic cooperation
between the countries of the people’s democracies and the Soviet Union, the
conference judged it indispensable to create the CMEA, whose task it will be to
exchange technical aid and mutual aid in raw materials, industrial equipment etc.

Press statement to Communist newspapers after a conference in Moscow,


January 1949.
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Source E

Prior to the summer of 1947, evidence suggests that Stalin still hoped to pursue a
variant of detente with the Western Powers. While he understood that the continuation
of wartime levels of cooperation with the West would not be possible – since the West
refused to accept Soviet predominance in East Europe – he apparently still hoped to
reach a negotiated settlement on most areas of difference, especially on the question
of Germany’s future. The Marshall Plan, however, radically changed Stalin’s
calculations, and led him to shift away from this more moderate line and to adopt a
strategy of confrontational unilateral action to secure Soviet interests. The new
archival documentation shows that in making this shift, the Soviet leadership was
moved primarily by fear of its own vulnerability to American economic power.

Extract from a journal article by an American academic, 1994.

Source F

A cartoon published in a British magazine, 18 June 1947.


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Now answer the following questions:

(a) Compare and contrast the evidence provided by Sources C and D on the view that
the superpowers were committed to European economic recovery. [10]

(b) How far do Sources A–F support the assertion that the Marshall Plan was primarily
responsible for the outbreak of the Cold War? [30]

Section B

You must answer two questions from this section.

EITHER

2 Assess the reasons why the ‘Golden Age of Capitalism’, 1945–1973, came to an
end. [30]

OR

3 ‘The role of the government surpassed all other factors in South Korea’s
transformation.’ How far do you agree with this assessment of South Korea’s
economy in the period 1970 to 1990? [30]

AND EITHER

4 Assess the view that the end of the Cold War made UN peacekeeping more
effective. [30]

OR

5 How successful was the International Court of Justice in ensuring adherence to


international law from 1945–2000? [30]

---THE END---

This document consists of 6 printed pages.

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