G.R. No.

146683 November 22, 2001

CIRILA ARCABA, petitioner,

MENDOZA, J.:

Petitioner Cirila Arcaba seeks review on certiorari of the decision1 of the Court of Appeals, which
affirmed with modification the decision2 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 10, Dipolog City,
Zamboanga del Norte in Civil Case No. 4593, declaring as void a deed of donation inter
vivos executed by the late Francisco T. Comille in her favor and its subsequent resolution3 denying
reconsideration.

The facts are as follows:

On January 16, 1956, Francisco Comille and his wife Zosima Montallana became the registered
owners of Lot No. 437-A located at the corner of Calle Santa Rosa (now Balintawak Street) and
Calle Rosario (now Rizal Avenue) in Dipolog City, Zamboanga del Norte. The total area of the lot
was 418 square meters.4 After the death of Zosima on October 3, 1980, Francisco and his mother-in-
law, Juliana Bustalino Montallana, executed a deed of extrajudicial partition with waiver of rights, in
which the latter waived her share consisting of one-fourth (1/4) of the property to Francisco.5 On
June 27, 1916, Francisco registered the lot in his name with the Registry of Deeds.6

Having no children to take care of him after his retirement, Francisco asked his niece Leticia
Bellosillo,7 the latter's cousin, Luzviminda Paghacian,8 and petitioner Cirila Arcaba, then a widow, to
take care of his house, as well as the store inside.9

Conflicting testimonies were offered as to the nature of the relationship between Cirila and
Francisco. Leticia Bellosillo said Francisco and Cirila were lovers since they slept in the same
room,10 while Erlinda Tabancura,11 another niece of Francisco, claimed that the latter had told her
that Cirila was his mistress.12 On the other hand, Cirila said she was a mere helper who could enter
the master's bedroom only when the old man asked her to and that Francisco in any case was too
old for her. She denied they ever had sexual intercourse.13

It appears that when Leticia and Luzviminda were married, only Cirila was left to take care of
Francisco.14 Cirila testified that she was a 34-year old widow while Francisco was a 75-year old
widower when she began working for the latter; that he could still walk with her assistance at that
time;15 and that his health eventually deteriorated and he became bedridden.16 Erlinda Tabancura
testified that Francisco's sole source of income consisted of rentals from his lot near the public
streets.17 He did not pay Cirila a regular cash wage as a househelper , though he provided her family
with food and lodging.18

On January 24, 1991, a few months before his death, Francisco executed an instrument
denominated "Deed of Donation Inter Vivos," in which he ceded a portion of Lot 437-A, consisting of
150 square meters, together with his house, to Cirila, who accepted the donation in the same
instrument. Francisco left the larger portion of 268 square meters in his name. The deed stated that
the donation was being made in consideration of "the faithful services [Cirila Arcaba] had rendered
over the past ten (10) years." The deed was notarized by Atty. Vic T. Lacaya, Sr.19 and later
registered by Cirila as its absolute owner .20
On October 4, 1991, Francisco died without any children. In 1993, the lot which Cirila received from
Francisco had a market value of P57,105.00 and an assessed value of P28,550.00.21

On February 18, 1993, respondents filed a complaint against petitioner 'for declaration of nullity of a
deed of donation inter vivos, recovery of possession, and damages. Respondents, who are the
decedent's nephews and nieces and his heirs by intestate succession, alleged that Cirila was the
common-law wife of Francisco and the donation inter vivos made by Francisco in her favor is void
under Article 87 of the Family Code, which provides:

Every donation or grant of gratuitous advantage, direct or indirect, between the spouses
during the marriage shall be void, except moderate gifts which the spouses may give each
other on the occasion of any family rejoicing. The prohibition shall also apply to persons
living together as husband and wife without a valid marriage.

On February 25, 1999, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of respondents, holding the
donation void under this provision of the Family Code. The trial court reached this conclusion based
on the testimony of Erlinda Tabancura and certain documents bearing the signature of one "Cirila
Comille." The documents were (1) an application for a business permit to operate as real estate
lessor, dated January 8, 1991, with a carbon copy of the signature "Cirila Comille";22 (2) a sanitary
permit to operate as real estate lessor with a health certificate showing the signature "Cirila Comille"
in black ink;23 and (3) the death certificate of the decedent with the signature "Cirila A. Comille"
written in black ink.24 The dispositive portion of the trial court's decision states:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is rendered:

1. Declaring the Deed of Donation Inter Vivos executed by the late Francisco Comille
recorded as Doc. No. 7; Page No. 3; Book No. V; Series of 1991 in the Notarial Register of
Notary Public Vic T. Lacaya (Annex " A " to the Complaint) null and void;

2. Ordering the defendant to deliver possession of the house and lot subject of the deed unto
the plaintiffs within thirty (30) days after finality of this decision; and finally

3. Ordering the defendant to pay attorney's fees in the sum of P10,000.00.

SO ORDERED.25

Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals, which rendered on June 19, 2000 the decision subject
of this appeal. As already stated, the appeals court denied reconsideration. Its conclusion was based
on (1) the testimonies of Leticia, Erlinda, and Cirila; (2) the copies of documents purportedly showing
Cirila's use of Francisco's surname; (3) a pleading in another civil case mentioning payment of
rentals to Cirila as Francisco's common-law wife; and (4) the fact that Cirila did not receive a regular
cash wage.

Petitioner assigns the following errors as having been committed by the Court of Appeals:

(a) The judgment of the Court of Appeals that petitioner was the common-law wife of the late
Francisco Comille is not correct and is a reversible error because it is based on a
misapprehension of facts, and unduly breaks the chain of circumstances detailed by the
totality of the evidence, its findings being predicated on totally incompetent or hearsay
evidence, and grounded on mere speculation, conjecture or possibility. (Salazar v. Gutierrez,
33 SCRA 243 and other cases; cited in Quiason, Philippine Courts and their J urisdictions,
1993 ed., p. 604)
 (b) The Court of Appeals erred in shifting the burden of evidence from the plaintiff to
defendant. (Bunyi v. Reyes, 39 SCRA 504; Quiason, id.)

(c) The Court of Appeals decided the case in away probably not in accord with law or with
the applicable jurisprudence in Rodriguez v. Rodriguez, 20 SCRA 908, and Liguez v. CA,
102 Phil. 577, 584.26

The issue in this case is whether the Court of Appeals correctly applied Art. 87 of the Family Code to
the circumstances of this case. After a review of the records, we rule in the affirmative.

The general rule is that only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court, subject only to certain exceptions: (a) when the conclusion is a finding grounded
entirely on speculations, surmises, or conjectures; (b) when the inference made is manifestly
mistaken, absurd, or impossible; (c) where there is grave abuse of discretion; (d) when the judgment
is based on a misapprehension of facts; (e) when the findings of fact are conflicting; (f) when the
Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same are
contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee; (g) when the findings of the Court of
Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court; (h) when the findings of fact are conclusions without
citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (i) when the finding of fact of the Court of
Appeals is premised on the supposed absence of evidence but is contradicted by the evidence on
record; and G) when the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed
by the parties and which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion.27 It appearing
that the Court of Appeals based its findings on evidence presented by both parties, the general rule
should apply.

In Bitangcor v. Tan,28 we held that the term "cohabitation" or "living together as husband and wife"
means not only residing under one roof, but also having repeated sexual intercourse. Cohabitation,
of course, means more than sexual intercourse, especially when one of the parties is already old
and may no longer be interested in sex. At the very least, cohabitation is public assumption by a
man and a woman of the marital relation, and dwelling together as man and wife, thereby holding
themselves out to the public as such. Secret meetings or nights clandestinely spent together, even if
often repeated, do not constitute such kind of cohabitation; they are merely meretricious.29 In this
jurisdiction, this Court has considered as sufficient proof of common-law relationship the stipulations
between the parties,30 a conviction of concubinage,31 or the existence of legitimate children.32

Was Cirila Francisco's employee or his common-law wife? Cirila admitted that she and Francisco
resided under one roof for a long time, It is very possible that the two consummated their
relationship, since Cirila gave Francisco therapeutic massage and Leticia said they slept in the same
bedroom. At the very least, their public conduct indicated that theirs was not just a relationship of
caregiver and patient, but that of exclusive partners akin to husband and wife.

Aside from Erlinda Tabancura's testimony that her uncle told her that Cirila was his mistress, there
are other indications that Cirila and Francisco were common-law spouses. Seigfredo Tabancura
presented documents apparently signed by Cirila using the surname "Comille." As previously stated,
these are an application for a business permit to operate as a real estate lessor,33 a sanitary permit
to operate as real estate lessor with a health certificate,34 and the death certificate of
Francisco.35 These documents show that Cirila saw herself as Francisco's common-law wife,
otherwise, she would not have used his last name. Similarly, in the answer filed by Francisco's
lessees in "Erlinda Tabancura, et al. vs. Gracia Adriatico Sy and Antonio Sy," RTC Civil Case
No.4719 (for collection of rentals), these lessees referred to Cirila as "the common-law spouse of
Francisco." Finally, the fact that Cirila did not demand from Francisco a regular cash wage is an
indication that she was not simply a caregiver-employee, but Francisco's common law spouse. She
was, after all, entitled to a regular cash wage under the law.36 It is difficult to believe that she stayed
with Francisco and served him out of pure beneficence. Human reason would thus lead to the
conclusion that she was Francisco's common-law spouse.

Respondents having proven by a preponderance of evidence that Cirila and Francisco lived together
as husband and wife without a valid marriage, the inescapable conclusion is that the donation made
by Francisco in favor of Cirila is void under Art. 87 of the Family Code. 1âw phi 1.nêt

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the decision of the trial court is hereby
AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Bellosillo, Quisumbing, Buena, De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1Per Associate Justice Bernardo Salas and concurred in by Associate Justices Presbiterio
Velasco, Jr. and Edgardo Cruz.

2 Per Judge Wilfredo C. Martinez.

3Per Associate Justice Edgardo Cruz, with the concurrence of Associate Justices Teodoro
Regino and Presbitero Velasco, Jr.

4 Exh. A; Records, p. 66.

5 Exh. D; id., p. 71.

6 Exhs. E & 3; id., pp. 73, 102.

7 Also called "Letitia," "Letecia," and "Leticia Belosillo."

8 Also known as "Luzminda."

9 TSN (Leticia Bellosillo), pp. 12-15, Sept. 27,1994; TSN (Cirila Arcaba), p. 8, Aug. 14, 1994.

10 TSN (Leticia Bellosillo), p. 14, Sept. 27, 1994.

11 Also known as "Erlinda Tabangcura Vda. de Batocael."

12 TSN (Erlinda Tabancura), p. 17, Apri128, 1994.

13 TSN (Cirila Arcaba), p. 11, Aug. 14, 1996.

14 TSN (Leticia Bellosillo), pp. 14-16, Sept. 27, 1994.

16 Id., p. 10; Rollo, p. 33.

17 TSN (Erlinda Tabancura), p. 12, Apri128, 1994; TSN (Cirila Arcaba), p. 8, Aug. 14, 1994.

18 TSN (Erlinda Tabancura), p. 9, Aug. 14, 1996.

19 Exh. C; Records, p. 69.

20 TSN (Atty. Vic T. Lacaya, Sr.), pp. 3-4, Feb. 13, 1995; Exh. 3-B; Records, p. 102.

21 Exh. B; Records, p. 68.

22 Exh. H-1; id., p. 154.

23 Exh. J-2; id., p. 155.

24 Exh. O-1; id., p. 159.

25 Decision, pp. 1-13; Rollo, pp. 36-48.

26 Petition, p. 7; Rollo, p. 9.

Martinez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 123547, May 21, 2001; Floro v. Llenado, 244
27

SCRA 715 (1995).

112 SCRA 113 (1982); See also A. SEMPIO-DIY, HANDBOOK ON THE FAMILY CODE
28

OF THE PHILIPPINES 115-117 (1995).

29 52 Am Jur 2 §50.

30The Insular Life Company, Ltd. v. Ebrado, 80 SCRA 181 (1977); Matabuena v. Cervantes,
38 SCRA 284 (1971).

31 Calimlim-Canullas v. Fortun, 129 SCRA 675 (1984),

32People v. Villagonzalo, 238 SCRA 215 (1994); Bienvenido v, Court of Appeals, 237 SCRA
676 (1994).

33 Exh, H-1; Records, p. 154.

34 Exh. J-2; id., p. 155.

35 Exh. 0-1; id., p, 159.

36 LABOR CODE, ARTS. 99-101.

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