THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 113447. October 9, 1997]

ALAIN MANALILI y DIZON, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE

DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:

When dealing with a rapidly unfolding and potentially criminal situation in the city streets where
unarguably there is no time to secure an arrest or a search warrant, policemen should employ limited,
flexible responses -- like stop-and-frisk -- which are graduated in relation to the amount of information
they possess, the lawmen being ever vigilant to respect and not to violate or to treat cavalierly the citizens
constitutional rights against unreasonable arrest, search and seizure.

The Case

This rule is reiterated as we resolve this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court, seeking the reversal of the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated April 19, 1993 and its
Resolution dated January 20, 1994 in CA G.R. CR No. 07266, entitled People of the Philippines vs. Alain
Manalili y Dizon.
In an Information dated April 11, 1988,[1] Petitioner Alain Manalili y Dizon was charged by Assistant
Caloocan City Fiscal E. Juan R. Bautista with violation of Section 8, Article II of Republic Act No. 6425,
allegedly committed as follows:[2]

That on or about the 11th day of April 1988 in Caloocan City, MM, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused without any authority of law, did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his custody, possession and control crushed marijuana
residue, which is a prohibited drug and knowing the same to be such.

Contrary to Law.

Upon his arraignment on April 21, 1988, appellant pleaded not guilty to the charge. [3] With the
agreement of the public prosecutor, appellant was released after filing a P10,000.00 bail bond.[4] After
trial in due course, the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City, Branch 124, acting as a Special Criminal
Court, rendered on May 19, 1989 a decision [5] convicting appellant of illegal possession of marijuana
residue. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:[6]

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, this Court finds the accused ALAIN MANALILI Y DIZON
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 8, Article II, of Republic Act No. 6425, as
amended (Illegal Possession of Marijuana residue), and hereby snetences (sic) said accused to suffer
imprisonment of SIX (6) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY; and to pay a fine of P6,000.00; and to pay the costs.
 xxx xxx xxx.
Appellant remained on provisional liberty. [7] Atty. Benjamin Razon, counsel for the defense, filed a
Notice of Appeal[8] dated May 31, 1989. On April 19, 1993, Respondent Court[9]promulgated its assailed
Decision, denying the appeal and affirming the trial court: [10]

ACCORDINGLY, the decision appealed from dated May 19, 1989 is hereby AFFIRMED in all
respects. Costs against appellant.

Respondent Court[11] denied reconsideration via its assailed Resolution dated January 20, 1994,
disposing:

ACCORDINGLY, accused-appellants motion for reconsideration is, as is hereby DENIED.

The Facts
Version of the Prosecution

The facts, as found by the trial court, are as follows: [12]

At about 2:10 oclock in the afternoon of April 11, 1988, policemen from the Anti-Narcotics Unit of the
Kalookan City Police Station were conducting a surveillance along A. Mabini street, Kalookan City, in
front of the Kalookan City Cemetery. The policemen were Pat. Romeo Espiritu and Pat. Anger Lumabas
and a driver named Arnold Enriquez was driving a Tamaraw vehicle which was the official car of the
Police Station of Kalookan City. The surveillance was being made because of information that drug
addicts were roaming the area in front of the Kalookan City Cemetery.

Upon reaching the Kalookan City Cemetery, the policemen alighted from their vehicle. They then
chanced upon a male person in front of the cemetery who appeared high on drugs. The male person was
observed to have reddish eyes and to be walking in a swaying manner. When this male person tried to
avoid the policemen, the latter approached him and introduced themselves as police officers. The
policemen then asked the male person what he was holding in his hands. The male person tried to
resist. Pat. Romeo Espiritu asked the male person if he could see what said male person had in his
hands. The latter showed the wallet and allowed Pat. Romeo Espiritu to examine the same. Pat. Espiritu
took the wallet and examined it. He found suspected crushed marijuana residue inside. He kept the wallet
and its marijuana contents.

The male person was then brought to the Anti-Narcotics Unit of the Kalookan City Police Headquarters
and was turned over to Cpl. Wilfredo Tamondong for investigation. Pat. Espiritu also turned over to Cpl.
Tamondong the confiscated wallet and its suspected marijuana contents. The man turned out to be the
accused ALAIN MANALILI y DIZON.

Upon receipt of the confiscated suspected marijuana residue from Pat. Espiritu, Cpl. Tamondong wrapped
the same with a white sheet of paper on which he wrote Evidence A 4/11/88 Alain Manalili. The white
sheet of paper was marked as Exhibit E-3. The residue was originally wrapped in a smaller sheet of
folded paper. (Exhibit E-4).

Cpl. Tamondong next prepared a referral slip addressed to the NBI Forensic Chemistry Section requesting
a chemical analysis of the subject marijuana residue (Exhibit D). Cpl. Tamondong thereafter prepared a
Joint Affidavit of the apprehending policemen (Exhibit A). Pat. Angel Lumabas handcarried the referral
slip (Exhibit D) to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), including the subject marijuana residue for
chemical analysis. The signature of Pat. Lumabas appears on the left bottom corner of Exhibit D.

The Forensic Chemistry Section of the NBI received the aforesaid referral slip and the subject marijuana
residue at 7:40 oclock in the evening of April 11, 1988 as shown on the stamped portion of Exhibit D.

It was NBI Aida Pascual who conducted the microscopic and chemical examinations of the specimen
which she identified. (Exhibit E)[13] Mrs. Pascual referred to the subject specimen as crushed marijuana
leaves in her Certification dated April 11, 1988 (Exhibit F). [14] These crushed marijuana leaves gave
positive results for marijuana, according to the Certificate.

Mrs. Pascual also conducted a chromatographic examination of the specimen. In this examination, she
also found that the crushed marijuana leaves gave positive results for marijuana. She then prepared a
Final Report of her examinations (Exhibit G).

After conducting the examinations, Ms. Pascual placed the specimen in a white letter-envelope and sealed
it. (Exhibit E). She then wrote identification notes on this letter-envelope. (Exhibit E-1).

Pat. Lumabas carried the Certification marked as Exhibit F from the NBI Forensic Chemistry Section to
Cpl. Tamondong. Upon receipt thereof, Cpl. Tamondong prepared a referral slip addressed to the City
Fiscal of Kalookan City. (Exhibit C)

On rebuttal, Pat. Espiritu testified that appellant was not riding a tricycle but was walking in front of
the cemetery when he was apprehended.[15]

Version of the Defense

The trial court summarized the testimonies of the defense witnesses as follows: [16]

At about 2:00 oclock in the afternoon of April 11, 1988, the accused ALAIN MANALILI was aboard a
tricycle at A. Mabini street near the Kalookan City Cemetery on the way to his boarding house. Three
policemen ordered the driver of the tricycle to stop because the tricycle driver and his lone passenger
were under the influence of marijuana. The policemen brought the accused and the tricycle driver inside
the Ford Fiera which the policemen were riding in. The policemen then bodily searched the accused and
the tricycle driver. At this point, the accused asked the policemen why he was being searched and the
policemen replied that he (accused) was carrying marijuana. However, nothing was found on the persons
of the accused and the driver. The policemen allowed the tricycle driver to go while they brought the
accused to the police headquarters at Kalookan City where they said they would again search the accused.

On the way to the police headquarters, the accused saw a neighbor and signaled the latter to follow
him. The neighbor thus followed the accused to the Kalookan City Police Headquarters. Upon arrival
thereat, the accused was asked to remove his pants in the presence of said neighbor and another
companion. The policemen turned over the pants of the accused over a piece of bond paper trying to look
for marijuana. However, nothing was found, except for some dirt and dust. This prompted the companion
of the neighbor of the accused to tell the policemen to release the accused. The accused was led to a
cell.The policemen later told the accused that they found marijuana inside the pockets of his pants.
At about 5:00 oclock in the afternoon on the same day, the accused was brought outside the cell and was
led to the Ford Fiera. The accused was told by the policemen to call his parents in order to settle the
case. The policemen who led the accused to the Ford Fiera were Pat. Lumabas, Pat. Espiritu and Cpl.
Tamondong. Pat. Lumabas was the policeman who told the accused to call his parents. The accused did
not call his parents and he told the policemen that his parents did not have any telephone.

At about 5:30 oclock in the afternoon of the same day, the accused was brought in the office of an inquest
Fiscal. There, the accused told the Fiscal that no marijuana was found on his person but the Fiscal told the
accused not to say anything. The accused was then brought back to the Kalookan City Jail.

Loreto Medenilla, the tricycle driver who was allegedly with the accused when he and the accused were
stopped by policemen and then bodily searched on April 11, 1988, testified. He said that the policemen
found nothing either on his person or on the person of the accused when both were searched on April 11,
1988.

Roberto Abes, a neighbor of the accused, testified that he followed the accused at the Kalookan City
Police Headquarters on April 11, 1988. He said that the police searched the accused who was made to
take off his pants at the police headquarters but no marijuana was found on the body of the accused.

Appellant, who was recalled to the stand as sur-rebuttal witness, presented several pictures showing
that tricycles were allowed to ply in front of the Caloocan Cemetery. [17]

The Rulings of the Trial and the Appellate Courts

The trial court convicted petitioner of illegal possession of marijuana residue largely on the strength
of the arresting officers testimony. Patrolmen Espiritu and Lumabas were neutral and disinterested
witnesses, testifying only on what transpired during the performance of their duties. Substantially, they
asserted that the appellant was found to be in possession of a substance which was later identified as
crushed marijuana residue.
The trial court disbelieved appellants defense that this charge was merely trumped up, because the
appellant neither took any legal action against the allegedly erring policemen nor moved for a
reinvestigation before the city fiscal of Kalookan City.
On appeal, Respondent Court found no proof that the decision of the trial court was based on
speculations, surmises or conjectures. On the alleged serious discrepancies in the testimonies of the
arresting officers, the appellate court ruled that the said inconsistencies were insubstantial to impair the
essential veracity of the narration. It further found petitioners contention -- that he could not be convicted
of illegal possession of marijuana residue -- to be without merit, because the forensic chemist reported
that what she examined were marijuana leaves.

Issues

Petitioner assigns the following errors on the part of Respondent Court:

The Court of Appeals erred in upholding the findings of fact of the trial court.
 II

The Court of Appeals erred in upholding the conviction of (the) accused (and) in ruling that the guilt
of the accused had been proved (beyond) reasonable doubt.

III

The Court of Appeals erred in not ruling that the inconsistencies in the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses were material and substantial and not minor.

IV

The Court of Appeals erred in not appreciating the evidence that the accused was framed for the
purpose of extorting money.

The Court of Appeals erred in not acquitting the accused when the evidence presented is consistent
with both innocence and guilt.

VI

The Court of Appeals erred in admitting the evidence of the prosecution which are inadmissible in
evidence.

Restated more concisely, petitioner questions (1) the admissibility of the evidence against him, (2)
the credibility of prosecution witnesses and the rejection by the trial and the appellate courts of the
defense of extortion, and (3) the sufficiency of the prosecution evidence to sustain his conviction.

The Courts Ruling

The petition has no merit.

First Issue: Admissibility of the Evidence Seized During a Stop-and-Frisk

Petitioner protests the admission of the marijuana leaves found in his possession, contending that
they were products of an illegal search. The Solicitor General, in his Comment, dated July 5, 1994, which
was adopted as memorandum for respondent, counters that the inadmissibility of the marijuana leaves
was waived because petitioner never raised this issue in the proceedings below nor did he object to their
admissibility in evidence. He adds that, even assuming arguendo that there was no waiver, the search was
legal because it was incidental to a warrantless arrest under Section 5 (a), Rule 113 of the Rules of Court.
We disagree with petitioner and hold that the search was valid, being akin to a stop-and-frisk. In the
landmark case of Terry vs. Ohio,[18] a stop-and-frisk was defined as the vernacular designation of the right
of a police officer to stop a citizen on the street, interrogate him, and pat him for weapon(s):
x x x (W)here a police officer observes an unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude in
light of his experience that criminal activity may be afoot and that the persons with whom he is dealing
may be armed and presently dangerous, where in the course of investigating this behavior he identified
himself as a policeman and makes reasonable inquiries, and where nothing in the initial stages of the
encounter serves to dispel his reasonable fear for his own or others safety, he is entitled for the protection
of himself and others in the area to conduct a carefully limited search of the outer clothing of such
persons in an attempt to discover weapons which might be used to assault him. Such a search is a
reasonable search under the Fourth Amendment, and any weapon seized may properly be introduced in
evidence against the person from whom they were taken. [19]

In allowing such a search, the United States Supreme Court held that the interest of effective crime
prevention and detection allows a police officer to approach a person, in appropriate circumstances and
manner, for purposes of investigating possible criminal behavior even though there is insufficient
probable cause to make an actual arrest. This was the legitimate investigative function which Officer
McFadden discharged in that case, when he approached petitioner and his companion whom he observed
to have hovered alternately about a street corner for an extended period of time, while not waiting for
anyone; paused to stare in the same store window roughly 24 times; and conferred with a third person.  It
would have been sloppy police work for an officer of 30 years experience to have failed to investigate this
behavior further.
In admitting in evidence two guns seized during the stop-and-frisk, the US Supreme Court held that
what justified the limited search was the more immediate interest of the police officer in taking steps to
assure himself that the person with whom he was dealing was not armed with a weapon that could
unexpectedly and fatally be used against him.
It did not, however, abandon the rule that the police must, whenever practicable, obtain advance
judicial approval of searches and seizures through the warrant procedure, excused only by exigent
circumstances.
In Philippine jurisprudence, the general rule is that a search and seizure must be validated by a
previously secured judicial warrant; otherwise, such search and seizure is unconstitutional and subject to
challenge.[20] Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, gives this guarantee:

SEC. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no
search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by
the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.

Any evidence obtained in violation of the mentioned provision is legally inadmissible in evidence as
a fruit of the poisonous tree, falling under the exclusionary rule:

SEC. 3. x x x

(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of x x x the preceding section shall be inadmissible for any
purpose in any proceeding.

This right, however, is not absolute.[21] The recent case of People vs. Lacerna enumerated five
recognized exceptions to the rule against warrantless search and seizure, viz.: (1) search incidental to a
lawful arrest, (2) search of moving vehicles, (3) seizure in plain view, (4) customs search, and (5) waiver
by the accused themselves of their right against unreasonable search and seizure. [22] In People vs.
Encinada,[23] the Court further explained that [i]n these cases, the search and seizure may be made only
with probable cause as the essential requirement. Although the term eludes exact definition, probable
cause for a search is, at best, defined as a reasonable ground of suspicion, supported by circumstances
sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man in the belief that the person accused is guilty
of the offense with which he is charged; or the existence of such facts and circumstances which could
lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the
item(s), article(s) or object(s) sought in connection with said offense or subject to seizure and destruction
by law is in the place to be searched.
Stop-and-frisk has already been adopted as another exception to the general rule against a search
without a warrant. In Posadas vs. Court of Appeals ,[24] the Court held that there are many instances where
a search and seizure can be effected without necessarily being preceded by an arrest, one of which is stop-
and-frisk. In said case, members of the Integrated National Police of Davao stopped petitioner, who was
carrying a buri bag and acting suspiciously. They found inside petitioners bag one .38-cal. revolver with
two rounds of live ammunition, two live ammunitions for a .22-cal. gun and a tear gas grenade. In
upholding the legality of the search, the Court said that to require the police officers to search the bag
only after they had obtained a search warrant might prove to be useless, futile and much too late under the
circumstances. In such a situation, it was reasonable for a police officer to stop a suspicious individual
briefly in order to determine his identity or to maintain the status quo while obtaining more information,
rather than to simply shrug his shoulders and allow a crime to occur.
In the case at hand, Patrolman Espiritu and his companions observed during their surveillance that
appellant had red eyes and was wobbling like a drunk along the Caloocan City Cemetery, which
according to police information was a popular hangout of drug addicts. From his experience as a member
of the Anti-Narcotics Unit of the Caloocan City Police, such suspicious behavior was characteristic of
drug addicts who were high. The policemen therefore had sufficient reason to stop petitioner to
investigate if he was actually high on drugs. During such investigation, they found marijuana in
petitioners possession:[25]
FISCAL RALAR:
Q And why were you conducting surveillance in front of the Caloocan Cemetery, Sangandaan,
Caloocan City?
A Because there were some informations that some drug dependents were roaming around at A.
Mabini Street in front of the Caloocan Cemetery, Caloocan City.
xxx xxx xxx
Q While you were conducting your surveillance, together with Pat. Angel Lumabas and one
Arnold Enriquez, what happened, if any?
A We chanced upon one male person there in front of the Caloocan Cemetery then when we
called his attention, he tried to avoid us, then prompting us to approach him and introduce
ourselves as police officers in a polite manner.
xxx xxx xxx
Q Could you describe to us the appearance of that person when you chanced upon him?
A That person seems like he is high on drug.
Q How were you able to say Mr. Witness that that person that you chanced upon was high on
drug?
A Because his eyes were red and he was walking on a swaying manner.
 Q What was he doing in particular when you chanced upon him?
A He was roaming around, sir.
Q You said that he avoided you, what did you do when he avoided you?
A We approached him and introduced ourselves as police officers in a polite manner, sir.
Q How did you introduce yourselves?
A In a polite manner, sir.
Q What did you say when you introduced yourselves?
A We asked him what he was holding in his hands, sir.
Q And what was the reaction of the person when you asked him what he was holding in his
hands?
A He tried to resist, sir.
Q When he tried to resist, what did you do?
A I requested him if I can see what was he was(sic) holding in his hands.
Q What was the answer of the person upon your request?
A He allowed me to examine that something in his hands, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q What was he holding?
A He was holding his wallet and when we opened it, there was a marijuana (sic) crushed
residue.
Furthermore, we concur with the Solicitor Generals contention that petitioner effectively waived the
inadmissibility of any evidence illegally obtained when he failed to raise this issue or to object thereto
during the trial. A valid waiver of a right, more particularly of the constitutional right against
unreasonable search, requires the concurrence of the following requirements: (1) the right to be waived
existed; (2) the person waiving it had knowledge, actual or constructive, thereof; and (3) he or she had an
actual intention to relinquish the right. [26] Otherwise, the Courts will indulge every reasonable
presumption against waiver of fundamental safeguards and will not deduce acquiescence from the failure
to exercise this elementary right. In the present case, however, petitioner is deemed to have waived such
right for his failure to raise its violation before the trial court. In petitions under Rule 45, as distinguished
from an ordinary appeal of criminal cases where the whole case is opened for review, the appeal is
generally limited to the errors assigned by petitioner. Issues not raised below cannot be pleaded for the
first time on appeal.[27]

Second Issue: Assessment of Evidence

Petitioner also contends that the two arresting officers testimony contained polluted, irreconcilable
and unexplained contradictions which did not support petitioners conviction.
We disagree. Time and again, this Court has ruled that the trial courts assessment of the credibility of
witnesses, particularly when affirmed by the Court of Appeals as in this case, is accorded great weight
and respect, since it had the opportunity to observe their demeanor and deportment as they testified before
it. Unless substantial facts and circumstances have been overlooked or misappreciated by the trial court
which, if considered, would materially affect the result of the case, we will not countenance a departure
from this rule.[28]
We concur with Respondent Courts ruling:

(e)ven assuming as contended by appellant that there had been some inconsistencies in the prosecution
witnesses testimonies, We do not find them substantial enough to impair the essential veracity of their
narration. In People vs. Avila, it was held that As long as the witnesses concur on the material points,
slight differences in their remembrance of the details, do not reflect on the essential veracity of their
statements.

However, we find that, aside from the presumption of regularity in the performance of duty, the
bestowal of full credence on Pat. Espiritus testimony is justified by tangible evidence on record. Despite
Pat. Lumabas contradictory testimony, that of Espiritu is supported by the Joint Affidavit [29] signed by
both arresting policemen. The question of whether the marijuana was found inside petitioners wallet or
inside a plastic bag is immaterial, considering that petitioner did not deny possession of said
substance. Failure to present the wallet in evidence did not negate that marijuana was found in petitioners
possession. This shows that such contradiction is minor, and does not destroy Espiritus credibility. [30]

Third Issue: Sufficiency of Evidence

The elements of illegal possession of marijuana are: (a) the accused is in possession of an item or
object which is identified to be a prohibited drug; (b) such possession is not authorized by law; and (c) the
accused freely and consciously possessed the said drug. [31]
The substance found in petitioners possession was identified by NBI Forensic Chemist Aida Pascual
to be crushed marijuana leaves. Petitioners lack of authority to possess these leaves was established. His
awareness thereof was undeniable, considering that petitioner was high on drugs when stopped by the
policemen and that he resisted when asked to show and identify the thing he was holding.  Such behavior
clearly shows that petitioner knew that he was holding marijuana and that it was prohibited by law.
Furthermore, like the trial and the appellate courts, we have not been given sufficient grounds to
believe the extortion angle in this case. Petitioner did not file any administrative or criminal case against
the arresting officers or present any evidence, other than his bare claim. His argument that he feared for
his life was lame and unbelievable, considering that he was released on bail and continued to be on bail as
early as April 26, 1988.[32] Since then, he could have made the charge in relative safety, as he was no
longer in the custody of the police. His defense of frame-up, like alibi, is viewed by this Court with
disfavor, because it is easy to concoct and fabricate. [33]

The Proper Penalty

The trial and the appellate courts overlooked the Indeterminate Sentence Law (Act No. 4103, as
amended) by sentencing petitioner to a straight penalty of six years and one day of imprisonment, aside
from the imposed fine of six thousand pesos. This Act requires the imposition of an indeterminate
penalty:
SECTION 1. Hereafter, in imposing a prison sentence for an offense punished by the Revised Penal
Code, or its amendments, the court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence the maximum
term of which shall be that which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be properly imposed
under the rules of the said Code, and the minimum which shall be within the range of the penalty next
lower to that prescribed by the Code for the offense; and if the offense is punished by any other law, the
court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence, the maximum term of which shall not
exceed the maximum fixed by said law and the minimum shall not be less than the minimum term
prescribed by the same. (As amended by Act No. 4225.)

SEC. 2. This Act shall not apply to persons convicted of offenses punished with death penalty or life-
imprisonment; to those convicted of treason; to those convicted of misprision of treason, rebellion,
sedition or espionage; to those convicted of piracy; to those who are habitual delinquents; to those who
shall have escaped from confinement or evaded sentence; to those who having been granted conditional
pardon by the Chief Executive shall have violated the terms thereof; to those whose maximum term of
imprisonment does not exceed one year, not to those already sentenced by final judgment at the time of
approval of this Act, except as provided in Section 5 hereof. (Underscoring supplied)

The Dangerous Drugs Law, R.A. 6425, as amended by B.P. 179, imposes the following penalty for
illegal possession of marijuana:

Sec. 8. x x x x

The penalty of imprisonment ranging from six years and one day to twelve years and a fine ranging from
six thousand to twelve thousand pesos shall be imposed upon any person who, unless authorized by law,
shall possess or use Indian hemp.

Prescinding from the foregoing, the Court holds that the proper penalty is an indeterminate sentence
of imprisonment ranging from six years and one day to twelve years. [34]
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision and Resolution are
hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Petitioner is sentenced to suffer IMPRISONMENT of SIX (6)
YEARS, as minimum, to TWELVE (12) YEARS, as maximum, and to PAY a FINE of SIX THOUSAND
PESOS. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., (Chairman), Romero, Melo, and Francisco, JJ., concur.