497 Phil.

227

SECOND DIVISION
[ G.R. NO. 155207, April 29, 2005 ]
WILHELMINA S. OROZCO, PETITIONER, VS. THE FIFTH
DIVISION OF THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS,
PHILIPPINE DAILY INQUIRER, AND LETICIA JIMENEZ
MAGSANOC, RESPONDENTS.
RESOLUTION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

Ostensibly, the question raised in this present petition is of general interest to

students of law¾whether a newspaper columnist is an employee of the newspaper
which publishes the columns. However, for failure to file the appeal bond required
by law, the Court is impelled to defer the settlement of the above issue until the
jurisdictional requirement has been duly complied with.

This Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assails the
Resolution[1] of the Court of Appeals Fifth Division denying the Motion for
Reconsideration filed by Wilhelmina Orozco (Orozco) and the Decision[2] of the
same division in CA-G.R. SP No. 50970, the dispositive portion of which provides:

WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing, the petition is hereby

GRANTED. The assailed decision of the public respondent NLRC
affirming the decision of the Labor Arbiter that private respondent
Wilhelmina Orozco is an employee of petitioner PDI is hereby SET
ASIDE. Private respondent Orozco’s complaint is hereby DISMISSED
for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.[3]

The above ruling of the Court of Appeals reversed the Decision[4] of the National
Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) which affirmed the Decision[5] of the Labor
:
 Arbiter,[6] the decretal portion of which stated:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, finding complainant to be

an employee of respondent company; ordering respondent company to
reinstate her to her former or equivalent position, with backwages.

Respondent company is also ordered to pay her 13th month pay and
service incentive leave pay.

Other claims are hereby dismissed for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.[7]

This case arose out of the complaint filed by Orozco against private respondents
Philippine Daily Inquirer (PDI) and Leticia Jimenez-Magsanoc (Magsanoc), the
editor-in-chief of the PDI at that time, for illegal dismissal, underpayment, non-
payment of allowance, separation pay, retirement pay, service incentive leave pay,
13th month pay, moral and exemplary damages, discrimination in pay and for
attorney’s fees[8] with the Arbitration Branch of the NLRC on 1 June 1993.[9]

Based on the records of this case, Orozco was engaged as a columnist by PDI on 8
March 1990. She penned the column “Feminist Reflections” which appeared in
the Lifestyle Section under the editorship of Lolita T. Logarta.[10]

Orozco worked by submitting weekly columns with a per article wage of Two
Hundred Fifty Pesos (P250.00) which was later increased to Three hundred Pesos
(P300.00).[11]

In June 1991, Magsanoc as editor-in-chief of PDI discussed how to improve the

Lifestyle section of the newspaper with the Lifestyle editor. They agreed to cut down
the number of columnists and for this reason, PDI decided to drop or terminate
Orozco’s column in November 1992.[12]

Orozco’s column thus appeared in PDI for the last time on 7 November 1992. Upon
inquiry at the office of Magsanoc as to why her column was stopped, the secretary
told Orozco that it was Eugenia Apostol (Apostol), the chairperson of PDI, who had
decided to stop her column.[13]

Apostol was out of the country at that time so Orozco waited until February 1993 to
talk to her. In a telephone conversation with Orozco, Apostol stated that she had
:
 been told by Magsanoc that there were too many columnists in the Lifestyle Section.
[14]

Aggrieved at the stoppage of her column, Orozco filed the instant case against
private respondents before the NLRC. The PDI raised as primary defense the claim
that Orozco was not an employee of the newspaper. However, in a Decision dated
29 October 1993, Labor Arbiter Arthur L. Amansec ruled that Orozco had been
illegally dismissed, after concluding that Orozco had indeed been an employee of the
PDI.

The PDI, through counsel, received a copy of the Labor Arbiter’s Decision on 16
December 1993.[15] It timely filed a Notice and Memorandum dated 24 December
1993, but it did not lodge a cash or surety bond in the amount equivalent to the
monetary award in the judgment appealed from. PDI adverted to such failure on its
part before the NLRC but justified the same on the ground that the Decision of the
Labor Arbiter did not fix any amount but merely stated that Orozco was entitled to
backwages.

The NLRC dismissed the appeal in its Decision dated 23 August 1994. In this
Decision, it made note of the failure of PDI to perfect the appeal by filing the cash or
surety bond. Nonetheless, the NLRC ventured to delve on the merits, and thereupon,
affirmed the finding of the Labor Arbiter that Orozco was an employee of PDI.

Private respondents elevated the case to the Supreme Court by way of the special
civil action of certiorari. Pursuant to the ruling in St. Martin Funeral Homes v.
NLRC,[16] this Court referred the case to the Court of Appeals.

On 11 July 2002, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the NLRC by
holding that Orozco is not an employee of PDI. The reversal was grounded on
factual premises, the appellate court concluding that the NLRC had misappreciated
the facts and rendered a ruling wanting in substantial evidence. It thereby dismissed
Orozco’s complaint for lack of merit. The Court of Appeals likewise dismissed
Orozco’s motion for reconsideration on 11 September 2002. Hence, this petition.

In her Memorandum, Orozco posits that the Court of Appeals should have dismissed
outright the private respondent’s petition for certiorari for their failure to file a cash
bond or a surety bond as provided for in Article 223 of the Labor Code.

In support of the argument, Orozco contends that a grievous error tantamount to

grave abuse of discretion was committed by the Court of Appeals when it failed to
appreciate the observation of the NLRC that private respondents did not perfect their
:
 appeal as they did not deposit on time any cash or surety bond in compliance with
the provision of Art. 223 of the Labor Code when they filed an appeal of the Labor
Arbiter’s decision at the NLRC. Orozco argues that the posting of the cash or surety
bond is mandatory and must be made by the employer within the reglementary
period of ten (10) days from receipt of the Labor Arbiter’s decision so as to perfect
his appeal. Failing to do so, the employer loses the right to appeal, and the Labor
Arbiter’s decision becomes final and executory, regardless of whether or not the
NLRC declares it so, by operation of law.[17]

The NLRC in its decision concluded that it had no jurisdiction over PDI’s appeal but
proceeded nonetheless to discuss the merits of the case. On the other hand, the Court
of Appeals made no mention at all of the jurisdictional defect, whether in its recital
of facts or discussion of the arguments.

The novelty of the argument on the merits aside, it is essential not to lose sight of the
jurisdictional issue, as it determines whether or not an appeal had indeed been
perfected.

The provisions of the Labor Code are quite clear cut on the matter. The relevant
portion of Article 223 states:

ART. 223. Appeal. - Decisions, awards or orders of the Labor Arbiter are
final and executory unless appealed to the Commission by any or both
parties within ten (10) calendar days from receipt of such decisions,
awards, or orders. . .

In case of a judgment involving a monetary award, an appeal by the

employer may be perfected only upon the posting of a cash or surety
bond issued by a reputable bonding company duly accredited by the
Commission in the amount equivalent to the monetary award in the
judgment appealed from. (emphasis supplied)

By explicit provision of law, an appeal is perfected only upon the posting of a cash
or surety bond. The reason behind the imposition of this requirement is not difficult
to divine. As the Court said in Viron Garments Mftg., Co., Inc. v. NLRC:[18]

The requirement that the employer post a cash or surety bond to perfect
its/his appeal is apparently intended to assure the workers that if they
prevail in the case, they will receive the money judgment in their favor
upon the dismissal of the employer's appeal. It was intended to discourage
employers from using an appeal to delay, or even evade, their obligation
:
 to satisfy their employees' just and lawful claims.[19]

But while the posting of a cash or surety bond is jurisdictional and is a condition sine
qua non to the perfection of an appeal, there is a plethora of jurisprudence
recognizing exceptional instances wherein the Court relaxed the bond requirement as
a condition for posting the appeal.

In Olacao v. NLRC[20] for example, the NLRC had discovered that the separation
pay awarded by the Labor Arbiter had already been paid by the employer. Since a
modification of the Labor Arbiter’s Decision was the only way to forestall the grant
of separation pay twice, the NLRC allowed the appeal perfected only on the twelfth
(12th) day.[21] In Cosico, Jr. v. NLRC,[22] the employer timely posted the bond based
on the monetary award for back wages and thirteenth month pay, but excluding the
exorbitant award for moral and exemplary damages. The Court ruled that there was
substantial compliance, owing to the fact that the NLRC had since excluded the
award of damages from the computation of the surety bond.[23] And in Star Angel
Handicraft v. NLRC,[24] the Court noted that a motion for reduction of the appeal
bond had been filed within the reglementary period, and that the appeal should not
be deemed perfected until the NLRC has acted on the motion and the appellant has
filed the bond as fixed by the NLRC.[25]

In YBL v. NLRC,[26] the appeal was interposed by the employers on 11 September

1989, or only six (6) days from the effectivity of the Interim Rules on Appeals which
incorporated for the first time the appeal bond requirement imposed by Republic Act
No. 6715, an amendatory law to the Labor Code. The Court therein considered the
apparent fact that neither the counsel for the employer nor that for the employee was
already aware of the then new requirement requiring the posting of a bond on appeal.
[27] The same justification was cited with approval by the Court in Blancaflor v.

NLRC,[28] and the same circumstance is likewise apparent in Rada v. NLRC.[29]

In the case of Taberrah v. NLRC,[30] the Court made note of the fact that the assailed
decision of the Labor Arbiter concerned did not contain a computation of the
monetary award due the employees, a circumstance which is likewise present in this
case. In said case, the Court stated,

As a rule, compliance with the requirements for the perfection of an

appeal within the reglamentary period is mandatory and jurisdictional.
However, in National Federation of Labor Unions v. Ladrido as well as in
several other cases, this Court relaxed the requirement of the posting of
:
 an appeal bond within the reglementary period as a condition for
perfecting the appeal. This is in line with the principle that substantial
justice is better served by allowing the appeal to be resolved on the merits
rather than dismissing it based on a technicality.[31]

The judgment of the Labor Arbiter in this case merely stated that petitioner was
entitled to backwages, 13th month pay and service incentive leave pay without
however including a computation of the alleged amounts. As the private respondents
asserted in their motion for reconsideration anent the NLRC decision:

III. NO BOND WAS FILED BECAUSE OF THE VAGUENESS OF

THE AWARD

The award as contained in the appealed 29 October 1993 decision did not
state the exact amount to be awarded. In particular, while it may be
assumed, as stated in the decision subject of this motion, the award be
based on the P300.00 per column/article basis, this is not clear in the
decision which likewise mentioned an award for thirteenth (13th) month
pay and service incentive leave pay. Noteworthy is the fact that the
complainant, not being an employee, was not being paid a fixed salary.
Hence, herein respondents-appellants requested in their memorandum on
appeal that the Commission fixes (sic) the amount of the bond, if it finds
the same necessary in exceptional cases like the present case, to wit:

“xxx Respondents-appellants however manifest that they are

able and willing to post a bond that this Commission may fix if
the latter finds it necessary.” (Notice and Memorandum on
Appeal dated 24 December 1993, p. 7).[32] (Emphasis in the
original)

In the case of NFLU v. Ladrido III,[33] this Court postulated that “private
respondents cannot be expected to post such appeal bond equivalent to the amount of
the monetary award when the amount thereof was not included in the decision of the
labor arbiter.”[34] The computation of the amount awarded to petitioner not having
been clearly stated in the decision of the labor arbiter, private respondents had no
basis for determining the amount of the bond to be posted.

Thus, while the requirements for perfecting an appeal must be strictly followed as
they are considered indispensable interdictions against needless delays and for
orderly discharge of judicial business,[35] the law does admit of exceptions when
warranted by the circumstances. Technicality should not be allowed to stand in the
:
 way of equitably and completely resolving the rights and obligations of the parties.
[36] But while this Court may relax the observance of reglementary periods and

technical rules to achieve substantial justice,[37] it is not prepared to give due course
to this petition and make a pronouncement on the weighty issue obtaining in this
case until the law has been duly complied with and the requisite appeal bond duly
paid by private respondents.

WHEREFORE, without giving due course to the petition, the Labor Arbiter is
hereby ordered to clarify the amount of the award due the petitioner. Private
respondents are ordered to post the requisite bond in accordance with Article 223 of
the Labor Code, whereupon, the petition will be given due course. No
pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Puno, (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.

[1] Promulgated on 11 September 2002; Rollo, p. 107.

[2]Penned by Associate Justice Juan Q. Enriquez, Jr., concurred in by Associate

Justices Eugenio S. Labitoria and Teodoro P. Regino, promulgated on 11 July 2002;
Rollo, pp. 101-106.

[3] Id. at 106.

[4] Dated 23 August 1994, penned by Commissioner Rogelio I. Ragala and

concurred in by Commissioner Victoriano R. Calaycay of the Second Division; Id. at
89-98.

[5] Dated 29 October 1993; Id. at 83-88.

[6] Arthur L. Amansec.

[7] Rollo, p. 88.

[8] Id. at 186, 352.

:
 [9] Id. at 348.

[10] Id. at 309, 350.

[11] Id. at 350.

[12] Id. at 185.

[13] Id. at 350-351.

[14] Ibid.

[15] Id. at 292.

[16] 356 Phil. 811 (1998).

[17] Id. at 5-6.

[18] Ibid.

[19] Id. See also Guadia v. NLRC, 376 Phil. 548, 555 (1999); Calabash Garments,
Inc. v. NLRC, 329 Phil. 226 (1996).

[20] G.R. No. 81390, 29 August 1989, 177 SCRA 38.

[21] Id. at 49.

[22] G.R. No. 118432, 338 Phil. 1080 (1997).

[23] Id. at 592.

[24] G.R. No. 108914, 20 September 1994, 236 SCRA 580.

[25] Id. at 584.

[26] G.R. No. 93381, 28 September 1990, 190 SCRA 160.

:
 [27] Id. at 163.

[28] G.R. No. 101013, 2 February 1993, 218 SCRA 366, 371.

[29] G.R. No. 96078, 9 January 1992, 205 SCRA 69.

[30] 342 Phil. 394 (1997).

[31] Ibid.

[32] Id. at 140.

[33] G.R. Nos. 94540-41, 8 May 1991, 196 SCRA 833.

[34] Ibid.

[35]Id. citing Arnold Ginete v. Hon. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 127596, 24
September 1998, 296 SCRA 38.

[36]Buenaobra vs. Lim King Guan, G.R. No. 150147, 20 January 2004, 420 SCRA
359, 364.

[37] Ibid.

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