GR Nos. 132848-49, June 26, 2001: Philrock, Inc. vs. Construction Industry Arbitration Commission
GR Nos. 132848-49, June 26, 2001: Philrock, Inc. vs. Construction Industry Arbitration Commission
GR Nos. 132848-49, June 26, 2001: Philrock, Inc. vs. Construction Industry Arbitration Commission
FACTS:
ISSUE:
RULING:
The petition has no merit. Section 4 of executive order 1008 expressly vests
in the CIAC original and exclusive jurisdiction over disputes arising from or
connected with construction contracts entered into by parties that have agreed
to submit their dispute to voluntary arbitration. It is undisputed that the
parties submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the Commission by virtue of
their Agreement to Arbitrate Petitioner1s contention is untenable because first,
private respondents removed the obstacle to the continuation of the
arbitration, precisely by withdrawing their objection to the exclusion of the
seven engineers. Second, petitioner continued participating in the arbitration
even after the CIAC order had been issued. It even concluded and signed the
terms of' reference in which the parties stipulated the circumstances leading to
the dispute summarized their respective positions, issues, and claims" and
identified the composition of the tribunal of arbitrators. The document clearly
confirms both parties1 intention and agreement to submit the dispute to
voluntary arbitration. In view of this fact, we fail to see how the CIAC could
have been divested of its jurisdiction. The Court will not countenance the effort
of any party to subvert or defeat the objective of voluntary arbitration for its
own private motives. After submitting itself to arbitration proceedings and
actively participating therein, petitioner is estopped from assailing the
jurisdiction of the CIAC, merely because the latter rendered an adverse
decision.
EXCELLENT QUALITY APPAREL, INC., vs. WIN MULTI RICH BUILDERS, INC.
GR No. 175048, February 10, 2009
Facts:
The duration of the project was for a maximum period of five (5) months or 150
consecutive calendar days. Included in the contract is an arbitration clause.
Respondent Win Multi-Rich Builders, Inc. (Win) was incorporated with the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) on 20 February 1997 with Chua
as its President and General Manager.-
Petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion claiming that it was neither about to close.
It also denied owing anything to Win, as it had already paid all its obligations
to it.-
In the hearing held, the counsel of Win moved that its name in the case be
changed from "Win Multi-Rich Builders, Inc." to "Multi-Rich Builders, Inc."-
It was only then that petitioner apparently became aware of the variance in the
name of the plaintiff.-
In the Reply filed by petitioner, it moved to dismiss the case since Win was not
the contractor and neither a party to the contract, thus it cannot institute the
case.
Moreover, Win in its Rejoinder did not oppose the allegations in the Reply. Win
admitted that it was only incorporated on 20 February 1997 while the
construction contract was executed on 26 March 1996. Likewise, it admitted
that at the time of execution of the contract, Multi-Rich was a registered sole
proprietorship and was issued a business permit by the Office of the Mayor of
Manila.
2. Does the RTC have jurisdiction over the case notwithstanding the presence
of the arbitration clause?
RULING:
FACTS:
ISSUE:
RULING:
The text of Section 4 of EO 1008 is broad enough to cover any dispute arising
from, or connected with, construction contracts, whether these involve mere
contractual money claims or execution of the works. Unless specifically
excluded, all incidents and matters relating to construction contracts are
deemed to be within the jurisdiction of the CIAC. Moreover, the parties
characterized the water supply contract as one involving construction, as its
arbitration clause specifically refers disputes, controversies or claims arising
out of or relating to the Contract or the breach, termination or validity thereof.
MORAL DAMAGES IN ARBITRAL AWARDS
Spouses Vicente and Nelia Cid” (S.C. G.R. 132848-49, June 26, 2001), the
Supreme
Court declared: “(W)hen parties agree to settle their disputes arising from or
The spouses Vicente and Nelia Cid purchased ready mix concrete from
petitioner Philrock. The concrete delivered turned out to be of substandard
quality. As a result, respondents sustained damages when the structures they
built using such ready mix concrete developed cracks and honeycombs.
Initially, the spouse Cid filed suit for damages against Philrock and seven of its
officers and engineers with the Regional Trial Court. The Regional Trial Court
dismissed the case and referred the case to the CIAC because the Cid spouses
and Philrock had executed an Agreement to Arbitrate with the CIAC. At the
CIAC, however, Philrock questioned the jurisdiction of CIAC over the 7Philrock
officers and engineers arguing they were not signatories to the agreement to
arbitrate. The CIAC referred back the case to the RTC which, however, refused
to reassume jurisdiction. To break the impasse, the spouses Cid opted to
exclude the seven officers and engineers to pave the way for the resumption of
jurisdiction by the CIAC.
The CIAC subsequently rendered judgment in favor of the Spouses Ciddirectin
gthe respondent Philrock to reimburse/refund the payments made and
awarded the Spouses Cid P50,000 as moral damages, P50,000 as nominal
damages,P50,000 as attorney’s fees.
The Supreme Court ruled that “Section 4 of Executive Order 1008 expressly
vests in the CIAC original and exclusive jurisdiction over disputes arising from
or connected with construction contracts entered into by parties that have
agreed to submit their dispute to voluntary arbitrary. IT ruled that
after submitting itself to arbitration proceedings and actively participating
therein, petitioner is estopped from assailing the jurisdiction of the CIAC.
Interestingly, the Supreme Court sustained the award of actual damages.
However, since actual damages were proven and respondents were amply
compensated, the Supreme Court withdrew the award for nominal damages. It
also sustained the award of attorney’s fees even if the respondents represented
themselves before the CIA because they purportedly incurred litigation
expenses in pursuing their action before the CIAC, the Court of Appeals and
also at the Supreme Court.