II.

PRELIMINARY TITLE

Case Digest
EFFECTIVITY OF LAWS:

TAÑADA VS. TUVERA

G.R. No. L-63915
Decided on: April 24, 1985
Ponente: ESCOLIN, J.

FACTS: Petitioners Lorenzo Tanada and others, seek a writ of mandamus to compel respondent public
officials to publish, and/or cause the publication in the Official Gazette of various presidential
decrees, letters of instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letters of
implementation and administrative orders. Respondents, through the Solicitor General would
have this case dismissed outright on the ground that petitioners have no legal personality or
standing to bring the instant petition. The view is submitted that in the absence of any showing
that the petitioner are personally and directly affected or prejudiced by the alleged non-
publication of the presidential issuances in question.

CONTENTION OF THE PETITIONER: Said laws needs publication requirement.

CONTENTION OF THE RESPONDENT: They argued that while publication was necessary as a rule,
it was not so when it was otherwise provided, as when decrees themselves provides for their own
effectivity dates. (Effective immediately upon approval)

ISSUE: Whether the presidential decrees in question which contain special provisions as to the date they
are to take effect, publication in the Official Gazette is not indispensable for their effectivity?

RULING: Publication in the Official Gazette is necessary in those cases where the legislation itself does
not provide for its effectivity date, for then the date of publication is material for determining its
date of effectivity, which is the 15th day following its publication, but not when the law itself
provides for the date when it goes into effect.

Article 2 does not preclude the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette, even if the
law itself provides for the date of its effectivity.

The publication of all presidential issuances of a public nature or of general applicability is

mandated by law. Obviously, presidential decrees that provide for fines, forfeitures or penalties
for their violation or otherwise impose burdens on the people, such as tax revenue measures, fall
within this category. Other presidential issuances which apply only to particular persons or class
of persons such as administrative and executive orders need not be published on the assumption
that they have been circularized to all concern.

The Court therefore declares that presidential issuances of general application, which have
not been published, shall have no force and effect.
Case Digest
EFFECTIVITY OF LAWS:

PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF SERVICE EXPORTERS, INC. vs. HON. RUBEN D. TORRES

G.R. No. 101279
Decided on: August 6, 1992
Ponente: GRIÑO-AQUINO, J.:

FACTS: Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) Secretary Ruben Torres issued Department
Order No. 16 Series of 1991 temporarily suspending the recruitment by private employment
agencies of “Filipino domestic helpers going to Hong Kong”. Pursuant to the circular, the
Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) issued Memorandum Circular No. 30,
Series of 1991, providing guidelines on the Government processing and deployment of Filipino
domestic helpers to Hong Kong and the accreditation of Hong Kong recruitment agencies
intending to hire Filipino domestic helpers. As a result, DOLE, through the POEA, took over the
business of deploying Hong Kong bound workers. Petitioner Philippine Association of Service
Exporters (PASEI), filed a petition for prohibition to annul the aforementioned order and to
prohibit implementation. 

CONTENTION OF THE PETITIONER: The requirements of publication and filing with the Office of
the National Administrative Register were not complied with. Hence, said order in invalid.

CONTENTION OF THE RESPONDENT: The circulars are valid exercise of the police power as
delegated to the executive branch of Government.

ISSUES: Whether or not the requirements of publication was complied with. 

RULING: No. The orders and circulars issued are invalid and unenforceable. The reason is the lack of
proper publication and filing in the Office of the National Administrative Registrar as required in
Article 2 of the Civil Code. Once, more we advert to our ruling in Tañada vs. Tuvera, 146 SCRA
446 that: “Administrative rules and regulations must also be published if their purpose is to
enforce or implement existing law pursuant also to a valid delegation.”
Case Digest
EFFECTIVITY OF LAWS:

RODOLFO S. DE JESUS vs. COMMISSION ON AUDIT

G.R. No. 109023
Decided on: August 12, 1998
Ponente: PURISIMA, J.,

FACTS: Petitioners are employees of the Local Water Utilities Administration (LWUA). Prior to July 1,
1989, they were receiving honoraria as designated members of the LWUA Board Secretariat and
the Pre-Qualification, Bids and Awards Committee. Republic Act No. 6758 entitled “An Act
Prescribing A Revised Compensation and Position Classification System in the Government and
For Other Purposes”, took effect. Section 12 of said law provides for the consolidation of
allowances and additional compensation into standardized salary rates. Certain additional
compensations, however, were exempted from consolidation. Department of Budget and
Management (DBM) issued Corporate Compensation Circular No. 10 (DBM-CCC No. 10),
discontinuing without qualification effective November 1, 1989, all allowances and fringe
benefits granted on top of basic salary. Pursuant to the aforesaid Law and Circular, respondent
Leonardo Jamoralin, as corporate auditor, disallowed on post audit, the payment of honoraria to
the herein petitioners. Petitioners appealed to the COA, questioning the validity and
enforceability of DBM-CCC No. 10 but were denied. Hence the instant petition.

CONTENTION OF THE PETITIONER: DBM-CCC No. 10 is inconsistent with the provisions of Rep.
Act 6758 (the law it is supposed to implement) and, therefore, void. And it is without force and
effect because it was not published in the Official Gazette.

CONTENTION OF THE RESPONDENT: DBM-CCC No. 10 need not be published for it is merely an
interpretative regulation of a law already published.

ISSUE: Whether or not DBM-CCC No. 10 is legally effective despite its lack of publication in the
Official Gazette.

RULING: No. Following the doctrine enunciated in Tanada, publication in the Official Gazette or in a
newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines is required since DBM-CCC No. 10 is in the
nature of an administrative circular the purpose of which is to enforce or implement an existing
law. Stated differently, to be effective and enforceable, DBM-CCC No. 10 must go through the
requisite publication in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the
Philippines.
Case Digest
EFFECTIVITY OF LAWS:

Philippine Veterans Bank Employees Union vs. Vega

G.R. No. 105364
Decided on: June 28, 2001
Ponente: KAPUNAN, J.:

FACTS: In 1985, Central Bank of the Philippines filed a petition for assistance in the liquidation of the
Philippine Veterans Bank (PVB). Thereafter, the PVB employees union, herein petitioner, filed
claim for accrued and unpaid employee wages and benefits. On January 2, 1992, RA 7169 (An
Act to Rehabilitate the PVB) which was signed into law by Pres. Corazon Aquino and which was
published in the Official Gazette on February 24, 1992. Thereafter, petitioners filed with the labor
tribunals their residual claims for benefits and for reinstatement upon reopening of the bank. In
May 1992, Central Bank issued a certificate of authority allowing the PVB to reopen despite the
late mandate for rehabilitation and reopening, respondent Judge Vega continued with the
liquidation proceedings of the bank alleging further that RA 7169 became effective only on
March 10, 1992 or 15 days after its publication in the Official Gazette on February 24, 1992.

CONTENTION OF THE PETITIONER: With the passage of R.A. 7169, the liquidation court became
functus officio, and no longer had the authority to continue with liquidation proceedings.

ISSUE: Whether or not RA 7169 became effective on January 2, 1992.

RULING: The Supreme Court upheld that while as a rule laws take effect after 15 days following
completion of their publication in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in
the Philippines, the legislature has the authority to provide for exceptions as indicated in the
clause “unless otherwise provided”. Citing Tanada vs Tuvera, this clause refers to the date of
effectivity and not to the requirement of publication, which cannot in any event be omitted. The
reason is that such omission would affect due process in so far as it would deny the public
knowledge of the laws that are supposed to govern it.
Case Digest
PUBLICATION OF SUPREME COURT DECISIONS

De Roy vs Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 80718
Decided on: January 29, 1988
Ponente: CORTES, J.:
FACTS: The firewall of a burned out building owned by petitioners collapsed and destroyed the tailoring
shop occupied by the family of the private respondents resulting in injuries to private respondents
had been warned by petitioners to vacate their shop in view of its proximity to the weakened wall
but the former failed to do. In the RTC, petitioners were found guilty of gross negligence. On the
last day of the 15 days period to file an appeal, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration
which was again denied. The Supreme Court finds that Court of Appeal did not commit a grave
abuse of discretion when it denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration. It correctly applied the
rule laid down in HabulayasvsJapzon. Counsel for petitioner contends that the said case should
not be applied non-publication in the Official Gazette.

CONTENTION OF THE PETITIONER: The rule enunciated in the Habaluyas case should not be
made to apply to the case at bar owing to the non-publication of the Habaluyas decision in the
Official Gazette as of the time the subject decision of the Court of Appeals was promulgated.

CONTENTION OF THE RESPONDENT: There is no law requiring the publication of Supreme Court
decisions in the Official Gazette before they can be binding and as a condition to their becoming
effective.

ISSUE: Whether or not Supreme Court decisions must be published in the Official Gazette before they
can be binding.

RULING: No. There is no law requiring the publication of Supreme Court decision in the Official
Gazette before they can be binding and as a condition to their becoming effective. It is bounden
duty of counsel as lawyer in active law practice to keep abreast of decisions of the Supreme Court
particularly where issues have been clarified, consistently reiterated and published in the advance
reports of Supreme Court decisions and in such publications as the SCRA and law journals.
Case Digest
PROSPECTIVITY OF LAWS:

UNCIANO PARAMEDICAL COLLEGE vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 100335
Decided on: April 7, 1993
Ponente: NOCON, J.:

FACTS: Private respondents Elena Villegas and Ted Magallanes (nursing students), thru their mothers,
filed a petition for injunction and damages with prayer for a writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction against petitioners Unciano Paramedical College, Inc. They alleged that they were not
admitted for the second semester for organizing a student body council which was not allowed by
the school which was allegedly a violation of the school regulations. The school argued that
under the Alcuaz Doctrine, schools have the discretion to admit students for the second semester
because upon enrolment of a student in the first semester, the contract was for that semester only.
However a new doctrine was later on promulgated which abandoned the Alcuaz doctrine which is
now the NON doctrine.

CONTENTION OF THE PETITIONER: Under the Alcuaz Doctrine, schools have the discretion to
admit students for the second semester because upon enrolment of a student in the first semester,
the contract was for that semester only.

CONTENTION OF THE RESPONDENT: The new doctrine should be applied retroactively.

ISSUE: Whether or not the new Non doctrine be applied retroactively to the case.

RULING: No. The new doctrine shall be applied prospectively and should not apply to parties who relied
on the old doctrine and acted on faith thereof. Although said doctrine was later abandoned in
Non, et al. v. Dames II, et al., supra, this case was promulgated much later, or on May 20, 1990,
when the termination of the contract between them had long become fait accompli. Settled is the
rule that when a doctrine of this Court is overruled and a different view is adopted, the new
doctrine is applied prospectively, and should not apply to parties who relied on the old doctrine
and acted on the faith thereof Thus, the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction was issued by
the trial court with grave abuse of discretion.

The ruling in the Non case should not be given a retroactive effect to cases that arose before its
promulgation on May 20, 1990, as in this case, which was filed on April 16, 1990. If it were
otherwise, it would result in oppression to petitioners and other schools similarly situated who
relied on the ruling in the Alcuaz case, promulgated on May 2, 1988, which recognized the
termination of contract theory.
Case Digest
COMPUTATION OF PERIODS:

CARLOS ALONZO vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and TECLA PADUA

G.R. No. 72873
Decided on: May 28, 1987
Ponente: CRUZ, J.:
FACTS: Five brothers and sisters inherited in equal pro indiviso shares a parcel of land registered in 'the
name of their deceased parents. On March 15, 1963, one of them, Celestino Padua, transferred his
undivided share of the herein petitioners for the sum of P550.00 by way of absolute sale. One
year later, on April 22, 1964, Eustaquia Padua, his sister, sold her own share to the same vendees,
in an instrument denominated "Con Pacto de Retro Sale," for the sum of P 440.00. By virtue of
such agreements, the petitioners occupied, after the said sales, an area corresponding to two-fifths
of the said lot, representing the portions sold to them. The vendees subsequently enclosed the
same with a fence. In 1975, with their consent, their son Eduardo Alonzo and his wife built a
semi-concrete house on a part of the enclosed area.

On February 25, 1976, Mariano Padua, one of the five coheirs, sought to redeem the area sold to
the spouses Alonzo, but his complaint was dismissed when it appeared that he was an American
citizen. On May 27, 1977, however, Tecla Padua, another co-heir, filed her own complaint
invoking the same right of redemption claimed by her brother.

The trial court * also dismiss this complaint, now on the ground that the right had lapsed, not
having been exercised within thirty days from notice of the sales in 1963 and 1964. Although
there was no written notice, it was held that actual knowledge of the sales by the co-heirs satisfied
the requirement of the law.

ISSUE: When did the 30-day period of redemption begin?

RULING: While we do not here declare that this period started from the dates of such sales in 1963 and
1964, we do say that sometime between those years and 1976, when the first complaint for
redemption was filed, the other co-heirs were actually informed of the sale and that thereafter the
30-day period started running and ultimately expired. This could have happened any time during
the interval of thirteen years, when none of the co-heirs made a move to redeem the properties
sold. By 1977, in other words, when Tecla Padua filed her complaint, the right of redemption had
already been extinguished because the period for its exercise had already expired.

The co-heirs in this case were undeniably informed of the sales although no notice in writing was
given them. And there is no doubt either that the 30-day period began and ended during the 14
years between the sales in question and the filing of the complaint for redemption in 1977,
without the co-heirs exercising their right of redemption. These are the justifications for this
exception.
Case Digest
JUDICIAL DECISIONS- FORM PART OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM

People vs. Jabinal

G.R. No. L-30061
Decided on: February 27, 1974
Ponente: ANTONIO, J.:
FACTS: Jabinal was found guilty of the crime of Illegal Possession of Firearm and Ammunition. The
accused admitted that on September 5, 1964, he was in possession of the revolver and the
ammunition described in the complaint, without the requisite license or permit. He, however,
claimed to be entitled to exoneration because, although he had no license or permit, he had an
appointment as Secret Agent from the Provincial Governor of Batangas and an appointment as
Confidential Agent from the PC Provincial Commander, and the said appointments expressly
carried with them the authority to possess and carry the firearm in question.

The accused contended before the court a quo that in view of his above-mentioned appointments
as Secret Agent and Confidential Agent, with authority to possess the firearm subject matter of
the prosecution, he was entitled to acquittal on the basis of the Supreme Court’s decision in
People vs. Macarandang(1959) and People vs. Lucero(1958) and not on the basis of the latest
reversal and abandonment in People vs. Mapa (1967).

CONTENTION OF THE ACCUSED: He must be acquitted basing from the Supreme Court’s decision
in People vs. Macarandang(1959) and People vs. Lucero(1958).

CONTENTION OF THE STATE: The rulings of the Supreme Court in the cases of Macarandang and
Lucero were reversed and abandoned in People vs. Mapa, supra.

ISSUE: Whether or not appellant should be acquitted on the basis of the court’s rulings in Macarandang
and Lucero, or should his conviction stand in view of the complete reversal of the MAcarandang
and Lucero doctrine in Mapa.

RULING: Decisions of this Court, under Article 8 of the New Civil Code states that “Judicial decisions
applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal system …” The
settled rule supported by numerous authorities is a restatement of legal maxim “legis
interpretation legis vim obtinet" — the interpretation placed upon the written law by a competent
court has the force of law.

Appellant was appointed as Secret Agent and Confidential Agent and authorized to possess a
firearm pursuant to the prevailing doctrine enunciated in Macarandang and Lucero under which
no criminal liability would attach to his possession of said firearm in spite of the absence of a
license and permit therefor, appellant must be absolved. Certainly, appellant may not be punished
for an act which at the time it was done was held not to be punishable.
Case Digest
EMETERIO CUI vs. ARELLANO UNIVERSITY
G.R. No. L-15127
Decided on: May 30, 1961
Ponente: CONCEPCION,J .:

FACTS: Emeterio Cui enrolled in the defendant university where plaintiff finished his law studies in the
up to and including the first semester of the fourth year. During all the school years in which
plaintiff was studying law in defendant Law College, he was awarded scholarship grants and his
semestral tuition fees were returned to him after ends of the semester. Plaintiff left the defendant's
law college and enrolled for the last semester of his fourth year law in the college of law of the
Abad Santos University graduating from the college of law of the latter university. He applied to
take the bar examination in which he needed the transcripts of his records in defendant Arellano
University. The defendant refused until after he had paid back the P1,033 87, noting the contract
that he signed which stated that in consideration of the scholarship granted to him by the
University, he waives his right to transfer to another school without having refunded to the
defendant the equivalent of the scholarship cash and followed by Memorandum No. 38 that the
Director of Private Schools issued.

ISSUE: Whether or not the contract between Cui and the respondent university, whereby the former
waives his right to transfer to another school without having refunded to the defendant the
equivalent of the scholarship cash valid or not?

RULING: The contract of waiver between the plaintiff and respondent on September 10, 1951, is a direct
violation of Memorandum No. 38 and hence null and void. The contract was contrary to sound
policy and civic honesty. The policy enunciated in Memorandum No.38, s. 1949 is sound policy.
When students are given full or partial scholarships, it is understood that such scholarships are
merited and earned. The amount in tuition and other fees corresponding to these scholarships
should not be subsequently charged to the recipient students when they decide to quit school or to
transfer to another institution. Scholarships should not be offered merely to attract and keep
students in a school.
Case Digest
REPEAL OF LAWS:

ASAALI vs. COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS

26 SCRA 205
Decided On: December 16, 1968
Ponente: FERNANDO J.

FACTS: Five vessels were seized in the high seas by customs carrying smuggled cigarettes and
rattan chairs which is contrary to the importation law R.A. 426. Later on R.A.426 was
repealed by R.A. 650. The accused then claimed that customs has no longer jurisdiction
over it and that the crime committed was abated.

ISSUE: Is the contention of the accused correct?

HELD: No. Jurisdiction is determined by law in force at the commission of the act and
continuous until the termination of the case except only when the repeal:
1. Expressly prohibit the exercise of jurisdiction.
2. When the provision penalizing the act is repealed and the act is no longer punishable.

When the court failed to provide a counsel when the accused did not waive his right to
counsel
Case Digest
NATIONALITY PRINCIPLE – DIVORCE

VAN DORN VS. ROMILLO JR.

G.R. No. L-68470
Decided on: October 8, 1985
Ponente: MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:

FACTS: Petitioner Alice Reyes is a citizen of the Philippines while private respondent is a citizen of the
United States. They were married in Hongkong. Thereafter, they established their residence in the
Philippines and begot two children. Subsequently, they were divorced in Nevada, United States,
and that petitioner has re-married also in Nevada, this time to Theodore Van Dorn. Private
respondent filed suit against petitioner, stating that petitioner’s business in Manila is their
conjugal property; that petitioner he ordered to render accounting of the business and that private
respondent be declared to manage the conjugal property. Petitioner moved to dismiss the case
contending that the cause of action is barred by the judgment in the divorce proceedings before
the Nevada Court. The denial now is the subject of the certiorari proceeding.

CONTENTION OF THE PETITIONER: Respondent is estopped from laying claim on the alleged
conjugal property because of the representation he made in the divorce proceedings before the
American Court that they had no community of property.

CONTENTION OF THE RESPONDENT: The Divorce Decree issued by the Nevada Court cannot
prevail over the prohibitive laws of the Philippines and its declared national policy; that the acts
and declaration of a foreign Court cannot, especially if the same is contrary to public policy,
divest Philippine Courts of jurisdiction to entertain matters within its jurisdiction.

ISSUE: Whether or not the divorce obtained by the parties is binding only to the alien spouse.

RULING: Is it true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only
Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same being
considered contrary to our concept of public policy and morality. However, aliens may obtain
divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according
to their national law. In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private respondent from the
marriage from the standards of American Law, under which divorce dissolves the marriage.

Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband petitioner. He
would have no standing to sue in the case below as petitioner’s husband entitled to exercise
control over conjugal assets. As he is bound by the decision of his own country’s court, which
validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he does not repudiate, he is stopped
by his own representation before said court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal
property.
Case Digest
NATIONALITY PRINCIPLE

PILAPIL vs. HON. IBAY-SOMERA

G.R. No. 80116
Decided on: June 30, 1989
Ponente: REGALADO, J.:

FACTS: Petitioner Imelda Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, and private respondent Erich Geiling, a German
national, were married in Germany. After about three and a half years of marriage, such
connubial disharmony eventuated in Geiling initiating a divorce proceeding against Pilapil in
Germany. The Local Court, Federal Republic of Germany, promulgated a decree of divorce on
the ground of failure of marriage of the spouses. More than five months after the issuance of the
divorce decree, Geiling filed two complaints for adultery before the City Fiscal of Manila
alleging in one that, while still married to saidGeiling, Pilapil “had an affair with a certain
William Chia.” The Assistant Fiscal, after the corresponding investigation, recommended the
dismissal of the cases on the ground of insufficiency of evidence. However, upon review, the
respondent city fiscal Victor approved a resolution directing the filing of 2 complaint for adultery
against the petitioner. Pilapil appealed, hence this petition.

CONTENTION OF THE PETITIONER: The court is without jurisdiction since the purported
complainant, a foreigner, does not qualify as an offended spouse having obtained a final divorce
decree under his national law prior to his filing the criminal complaint.

CONTENTION OF THE RESPONDENT: Private respondent argued that he could not have brought
this case before the decree of divorce for lack of knowledge.

ISSUE: Did Geiling have legal capacity at the time of the filing of the complaint for adultery, considering
that it was done after obtaining a divorce decree?

RULING: No. The fact that private respondent obtained a valid divorce in his country, the Federal
Republic of Germany, is admitted. Said divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the
Philippines insofar as private respondent is concerned in view of the nationality principle in our
civil law on the matter of status of persons Under the same considerations and rationale, private
respondent, being no longer the husband of petitioner, had no legal standing to commence the
adultery case under the imposture that he was the offended spouse at the time he filed suit.

It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only
Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same being
considered contrary to our concept of public policy and morality. However, aliens may obtain
divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according
to their national law. ...

Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner. He
would have no standing to sue in the case below as petitioner's husband entitled to exercise
control over conjugal assets.
Case Digest
Nationality Principle

Llorente vs. CA
G.R. No. 124371
Decided on: November 23, 2000
Ponente: Pardo, J.

FACTS: Lorenzo and petitioner Paula Llorente were married before a parish priest. Before the outbreak
of war, Lorenzo departed for the United States and Paula was left at the conjugal home. Lorenzo
was naturalized by the United State. After the liberation of the Philippines he went home and
visited his wife to which he discovered that his wife was pregnant and was having an adulterous
relationship with his brother, Ceferino Llorente. Lorenzo returned to the US and filed for divorce.
Lorenzo married Alicia Llorente; they lived together for 25 years and begot 3 children. Lorenzo
on his last will and testament bequeathed all his property to Alicia and their 3 children. Paula
filed a petition for letters administration over Lorenzo’s estate. Paula contended (1) that she was
Lorenzo’s surviving spouse, (2) that the various property were acquired during their marriage, (3)
that Lorenzo’s will disposed of all his property in favor of Alicia and her children, encroaching
on her legitime and 1/2 share in the conjugal property. The RTC ruled in favor of Paula. On
appeal, the decision was modified declaring Alicia as co-owner of whatever properties they have
acquired. Hence, this petition to the Supreme Court.

ISSUES: Whether or not the divorce obtained by Lorenzo capacitated him to remarry. Who are entitled to
inherit from the late Lorenzo Llorente?

HELD: In Van Dorn vs Ramillo Jr. the Supreme Court held that owing to the nationality principle
embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy
against absolute divorce. In the same case, the Court ruled that aliens may obtain divorce abroad
provided that they are valid according to their national law. The Supreme Court held that divorce
obtained by Lorenzo from his first wife Paula was valid and recognized in this jurisdiction as a
matter of comity.

The Supreme Court remanded the case to the court of origin for the determination of the intrinsic
validity of Lorenzo’s will and determine the successional rights allowing proof of foreign law.
The deceased is not covered by our laws on “family rights and duties, status, condition and legal
capacity” since he was a foreigner.
Case Digest
Nationality Principle

Roehr vs. Rodriguez

G.R. No. 142820
Decided on: June 20, 2003
Ponente: Quisumbing, J.

Facts: Petitioner Wolfgang, a German citizen and resident of Germany, married private respondent
Carmen, a Filipina, on 11 December 1980 in Hamburg, Gemany. Early 1981, the marriage was
ratified in Tayasan, Negros Oriental. They had two daughters, Carolyne and Alexandria Kristine.

Private respondent filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage before the Regional
Trial Court of Makati on 28 August 1996. Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss but was denied by
trial court. A motion for reconsideration was filed by private respondent but was again denied by
the trial court.

In 1997, petitioner obtained a decree of divorce from the Court of First Instance of Hamburg-
Blankenese and granting the custody of the children to the father. An Opposition to the Motion
for Partial Reconsideration was filed by the petitioner on the ground that there is nothing to be
done anymore in the instant case as the marital tie between petitioner Wolfgang Roehr and
respondent Ma. Carmen D. Rodriguez had already been severed by the decree of divorce
promulgated by the Court of First Instance of Hamburg, Germany on December 16, 1997 and in
view of the fact that said decree of divorce had already been recognized by the RTC in its order
of July 14, 1999, through the implementation of the mandate of Article 26 of the Family Code,10
endowing the petitioner with the capacity to remarry under the Philippine law.

It was June 14, 1999 when public respondent issued an order granting the petitioner’s motion to
dismiss, but was partially set aside on September 1999 for the purpose of tackling issues
regarding property relations of the spouses as well as support and custody of their children.
Petitioner assailed for the trial court’s lack of jurisdiction, and grave abuse of discretion on the
part of the respondent judge.

Issue: Whether or not the Philippine courts can determine the legal effects of a decree of divorce from a
foreign country.

Held: Yes. Our courts can determine the legal effects of a divorce obtained from a foreign country such
as those concerning with support and custody of the children.

In this case, the decree did not touch as to who the offending spouse was. The trial court was
correct in setting the issue for hearing to determine the issue of parental custody, care, support
and education of the best interests of the children. After all, the child’s welfare is always the
paramount consideration in all questions concerning his care and custody.
 WHEREFORE, the orders of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 149, issued on
September 30, 1999 and March 31, 2000 are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. We hereby
declare that the trial court has jurisdiction over the issue between the parties as to who has
parental custody, including the care, support and education of the children, namely Carolyne and
Alexandra Kristine Roehr. Let the records of this case be remanded promptly to the trial court for
continuation of appropriate proceedings. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Case Digest
Nationality Principle – Internal and Conflict Rule

Aznar vs Garcia
G.R. No. L-16749
Decided on: January 31, 1963
Ponente: LABRADOR, J.:

FACTS: Edward Christensen, though born in New York, migrated to California, where he resided (and
consequently was considered a California citizen) for a period of 9 years. In 1913, he came to the
Philippines where he became a domiciliary until the time of his death . However, during the
entire period of his residence in this country he had always considered himself a citizen of
California. In his will executed on March 5, 1951, he instituted an acknowledged natural
daughter, Maria Lucy Christensen as her only heir, but left a legacy of sum of money in favor of
Helen Christensen Garcia (who in a decision rendered by the Supreme Court had been declared
another acknowledged natural daughter of his). Counsel for the acknowledged natural daughter
Helen Claims that under Art. 16, par. 2 of the Civil Code, California law should be applied; that
under California law, the matter is referred back to the law of the domicile; that therefore
Philippine law is ultimately applicable; that finally, the share of Helen must be increased in view
of the successional rights of illegitimate children under Philippine law. Upon the other hand,
consel for the child Maria Lucy contends that inasmuch as it is clear that under Art. 16 par.2 of
our Civil Code, the national law of the deceased must apply, our courts must immediately apply
the internal law of California on the matter, that under California law there are no compulsory
heirs and consequently a testator could dispose of any property possessed by him in absolute
dominion and that finally, illegitimate children not being entitled to anything under california
law, the will of the deceased giving the bulk of the property to Maria Lucy must remain
undisturbed.

ISSUE: What law should govern? Philippine law or California law?

HELD: WHEREFORE, the decision apealed from is hereby reversed and the case returned to the lower
court with instructions that the partition be made as the Philippine law on succession provides.

The law that governs the validity of his testamentary dispositions is defined in Article 16 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines, which is as follows:
 ART. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country
where it is situated.

However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of succession and
to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall
be regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is under consideration, whatever
may be the nature of the property and regardless of the country where said property may be
found.

The application of this article in the case at bar requires the determination of the meaning of the
term “national law” is used therein.

The next question is: What is the law in California governing the disposition of personal
property?

The decision of CFI Davao, sustains the contention of the executor-appellee that under the
California Probate Code, a testator may dispose of his property by will in the form and manner he
desires. But HELEN invokes the provisions of Article 946 of the Civil Code of California, which
is as follows:

If there is no law to the contrary, in the place where personal property is situated, it is deemed to
follow the person of its owner, and is governed by the law of his domicile.

It is argued on executor’s behalf that as the deceased Christensen was a citizen of the State of
California, the internal law thereof, which is that given in the Kaufman case, should govern the
determination of the validity of the testamentary provisions of Christensen’s will, such law being
in force in the State of California of which Christensen was a citizen. Appellant, on the other
hand, insists that Article 946 should be applicable, and in accordance therewith and following the
doctrine of the renvoi, the question of the validity of the testamentary provision in question
should be referred back to the law of the decedent’s domicile, which is the Philippines.

We note that Article 946 of the California Civil Code is its conflict of laws rule, while the rule
applied in In re Kaufman, its internal law. If the law on succ ession and the conflict of laws rules
of California are to be enforced jointly, each in its own intended and appropriate sphere, the
principle cited In re Kaufman should apply to citizens living in the State, but Article 946 should
apply to such of its citizens as are not domiciled in California but in other jurisdictions. The rule
laid down of resorting to the law of the domicile in the determination of matters with foreign
element involved is in accord with the general principle of American law that the domiciliary law
should govern in most matters or rights which follow the person of the owner.

Appellees argue that what Article 16 of the Civil Code of the Philippines pointed out as the
national law is the internal law of California. But as above explained the laws of California have
prescribed two sets of laws for its citizens, one for residents therein and another for those
domiciled in other jurisdictions.

It is argued on appellees’ (Aznar and LUCY) behalf that the clause “if there is no law to the
contrary in the place where the property is situated” in Sec. 946 of the California Civil Code
 refers to Article 16 of the Civil Code of the Philippines and that the law to the contrary in the
Philippines is the provision in said Article 16 that the national law of the deceased should govern.
This contention cannot be sustained.

As explained in the various authorities cited above, the national law mentioned in Article 16 of
our Civil Code is the law on conflict of laws in the California Civil Code, i.e., Article 946, which
authorizes the reference or return of the question to the law of the testator’s domicile. The conflict
of laws rule in California, Article 946, Civil Code, precisely refers back the case, when a
decedent is not domiciled in California, to the law of his domicile, the Philippines in the case at
bar. The court of the domicile cannot and should not refer the case back to California; such action
would leave the issue incapable of determination because the case will then be like a football,
tossed back and forth between the two states, between the country of which the decedent was a
citizen and the country of his domicile. The Philippine court must apply its own law as directed in
the conflict of laws rule of the state of the decedent, if the question has to be decided, especially
as the application of the internal law of California provides no legitime for children while the
Philippine law, Arts. 887(4) and 894, Civil Code of the Philippines, makes natural children
legally acknowledged forced heirs of the parent recognizing them.

We therefore find that as the domicile of the deceased Edward, a citizen of California, is the
Philippines, the validity of the provisions of his will depriving his acknowledged natural child,
the appellant HELEN, should be governed by the Philippine Law, the domicile, pursuant to Art.
946 of the Civil Code of California, not by the internal law of California..

Case Digest
Nationality principle

Bellis vs. Bellis

G.R. No. L-23678
Decided on: June 6, 1967
Ponente: BENGZON, J.P., J.:

FACTS: Amos G. Bellis was a citizen and resident of Texas at the time of his death. He executed a will in
the Philippines, in which he directed that after all taxes, obligations, and expenses of
administration are paid for, his distributable estate should be divided, in trust, in the following
order and manner

a) $240,000.00 to his first wife MARY E. MALLEN

b) $120,000.00 to his three illegitimate childrenAMOS BELLIS, JR., MARIA CRISTINA

BELLIS, MIRIAM PALMA BELLIS,or $40,000.00 each, and

c) After foregoing the two items have been satisfied, the remainder shall go to his seven surviving
children by his first and second wives EDWARD A. BELLIS, HENRY A. BELLIS,
ALEXANDER BELLIS, and ANNA BELLIS-ALLSMAN, EDWARD G. BELLIS, WA LTER
S. BELLIS, and DOROTHY E. BELLIS in equal shares.
 MARIA CRISTINA BELLIS and MIRIAM PALMA BELLIS filed their respective oppositions
to the project of partition on the ground that they were deprived of their legitimes as illegitimate
children and, therefore, compulsory heirs of the deceased.

The LOWER COURT issued an order overruling the oppositions and approving the executor’s
final account, report and administration, and project of partition. Relying upon Article 16 of the
Civil Code, it applied the national law of the decedent, which in this case is which did not provide
for legitimes.

ISSUE: Which law must apply in executing the will of the deceased – Texas Law or Philippine Law?

RULING: The said illegitimate children are not entitled to their legitimes under the Texas Law(which is
the national law of the deceased), here are no legitimes. The renvoi doctrinecannot be applied.
Said doctrine is usually pertinent where the decedent is a national of one country ad a domiciliary
of another. In the said case, it is not disputed that the deceased was both a national of Texas and a
domicile thereof at the time of his death.

Article 16, Paragraph 2 of Civil code render applicable the national law of the decedent, in
intestate and testamentary successions, with regard to four items: (a) the order of succession, (b)
the amount of successional rights, (c) the intrinsic validity of provisions of will, and (d) the
capacity to succeed.

They provide that:

ART.16 Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country to
where it is situated. However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to
the order of successions and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic
validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person
whose succession is under consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property and
regardless of the country wherein said property may be found.

Case Digest
Nationality Principle

Testate Estate of C.O Bohanan vs. Bohanan

G.R. No. L-12105
Decided on: January 30, 1960
Ponente: LABRADOR, J.:
FACTS: C.O. Bohanan was born in Nebraska and therefore a citizen of that state. Notwithstanding his
long residence in the Philippines, he continued and remained to be a citizen of the United States
and of the state of his pertinent residence to spend the rest of his days in that state. His permanent
residence or domicile in the United States depended upon his personal intent or desire, and he
selected Nevada as his domicile and therefore at the time of his death, he was a citizen of that
state.
ISSUES: The oppositors, Magadalena C. Bohanan and her two children, question the validity of the
executor/testator C.O. Bohanan’s last will and testament, claiming that they havebeen deprived of
the legitimate that the laws of the form concede to them. Another, is the claim of the testator's
children, Edward and Mary Lydia Bohanan, who had received legacies in the amount of PHP 6,
000 each only, and, therefore, have not been given their shares in the estate which, in accordance
with the laws, should be two-thirds of the estate left by the testator.

RULING: The first issue refers to the share that the wife of the testator, Magdalena C. Bohanan, should
be entitled to receive. The will has not given her any share in the estate left by the testator. It is
argued that it was error for the trial court to have recognized the Reno divorce secured by the
testator from his Filipino wife Magdalena C. Bohanan, and that said divorce should be declared a
nullity in this jurisdiction. The court refused to recognize the claim of the widow on the ground
that the laws of Nevada, of which the deceased was a citizen, allow him to dispose of all of his
properties without requiring him to leave any portion of his estate to his former (or divorced)
wife. No right to share in the inheritance in favor of a divorced wife exists in the State of Nevada,
thus the oppositor can no longer claim portion of the estate left by the testator. With regards the
second issue, the old Civil Code, which is applicable to this case because the testator died in
1944, expressly provides that successional rights to personal property are to be earned by the
national law of the person whose succession is in question, thus the two-third rule is not
enforceable.

Wherefore, the court finds that the testator C. O. Bohanan was at the time of his death a citizen of
the United States and of the State of Nevada and declares that his will and testament is fully in
accordance with the laws of the state of Nevada and admits the same to probate. As in accordance
with Article 10 of the old Civil Code, the validity of testamentary dispositions are to be governed
by the national law of the testator, and as it has been decided and it is not disputed that the
national law of the testator is that of the State of Nevada which allows a testator to dispose of all
his property according to his will, as in the case at bar, the order of the court approving the
project of partition made in accordance with the testamentary provisions, must be, as it is hereby
affirmed, with costs against appellants.
VII. LEGAL SEPARATION
Case Digest

ELOISA GOITIA Y DELA CAMARA vs. JOSE CAMPOS RUEDA 35 PHIL 252
G.R. No. 11263.
Decided On: November 2, 1916
Ponente: TRENT, J.:

Facts: This is an action by the wife against the husband for support outside of the conjugal domicile.
Eloitia Goitia and Jose Campos Rueda were legally married on January 7, 1915. After a month of
living together, the wife returned to the home of her parents due to the following reasons: that the
husband demand wife to perform unchaste and lascivious acts on his genital organs; that
whenever wife rejected husband’s indecorous demands, husband would maltreat wife by words
and inflict injuries on wife’s lips, face and different parts of her body; and that because she was
unable to desist husband’s repugnant desires and maltreatment, she was obliged to leave the
conjugal home. The wife also seeks for support from his husband even if she lives separately. The
husband on the other hand, seeks the relief of the courts in compelling his wife to return back to
their conjugal home.

Issue: Whether or not the husband can be compelled to support the wife outside the conjugal domicile

Ruling: Marriage is something more than a mere contract. It is a new relation, the rights, duties and
obligations of which rest not upon the agreement of the parties but upon the general law which
defines and prescribes those rights, duties and obligations. When the legal existence is merged
into one by marriage, the new relation is regulated and controlled by the government upon
principles of public policy for the benefit of the society as well as the parties.

Marriage is an institution and its maintenance is in its purity which the public is deeply interested.
In the case at bar, when the continuance of the marriage becomes intolerable to one or both
parties and gives no possible good to the community, relief from the court should be attainable.
The Supreme Court made the observation that implied approval by the court of a wife’s separate
residence from her husband does not necessarily violate the sacredness and inviolability of the
marriage. Since separation de-facto is allowed in this case, it is only due to the fact that public
peace and wife’s purity must be preserved.

Lastly, the husband cannot, by his own wrongful acts, relieve himself from the duty to support his
wife imposed by law; and where a husband, by wrongful, illegal and unbearable conduct, drives
his wife from the domicile fixed by him, he cannot take the advantage of her departure to
abrogate his duty to still support his wife. In law, the wife is legally still within the conjugal
 domicile, even if living separately, thus she is entitled to support and maintenance by the
husband.

Case Digest

MARIANO ARROYO vs. DOLORES VAZQUEZ DE ARROYO 42 PHIL 54

G.R No. 17014.
August 11, 1921
STREET, J.:

Facts: Mariano Arroyo and Dolores Vazquez de Arroyo were united in the bonds of wedlock by marriage
in 1910 and since that date, with a few short intervals of separation, they lived together as
husband and wife until July 4, 1920, when the wife went away from their common home with the
intention to live separately from her husband. After efforts had been made by the husband
without avail to induce her to resume marital relations, an action was initiated by him to compel
her to return to the matrimonial home and live with him as a dutiful wife. The wife answered that
she had left her husband’s home without his consent because of the cruel treatment on the part of
her husband. Upon hearing the cause, the lower court gave judgment in favor of the wife,
authorizing her to live apart from her husband. They concluded that the husband was more to
blame than the wife and that his continued ill-treatment was a sufficient justification for her
abandonment of the conjugal home.

Issue: Whether or not the lower court erred in their judgment favoring the wife

Whether or not it is competent for the court to make such an order for the return of the wife to the
marital domicile

Ruling: To begin with, the obligation which the law imposes on the husband to maintain the wife is a
duty universally recognized in civil society and is clearly expressed in Art. 142 and 143 of the
Civil Code. Accordingly, it has been determined that where the wife is forced to leave the
matrimonial abode, she can, compel him to make provision for her separate maintenance.
Nevertheless, the interests of both parties and the society at large require that the courts should
move with caution in enforcing the duty to provide for the separate maintenance of the wife.
From this consideration, it follows that provisions should be made for separate maintenance in
favor of the wife unless it appears that the continued cohabitation of the pair has become
impossible and separation necessary from the fault of the husband.

We are therefore hold that Mariano Arroyo in this case is entitled to the unconditional and
absolute return of the wife to the marital domicile. He is entitled to a judicial declaration that his
wife has absented herself without sufficient cause and that it is her duty to return.

Therefore, reversing the judgment of the lower court, it is declared that Dolores Vazquez de
Arroyo has absented herself from the marital home without sufficient cause; and that she is
admonished that it is her duty to return.
Case Digest

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. RODOLFO SCHNCKENBERGER 73 SCRA 413

G.R. No. 48183.
November 10, 1941
MORAN, J.:

Facts: On Mach 16, 1926, the accused, Rodolfo Schneckenberger married the complainant Elena
Cartegena and after 7 years of marital life, they agreed, for reason of alleged incompatibility of
character, to live separately from each other. On June 15, 1935, Rodolfo, without leaving the
Philippines, secured a divorce from the civil court of Juarez, Mexico. On May 11, 1936, he
contracted another marriage with his co-accused, Julia Medel. Complainant herein instituted two
actions, one for bigamy in the Court of First Instance of Rizal and the other for concubinage in
the Court of First Instance of Manila. The first culminated in the conviction of the accused. On
the trial of concubinage, Rodolfo interposed the plea of double jeopardy, and the case was
dismissed. Upon appeal by the fiscal, Rodolfo was convicted of concubinage through reckless
imprudence and sentenced to a penalty of two months and one day of arresto mayor. Hence this
appeal.

Issue: Whether or not the court erred in convicting accused in the offense of concubinage

Ruling: As to appellant’s plea for double jeopardy, it need only be observed that the offense of bigamy
for which he was convicted and that of concubinage for which he stood trial are two distinct
offenses in law and in fact as well as the mode of their prosecution. The celebration of the second
marriage, with the first still existing, characterizes bigamy; in the present case, mere cohabitation
by the husband with a woman who is not his wife characterizes concubinage.

Upon the other hand, we believe and so hold that the accused should be acquitted of the crime of
concubinage. The document executed by and between the accused clearly shows that each party
intended to forego the illicit acts of the other. As the term “pardon” unquestionably refers to the
offense after its commission, “consent” must have been intended, agreeably with its ordinary
usage, to refer to the offense prior its commission. No logical difference can indeed be perceived
between prior and subsequent consent, for in both instances as the offended party has chosen to
compromise with his/her dishonor, he/she becomes unworthy to come to court and invoke its aid
in the vindication of the wrong. In arriving at this conclusion, we do not wish to be misconstrued
as legalizing an agreement to do an illicit act, in violation of law. Our view must be taken only to
mean that an agreement of the tenor entered into between the parties herein, operates, within the
plain language and manifest policy of the law, to bar the offended party from prosecuting the
offense.
 The accused is acquitted in the crime of concubinage.

Case Digest

Elisea Laperal vs Republic of the Philippines

GR No. L-18008
October 30, 1962
J. Barrerra

Facts: Elisea Laperal married Enrique Santamaria on March 24, 1939. However, they filed a petition for
legal separation and it was granted by the court on January 18, 1958. Thereafter, they lived
separately. Prior to the legal separation, petitioner used the name Elisea L. Santamaria. However,
now that the petition for legal separation has been granted, the petitioner wants to revert to using
her maiden name, Elisea Laperal. This was opposed by the City Attorney of Baguio on the
ground that it violates Art. 372 of the Civil Code.  She was claiming that continuing to use her
married name would give rise to confusion in her finances and the eventual liquidation of the
conjugal assets.

Issue: WoN petitioner be allowed to use her maiden name Elisea Laperal

Ruling: The fact of legal separation alone which is the only basis for the petition at bar is, in our opinion,
not a sufficient ground to justify a change of the name of herein petitioner. It is true that in the
second decision which reconsidered the first it is stated that as the petitioner owns extensive
business interests, the continued used of her husband surname may cause undue confusion in her
finances and the eventual liquidation of the conjugal assets. This finding is however without
basis. In the first place, these were not the causes upon which the petition was based; hence,
obviously no evidence to this effect had been adduced.

Case Digest

Tenchavez vs Escano
G.R. No. L-19671
November 29, 1965
J. Reyes

Facts: In February 1948, Tenchavez and Escaño secretly married each other and of course without the
knowledge of Escaño’s parents who were of prominent social status. The marriage was celebrated
by a military chaplain. When Escaño’s parents learned of this, they insisted a church wedding to
 be held but Escaño withdrew from having a re-celebration because she heard that Tenchavez was
having an affair with another woman. Eventually, their relationship went sour; 2 years later,
Escaño went to the US where she acquired a decree of absolute divorce and she subsequently
became an American citizen and also married an American.

In 1955, Tenchavez initiated a case for legal separation and further alleged that Escaño’s parents
dissuaded their daughter to go abroad and causing her to be estranged from him hence he’s asking
for damages in the amount of P1,000,000.00. The lower court did not grant the legal separation
being sought for and at the same time awarded a P45,000.00 worth of counter-claim by the
Escaños.

Issue: Whether or not damages should be awarded to either party in the case at bar

Held: Yes. On the part of Tenchavez:

His marriage with Escaño was a secret one and the failure of said marriage did not result to public
humiliation; that they never lived together and he even consented to annulling the marriage earlier
(because Escaño filed for annulment before she left for the US but the same was dismissed due to
her non-appearance in court); that he failed to prove that Escaño’s parents dissuaded their
daughter to leave Tenchavez and as such his P1,000,000.00 claim cannot be awarded.
HOWEVER, by reason of the fact that Escaño left without the knowledge of Tenchavez and
being able to acquire a divorce decree; and Tenchavez being unable to remarry, the SC awarded
P25,000.00 only by way of moral damages and attorney’s fees to be paid by Escaño and not her
parents.

On the part of Escaño’s parents:

It is true that the P1,000,000.00 for damages suit by Tenchavez against the Escaños is unfounded
and the same must have wounded their  feelings and caused them anxiety, the same could in no
way have seriously injured their reputation, or otherwise prejudiced them, lawsuits having
become a common occurrence in present society. What is important, and has been correctly
established in the decision of the lower court, is that they were not guilty of any improper conduct
in the whole deplorable affair. The SC reduced the damages awarded from P45,000.00 to
P5,000.00 only.

Case Digest

Macadangdang vs Court of Appeals

G.R. No. L-38287
October 23, 1981
J. Makasiar

Facts: Respondent Filomena Gaviana Macadangdang and petitioner Antonio Macadangdang were
married in 1946 after having lived together for two years and had 6 children. They started a buy
and sell business and sari-sari store in Davao City. Through hard work and good fortune, their
business grew and expanded into merchandising, trucking, transportation, rice and corn mill
business, abaca stripping, real estate etc. Their relationship became complicated and both
indulged in extramarital relations. Married life became intolerable so they separated in 1965
 when private respondent left for Cebu for good. When she returned in Davao in 1971, she
learned of the illicit affairs of her estranged husband. She then decided to take the initial action.
In April 1971, she instituted a complaint for legal separation.

Issue: Whether or not the death of a spouse after a final decree of legal separation has effect on the legal
separation.

Ruling: The death of a spouse after a final decree of legal separation has no effect on the legal separation.
When the decree itself is issued, the finality of the separation is complete after the lapse of the
period to appeal the decision to a higher court even if the effects, such as the liquidation of the
property, have not yet been commenced nor terminated.

The law clearly spells out the effect of a final decree of legal separation on the conjugal property.
Therefore, upon the liquidation and distribution confortably with the effects of such final decree,
the law on intestate succession should take over the disposition of whatever remaining properties
have been allocated to the deceased spouse.

Such dissolution and liquidation are necessary consequences of the final decree. Article 106 of
the Civil Code, now Article 63 of the Family Code provides the effects of the decree of legal
separation. These legal effects ipso facto or automatically follows, as an inevitable incident of the
judgment decreeing legal separation, for the purpose of determining the share of each spouse in
the conjugal assets.

Case Digest

Lapuz-Sy vs Eufemio
G.R. No. L-30977
January 31, 1972
J. Reyes

Facts: Carmen Lapuz-Sy filed a petition for legal separation against Eufemio Eufemio on August 1953.
They were married civilly on September 21, 1934 and canonically after nine days. They had
lived together as husband and wife continuously without any children until 1943 when her
husband abandoned her. They acquired properties during their marriage. Petitioner then
discovered that her husband cohabited with a Chinese woman named Go Hiok on or about 1949.
She prayed for the issuance of a decree of legal separation, which among others, would order that
the defendant Eufemio should be deprived of his share of the conjugal partnership profits.

Eufemio counterclaimed for the declaration of nullity of his marriage with Lapuz-Sy on the
ground of his prior and subsisting marriage with Go Hiok. Trial proceeded and the parties
adduced their respective evidence. However, before the trial could be completed, respondent
already scheduled to present surrebuttal evidence, petitioner died in a vehicular accident on May
1969. Her counsel duly notified the court of her death. Eufemio moved to dismiss the petition
for legal separation on June 1969 on the grounds that the said petition was filed beyond the one-
year period provided in Article 102 of the Civil Code and that the death of Carmen abated the
action for legal separation. Petitioner’s counsel moved to substitute the deceased Carmen by her
father, Macario Lapuz.

Issue: Whether the death of the plaintiff, before final decree in an action for legal separation, abate the
action and will it also apply if the action involved property rights.
Ruling: An action for legal separation is abated by the death of the plaintiff, even if property rights are
involved. These rights are mere effects of decree of separation, their source being the decree
itself; without the decree such rights do not come into existence, so that before the finality of a
decree, these claims are merely rights in expectation. If death supervenes during the pendency of
the action, no decree can be forthcoming, death producing a more radical and definitive
separation; and the expected consequential rights and claims would necessarily remain unborn.

The petition of Eufemio for declaration of nullity is moot and academic and there could be no
further interest in continuing the same after her demise, that automatically dissolved the
questioned union. Any property rights acquired by either party as a result of Article 144 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines 6 could be resolved and determined in a proper action for partition
by either the appellee or by the heirs of the appellant.

Case Digest

Pacete vs Carriaga
G.R. No. L-53880
March 17, 1994
J. Vitug

Facts: Concepcion Alanis filed a complaint on October 1979, for the Declaration of Nullity of Marriage
between her erstwhile husband Enrico Pacete and one Clarita de la Concepcion, as well as for
legal separation between her and Pacete, accounting and separation of property. She averred in
her complaint that she was married to Pacete on April 1938 and they had a child named
Consuelo; that Pacete subsequently contracted a second marriage with Clarita de la Concepcion
and that she learned of such marriage only on August 1979. Reconciliation between her and
Pacete was impossible since he evidently preferred to continue living with Clarita.
The defendants were each served with summons. They filed an extension within which to file an
answer, which the court partly granted. Due to unwanted misunderstanding, particularly in
communication, the defendants failed to file an answer on the date set by the court. Thereafter,
the plaintiff filed a motion to declare the defendants in default, which the court forthwith granted.
The court received plaintiffs’ evidence during the hearings held on February 15, 20, 21, and 22,
1980. After trial, the court rendered a decision in favor of the plaintiff on March 17, 1980.
Issue: Whether or not the RTC gravely abused its discretion in denying petitioner’s motion for extension
of time to file their answer, in declaring petitioners in default and in rendering its decision on
March 17, 1980 which decreed the legal separation of Pacete and Alanis and held to be null and
void the marriage of Pacete to Clarita.

Ruling: The Civil Code provides that “no decree of legal separation shall be promulgated upon a
stipulation of facts or by confession of judgment. In case of non-appearance of the defendant, the
court shall order the prosecuting attorney to inquire whether or not collusion between parties
exists. If there is no collusion, the prosecuting attorney shall intervene for the State in order to
take care that the evidence for the plaintiff is not fabricated.”

The above stated provision calling for the intervention of the state attorneys in case of
uncontested proceedings for legal separation (and of annulment of marriages, under Article 88) is
 to emphasize that marriage is more than a mere contract. Article 103 of the Civil Code, now
Article 58 of the Family Code, further mandates that an action for legal separation must “in no
case be tried before six months shall have elapsed since the filing of the petition,” obviously in
order to provide the parties a “cooling-off” period. In this interim, the court should take steps
toward getting the parties to reconcile.

The significance of the above substantive provisions of the law is further or underscored by the
inclusion of a provision in Rule 18 of the Rules of Court which provides that no defaults in
actions for annulments of marriage or for legal separation. Therefore, “if the defendant in an
action for annulment of marriage or for legal separation fails to answer, the court shall order the
prosecuting attorney to investigate whether or not a collusion between the parties exists, and if
there is no collusion, to intervene for the State in order to see to it that the evidence submitted is
not fabricated.”

Case Digest

Alcantara vs Alcantara
G.R. No. 167746
August 28, 2007
J. Chico-Nazario

Facts: Restituto filed a petition for annulment of marriage against Rosita alleging that on 8 Dec 1982 he
and Rosita, without securing the required marriage license, went to the Manila City Hall for the
purpose of looking for a “fixer” who could arrange a marriage for them  before a certain Rev.
Navarro. They got married on the same day.  Restituto  and Rosita went through another marriage
ceremony in Tondo, Manila, on 26 March 1983.  The marriage was again celebrated without the
parties securing a marriage license.  The alleged marriage license, procured in Carmona, Cavite,
appearing on the marriage contract, is a sham, as neither party was a resident of Carmona, and
they never went to Carmona to apply for a license with the local civil registrar of the said place.  
In 1988, they parted ways and lived separate lives.  Petitioner prayed that after due hearing,
judgment be issued declaring their marriage void and ordering the Civil Registrar to cancel the
corresponding marriage contract and its entry on file.     Rosita however asserts the validity of
their marriage and maintains that there was a marriage license issued as evidenced by a
certification from the Office of the Civil Registry of Carmona, Cavite.  

Restituto has a mistress with whom he has three children. Restituto only filed the annulment of
their marriage to evade prosecution for concubinage. Rosita, in fact, has filed a case for
concubinage against Restituto.

Issue: Whether or not their marriage is valid.

Ruling: The requirement and issuance of a marriage license is the State’s demonstration of its
involvement and participation in every marriage, in the maintenance of which the general public
is interested. Petitioner cannot insist on the absence of a marriage license to impugn the validity
of his marriage.  The cases where the court considered the absence of a marriage license as a
ground for considering the marriage void are clear-cut. In this case, the marriage contract between
the petitioner and respondent reflects a marriage license number.  A certification to this effect
was also issued by the local civil registrar of Carmona, Cavite. The certification moreover is
precise in that it specifically identified the parties to whom the marriage license was issued,
namely Restituto Alcantara and Rosita Almario, further validating the fact that a license was in
fact issued to the parties herein.Petitioner, in a faint attempt to demolish the probative value of
the marriage license, claims that neither he nor respondent is a resident of Carmona, Cavite.  
Even then, we still hold that there is no sufficient basis to annul petitioner and respondent’s
marriage.  Issuance of a marriage license in a city or municipality, not the residence of either of
the contracting parties, and issuance of a marriage license despite the absence of publication or
prior to the completion of the 10-day period for publication are considered mere irregularities that
do not affect the validity of the marriage.  An irregularity in any of the formal requisites of
marriage does not affect its validity but the party or parties responsible for the irregularity are
civilly, criminally and administratively liable. Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio.  The
presumption is always in favor of the validity of the marriage. Every intendment of the law or
fact leans toward the validity of the marriage bonds.  The Courts look upon this presumption with
great favor.  It is not to be lightly repelled; on the contrary, the presumption is of great weight.