AN ANALYSIS OF CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS

AS VEHICLES OF SOCIAL JUSTICE VIA THE STUDY

OF THE RIGHT TO PROPERTY AND THE WOMEN’S
RESERVATION BILL
Subject: Constitutional Amendments

MEGHANA KUDLIGI
20171193
BA LLB SEC C

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3665196

Chapter 1: Introduction
“The service of India means the service of the millions who suffer. It means the ending of poverty and ignorance
and disease and inequality of opportunity. The ambition of the greatest man of our generation has been to wipe
every tear from every eye. That may be beyond us but as long as there are tears and suffering, so long our work
will not be over.” 1

Newly freed independent India was roaring with the promise of a bright and prosperous future. At the gateway to
such prosperity was the Constitution of India, adopted on November 26th, 1949 and enforced from 26th January 1950.
The Constitution vows to the citizens of India three kinds of justice; social, political, and economical. For this paper,
the trifold justice envisaged by the Constitution is understood as a comprehensive term, ‘social justice.’ The term
social justice is not new to the Indian polity. Since time immemorial, inequality and discrimination has existed in
Indian society ranging from the pervasive hand of patriarchy, caste-based discrimination to exploitation of labourers
and other vulnerable groups. When the British left India, these maladies continued to inflict Indian society and the
mammoth task of curing society or at best mitigating the impact of such maladies was left to the leaders of new India.
Bearing this in mind, provisions were inserted in the Constitution to secure social justice. Thus, the notion of ‘justice’
formed the grundnorm of the Constitution from which other provisions stemmed.

Social justice is the idea of creating a society or institution that is based on the principles of equality and solidarity,
2
that understands and values human rights, and that recognizes the dignity of every human being. In other words,
social justice is an all-encompassing idea that aims at eradicating exploitation of man, by man and the absence of
privileges being extended to a section of society arbitrarily. The makers of the Constitution highly driven by this idea
of social justice have inserted the Preamble, Fundamental Rights and Directive Principles of State Policy as a means
to achieve the end of social justice. However, society is dynamic and continually changing. Injustice as it existed
previously has manifested itself in different forms in contemporary times. In this context, the power to amend the
constitution serves the purpose of a safeguard regarding evolving injustices.

Amendments to the Constitution have been made bearing such change in the forms of injustice. Social justice has a
very wide ambit and therefore, for this paper the study of social justice and how it is achieved via constitutional
amendments is limited to the transformation of right to property from a fundamental right to a legal right and a study
of the tumultuous journey of the Women’s Reservation Bill. By tracing the trajectory of property rights and the Bill,
it is concluded that while some endeavours to achieve social justice have been successful, others have been to no
avail.

1 Words of Jawarharlal Nehru at from ‘Tryst with Destiny’ speech in the Constituent Assembly at midnight of 14-15 August
1947 on the eve of independence.
2 KRISHNA IYER, BEYOND SOCIAL JUSTICE- SUNSET OR DAWN: SOME HALF-HIDDEN ASPECTS OF INDIAN

SOCIAL JUSTICE (Eastern Book Company 2nd ed. 2011)

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CHAPTER 2: RIGHT TO PROPERTY- A SUCCESS STORY?

Image I: The practise of eminent domain has rendered many powerless in the face of seemingly
innocuous state actions.

Image II: The interpretation of the right to property has been a continuous tussle
between the legislature and judiciary, with each presenting their own ‘new’ ideas.

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The legal and constitutional framework of the right to property is contentious on two fronts; it is the only
fundamental right to have been abolished and is the most amended right since the adoption of the
Constitution. Property rights invite conflict mainly because of the power vested in the state to exercise
eminent domain. ‘Eminent domain’ is the power of the state to acquire land privately owned for a public
purpose, or for public benefit. A person has a right not to be deprived of his property except through due
process of law. These two rights i.e., the right of eminent domain of the state and right of citizen not to be
deprived of his property except by due process of law exist in diametrical opposition. Reconciliation of the
two has been attempted by the legislature and judiciary. However, each pillar of democracy varied in its
approach to reconciliation thereby leading to multiple amendments, the result being the abolishment of the
right to property as a fundamental right. A study of the tussle between the legislature and judiciary illustrates
the ideological inclination of the two organs.

This section of the paper is divided into three components. The first part studies the history of the right to
property by looking at the origin of the right to property and Constituent Assembly debates, to provide a
context for following sections. The second component analyses the trajectory of the right to property (as a
fundamental right) from its conception to its demise vis a vis the numerous amendments that took place to
conclude that ultimately a citizen’s right to property is paramount and the exercise of eminent domain is to
be accompanied by caveats. The final part, ties back to the original argument made at the start of the paper,
the right to property as it stands today is a result of constitutional amendments that are a vehicle through
which social justice is attained.

Historical Context of the Right to Property

The demand for a guarantee of fundamental right to property can be traced back to the time of the Magna
Carta, 1215. That Charter set out the rights of the various classes of the medieval community according to
their needs. Other ancient documents enrolled on the statute book were the Petition of Right, 1628, the
Bill of Rights, 1689 and the Act of settlement, 1701 inaugurated in England an era of Constitutional
government. However, in the Indian context it would be difficult to carve out an exact era during which
the demand for property rights was made. Property rights have existed in Indian society since time
immemorial, just in varied forms. For example, before India was colonised when provinces and kingdoms
were the norm, property was owned by peasants and landlords. The monarch usually received a portion of
fruits borne by the property, either in cash or in kind. The exercise of control over the land by the
monarch illustrates how the practise of eminent domain existed at that time.

A feudal system was in place when the British arrived in India. The Indian feudal system at this point of
time was a varied one, with different relationships and arrangements existing between the owner of the
land and the actual user. British rule brought with it first certain permanent settlements and grants in

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perpetuity, but without any explicit recognition of a Constitutional right to property. 3 With the weight of
expansionary policies bearing upon them, the British enacted the Bengal Regulation I of 1824 which
provided for acquisition of property by the State. Acquisition of land happened at the expense of
landlords and other feudal chiefs. Compensation for expropriation of land was not determined by any
statutory mechanism. Therefore, the Land Acquisition Act of 1984 4 was passed, a large portion of which
has influenced the doctrine of eminent domain as practised today. The Act inserted eminent domain
statutorily, in the fabric of property rights in India by clarifying all the elements of the doctrine such as
procedure to obtain property, circumstances that attract public purpose, compensation in lieu of
expropriation etc. However, it did not explicitly recognise the right to own property.

For the first time, the right to own property was recognised by law in the Government of India Act, 1935.
This Act formed the edifice of the Constitution, which was adopted fifteen years after. Contained in S.299
of the Act, the right to possess property was important considering the political context at that time. In the
fifteen years following the Act, the fight for independence reached its pinnacle. This section provided the
impetus in the long journey of social justice by protecting smaller and vulnerable groups of society by
recognising limitations on the state’s ability to acquire property and due process.

Constituent Assembly Debates on the Right to Property:

Property rights are deeply entrenched in society and are often tools of exploitation and oppression.
Therefore, they were heavily debated by the constituent assembly before being inserted into the
Constitution.
The prevailing ideology at the time of framing the constitution was to constitute India into a republic with
a parliamentary democracy and a socialist welfare state. 5 Discussion in the Assembly was influenced by
the American Constitution and the Bill of Rights guaranteed by an independent judiciary as well as socialist
and communist principles of state intervention to achieve equity, thereby leading to divergent views on the
topic.

On one end of the spectrum were liberal thinkers in favour of property rights accompanied by constitutional
limitations. Additionally, they advocated for full compensation in case of expropriation of property,
independent of the purpose of acquisition, social standing of owner or the type of property. On the other
end, socialist leaders were critical of the concept of private property and were inclined towards all property

3
Gopal Sankaranarayanan, 44 Verfassung Und Recht in Übersee / Law and Politics in Africa, Asia and Latin America The
Fading Right to Property in India, 220, 222 (2011) www.jstor.org/stable/43239608
4
The Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (Act. No. 1 of 1894) (India)
available at, http://megrevenuedm.gov.in/acts/land-aquisition-act-1894.pdf
5 Shruti Rajagopalan, Our Founders and the Right to Property, THINK PRAGATI, (May 29th, 2020, 10:00 A.M)
https://www.thinkpragati.com/opinion/1849/founding-fathers-right-property/
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being state owned. An accompanying concern was how mandating full compensation would impact
redistribution of wealth and nationalisation efforts. Leaders like Dr. B.R Ambedkar and Alladi
Krishnaswamy Iyer propounded a co-existence between private capital and socialist welfare policies.

The question of property rights and the manner in which they were to be granted was so important because
of India’s history of the zamindari system. The zamindari system was the epitome of oppression and
subjugation of the vulnerable by the powerful. Keeping in mind tenets of social justice and the overarching
goal of erasing the suffering of those on the receiving end of systemic oppression the task before the
Constituent Assembly was to now determine whether property rights will be constitutionally protected and
if the right of the state over property would be limited through constitutional provisions. Drawing heavily
from S.299 6 of the GoI Act, 1935 Article 31 was injected into the Constitution. S.299 while recognising
the idea of eminent domain, raised important questions of public domain, and compensation. To no surprise,
there were divergent views on each of these pertinent topics.

2.1 “Public use”

The question of for what purpose could the land be acquired was heavily deliberated among the members.
Bearing in mind the agenda of social justice, could the purpose be extended to abolition of the unjust
zamindari system? Alternatively, would the consideration of nationalisation impact such provision thereby
allowing the state to acquire land for its own purposes, divorced of social causes?
Govind Ballabh Pant was concerned that the phrase “public use” was ambiguous and unclear. His line of
argument combined socialist and liberal strands of thinking. According to him, if the government was to
acquire land for a social purpose, no restriction was to be placed on such exercise of eminent domain and
the question of ‘just compensation’ should not arise. However, if the government was to acquire land for
its usage, such exercise entails restrictions and a question of compensation may arise, to be determined by
the legislature and not the judiciary. In contrast, some members believed that S.299 was not ambiguous and
allowed for acquisition of both kinds. The strongest proponent of socialist thought, Nehru believed that the
cause of abolition of the zamindari system was too strong a cause to allow individual rights to get in the
way. In cases of eminent domain, a distinction was to be made between frivolous acquisitions and large
scale social reforms. Prima facie, Nehru and Pant’s arguments pass the muster of social justice. On a
deconstruction of their argument, it becomes clear that in social causes such as the abolition of the zamindari
system the power to acquire property must be unfettered. Constitutional limits are attracted in all other

6 S.299.-(1) No person shall be deprived of his property in British India save by authority of law. (2) Neither the Federal nor a
Provincial Legislature shall have power to make any law authorising the compulsory acquisition for public purposes of any land,
or any commercial or industrial undertaking, or any interest in, or in any company owning, any commercial or industrial
undertaking, unless the law provides for the payment of compensation for the property acquired and either fixes the amount of
the compensation, or specifies the principles on which, and the manner in which, it is to be determined.

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cases, therefore implying that the state has the authority only if it abuses the rights of many and not just
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one.

2.2 “Compensation”
Much of the debate about the right to property cantered around the erstwhile immediate problem at hand,
abolition of the zamindari system. As seen above, many leaders carved out an exception to eminent domain
viz social causes. A similar line of argument influenced discussions of compensation.
Socialist members were against the right to property in toto, therefore did not participate much in
discussions of compensation. So deeply embedded was the violence of the zamindari system that even to
the most liberal members, compensating zamindars elicited reactions of discomfort. A few members were
in favour of compensating even the zamindars, keeping in mind the larger purpose of the scheme. They
argued that analysing compensation only from the lens of zamindari system does not take into account the
original purpose of property rights; to allow for the practise of eminent domain, subject to public purpose
and compensation in conformity with the principles of social justice.

2.3 The final result

The inherent contradiction between conserving existing property rights and ushering in a more egalitarian
society through redistribution of land led to intense debate within the Constituent Assembly, ending in an
uneasy compromise between competing interests 8. Article 19(1)(f) guaranteed the fundamental right to
property, thereby allowing any transgression to be justiciable directly in the Supreme Court. However, this
right was subject to reasonable restrictions stipulated by Article 19(6). Additionally, Article 31 incorporated
elements of public use, due process, compensation and entailed qualifications to the rule to allow for social
causes. The right to property as informed by the erstwhile property clauses in the Constitution was thus was
a triumphant provision, limiting state practise of eminent domain via due process and requirement of
compensation but also making space for social reform through exceptions.

Interestingly, one year after the adoption of the Constitution, the first amendment was made diluting the
right to property by a body of individuals, almost all of whom were members of the Constituent Assembly.
From an examination of the discussions among members, it becomes clear that the central question was
balancing individual rights and social welfare. The zamindari system was the foundation of most debates.
Members did not pay heed to how the right to property, analysed from such a restricted vantage point would

7Rajagopalan, supra note 5

8 Wahi, Namita, The Fundamental Right to Property in the Indian Constitution, SSRN, (May 29th 2020 2:00 P.M)
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2661212
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play out in the grand scheme of things. Applying this principle in contemporary times, often instances of
abuse of eminent domain are reported.

Birth and Demise of the Right to Property as a fundamental right

The right to property underwent a series of ten amendments to arrive at where it is today. Inserted as a
fundamental right, stripped of that status, and delegated to a legal right, the story of the right to property
is reflective of the struggle in achieving social justice. There is an abundance of literature analysing the
trajectory of the right to property as a tussle between the legislature and judiciary, or as the fight to
balance individual rights and social welfare schemes. However, in this component of the paper a
conventional study of the right to property is digressed from, and analysed through the perspective of
social justice to conclude that at every juncture, the interests of one group was strengthened at the
expense of another 9. At some junctures, severe deviation can be seen from the ubiquitous principles of
social justice. However, through judicial interpretation and changing ideologies reflective of changing
times ultimately, social justice emerges triumphant even after much deviation.

The First Amendment - ‘A genie on the loose’ 10

Even before abolition of the zamindari system and other land reform measures attracted controversy and
litigation causing a break in the socialist revolution about to begin with the adoption of the Constitution 11.
In Bihar, Madhya Pradesh, West Bengal and erstwhile United Provinces, land reform measures were
creating unrest. True to the promise made my Nehru, a series of land reform legislations had been enacted
by several states. The constitutional validity of these legislation was being questioned in courts.

The courts were not zealous in abolishing the zamindari system. One of the most significant land reform
legislation, the Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950 was challenged in the Patna High Court on grounds of
unconstitutionality. The Patna High Court declared the Act as unconstitutional, much to the chagrin of the
legislature, on the basis of it violating the principles of equality enshrined in Article 14 as it provided
different rates of compensation to different categories of zamindars. The Patna High Court held that Article
31(4) only protected laws against judicial review under the compensation provisions of Article 31(2) but

9 Wahi, supra note 8

10 Granville Austin, in his commentary on Working of a democratic constitution, uses the phrase ‘genie on the loose’ to
describe the 9th Schedule inserted by the First Amendment. It alludes to the idea that while the 9th Schedule is a wish granting
factory for the legislature, as every item it wishes to save from judicial scrutiny may be inserted into it, it is also a bane for the
democracy insofar the threat it poses to abridging rights and liberties, at the hands of the legislature.
11GRANVILLE AUSTIN, WORKING A DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION- THE INDIAN EXPERIENCE, 70 (1st ed.
1999)
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not under the provisions of other fundamental rights contained in the Constitution. 12 However, in Madhya
Pradesh 13 and United Provinces 14 the constitutional validity of the law was upheld.

In response to Patna’s High Court’s decision to invalidate the land reform legislation, Dr. Ambedkar
(incumbent Law Minister) sent a letter the Cabinet Committee constituted by Nehru to amend Art. 31 in a
manner so as to widen its ambit and allow different amounts of compensation for different categories of
land owners and to place restrictions on the judiciary in determining questions of compensation. On the
same day, an advocate from Tamil Nadu sent a letter to the Law Secretary, suggesting that the idea to name
in Article 31 the tenure laws to be exempted from its reach be expanded to creating a separate schedule to
the Constitution that would contain acts certified by the President and deemed valid retrospectively and
prospectively notwithstanding anything in the Constitution. Thus, the genie of the Ninth Schedule emerged
from the bottle, for the schedule, a risky device in any event, would come to be used for other than land
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reform legislation.

While the challenges from Patna, Allahabad and Bhopal High Courts were pendente lite, the provisional
Government formed mostly comprising of members of the Constituent Assembly were deliberating the
First Amendment to the Constitution. In essence, it was merely a ploy to prevent land reform legislations
from judicial review and scrutiny. Article 31A was inserted, barring judicial review of claims of
fundamental right violations emanating from the exercise of eminent domain. Article 31B was inserted that
created the Ninth Schedule. A list of preferred legislations were inserted into the Ninth Schedule and as per
Article 31B, these legislations could not be vitiated on the grounds that they infringed upon the rights
contained in Part III, i.e, fundamental rights. The Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950 was listed as one of the
legislations under the Ninth Schedule, effectively depraving the Supreme Court of the authority to render
a judgement in favour of striking down the Act. The Supreme Court provided no respite and upheld the
decision of the High Court.
In Shankari Prasad Singh v Union of India16, the First Amendment was challenged. The Supreme Court
confirmed the validity and stated that if the procedure to amend as established by the Constitution was
followed, Parliament was vested with the authority to make amendments.

The First Amendment has falls foul of the spirit of social justice. It set into motion the idea that the
Constitution was open to amendment, in case of judicial pronouncements and the legislature not seeing eye

12 Wahi, supra note 8

13 Raj Rajendra Malojirao Shitole v State of Madhya Bharat (1952) AIR MP 97
14Raja Suryapal Singh v State of Uttar Pradesh (1951) AIR All 674.
15 Austin, supra note 11, at 85.
16 Sri Shankari Prasad Deo v. Union of India and State of Bihar & Ors. (1951) AIR 458
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to eye, thereby violating the sanctity of the Constitution. With this single move, the Indian framers showed
17
that they were democrats, but at best reluctant constitutionalists. The Ninth Schedule, as described by
Granville Austin, was a ‘’constitutional vault’’, the key to which only the legislature possessed. The scope
for circumventing the law and abusing the provision was far and wide.

The Fourth Amendment - The Second Strike 18

In State of Bihar v Kameshwar Singh 19, the Supreme Court ruled on the constitutional validity of the Bihar,
United Province, and Madhya Pradesh land reform legislation. This was the first case to examine the
contours of Article 31 as envisaged by the First Amendment.

2.1 “Public Purpose”

In Kameshwar Singh, the question of public purpose was briefly examined by the Court. It recognised the
right of the court to test whether taking over of land had occurred for a public purpose or not. However, it
did not lay down any tests or conclusively define the contours of public purpose.
Dating back to older cases, on 11 May 1950, the Allahabad High Court ordered the state government to
desist from nationalizing certain private motorbus operations in a case concerning the individual's right to
own and operate a business. 20 In Dwarkadas Shrinivas v The Sholapur Spinning and Weaving Company
Ltd 21 the court held that placing a company under government appointed agents wold amount to deprivation
of property and thereby violate the fundamental right guaranteed under Article 19(1)(f). Neither of these
cases are related to land reforms, but still pertain to the question of ‘’public purpose’’. The Court did not
question the acquisition in non-agrarian cases, leaving the decision to be made by the Legislature. The
resultant effect of that was the watering down of ‘’public purpose’’ as a defence against unjust acquisitions.

2.2 “Just Compensation”

In Indian jurisprudence, the right to receive compensation in lieu of acquisition of property by the State
was read as a fundamental right. However, this right was accompanied by a caveat; judicial review of laws
contravening the fundamental right of compensation guaranteed by the Constitution were barred in case of
land reform laws, zamindari abolition and other transitional laws. This caveat was inserted by the First

17 Rajagopalan, supra note 5

18 In reference to the First Amendment, considered as the First Strike by the Legislature in opposing the judiciary.
19 State of Bihar v. Kameshwar Prasad Singh (1998) Special Leave Petition (civil) 10653
20 Austin, supra note 11, at 78
21 Dwarkadas Shrinivas v The Sholapur Spinning and Weaving Company Ltd (1954) AIR 119
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Amendment to the Constitution.

In the case of State of West Bengal v Bela Banerjee 22, for the first time, the question of interpretation of the
term ‘’compensation’’ as used in Article 31(2) arose. A challenge was made to the West Bengal Land
Development and Planning Act, 1948 that allowed the state to acquire land for public purposes such as
establishment of settlements for migrants, creation of towns etc. The compensation to be paid was fixed at
a prior date to the acquisition without considering possible fluctuation of market price after date of
procurement. Compensation was contested as arbitrary and the court opined that compensation fixed by the
Act was not a ‘’just equivalent’’ of what the owners were deprived of. It was further opined that while the
legislature is at liberty to determine the principles upon which compensation is calculated, these principles
must ensure full indemnification of expropriated owner.

The Bela Banerjee decision prompted the 4th Constitutional Amendment, 1955. The Statements, Objectives
and Reasons attached to the Bill 23, states that the Bill seeks to amend Articles 31, 31A and 305 of, and the
Ninth Schedule of the Constitution. This amendment was motivated by the belief that the Supreme Court
was incorrect in its interpretation of the right to property and its corollaries. According to the amendment
bill, the government was exclusively vested with the authority to determine amount of compensation
because they had access to relevant data to make such decision. Article 31(2) 24 was amended to expel the
jurisdiction of the court in assessing sufficiency of compensation. Additionally, three land reforms were
added to the Ninth Schedule. Jaipal Singh, a representative of the Adivasis of Bihar and a member of the
Constituent Assembly, wrote in his dissent that for the poor man's sake compensation must be justiciable,
25
for the right to approach the courts 'is the most effective guarantee against executive tyranny’.

2.3 Non-agrarian motivated reforms

Apart from land reforms, the Amendment added Chapter III-A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1951 to the
Ninth Schedule. Overtaking private institutions was generally barred by principles of equity prevailing in
the Constitution. In a Nehruvian era, where socialist principles were of paramount importance, the 4th

22 State of West Bengal v Bela Banerjee (1954) AIR 170

23 The Constitution (Fourth) Amendment Act, 1955, MINISTRY OF LAW AND JUSTICE, (May 29th 4:02 PM, 2020)
http://legislative.gov.in/constitution-fourth-amendment-act-1955
24 Article 31 (2): No property shall be compulsorily acquired or requisitioned save for a public purpose and save by authority
of a law which provides for compensation for the property so acquired or requisitioned and either fixes the amount of the
compensation or specifies the principles on which, and the manner in which, the compensation is to be determined and given;
and no such law shall be called in question in any court on the ground that the compensation provided by that law is not
adequate.’’
25 Austin, supra note 11, at 242
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Amendment allowed the state to take over industrial undertakings in certain specific cases. State
intervention in railways and insurance was also made possible by the 4th Amendment.

17th Constitutional Amendment

The Bela Banerjee case initiated the process of doctrinally defining compensation. However, in a series of
cases that followed, the Court was inconsistent in its reasoning and decisions, until the Bank
nationalisation 26 case. The 17th Constitutional Amendment 27 was the last one passed under the leadership
of Nehru. In KK Kochuni v State of Madras 28 , the Court held that removing judicial review reform
questioning compensation was only limited to cases which where the land acquisition was to further the
land reform agenda. In all other non-agrarian reform cases, the compensation must be market-value
compensation. Similarly, in Kunhikoman v State of Kerala 29 the Supreme Court held that the land reform
legislation introduced in Kerala was not protected by Article 31A(2) and would attract judicial scrutiny.
The land in question was of a ryotwari nature, therefore did fall under the term ‘’estate’’ because a ryot 30
was a tenant.

In response to this definitional loophole noticed by the judiciary, the 17th Constitutional Amendment was
passed in 1964. As per the Statements and Objectives of the Bill,, it proposed to amend the Ninth Schedule
by including therein certain State enactments relating to land reform in order to remove any uncertainty or
doubt that may arise in regard to their validity. The Seventeenth Amendment made three important changes
to the constitutional property clause. First, it inserted a proviso in Article 31A(1) which enabled the State
to acquire land over and above the prescribed land ceilings in each State at less than market value
compensation. Second, it amended the definition of ‘estate’ in Article 31A(2)(a) to specifically include
lands under ryotwari settlement. Moreover, the term ‘estate’ now also included, all lands ‘held or let for
purposes of agriculture or for purposes ancillary thereto, including waste land, forest land, land for pasture
or sites of buildings and other structures occupied by cultivators of land, agricultural labourers and village
artisans’. Finally, the Amendment added forty-four laws to the Ninth Schedule thereby shielding them from

26 Rustom Cavasjee Cooper v. Union Of India (1970) AIR 564

27 The Constitution (Seventeenth Amendment) ACT, 1964, MINISTRY OF LAW AND JUSTICE, (MAY 30th 2:30 P.M)
http://legislative.gov.in/constitution-seventeenth-amendment-act-
1964#:~:text=THE%20CONSTITUTION%20(SEVENTEENTH%20AMENDMENT)%20ACT%2C%201964,-
THE%20CONSTITUTION%20(SEVENTEENTH&text=It%20is%2C%20therefore%2C%20proposed%20to,made%20in%20
land%20reform%20enactments.
28 Kavalappara Kottarathil Kochuni v. The State Of Madras And Others (1960) AIR 1080.
29 Karimbil Kunhikoman v. State Of Kerala (1962) AIR 723.
30 ‘Ryot’- a general economic term used for Indian peasants or tenant farmers during colonial times.
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judicial review on grounds of Articles 14, 19 and 31. 31

25th Constitutional Amendment

In, Vajravelu Mudaliar v. Special Deputy Collector 32 , the court identified four different categories of
compensation – just equivalent, just equivalent but not adequate, not illusory compensation but not adequate
and illusory compensation. The first three instances were saved by Article 31 and the court would not
intervene, but in fourth instance, it is duty bound to interfere. Compensation must not be illusory, it must
actually ‘’compensate’’. The impugned legislation was violative of Article 14 and was declared void.
However, the question of judicial review of adequacy of compensation was not conclusively determined.
This gap was filled in Union of India v Metal Corporation of India Ltd 33 case. The principles of computing
compensation under the Metal Corporation of India (Acquisition of Undertaking) Act 1965 were
challenged. Court applied the test established in Vajravelu case and held that compensation as imagined by
the Act was irrelevant to compensation and illusory in nature, hence not within the meaning of
compensation envisaged by Article 31(2) and therefore void. This case was overruled in State of Gujarat
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v. Shantilal where the Bombay Town Planning Act, 1958 was challenged. Since, compensation was
calculated bearing market value of land on date of declaration of intention to make a scheme and not on the
date of extinguishment of title, it was contested as violative of Article 31(2) keeping in mind Bela Banerjee.
The Court held that the Act specified guidelines to ascertain compensation and therefore the court cannot
intervene to determine whether it is a just equivalent of the value of property expropriated in lieu of
amended Article 31(2). In the landmark Bank Nationalisation 35 case, Shantilal decision was overruled by
a majority of ten to one. The constitutional validity of the Banking Companies (Acquisition of Transfer of
Undertakings) Act 1969 was in question. The attempt to nationalise 14 banks was rendered unconstitutional.
The court outlined the relevant principles to determine adequacy of compensation in conformity with prior
precedents (compensation must not be illusory, must be commensurate to what the owner has been deprived
of and not determined by principles that are irrelevant) and reinstated the Court’s powers of judicial review
in cases to determine adequacy of compensation. This case cleared up previous incongruity from Vajrevelu,
Shantilal, Metal Corporation and established a new norm. The legislature was unhappy and the Constitution
(Twenty-Fifth Amendment) Act, 1971 36 was passed expressly to annul the verdict in the Bank
Nationalisation case.

31 Wahi, supra note 8.

32 P. Vajravelu Mudaliar v. Special Deputy Collector, Madras (1965) AIR 1017.
33 Union of India v Metal Corporation of India Ltd (1967) AIR 637
34 State Of Gujarat v Shri Shantilal Mangaldas & Ors (1969) AIR 634
35 Rustom Cavasjee Cooper v. Union Of India (1970) AIR 564
36 The Constitution (Twenty-Fifth Amendment) Act, 1971, MINISTRY OF LAW AND JUSTICE, (May 30 6:00 PM)
http://legislative.gov.in/constitution-twenty-fifth-amendment-act-1971
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Article 31(2) was amended again, and the word “compensation” was replaced with the word ‘’amount’’.
Additionally, it stated that the amount cannot be questioned in court on the grounds of inadequacy or
because it was not paid in cash. Article 31(C) was also introduced. Effectively, the 25th Amendment ousted
judicial review of adequacy of compensation.

The Final Strike37 - 44th Constitutional Amendment

The Constitution (Forty-Fourth Amendment) Act 1978, abolished Articles 19(1)(f) and 31 and inserted
Article 300A into a new chapter IV of Part XII of the Constitution, thereby depriving it of its ‘fundamental
right’ status. The scope of Article 300-A was clarified in KT Plantation v. State of Karnataka 38. To satisfy
Article 300-A, firstly, the purpose of acquisition of property must be primarily public and not incidentally
public. Secondly, the payment of compensation must be ‘’just, fair and reasonable’’. This is the leading
case on eminent domain in Indian jurisprudence.

With the abolition of Article 31, there is no express provision in the Constitution mandating compensation
with the exception of Article 30(1A) and Article 31A(1). This has created an anomalous situation, whereby,
in all other cases of acquisition, there is no express constitutional requirement for the State to pay market
value compensation. 39 This categorization of circumstances in which compensation is mandated by the
Constitution has been viewed as violative of principles of equality, which form the touchstone of a
democracy. The above circumstance leads to discriminations between majority and minority com-
munities, between personal holders of land and actual tillers and between the agrarian rich and rural poor.
This is not only anomalous, but wholly against the ideals of the Constitution enshrined in the Directive
40
Principles, particularly with reference to economic and social justice.
Scholars have argued that payment of compensation need not be explicitly stated, it is inherently a part of
the right to life and liberty envisaged by Article 21. However, the Supreme Court in Jilubhai Khachar v.
41
State of Gujarat explicitly stated that the adequacy of compensation was not a matter for the court. The
only matter investigated by the court would be whether such compensation was relevant and not illusory.

All amendments made, leading up to the 44th Amendment cannot be divorced from their political contexts.
Many scholars have critiqued the 44th Amendment as an attempt by the erstwhile Janata government to

37 Following the 1st Amendment, 4th Amendment, 17th Amendment, 25th Amendment, the 44th Amendment was the final
strike by the legislature in attempting to change the meaning of the right to property in conformity to their convenience, self-
interest and ideology.
38 K.T. Plantation Pvt. Ltd. & Anr vs State Of Karnataka (2011) 9 SCC 1.
39 Wahi, supra note 8.
40 Sankaranarayan, supra note 3.
41 Jilubhai Khachar v. State of Gujarat (1994) Supp(1) SCR 807.
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complete their electoral promises. The 44th Amendment was made following the years after the Emergency,
which was a dark period for India where principles of democracy were blatantly flouted. The newly formed
Janata government to reverse the ‘’draconian’’ acts of the previous regime, introduced the 44th
Amendment.

Revival of Individual rights

In analysing the trajectory of the right to property, it is evident that the idea of social justice was always not
kept in mind, with political motivations and self-interests spearheading certain amendments. The right to
property as a fundamental right as it was originally envisioned was complete in its understanding of
compensation, practise of eminent domain and permitting social reform. It has been argued that, with the
passage of time, watering down of the right to property as a legal right has led to its erosion and increased
depravement of property. Constitutional amendments have been used plentifully merely to play devil’s
advocate and oppose the judiciary.
However, as seen from an analysis of the above cases and the manner in which the judiciary has interpreted
the right to property, an individual’s or a corporation’s right over their property cannot be acquired without
qualifying the high threshold of tests established in the K.T Plantation case. The judiciary has not read the
right to receive compensation as a part of Article 21 but has successfully embedded it as a part of Article
300A in the K.T Plantation case. Therefore, the idea of social justice and inclusivity of all has been the
motivating factor for the judiciary, and constitutional amendments have rightly served their purpose as
vehicles of social justice in the context of the right to property.

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Chapter III: The Women’s Reservation Bill- A long road ahead..

Image I: The Women’s Reservation Bill, a subject of much debate among changing ruling parties, being torn
apart in the process of such discussions.

Image II: Congress and Janata government, fighting over who deserves the credit for the Bill, illustrating
the vote-bank politics. However, it remains ‘vote bank’ tactics, with no actual fruition.

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 “Women hold up half the sky”
Mao Zaedong in his speeches on gender equality payed homage to aforesaid Chinese adage. Revolutions
have come and gone, but patriarchy seems to live on forever. 42 True to this statement, even more than two
decades after the introduction of the Women’s Reservation Bill in the parliament it has failed to pass. First
introduced through the 81st Amendment by the United Front of the H.D Deve Government, it was an
attempt to secure 33% reservation for women in the parliament and state assemblies. The chequered history
of the Bill has passed through various ruling parties and has been subject to much controversy. It was
reintroduced via the 84th Amendment in 1998, under the Atal Bihari Vajypayee government. A series of
reintroductions followed in 1999, 2003, 2008 and finally 2010. In 2008, the Bill was bought under the
spotlight via the 108th Amendment. Ten years ago, the Bill was passed by the Rajya Sabha but due to
dissolution of the Lok Sabha in 2014, the Bill stands repealed and there have been no further attempts to
regurgitate discussion on the Bill.

Indian society constitutes complex layers of social stratification. In the ethos of social justice, reservations
or affirmative actions were created to benefit groups of society who have been oppressed and not provided
with equal opportunities. An irony of these policies to help disadvantaged groups in Indian society is that
competition over the allocation of benefits often divides groups that might otherwise work together to fight
43
inequality. However, this does not take away from the importance of reservations in facilitating equal
opportunities and fair treatment. In this component of the paper, by looking at the various stages through
which the Bill has passed, socio-political factors influencing the bill and the plausible reasons for failure of
the Bill, it is argued that even though multiple amendments have been passed in favour of the Bill, the
factum of all amendments being of to no avail illustrates how social justice has not been achieved as
originally envisaged by the makers of the Constitution.

Historical Context
1.1 Pre-independence debates
The demand for reservation of women in the public sphere was not limited to post-independent India. Even
before the Constituent Assembly was formed, legislative reforms for women were being deliberated.
Reservations for women did not take center stage and much of the debate on affirmative action revolved
around uplifting the OBC’s, SC/ST’s and religious minorities. The demand for reservation was a corollary
to the demand of suffrage. However, both were in the category of ‘’minor minorities’’, and ‘’major

42Holding Up Half the Sky: Women Are Voting in Ever Larger Numbers, Will It Reflect in Policies? EPW 49 No. 12 8 8
(2014).
43Jenkins, Competing Inequalities: The Struggle over Reserved Legislative Seats for Women in India, International Review of
Social History, 44 53 (1999).
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majorities’’ such as religious minorities, were given priority. Creating a hierarchy of competing minorities
increased the fervour with which reservations and suffrage for women was pursued by woman’s
organizations and leaders.

Giving into political pressure, the British in the final years of their rule created granted Indians limited
rights to serve as representatives in legislative bodies. In part an effort to neutralize nationalists and expand
the "circle of collaborators", such policies also contributed to "divide and rule" tactics by giving special
electoral rights to certain group. 44 These groups included Muslims who were granted a separate electorate
under Government of India Act, 1909. Subsequent acts, such as the GoI 1919 and 1935 extended that right
to Sikhs and Christians. Additionally, lower caste groups were also granted limited seats in legislative
bodies. It is only the ‘’majority minorities” that were granted with such privileges, and the question of
women’s rights remained unanswered. However, during this period powerful organizations led by women,
for women such as the Women’s India Association, National Council for Women in India were established.

Interestingly, these organizations opposed the idea of reservations for women. In tune with nationalist
leaders of Congress who rejected the idea of separate electorates because they perpetuated British control
and caused further divide, women’s organizations also rejected preferential treatment. According to them,
making such a request would contravene the universal demand of political equality. Not paying much heed
to the pleas of women’s organizations and the leaders of Congress, the GoI 1935 reserved forty-one seats
for women in provincial legislatures and granted limited seats in the central assembly as well. The rationale
behind decision transgressing the requests made can be interpreted and understood in many ways. It may
be due to the ‘’white man’s burden’’ of correcting colonized society and to that end enacting reforms to
uplift all oppressed groups. Alternately, it could be because of pressure from ardent advocates of women’s
representation from Britain such as Elanor Rathbone.

Even after the formation of the Constituent Assembly, the question of women’s reservation came up but
was rejected by women representatives as it was felt to be unnecessary, since the working of democracy in
the normal course would ensure the representation of all sections of Indian society. The suggestion was
45
also seen to underestimate the strength of women to compete as equals. Ultimately, the government of
newly independent India retained legislative reservations only for SC/ST’s in the Lok Sabha at the center,
and Vidhan Sabha at the state level. Reservations for religious minorities, women and other backward
classes were deleted. Ironically, although the major women's organizations opposed women's reservations,

44 Barbara Ramusack, Cultural Missionaries, Maternal Imperialists, Feminist Allies: British Women Activists in India, 1865-
1945, Women's Studies International Forum, 13 (1990), p. 316
45 Nivideta Menon, Elusive 'Woman': Feminism and Women's Reservation Bill, 35(43/44) EPW 3835
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and the reservations themselves were quite short-lived, they gave elite, nationalist women a foothold in
Indian legislative life. 46 From an analysis of the way in which women’s reservations were debated prior to
formation of Constituent Assembly and even during debates between members, the nationalist agenda
appears to subsume women’s representation.

1.2 Post-independence debates:

Independent India was on the cusp of greatness and the means to achieve greatness was social justice,
meaning, inclusion and equality of all. From the perspective of participation of women in politics, or women
representation in the parliament and state assemblies the statistics were abysmally low. India was failing in
its mission of social justice viz a viz women empowerment.
The Committee on the Status of Women published a report, around twenty-five years after independence
titled “Towards Equality”. At that time, it was the first extensive study of women in India from multiple
perspectives and hence gained much traction.

Towards Equality, represents a paradigm shift in the study of development through the lens of gender.
Published in 1974 it provides a vantage point to have a parallax view of the women’s movement in India
vis-à-vis Indian democracy and the building of the modern nation. 47 It is often considered the turning point
of the women’s movement in India as it deconstructed the painful reality of women in India and how
existing models of social development were not suited to achieving the goal of equality. Up until then, focus
on accomplishing social justice was understood vis-à-vis egalitarian methods. This report informed the
failures of such model and the need to focus on a new development model.

The report signified a shift in the opinion on reservation, divergent from pre-independence nationalist
orthodoxy. The idea of reservation was now met with more acceptance, but it still did creation sufficient
friction. The Committee, fully aware of the drawbacks of affirmative action while supportive of it,
concluded that they would not recommend such a step. There was a three-pronged argument against
reservations. Firstly, inequality faced by other communities outweighed the inequality faced by women,
and women were a socially heterogeneous group. Secondly, a more general argument that rejected
affirmative action for all, reflective of pre-independent nationalist ideas, believed that creating social
distinctions would ultimately distort national unity. Thirdly, it would contravene the principle of equality
enshrined in the Constitution. Based on a majority decision, reservations for women were rejected by the
Committee.

46 Jenkins, supra note 43

47 Sanchayita Paul Charaborty, Women and Development: Revisiting the Towards Equality Report, (June 2nd 2020 7:00 P.M)
https://www.academia.edu/17461498/WOMEN_AND_DEVELOPMENT_REVISITING_THE_TOWARDS_EQUALITY_RE
PORT
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1.2.1 73rd and 74th Constitutional Amendments
The Committee agreed that the plight of rural women was devastating and often ignored. Therefore, they
recommended reservations for women at the local level. In other words, the establishment of a statutory
women’s panchayat was recommended. This sparked dissent as well as some believed that it prioritised one
class of women over another thereby feeding into separatist tendencies. Others advocated for more
encompassing reservations not limited to just local institutions, but inclusive of the parliament and state
assemblies as well.

The influence of the report with respect to political participation began to lull in the coming years. This was
firmly felt in the 1976 "National Plan of Action", which was the major outcome of the CSWI-Report.
Political participation of women was hardly mentioned. The focus was still on women and development -
a welfarist approach criticized later as a paternalistic stance of the state towards women dominant in the
48
decades that followed Independence.

The recommendation eventually became a part of the 73rd Constitutional Amendment passed under the
leadership of Rajiv Gandhi, (introduced in 1989) with the objective or resuscitating institutions of local
governance, namely, panchayati raj. The village panchayats or councils must reserve one third of their
seats for women and also reserve seats for "scheduled castes and tribes" in proportion to their populations
in that area; one third of SC and ST seats are reserved for SC and ST women. 49 A shift in the general
acceptance of reservations fuelled the hunger for reservation in other institutes of governance. This was the
beginning of a long-drawn fight of equality.

Chequered journey of the Women’s Reservation Bill

Before analysing the attempts to pass the Bill, it is important to note that the concept of reservations of
women, not just in the legislature but in any public sphere, cannot be understood in isolation. Women’s
reservation is to be located and understood under the ambit of complex intersections of systemic patriarchy,
party politics, caste-based discrimination, and other socio-political factors. India was a relatively new entry
in the international community. As a member of the United Nations, and a signatory to several conventions
of the UN which stood of representation of women in legislative bodies and all levels of decision making,

48LOEFFLER, INDIA’S CLAIM FOR GENDER JUSTICE: AN ANALYSIS OF THE CONFLICT ACCOMPANYING THE
DEBATE ON A 33% QUOTA FOR WOMEN IN THE NATIONAL PARLIAMENT AND STATE ASSEMBLIES, 37 (Subrata
K. Mitra, 2002)
49Hoshiar Singh, Constitutional Base for Panchayati Raj in India: The 73rd Amendment Act, Asian Survey, 34 (1994), pp. 824-
825; P.M. Bakshi. The Constitution of India: With Selective Comments by P.M. Bakshi (Delhi, 1996)
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Indian leaders were pressurized into applying these standards in their own country. Around this time, the
74th Constitutional Amendment was passed, and the process of securing women’s participation had begun
with local level reservations.

The 1996 parliament had fewer women members than previous three parliament sessions. Greater visibility
of women in the parliament became an attractive vote bank for political parties, and each party in their
manifesto promised to meet such visibility. This resulted in the 81st Amendment, introduced by the
coalition of the United Front government. The reservations bill was included in the Common Minimum
Programme and the 81st Amendment Bill was introduced in 1996, proposing 33 per cent reservation for
women in parliament. It could not be passed and was referred to a Joint Select Committee. In 1998 the bill
(now the 84th Amendment Bill), was introduced again by the BJP government to strong opposition and
50
was derailed once again. It was reintroduced in 1999, 2003, in 2008 as the 108th Amendment Bill and
again in 2010. Multiple attempts, all futile illustrate the failure to achieve social justice.

2.1Attempts to pass the 81st Amendment Bill

The 81st Amendment Bill was heavily debated. As per the draft, reservation was to be made on a rotational
basis and be determined by draw of lots, in such a way that a seat would be reserved only once in three
consecutive general elections. It said reservation of seats for women would cease to exist 15 years after the
51
commencement of the amendment Act. The Bill failed to receive approval from the Lok Sabha was
instead referred to a joint parliamentary committee. In brief, feminist arguments pro reservation linked the
abysmal number of women in institutes of governance to gender justice and principles of fairness. However,
feminist arguments against reservations were also made considering the aftermath of the 73rd and 74th
Constitutional Amendments. In a study of the impact of the amendments in West Bengal, it was observed
that dalit and tribal males had benefitted more than women, whose chances were doubly affected if they
were dalit and women. Caste based arguments were made but were frequently accompanied by misogynistic
undertones. The most reviled, explicitly caste-based opposition to women's reservations has been the
derogatory reference of Sharad Yadav to the 'short-haired' women who would over- run parliament. While
this has been understood as a misogynist statement, we must see it also as expressing a legitimate fear that
reservations for women would radically alter the composition of parliament in favor of upper classes and
upper castes - the term 'parkati mahilaen' in this context drawing upon a common stereo- type of westernized
52
and elite women. The "vexed issue", the issue of the Women's Reservation Bill, got stuck between two

50
Menon, supra note 45
51
Nine Years On, Women's Reservation Bill Still Awaiting Lok Sabha Nod, THE WIRE, (June 2nd 2020 8:02 PM),
https://thewire.in/law/nine-years-on-womens-reservation-bill-still-awaiting-lok-sabha-nod
52 Id. at 50.
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dominant claims to justice: the social justice claim and the gender justice claim; it became the victim of a
political gimmick, a democratic number play, appearing with politically correct overtones. 53

A major component of the discussion centred around “other minorities”. Uma Bharti, strongly propagated
reservation of women belonging to other backward classes. Similarly, reservations for women belonging
to religious minorities was also bought forward. In conclusion, the idea of competing minorities diluted the
overarching purpose of social justice and ultimately was an encumbrance in achieving the same. The
extension of reservations to women in local level legislative bodies signalled a shift towards the acceptance of the category
of "women" as a legitimate target of such public policies; yet the recent uproar in Parliament over the Women's Reservation
Bill demonstrates that women's goals are still seen as competing with other groups rather than complimenting them. 54

Women’s Reservation Bill in contemporary times

The Bill, in its most recent incarnation via the 108th Amendment was passed by the Rajya Sabha in 2010.
The Lok Sabha did not vote on it, and subsequently was dissolved and therefore the Bill stands repealed.
The Bill was an attempt to break the status quo of male domination, but unfortunately even decades later it
continues to be stymied. In 1998, when the Bill was reintroduced by Atal Bihar Vajpye, a Rashtriya Janata
Dal MP snatched it from the speaker and tore it into bits. 55

Members of the National Federation of Women, and other organizations have been protesting relentlessly
for the Bill to be passed. Since the fate of the Bill remains undecided, the Election Commission has
recommended that all political parties must mutually agree on the percentage of seats they will compulsorily
elect as members of the center and state assemblies, failure of which would attract punishment.
Recommendations such as these merely guarantee a ticket, but do not guarantee representation.

Amendments have been passed and repealed but have failed in achieving inclusion. Years of
institutionalized violence and subjugation cannot be undone by just one provision, but it is a step in the
right direction. Though there is merit in the arguments made against reservation of women, the need for
adequate representation in contemporary times supersedes. The biggest critique of the Bill is that it assumes
homogeneity of women. While it is true, that there ‘’others’’ among the ‘’others’’, granting wide
recognition is the first step in the arduous journey of achieving social justice for all.

53 Loeffler, supra note at 7.

54 Jenkins,supra note at 2.
55 Supra at note 51.
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Year of Introduction Incumbent Prime Minister Party in power

1996 H. D. Deve Gowda United Front (coalition parties)

1998 Atal Bihari Vajpayee Bharatiya Janata Party

1999 Atal Bihari Vajpayee Bharatiya Janata Party

2003 Atal Bihari Vajpayee Bharatiya Janata Party

2008 Dr. Manmohan Singh United Progressive Alliance

2010 Dr. Manmohan Singh United Progressive Alliance

Table displaying the years in which the Bill was introduced and under whose leadership

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Chapter IV: Conclusion
In the previous sections of the paper, the historical context of the right to property and the Women’s
Reservation Bill was explored with special emphasis on the constituent assembly debates on both. Further,
the subsequent amendments were discussed with reference to the motivations behind such amendments.
With respect to the right to property, the story took a tangent from social justice on several occasions, with
the legislature introducing amendments as and when it pleases to oust the jurisdiction of the judiciary from
reviewing property matters. However, the judiciary maintained its resilience. While it did waver in some
cases in interpreting the right to property, the settled position of law in temporal times is the exercise of
high thresholds to qualify for ‘eminent domain’. Setting high standards lends security to expropriated
owners, thereby furthering the aim of social justice. In contrast, the Women’s Reservation Bill followed a
different route. When being debated by the Constituent Assembly members, the intentions were perfectly
aligned with the ideals of social justice. However, political motivations subsumed social justice interests
and the Bill took a backseat. In contemporary times, even after multiple protests the Bill has not been
reintroduced or passed, thereby directly violating social justice, the foundation of all constitutional
amendments.

The judiciary is an extremely powerful organ vested with the authority to interpret the provisions of the
Constitution. The right to property being a contentious provision has reached the court on multiple
occasions, providing the opportunity to interpret it in a manner best suited to achieving social justice.
However, the Women’s Reservation Bill, due to not being passed is outside the jurisdiction of the courts.
Additionally, the pace at which social justice was achieved in respect of the right to property might have
been slow, but it would be incorrect to categorize it as a total failure. Regarding the WRB, the object of the
amendments might have been social justice. Realisation of the object, however, was hindered by indolence
and political motivations.

A recent example of the continued attempt to achieve social justice is a case regarding inclusion of sign
language as an official language via an amendment to the 8th Schedule. A PIL has been filed by 31-year-
old disability rights activist Nipun Malhotra, seeking the official recognition of Indian Sign Language (ISL),
for hearing. 56 In conclusion, most constitutional amendments in the past have been provoked for
augmentation of social justice. However, constitutional amendment is not the end, it is simply the means

56
Recognize Indian Sign Language (ISL) as the 23rd Official Language of India, CHANGE, (June 10th 2020 10:00 PM),
https://www.change.org/p/ministry-of-social-justice-and-empowerment-recognise-indian-sign-language-isl-as-the-23rd-
official-language-of-india

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for the realisation of socialistic objectives, therefore, legal measures and executive dynamism in
consonance with the amendments ought to be devised to achieve the desired goal. 57

57Mohapatra & Bijoy Chandra, Constitution amendments in India for social justice and its future dimensions a critical
analysis, UTKAL UNIVERSITY, (June 1st 2020 7:00 PM)
http://shodhganga.inflibnet.ac.in:8080/jspui/handle/10603/189756
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 BIBLIOGRAPHY

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1964#:~:text=THE%20CONSTITUTION%20(SEVENTEENTH%20AMENDMENT)%20ACT%2C%201964,-
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Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3665196