Arnab Bail Order HC

1 / 56 1-IAST-4278-2020.
doc
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPLICATION STAMP NO. 4278 OF 2020

IN
CRIMINAL WRIT PETITION STAMP NO. 4132 OF 2020
Arnab Manoranjan Goswami ...Applicant
Versus
The State of Maharashtra & Ors. ...Respondents

...
Mr. Harish Salve, Senior Advocate a/w. Mr. Aabad Ponda, Senior Advocate,
Ms. Malvika Trivedi, Mr. Saket Shukla, Mr. Mrinal Ojha, Mr. Vasanth
Rajesekaran, Mr. Debarshi Dutta, Mr. Rajat Pradhan, Mr. Biswadeep
Chakravarty, Mr. Vikram Kamat, Ms. Madhavi Doshi, Mr. Sanjeev
Sambasivam, Mr. Siddhant Kumar, Ms. Kajri Roy, Ms. Sheena Iype,
Advocates i/b. Phoneix Legal for Applicant.
Mr. Amit Desai, Senior Advocate a/w. Mr. Deepak Thakare, Public
Prosecutor, for State in IAST No. 4278 of 2020.
Mr. Shirish Gupte, Senior Advocate a/w. Mr. Vaibhav Karnik,

Mr. Karansingh Rajput, Advocates for Respondent No. 5. in IAST No. 4278
of 2020.
Mr. Devdatta Kamat, Senior Advocate a/w. Mr. Rahul Chitnis, Mr. Rajesh
Inamdar & Mr. Hemant Shah, Advocates for Respondent No. 3 in IAST No.
4278 of 2020.
Mr. D.P. Singh for Respondent No. 4-Union of India.

...
CORAM : S. S. SHINDE &
M.S. KARNIK, JJ.
RESERVED ON: NOVEMBER 07, 2020.

PRONOUNCED ON: NOVEMBER 09, 2020.
V.S. Sherla/B.T. Punde

2 / 56 1-IAST-4278-2020.doc
ORDER:
1. The present application is filed for interim protection/bail in the
Criminal Writ Petition Stamp No. 4132 of 2020 filed under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India read with Section 482 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure ('Cr.P.C.' for short) praying for a writ of Habeas Corpus to produce
the Petitioner, who has been illegally arrested and wrongfully detained by the
Station House Officer, Alibaug Police Station, Raigad, in relation to First
Information Report ('FIR' for short) being C.R.No.0059/2018 dated 5/5/2018
registered at Alibaug Police Station, Raigad, under Sections 306 and 34 of
the Indian Penal Code ('said IPC' for short) despite a closure report being
filed. The Petitioner also prays for quashing of the said FIR.
2. So far as the main Writ Petition is concerned, the petitioner is
alleging gross abuse of State’s power by the respondents in effecting his
arrest on 04.11.2020 and consequent alleged illegal detention. As there are
allegations of malafides, an opportunity needs to be given to the respondents
to file a counter and accordingly with the consent of learned counsel
appearing for the parties, the petition is posted for hearing on 10.12.2020.
3. Mr. Harish Salve, learned Senior Advocate for Petitioner, Mr.
Amit Desai, learned Senior Advocate for State and Mr. Shirish Gupte,
learned Senior Advocate appearing for the victim have confined their

3 / 56 1-IAST-4278-2020.doc
arguments limited to the relief claimed in the Interim Application. Therefore,
we confine our adjudication restricted to the reliefs claimed in the Interim
Application.
4. Learned Senior Advocate Mr. Harish Salve would contend that
not only the arrest of the Petitioner is a malafide action and abuse of the
State’s power, but the arrest is ex-facie illegal in view of the closure report
filed before the Learned Magistrate. According to the learned Senior
Advocate, the re-investigation commenced by the Respondents is without
seeking permission of the Magistrate under Section 173 (8) of the Cr.P.C. He
would urge that this is a fit case where this Court should exercise its
extraordinary powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and
inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. protecting the petitioner
in the interregnum by granting him bail. We have therefore considered the
pleadings and grounds taken in the Writ Petition and also perused the
documents relied by the Petitioner for the limited purpose of deciding the
present application.
5. In the petition there is reference to the FIR dated 5/5/2018. It is
in relation to the alleged suicide committed by deceased Anvay Naik and his
mother Kumud Naik, who were Directors of an interior design company
'Concorde Design Pvt. Ltd.' ('CDPL' for short). It is alleged that the deceased

4 / 56 1-IAST-4278-2020.doc
left behind a note, wherein it was stated that the deceased was committing
suicide on account of the non-payment of CDPL's dues. The officers of the
Alibaug Police Station visited the petitioner's 'ARG Outlier Media Private
Limited' ('ARG' for short) office informing him about the unfortunate
incident and the note left behind by the deceased which had the name of the
petitioner.
6. It is pleaded by the Petitioner that he was questioned regarding
the transaction between 'ARG' and 'CDPL'. The petitioner provided all
necessary and available details to the police officers and also assured them of
his full co-operation during the course of the investigation. On 7 th May 2018,
Mr. S. Sukharam and Mr. Vikas Khanchandani of ARG along with their
Advocate went to the Alibaug police station with all the required documents
asked from them. The petitioner co-operated with the investigation in every
possible way. Even the statement of the petitioner came to be recorded.
7. Our attention is invited to the report filed by the Station House
Officer, Alibaugh Police Station, Raigad, dated 16/4/2019 in the Court of the
Chief Judicial Magistrate for 'A' Summary. The Dy.S.P., Alibaug, accordingly
submitted a report and prayed for grant of 'A' Summary.

5 / 56 1-IAST-4278-2020.doc
8. The Chief Judicial Magistrate, Raigad, vide order dated
16/4/2019 accepted the report and granted 'A' Summary as prayed for.
9. Learned Senior Advocate Mr. Salve would submit that in blatant
violation of the fundamental rights to life and personal liberty of the
petitioner and his dignity guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of
India, the petitioner was arrested. The petitioner was forced out from his
residence with around 20 officials of Mumbai Police barging into his house.
The petitioner was dragged into the police vehicle in the process of causing
his arrest. His son was assaulted in the process. The Petitioner’s wife was
informed that he was being arrested in connection with the said FIR.
10. Learned Senior Advocate would urge that once the case was
decisively closed by the Mumbai Police in 2019, which report was accepted
by the Chief Judicial Magistrate, the same is reinvestigated with the sole
purpose of misusing power, concocting facts and forcefully arresting the
petitioner in a prima facie act of revenge and vengeance for his news
coverage which questioned those in power in the State of Maharashtra. Mr.
Salve would submit that this is another attempt of the State machinery to
implicate the petitioner. This is nothing but a brazen attempt of vendetta
politics against the petitioner and his channel.

6 / 56 1-IAST-4278-2020.doc
11. Mr. Salve then took us through the averments made in the
Petition and the discussions in the debate before the State Assembly
particularly those of Mr. Sunil Prabhu, Dr. Nitin Raut and Mr. Chagan
Bhujbal, which are at pages 94 to 121 of the Petition. He would contend that
there is a desperation on the part of the political dispensation to falsely
implicate the petitioner in the said case and to reopen the matter. Mr. Anil
Deshmukh (Hon’ble Home Minister in the Ruling coalition) readily obliged.
12. Mr. Salve, learned Senior Advocate, then invited our attention to
the details set out in the Petition to show that there was purely a commercial
relationship between ARG and CDPL. CDPL was unable to meet the dates
for completion of works on several occasions. Several defects in the works
were also discovered. The ARG in fact made a total payment of
Rs.5,21,54,383/- under the work orders. A balance of only Rs.74,23,014/- is
outstanding under the work orders which was legitimately withheld by the
ARG with the intention to pay such amounts upon rectification of defects and
completion of works in accordance with the terms of the work orders. There
was exchange of correspondence between the wife of deceased and ARG. In
or around 2020, the wife of deceased, having failed to extract money from
ARG, approached the political dispensation and upon immense pressure from
certain Cabinet Ministers in the Maharashtra Government, there was a

7 / 56 1-IAST-4278-2020.doc
demand to re-open and re-investigate the matter in connection with the said
FIR so that the petitioner could be falsely implicated. Our attention is invited
to the news reports at Exhibits H, I, J and K.
13. Mr. Salve would submit that the petitioner did not have direct
interaction with the deceased regarding the works or regarding payment as is
the case with large organizations. The deceased was one of the vendors and
the matter regarding payments was handled by the Finance Department. Mr.
Salve would urge that in these circumstances, the ingredients to attract the
offence of abetment is absent i.e. the intention of the accused to aid, abet or
instigate the deceased to commit suicide. Moreover, there is no direct
involvement of the petitioner with the deceased.
14. Learned Senior Advocate would submit that there are no
allegations in the FIR to establish that the suicide by the deceased was
directly linked to the instigation or abetment by the Petitioner. In support of
his submissions, learned Senior Advocate relied upon the following decisions
of Hon’ble Supreme Court:-M. Arjunan Vs. State1,, M. Mohan Vs. State2, SS
Cheena Vs. Bijay Kumar Mahajan & Anr3, Amlendu Pal Vs. State of West
Bengal4, Gurcharan Singh Vs. State of Punjab5, Rajesh Vs. State of Haryana6.
1 (2019) 3 SCC 315
2 (2011) 3 SCC 626
3 (2010) 12 SCC 190
4 (2010) 1 SCC 707
5 Supreme Court of India Criminal Appeal No. 40 of 2011
6 2019 SCC Online SC 44

8 / 56 1-IAST-4278-2020.doc
15. Learned Senior Advocate then invited our attention to the order
dated 16.04.2019 passed by the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Raigad, granting
'A' summary as prayed by the Dy.S.P., Alibaug in terms of his report. He
would submit that once a case is closed by the Chief Judicial Magistrate, then
the Investigating Officer has no power to re-investigate the matter unless the
order granting 'A' summary by Chief Judicial Magistrate is set aside.
According to the learned Senior Advocate, the Investigating Officer did not
even approach the Magistrate seeking permission to re-investigate the matter.
He would submit that the action on the part of the police amounts to revising
the order of the Magistrate on their own. In support of his submissions,
learned Senior Advocate would rely upon the following decisions of Hon’ble
Supreme Court – Bhagwant Singh Vs. Commissioner of Police & Another 7,
Vinubhai Haribhai Malaviya and Others Vs. State of Gujarat & Anr 8, Inderjit
Singh Gerwal Vs. State of Punjab and another9, Gangadhar Janardan Mhatre
Vs. State of Maharashtra & Others10, Kishore Kumar Gyanchandani Vs. G.D.
Mehrotra and Another11, Vishnu Kumar Tiwari Vs.
7 (1985) 2 SCC 537

8 2019 SCC Online 1346
9 (2011) 12 SCC 588
10 (2004) 7 SCC 768
11 (2011) 15 SCC 513

9 / 56 1-IAST-4278-2020.doc
State of Uttar Pradesh Through Secretary Home, Civil Secretariat, Lucknow
and Another.12
16. Learned Senior Advocate placed reliance on the decision in the
case of Vinubhai (supra), more particularly Para 34, to contend that only
Magistrate in exercise of powers under Section 173 (8) of Cr.P.C., can direct
further investigation. According to learned Senior Advocate, either the police
should have challenged the decision or invoked Section 156 (3) Cr.P.C.
Relying on the decision of Inderjit Singh Gerwal (supra), learned Senior
Advocate would submit that even if the closure is without hearing or notice
to the first informant, still then, even if such order is void, the same has to be
set aside by approaching the appropriate forum. Till such time, the order
would continue to remain in force.
17. Mr. Salve, learned Senior Advocate, placed reliance on the
observations made in the order dated 04.11.2020 passed by the Chief Judicial
Magistrate on the remand report pursuant to the arrest of the Petitioner. He
would contend that in the said order, the Magistrate observed that, before re-
investigating the matter, it appears that no permission of the Court has been
obtained. It is, therefore, his submission that if re-investigation itself is on an
illegal premise, the detention of the petitioner has to be declared as illegal.
12 (2019) 8 SCC 27

10 / 56 1-IAST-4278-2020.doc
Mr. Salve then submitted that as the re-investigation is nothing but an abuse
of powers of the State and as circumstances would demonstrate that the State
is acting with malice (in fact) against the Petitioner, this is a fit case for
staying the investigation. He relied upon the decisions of Hon’ble Supreme
Court in the following cases - Asian Resurfacing of Road Agency Private
Limited and Anr. Vs. Central Bureau of Investigation13, Imtiyaz Ahmad Vs.
State of Uttar Pradesh and others14,Joginder Kumar Vs. State of UP &
Others15.
Drawing support from the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme
Court in the case of Asian Resurfacing of Road Agency Pvt. Ltd.(supra),
Mr.Salve would contend that it is the duty of the Court to protect the
fundamental rights of citizens under article 226 of the Constitution of India,
the inherent power to do justice in cases involving the liberty of the citizens
would also sound under article 21 of the Constitution of India. Mr. Salve
would contend that the manner in which false cases are being registered
against the Petitioner and his channel and the apparent desperation of the
political dispensation to implicate the Petitioner in false cases, would justify
an exercise of power of this Court to stay the investigation and prevent the
abuse of process and promote the ends of justice.
13 (2018) 16 SCC 299

14 (2012) 2 SCC 688
15 (1994) 4 SCC 260

11 / 56 1-IAST-4278-2020.doc
18. Mr. Salve would then submit that merely because the Petitioner
has remedy under Section 439 of Cr.P.C. to approach the Sessions Court for
regular bail, would not preclude the Petitioner from invoking writ jurisdiction
in an appropriate case where the extraordinary circumstances so warrant. In
support of aforesaid submission he placed reliance on the decision in Kartar
Singh Vs. State of Punjab16 to contend that even in a case under TADA, it has
been held that there is no reason why the High Court should not exercise its
jurisdiction and grant of bail to the accused in those cases where one or the
other exceptional ground is made out.
19. He would further invite our attention to the observations in Para
459 in Kartar Singh (supra) to point out the observations of their Lordships
that “since the High Court under the Constitution is a forum for enforcement
of fundamental right of a citizen it cannot be denuded of the power to
entertain a petition by a citizen claiming that the State machinery was
abusing its power and was acting in violation of the constitutional guarantee.
Rather it has a constitutional duty and responsibility to ensure that the State
machinery was acting fairly and not on extraneous considerations.” Learned
Senior Advocate would, therefore, urge that the Petitioner be released on bail.
16 (1994) 3 SCC 569

12 / 56 1-IAST-4278-2020.doc
20. On the other hand, Mr. Desai, learned Senior Advocate
appearing on behalf of Respondent No.1 – State would submit that the
present petition seeking Writ of Habeas Corpus is not maintainable.
According to him, the Petitioner was in judicial custody on the date of filing
of the petition. He invited our attention to the decision of the Hon’ble
Supreme Court in the case of State of Maharashtra Vs. Tasneem Rizwan
Siddique17, Saurabh Kumar Vs. Jailor Koneila Jail 18, Col B. Ramchandra Rao
(Dr) Vs. State of Orissa19 and Ankit Mutha Vs. UOI20 to submit that if the
Petitioner is in custody pursuant to the remand order by the jurisdictional
Magistrate in connection with the offences under investigation, the Writ of
Habeas Corpus is not maintainable. Mr. Desai would then submit that the
Petitioner has alternate efficacious remedy of approaching the Sessions Court
for bail under Section 439 of Cr.P.C. and, therefore, the prayer for grant of
bail ought not to be entertained. Mr. Desai relying upon the decision of the
Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Telangana Vs. Habib Abdullah
Jeelani21 would contend that the power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. or under
article 226 of the Constitution of India should be exercised sparingly with
judicial restraint. He would further submit that in fact the Petitioner had
applied for bail before Chief Judicial Magistrate but chose to withdraw the
17 (2018) 9 SCC 745

18 (2014) 13 SCC 436
19 (1972) 3 SCC 256
20 2020 SCC Onlilne Bom 121
21 (2017) 2 SCC 779

13 / 56 1-IAST-4278-2020.doc
said application. There is no challenge by the Petitioner to the remand order
of the jurisdictional Magistrate.
21. Mr. Desai then dealt with the contention as regards the power of
police to further investigate in the said offences after grant of 'A' summary.
He would submit that there is an illegality on the part of the Investigating
Officer in his approach while submitting the “A” summary. Relying on Rule
219 of the Police Manual, Mr. Desai would submit that ‘A’ summary is filed
in the circumstances where though offence was committed, the same
remained undetected where there is no clue whatsoever about the culprits or
property or where the accused is known but there is no evidence to justify
him being sent up to the Magistrate (for trial). According to Mr. Desai, ‘A’
summary was granted by the Magistrate without following mandatory
requirement of hearing the informant. This, according to him, would go to the
root of the matter.
22. He would further submit that nonetheless, the Investigating
officer had intimated the jurisdictional Magistrate on 15 th October 2020 that
orders were received from his superiors for conducting further investigation
of the said offences and that the same would be further investigated under
section 173 (8) of Cr.P.C. On the said application, the Chief Judicial
Magistrate, Alibaug had noted ‘seen and filed’. Mr. Desai further pointed out

14 / 56 1-IAST-4278-2020.doc
that thereafter during the course of investigation, even the statements are
recorded by the Magistrate under Section 164 Cr.P.C. He would, therefore,
submit that merely because 'A' summary is filed, would not preclude the
Investigating Officer from conducting further investigation of said offence on
receipt of fresh materials as the rights of victim too have to be considered.
23. Learned Senior Advocate would submit that the first informant-
victim had made representation to the superior officer seeking redressal of
grievance. He would further submit that the Magistrate was yet to take the
cognizance of the case and therefore, the Investigating Officer is well within
his rights under Section 173 (8) to conduct the further investigation. In any
case, having intimated the Magistrate, the said intimation is sufficient
compliance of Section 173 (8) of Cr.P.C. Mr. Desai would rely upon the
decision of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Nirmal Singh Kahlon Vs.
State of Punjab22 to submit that the victim of a crime is equally entitled to fair
investigation. Relying upon the decision of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the
case of Rama Chaudhary Vs. State of Bihar23 learned Senior Advocate would
submit that under Section 173 (8) Cr.P.C., the law does not mandate taking
prior permission from Magistrate for further investigation, even where a
charge sheet is filed, as carrying out further investigation is a statutory right
22 (2009) 1 SCC 441

23 (2009) 6 SCC 346

15 / 56 1-IAST-4278-2020.doc
of the police. He would submit that granting of 'A' summary does not mean
that the case is closed, it only means that the offence is committed but the
same remains undetected as the accused is known but there is no evidence to
justify him being sent up to the Magistrate (for trial). Learned Senior
Advocate would invite our attention to Section 36 of Cr.P.C. to contend that
the police officer superior in rank to an officer in charge of a police station
may exercise the same powers, throughout the local area to which they are
appointed, as may be exercised by such officer within the limits of his
station. In his submission nothing precludes an Investigating Officer from
conducting further investigation upon receiving orders from the superiors
following a representation made by the victim. He would further rely on the
provision of Section 4 of Bombay Police Act, 1951, which says that
superintendence of police force throughout the State of Maharashtra vests in
and is exercisable by the State Government and any control, direction or
supervision exercisable by any officer over any member of the Police force
shall be exercisable subject to such superintendence. Mr. Desai would submit
that the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of Bihar Vs. J.A.C. Saldhana24 case
has further expanded the meaning of term ‘superintendence’.
24. Mr. Desai would further submit that decision of Hon’ble
Supreme Court relied upon by learned Senior Advocate Mr. Salve for the
24 1980 AIR 326,

16 / 56 1-IAST-4278-2020.doc
Petitioner on the interpretation of Section 306 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860
are post trial and conviction on the basis of evidence adduced. According to
him, at the stage of quashing FIR, the said decisions would not have any
application, more so, when the matter is still under investigation.
25. Relying upon the decision of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case
of Praveen Pradhan Vs. State of Uttaranchal25, Mr. Desai pointed out that on
the basis of FIR in ‘Praveen Pradhan’, criminal proceedings were initiated.
During investigation, the investigating officer found the suicide note which
had been written by the deceased. It was alleged that the appellant was
responsible for his death. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the facts of that
case refused to interfere with the order passed by the High Court declining to
quash the proceedings in exercise of power under Section 482 of Cr.P.C.
26. Mr. Desai would also rely upon the decision in the case of State
of Andhra Pradesh Vs. A.S. Peter26 to contend that the law does not mandate
taking prior permission of Magistrate for further investigation and Magistrate
has discretion to direct further investigation. In the present case having
intimated to the Magistrate that a further investigation is necessary to be
carried out, this would amount to sufficient compliance of Section 173 (8) of
Cr.P.C.
25 (2012) 9 SCC 734
26 Appeal (Crl) No. 1119 of 2004

17 / 56 1-IAST-4278-2020.doc
27. Mr. Gupte, learned Senior Advocate appeared on behalf of the first
informant-victim would submit that the deceased left behind a note holding
the petitioner responsible for his death. He submits that as a result of non-
payment of dues by the Petitioner, the informant lost two close family
members. Mr. Gupte would submit that grant of 'A' summary by Chief
Judicial Magistrate, Alibaug is per se illegal as informants were not heard as
is the mandatory requirement of law. This illegality, according to him, goes to
the root of the matter. Mr. Gupte would submit that the informant was not
aware of the grant of ‘A’ summary as she was not given notice nor heard. It is
through tweets that she came to know about the same.
28. He invited our attention to the Criminal Writ Petition No. 1543 of 2020
(Adnya Anvay Naik vs. State of Maharashtra) filed by the daughter of the
deceased which is on board today. He further submitted that the informant
was not intimated about filing of “A” summary or acceptance of said report
and after a few months from filing such “A” summary and acceptance of it
by the Magistrate. All this she came to know from some tweets. Thereafter,
the informant approached the State Government and its officials for redressal
of her grievance. Mr. Gupte pointed out that the informant approached the
superior authorities seeking redressal. Criminal Writ Petition-ASDB-LDVC
No. 33 of 2020 filed by the informant/daughter came to be

18 / 56 1-IAST-4278-2020.doc
disposed of as withdrawn on 2nd June 2020 in view of fresh developments in
the matter. Representation was made by the informant on 13th June 2020 to
the Additional Director General of Police, Maharashtra State, CID, Pune
seeking justice.
29. Mr. Gupte would rely on the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme
Court in the case of Bhagwant Singh (supra) to contend that if the Magistrate
is not inclined to take cognizance of offence and issue process, the informant
must be given opportunity of being heard so that he can make his submission
to persuade the Magistrate to take cognizance of the offence and issue
process. According to him in Ajay Kumar Parmar Vs. State of Rajasthan27 the
Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that when the Magistrate decided not to
take cognizance of the case and to drop the proceeding against accused it is
mandatory to hear complainant or informant by issuing him notice. Mr.
Gupte would submit that before granting 'A' summary, neither was the
informant given any notice or was heard and thus the impugned order is in
violation of mandatory requirement of law. Mr. Gupte would urge that the
fundamental rights which the Petitioner claims has to be balanced with the
corresponding right of the victim to claim justice. According to him in a case
where 'A' summary is granted without even issuing notice to the applicant,
the Petitioner would not be justified in seeking relief on the premise that
27 (2012) 12 SCC 406

19 / 56 1-IAST-4278-2020.doc
further investigation is being carried out without permission from the
Magistrate. Mr. Gupte would hasten to add that in the present case the
Magistrate has been intimated by the Investigating Officer and thereafter
further investigation is commenced and that itself is sufficient compliance of
section 173 (8) of Cr.P.C. He would submit that the informant and her
daughter have received threats on many occasions and for which complaint
was filed which is registered as N.C.
30. Heard the learned Counsel for the parties.
31. Though we are considering prayer in the Interim Application for
grant of bail and not hearing the main petition, for deciding this application it
may be necessary to reproduce the prayer clause (a) of the petition, seeking a
Writ of Habeas Corpus, which reads as under:
“(a) Issue a writ of habeas corpus and/or any other similar

writ, order and direction of like nature, directing the
Respondents to produce the Petitioner who has been illegally
arrested and wrongfully detained by the Respondent No. 2 in
relation to FIR, being C.R. No. 0059 of 2018, dated 5 May
2018, registered at Alibaug Police Station, Raigad, under
Sections 306 and 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 despite a
closure report being filed.”
32. The averments made in the petition are in the context of illegal
detention of the petitioner which according to the Petitioner is without any

20 / 56 1-IAST-4278-2020.doc
authority of law. The petitioner was arrested in the early hours of 4 th
November, 2020. There is no dispute that as on the date of filing of the
petition, there was already an order of the jurisdictional Magistrate for
remand of the petitioner in custody. In the light of the law laid down by the
Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Maharashtra and others vs.
Tasneem Rizwan Siddiquee (supra), the question as to whether a Writ of
Habeas Corpus could be maintained in respect of a person, who is in police
custody pursuant to the remand order passed by the jurisdictional Magistrate
in connection with the offence under investigation, is no more res integra. A
profitable reference could also be made to the decisions in Saurabh Kumar
(supra); Col. B. Ramchandra Rao (supra); Ankit Mutha vs. Union of India
(supra).
33. Mr.Harish Salve, the learned Senior Advocate, submits that the
very same argument, that the petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus was not
maintainable, was advanced in the case of Jagisha Arora vs. The State of
Uttar Pradesh & another28. However, the Supreme Court in the said case,
directed the petitioner’s husband therein to be immediately released on bail
on such conditions to the satisfaction of the jurisdictional Chief Judicial
Magistrate. Therefore, the learned Senior Advocate submits that in the present
case also, though the prayer for issuance of Writ of Habeas Corpus is not
28 (2019) 6 SCC 619

21 / 56 1-IAST-4278-2020.doc
maintainable, the concerned Magistrate may be directed to release the
petitioner forthwith.
34. It is true that the Hon’ble Supreme Court directed an immediate
release of the husband of the petitioner therein. However, the said direction
was issued in exercise of power under Article 142 of the Constitution of
India; such power is not available with this Court. Therefore, the prayer of
the petitioner to be forthwith released, cannot be acceded to. In the facts of
Jagisha Arora (supra), it appears that the husband of the petitioner therein was
arrested pursuant to the initiation of proceedings under sections 500 and 505
of the Indian Penal Code read with section 67 of the Information Technology
Act, 2000. It appears that the proceedings were initiated for the posts/tweets
made by the husband of the petitioner therein. However, in the present case,
the petitioner is arraigned as an accused in Crime No.59 of 2018 for the
offences under section 306 of the Indian Penal Code, wherein the maximum
sentence provided, is 10 years imprisonment and shall also be liable to fine.
The offence is cognisable, non-bailable, triable by Court of Sessions and not
compoundable.
35. In the recent judgment in the case of Serious Fraud Investigation
Office vs. Rahul Modi29, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in paragraphs 16 to 22
held thus:
29 (2019) 5 SCC 266

22 / 56 1-IAST-4278-2020.doc
16. The basic facts in the present matter can be summed

up:-
16.1. The investigation was assigned to SFIO vide Order
dated 20.6.2018. This Order did stipulate in para 6 that the
Inspectors should complete their investigation and submit
their report to the Central Government within three
months.
16.2) The period of three months expired on

19.09.2018.
16.3) The proposal to arrest three accused persons

was placed before the Director, SFIO and after being
satisfied in terms of requirements of Section 212(8) of
2013 Act approval was granted by Director, SFIO on
10.12.2018.
16.4) After they were arrested on 10.12.2018, the

accused were produced before the Judicial Magistrate,
who by his order dated 11.12.2018 remanded them to
custody till 14.12.2018 and also directed that they be
produced before the Special Court on 14.12.2018.
16.5) On 13.12.2018 a proposal seeking extension of time
for completing investigation in respect of 57 cases
including the present case was preferred by SFIO.
16.6) On 14.12.2018 the Special Court, Gurugram
remanded the accused to custody till 18.12.2018.
16.7) On the same date i.e. on 14.12.2018 the proposal
for extension was accepted by the Central Government in
respect of the Group and extension was granted upto
30.06.2019.
16.8) On 17.12.2018 the present Writ Petitions were
preferred which came up for the first time before the High
Court on 18.12.2018.
16.9) On 18.12.2018 itself the accused were further
remanded to police custody till 21.12.2018.
16.10) On 20.12.2018 Writ Petitions were
entertained and the order which is presently under appeal
was passed.

23 / 56 1-IAST-4278-2020.doc
16.11) Pursuant to said order, the original Writ

Petitioners were released on bail.
16.12) In the backdrop of these facts, the High
Court found that a case for interim relief was made out.
The principal issues which arise in the matter are whether
the High Court was right and justified in entertaining the
petition and in passing the Order under appeal?
17. For considering whether the writ petitioners were
entitled to any interim relief, two questions were framed by
the High Court in paragraph 15 of its Order. Before
considering the matter from the perspective of said two
questions, an issue which was stressed by the learned
Solicitor General may be addressed first. It was submitted
by him that the date with reference to which the legality of
detention can be challenged in a Habeas Corpus
proceeding is the date on which the return is filed in such
proceedings and not with reference to the initiation of the
proceedings. He relied upon the decision of the Federal
Court in Basanta Chandra Ghose vs. King Emperor, which
had concluded:
“… …If at any time before the Court directs the release of
the detenue, a valid order directing his detention is
produced, the Court cannot direct his release merely on the
ground that at some prior stage there was no valid cause
for detention…. …” Similar questions arose for
consideration in Naranjan Singh nathawan vs. State of
Punjab, Ram Narayan Singh vs. State of Delhi, A.K.
Gopalan vs. Union of India, Pranab Chatterjee vs. State of
Bihar, Talib Hussain vs. State of J & K., B.Ramchandra
Rao vs. State of Orissa & others. These decisions were
considered in Kanu Sanyal vs. District Magistrate,
Darjeeling & others, as under:
Re: Grounds A and B.
4. These two grounds relate exclusively to the legality of the

initial detention of the petitioner in the District Jail,
Darjeeling. We think it unnecessary to decide them. It is now
well settled that the earliest date with reference to which the
legality of detention challenged in a habeas corpus
proceeding may be examined is the date on which the

24 / 56 1-IAST-4278-2020.doc
application for habeas corpus is made to the Court. This

Court speaking through Wanchoo, J., (as he then was) said in
A.K. Gopalan vs. Union of India :
5. “It is well settled that in dealing with the petition for

habeas corpus the Court is to see whether the detention on
the date on which the application is made to the Court is
legal, if nothing more has intervened between the date of the
application and the date of the hearing.” In two early
decisions of this Court, however, namely, Naranjan Singh v.
State of Punjab and Ram Narayan Singh v. State of Delhi a
slightly different view was expressed and that view was
reiterated by this Court in B.R. Rao v. State of Orissa where
it was said (at p. 259, para 7):
“in habeas corpus proceedings the Court is to have regard to

the legality or otherwise of the detention at the time of the
return and not with reference to the institution of the
proceedings”.
and yet in another decision of this Court in Talib Hussain v.

State of Jammu & Kashmir6 Mr Justice Dua, sitting as a
Single Judge, presumably in the vacation, observed that (at p.
121, para 6):
“6. … in habeas corpus proceedings the Court has to

consider the legality of the detention on the date of the
hearing.”
Of these three views taken by the Court at different times, the

second appears to be more in consonance with the law and
practice in England and may be taken as having received the
largest measure of approval in India, though the third view
also cannot be discarded as incorrect, because an inquiry
whether the detention is legal or not at the date of hearing of
the application for habeas corpus would be quite relevant, for
the simple reason that if on that date the detention is legal, the
Court cannot order release of the person detained by issuing a
writ of habeas corpus. But, for the purpose of the present
case, it is immaterial which of these three views is accepted
as correct, for it is clear that, whichever be the correct view,
the earliest date with reference to which the legality of

25 / 56 1-IAST-4278-2020.doc
detention may be examined is the date of filing of the

application for habeas corpus and the Court is not, to quote
the words of Mr Justice Dua in B.R. Rao v. State of Orissa
“concerned with a date prior to the initiation of the
proceedings for a writ of habeas corpus”. Now the writ
petition in the present case was filed on January 6, 1973 and
on that date the petitioner was in detention in the Central Jail,
Visakhapatnam. The initial detention of the petitioner in the
District Jail, Darjeeling had come to an end long before the
date of the filing of the writ petition. It is, therefore,
unnecessary to examine the legality or otherwise of the
detention of the petitioner in the District Jail, Darjeeling. The
only question that calls for consideration is whether the
detention of the petitioner in the Central Jail, Visakhapatnam
is legal or not. Even if we assume that grounds A and B are
well founded and there was infirmity in the detention of the
petitioner in the District Jail, Darjeeling, that cannot
invalidate the subsequent detention of the petitioner in the
Central Jail, Visakhapatnam. See para 7 of the judgment of
this Court in B.R. Rao v. State of Orissa. The legality of the
detention of the petitioner in the Central Jail, Visakhapatnam
would have to be judged on its own merits. We, therefore,
consider it unnecessary to embark on a discussion of grounds
A and B and decline to decide them.”
19. The law is thus clear that “in Habeas Corpus

proceedings a Court is to have regard to the legality or
otherwise of the detention at the time of the return and not
with reference to the institution of the proceedings”. In Kanu
Sanyal the validity of the detention of the petitioner in District
Jail, Darjeeling was therefore not considered by this Court and
it was observed that the infirmity in the detention of the
petitioner therein in the District Jail, Darjeeling could not
invalidate subsequent detention of the petitioner in the Central
Jail, Vishakhapatnam.
20. At this stage we may also deal with three recent cases
decided by this Court:-
20.1) In Manubhai Ratilal Patel through Ushaben vs. State
of Gujarat and others 9 a Division bench of this Court
extensively considered earlier decisions in the point including
cases referred to above. It also dealt with an issue whether

26 / 56 1-IAST-4278-2020.doc
Habeas Corpus petition could be entertained against an order

of remand passed by a Judicial Magistrate. The observations
of this Court in paragraphs 20 to 24 and para 31 were as under:
“20. After so stating, the Bench in Kanu Sanyal case opined
that for adjudication in the said case, it was immaterial which
of the three views was accepted as correct but eventually
referred to para 7 in B. Ramachandra Rao wherein the Court
had expressed the view in the following manner: (SCC p. 259)
“7. … in habeas corpus proceedings the court is to have

regard to the legality or otherwise of the detention at the time
of the return and not with reference to the institution of the
proceedings.”
Eventually, the Bench ruled thus: (Kanu Sanyal case, SCC p.

148, para 5)
“5. … The production of the petitioner before the Special

Judge, Visakhapatnam, could not, therefore, be said to be
illegal and his subsequent detention in the Central Jail,
Visakhapatnam, pursuant to the orders made by the Special
Judge, Visakhapatnam, pending trial must be held to be
valid. This Court pointed out in Col. B. Ramachandra Rao v.
State of Orissa (SCC p. 258, para 5) that a writ of habeas
corpus cannot be granted
‘5....where a person is committed to jail custody by a
competent court by an order which prima facie does not
appear to be without jurisdiction or wholly illegal’.”
21. The principle laid down in Kanu Sanyal, thus, is that any
infirmity in the detention of the petitioner at the initial stage
cannot invalidate the subsequent detention and the same has
to be judged on its own merits.
22. At this juncture, we may profitably refer to the
Constitution Bench decision in Sanjay Dutt v. State through
CBI, Bombay (II) 10 wherein it has been opined thus: (SCC
p. 442, para 48)
“48. … It is settled by Constitution Bench decisions that a
petition seeking the writ of habeas corpus on the ground
of absence of a valid order of remand or detention of the

27 / 56 1-IAST-4278-2020.doc
accused, has to be dismissed, if on the date of return of

the rule, the custody or detention is on the basis of a valid
order.”
23. Keeping in view the aforesaid concepts with regard to
the writ of habeas corpus, especially pertaining to an order
passed by the learned Magistrate at the time of production
of the accused, it is necessary to advert to the schematic
postulates under the Code relating to remand. There are
two provisions in the Code which provide for remand i.e.
Sections 167 and 309. The Magistrate has the authority
under Sections 167 (2) of the Code to direct for detention
of 10 (1994) 5 SCC 410 : 1994 SCC (Cri) 1433 the
accused in such custody i.e. police or judicial, if he thinks
that further detention is necessary.
24. The act of directing remand of an accused is
fundamentally a judicial function. The Magistrate does not
act in executive capacity while ordering the detention of
an accused. While exercising this judicial act, it is
obligatory on the part of the Magistrate to satisfy himself
whether the materials placed before him justify such a
remand or, to put it differently, whether there exist
reasonable grounds to commit the accused to custody and
extend his remand. The purpose of remand as postulated
under Section 167 is that investigation cannot be
completed within 24 hours. It enables the Magistrate to
see that the remand is really necessary. This requires the
investigating agency to send the case diary along with the
remand report so that the Magistrate can appreciate the
factual scenario and apply his mind whether there is a
warrant for police remand or justification for judicial
remand or there is no need for any remand at all. It is
obligatory on the part of the Magistrate to apply his mind
and not to pass an order of remand automatically or in a
mechanical manner.
31. Coming to the case at hand, it is evincible that the
arrest had taken place a day prior to the passing of the
order of stay. It is also manifest that the order of remand
was passed by the learned Magistrate after considering the
allegations in the FIR but not in a routine or mechanical
manner. It has to be borne in mind that the effect of the
order of the High Court regarding stay of investigation

28 / 56 1-IAST-4278-2020.doc
could only have a bearing on the action of the investigating

agency. The order of remand which is a judicial act, as we
perceive, does not suffer from any infirmity. The only
ground that was highlighted before the High Court as well
as before this Court is that once there is stay of
investigation, the order of remand is sensitively susceptible
and, therefore, as a logical corollary, the detention is
unsustainable. It is worthy to note that the investigation
had already commenced and as a resultant consequence,
the accused was arrested. Thus, we are disposed to think
that the order of remand cannot be regarded as untenable
in law. It is well-accepted principle that a writ of habeas
corpus is not to be entertained when a person is committed
to judicial custody or police custody by the competent
court by an order which prima facie does not appear to be
without jurisdiction or passed in an absolutely mechanical
manner or wholly illegal. As has been stated in B.
Ramachandra Rao and Kanu Sanyal, the court is required
to scrutinise the legality or otherwise of the order of
detention which has been passed. Unless the court is
satisfied that a person has been committed to jail custody
by virtue of an order that suffers from the vice of lack of
jurisdiction or absolute illegality, a writ of habeas corpus
cannot be granted. It is apposite to note that the
investigation, as has been dealt with in various authorities
of this Court, is neither an inquiry nor trial. It is within the
exclusive domain of the police to investigate and is
independent of any control by the Magistrate. The sphere
of activity is clear cut and well demarcated. Thus viewed,
we do not perceive any error in the order passed by the
High Court refusing to grant a writ of habeas corpus as the
detention by virtue of the judicial order passed by the
Magistrate remanding the accused to custody is valid in
law.”
20.2) Saurabh Kumar vs. Jailor, Koneila Jail and
another the issue was dealt with in para 13 of the leading
Judgment as under:-
13. It is clear from the said narration of facts that the
petitioner is in judicial custody by virtue of an order
passed by the Judicial Magistrate. The same is further
ensured from the original record which this Court has, by

29 / 56 1-IAST-4278-2020.doc
order dated 9-4-2014, called for from the Court of the

Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Dalsingsarai, District
Samastipur, Bihar. Hence, the contention of the learned
counsel for the petitioner that there was illegal detention
without any case is incorrect. Therefore, the relief sought
for by the petitioner cannot be granted. Even though there
are several other issues raised in the writ petition, in view
11 (2014) 13 SCC 436 of the facts narrated above, there is
no need for us to go into those issues. However, the
petitioner is at liberty to make an application for his
release in Criminal Case No. 129 of 2013 pending before
the Court of the learned Additional Chief Judicial
Magistrate, Dalsingsarai.” Thakur, J. (as the learned Chief
Justice then was) who agreed with the leading Judgment
authored by Ramana, J., also dealt with the matter in
paragraph 22 of his concurring opinion as under:
“22. The only question with which we are concerned within

the above backdrop is whether the petitioner can be said to
be in the unlawful custody. Our answer to that question is
in the negative. The record which we have carefully
perused shows that the petitioner is an accused facing
prosecution for the offences, cognizance whereof has
already been taken by the competent court. He is presently
in custody pursuant to the order of remand made by the
said Court. A writ of habeas corpus is, in the circumstances,
totally misplaced. Having said that, we are of the view that
the petitioner could and indeed ought to have filed an
application for grant of bail which prayer could be allowed
by the court below, having regard to the nature of the
offences allegedly committed by the petitioner and the
attendant circumstances. The petitioner has for whatever
reasons chosen not to do so. He, instead, has been advised
to file the present petition in this Court which is no
substitute for his enlargement from custody.”
20.3) A Bench of three learned Judges of this Court in

State of Maharashtra and Others vs. Tasneem Rizwan
Siddiquee concluded as under:-
“10. The question as to whether a writ of habeas corpus

could be maintained in respect of a person who is in police

30 / 56 1-IAST-4278-2020.doc
12 (2018) 9 SCC 745 custody pursuant to a remand order

passed by the jurisdictional Magistrate in connection with
the offence under investigation, this issue has been
considered in Saurabh Kumar v. Jailor Koneila Jail and
Manubhai Ratilal Patel v. State of Gujarat. It is no more
res integra. In the present case, admittedly, when the writ
petition for issuance of a writ of habeas corpus was filed by
the respondent on 18-3-2018/19-3-2018 and decided by the
High Court on 21-3-2018 her husband Rizwan Alam
Siddiquee was in police custody pursuant to an order
passed by the Magistrate granting his police custody in
connection with FIR No. I-31 vide order dated 17-3-2018
and which police remand was to enure till 23-3-2018.
Further, without challenging the stated order of the
Magistrate, a writ petition was filed limited to the relief of
habeas corpus. In that view of the matter, it was not a case
of continued illegal detention but the incumbent was in
judicial custody by virtue of an order passed by the
jurisdictional Magistrate, which was in force, granting
police remand during investigation of a criminal case.
Resultantly, no writ of habeas corpus could be issued.
11. Reverting to the prayer for expunging the scathing

observations made in the impugned judgment, in particular
paras 4-6, reproduced earlier, it is submitted that the said
observations were wholly unwarranted as the Deputy
Commissioner of Police concerned who was present in
Court, could not have given concession to release Rizwan
Alam Siddiquee in the teeth of a judicial order passed by the
Magistrate directing police remand until 23-3-
2018.Moreover, it is evident that the High Court proceeded
to make observations without giving any opportunity,
whatsoever, to the police officials concerned to explain the
factual position on affidavit. The writ petition was filed on
18-3-2018/19-3-2018 and was moved on 20-3-20182 when
the Court called upon the advocate for the appellants to
produce the record on the next day i.e. 21-3-2018. The
impugned order came to be passed on 21-3-20181,
notwithstanding the judicial order of remand operating till
23-3-2018. The High Court, in our opinion, should not have
taken umbrage to the submission made on behalf of the
Deputy Commissioner of Police that the respondent’s

31 / 56 1-IAST-4278-2020.doc
husband could be released if so directed by the Court. As

aforesaid, the DCP has had no other option but to make
such a submission. For, he could not have voluntarily
released the accused who was in police custody pursuant to
a judicial order in force. The High Court ought not to have
made scathing observations even against the investigating
officer without giving him an opportunity to offer his
explanation on affidavit.
12. Suffice it to observe that since no writ of habeas corpus

could be issued in the fact situation of the present case, the
High Court should have been loath to enter upon the merits
of the arrest in the absence of any challenge to the judicial
order passed by the Magistrate granting police custody till
23-3-2018 and more particularly for reasons mentioned in
that order of the Magistrate. In a somewhat similar
situation, this Court in State represented by Inspector of
Police and others v. N.M.T. Joy Immaculate 13 deprecated
passing of disparaging and strong remarks by the High
Court against the investigating officer and about the
investigation done by them. Accordingly, we have no
hesitation in expunging the observations made in paras 4 to
6 of the impugned judgment against the police officials
concerned in the facts of the present case.”
21) The act of directing remand of an accused is thus
held to be a judicial function and the challenge to the order
of remand is not to be entertained in a habeas corpus
petition. The first question posed by the High Court, thus,
stands answered. In the present case, as on the date when the
matter was considered by the High Court and the Order was
passed by it, not only were there orders of remand passed by
the Judicial Magistrate 13 (2004) 5 SCC 729 as well as the
Special Court, Gurugram but there was also an order of
extension passed by the Central Government on 14.12.2018.
The legality, validity and correctness of the order or remand
could have been challenged by the original Writ Petitioners
by filing appropriate proceedings. However, they did not
raise such challenge before the competent Appellate or
Revisional Forum. The orders of remand passed by the
Judicial Magistrate and the Special Court, Gurugram had
dealt with merits of the matter and whether continued
detention of the accused was justified or not. After going

32 / 56 1-IAST-4278-2020.doc
into the relevant issues on merits, the accused were

remanded to further police custody. These orders were not
put in challenge before the High Court. It was, therefore, not
open to the High Court to entertain challenge with regard to
correctness of those orders. The High Court, however,
considered the matter from the standpoint whether the initial
Order of arrest itself was valid or not and found that such
legality could not be sanctified by subsequent Order of
remand. Principally, the issue which was raised before the
High Court was whether the arrest could be effected after
period of investigation, as stipulated in said order dated
20.06.2018 had come to an end. The supplementary issue
was the effect of extension of time as granted on 14.12.2018.
It is true that the arrest was effected when the period had
expired but by the time the High Court entertained the
petition, there was as order of extension passed by the
Central Government on 14.12.2018. Additionally, there were
judicial orders passed by the Judicial Magistrate as well as
the Special Court, Gurugram, remanding the accused to
custody. If we go purely by the law laid down by this Court
with regard to exercise of jurisdiction in respect of Habeas
Corpus petition, the High Court was not justified in
entertaining the petition and passing the Order.
22. We must, however, deal with the submission advanced on
behalf of the original Writ Petitioners that the relief as regards
Habeas Corpus was a secondary prayer while the principal
submissions were with regard to the first three prayers in the
petition. It was submitted that with the expiry of period, the
entire mandate came to an end and as such, there could be no
arrest and that illegality in that behalf would continue
regardless whether there was a subsequent order of extension.
In the submission of the learned counsel for the Writ
Petitioner such an extension could not cure the inherent
defect and as such, the High Court was justified in
entertaining the petition. We may deal with this issue after
considering the second question posed by the High Court in
said paragraph 15.

33 / 56 1-IAST-4278-2020.doc
36. In the facts of Serious Fraud Investigation Office case (supra),
the High Court released the original petitioners on bail while exercising writ
jurisdiction. The hon’ble Supreme Court allowed the appeal filed by the
appellant therein i.e., Serious Fraud Investigation Office and original writ
petitioners were directed to surrender before the Special Court.
37. Be that as it may, the learned Senior Advocate for the petitioner
would submit that he would not be pressing prayer clause (a).
38. Prayer clause (b) of the petition reads thus:
(b) Issue a writ of mandamus and/or any other

writ, order and direction of like nature, quashing the
FIR, being C.R. No. 0059 of 2018, dated 5 May 2018,
registered at Alibaug Police Station, Raigad, under
Sections 306 and 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860.
In relation to relief claimed in terms of prayer clause (b), there is
consensus amongst the learned Senior Advocate appearing for all the parties
that the main petition can be heard on the next date after pleadings are
completed and thus said prayer can be considered. We have posted the writ
petition for hearing on 10.12.2020.
39. The petitioner by filing the present application i.e., Interim
Application (Stamp) No.4278 of 2020, has prayed for the following reliefs
pending decision in the Writ Petition:

34 / 56 1-IAST-4278-2020.doc
“(a) Pending the hearing and disposal of the captioned

writ petition, this Hon’ble Court be pleased to grant
bail to the Petitioner in FIR No. 59 of 2018 and direct
the Respondents and/or each of them to immediately
release the Petitioner from illegal detention and
wrongful custody and/or arrest by the Respondents in
view of detailed submissions made herein above, to
meet the ends of justice.
(b) Pending the hearing and disposal of the
captioned writ petition, this Hon’ble Court be pleased
to stay all further proceedings, including the
investigation in FIR No. 59 of 2018, with respect to
the Petitioner.”
40. The learned Senior Advocate for the petitioner has prayed that
the petitioner be released on bail during the pendency of the present petition
seeking quashing of the First Information Report No.59 of 2018.
41. The issue as to the exercise of jurisdiction by the High Court in a
proceeding relating to quashing of First Information Report has been
authoritatively dealt with in the case of State of Telangana vs. Habib Abdullah
Jeelani & others30. Their Lordships in paragraph 12 clarified the parameters
as to the circumstances and situations where the Court’s inherent power can
be exercised. In paragraphs 13 and 14 which have a bearing on the
controversy reads thus:
“13. There can be no dispute over the proposition that

30 (2017) 2 SCC 779

35 / 56 1-IAST-4278-2020.doc
inherent power in a matter of quashment of FIR has to be

exercised sparingly and with caution and when and only
when such exercise is justified by the test specifically laid
down in the provision itself. There is no denial of the fact
that the power under Section 482 CrPC is very wide but it
needs no special emphasis to state that conferment of wide
power requires the court to be more cautious. It casts an
onerous and more diligent duty on the Court.
14. In this regard, it would be seemly to reproduce a passage
from Kurukshetra University (supra) wherein Chandrachud,
J. (as His Lordship then was) opined thus:-
“2. It surprises us in the extreme that the High Court thought
that in the exercise of its inherent powers under Section 482
of the Code of Criminal Procedure, it could quash a first
information report. The police had not even commenced
investigation into the complaint filed by the Warden of the
University and no proceeding at all was pending in any court
in pursuance of the FIR. It ought to be realised that inherent
powers do not confer an arbitrary jurisdiction on the High
Court to act according to whim or caprice. That statutory
power has to be exercised sparingly, with circumspection
and in the rarest of rare cases.”
(emphasis supplied)
42. Further in para 20, the Hon'ble Supreme Court referred to the
decision in Hema Mishra Vs. State of U.P.31 and in paragraphs 23 to 25 of
the said decision, their Lordships have held thus:
“23. We have referred to the authority in Hema Mishra

(supra) as that specifically deals with the case that came from
the State of Uttar Pradesh where Section 482 CrPC has been
deleted. It has concurred with the view expressed in Lal
Kamlendra Pratap Singh (supra). The said decision, needless
to say, has to be read in the context of State of Uttar Pradesh.
We do not intend to elaborate the said principle as that is not
necessary in this case. What needs to be stated here is that
31 (2014) 4 SCC 453

36 / 56 1-IAST-4278-2020.doc
the States where Section 482 CrPC has not been deleted and
kept on the statute book, the High Court should be well
advised that while entertaining petitions under Article 226 of
the Constitution or Section 482 CrPC, exercise judicial
restraint. We may hasten to clarify that the Court, if it thinks
fit, regard being had to the parameters of quashing and the
self-restraint imposed by law, has the jurisdiction to quash
the investigation and may pass appropriate interim orders as
thought apposite in law, but it is absolutely inconceivable
and unthinkable to pass an order of the present nature while
declining to interfere or expressing opinion that it is not
appropriate to stay the investigation. This kind of order is
really inappropriate and unseemly. It has no sanction in law.
The Courts should oust and obstruct unscrupulous litigants
from invoking the inherent jurisdiction of the Court on the
drop of a hat to file an application for quashing of launching
an FIR or investigation and then seek relief by an interim
order. It is the obligation of the court to keep such
unprincipled and unethical litigants at bay.
24. It has come to the notice of the Court that in certain
cases, the High Courts, while dismissing the application
under Section 482 CrPC are passing orders that if the
accused-petitioner surrenders before the trial magistrate, he
shall be admitted to bail on such terms and conditions as
deemed fit and appropriate to be imposed by the concerned
Magistrate. Sometimes it is noticed that in a case where
sessions trial is warranted, directions are issued that on
surrendering before the concerned trial judge, the accused
shall be enlarged on bail. Such directions would not
commend acceptance in light of the ratio in Rashmi Rekha
Thatoi (supra), Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia (supra), etc., for they
neither come within the sweep of Article 226 of the
Constitution of India nor Section 482 CrPC nor Section 438
CrPC. This Court in Ranjit Singh (supra) had observed that
the sagacious saying “a stitch in time saves nine” may be an
apposite reminder and this Court also painfully so stated.
25. Having reminded the same, presently we can only say
that the types of orders like the present one, are totally
unsustainable, for it is contrary to the aforesaid settled
principles and judicial precedents. It is intellectual truancy to
avoid the precedents and issue directions which are not in

37 / 56 1-IAST-4278-2020.doc
consonance with law. It is the duty of a Judge to sustain the

judicial balance and not to think of an order which can cause
trauma to the process of adjudication. It should be borne in
mind that the culture of adjudication is stabilized when
intellectual discipline is maintained and further when such
discipline constantly keeps guard on the mind.”
43. No doubt, regard being had to the parameters of quashing and
the self-restraint imposed by law, this court has jurisdiction to quash the
investigation and pass appropriate interim orders as thought apposite in law.
However, the powers are to be exercised sparingly and that too, in rare and
appropriate cases and in extreme circumstances to prevent abuse of process
of law.
44. In State of Telangana vs. Habib Abdullah Jeelani & others
(supra), their Lordships have observed that the Courts have to ensure such a
power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is not to be exercised
liberally so as to convert it into section 438 of Cr.P.C. proceedings.
45. The principle stated therein will equally apply to the exercise of
this Court’s power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and section
482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure while considering the applications for
bail since the petitioner is already in Judicial custody. The legislature has
provided specific remedy under Section 439 Cr.P.C. for applying for regular
bail. Having regard to the alternate and efficacious remedy available to the

38 / 56 1-IAST-4278-2020.doc
petitioner under section 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, this Court
has to exercise judicial restraint while entertaining application in the nature
of seeking regular bail in a petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution
of India read with section 482 of Code of Criminal Procedure.
46. Mr. Amit Desai, learned Senior Advocate appearing for the
State, submitted that an application for bail was filed before the learned
Magistrate which the petitioner chose to withdraw. However, he submitted
that in the event an application is filed before the appropriate Court under
section 439 of Code of Criminal Procedure for regular bail, the State would
not delay the hearing of the application and would cooperate in the
expeditious disposal of the same.
47. It is brought to our notice that the order of Remand passed by
the Chief Judicial Magistrate is challenged in Revision before the Sessions
Court by the State and the same is pending. Though the Senior Advocate for
the Petitioner made submissions in the context of the remand order, however,
as the issue is subjudiced before the Revisional Court, we think it appropriate
not to refer to the said order.
48. Let us now consider the submissions of the learned Senior
Advocate for the petitioner that the Investigating Officer is not justified in

39 / 56 1-IAST-4278-2020.doc
reinvestigating the offence in which the jurisdictional Magistrate has already
accepted the “A” summary.
49. Reference to some of the provisions of the Code would be
necessary in the context of the contention of the learned Senior Advocate
appearing for the petitioner. Before we deal with the relevant provisions, at
the cost of repetition, it would be necessary to mention that “A” summary was
granted by the jurisdictional Magistrate on 16.4.2019. The said order reads
thus:
:ORDER:
1. The report submitted by DYSP is accepted.
2. “A” Summary as prayed for is granted.”
50. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Bhagwant Singh (supra) and
Gangadhar (supra) and in the case of State of Andhra Pradesh vs. A.S. Peter 32,
has held that when the Magistrate is not inclined to take cognizance of the
offence and issue process, the informant must be given an opportunity of being
heard so that he can make his submissions to persuade the Magistrate to take
cognizance of the offence and issue process. In the facts of the case in hand,
admittedly, the informant was neither given any notice nor heard when the “A”
summary was granted. Even the aforesaid order was not communicated to the
first informant. The victim i.e. first informant, when became aware about the
32 (2008) 2 SCC 383

40 / 56 1-IAST-4278-2020.doc
“A” summary, though some tweets as submitted by learned Senior Advocate
Mr. Gupte, requested the State Government and Superior officer of police that
the case should be properly and thoroughly investigated. Criminal Writ
Petition-ASDB-LDVC No.33 of 2020 was filed in this Court by the daughter
of the deceased – Adnya Anvay Naik (First Informant). The said petition was
allowed to be withdrawn with liberty as there were fresh developments in the
matter.
51. A detailed representation was made to the Additional Director
General of Police, Maharashtra State CID on 13th June, 2020 by Smt.Akshata
Naik, widow of the deceased. The issue was raised in the State Assembly. On
the instructions of superior officers of the Investigating Officer, the local
Crime Investigation Branch, Alibaug filed a report before the jurisdictional
Magistrate for conducting further investigation of the said offence and
accordingly, intimated to the jurisdictional Magistrate that further investigation
of the offence under section 173(8) of the Code is being carried out. The
jurisdictional Magistrate recorded the endorsement as “seen and filed”. In this
context, it would be relevant to refer to section 173(8) of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, which reads thus:
“SECTION 173 (8) CRPC
(8) Nothing in this section shall be deemed to preclude

further investigation in respect of an offence after a

41 / 56 1-IAST-4278-2020.doc
report under sub- section (2) has been forwarded to the

Magistrate and, where upon such investigation, the
officer in charge of the police station obtains further
evidence, oral or documentary, he shall forward to the
Magistrate a further report or reports regarding such
evidence in the form prescribed; and the provisions of
sub- sections (2) to (6) shall, as far as may be, apply in
relation to such report or reports as they apply in
relation to a report forwarded under sub- section (2).”
52. We may also refer to sections 3 and 4 of the Bombay Police Act,
1951, which reads thus:
“3. One Police Force for the whole of the State of

Maharashtra.
There shall be one Police Force for the whole of the
State of Maharashtra and such Police Force shall
include every Police officer referred to in clause (6) of
section 2:
Provided that, the members of the Police Forces

constituted under any of the Acts mentioned in Schedule
I, immediately before the coming into force of this Act in
the relevant part of the State shall be deemed to be the
members of the said Police Force .
4. Superintendence of Police Force to vest in the

State Government. The Superintendence of the Police
Force throughout the State of Maharashtra vests in and is
exercisable by the State Government and any control,
direction or supervision exercisable by any officer over
any member of the Police Force shall be exercisable
subject to such superintendence. (emphasis supplied)
53. Section 36 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to which Mr.
Desai refers to provides as under:

42 / 56 1-IAST-4278-2020.doc
“36. Powers of superior officers of police. Police officers

superior in rank to an officer in charge of a police station
may exercise the same powers, throughout the local area
to which they are appointed, as may be exercised by such
officer within the limits of his station.”
54. From the above provisions, it would thus be seen that exercise of
supervisory powers of superintendence of the police force throughout the
State of Maharashtra vests and is exercisable by the State Government and
any control, direction exercisable by any officer or any member of the police
force shall be subject to such superintendence. The State Government,
therefore, in exercise of its powers directed the local Crime Investigation
Branch, Raigad – Alibag to conduct further investigation of the said offence.
Though the learned Senior Advocate for the petitioner has pointed out that
the State Government has issued directions for reinvestigating the matter,
which, according to him, is not permissible, however, we find that when
report was submitted before the jurisdictional Magistrate, the concerned
Investigating Officer has correctly understood it to mean a further
investigation and accordingly made the submission. The power of
superintendence has been explained by the hon'ble Supreme Court in the case
of State of Bihar vs. J.A.C. Saldanha. Paragraph 17 of the said case, which is
relevant, reads thus:

43 / 56 1-IAST-4278-2020.doc
“17. The High Court construed the expression

'superintendence' in s. 3 of the Act to mean 'general supervision
of the management of the police department and does not vest
the State Government with authority to decide what the police
alone is authorised to decide'. There is nothing in the Act to
indicate such a narrow construction of the word
'superintendence'. Nothing was pointed out to us to put a
narrow construction on this general power of superintendence
conferred under the Act on the State Government and there is
no justification for limiting the broad spectrum of power
comprehended in power of superintendence. Accordingly
superintendence would comprehend the power to direct further
investigation if the circumstances so warrant and there is
nothing in the Code providing to the contrary so as to limit or
fetter this power. Sub-s. (8) of s. 173 was pressed into service
to show that the power of further investigation after the
submission of a report under s. 173(2) would be with the
officer in charge of a police station. Sub-s. (8) of s. 173 is not
the source of power of the State Government to direct further
investigation. Section 173(8) enables an officer in charge of a
police station to carry on further investigation even after a
report under s. 173(2) is submitted to Court. But if State
Government has otherwise power to direct further investigation
it is neither curtailed, limited nor denied by s. 173(8), more so,
when the State Government directs an officer superior in rank
to an officer in charge of police station thereby enjoying all
powers of an officer in charge of a police station to further
investigate the case. Such a situation would be covered by the
combined reading of s. 173(8) with s. 36 of the Code. Such
power is claimed as flowing from the power of
superintendence over police to direct a police officer to do or
not to do a certain thing because at the stage of investigation
the power is enjoyed as executive power untrammeled by the
judiciary. It was incidentally submitted that it is an undisputed
dictum of law that when a statute requires a thing to be done in
a certain manner it shall be done in that manner alone and the
Court would not expect its being done in some other manner
(see State of Gujarat v. Shantilal Mangaldas & Ors.
Expounding the submission it was stated that sub-s. (8) of s.
173 clearly indicates the power of further investigation after

44 / 56 1-IAST-4278-2020.doc
submission of a report and that power is conferred on the

officer in charge of a police station only and, therefore, the
State Government was incompetent to direct further
investigation. It was further contended that in view of the
provision contained in s. 173(8) it would not be open to the
Court to so interpret the word 'superintendence' in s. 3 of the
Police Act as to empower the State Government to direct
investigation being done by some one other than the statutory
authority envisaged by s. 173(8) because such an interpretation
would derogate from the principle that where a thing is
required by a statute to be done in a particular way it shall be
deemed to have prohibited that thing being done in any other
way. In Ex-parte Stephen's, the principle is stated that if a
statute directs a thing to be done in a certain way that thing
shall not, even if there be no negative words, be done in any
other way. Subba Rao, J. in Patna Improvement Trust v. Smt.
Lakshmi Devi & Ors., spelt out the combined effect of the
aforementioned principles thus:
"A general Act must yield to a special Act dealing with a
specific subject-matter and that if an Act directs a thing to be
done in a particular way, it shall be deemed to have prohibited
the doing of that thing in any other way".
55. Thus, there is no manner of doubt in our minds that the State
Government can always direct a further investigation to the concerned police
officers, as done in the present case.
56. Insofar as the provision regarding grant of “A” summary is
concerned, the procedure thereof is mentioned under Rule 219 of the
Bombay Police Manual, 1959. Rule 219, dealing with final reports, more
particularly, clause (3) reads thus:

45 / 56 1-IAST-4278-2020.doc
“RULE 219 (3) OF BOMBAY POLICE MANUAL

(3) The final report should be written up carefully by the officers in-
charge of the Police Station personally and should be accompanied by
all the case papers numbered and indexed methodically. If the accused
has been released on bail, the Magistrate should be requested to cancel
the bail bond. He should also be requested to pass orders regarding the
disposal of property attached, unless any of the articles, e.g., blood
stained clothes, are required for further use in true but undetected
cases. A request should also be made to the Magistrate to classify the
case and to issue an appropriate summary of his order, viz:-
“A’ True, undetected (where there is no clue whatsoever about the
culprits or property or where the accused in known but there is no
evidence to justify his being sent up to the Magistrate (for trial).
“B” Maliciously false.
“C” Neither true nor false, e.g., due to mistake ot fact or being of a
civil nature.
“Non-cognizable” Police investigation reveals commission of only
non-cognizable offence.”
(emphasis supplied)
57. Reading of clause (3) would indicate that “A” summary is
granted in a case where the offence is committed but the same is undetected,
in that, where there is no clue whatsoever about the culprits or property or
where the accused is known but there is no evidence to justify the same for
being sent to the Magistrate (trial). The jurisdictional Magistrate has
classified the case and issued “A” summary in this case. Consequent upon
receiving instructions pursuant to the complaint made by the victim to the
superiors, the local Crime Branch intimated the jurisdictional Magistrate that
they want to the carry out further investigation in the offence.

46 / 56 1-IAST-4278-2020.doc
58. The intimation thereon was given to the Magistrate who had
made an endorsement of “seen and file”. Not only that but even when the
application was made by the Investigating Officer for recording the
statements under section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the same
was recorded by the Magistrate. Their Lordships in the case of State of
Andhra Pradesh vs. A.S. Peter (supra) have in the context of section 173 of
Code of Criminal Procedure held that the law does not mandate taking prior
permission of Magistrate for further investigation. Their Lordships further
held that carrying out further investigation even after filing of chargesheet, is
a statutory right of the police. A distinction also exists between further
investigation and reinvestigation. It is observed that whereas reinvestigation
without prior permission is necessarily forbidden, further investigation is not.
59. We find that before carrying out the said investigation, the
Magistrate was intimated about the further investigation. Thereafter, even
the statements are recorded under section 164 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure after obtaining permission from Chief Judicial Magistrate. In our
opinion, the further investigation cannot be termed as illegal and without
seeking permission of the Magistrate. The same is in consonance with the
power conferred by section 173 (8) of Code of Criminal Procedure, which is
extracted hereinabove. In the facts of the present case two family members of

47 / 56 1-IAST-4278-2020.doc
the informant died. Allegations are made in the FIR against three accused
involving present petitioner. She filed the representation to the State
Government and police officers for redressal of her grievance.
60. At this juncture, it would be pertinent to consider the decision of
the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Vinubhai Haribhai Malaviya &
another vs. State of Gujarat (supra). In paragraph 49 of the said judgement,
their Lordships have observed thus:
“49. There is no good reason given by the Court in these

decisions as to why a Magistrate’s powers to order further
investigation would suddenly cease upon process being issued,
and an accused appearing before the Magistrate, while
concomitantly, the power of the police to further investigate the
offence continues right till the stage the trial commences. Such a
view would not accord with the earlier judgments of this Court,
in particular, Sakiri (supra), Samaj Parivartan Samudaya
(supra), Vinay Tyagi (supra), and Hardeep Singh (supra);
Hardeep Singh (supra) having clearly held that a criminal trial
does not begin after cognizance is taken, but only after charges
are framed. What is not given any importance at all in the recent
judgments of this Court is Article 21 of the Constitution and the
fact that the Article demands no less than a fair and just
investigation. To say that a fair and just investigation would lead
to the conclusion that the police retain the power, subject, of
course, to the Magistrate’s nod under Section 173(8) to further
investigate an offence till charges are framed, but that the
supervisory jurisdiction of the Magistrate suddenly ceases mid-
way through the pre-trial proceedings, would amount to a
travesty of justice, as certain cases may cry out for further
investigation so that an innocent person is not wrongly
arraigned as an accused or that a prima facie guilty person is not
so left out. There is no warrant for such a narrow and restrictive
view of the powers of the Magistrate, particularly when such
powers are traceable to Section 156(3) read with Section 156(1),

48 / 56 1-IAST-4278-2020.doc
Section 2(h), and Section 173(8) of the CrPC, as has been

noticed hereinabove, and would be available at all stages of the
progress of a criminal case before the trial actually commences.
It would also be in the interest of justice that this power be
exercised suo motu by the Magistrate himself, depending on the
facts of each case. Whether further investigation should or
should not be ordered is within the discretion of the learned
Magistrate who will exercise such discretion on the facts of
each case and in accordance with law. If, for example, fresh
facts come to light which would lead to inculpating or
exculpating certain persons, arriving at the truth and doing
substantial justice in a criminal case are more important than
avoiding further delay being caused in concluding the criminal
proceeding, as was held in Hasanbhai Valibhai Qureshi (supra).
Therefore, to the extent that the judgments in Amrutbhai
Shambubhai Patel (supra), Athul Rao (supra) and Bikash Ranjan
Rout (supra) have held to the contrary, they stand overruled.
Needless to add, Randhir Singh Rana v. State (Delhi
Administration) (1997) 1 SCC 361 and Reeta Nag v. State of
West Bengal and Ors. (2009) 9 SCC 129 also stand overruled.”
61. In Vinubhai Haribhai Malaviya (supra), their Lordships were
considering the fact situation as to whether post-cognisance, the Magistrate is
denuded of his powers of further investigation. In the present case, post
filing of “A” summary, an intimation was given to the Magistrate by the
Investigating Officer that they are carrying out further investigation
whereafter, even the statements under section 164 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure are recorded by the concerned Magistrate pursuant to the
directions issued by the Chief Judicial Magistrate.
62. It is rightly submitted by Mr.Desai that the judgments cited by
the petitioner deal with the power of the Court to order further investigation,

49 / 56 1-IAST-4278-2020.doc
which is different from the State’s power to order further investigation,
depending upon the nature of summary i.e., “A”, “B” or “C”.
63. Merely because the Magistrate has accepted the “A” summary
submitted by the Investigating Officer, that would not mean and preclude the
concerned Investigating Officer to invoke the provisions of section 173(8) of
Code of Criminal Procedure to commence further investigation after giving
intimation to the jurisdictional Magistrate.
64. The fact that the Magistrate did not give notice and opportunity
to the first informant to file a protest petition before accepting the report, goes
to the root of the matter. Therefore, the continuous persuasion of the State
Government by the informant for redressal of her grievance since her two
family members had committed suicide, and in the aforesaid background, the
concerned Investigating Officer, after intimating the Magistrate, commences
the further investigation, cannot be said to be irregular or illegal by any stretch
of imagination. The victim’s rights are equally important like the rights of the
accused. We cannot accept the contention of the petitioner that there cannot
be further investigation when the order passed by the Magistrate accepting the
“A” summary was without notice and without giving an opportunity to the
informant for filing the protest petition.

50 / 56 1-IAST-4278-2020.doc
65. It is relevant to mention that the informant has also filed a
petition making serious allegations against the Investigating Officer, who
investigated in Crime No.59 of 2018 at the relevant time and filed “A”
summary before the jurisdictional Magistrate without informing and notice to
the informant. In the said petition, this Court has issued notice to the
respondents. It is alleged by the informant that the first time she came to know
about it from ‘Twitter’ about filing “A” summary report by the concerned
police officer before the concerned jurisdictional Magistrate and thereafter, she
approached various State authorities for redressal of her grievance. As already
observed, the informant’s prayer for further investigation could not have been
brushed aside by the respondent State and its officials, when as per the
allegations in the FIR, two of her family members committed suicide due to the
alleged acts of the accused. As rightly submitted by Mr.Gupte, the learned
Senior Counsel appearing for the first informant, relying upon the exposition of
law in the case of Bhagwant Singh (supra) and Gangadhar (supra) that the
notice to the victim and opportunity for filing the protest petition was necessary
before accepting “A” summary report by the jurisdictional Magistrate. It
would be gainful to reproduce hereinbelow paragraphs 4 and 5 of the judgment
in the case of Bhagwant Singh (supra):
“4. Now, when the report forwarded by the officer-in charge

of a police station to the Magistrate under sub-section (2)(i) of

51 / 56 1-IAST-4278-2020.doc
Section 173 comes up for consideration by the Magistrate, one

of two different situations may arise. The report may conclude
that an offence appears to have been committed by a particular
person or persons and in such a case, the Magistrate may do
one of three things: (1) he may accept the report and take
cognizance of the offence and issue process or (2) he may
disagree with the report and drop the proceeding or (3) he may
direct further investigation under sub-section (3) of Section
156 and require the police to make a further report. The report
may on the other hand state that, in the opinion of the police,
no offence appears to have been committed and where such a
report has been made, the Magistrate again has an option to
adopt one of three courses: (1) he may accept the report and
drop the proceeding or (2) he may disagree with the report and
taking the view that there is sufficient ground for proceeding
further, take cognizance of the offence and issue process or (3)
he may direct further investigation to be made by the police
under sub-section (3) of Section 156. Where, in either of these
two situations, the Magistrate decides to take cognizance of the
offence and to issue process, the informant is not prejudicially
affected nor is the injured or in case of death, any relative of
the deceased aggrieved, because cognizance of the offence is
taken by the Magistrate and it is decided by the Magistrate that
the case shall proceed. But if the Magistrate decides that there
is no sufficient ground for proceeding further and drops the
proceeding or takes the view that though there is sufficient
ground for proceeding against some, there is no sufficient
ground for proceeding against others mentioned in the First
Information Report, the informant would certainly be
prejudiced because the First Information Report lodged by him
would have failed of its purpose, wholly or in part. Moreover,
when the interest of the informant in prompt and effective
action being taken on the First Information Report lodged by
him is clearly recognised by the provisions contained in sub-
section (2) of Section 154, sub- section (2) of Section 157 and
sub-section (2)(ii) of Section 173, it must be presumed that the
informant would equally be interested in seeing that the
Magistrate takes cognizance of the offence and issues process,
because that would be culmination of the First Information
Report lodged by him. There can, therefore, be no doubt that
when, on a consideration of the report made by the officer in
charge of a police station under sub-section (2)(i) of Section

52 / 56 1-IAST-4278-2020.doc
173, the Magistrate is not inclined to take cognizance of the

offence and issue process, the informant must be given an
opportunity of being heard so that he can make his submissions
to persuade the Magistrate to take cognizance of the offence
and issue process. We are accordingly of the view that in a case
where the magistrate to whom a report is forwarded under sub-
section (2)(i) of Section 173 decides not to take cognizance of
the offence and to drop the proceeding or takes the view that
there is no sufficient ground for proceeding against some of the
persons mentioned in the First Information Report, the
magistrate must give notice to the informant and provide him
an opportunity to be heard at the time of consideration of the
report. It was urged before us on behalf of the respondents that
if in such a case notice is required to be given to the informant,
it might result in unnecessary delay on account of the difficulty
of effecting service of the notice on the informant. But we do
not think this can be regarded as a valid objection against the
view we are taking, because in any case the action taken by the
police on the First Information Report has to be communicated
to the informant and a copy of the report has to be supplied to
him under sub-section (2) (i) of Section 173 if that be so, we do
not see any reason why it should be difficult to serve notice of
the consideration of the report on the informant. Moreover, in
any event, the difficulty of service of notice on the informant
cannot possibly provide any justification for depriving the
informant of the opportunity of being heard at the time when
the report is considered by the Magistrate.
5. The position may however, be a little different when we
consider the question whether the injured person or a relative
of the deceased, who is not the informant, is entitled to notice
when the report comes up for consideration by the Magistrate.
We cannot spell out either from the provisions of the Code of
Criminal procedure, 1973 or from the principles of natural
justice, any obligation on the Magistrate to issue notice lo the
injured person or to a relative of the deceased for providing
such person an opportunity to be heard at the time of
consideration of the report, unless such person is the informant
who has lodged the First Information Report. But even if such
person is not entitled to notice from the Magistrate, he can
appear before the Magistrate and make his submissions when
the report is considered by the Magistrate for the purpose of

53 / 56 1-IAST-4278-2020.doc
deciding what action he should take on the report. The injured

person or any relative of the deceased, though not entitled to
notice from the Magistrate, has locus to appear before the
Magistrate at that time of consideration of the report, if he
otherwise comes to know that the report is going to be
considered by the Magistrate and if he wants to make his
submissions in regard to the report, the Magistrate is bound to
hear him. We may also observe that even though the Magistrate
is not bound to give notice of the hearing fixed for
consideration of the report to the injured person or to any
relative of the deceased, he may, in the exercise of his
discretion, if he so thinks fit, give such notice to the injured
person or to any particular relative of or relatives the deceased,
but not giving of such notice will not have any invalidating
effect on the order which may be made by the Magistrate on a
consideration of the report.”
66. Another prayer of the petitioner is to stay the investigation. In
the case of State of Haryana vs. Bajan Lal & others 33, it was held that the core
of the Sections 156, 157 and 159 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is that if
a police officer has reason to suspect the commission of a cognizable offence,
he must either proceed with the investigation or cause an investigation to be
proceeded with by his subordinate; that in a case where the police officer sees
no sufficient ground for investigation, he can dispense with the investigation
altogether that the field of investigation of any cognizable offence is
exclusively within the domain of the investigation agencies over which the
Courts cannot have control and have no power to stiffle or impinge upon the
proceedings in the investigation so long as the investigation proceeds in
33 AIR 1992 SC 604

54 / 56 1-IAST-4278-2020.doc
compliance with the provisions relating to investigation and that it is only in a
case wherein a police officer decides not to investigate an offence, the
concerned Magistrate can intervene and either direct an investigation or in the
alternative, if he thinks fit, he himself can, at once proceed or depute any
Magistrate sub-ordinate to him to proceed to hold a preliminary inquiry into
or otherwise to dispose of the case in the manner provided in the Code.
(emphasis supplied)
67. In that view of the matter and since we have posted the Writ
Petitions for hearing on 10th December, 2020, wherein the prayer of the
petitioner for quashing the First Information Report would be considered, we
are not inclined to accede to the prayer of the petitioner to stay the
investigation.
68. The petition and application for interim protection proceeds on
the premise that the petitioner is illegally detained. However, on the date of
filing the petition and the application, the applicant – petitioner was in judicial
custody as it is averred by the petitioner himself in the application. The
prayers in the interim application are keeping in view the relief claimed in
terms of prayer clause (a) of the main petition.

55 / 56 1-IAST-4278-2020.doc
69. Mr.Harish Salve, the learned Senior Advocate appearing for the
Petitioner, vehemently argued that the allegations in the First Information
Report, read in its entirety, do not disclose the alleged offence against the
petitioner. The said submission deserves no consideration at this stage when
the investigation is in progress and the alleged suicide note recovered by the
Investigating Officer mentions the name of the petitioner. Since the petitions
are posted for hearing for consideration of prayer of the petitioners for
quashing of the First Information Report, we refrain ourselves from expressing
opinion on merits at this stage. In the facts of the present case, no case is made
out for release of the applicant – petitioner under extra-ordinary writ
jurisdiction.
70. In our opinion, the petitioner has an alternate and efficacious
remedy under section 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to apply for
regular bail. At the time of concluding the hearing of Applications, we had
made it clear that if the petitioner, if so advised, to apply for regular bail under
section 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure before the concerned Court,
then, in that case, we have directed the concerned Court to decide the said
application within four days from filing of the same.
71. In the light of discussion in the foregoing paragraphs, the
Interim Application stands rejected.

56 / 56 1-IAST-4278-2020.doc
72. The observations made hereinabove are prima facie in nature and
confined to the adjudication of the present Interim Application only.
73. The remedy of the petitioner to apply for bail under section 439 of the
Cr.PC shall remain unaffected and rejection of Interim Application shall not be
construed as an impediment to the applicant – petitioner to avail the said
remedy.
74. Needless to observe that in case such an application is filed, the
concerned Court shall decided the same on its own merits without being
influenced by observations made by us in this order in the time limit specified
in paragraph 70 of this order.
( M. S. KARNIK, J.) (S. S. SHINDE, J.)
Vishwanath
S. Sherla
Digitally signed by
Vishwanath S.
Sherla
Date: 2020.11.09
15:52:21 +0530

Arnab Bail Order HC

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Arnab Bail Order HC

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Description:

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Arnab Bail Order HC

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

1 / 56 1-IAST-4278-2020.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY

CRIMINAL APPLICATION STAMP NO. 4278 OF 2020

Arnab Manoranjan Goswami ...Applicant

The State of Maharashtra & Ors. ...Respondents

Mr. Shirish Gupte, Senior Advocate a/w. Mr. Vaibhav Karnik,

Mr. D.P. Singh for Respondent No. 4-Union of India.

RESERVED ON: NOVEMBER 07, 2020.

V.S. Sherla/B.T. Punde

1. The present application is filed for interim protection/bail in the

Constitution of India read with Section 482 of the Code of Criminal

Station House Officer, Alibaug Police Station, Raigad, in relation to First

Information Report ('FIR' for short) being C.R.No.0059/2018 dated 5/5/2018

registered at Alibaug Police Station, Raigad, under Sections 306 and 34 of

2. So far as the main Writ Petition is concerned, the petitioner is

alleging gross abuse of State’s power by the respondents in effecting his

arrest on 04.11.2020 and consequent alleged illegal detention. As there are

allegations of malafides, an opportunity needs to be given to the respondents

to file a counter and accordingly with the consent of learned counsel

3. Mr. Harish Salve, learned Senior Advocate for Petitioner, Mr.

V.S. Sherla/B.T. Punde

arguments limited to the relief claimed in the Interim Application. Therefore,

we confine our adjudication restricted to the reliefs claimed in the Interim

4. Learned Senior Advocate Mr. Harish Salve would contend that

filed before the Learned Magistrate. According to the learned Senior

Advocate, the re-investigation commenced by the Respondents is without

extraordinary powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and

in the interregnum by granting him bail. We have therefore considered the

5. In the petition there is reference to the FIR dated 5/5/2018. It is

mother Kumud Naik, who were Directors of an interior design company

V.S. Sherla/B.T. Punde

suicide on account of the non-payment of CDPL's dues. The officers of the

6. It is pleaded by the Petitioner that he was questioned regarding

possible way. Even the statement of the petitioner came to be recorded.

7. Our attention is invited to the report filed by the Station House

submitted a report and prayed for grant of 'A' Summary.

V.S. Sherla/B.T. Punde

8. The Chief Judicial Magistrate, Raigad, vide order dated

9. Learned Senior Advocate Mr. Salve would submit that in blatant

violation of the fundamental rights to life and personal liberty of the

petitioner and his dignity guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of

purpose of misusing power, concocting facts and forcefully arresting the

coverage which questioned those in power in the State of Maharashtra. Mr.

implicate the petitioner. This is nothing but a brazen attempt of vendetta

politics against the petitioner and his channel.

V.S. Sherla/B.T. Punde

there is a desperation on the part of the political dispensation to falsely

Deshmukh (Hon’ble Home Minister in the Ruling coalition) readily obliged.

for completion of works on several occasions. Several defects in the works

were also discovered. The ARG in fact made a total payment of

Rs.5,21,54,383/- under the work orders. A balance of only Rs.74,23,014/- is

was exchange of correspondence between the wife of deceased and ARG. In

certain Cabinet Ministers in the Maharashtra Government, there was a

V.S. Sherla/B.T. Punde

to the news reports at Exhibits H, I, J and K.

interaction with the deceased regarding the works or regarding payment as is

instigate the deceased to commit suicide. Moreover, there is no direct

involvement of the petitioner with the deceased.